Are More Border Changes Ahead In Eurasia?
By Paul Goble
Since 1991, the post-Soviet governments and the international community have been adamant against any change in the borders in Eurasia, and many expressed concerns that one of the results of Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be to spark demands for border changes or even the formation of new independent states.
There have been demands by various groups across the post-Soviet space since that time, but this week featured three such calls, an indication ever more people may think they now have a chance to achieve such outcomes and thus a challenge to the supporters of current arrangements even if nothing comes of their appeals.
The first of these calls came from the Mezhdurechensk miners, at least some of whom are calling for the creation of a West Siberian Republic as a way of forcing out the current powers that be at a minimum and possibly leading to the creation of their own independent state, something that would cut the Russian Federation in half (imc-siberia.org/ru/node/4676).
The second comes from a group calling itself “Vally Karjala” or “Free Karelia, which is using both print media and the Internet to push the idea that Karelia should be allowed to become a free and independent state, the successor to the Ukhta Republic of 1920 whose 90th anniversary the group is celebrating (mariuver.wordpress.com/2010/05/19/kareliju-svobodnoi/#more-17289).
And the third involves speculation that, in the words of the New Region agency, “as a result of secret agreements of Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovich, the unrecognized Transdniestr Republic can be folded into Ukraine, and Moldova can thereby return to the zone of Russian influence (www.nr2.ru/283874.html).
(Indeed, according to Oleh Bilorus, Ukraine’s first ambassador to the US and currently chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign relations committee, this is the direction the Kyiv appears to be moving in even though the consequences of such an action would be enormous not only in Moldova, which might disappear, but throughout the Balkans.)
None of these calls or speculations is likely to have a result, just as none of the efforts of various ethnic communities in the North Caucasus to redraw the map there is. But what is striking is that more and more groups are prepared to identify such changes as part of their agenda, an indication the taboo that Vladimir Putin worked so hard to impose is decaying.
And that in turn means that more groups, both those like the Ingermanlanders in the Northwest and ethnic communities across the Russian Federation and predominantly ethnic Russian regions are now going to be discussing such possibilities, discussions that by their very nature will force Moscow and other capitals to take a position.
Again, the chances that any or even a few of these changes will occur are not great, but public discussions about them at the very least will highlight the problems underlying many of the borders imposed by Stalin and make in more likely that those who feel new borders or even new states are the only way to proceed will be less likely to back down.
That could have its most immediate consequences on some of the “frozen” conflicts, making their resolution more rather than less difficult and highlighting the way in which Moscow’s incautious approach to Georgia in 2008 is going to continue to have consequences far beyond the borders of the Caucasus.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Since 1991, the post-Soviet governments and the international community have been adamant against any change in the borders in Eurasia, and many expressed concerns that one of the results of Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be to spark demands for border changes or even the formation of new independent states.
There have been demands by various groups across the post-Soviet space since that time, but this week featured three such calls, an indication ever more people may think they now have a chance to achieve such outcomes and thus a challenge to the supporters of current arrangements even if nothing comes of their appeals.
The first of these calls came from the Mezhdurechensk miners, at least some of whom are calling for the creation of a West Siberian Republic as a way of forcing out the current powers that be at a minimum and possibly leading to the creation of their own independent state, something that would cut the Russian Federation in half (imc-siberia.org/ru/node/4676).
The second comes from a group calling itself “Vally Karjala” or “Free Karelia, which is using both print media and the Internet to push the idea that Karelia should be allowed to become a free and independent state, the successor to the Ukhta Republic of 1920 whose 90th anniversary the group is celebrating (mariuver.wordpress.com/2010/05/19/kareliju-svobodnoi/#more-17289).
And the third involves speculation that, in the words of the New Region agency, “as a result of secret agreements of Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovich, the unrecognized Transdniestr Republic can be folded into Ukraine, and Moldova can thereby return to the zone of Russian influence (www.nr2.ru/283874.html).
(Indeed, according to Oleh Bilorus, Ukraine’s first ambassador to the US and currently chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign relations committee, this is the direction the Kyiv appears to be moving in even though the consequences of such an action would be enormous not only in Moldova, which might disappear, but throughout the Balkans.)
None of these calls or speculations is likely to have a result, just as none of the efforts of various ethnic communities in the North Caucasus to redraw the map there is. But what is striking is that more and more groups are prepared to identify such changes as part of their agenda, an indication the taboo that Vladimir Putin worked so hard to impose is decaying.
And that in turn means that more groups, both those like the Ingermanlanders in the Northwest and ethnic communities across the Russian Federation and predominantly ethnic Russian regions are now going to be discussing such possibilities, discussions that by their very nature will force Moscow and other capitals to take a position.
Again, the chances that any or even a few of these changes will occur are not great, but public discussions about them at the very least will highlight the problems underlying many of the borders imposed by Stalin and make in more likely that those who feel new borders or even new states are the only way to proceed will be less likely to back down.
That could have its most immediate consequences on some of the “frozen” conflicts, making their resolution more rather than less difficult and highlighting the way in which Moscow’s incautious approach to Georgia in 2008 is going to continue to have consequences far beyond the borders of the Caucasus.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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Parliament Lays Markers For Future EU Relations With The South Caucasus
By LINKS
The resolution on a future EU strategy towards the South Caucasus adopted yesterday by the European Parliament lays down a number of important markers that those in the region, and in the European Union and beyond working with the South Caucasus, should note and heed.
The resolution is a reflection of a realisation that has finally taken hold in Brussels that the South Caucasus is the next area that the European Union will have to engage with in a significant way over the coming decade and beyond. This engagement had felt for most of the past decade more as mission creep rather than a strategic choice. That is past. The strategy may not yet be fully mature, but the understanding that one is needed is now well and truly embedded. The reflexes of the European Commission have traditionally been to approach the region with caution. This could also be seen from the intervention of Commissioner Stefan Fule immediately prior to the vote, where he tried to argue that no new strategy was necessary because the EU Eastern Partnership and neighbourhood Policies already lay down strategies for engagement with the South Caucasus.
In a sense he is right. There is no need for another exercise that takes years in planning and creates a new bureaucratic layer at the end to implement its recommendations. What is required now is that what is already envisaged and decided in the Eastern Partnership and Neighbourhood Policy instruments be implemented strategically rather than as bureaucratic chore.
The Parliament’s resolution was diligently drafted by the rapporteur, Bulgarian MEP Evgeni Kirilov. It went through a rigorous process of debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee where a number of amendments were considered and adopted and where the text was tightened. The European Parliament is sometimes considered an ineffective talking shop. However this resolution has been able to capture the broad consensus of the European political leadership towards the South Caucasus, despite all the diversity, differences and nuanced approaches that exist in the 27 member states. Even for this alone it needs to be applauded.
The resolution contains a number of innovative ideas for strengthening peace and democracy in the region and about the facilitation of interaction between the EU and the three South Caucasus Republics
Some ideas included in the resolution may take time to implement. The proposal to establish a Conference for Security and Co-operation for the South Caucasus where the countries of the region, their neighbours and other interested party can start addressing some of the security concerns that have overshadowed regional relations over the last decade, is one that as yet has to find favour in many of the chancelleries of Europe. Its endorsement by the European Parliament however, takes it for the first time out of the realm of discussion of the think tanks and puts it for discussion in the political arena. Other recommendations should however be easier to implement. Extending an EU mandate to the French co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group that is empowered to facilitate negotiations over the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is something that is now widely considered expedient, and the fact that French MEPs have not opposed it indicates that there may be a certain amount of French convergence on this issue.
The EP resolution talks at length about the importance of the process of democracy, human rights and particularly media freedom in Armenia , Azerbaijan and Georgia. The message to the three countries is clear, you cannot avoid these issues if you want to do business with Europe. The Parliament has a duty to ensure that European institutions continue to put the human dimension agenda at the heart of the relations between the EU and the South Caucasus.
The resolution does not quite spell out what the EU’s end game in the region is. It states that “the EU’s main objective in the region is to encourage the development of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards open, peaceful, stable and democratic countries, ready to establish good neighbourly relations and able to transform the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity, with a view to enhancing the integration of these countries in European policies; considers that the EU needs to play an increasingly active political role to achieve this objective, by developing a strategy that would combine its soft power with a firm approach, in agreement with the countries of the region and complemented by bilateral policies”. Not quite membership perspective, but in fact to have tried to do so at this stage would have been counter-productive.
None of the three South Caucasus countries is ready for EU membership, politically, economically or socially. It is not clear if the leaderships of the three countries are even ready to embark on the long and difficult journey towards membership. What the EP resolution does however is it proposes a range of measures, that if properly implemented would in the end make EU membership for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, not only possible, but also desirable for both sides.
The European Parliament should continue to monitor the situation in the South Caucasus, and particularly its relations with the EU, holding the institutions to account but also ensuring that the message sent to the three governments remains clear and unambiguous.
LINKS is a British non governmental organisation working for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and in support of democracy and sustainable development in societies in transition, through dialogue and innovative initiatives.
The resolution on a future EU strategy towards the South Caucasus adopted yesterday by the European Parliament lays down a number of important markers that those in the region, and in the European Union and beyond working with the South Caucasus, should note and heed.
The resolution is a reflection of a realisation that has finally taken hold in Brussels that the South Caucasus is the next area that the European Union will have to engage with in a significant way over the coming decade and beyond. This engagement had felt for most of the past decade more as mission creep rather than a strategic choice. That is past. The strategy may not yet be fully mature, but the understanding that one is needed is now well and truly embedded. The reflexes of the European Commission have traditionally been to approach the region with caution. This could also be seen from the intervention of Commissioner Stefan Fule immediately prior to the vote, where he tried to argue that no new strategy was necessary because the EU Eastern Partnership and neighbourhood Policies already lay down strategies for engagement with the South Caucasus.
In a sense he is right. There is no need for another exercise that takes years in planning and creates a new bureaucratic layer at the end to implement its recommendations. What is required now is that what is already envisaged and decided in the Eastern Partnership and Neighbourhood Policy instruments be implemented strategically rather than as bureaucratic chore.
The Parliament’s resolution was diligently drafted by the rapporteur, Bulgarian MEP Evgeni Kirilov. It went through a rigorous process of debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee where a number of amendments were considered and adopted and where the text was tightened. The European Parliament is sometimes considered an ineffective talking shop. However this resolution has been able to capture the broad consensus of the European political leadership towards the South Caucasus, despite all the diversity, differences and nuanced approaches that exist in the 27 member states. Even for this alone it needs to be applauded.
The resolution contains a number of innovative ideas for strengthening peace and democracy in the region and about the facilitation of interaction between the EU and the three South Caucasus Republics
Some ideas included in the resolution may take time to implement. The proposal to establish a Conference for Security and Co-operation for the South Caucasus where the countries of the region, their neighbours and other interested party can start addressing some of the security concerns that have overshadowed regional relations over the last decade, is one that as yet has to find favour in many of the chancelleries of Europe. Its endorsement by the European Parliament however, takes it for the first time out of the realm of discussion of the think tanks and puts it for discussion in the political arena. Other recommendations should however be easier to implement. Extending an EU mandate to the French co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group that is empowered to facilitate negotiations over the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is something that is now widely considered expedient, and the fact that French MEPs have not opposed it indicates that there may be a certain amount of French convergence on this issue.
The EP resolution talks at length about the importance of the process of democracy, human rights and particularly media freedom in Armenia , Azerbaijan and Georgia. The message to the three countries is clear, you cannot avoid these issues if you want to do business with Europe. The Parliament has a duty to ensure that European institutions continue to put the human dimension agenda at the heart of the relations between the EU and the South Caucasus.
The resolution does not quite spell out what the EU’s end game in the region is. It states that “the EU’s main objective in the region is to encourage the development of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards open, peaceful, stable and democratic countries, ready to establish good neighbourly relations and able to transform the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity, with a view to enhancing the integration of these countries in European policies; considers that the EU needs to play an increasingly active political role to achieve this objective, by developing a strategy that would combine its soft power with a firm approach, in agreement with the countries of the region and complemented by bilateral policies”. Not quite membership perspective, but in fact to have tried to do so at this stage would have been counter-productive.
None of the three South Caucasus countries is ready for EU membership, politically, economically or socially. It is not clear if the leaderships of the three countries are even ready to embark on the long and difficult journey towards membership. What the EP resolution does however is it proposes a range of measures, that if properly implemented would in the end make EU membership for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, not only possible, but also desirable for both sides.
The European Parliament should continue to monitor the situation in the South Caucasus, and particularly its relations with the EU, holding the institutions to account but also ensuring that the message sent to the three governments remains clear and unambiguous.
LINKS is a British non governmental organisation working for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and in support of democracy and sustainable development in societies in transition, through dialogue and innovative initiatives.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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European Parliament Adopts Resolution On South Caucasus
(Civil.Ge) -- European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution on May 20 calling for greater EU involvement in the South Caucasus and for the EU to became "a significant security actor in the region".
The key amendment, which draft of the resolution underwent before being adopted, in respect of Georgia is that the final text no longer includes term "occupied territories" in reference to Georgia's two breakaway regions. (Summary of the draft available here)
The draft resolution said that "Russia and the de facto authorities of the occupied territories, which are under Russian effective control, are blocking" full implementation of a mandate by EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which is not able to access the breakaway regions.
Wording of the adopted text in this respect is as follows: the European Parliament "calls on Russia and the de facto authorities of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to stop blocking" full implementation of EUMM mandate.
Other key points of the text in respect of Georgia, including calls for Russia to fully ceasefire accords, as well as on democratic reforms and on media ownership, remained unchanged.
The key amendment, which draft of the resolution underwent before being adopted, in respect of Georgia is that the final text no longer includes term "occupied territories" in reference to Georgia's two breakaway regions. (Summary of the draft available here)
The draft resolution said that "Russia and the de facto authorities of the occupied territories, which are under Russian effective control, are blocking" full implementation of a mandate by EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which is not able to access the breakaway regions.
Wording of the adopted text in this respect is as follows: the European Parliament "calls on Russia and the de facto authorities of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to stop blocking" full implementation of EUMM mandate.
Other key points of the text in respect of Georgia, including calls for Russia to fully ceasefire accords, as well as on democratic reforms and on media ownership, remained unchanged.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Bishkek Fears Russia Wants A Protectorate Over Kyrgyzstan
By Paul Goble
Continuing violence in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the south, and Russian moves that some in Bishkek see as intended to discredit the Provisional Government have prompted some in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere to speculate that Russia wants to establish a protectorate over Kyrgyzstan in order to restore order.
But according to an analysis posted online in Moscow today, the Russian government is extremely reluctant to move in that direction, having been chastened by the costs financial and political of its recognition of and assumption of responsibility for Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the August 2008 war with Georgia.
Writing for Stoletiye.ru, Aleksandr Shustov, a frequent commentator on Central Asia, says that increasing violence in Kyrgyzstan has “increased concerns about the possibility of the introduction of ‘external rule’ or ‘a protectorate’” by Russia or some combination of powers (www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/moskve_navazyvajut_protektorat_nad_kirgizijej_2010-05-20.htm).
The Moscow analyst suggests that people who were part of the former Kyrgyzstan government have as their “tactical goal” the “seizure of power in three southern oblasts which they to all appearances in the case of irresoluteness or slowness on the part of the Provisional Government, they count on holding.”
The “strategic” goal of these people, Shustov continues, citing media reports, is the maintenance of control over economic interests so that they can play this “card” in future relations with Bishkek regardless of whether it succeeds in stabilizing the situation or ultimately fails to do so.
Toward those ends, the Russian commentator says, “the opponents of the Provisional Government are attempting to use [the latter’s] lack of legitimacy and consequently the shaky legal status of the governors it has assigned in the southern regions,” as well as discontent among non-Kyrgyz nationalities, Islamist radicals, and criminal groups with ties to the drug trade.
Two days ago, Azimbek Beknazarov, the vice president of the Provisional Government who has been tracking developments in the south, said that “we are predicting the third wave of the counter-revolution in Kyrgyzstan,” a prediction that the clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups in Jalal-Abad yesterday appears to confirm.
According to the Provisional Government leader, “the next attempt at destabilization of the situation will be undertaken on an inter-ethnic basis,” with the regime’s opponents seeking to exploit ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south. The events of the last 24 hours suggest his prediction was accurate.
But because of this instability, Shustov continues, rumors are circulating in Bishkek “about the possible introduction of “foreign rule’ or a protectorate which Russia and Kazakhstan may establish.” These rumors have been sparked by the appointment of Vladimir Rushaylo, the former Russian interior minister, as special representative of Moscow and Astana.
Moreover, as Elmira Nogoybayeva, the head of the Kyrgyz Polis Asia Analytic Center has noted, “there has been a consistent campaign in the mass media of Kazakhstan and Russia aimed at discrediting the image of Kyrgyzstan, all the more so after the Provisional Government announced a draft constitution calling for a parliamentary form of government.
Such a regime if established would by its very nature, she argued, represent a challenge to the authoritarian presidential regimes in both Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. But criticism of Bishkek’s plans, she insisted, represents “crude interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Kyrgyzstan.”
According to Shustov, “the idea of introducing a Russian protectorate in Kyrgyzstan came from beyond the ocean” in an analysis prepared by Nikolay Zlobin of the Washington Institute of World Security. The Russian-American analyst suggested that a protectorate might be the only way to save the situation and prevent an unwelcome Chinese intervention. .
But according to Shustov, this idea does not currently enjoy “particular enthusiasm” either in Kyrgyzstan where it might lead to the extinction of independence or in Russia where it would mean the assumption by Moscow of “all responsibility for the situation” in that Central Asian republic.
People in Moscow have not forgotten the enormous expenses it assumed and continues to pay for in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and they know that “support of the much larger and more populous Kyrgyzstan, a republic without a common border with Russia would require much greater expenditures.”
But even more important, any such Russian move would not only force Russia to use its own forces to control the situation but could trigger a new outburst of hostility toward Moscow much as the August 2008 war in Georgia did. And consequently, Shustov concludes, it is “not accidental” that Rushaylo has insisted that he “does not intend” to interfere in Kyrgyz affairs.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Continuing violence in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the south, and Russian moves that some in Bishkek see as intended to discredit the Provisional Government have prompted some in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere to speculate that Russia wants to establish a protectorate over Kyrgyzstan in order to restore order.
But according to an analysis posted online in Moscow today, the Russian government is extremely reluctant to move in that direction, having been chastened by the costs financial and political of its recognition of and assumption of responsibility for Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the August 2008 war with Georgia.
Writing for Stoletiye.ru, Aleksandr Shustov, a frequent commentator on Central Asia, says that increasing violence in Kyrgyzstan has “increased concerns about the possibility of the introduction of ‘external rule’ or ‘a protectorate’” by Russia or some combination of powers (www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/moskve_navazyvajut_protektorat_nad_kirgizijej_2010-05-20.htm).
The Moscow analyst suggests that people who were part of the former Kyrgyzstan government have as their “tactical goal” the “seizure of power in three southern oblasts which they to all appearances in the case of irresoluteness or slowness on the part of the Provisional Government, they count on holding.”
The “strategic” goal of these people, Shustov continues, citing media reports, is the maintenance of control over economic interests so that they can play this “card” in future relations with Bishkek regardless of whether it succeeds in stabilizing the situation or ultimately fails to do so.
Toward those ends, the Russian commentator says, “the opponents of the Provisional Government are attempting to use [the latter’s] lack of legitimacy and consequently the shaky legal status of the governors it has assigned in the southern regions,” as well as discontent among non-Kyrgyz nationalities, Islamist radicals, and criminal groups with ties to the drug trade.
Two days ago, Azimbek Beknazarov, the vice president of the Provisional Government who has been tracking developments in the south, said that “we are predicting the third wave of the counter-revolution in Kyrgyzstan,” a prediction that the clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups in Jalal-Abad yesterday appears to confirm.
According to the Provisional Government leader, “the next attempt at destabilization of the situation will be undertaken on an inter-ethnic basis,” with the regime’s opponents seeking to exploit ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south. The events of the last 24 hours suggest his prediction was accurate.
But because of this instability, Shustov continues, rumors are circulating in Bishkek “about the possible introduction of “foreign rule’ or a protectorate which Russia and Kazakhstan may establish.” These rumors have been sparked by the appointment of Vladimir Rushaylo, the former Russian interior minister, as special representative of Moscow and Astana.
Moreover, as Elmira Nogoybayeva, the head of the Kyrgyz Polis Asia Analytic Center has noted, “there has been a consistent campaign in the mass media of Kazakhstan and Russia aimed at discrediting the image of Kyrgyzstan, all the more so after the Provisional Government announced a draft constitution calling for a parliamentary form of government.
Such a regime if established would by its very nature, she argued, represent a challenge to the authoritarian presidential regimes in both Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. But criticism of Bishkek’s plans, she insisted, represents “crude interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Kyrgyzstan.”
According to Shustov, “the idea of introducing a Russian protectorate in Kyrgyzstan came from beyond the ocean” in an analysis prepared by Nikolay Zlobin of the Washington Institute of World Security. The Russian-American analyst suggested that a protectorate might be the only way to save the situation and prevent an unwelcome Chinese intervention. .
But according to Shustov, this idea does not currently enjoy “particular enthusiasm” either in Kyrgyzstan where it might lead to the extinction of independence or in Russia where it would mean the assumption by Moscow of “all responsibility for the situation” in that Central Asian republic.
People in Moscow have not forgotten the enormous expenses it assumed and continues to pay for in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and they know that “support of the much larger and more populous Kyrgyzstan, a republic without a common border with Russia would require much greater expenditures.”
But even more important, any such Russian move would not only force Russia to use its own forces to control the situation but could trigger a new outburst of hostility toward Moscow much as the August 2008 war in Georgia did. And consequently, Shustov concludes, it is “not accidental” that Rushaylo has insisted that he “does not intend” to interfere in Kyrgyz affairs.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Ukraine Refuses To Recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia
Despite improving relations between Russia and Ukraine, Kiev has no plans to recognize the former Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ukrainian Foreign Minister said in an interview with a respected Kiev daily.
"The issue of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders is fundamental to us," Kostyantyn Hryshchenko told Kommersant-Ukraine.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia recognized their independence after a five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 that began when Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia in an attempt to bring it back under central control. Only Nicaragua, Venezuela and the tiny Pacific island state of Nauru have followed suit.
Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko supported Georgia in the war over South Ossetia, causing a worsening of already sour relations between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev's NATO bid and a series of gas disputes were also causes of animosity.
Viktor Yanukovych, who was sworn in on February 25, has pledged to steer a more balanced policy towards Russia.
Before his victory in February's polls, Yanukovych's Party of Regions called on the Yushchenko administration to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Many experts believe Yanukovych, seen as pro-Russian during the election campaign, will "disappoint" Moscow, pledging friendship with the Kremlin while still trying to pursue Yushchenko's bid to take Ukraine into NATO and the EU.
Source: RIA Novosti
"The issue of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders is fundamental to us," Kostyantyn Hryshchenko told Kommersant-Ukraine.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia recognized their independence after a five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 that began when Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia in an attempt to bring it back under central control. Only Nicaragua, Venezuela and the tiny Pacific island state of Nauru have followed suit.
Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko supported Georgia in the war over South Ossetia, causing a worsening of already sour relations between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev's NATO bid and a series of gas disputes were also causes of animosity.
Viktor Yanukovych, who was sworn in on February 25, has pledged to steer a more balanced policy towards Russia.
Before his victory in February's polls, Yanukovych's Party of Regions called on the Yushchenko administration to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Many experts believe Yanukovych, seen as pro-Russian during the election campaign, will "disappoint" Moscow, pledging friendship with the Kremlin while still trying to pursue Yushchenko's bid to take Ukraine into NATO and the EU.
Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, May 14, 2010 |
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Medvedev: Good Russia-Georgian Relations Will Be Restored
(Civil.Ge) -- In a message to the Georgian citizens, congratulating with the Victory Day, 65th anniversary of the end of World War II, expressed confidence that “good, open and constructive relations, based on solid foundation of cultural, spiritual and historical ties” will be restored between Georgia and Russia.
“Any attempt to destroy Russian-Georgian friendship is doomed for a failure,” the message, posted on the Kremlin website on May 8, reads.
Fighting fascism side-by-side in World War II, the message reads, is of a special importance “in our common and multi-century history of relations between the Russian and Georgian people.”
Medvedev also says in the message that memory of those fallen in fight against fascism obliges Russian and Georgian people “to take care of traditions of friendship, good neighborly relations and mutual assistance.”
“It was no accident that a sacrilegious action of the current regime in Tbilisi to destroy World War II heroes’ memorial in Kutaisi triggered wave of outrage. I am sure that any attempt to destroy Russian-Georgian friendship is doomed for a failure. Like the memorial in Kutaisi will be recreated [in Moscow], good, open and constructive relations between our countries will also be restored… It can’t be otherwise,” Medvedev says.
The Russian President sent two other separate congratulating messages to leaders of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow has recognized after the August, 2008 war.
“Any attempt to destroy Russian-Georgian friendship is doomed for a failure,” the message, posted on the Kremlin website on May 8, reads.
Fighting fascism side-by-side in World War II, the message reads, is of a special importance “in our common and multi-century history of relations between the Russian and Georgian people.”
Medvedev also says in the message that memory of those fallen in fight against fascism obliges Russian and Georgian people “to take care of traditions of friendship, good neighborly relations and mutual assistance.”
“It was no accident that a sacrilegious action of the current regime in Tbilisi to destroy World War II heroes’ memorial in Kutaisi triggered wave of outrage. I am sure that any attempt to destroy Russian-Georgian friendship is doomed for a failure. Like the memorial in Kutaisi will be recreated [in Moscow], good, open and constructive relations between our countries will also be restored… It can’t be otherwise,” Medvedev says.
The Russian President sent two other separate congratulating messages to leaders of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow has recognized after the August, 2008 war.
Saturday, May 08, 2010 |
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The Road To Europe For The South Caucasus Countries Is Open
By LINKS
When the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fule, addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on 28 April he referred to relations between the EU and the South Caucasus countries. Unusually, his tone was upbeat. He had just returned back from what by all accounts was a successful first trip to the region.
“There was a clear and loud message to Europe that I heard throughout my trip to Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan” Fule said. “Presidents, Prime Ministers, parliamentarians, opposition and civil society all confirmed that they wanted a closer, deeper and fuller relationship with the EU”. Fule said that his message to interlocutors in Yerevan, Tbilisi and Baku was that “the EU is also prepared to step up a gear and to develop concrete areas where a strengthened relationship can make a real difference for people in the South Caucasus and in the EU”.
EU membership is still something that neither Brussels, nor indeed the governments of the three countries are ready to talk about. Yet in the next weeks the process of negotiating and signing separate Association agreements will start. This is likely to be a long process stretched over as much as five years. But in the meantime various provisions can start coming into force which will help bring the two sides closer together as the negotiations continue. The principals that underpin the EU position in these negotiations are "inclusiveness, differentiation, conditionality and joint ownership”. Successful association agreements are considered as important prerequisites for full membership, though they do not automatically lead to it.
Over the next years the political elites in the three countries – and this will need a wider base of support than simply small groups around the three presidents, will have to decide if they have the will and the stamina to start, and to eventually complete the long journey on the road to Europe. This is by no means certain.
Although governments and civil society alike in the region like to wrap themselves in the European flag they do not always (some say they rarely) act in a way that is conducive to the European model.
There are four main areas where much work still needs to be done: in the area of reform and democratisation, the region still suffers from a serious democratic deficit and the reform process, political as well as economic is far from complete. Senior leaders in all three countries openly express disdain at Europe’ attempts to bring attention to shortcoming such as in elections, with regards to freedom of speech and corruption. Yet the Association agreements that will start to be negotiated soon envisage a “a close political association” built on “common values and shared principles”.
A second area is the resolution of the outstanding conflicts that impact the three countries very deeply. Armenia and Azerbaijan need to sort out the problem over Karabakh before full EU membership will ever be considered. EU membership may be part of the solution if they decide to go this way. With Georgia the situation is more complicated now that Russia is directly involved in the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
However the European dimension may help to focus minds in Tbilisi over the end game with regards to these territories. The third area for EU-South Caucasus interaction is Energy, Trade and sustainable development. The region is important for European energy security and this gives it clout in the Brussels corridors of power. Discussions are likely to start soon on developing “deep and comprehensive free trade areas”, in parallel with the association agreements. Finally the fourth area for the EU-South Caucasus interaction is in the field of human resources and human development. Here the EU has much to give and this is where the Union needs to be generous, creative and forward looking. It is the young and educated generation of Armenians,
Azerbaijanis and Georgians - not to mention Abkhaz and Ossetians, who need to be the instruments of change amongst their communities. More extensive contacts between universities and think tanks, deeper cultural contacts, and more importantly a freer exchange of information and knowledge is required. This will require European will and European money, but it will also require the will of the governments of the region to snap out of their isolated mental comfort zones and join the European process of openness. Europe needs a communications strategy for the region that talks directly to the populations.
The relations between the EU and the South Caucasus are entering a new phase. The Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 triggered a new sense of awareness in Europe of the region, its problems, but also its potentials. The future needs to be built on the positive and must not be crisis driven. The signs are that even though cautiously and with some trepidation the EU is now ready to turn its relationship with the region into something really meaningful.
The question remains are the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia ready for this? The answer will not be in cheap rhetoric of which there has been a lot, particularly in Georgia. The answer must be in facts: in the willingness of these countries to continue and complete the reform process; in their willingness to find peaceful solutions to the regional conflicts; in their willingness to open up their economies and not least in their willingness to maximise the potential of their own people. The next few years will give us an answer.
LINKS is a British non governmental organisation working for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and in support of democracy and sustainable development in societies in transition, through dialogue and innovative initiatives.
When the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fule, addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on 28 April he referred to relations between the EU and the South Caucasus countries. Unusually, his tone was upbeat. He had just returned back from what by all accounts was a successful first trip to the region.
“There was a clear and loud message to Europe that I heard throughout my trip to Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan” Fule said. “Presidents, Prime Ministers, parliamentarians, opposition and civil society all confirmed that they wanted a closer, deeper and fuller relationship with the EU”. Fule said that his message to interlocutors in Yerevan, Tbilisi and Baku was that “the EU is also prepared to step up a gear and to develop concrete areas where a strengthened relationship can make a real difference for people in the South Caucasus and in the EU”.
EU membership is still something that neither Brussels, nor indeed the governments of the three countries are ready to talk about. Yet in the next weeks the process of negotiating and signing separate Association agreements will start. This is likely to be a long process stretched over as much as five years. But in the meantime various provisions can start coming into force which will help bring the two sides closer together as the negotiations continue. The principals that underpin the EU position in these negotiations are "inclusiveness, differentiation, conditionality and joint ownership”. Successful association agreements are considered as important prerequisites for full membership, though they do not automatically lead to it.
Over the next years the political elites in the three countries – and this will need a wider base of support than simply small groups around the three presidents, will have to decide if they have the will and the stamina to start, and to eventually complete the long journey on the road to Europe. This is by no means certain.
Although governments and civil society alike in the region like to wrap themselves in the European flag they do not always (some say they rarely) act in a way that is conducive to the European model.
There are four main areas where much work still needs to be done: in the area of reform and democratisation, the region still suffers from a serious democratic deficit and the reform process, political as well as economic is far from complete. Senior leaders in all three countries openly express disdain at Europe’ attempts to bring attention to shortcoming such as in elections, with regards to freedom of speech and corruption. Yet the Association agreements that will start to be negotiated soon envisage a “a close political association” built on “common values and shared principles”.
A second area is the resolution of the outstanding conflicts that impact the three countries very deeply. Armenia and Azerbaijan need to sort out the problem over Karabakh before full EU membership will ever be considered. EU membership may be part of the solution if they decide to go this way. With Georgia the situation is more complicated now that Russia is directly involved in the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
However the European dimension may help to focus minds in Tbilisi over the end game with regards to these territories. The third area for EU-South Caucasus interaction is Energy, Trade and sustainable development. The region is important for European energy security and this gives it clout in the Brussels corridors of power. Discussions are likely to start soon on developing “deep and comprehensive free trade areas”, in parallel with the association agreements. Finally the fourth area for the EU-South Caucasus interaction is in the field of human resources and human development. Here the EU has much to give and this is where the Union needs to be generous, creative and forward looking. It is the young and educated generation of Armenians,
Azerbaijanis and Georgians - not to mention Abkhaz and Ossetians, who need to be the instruments of change amongst their communities. More extensive contacts between universities and think tanks, deeper cultural contacts, and more importantly a freer exchange of information and knowledge is required. This will require European will and European money, but it will also require the will of the governments of the region to snap out of their isolated mental comfort zones and join the European process of openness. Europe needs a communications strategy for the region that talks directly to the populations.
The relations between the EU and the South Caucasus are entering a new phase. The Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 triggered a new sense of awareness in Europe of the region, its problems, but also its potentials. The future needs to be built on the positive and must not be crisis driven. The signs are that even though cautiously and with some trepidation the EU is now ready to turn its relationship with the region into something really meaningful.
The question remains are the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia ready for this? The answer will not be in cheap rhetoric of which there has been a lot, particularly in Georgia. The answer must be in facts: in the willingness of these countries to continue and complete the reform process; in their willingness to find peaceful solutions to the regional conflicts; in their willingness to open up their economies and not least in their willingness to maximise the potential of their own people. The next few years will give us an answer.
LINKS is a British non governmental organisation working for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and in support of democracy and sustainable development in societies in transition, through dialogue and innovative initiatives.
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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Ukraine Base Agreement Doesn't Take Into Account Crimean Tatar Issue
By Paul Goble
Moscow is celebrating its Sevastopol accord with Kyiv as “a victory … over the West,” but unless it focuses on the issues raised by the Crimean Tatars, the Russian powers that be will fail to see that this “victory” is not so much a solution to the problem as a change in its nature, a Moscow analyst says.
In an analysis posted online today, Sergey Markedonov argues that both Moscow and Kyiv in their accord have neglected to take into consideration “a very important player” – the national movement of the Crimean Tatars, whose leaders are considering how to proceed in the wake of the new base accord (www.chaskor.ru/article/znakomaya_stilistika_17132).
Indeed, at the very time that the Kharkov accords were being signed, the Moscow analyst says, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people again put forward the notion to Ukrainian officials that the Crimean Tatars should receive “proportional representation in the organs of power” in Crimea.
According to Mustafa Cemilev, a leader of the Crimean Tatars and a member of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, “such quotas should exist ‘independently of whom we vote for.’” That is, Markedonov says, “if today according to the census, the Crimean Tatars form about 12 percent” of Crimea’s population, they must have an equal percentage of government positions.
Another Crimean Tatar leader, Ali Khamzin, the head of the department of foreign ties of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, says that “independently of the possible development of the situation in Ukraine” after the accords, the Mejlis and the World Congress of Crimean Tatars consider “the convention of an international conference on the security of the Crimean Tatar people.”
“The threat to this security,” Khamzin clearly believes according to Markedonov, “is the Russian presence in Sevastopol and in the Crimea as a whole.” Indeed, he characterizes “the accords as “a bomb which can lead to the disintegration of Ukraine,” much like the events in Georgia in August 2008 or Yugoslavia in 1999 but “without a single shot, bombing or force.”
Such possibilities, Markedonov continues, makes “the search for adequate assessments of the potential of the Crimean Tatar movement an extraordinarily important task today.” At the very least, he says, “it is much more useful than the celebration of the latest ‘victory’” over the West.
If that assessment is to be adequate, he says, it should not fall in the trap of “alarmist” predictions about “’a second Cyprus’” or “a second Kosovo’” but rather seek to consider the ways in which “the force” represented by the Crimean Tatars could become either “a factor of unleashing an ethno-political crisis or on the contrary could promote stabilization.”
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Markedonov points out, “two ethno-political movements – the Crimean Tatar and the pro-Russian – began to develop in parallel in the Crimea.” But if the latter reached “its peak in 1994,” the Crimean Tatar one “has demonstrated its vitality and creativity, skillfully playing on the complexes of the Ukrainian leadership.”
For nearly 19 years, the Moscow analyst says, “the Crimean Tatar movement on the one hand has spoken in support of the new state [of Ukraine], the inviolability of its borders and against pro-Russian Crimean separatism but on the other it has sought a special status on the Crimean peninsula, one that does not take the all-Ukraine legal bas too much into consideration.”
Since 1991, “the Crimean Tatar movement has actively used the practice of unilateral seizures of land parcels” in Crimea, a practice that is “partially” the result of the lack of land resources for those returning but one that “leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement “justify by the fact of the Stalinist deportation in May 1944.”
“In this way,” Markedonov says, “the tragedy of the Crimean Tatar people is presented by its current leaders as an event which legitimizes any illegal actions today. By the way,” he continues, “the illegal actions are connected not only with ‘the national trauma’ but also with the high level of corruption” in Crimea, something that makes resolving the problem more difficult.
And that in turn feeds in to another danger, the Moscow analyst suggests. “One cannot fail to see the growth of radical Islamism among the Crimean Tatar youth,” something that he suggests is “a threat not only to Russian and Ukrainian security but to the secular national movement of the Crimean Tatars.”
That danger also helps to explain why the Crimean Tatar Mejlis’ department of external affairs is now calling on that body “to consider the question about the preparation of an appeal to the leadership of Ukraine, the EU countries, the US, Russia and Turkey, the countries of the CIS and also international organizations like the UN, PACE and the OSCE.”
“In this appeal of the Crimean Tatar people as a subject of international law,” Markedonov points out, “’the question about support for the resolution of the national question arising from the deportation of 1944 and the provision of guarantees, security, the right to existence and development as the indigenous people of Crimea.’”
Anyone “familiar” with appeals from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh,” Markedonov says, will note a certain common “style.” And anyone who does not want the Crimean issue to grow over into something like one of these others must focus on this issue now. Otherwise, he says, “the dividends of ‘the Kharkov victory’ will not be too much in evidence.”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Moscow is celebrating its Sevastopol accord with Kyiv as “a victory … over the West,” but unless it focuses on the issues raised by the Crimean Tatars, the Russian powers that be will fail to see that this “victory” is not so much a solution to the problem as a change in its nature, a Moscow analyst says.
In an analysis posted online today, Sergey Markedonov argues that both Moscow and Kyiv in their accord have neglected to take into consideration “a very important player” – the national movement of the Crimean Tatars, whose leaders are considering how to proceed in the wake of the new base accord (www.chaskor.ru/article/znakomaya_stilistika_17132).
Indeed, at the very time that the Kharkov accords were being signed, the Moscow analyst says, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people again put forward the notion to Ukrainian officials that the Crimean Tatars should receive “proportional representation in the organs of power” in Crimea.
According to Mustafa Cemilev, a leader of the Crimean Tatars and a member of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, “such quotas should exist ‘independently of whom we vote for.’” That is, Markedonov says, “if today according to the census, the Crimean Tatars form about 12 percent” of Crimea’s population, they must have an equal percentage of government positions.
Another Crimean Tatar leader, Ali Khamzin, the head of the department of foreign ties of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, says that “independently of the possible development of the situation in Ukraine” after the accords, the Mejlis and the World Congress of Crimean Tatars consider “the convention of an international conference on the security of the Crimean Tatar people.”
“The threat to this security,” Khamzin clearly believes according to Markedonov, “is the Russian presence in Sevastopol and in the Crimea as a whole.” Indeed, he characterizes “the accords as “a bomb which can lead to the disintegration of Ukraine,” much like the events in Georgia in August 2008 or Yugoslavia in 1999 but “without a single shot, bombing or force.”
Such possibilities, Markedonov continues, makes “the search for adequate assessments of the potential of the Crimean Tatar movement an extraordinarily important task today.” At the very least, he says, “it is much more useful than the celebration of the latest ‘victory’” over the West.
If that assessment is to be adequate, he says, it should not fall in the trap of “alarmist” predictions about “’a second Cyprus’” or “a second Kosovo’” but rather seek to consider the ways in which “the force” represented by the Crimean Tatars could become either “a factor of unleashing an ethno-political crisis or on the contrary could promote stabilization.”
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Markedonov points out, “two ethno-political movements – the Crimean Tatar and the pro-Russian – began to develop in parallel in the Crimea.” But if the latter reached “its peak in 1994,” the Crimean Tatar one “has demonstrated its vitality and creativity, skillfully playing on the complexes of the Ukrainian leadership.”
For nearly 19 years, the Moscow analyst says, “the Crimean Tatar movement on the one hand has spoken in support of the new state [of Ukraine], the inviolability of its borders and against pro-Russian Crimean separatism but on the other it has sought a special status on the Crimean peninsula, one that does not take the all-Ukraine legal bas too much into consideration.”
Since 1991, “the Crimean Tatar movement has actively used the practice of unilateral seizures of land parcels” in Crimea, a practice that is “partially” the result of the lack of land resources for those returning but one that “leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement “justify by the fact of the Stalinist deportation in May 1944.”
“In this way,” Markedonov says, “the tragedy of the Crimean Tatar people is presented by its current leaders as an event which legitimizes any illegal actions today. By the way,” he continues, “the illegal actions are connected not only with ‘the national trauma’ but also with the high level of corruption” in Crimea, something that makes resolving the problem more difficult.
And that in turn feeds in to another danger, the Moscow analyst suggests. “One cannot fail to see the growth of radical Islamism among the Crimean Tatar youth,” something that he suggests is “a threat not only to Russian and Ukrainian security but to the secular national movement of the Crimean Tatars.”
That danger also helps to explain why the Crimean Tatar Mejlis’ department of external affairs is now calling on that body “to consider the question about the preparation of an appeal to the leadership of Ukraine, the EU countries, the US, Russia and Turkey, the countries of the CIS and also international organizations like the UN, PACE and the OSCE.”
“In this appeal of the Crimean Tatar people as a subject of international law,” Markedonov points out, “’the question about support for the resolution of the national question arising from the deportation of 1944 and the provision of guarantees, security, the right to existence and development as the indigenous people of Crimea.’”
Anyone “familiar” with appeals from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh,” Markedonov says, will note a certain common “style.” And anyone who does not want the Crimean issue to grow over into something like one of these others must focus on this issue now. Otherwise, he says, “the dividends of ‘the Kharkov victory’ will not be too much in evidence.”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Monday, May 03, 2010 |
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Bagapsh ‘Cautiously Optimistic’ Over Abkhaz Recognition By Ukraine, Belarus
(Civil.Ge) -- Abkhaz leader, Sergey Bagapsh, said on April 29 that he was “cautiously optimistic” about possible recognition of Abkhazia by Ukraine and Belarus, Abkhaz news agency, Apsnipress, reported.
“Of course, it is important for us that Ukraine recognizes Abkhazia, that Belarus finally closes this issue, especially if we take into consideration that we had already held negotiations with them. I understand well that each country has its own problems, [each governments has] its opposition, there is influence of the West, financial structures… If it [recognition] happens we will be very happy, because Belarus, Russia and Ukraine as well as other CIS countries are our friendly states. We do not ask unconditional recognition, we offer to build relations,” Bagapsh was quoted by Apsnipress.
He said for gaining international support, Abkhazia would require to build “a real democracy.”
Speaking at a news conference, Bagapsh also hailed border guard forces of the Russian Federal Security Service, which were deployed in the breakaway region a year ago.
“Russian border guards protect not only the borders of Abkhazia, but also Russian borders. We have invited them to ensure peace and stability here. It is not only about Abkhazia; it is about how the situation will develop in the entire Caucasus.”
He also added that Russian border guard service in Abkhazia “is ready to recruit Abkhaz citizens, who are willing to serve in Russian border guard troops.”
“Of course, it is important for us that Ukraine recognizes Abkhazia, that Belarus finally closes this issue, especially if we take into consideration that we had already held negotiations with them. I understand well that each country has its own problems, [each governments has] its opposition, there is influence of the West, financial structures… If it [recognition] happens we will be very happy, because Belarus, Russia and Ukraine as well as other CIS countries are our friendly states. We do not ask unconditional recognition, we offer to build relations,” Bagapsh was quoted by Apsnipress.
He said for gaining international support, Abkhazia would require to build “a real democracy.”
Speaking at a news conference, Bagapsh also hailed border guard forces of the Russian Federal Security Service, which were deployed in the breakaway region a year ago.
“Russian border guards protect not only the borders of Abkhazia, but also Russian borders. We have invited them to ensure peace and stability here. It is not only about Abkhazia; it is about how the situation will develop in the entire Caucasus.”
He also added that Russian border guard service in Abkhazia “is ready to recruit Abkhaz citizens, who are willing to serve in Russian border guard troops.”
Friday, April 30, 2010 |
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Enriched Uranium Smuggling Ring Busted In Georgia
By Molly Corso
The Georgian government is charging an undisclosed number of individuals with criminal conduct in connection with a thwarted attempt to sell highly enriched uranium on the black market in Tbilisi.
Zaal Lomtadze, head of the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources’ Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service, told EurasiaNet.org that police took possession of highly enriched uranium (HEU) during a March 13 sting operation in the Georgian capital. Lomtadze did not disclose how much radioactive material was seized in the sting.
Official charges have been filed in connection with the case, stated Shota Utiashvili, head of the Georgian Ministry of the Interior’s Information and Analysis Department. He would not specify the charges, or the number of individuals facing prosecution.
Lomtadze would not reveal how radioactive the seized material is. Citing unnamed Georgian government sources, an April 13 blog report by The Guardian stated that the HEU was "over 70 percent enriched," which would be of high enough quality to create a crude nuclear bomb.
The Georgian government currently has the seized HEU in "a secure location." Lomtadze said that the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has been notified about the seizure, but IAEA officials refused to comment to EurasiaNet.org about the investigation.
The materials’ possible provenance remains a tightly guarded secret. Answering a reporter’s question at The Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, on April 15, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili implied that the HEU is somehow connected with Russia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- areas that he termed "black holes."
"[Y]ou can assume from where they were coming," Saakashvili said. "One thing I can say, they were not coming from Australia, and they were not coming from some other place, from Norway, for instance."
"Fact is that once there were multiple attempts, there were these things going around in that region and we all should be vigilant," Saakashvili continued, without specifying the region. "We are very well equipped, but black holes ... nobody can guarantee it fully."
Russian officials have denied any involvement in the HEU smuggling, the Associated Press has reported.
Nuclear material enriched "beyond a certain grade" carries a "fingerprint" that can reveal its point of origin, Lomtadze asserted. Based on fingerprints obtained from HEU seized during previous police operations, Georgian officials know that the material is coming from various locations, he said. The fingerprint of the HEO batch seized during the March 13 operation has not been determined yet, Lomtadze stated.
Georgia does not have the necessary laboratories for fingerprinting HEU, but has worked in collaboration with the IAEA and the US government, among other partners, to analyze materials seized in the past.
US embassy spokesperson Karen Robblee did not provide any indication that US government representatives were involved in the current HEU investigation. She stated that the March sting operation was a "Georgian seizure," and added that the US government is "thankful for the effort" Georgia has made to secure nuclear materials.
Washington has equipped 11 Georgian border crossings, two seaports, two airports, and one training center with "portal monitors" to "detect, interdict, and deter illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials."
Over the past 10 years, according to Lomtadze, there have been eight confirmed attempts to smuggle HEU through Georgia. "[We] are in possession of every means to stop this ... and I don’t think there are cases which are smuggled that are not known," he said. He added that officials cannot control borders in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In 2006, another sting operation resulted in the seizure of 100 grams of HEU from a North Ossetian smuggler, who had taken the materials through a border checkpoint high in the mountains that separate Russia’s North Ossetia from Georgia. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Lomtadze noted that Georgian officials encounter a couple of smuggling attempts of potential dangerous substances every year, but "only the lesser part" of them involves radioactive materials. The frequency of the attempts indicates that there is likely an "organized" effort to smuggle HEU through Georgia, he said.
"This is not an isolated case of one person or one group," Lomtadze said. "So we have to be careful and pay attention to this."
Molly Corso is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi. Joshua Kucera in Washington, DC contributed reporting to this story. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org
The Georgian government is charging an undisclosed number of individuals with criminal conduct in connection with a thwarted attempt to sell highly enriched uranium on the black market in Tbilisi.
Zaal Lomtadze, head of the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources’ Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service, told EurasiaNet.org that police took possession of highly enriched uranium (HEU) during a March 13 sting operation in the Georgian capital. Lomtadze did not disclose how much radioactive material was seized in the sting.
Official charges have been filed in connection with the case, stated Shota Utiashvili, head of the Georgian Ministry of the Interior’s Information and Analysis Department. He would not specify the charges, or the number of individuals facing prosecution.
Lomtadze would not reveal how radioactive the seized material is. Citing unnamed Georgian government sources, an April 13 blog report by The Guardian stated that the HEU was "over 70 percent enriched," which would be of high enough quality to create a crude nuclear bomb.
The Georgian government currently has the seized HEU in "a secure location." Lomtadze said that the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has been notified about the seizure, but IAEA officials refused to comment to EurasiaNet.org about the investigation.
The materials’ possible provenance remains a tightly guarded secret. Answering a reporter’s question at The Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, on April 15, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili implied that the HEU is somehow connected with Russia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- areas that he termed "black holes."
"[Y]ou can assume from where they were coming," Saakashvili said. "One thing I can say, they were not coming from Australia, and they were not coming from some other place, from Norway, for instance."
"Fact is that once there were multiple attempts, there were these things going around in that region and we all should be vigilant," Saakashvili continued, without specifying the region. "We are very well equipped, but black holes ... nobody can guarantee it fully."
Russian officials have denied any involvement in the HEU smuggling, the Associated Press has reported.
Nuclear material enriched "beyond a certain grade" carries a "fingerprint" that can reveal its point of origin, Lomtadze asserted. Based on fingerprints obtained from HEU seized during previous police operations, Georgian officials know that the material is coming from various locations, he said. The fingerprint of the HEO batch seized during the March 13 operation has not been determined yet, Lomtadze stated.
Georgia does not have the necessary laboratories for fingerprinting HEU, but has worked in collaboration with the IAEA and the US government, among other partners, to analyze materials seized in the past.
US embassy spokesperson Karen Robblee did not provide any indication that US government representatives were involved in the current HEU investigation. She stated that the March sting operation was a "Georgian seizure," and added that the US government is "thankful for the effort" Georgia has made to secure nuclear materials.
Washington has equipped 11 Georgian border crossings, two seaports, two airports, and one training center with "portal monitors" to "detect, interdict, and deter illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials."
Over the past 10 years, according to Lomtadze, there have been eight confirmed attempts to smuggle HEU through Georgia. "[We] are in possession of every means to stop this ... and I don’t think there are cases which are smuggled that are not known," he said. He added that officials cannot control borders in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In 2006, another sting operation resulted in the seizure of 100 grams of HEU from a North Ossetian smuggler, who had taken the materials through a border checkpoint high in the mountains that separate Russia’s North Ossetia from Georgia. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Lomtadze noted that Georgian officials encounter a couple of smuggling attempts of potential dangerous substances every year, but "only the lesser part" of them involves radioactive materials. The frequency of the attempts indicates that there is likely an "organized" effort to smuggle HEU through Georgia, he said.
"This is not an isolated case of one person or one group," Lomtadze said. "So we have to be careful and pay attention to this."
Molly Corso is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi. Joshua Kucera in Washington, DC contributed reporting to this story. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Doubts About Georgia's Supercentenarian's Claims To Old Age Fame
By Molly Corso
Recent publicity about an allegedly 129-year-old woman living in a mountain village in western Georgia has revived the country’s Soviet-era reputation for hale and hearty centenarians. But data collected by experts in Tbilisi suggest that Georgia is not exactly a Garden of Youth.
The country first gained notice in the United States for its population of octogenarians and nonagenarians with a 1977 Dannon yogurt commercial that touted several robust elderly residents’ love of yogurt. (The ad was filmed in Abkhazia, a disputed region now outside Georgia’s control).
Vodka-drinking, backgammon-playing Samegrelo villager Antissa Khvichava -- reported to be turning 130 this summer - at first glance appeared to reaffirm the popular notion that Georgians, somehow, live longer. If her age is verified, Khvichava would rank as the oldest woman in the world by a 15-year margin. The current certified titleholder is a 114-year-old woman living in Japan.
But doubts exist that Khvichava’s claim will hold up to scrutiny.
Georgia’s Civil Registry Agency has presented a birth certificate from 1880 and a document from a 1980 special commission that investigated her age as proof that Khvichava is 129. The country’s official statistics on life expectancy, birth rates and death rates, however, are notoriously incorrect, stressed Avtandil Sulaberidze, director of the Institute of Sociology and Demography in Tbilisi.
National data depends on the local registration of births and deaths -- numbers that are often wrong, Sulaberidze said. Residents often submit false information, or withhold information in an attempt to secure pension payments and other government handouts, he claimed.
With those limitations in mind, one Tbilisi gerontologist has assembled his own collection of population data over the past 30 years.
Simon Dalakishvili, head of the department of gerontology and palliative medicine at the Natishvili Institute of Morphology in Tbilisi, states that Georgia has slightly fewer than 500 centenarians. (The number does not include the disputed regions of Abkhazia or South Ossetia.) The country contains eight individuals over the age of 115, he said. The figures, which Dalakishvili claims are unchanged since Soviet times, represent far less than 1 percent of Georgia’s official general population of around 4.6 million.
By comparison, two US states with roughly similar population sizes - Minnesota and Louisiana - contained 1,044 centenarians and 804 centenarians, respectively, in the 2000 census.
Most of Georgia’s centenarians, like Antissa Khvichava, live in rural communities, where family support systems for the elderly are still strong, and diet depends less on processed food.
Nonetheless, Dalakishvili says that he "doubts" that Khvichava has lived as long as 129 years.
"I am not interested in people living until age 150 because I know in advance that is not true; I am interested in those who live until 120, 115, 110. That gives us more information how to create the social conditions to help people. That is the most important," he said.
To estimate Khvichava’s age, Dalakishvili’s team of researchers would need to compare church records, official registrations, work history, marriage certificates and children’s ages.
"We get, in general, within four to five years [of the correct age] . . . With that methodology, we get close. If it turns out that a woman gave birth at age 80, it is immediately clear that it is not true," Dalakishvili said.
Genetics plays roughly half the reason for a person’s long life, he believes; the rest goes to diet and quality of life, among other factors. No proof exists to establish that matsoni, the Georgian yogurt touted by Dannon, contributes to that process, he added. Much more than yogurt is needed to correct current demographic trends.
Demographer Sulaberidze points out that Georgia’s overall population is shrinking. The population increased by a mere 1.8 percent in 2008 - a jump credited by Sulaberidze to Patriarch Ilia II’s pledge to be the godfather of every family’s third child; by comparison, in 1960, it allegedly grew by 15.2 percent, the United Nations Population Fund reports.
The death rate, meanwhile, is increasing: allegedly 9.5 deaths per 1,000 people in 1960 versus 13.2 deaths per 1,000 people in 2008.
In 2008, life expectancy stood at 66.4 years for men and 75.3 years for women, according to the Fund. Ninety-five-year-old scientist Nino Javakhishvili, however, cautions that there is "no secret" to a long life. Javakhishvili is a nationally renowned experimental human anatomist who still goes to her Tbilisi office four days a week, conducts experiments on rats and is planning on publishing a book on her research into diabetes. She can read without glasses and download photos into her cell phone.
Her advice for becoming a nonagenarian is straightforward: "Do everything in moderation," she said.
Molly Corso is a freelance reporter and photojournalist based in Tbilisi. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org
Recent publicity about an allegedly 129-year-old woman living in a mountain village in western Georgia has revived the country’s Soviet-era reputation for hale and hearty centenarians. But data collected by experts in Tbilisi suggest that Georgia is not exactly a Garden of Youth.
The country first gained notice in the United States for its population of octogenarians and nonagenarians with a 1977 Dannon yogurt commercial that touted several robust elderly residents’ love of yogurt. (The ad was filmed in Abkhazia, a disputed region now outside Georgia’s control).
Vodka-drinking, backgammon-playing Samegrelo villager Antissa Khvichava -- reported to be turning 130 this summer - at first glance appeared to reaffirm the popular notion that Georgians, somehow, live longer. If her age is verified, Khvichava would rank as the oldest woman in the world by a 15-year margin. The current certified titleholder is a 114-year-old woman living in Japan.
But doubts exist that Khvichava’s claim will hold up to scrutiny.
Georgia’s Civil Registry Agency has presented a birth certificate from 1880 and a document from a 1980 special commission that investigated her age as proof that Khvichava is 129. The country’s official statistics on life expectancy, birth rates and death rates, however, are notoriously incorrect, stressed Avtandil Sulaberidze, director of the Institute of Sociology and Demography in Tbilisi.
National data depends on the local registration of births and deaths -- numbers that are often wrong, Sulaberidze said. Residents often submit false information, or withhold information in an attempt to secure pension payments and other government handouts, he claimed.
With those limitations in mind, one Tbilisi gerontologist has assembled his own collection of population data over the past 30 years.
Simon Dalakishvili, head of the department of gerontology and palliative medicine at the Natishvili Institute of Morphology in Tbilisi, states that Georgia has slightly fewer than 500 centenarians. (The number does not include the disputed regions of Abkhazia or South Ossetia.) The country contains eight individuals over the age of 115, he said. The figures, which Dalakishvili claims are unchanged since Soviet times, represent far less than 1 percent of Georgia’s official general population of around 4.6 million.
By comparison, two US states with roughly similar population sizes - Minnesota and Louisiana - contained 1,044 centenarians and 804 centenarians, respectively, in the 2000 census.
Most of Georgia’s centenarians, like Antissa Khvichava, live in rural communities, where family support systems for the elderly are still strong, and diet depends less on processed food.
Nonetheless, Dalakishvili says that he "doubts" that Khvichava has lived as long as 129 years.
"I am not interested in people living until age 150 because I know in advance that is not true; I am interested in those who live until 120, 115, 110. That gives us more information how to create the social conditions to help people. That is the most important," he said.
To estimate Khvichava’s age, Dalakishvili’s team of researchers would need to compare church records, official registrations, work history, marriage certificates and children’s ages.
"We get, in general, within four to five years [of the correct age] . . . With that methodology, we get close. If it turns out that a woman gave birth at age 80, it is immediately clear that it is not true," Dalakishvili said.
Genetics plays roughly half the reason for a person’s long life, he believes; the rest goes to diet and quality of life, among other factors. No proof exists to establish that matsoni, the Georgian yogurt touted by Dannon, contributes to that process, he added. Much more than yogurt is needed to correct current demographic trends.
Demographer Sulaberidze points out that Georgia’s overall population is shrinking. The population increased by a mere 1.8 percent in 2008 - a jump credited by Sulaberidze to Patriarch Ilia II’s pledge to be the godfather of every family’s third child; by comparison, in 1960, it allegedly grew by 15.2 percent, the United Nations Population Fund reports.
The death rate, meanwhile, is increasing: allegedly 9.5 deaths per 1,000 people in 1960 versus 13.2 deaths per 1,000 people in 2008.
In 2008, life expectancy stood at 66.4 years for men and 75.3 years for women, according to the Fund. Ninety-five-year-old scientist Nino Javakhishvili, however, cautions that there is "no secret" to a long life. Javakhishvili is a nationally renowned experimental human anatomist who still goes to her Tbilisi office four days a week, conducts experiments on rats and is planning on publishing a book on her research into diabetes. She can read without glasses and download photos into her cell phone.
Her advice for becoming a nonagenarian is straightforward: "Do everything in moderation," she said.
Molly Corso is a freelance reporter and photojournalist based in Tbilisi. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org
Monday, April 19, 2010 |
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Georgia MPs Make Intl Appeal For Declaring Abkhazia, S.Ossetia As Occupied
(Civil.Ge) -- Georgian parliamentary committee for foreign relations has requested lawmakers from 31 countries to “declare the two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as being territories under Russian occupation and recognise the ethnic cleansing committed by Russia” in those territories.
“We sincerely hope that you can adopt appropriate statements of support on these matters,” a letter by the parliamentary committee reads.
The letter, according to the parliamentary committee for foreign relations, was sent to its counterpart committees of legislative bodies from 20 EU-member states, plus Norway and Island, as well as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, New Zeeland, South Korea, Japan, Israel and the United States.
“Russian policy continues to pursue the systematic undermining of Georgian sovereignty, the increased militarization of the territories Moscow has occupied, and the justification of ethnic cleansing campaigns used against Georgians in those territories. All components of this policy seek to derail Georgia’s progress and ongoing efforts at reform, as well as Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy alignment,” the letter reads.
“We sincerely hope that you can adopt appropriate statements of support on these matters,” a letter by the parliamentary committee reads.
The letter, according to the parliamentary committee for foreign relations, was sent to its counterpart committees of legislative bodies from 20 EU-member states, plus Norway and Island, as well as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, New Zeeland, South Korea, Japan, Israel and the United States.
“Russian policy continues to pursue the systematic undermining of Georgian sovereignty, the increased militarization of the territories Moscow has occupied, and the justification of ethnic cleansing campaigns used against Georgians in those territories. All components of this policy seek to derail Georgia’s progress and ongoing efforts at reform, as well as Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy alignment,” the letter reads.
Thursday, April 08, 2010 |
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Abkhazia Expects Recognition Of Independence By Bolivia, Ecuador
The former Georgian republic of Abkhazia hopes Bolivia and Ecuador may soon recognize its independence, the republic's foreign minister said on Friday.
"We expect Bolivia and Ecuador to recognize the independence of Abkhazia soon because there is a positive attitude to our country there," Maxim Gvindzhiya, who is heading the Abkhaz delegation in Latin America, told journalists.
The delegation has visited Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador.
Russia recognized Abkhazia and another breakaway republic, South Ossetia, as independent shortly after a five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 that began when Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia in an attempt to bring it back under central control.
Nicaragua, Venezuela and the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru have also recognized the two former Georgian republics
Source: RIA Novosti
"We expect Bolivia and Ecuador to recognize the independence of Abkhazia soon because there is a positive attitude to our country there," Maxim Gvindzhiya, who is heading the Abkhaz delegation in Latin America, told journalists.
The delegation has visited Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador.
Russia recognized Abkhazia and another breakaway republic, South Ossetia, as independent shortly after a five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 that began when Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia in an attempt to bring it back under central control.
Nicaragua, Venezuela and the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru have also recognized the two former Georgian republics
Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, April 02, 2010 |
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Georgia Trying New Way To Woo Abkhazia, South Ossetia
By Joshua Kucera
The Georgian government has developed a new strategy for re-engaging with -- and ultimately re-incorporating -- the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and is working to gain international support and funding for its plan.
The plan, officially named the "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation," was developed by Georgia’s Ministry of Reintegration and released at the end of January. Published in five languages -- Georgian, English, Russian, Abkhaz and Ossetian -- the plan takes a more conciliatory tone than has been customary for Tbilisi, and stresses the need for a "human-centric policy aimed at engagement with the residents of" Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Providing for a variety of social programs, the plan would make health care available to people in the separatist territories, and sketches out plans for rebuilding roads and establishing bus lines. It would also promote the Abkhaz (though not Ossetian) language, and encourage people-to-people contacts across the de facto borders. Focusing on these less controversial issues would help Tbilisi blunt criticism from authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the Russian government, Temuri Yakobashvili, Georgia’s Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister for Reintegration, said in an interview with EurasiaNet.
"Status and security, those two issues are deliberately not part of the strategy. It’s about people," Yakobashvili said. Still, the strategy document openly acknowledges that it is intended to help the Georgian government regain control over the territories. "The Strategy is part of Georgia’s overarching determination to achieve the full de-occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, reverse the process of annexation of these territories by the Russian Federation, and peacefully reintegrate these territories and their populations," the document says in its preamble.
Now that the overarching strategy has been completed, Yakobashvili’s ministry is taking steps to try to implement it. The hope is that a donor conference could be convened in late June, in order to attract funding from Georgia’s allies.
To that end, Yakobashvili toured Western capitals late February to drum up support for the plan. He visited Washington on February 25-26, meeting Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, as well as with officials from the White House, Department of Defense and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and members of Congress. Before that, he had met with UN officials in New York and French officials, including Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, in Paris.
A statement issued by the US. Embassy in Tbilisi said it "strongly supports" the objectives of the plan. "The strategy is a constructive step towards easing tensions and a way to reach out to all residents of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," the embassy said. Yakobashvili said the reaction he had gotten from US officials on his trip was positive, adding that USAID representatives indicated they would provide some assistance for the reintegration strategy.
Yakobashvili’s early success in generating international enthusiasm for the plan may be set back by a mid-March scandal in Tbilisi, in which a television hoax about a fake Russian invasion caused panic in the Georgian capital and outrage in Moscow. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. US and European Union officials have voiced displeasure over the fake report, which Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has nonetheless characterized as "maximally close to reality." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The television scandal has appeared to dent Georgia’s image among some of its most important donors. On March 17, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso voiced concern about the report, cautioning Tbilisi to avoid action that could inflame regional tension.
In any event, reaction to the new Georgian strategy from authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- as well as from the Russian government, which exerts significant control over those territories -- has been antagonistic. Abkhazia’s leader, Sergey Bagapsh, dismissed the strategy as "soft bribery."
"We will not even talk about this issue. In response to this document we will tighten border control along the Inguri River, and we will not allow the creation of ’fifth column’ in the Gali District. I can imagine how many people are already recruited [by Georgian authorities] and running around the [Gali] District," Bagapsh said.
Russian officials have scoffed at the plan, too, saying that it was "written by Americans," Yakobashvili noted. But if those in charge of the separatist territories don’t allow Georgia to implement the programs it wants to, they will be the ones who suffer, he claimed.
"Theoretically it’s possible to block [the strategy] but practically they would have to demonize themselves excessively if they want to block it," Yakobashvili said. "We want free Internet for Abkhazia. Somehow, is free Internet hindering national Abkhaz feelings? Tell me how? If they get better health care, is that politically radioactive?"
US analysts doubt that implementation of the plan is feasible in the short term, but said it was nevertheless an important and welcome step for Georgia’s policy toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
"An Abkhaz or a South Ossetian reading this isn’t even going to feel good about the title, about the ’occupied territories.’ So this is not written [in] a way to engage them. But it’s useful as a tool for internal Georgian discussions, saying that ’we want engagement, we don’t want a military solution and we made mistakes,’" said Susan Allen Nan, a professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. "These are significant steps in a very, very, very long process."
"It represents a conceptual breakthrough on the part of the Georgian government on how to deal with the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I think the substance of the plan can be supported in every way, but the issue of feasibility is another question entirely," said Cory Welt, associate director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
Welt said the United States can be expected to help fund programs that Georgians prove can be actually implemented, and that Tbilisi is also hoping to use the strategy to gain more US diplomatic support.
"I think they’re looking for the Americans to keep the strategy in mind in their discussions with the Russians so that when, as it inevitably will, the strategy runs into obstacles, there is some hope on the Georgian side that the United States might try to encourage the Russians to see the strategy in a more positive way," he said.
Joshua Kucera is a Washington, DC,-based freelance writer who specializes in security issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
The Georgian government has developed a new strategy for re-engaging with -- and ultimately re-incorporating -- the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and is working to gain international support and funding for its plan.
The plan, officially named the "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation," was developed by Georgia’s Ministry of Reintegration and released at the end of January. Published in five languages -- Georgian, English, Russian, Abkhaz and Ossetian -- the plan takes a more conciliatory tone than has been customary for Tbilisi, and stresses the need for a "human-centric policy aimed at engagement with the residents of" Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Providing for a variety of social programs, the plan would make health care available to people in the separatist territories, and sketches out plans for rebuilding roads and establishing bus lines. It would also promote the Abkhaz (though not Ossetian) language, and encourage people-to-people contacts across the de facto borders. Focusing on these less controversial issues would help Tbilisi blunt criticism from authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the Russian government, Temuri Yakobashvili, Georgia’s Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister for Reintegration, said in an interview with EurasiaNet.
"Status and security, those two issues are deliberately not part of the strategy. It’s about people," Yakobashvili said. Still, the strategy document openly acknowledges that it is intended to help the Georgian government regain control over the territories. "The Strategy is part of Georgia’s overarching determination to achieve the full de-occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, reverse the process of annexation of these territories by the Russian Federation, and peacefully reintegrate these territories and their populations," the document says in its preamble.
Now that the overarching strategy has been completed, Yakobashvili’s ministry is taking steps to try to implement it. The hope is that a donor conference could be convened in late June, in order to attract funding from Georgia’s allies.
To that end, Yakobashvili toured Western capitals late February to drum up support for the plan. He visited Washington on February 25-26, meeting Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, as well as with officials from the White House, Department of Defense and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and members of Congress. Before that, he had met with UN officials in New York and French officials, including Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, in Paris.
A statement issued by the US. Embassy in Tbilisi said it "strongly supports" the objectives of the plan. "The strategy is a constructive step towards easing tensions and a way to reach out to all residents of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," the embassy said. Yakobashvili said the reaction he had gotten from US officials on his trip was positive, adding that USAID representatives indicated they would provide some assistance for the reintegration strategy.
Yakobashvili’s early success in generating international enthusiasm for the plan may be set back by a mid-March scandal in Tbilisi, in which a television hoax about a fake Russian invasion caused panic in the Georgian capital and outrage in Moscow. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. US and European Union officials have voiced displeasure over the fake report, which Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has nonetheless characterized as "maximally close to reality." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The television scandal has appeared to dent Georgia’s image among some of its most important donors. On March 17, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso voiced concern about the report, cautioning Tbilisi to avoid action that could inflame regional tension.
In any event, reaction to the new Georgian strategy from authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- as well as from the Russian government, which exerts significant control over those territories -- has been antagonistic. Abkhazia’s leader, Sergey Bagapsh, dismissed the strategy as "soft bribery."
"We will not even talk about this issue. In response to this document we will tighten border control along the Inguri River, and we will not allow the creation of ’fifth column’ in the Gali District. I can imagine how many people are already recruited [by Georgian authorities] and running around the [Gali] District," Bagapsh said.
Russian officials have scoffed at the plan, too, saying that it was "written by Americans," Yakobashvili noted. But if those in charge of the separatist territories don’t allow Georgia to implement the programs it wants to, they will be the ones who suffer, he claimed.
"Theoretically it’s possible to block [the strategy] but practically they would have to demonize themselves excessively if they want to block it," Yakobashvili said. "We want free Internet for Abkhazia. Somehow, is free Internet hindering national Abkhaz feelings? Tell me how? If they get better health care, is that politically radioactive?"
US analysts doubt that implementation of the plan is feasible in the short term, but said it was nevertheless an important and welcome step for Georgia’s policy toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
"An Abkhaz or a South Ossetian reading this isn’t even going to feel good about the title, about the ’occupied territories.’ So this is not written [in] a way to engage them. But it’s useful as a tool for internal Georgian discussions, saying that ’we want engagement, we don’t want a military solution and we made mistakes,’" said Susan Allen Nan, a professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. "These are significant steps in a very, very, very long process."
"It represents a conceptual breakthrough on the part of the Georgian government on how to deal with the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I think the substance of the plan can be supported in every way, but the issue of feasibility is another question entirely," said Cory Welt, associate director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
Welt said the United States can be expected to help fund programs that Georgians prove can be actually implemented, and that Tbilisi is also hoping to use the strategy to gain more US diplomatic support.
"I think they’re looking for the Americans to keep the strategy in mind in their discussions with the Russians so that when, as it inevitably will, the strategy runs into obstacles, there is some hope on the Georgian side that the United States might try to encourage the Russians to see the strategy in a more positive way," he said.
Joshua Kucera is a Washington, DC,-based freelance writer who specializes in security issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Thursday, March 18, 2010 |
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Post-Soviet States Boosting Military Spending Since Russian-Georgian War
By Paul Goble
Even though the GDP of the post-Soviet states – the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States plus Georgia – fell an average of seven percent in 2009, their respective military spending increased five percent in comparison with 2009 and “almost15 percent” in comparison with 2008, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reports today.
And those figures may in fact understate the arms race in the post-Soviet region, the paper’s military observer Vladimir Mukhin points out, because they “do not take into account the military assistance given to a number of countries from abroad” or support from allies such as that provided by Karabakh to Armenia (www.ng.ru/cis/2010-03-17/1_military.html).
Such military spending means both that the governments in the region have fewer funds to support social programs and that they may enter into a vicious cycle in which increases by one country will lead to increases by others, creating instability and the threat of outbreaks of serious violence.
Given the timing of these increases, it appears that at least some of the governments involved have decided that they must have more serious military forces now that Moscow has violated the taboo on unilaterally using armed force across recognized international borders by its intervention in Georgia in August 2008.
Mukhin surveys the situation across the region. In the southern Caucasus, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have increased military spending significantly, a reflection, the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” writer suggests, of the failure of the Karabakh peace process to make progress.
Georgia, the object of Russia’s attack, saw its GDP fall by “more than a billion dollars” between 2008 and 2009, but nonetheless President Mikhail Saakashvili increased military spending to the point that the Georgian defense budget eats up the largest share of GDP in any post-Soviet state (4.56 percent).
Because of that and because of the military assistance Georgia has received from NATO countries, Mukhin observes, “it is not accidental that the military-political leadership of Russia not long ago concluded that there was the possibility that Georgia would unleash a new military conflict.”
To counter that, Moscow has increased military spending on objects in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though Russia’s military budget over all actually declined between 2009 and 2010 – the only one of the 12 countries surveyed -- when expressed in dollar terms as a result of changing exchange rates.
In Central Asia, Mukhin notes, Uzbekistan continued to have the largest military budget, although Kazakhstan spent nearly as much. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan spent relatively little, being “the poorest countries in the post-Soviet space,” but their military budgets were boosted by assistance from Russia, China and NATO. Turkmenistan’s spending remained almost flat.
The military budgets of both Moldova and Ukraine are slated to increase, although economic and political turmoil in both places may block that from happening. Ukraine plans to boost its military spending by 5.2 billion US dollars, but Mukhin was skeptical that it would be able to. Belarus meanwhile kept its military spending high even though its GDP fell.
Mukhin appends to his article a table on military expenditures in US dollar amounts of the CIS states and Georgia for the period 2008 to 2010, which shows the percentage of GDP being spent for military purposes and the size and direction of any change year to year in those figures.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Even though the GDP of the post-Soviet states – the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States plus Georgia – fell an average of seven percent in 2009, their respective military spending increased five percent in comparison with 2009 and “almost15 percent” in comparison with 2008, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reports today.
And those figures may in fact understate the arms race in the post-Soviet region, the paper’s military observer Vladimir Mukhin points out, because they “do not take into account the military assistance given to a number of countries from abroad” or support from allies such as that provided by Karabakh to Armenia (www.ng.ru/cis/2010-03-17/1_military.html).
Such military spending means both that the governments in the region have fewer funds to support social programs and that they may enter into a vicious cycle in which increases by one country will lead to increases by others, creating instability and the threat of outbreaks of serious violence.
Given the timing of these increases, it appears that at least some of the governments involved have decided that they must have more serious military forces now that Moscow has violated the taboo on unilaterally using armed force across recognized international borders by its intervention in Georgia in August 2008.
Mukhin surveys the situation across the region. In the southern Caucasus, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have increased military spending significantly, a reflection, the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” writer suggests, of the failure of the Karabakh peace process to make progress.
Georgia, the object of Russia’s attack, saw its GDP fall by “more than a billion dollars” between 2008 and 2009, but nonetheless President Mikhail Saakashvili increased military spending to the point that the Georgian defense budget eats up the largest share of GDP in any post-Soviet state (4.56 percent).
Because of that and because of the military assistance Georgia has received from NATO countries, Mukhin observes, “it is not accidental that the military-political leadership of Russia not long ago concluded that there was the possibility that Georgia would unleash a new military conflict.”
To counter that, Moscow has increased military spending on objects in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though Russia’s military budget over all actually declined between 2009 and 2010 – the only one of the 12 countries surveyed -- when expressed in dollar terms as a result of changing exchange rates.
In Central Asia, Mukhin notes, Uzbekistan continued to have the largest military budget, although Kazakhstan spent nearly as much. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan spent relatively little, being “the poorest countries in the post-Soviet space,” but their military budgets were boosted by assistance from Russia, China and NATO. Turkmenistan’s spending remained almost flat.
The military budgets of both Moldova and Ukraine are slated to increase, although economic and political turmoil in both places may block that from happening. Ukraine plans to boost its military spending by 5.2 billion US dollars, but Mukhin was skeptical that it would be able to. Belarus meanwhile kept its military spending high even though its GDP fell.
Mukhin appends to his article a table on military expenditures in US dollar amounts of the CIS states and Georgia for the period 2008 to 2010, which shows the percentage of GDP being spent for military purposes and the size and direction of any change year to year in those figures.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Thursday, March 18, 2010 |
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How Are South Ossetia And Abkhazia Any Different Than The Falklands?
By Andrei Fedyashin
Britain and Argentina have renewed their unhealthy diplomatic exchange over the ownership and sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, which Argentineans call the Malvinas.
Britain and Argentina waged a 70-odd day war over the islands in 1982. Now all self-proclaimed republics - both recognized and unrecognized - cite the Falklands to support their cause.
London claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were illegally torn from Georgia (along with their inhabitants), whereas the Falklands are legally British territory and are populated exclusively by British people.
Britain retains control of the islands and finds it very unpleasant when the Falklands question is raised because it reminds the world about Britain's complicated colonial past and the British about their glorious imperial past. But beyond this, the Falklands issue prevents the world from seeing Britain's position in the recent disputes over self-proclaimed republics - be they recognized or unrecognized - for what it is.
The Foreign Office's attitude can be summed up as follows: It would be great if the Falklands remained the property of the Crown, and it would be better still if nobody remembered that they exist.
Tensions between the countries flared up again when the British oil company Desire Petroleum started drilling exploration wells some 60 miles north of the archipelago's administrative center, Port Stanley.
Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner reacted immediately, denouncing the move as a violation of UN resolutions on the Malvinas/Falklands, which call on both countries to renew sovereignty negotiations and abstain from taking unilateral measures, and evidence of a lingering colonial attitude, among other things
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the U.K. were cut off after the Malvinas/Falklands War, but were renewed in the early 1990s.
According to geological surveys carried out in 1998, there could be 60 billion barrels of oil in the area around these southern islands. Desire Petroleum's own studies have confirmed close to three billion barrels of oil.
The Falklands issue is more than just a colonial anachronism. They are like an ulcer in today's global body politic, which has become inflamed again and again.
The ulcer is usually aggravated by one side in the Falklands dispute for internal political gains.
This time President Kirchner is responsible for the relapse. Kirchner faces a tough election next year, with Argentineans growing increasingly unhappy with the Kirchners (before Cristina, the president was her husband Nestor, who is currently his wife's chief adviser). Both Argentina's economy and Cristina's popularity have slumped, and there have been numerous scandals regarding the couple's questionable business deals.
Drawing public attention to the Malvinas was a primitive but effective move, as 80% of Argentineans think the islands have been taken from them illegally, which is actually true: the British snatched the islands from Argentina in 1833.
The Falklands resurfaced as a political issue in the spring of 1982 when Argentina declared that the Malvinas were Argentinean territory. Before that, many British people did not even know that they had a dependent territory so far from home.
The campaign for the return of all Argentinean land (the Argentineans also claim South Georgia some 1,200 miles east of the islands) was launched by Constantino Davidoff, an Argentinean scrap-metal merchant of Russian descent, who landed without permission at Leith on the island of South Georgia on December 20, 1981, and hoisted the Argentinean flag above the manager's house.
The British dispatched half of their Falklands garrison to South Georgia. Argentina responded by invading and occupying the islands.
Britain and Argentina fought a war over a territory located 14,000 miles from Britain and some 300 miles from Argentina. It was the most bizarre colonial war of the 20th century.
The war saved British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and ensured the political demise of Argentinean dictator Leopoldo Galtieri.
In 1982, Britain experienced a period of national revival and unity it had not seen since WWII. Thatcher's popularity, which had been hovering near zero, soared as a result of the Falklands War, which put an end to the military dictatorship in Argentina. But the restoration of democracy did not ease tensions.
The Falklands dispute is extremely complicated, but there is a solution. For decades now, British experts on international law have been calling it a 19th-century colonial relic. Britain must grow up and give back the islands, they say. The Falklands' sovereignty could be transferred to Argentina, which would then lease the islands to Britain.
This would satisfy Argentina's territorial claims, while also respecting the interests of the islands' population of British settlers.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article first appeared.
Britain and Argentina have renewed their unhealthy diplomatic exchange over the ownership and sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, which Argentineans call the Malvinas.
Britain and Argentina waged a 70-odd day war over the islands in 1982. Now all self-proclaimed republics - both recognized and unrecognized - cite the Falklands to support their cause.
London claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were illegally torn from Georgia (along with their inhabitants), whereas the Falklands are legally British territory and are populated exclusively by British people.
Britain retains control of the islands and finds it very unpleasant when the Falklands question is raised because it reminds the world about Britain's complicated colonial past and the British about their glorious imperial past. But beyond this, the Falklands issue prevents the world from seeing Britain's position in the recent disputes over self-proclaimed republics - be they recognized or unrecognized - for what it is.
The Foreign Office's attitude can be summed up as follows: It would be great if the Falklands remained the property of the Crown, and it would be better still if nobody remembered that they exist.
Tensions between the countries flared up again when the British oil company Desire Petroleum started drilling exploration wells some 60 miles north of the archipelago's administrative center, Port Stanley.
Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner reacted immediately, denouncing the move as a violation of UN resolutions on the Malvinas/Falklands, which call on both countries to renew sovereignty negotiations and abstain from taking unilateral measures, and evidence of a lingering colonial attitude, among other things
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the U.K. were cut off after the Malvinas/Falklands War, but were renewed in the early 1990s.
According to geological surveys carried out in 1998, there could be 60 billion barrels of oil in the area around these southern islands. Desire Petroleum's own studies have confirmed close to three billion barrels of oil.
The Falklands issue is more than just a colonial anachronism. They are like an ulcer in today's global body politic, which has become inflamed again and again.
The ulcer is usually aggravated by one side in the Falklands dispute for internal political gains.
This time President Kirchner is responsible for the relapse. Kirchner faces a tough election next year, with Argentineans growing increasingly unhappy with the Kirchners (before Cristina, the president was her husband Nestor, who is currently his wife's chief adviser). Both Argentina's economy and Cristina's popularity have slumped, and there have been numerous scandals regarding the couple's questionable business deals.
Drawing public attention to the Malvinas was a primitive but effective move, as 80% of Argentineans think the islands have been taken from them illegally, which is actually true: the British snatched the islands from Argentina in 1833.
The Falklands resurfaced as a political issue in the spring of 1982 when Argentina declared that the Malvinas were Argentinean territory. Before that, many British people did not even know that they had a dependent territory so far from home.
The campaign for the return of all Argentinean land (the Argentineans also claim South Georgia some 1,200 miles east of the islands) was launched by Constantino Davidoff, an Argentinean scrap-metal merchant of Russian descent, who landed without permission at Leith on the island of South Georgia on December 20, 1981, and hoisted the Argentinean flag above the manager's house.
The British dispatched half of their Falklands garrison to South Georgia. Argentina responded by invading and occupying the islands.
Britain and Argentina fought a war over a territory located 14,000 miles from Britain and some 300 miles from Argentina. It was the most bizarre colonial war of the 20th century.
The war saved British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and ensured the political demise of Argentinean dictator Leopoldo Galtieri.
In 1982, Britain experienced a period of national revival and unity it had not seen since WWII. Thatcher's popularity, which had been hovering near zero, soared as a result of the Falklands War, which put an end to the military dictatorship in Argentina. But the restoration of democracy did not ease tensions.
The Falklands dispute is extremely complicated, but there is a solution. For decades now, British experts on international law have been calling it a 19th-century colonial relic. Britain must grow up and give back the islands, they say. The Falklands' sovereignty could be transferred to Argentina, which would then lease the islands to Britain.
This would satisfy Argentina's territorial claims, while also respecting the interests of the islands' population of British settlers.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article first appeared.
Friday, March 05, 2010 |
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Ian Bremmer: Iran Ultimately To Go nuclear As Did North Korea
Ian Bremmer is the president of the Eurasia Group, a New York based think-tank. He is one of the leading American experts on Russia, the Post-Soviet states and Asia. Mr.Bremmer is also the author of "The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?" He gives his assessments of the situation around Iran, the problems in negotiating a new agreement to replace the START Treaty between Russia and the United States as well as his point on the political and energy turf wars in Europe, in an interview with RIA Novosti New York Bureau chief Dmitry Gornostaev.
- Iran has said it's prepared to exchange the nuclear fuel on its territory only. Why is this condition unacceptable for the US as it seems to be one of the few ways to make a diplomatic deal with Iran? In the current situation, is the negotiating track still considered to be a realistic one or the US has nothing to do but close the door to negotiations and proceed with sanctions?
- Iran has consistently hidden key components of its enrichment program from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The discovery late last year that Iran had hidden an underground nuclear site at Qom has dampened hopes within the Obama administration that Iran might be willing to make an acceptable deal, and the latest IAEA report on the program argues that the problem continues. Given that history, Washington insists that there cannot be a diplomatic solution unless Tehran’s compliance with the agreement can be easily verified by international inspectors. The US and its European partners will continue with negotiations, but the UN Security Council will likely take up another sanctions resolution soon.
- The idea of new sanctions against Tehran has seemingly got - if not an approval, then at least the concession - of Russia and the only objection is from China. Why is Beijng so reluctant to sanctions even after the new IAEA report only increased the concerns of Iran building a nuclear weapon? Is it possible that China will give up?
- China has been the most reluctant because it imports large quantities of energy from Iran, because it doesn’t like the appearance of doing anything under pressure from Washington, and because Iran’s nuclear program doesn’t pose a direct threat to China’s interests. Yet, China will probably support some form of sanctions, given the IAEA report, Russia’s position on the issue and the latest news from Tehran. They do not want to be the only UNSC permanent member to cast a veto.
- It's a bit surprising to watch the US trying to persuade China on Iran and at the same time kicking Beijing by selling arms to Taiwan and welcoming the Dalai Lama to the White House. Were these two apparently anti-Chinese moves more important for Washington than getting China on board in terms of UN sanctions against Tehran?
- These problems in US-Chinese relationship are not as serious as they appear. There is nothing new about arms sales to Taiwan, and China isn’t particularly threatened by them. The Dalai Lama is a similar story. Every president since Ronald Reagan has met with the Dalai Llama at least once, and the Obama administration was careful to downplay the importance of the meeting after refusing to meet with him last year on the eve of a crucial G20 meeting. Again, China will take the usual diplomatic steps to express disapproval in a case like this, but there are many issues in US-Chinese relations that are far more important to both sides.
- The Israeli prime minister proposed to impose sanctions on Iran without the UN Security Council approval in case China (and possibly Russia) doesn't agree. Do you think that the Obama administration can go for actions bypassing the UN Security Council, as the Bush administration did when starting the war against Iraq?
- The Obama administration sees these as separate tracks. First, let be clear that I do not see any real risk of US military strikes against Iran. On the sanctions process, the US will work through the Security Council, but it will also work with allies and other willing partners to tighten sanctions in other ways. Washington hopes to craft sanctions that will inflict as much financial pain as possible on the Iranian government and the Revolutionary Guard but harm the Iranian people as little as possible. That’s why you do not see more support within the Obama administration for sanctions that would cut gasoline supplies to Iran. That kind of move would hurt millions of Iranians. On the other hand, the US does want to restrict the flow of revenue for Iran’s government—and perhaps the personal financial transactions of those at the highest levels of the leadership. This will not be easy, and it remains very unlikely that sanctions in any form will persuade Iran’s government to renounce its nuclear ambitions.
- Then this means that the sanctions will miss their goal to secure the non-proliferation regime, doesn't it?
- Yes, Iran is ultimately likely to go nuclear, just as North Korea did—though Tehran may avoid actually testing a weapon in order to maintain a kind of ambiguity on the issue. There is deep division within Iran on many questions, but this is not one of them; there is broad and deep support for the nuclear program both within the leadership and the general public. The international non-proliferation regime is broken, and only a serious crisis is likely to create real momentum behind efforts to fix it.
- The White House said it didn't exclude any option on Iran, including a military one. But it's obvious that it has to say that in order to maintain pressure on Tehran. In practical terms, do you think that a military strike against Iran or even a limited ground military operation against its nuclear sites is possible, and can this be effective in longer terms?
- In the military sense, damage could certainly be inflicted. But the effectiveness of strikes would depend on the attacker’s goals. It is extremely unlikely that Iran’s nuclear program could be destroyed, though it could certainly be delayed for some time via damage to key underground sites.
But neither the Americans nor the Israelis appear to believe that the benefits that might come with a military attack are worth the potential costs. There are many opinions on these questions, but there are also two very important facts to consider: Neither the US nor Israeli government has undertaken any attack on an Iranian nuclear facility. This is a reflection of their growing skepticism that any military option can achieve its goal at an acceptable “cost.” That cost would take many forms—political, diplomatic, security, economic, etc.
- What is your assessment of the process of negotiating the new START agreement between Russia and the US? Many promises have been made from both sides that the deal would be sealed pretty soon, but it's still unfinished. What is the main obstacle for this delay? Do you think that it can be removed to open the way for conclusion by the April nuclear summit in Washington?
- Reaching a new strategic arms control treaty is an important near-term goal of the "reset" in US-Russia relations, and while the two sides failed to conclude a deal by the end of 2009, as Presidents Medvedev and Obama suggested they might, intensive negotiations are ongoing. The key sticking point concerns missile defense capabilities. Russia insists that the treaty cover not only offensive weapons, as in the past, but also includes more transparency on US tests of defensive systems. Washington has always promised the Russians a degree of transparency about its missile defense plans but is reluctant in practice to allow its ballistic missile defense programs to be compromised in any way by treaty obligations. This is particularly true given Moscow's bristling displeasure with the missile defense plans. Presidents Obama and Medvedev may personally discuss the issue again in coming days, and while the April deadline may be in some doubt, this is an issue of sufficient mutual interest that a deal is still expected at some point this spring.
- Do you think that the announcement of the possibility to deploy the BMD elements in Romania and Bulgaria can affect the arms reduction process? Many Russian experts say that the last year Obama's decision on ABM defense in Europe was in no way a move toward Russia but a more sophisticated reshaping of the future AMB system. Saying that means that this problem will continue to be a major irritant in Russian-American relations. What is your point on that?
- Missile defense is not a high priority for the Obama administration, but I do think it has the potential to continue to impact US-Russian relations. Moscow finds missile defense an irritant, but I don't believe that Washington is willing to completely give up on it. We have to remember that this issue is not simply about Russia. It’s a key principle in America’s relations with its NATO allies in Eastern Europe.
- But at the same time Washington doesn't like the idea of submitting the decision on missile defense deployment in Europe to NATO in Brussels, while some in the Alliance, (Germany, for example) have indicated at least reservations, if not opposition to US plans. Does the current situation mean that Obama's decision to shelve the deployment hasn’t changed at all the US strategy on missile defense in Europe?
- The Obama administration will not push on the issue of missile defense, but it is not going to eliminate the idea either. Missile defense remains a part of US strategy in the region.
- On NATO, a decision was made not to make any decision in regards of accepting Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance. For how long will this uncertainty last? Can Mr. Yanukovich's victory in the presidential elections in Ukraine stop the previous efforts of the political elite of Ukraine to join NATO. I mean not the general process of building closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community but, precisely, the issue of joining NATO.
And the same question is on Georgia - can the present uncertainty with the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia block Tbilisi from joining NATO, at least unless their status is resolved?
- I think that the election of Yanukovych will end the conversation about Ukraine joining NATO for the foreseeable future. But talk of membership for Ukraine and Georgia was always a long-term issue. The US and Europe have too much lose in terms of stability along the former Soviet periphery from dramatically worsened relations with Russia. Neither country was ever going to join NATO in the next five years. Recent developments simply ensure that a long-term project will take even longer—if it EVER happens.
I wouldn't say that recent developments will put a permanent end to NATO enlargement, but we should see much less talk about (and tension over) the issue over the next few years. For the moment, there is very little support for further expansion within Europe.
- NATO is preparing a new concept for the Alliance. What should it inherit from the previous 1999 concept and what should be abandoned? Why did it decide to create a new concept?
- The need for a new concept is obvious: There is no longer a Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat to NATO member states, and the organization must build a broader mandate--Afghanistan isn't part of the “North Atlantic.” Some will argue that NATO has outlived its usefulness and should be abandoned. But the need for collective action on common security challenges remains vitally important for its member states. NATO should be working on more complicated threats, not simply traditional issues of war and peace. Security threats have become more sophisticated and flexible, and so should NATO. It’s not just about terrorism. Cyber-security, for example, is becoming more important by the minute. These are areas where NATO member states (and others) can benefit from a collective approach to security.
- At the same time Russia is pushing forward its idea of a new European Security Treaty, and it seems that these two processes can come into contradictions because Russia is trying to create an environment that will allow Moscow a say in the broader European Security system while the West wants to prevent Russia from blocking any possible options within the Euro-Atlantic security structures, like further enlargement of NATO or using the military structure of its future partners. What is your opinion on that? Will these two processes come into a clinch?
- The Russian government has been increasingly unhappy with the post Cold War regional balance of power, particularly following the so-called Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. With the 2008 war in Georgia, launched as Prime Minister Putin and President Bush sat side by side during the Beijing Summer Olympics, Russia moved suddenly and dramatically to shift that balance.
But tensions in the post-Soviet space have diminished quite a bit. There are several reasons. First, economic troubles in Russia forced Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev to focus their time and energy on keeping banks afloat, factories open, and workers in their jobs. Second, the US now plays a less visible role in the region as the Obama team tries to reset relations with Moscow and to win Russian support for sanctions on Iran. Building out NATO is not on the agenda. Third, Russia is feeling more secure about how things are going in Georgia, where President Saakashvili has been tamed, and in Ukraine, where the Russia-friendly Viktor Yanukovych has been elected president. Yanukovych is not a Kremlin puppet, by any means. He cannot afford to be if he hopes to maintain his political credibility at home. But Ukraine’s NATO bid will remain on hold for years to come.
With less tension in the region, I don’t think we will see the sort of confrontation you’re describing any time soon.
- I will put this question in a different way. Will the Russian push for a new security Treaty in Europe have a positive or negative response from the Obama administration?
- The US reaction would be negative, because Washington sees the new treaty as an attempt to create an alternative to NATO. But there isn’t much urgency behind the new treaty proposal, and I don’t think there is much chance that it will create significant trouble.
- We see similar trends in the energy security in Europe. Russia is pushing the South Stream project while some other countries support the de-facto competing Nabucco pipeline. What is your scenario of the competition between these two major energy projects?
- Europe is taking small but real steps to diversify gas supplies away from Russia. Yet, progress on the larger multi-country projects, like the Nabucco gas pipeline, will remain slow because of an ongoing inability to secure large enough gas supplies and financing to make the project viable. Smaller regional energy projects, like the Italy-Greece-Turkey Interconnector (ITGI), will make faster progress, and could end up competing for some of the same supplies that Nabucco wants.
Gazprom and the Russian government are making progress with the South Stream gas pipeline project and effectively undermining Nabucco. The Russian side is striking bilateral agreements with potential transit countries for the two-branch route, including Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy and Greece. Russia has signed a deal with Slovenia, but Romania is still on hold. Gazprom is, where possible, buying existing gas storage or planning the construction of new units along or near the South Stream route. EU law could complicate further acquisitions, though regulatory enforcement may be uneven and companies, including Gazprom, might work around the law by acting via third parties. South Stream is progressing faster than EU-backed alternatives, but the economic environment and remaining political hurdles could still delay Russia's project.
Source: RIA Novosti
- Iran has said it's prepared to exchange the nuclear fuel on its territory only. Why is this condition unacceptable for the US as it seems to be one of the few ways to make a diplomatic deal with Iran? In the current situation, is the negotiating track still considered to be a realistic one or the US has nothing to do but close the door to negotiations and proceed with sanctions?
- Iran has consistently hidden key components of its enrichment program from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The discovery late last year that Iran had hidden an underground nuclear site at Qom has dampened hopes within the Obama administration that Iran might be willing to make an acceptable deal, and the latest IAEA report on the program argues that the problem continues. Given that history, Washington insists that there cannot be a diplomatic solution unless Tehran’s compliance with the agreement can be easily verified by international inspectors. The US and its European partners will continue with negotiations, but the UN Security Council will likely take up another sanctions resolution soon.
- The idea of new sanctions against Tehran has seemingly got - if not an approval, then at least the concession - of Russia and the only objection is from China. Why is Beijng so reluctant to sanctions even after the new IAEA report only increased the concerns of Iran building a nuclear weapon? Is it possible that China will give up?
- China has been the most reluctant because it imports large quantities of energy from Iran, because it doesn’t like the appearance of doing anything under pressure from Washington, and because Iran’s nuclear program doesn’t pose a direct threat to China’s interests. Yet, China will probably support some form of sanctions, given the IAEA report, Russia’s position on the issue and the latest news from Tehran. They do not want to be the only UNSC permanent member to cast a veto.
- It's a bit surprising to watch the US trying to persuade China on Iran and at the same time kicking Beijing by selling arms to Taiwan and welcoming the Dalai Lama to the White House. Were these two apparently anti-Chinese moves more important for Washington than getting China on board in terms of UN sanctions against Tehran?
- These problems in US-Chinese relationship are not as serious as they appear. There is nothing new about arms sales to Taiwan, and China isn’t particularly threatened by them. The Dalai Lama is a similar story. Every president since Ronald Reagan has met with the Dalai Llama at least once, and the Obama administration was careful to downplay the importance of the meeting after refusing to meet with him last year on the eve of a crucial G20 meeting. Again, China will take the usual diplomatic steps to express disapproval in a case like this, but there are many issues in US-Chinese relations that are far more important to both sides.
- The Israeli prime minister proposed to impose sanctions on Iran without the UN Security Council approval in case China (and possibly Russia) doesn't agree. Do you think that the Obama administration can go for actions bypassing the UN Security Council, as the Bush administration did when starting the war against Iraq?
- The Obama administration sees these as separate tracks. First, let be clear that I do not see any real risk of US military strikes against Iran. On the sanctions process, the US will work through the Security Council, but it will also work with allies and other willing partners to tighten sanctions in other ways. Washington hopes to craft sanctions that will inflict as much financial pain as possible on the Iranian government and the Revolutionary Guard but harm the Iranian people as little as possible. That’s why you do not see more support within the Obama administration for sanctions that would cut gasoline supplies to Iran. That kind of move would hurt millions of Iranians. On the other hand, the US does want to restrict the flow of revenue for Iran’s government—and perhaps the personal financial transactions of those at the highest levels of the leadership. This will not be easy, and it remains very unlikely that sanctions in any form will persuade Iran’s government to renounce its nuclear ambitions.
- Then this means that the sanctions will miss their goal to secure the non-proliferation regime, doesn't it?
- Yes, Iran is ultimately likely to go nuclear, just as North Korea did—though Tehran may avoid actually testing a weapon in order to maintain a kind of ambiguity on the issue. There is deep division within Iran on many questions, but this is not one of them; there is broad and deep support for the nuclear program both within the leadership and the general public. The international non-proliferation regime is broken, and only a serious crisis is likely to create real momentum behind efforts to fix it.
- The White House said it didn't exclude any option on Iran, including a military one. But it's obvious that it has to say that in order to maintain pressure on Tehran. In practical terms, do you think that a military strike against Iran or even a limited ground military operation against its nuclear sites is possible, and can this be effective in longer terms?
- In the military sense, damage could certainly be inflicted. But the effectiveness of strikes would depend on the attacker’s goals. It is extremely unlikely that Iran’s nuclear program could be destroyed, though it could certainly be delayed for some time via damage to key underground sites.
But neither the Americans nor the Israelis appear to believe that the benefits that might come with a military attack are worth the potential costs. There are many opinions on these questions, but there are also two very important facts to consider: Neither the US nor Israeli government has undertaken any attack on an Iranian nuclear facility. This is a reflection of their growing skepticism that any military option can achieve its goal at an acceptable “cost.” That cost would take many forms—political, diplomatic, security, economic, etc.
- What is your assessment of the process of negotiating the new START agreement between Russia and the US? Many promises have been made from both sides that the deal would be sealed pretty soon, but it's still unfinished. What is the main obstacle for this delay? Do you think that it can be removed to open the way for conclusion by the April nuclear summit in Washington?
- Reaching a new strategic arms control treaty is an important near-term goal of the "reset" in US-Russia relations, and while the two sides failed to conclude a deal by the end of 2009, as Presidents Medvedev and Obama suggested they might, intensive negotiations are ongoing. The key sticking point concerns missile defense capabilities. Russia insists that the treaty cover not only offensive weapons, as in the past, but also includes more transparency on US tests of defensive systems. Washington has always promised the Russians a degree of transparency about its missile defense plans but is reluctant in practice to allow its ballistic missile defense programs to be compromised in any way by treaty obligations. This is particularly true given Moscow's bristling displeasure with the missile defense plans. Presidents Obama and Medvedev may personally discuss the issue again in coming days, and while the April deadline may be in some doubt, this is an issue of sufficient mutual interest that a deal is still expected at some point this spring.
- Do you think that the announcement of the possibility to deploy the BMD elements in Romania and Bulgaria can affect the arms reduction process? Many Russian experts say that the last year Obama's decision on ABM defense in Europe was in no way a move toward Russia but a more sophisticated reshaping of the future AMB system. Saying that means that this problem will continue to be a major irritant in Russian-American relations. What is your point on that?
- Missile defense is not a high priority for the Obama administration, but I do think it has the potential to continue to impact US-Russian relations. Moscow finds missile defense an irritant, but I don't believe that Washington is willing to completely give up on it. We have to remember that this issue is not simply about Russia. It’s a key principle in America’s relations with its NATO allies in Eastern Europe.
- But at the same time Washington doesn't like the idea of submitting the decision on missile defense deployment in Europe to NATO in Brussels, while some in the Alliance, (Germany, for example) have indicated at least reservations, if not opposition to US plans. Does the current situation mean that Obama's decision to shelve the deployment hasn’t changed at all the US strategy on missile defense in Europe?
- The Obama administration will not push on the issue of missile defense, but it is not going to eliminate the idea either. Missile defense remains a part of US strategy in the region.
- On NATO, a decision was made not to make any decision in regards of accepting Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance. For how long will this uncertainty last? Can Mr. Yanukovich's victory in the presidential elections in Ukraine stop the previous efforts of the political elite of Ukraine to join NATO. I mean not the general process of building closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community but, precisely, the issue of joining NATO.
And the same question is on Georgia - can the present uncertainty with the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia block Tbilisi from joining NATO, at least unless their status is resolved?
- I think that the election of Yanukovych will end the conversation about Ukraine joining NATO for the foreseeable future. But talk of membership for Ukraine and Georgia was always a long-term issue. The US and Europe have too much lose in terms of stability along the former Soviet periphery from dramatically worsened relations with Russia. Neither country was ever going to join NATO in the next five years. Recent developments simply ensure that a long-term project will take even longer—if it EVER happens.
I wouldn't say that recent developments will put a permanent end to NATO enlargement, but we should see much less talk about (and tension over) the issue over the next few years. For the moment, there is very little support for further expansion within Europe.
- NATO is preparing a new concept for the Alliance. What should it inherit from the previous 1999 concept and what should be abandoned? Why did it decide to create a new concept?
- The need for a new concept is obvious: There is no longer a Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat to NATO member states, and the organization must build a broader mandate--Afghanistan isn't part of the “North Atlantic.” Some will argue that NATO has outlived its usefulness and should be abandoned. But the need for collective action on common security challenges remains vitally important for its member states. NATO should be working on more complicated threats, not simply traditional issues of war and peace. Security threats have become more sophisticated and flexible, and so should NATO. It’s not just about terrorism. Cyber-security, for example, is becoming more important by the minute. These are areas where NATO member states (and others) can benefit from a collective approach to security.
- At the same time Russia is pushing forward its idea of a new European Security Treaty, and it seems that these two processes can come into contradictions because Russia is trying to create an environment that will allow Moscow a say in the broader European Security system while the West wants to prevent Russia from blocking any possible options within the Euro-Atlantic security structures, like further enlargement of NATO or using the military structure of its future partners. What is your opinion on that? Will these two processes come into a clinch?
- The Russian government has been increasingly unhappy with the post Cold War regional balance of power, particularly following the so-called Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. With the 2008 war in Georgia, launched as Prime Minister Putin and President Bush sat side by side during the Beijing Summer Olympics, Russia moved suddenly and dramatically to shift that balance.
But tensions in the post-Soviet space have diminished quite a bit. There are several reasons. First, economic troubles in Russia forced Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev to focus their time and energy on keeping banks afloat, factories open, and workers in their jobs. Second, the US now plays a less visible role in the region as the Obama team tries to reset relations with Moscow and to win Russian support for sanctions on Iran. Building out NATO is not on the agenda. Third, Russia is feeling more secure about how things are going in Georgia, where President Saakashvili has been tamed, and in Ukraine, where the Russia-friendly Viktor Yanukovych has been elected president. Yanukovych is not a Kremlin puppet, by any means. He cannot afford to be if he hopes to maintain his political credibility at home. But Ukraine’s NATO bid will remain on hold for years to come.
With less tension in the region, I don’t think we will see the sort of confrontation you’re describing any time soon.
- I will put this question in a different way. Will the Russian push for a new security Treaty in Europe have a positive or negative response from the Obama administration?
- The US reaction would be negative, because Washington sees the new treaty as an attempt to create an alternative to NATO. But there isn’t much urgency behind the new treaty proposal, and I don’t think there is much chance that it will create significant trouble.
- We see similar trends in the energy security in Europe. Russia is pushing the South Stream project while some other countries support the de-facto competing Nabucco pipeline. What is your scenario of the competition between these two major energy projects?
- Europe is taking small but real steps to diversify gas supplies away from Russia. Yet, progress on the larger multi-country projects, like the Nabucco gas pipeline, will remain slow because of an ongoing inability to secure large enough gas supplies and financing to make the project viable. Smaller regional energy projects, like the Italy-Greece-Turkey Interconnector (ITGI), will make faster progress, and could end up competing for some of the same supplies that Nabucco wants.
Gazprom and the Russian government are making progress with the South Stream gas pipeline project and effectively undermining Nabucco. The Russian side is striking bilateral agreements with potential transit countries for the two-branch route, including Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy and Greece. Russia has signed a deal with Slovenia, but Romania is still on hold. Gazprom is, where possible, buying existing gas storage or planning the construction of new units along or near the South Stream route. EU law could complicate further acquisitions, though regulatory enforcement may be uneven and companies, including Gazprom, might work around the law by acting via third parties. South Stream is progressing faster than EU-backed alternatives, but the economic environment and remaining political hurdles could still delay Russia's project.
Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, March 05, 2010 |
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Abkhazia's Deepening Dependence On Russia
In the eighteen months since Russia recognised it as independent from Georgia, small but strategic Abkhazia has become increasingly dependent on its giant patron.
"Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence," the latest report from the International Crisis Group, gives a snapshot of the current situation, particularly the extent of Russian economic, political and cultural dominance in the Black Sea entity that has long been a favourite winter holiday resort for the Moscow elite.
“Abkhazia’s international status is far from settled”, says Lawrence Scott Sheets, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project Director. “All except four countries in the world regard it as part of Georgia, and there is no chance of European Union member-state or other major international recognition.”
In return for recognition and aid, Russia obtained highly prized military-strategic assets in Abkhazia. Moscow has not abided by the terms of the 2008 ceasefire agreements to withdraw its military forces to pre-war positions. Most recently it signed with the Abkhaz a new agreement to build a joint military base in the entity.
To meet its international commitments, Russia should fully implement the terms of the ceasefire agreements and cut back its military presence to what it was before the war, argues the International Crisis Group report.
Russian recognition of Abkhazia came fifteen years after Tbilisi lost effective control of the territory and some 210,000 ethnic Georgians were forcibly displaced. During those years, the entity took steps to build up its own institutions, economy, and rule of law. Now after Russian recognition, some Abkhazians are not happy with their deepening dependence on their northern neighbour and are concerned with becoming overly reliant economically, politically and culturally. Yet they still view Moscow as their guarantor against what they consider Georgian aggression.
It is in the interests of all sides to agree to disagree about status topics that can only be resolved over a long time. Abkhazia and Georgia should focus instead on creating economic and humanitarian links without legalistic preconditions. That would benefit both, build stability and give momentum to what must be a lengthy reconciliation process. Georgia should stick to its commitment of not seeking the isolation of Abkhazia.
The EU and UN should continue to implement humanitarian, confidence-building, economic integration and democracy building projects in Abkhazia, as well as finalise agreements with Tbilisi and Sukhumi to make quicker decisions on project implementation.
"Tbilisi has developed a new ‘State Strategy’ on engagement with Abkhazia and become more permissive of international involvement in the entity. This is a step forward," said Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. “All sides should focus on projects that avoid the contentious issue of status to build the confidence needed to eventually address issues including the return of roughly 200,000 displaced ethnic Georgians to their homes in Abkhazia.”
"Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence," the latest report from the International Crisis Group, gives a snapshot of the current situation, particularly the extent of Russian economic, political and cultural dominance in the Black Sea entity that has long been a favourite winter holiday resort for the Moscow elite.
“Abkhazia’s international status is far from settled”, says Lawrence Scott Sheets, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project Director. “All except four countries in the world regard it as part of Georgia, and there is no chance of European Union member-state or other major international recognition.”
In return for recognition and aid, Russia obtained highly prized military-strategic assets in Abkhazia. Moscow has not abided by the terms of the 2008 ceasefire agreements to withdraw its military forces to pre-war positions. Most recently it signed with the Abkhaz a new agreement to build a joint military base in the entity.
To meet its international commitments, Russia should fully implement the terms of the ceasefire agreements and cut back its military presence to what it was before the war, argues the International Crisis Group report.
Russian recognition of Abkhazia came fifteen years after Tbilisi lost effective control of the territory and some 210,000 ethnic Georgians were forcibly displaced. During those years, the entity took steps to build up its own institutions, economy, and rule of law. Now after Russian recognition, some Abkhazians are not happy with their deepening dependence on their northern neighbour and are concerned with becoming overly reliant economically, politically and culturally. Yet they still view Moscow as their guarantor against what they consider Georgian aggression.
It is in the interests of all sides to agree to disagree about status topics that can only be resolved over a long time. Abkhazia and Georgia should focus instead on creating economic and humanitarian links without legalistic preconditions. That would benefit both, build stability and give momentum to what must be a lengthy reconciliation process. Georgia should stick to its commitment of not seeking the isolation of Abkhazia.
The EU and UN should continue to implement humanitarian, confidence-building, economic integration and democracy building projects in Abkhazia, as well as finalise agreements with Tbilisi and Sukhumi to make quicker decisions on project implementation.
"Tbilisi has developed a new ‘State Strategy’ on engagement with Abkhazia and become more permissive of international involvement in the entity. This is a step forward," said Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. “All sides should focus on projects that avoid the contentious issue of status to build the confidence needed to eventually address issues including the return of roughly 200,000 displaced ethnic Georgians to their homes in Abkhazia.”
Saturday, February 27, 2010 |
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Abkhaz Leader: 'We Are An Independent Country And That Will Not Change'
By Danila Galperovich
Ties between Abkhazia and Russia have blossomed at a frantic rate ever since Moscow recognized the Georgian breakaway republic's independence following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008.
In the latest step, Abkhazia's de facto leader Sergei Bagapsh says his almost universally unrecognized territory would consider joining a customs union with Russia that would further open the Russian market to Abkhaz trade and help boost investment in the territory.
"We are an independent country and this will not change. But we would consider the possibility of joining a customs union with Russia," Bagapsh told RFE/RL's Russian Service in Moscow today.
Bagapsh was in Moscow to oversee the signing of an agreement allowing Russia to build a military base in the breakaway territory. The base will accommodate at least 3,000 Russian troops already stationed in Abkhazia for at least 49 years.
The Abkhaz leader said the Russian base was necessary for the security of the territory, which broke from Georgia's direct control following a bitter war in the early 1990s in which 15,000 people died and 250,000 ethnic Georgians were expelled.
"We don't want a repeat of what happened in 1992-93. We need a [Russian] base in Abkhazia for the same reason NATO needs a base in Kosovo," Bagapsh said.
"Why do European countries want to join NATO? So they can live safely and peacefully. We also want to live peacefully. We have fought too much and we want to live peacefully with our friends."
Russian Domination
Moscow formally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and a second Georgian breakaway region, South Ossetia, from Tbilisi following the August 2008 five-day war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia. Since then, however, only Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the Micronesian island republic of Nauru have followed suit.
The Russian base will be located in the port town of Gudauta, north of the capital Sukhumi. Moscow also has plans to house a naval base in the port of Ochamchire, close to the cease-fire line separating Abkhazia from Georgia proper.
Russia's dominance of Abkhazia has become nearly total, with 4,000 to 5,000 Russian land, air, and naval troops believed to be deployed in the region. Moscow has also been granted control over the territory's borders, airport, and railway system.
Most Abkhaz residents carry Russian passports in order to be able to travel abroad and communicate predominantly in the Russian language. And the Russian ruble remains the territory's official currency.
Abkhazia is also dependent on Moscow for state aid, trade, and foreign investment. Bagapsh says the Russian assistance is needed because Western governments, which do not recognize Abkhazia's independence, have refused to help.
"Things developed in a difficult way for us after the war," Bagapsh said. "European structures are not helping us. Russia is helping. That assistance is targeted so it doesn't get swallowed up somewhere. It is aimed at developing infrastructure and our productive capacity."
No Right Of Return
Prior to the 1992-93 war, ethnic Georgians made up the largest group in Abkhazia. Approximately 50,000-60,000 ethnic Georgians displaced by the war have managed to return to Abkhazia.
But Bagapsh says his government will not allow the remaining 200,000 displaced Georgian to return to their former homes, arguing that such a move would be destabilizing.
"It is not possible for the remaining displaced persons to return. If they return, there would be many people among them who took part in the fighting. Their children fought. Their parents fought. This would lead to another conflict," Bagapsh said.
"I have another idea. Europeans, non-Europeans, and everybody else should not be helping [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili to arm himself. Instead they should use that money to help displaced persons to adapt to life in Georgia. That would be the right thing to do."
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
Ties between Abkhazia and Russia have blossomed at a frantic rate ever since Moscow recognized the Georgian breakaway republic's independence following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008.
In the latest step, Abkhazia's de facto leader Sergei Bagapsh says his almost universally unrecognized territory would consider joining a customs union with Russia that would further open the Russian market to Abkhaz trade and help boost investment in the territory.
"We are an independent country and this will not change. But we would consider the possibility of joining a customs union with Russia," Bagapsh told RFE/RL's Russian Service in Moscow today.
Bagapsh was in Moscow to oversee the signing of an agreement allowing Russia to build a military base in the breakaway territory. The base will accommodate at least 3,000 Russian troops already stationed in Abkhazia for at least 49 years.
The Abkhaz leader said the Russian base was necessary for the security of the territory, which broke from Georgia's direct control following a bitter war in the early 1990s in which 15,000 people died and 250,000 ethnic Georgians were expelled.
"We don't want a repeat of what happened in 1992-93. We need a [Russian] base in Abkhazia for the same reason NATO needs a base in Kosovo," Bagapsh said.
"Why do European countries want to join NATO? So they can live safely and peacefully. We also want to live peacefully. We have fought too much and we want to live peacefully with our friends."
Russian Domination
Moscow formally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and a second Georgian breakaway region, South Ossetia, from Tbilisi following the August 2008 five-day war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia. Since then, however, only Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the Micronesian island republic of Nauru have followed suit.
The Russian base will be located in the port town of Gudauta, north of the capital Sukhumi. Moscow also has plans to house a naval base in the port of Ochamchire, close to the cease-fire line separating Abkhazia from Georgia proper.
Russia's dominance of Abkhazia has become nearly total, with 4,000 to 5,000 Russian land, air, and naval troops believed to be deployed in the region. Moscow has also been granted control over the territory's borders, airport, and railway system.
Most Abkhaz residents carry Russian passports in order to be able to travel abroad and communicate predominantly in the Russian language. And the Russian ruble remains the territory's official currency.
Abkhazia is also dependent on Moscow for state aid, trade, and foreign investment. Bagapsh says the Russian assistance is needed because Western governments, which do not recognize Abkhazia's independence, have refused to help.
"Things developed in a difficult way for us after the war," Bagapsh said. "European structures are not helping us. Russia is helping. That assistance is targeted so it doesn't get swallowed up somewhere. It is aimed at developing infrastructure and our productive capacity."
No Right Of Return
Prior to the 1992-93 war, ethnic Georgians made up the largest group in Abkhazia. Approximately 50,000-60,000 ethnic Georgians displaced by the war have managed to return to Abkhazia.
But Bagapsh says his government will not allow the remaining 200,000 displaced Georgian to return to their former homes, arguing that such a move would be destabilizing.
"It is not possible for the remaining displaced persons to return. If they return, there would be many people among them who took part in the fighting. Their children fought. Their parents fought. This would lead to another conflict," Bagapsh said.
"I have another idea. Europeans, non-Europeans, and everybody else should not be helping [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili to arm himself. Instead they should use that money to help displaced persons to adapt to life in Georgia. That would be the right thing to do."
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
Friday, February 19, 2010 |
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Russia To Build Military Base In Occupied Georgia
Russia secured on 17 February the right to maintain a large, long-term military presence in the Georgian rebel region of Abkhazia, signing a deal for a military base that was condemned by Tbilisi and the West.
With Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Abkhazia's leader Sergei Bagapsh looking on, their defence chiefs signed an agreement allowing Moscow to build a military base in the breakaway territory on the Black Sea.
The base will accommodate at least 3,000 Russian land troops, already stationed in Abkhazia, for at least 49 years, Abkhaz officials said.
"This agreement creates a foundation for the development of Abkhazia as an independent state," Medvedev said at a signing ceremony in the Great Kremlin Palace.
Moscow recognised Abkhazia in August 2008 after crushing an assault by US ally Georgia on another pro-Russian breakaway region, South Ossetia, in a five-day war.
The regions, which broke away from Georgia in bloody wars in the early 1990s, are almost completely dependent on Russia. Both use the Russian rouble and Moscow has issued most residents with Russian passports and pays their pensions.
The new base is one of several that Russia plans to build on the sliver of land, which is close to NATO member Turkey, in the near future. The others are for airborne troops and the navy.
NATO reacts swiftly
NATO swiftly called on Russia to reverse the deal, saying it violated the restrictions on military forces stipulated in the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement after the 2008 war.
"We do not consider any agreements signed between the Russian Federation and the regions of Georgia as having any validity," the alliance's spokeswoman Carmen Romero said.
Georgia had decried the plans for a land base as illegal and called it part of Moscow's "occupation" campaign.
In April 2009, Russia formally took control over the de-facto borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, provoking condemnation from Western powers.
The European Union and NATO have repeatedly expressed concern that a Moscow-led military build-up in Abkhazia threatens Georgia's territorial integrity.
It is also watched with unease by Western powers for its proximity to crucial energy routes which flow to the EU.
Medvedev said the base would not violate Russia's international obligations.
Source: EurActiv
With Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Abkhazia's leader Sergei Bagapsh looking on, their defence chiefs signed an agreement allowing Moscow to build a military base in the breakaway territory on the Black Sea.
The base will accommodate at least 3,000 Russian land troops, already stationed in Abkhazia, for at least 49 years, Abkhaz officials said.
"This agreement creates a foundation for the development of Abkhazia as an independent state," Medvedev said at a signing ceremony in the Great Kremlin Palace.
Moscow recognised Abkhazia in August 2008 after crushing an assault by US ally Georgia on another pro-Russian breakaway region, South Ossetia, in a five-day war.
The regions, which broke away from Georgia in bloody wars in the early 1990s, are almost completely dependent on Russia. Both use the Russian rouble and Moscow has issued most residents with Russian passports and pays their pensions.
The new base is one of several that Russia plans to build on the sliver of land, which is close to NATO member Turkey, in the near future. The others are for airborne troops and the navy.
NATO reacts swiftly
NATO swiftly called on Russia to reverse the deal, saying it violated the restrictions on military forces stipulated in the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement after the 2008 war.
"We do not consider any agreements signed between the Russian Federation and the regions of Georgia as having any validity," the alliance's spokeswoman Carmen Romero said.
Georgia had decried the plans for a land base as illegal and called it part of Moscow's "occupation" campaign.
In April 2009, Russia formally took control over the de-facto borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, provoking condemnation from Western powers.
The European Union and NATO have repeatedly expressed concern that a Moscow-led military build-up in Abkhazia threatens Georgia's territorial integrity.
It is also watched with unease by Western powers for its proximity to crucial energy routes which flow to the EU.
Medvedev said the base would not violate Russia's international obligations.
Source: EurActiv
Thursday, February 18, 2010 |
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