Challenges For The Euro Area And The World Economy
Speech by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
“The Group of Thirty”, 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem, Rabat, 28 May 2010
It is a pleasure to be here today, in the Group of Thirty, to discuss the main challenges on the road to a sustained recovery. I actually ask myself whether the title of the first session – “Crisis of the Eurosystem” – adequately reflects what is happening in Europe and more generally in the global financial markets. My impression is that what we are now seeing primarily in the euro area reflects a broader phenomenon, namely the sustainability of public finances in advanced economies. To repeat a much used metaphor recently, we could say that euro area tensions are “the canary in the coal mine” of the challenges that policy-makers worldwide are going to face.
Let me elaborate by looking at the origin of the problem, i.e. the sustainability of public finances. In the aftermath of the Lehman failure, governments around the world seemed to rediscover Keynes. They injected huge amounts of borrowed money – public funds – to stabilise the economy after the shock of the Lehman failure. These policies worked, and averted a global depression. The success of those policies has led governments – encouraged by international organisations – to continue using expansionary fiscal policies to try pulling the economy out of the recession and getting it back to the pre-crisis level.
The strategy is based on a model which may turn out to be inappropriate in the current conjuncture. Let me discuss some of the underlying assumptions of the model. First, the initial fiscal impulse was successful in avoiding a depression because it helped to coordinate agents’ expectations, in the Keynesian or Knightian way of reducing uncertainty, thereby avoiding a vicious circle of recession and deflation. The direct impact on domestic demand may have been more modest, as shown in countries where the size of the fiscal stimulus was more contained but nevertheless fared equally well. Second, potential growth might have been severely affected by the crisis. As a result, the pre-crisis level of output, achieved in a bubble economy, would not represent a sustainable objective over the policy-relevant horizon. Third, the level achieved by the public debt in many countries may have impaired the effectiveness of further expansionary fiscal policy.
To sum up, while the fiscal expansion was successful immediately after the Lehman crisis, it may not be sustainable over time and may have to be corrected rapidly. Financial markets seem to be giving increasing attention to this hypothesis. And they have started to test it.
They have focused on the euro area, even though it has on average a lower deficit and a lower debt ratio than other economies. There are two reasons for this. They have to do with the particular institutional construction of the euro area, which is built on two pillars.
One is the monetary pillar, which is supported by an independent central bank with a clear price stability objective. This implies that the ECB will not use an inflation tax to reduce the real value of government debt. Euro area governments have thus to rely on budgetary measures to address their own fiscal problems. These measures are difficult to adopt, especially in countries with fragile political systems, such as those with minority governments or weak leadership, or where growth is projected to be slow due in particular to lost competitiveness or heavy reliance on external borrowing. Financial markets are testing each country, one by one, to see whether they are willing to adopt the necessary budgetary measures, starting with those which seem to be facing the greatest hurdles to consolidation.
Let me digress briefly on this point. Some may think that the fact that the ECB cannot use the inflation tax to bail out Governments is a weakness of the euro area’s construction, because it obliges some countries to make fiscal adjustments earlier than others. In my view, this is a strength. To believe that an inflation tax can solve the problem posed by the mounting public debt is an illusion that some people like to cultivate. For several reasons. First, people are less naïve than some might think – they dislike an inflation tax as much as other forms of fiscal adjustment. Second, it’s not so easy to generate inflation, in particular ‘surprise’ inflation, without provoking a more-than-proportional increase in interest rates, also in light of the short average maturity of public debt in most countries. Third, a rise in inflation, and inflation expectations, would produce a major upward shift in the yield curve, inflicting major losses on the banks and financial institutions which have been heavily investing in these markets, potentially undermining the recovery.
In short, the impossibility of resorting to an inflation tax is forcing euro area countries to tackle the burden of public debt sooner rather than later. In other countries the illusion of being able to resort to the inflation tax might delay the adjustment, but the longer the treatment is postponed the harsher it’s likely to be. End of digression.
The second pillar of the euro area construction concerns the economic and fiscal dimension. It was based on four key assumptions. The first was that markets would exert strong pressure on euro area fiscal policies. The second assumption was that if the first assumption were insufficient to discipline public finances, then the Stability and Growth Pact, based on monitoring, peer pressure and sanctions, would do the job. The third assumption, reinforcing the previous ones, is that if a member of the euro area were unable to implement sound fiscal policies, it would be left to its own devices. The final assumption was that national economic policies would be geared to ensure convergence among euro area economies, within a strengthened single market.
These assumptions turned out to be misplaced. Why?
One reason was that markets did not impose the necessary discipline on the Member States, in particular during the first years of Monetary Union, as spreads narrowed on different government bonds independently of emerging potential problems. Markets moved in a binary way, from all good to all bad, in an abrupt and pro-cyclical way.
Another reason was that the Pact did not work as expected. Surveillance proved difficult to implement, technically and politically. Sanctions gave rise to tensions between national authorities and European institutions. The latter became a scapegoat; they were accused of interpreting the Pact too rigidly and rigorously. As a result, the rules were weakened and ‘politicised’, leading to less stringent monitoring.
The third reason was that, in the midst of the worst crisis since World War II, the belief that countries could be left to their own devices, and eventually fail, without infecting others, proved wrong. Several academics and commentators are still flirting with the idea that a partial default could be organised in an orderly fashion, with minor repercussions on the country itself and on its neighbours. But financial markets have shown how exposed they are to contagion – contagion which, by the way, is not limited to the euro area. It’s global.
The final reason for these misplaced assumptions was that, during its first 11 years, the euro area economy experienced a strong convergence in real economic activity together with a significant divergence in nominal cost and price developments, which gave rise to large payments imbalances within the Union. Countries with lower income per capita grew faster than the richer ones, in some cases catching up with them, partly through excessive external borrowing and a decline in competitiveness. These developments were not offset by conservative fiscal policies to moderate domestic demand growth and to provide a buffer for any shocks.
The unique nature of the euro area institutional framework and the policies implemented by some of its members offer explanations for why the crisis erupted. I will not dwell too much on how the crisis developed and why it took so long to find a solution. The reasons are mainly political. They are not exclusive to the euro area, but are part of life in all democracies, where the trade-offs between the short-term costs and the long-term benefits of optimal solutions are difficult to perceive for the average taxpayer, and sometimes even for their elected representatives. Ultimately, the time it took to work out a solution – three months – was largely due to problems like those experienced in other countries faced with similar challenges. Remember the opposition by many members of the US Congress to the 1995 rescue package for Mexico, which was skilfully circumvented when the US Administration found USD 20 billion in the Exchange Stabilization Fund (which did not require Congressional approval). Remember also the initial vote against the TARP by Congress, even after the failure of Lehman Brothers, until markets slid further. These are all examples of the difficulties our democracies face in mobilising the appropriate resources to tackle major financial crises. They need to be explained to the public.
In the case of Greece, there was an additional complication: the previous government, in an election year, had hidden the sharp increase in the deficit (from 5% to over 13% of GDP). This shocked the other governments in the euro area and ordinary people too.
A further dimension, in the European context, is the difference in cultures and sensitivities. They affect how issues are communicated within countries, in particular between politicians and their electorates. These are differences which totally disconcert financial markets. For instance, in one large euro area country it was thought that public support for swift action could be achieved only by dramatising the situation, for instance, by telling the public that “the euro is in danger” or by considering the possibility of expelling a country from the euro area. But it was not realised that, in the midst of a financial upheaval, such words are like fanning the flames and that the cost of the support package could only increase following such dramatic declarations. By contrast, in other countries, leaders want to be seen as being in control of the situation and taking all sorts of initiatives to reassure their electorates. The media, of course, have a field day reporting on such apparently inconsistent activities.
What is clear is that Europeans have found out during this crisis that sharing a common currency entails much deeper links than they might have initially thought. Monetary Union is to some extent also a political union and subject to the challenges that such unions face, possibly even on a larger scale.
All in all, a series of decisions have been taken, both at the national and European level over the last three months. First, Greece has negotiated an adjustment programme with the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB. It is a very tough fiscal programme and contains major structural measures that will fundamentally change the Greek economy. The programme is accompanied by a €110 billion financial support package from the IMF and the euro area countries, which has been passed by the 16 euro area countries’ parliaments. Second, measures have been taken to avert contagion. A European fund, consisting of €500 billion, to be supplemented by €250 billion from the IMF, has been designed to prevent other potential cases. Third, measures have been taken by several countries to speed up fiscal consolidation. In particular, Portugal and Spain have announced additional fiscal and structural measures to accelerate the stabilisation of their debt/GDP dynamics as from 2012. Other countries have announced that they will step up consolidation of their budgets for the coming year. Finally, the ECB has decided to intervene in specific segments of euro area debt securities markets to improve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The way in which some of these decisions have been taken might appear cumbersome, or even clumsy, especially to outside observers unfamiliar with European decision-making processes. However, whenever a decision was needed it was ultimately taken. We experienced nothing like the TARP being voted down by a national parliament.
Each of these decisions had a positive, though short-lived, effect on market sentiment. Several market participants seem to be sceptical, in particular about whether the Greek adjustment programme will succeed. In their view – as far as I can understand – the programme is bound to fail for economic, political and European governance reasons. The logical conclusion is that Greece will default, at least partially, or restructure its debt. They are probably taking positions based on this conviction. The IMF, the euro area governments, the Greek government and the ECB however take a different view. They all consider that a default is not a viable solution. And they have taken decisions consistent with this view and put money – taxpayers’ money – where their mouths are.
Let me consider the arguments put forward by those who regard a Greek default as unavoidable.
Their first argument is economic. The adjustment programme is too harsh, given the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio reached in Greece. It will produce a debt spiral which will lead the country into a recession and deflation. The problem is made worse by the loss of competitiveness suffered by Greece over the last decade and the impossibility of devaluing the currency. Their reasoning is generally no more sophisticated than that. Some analysts have put together a few numbers to show that they are aware of the problem. But I have not seen a serious analysis of the 120-page report produced by the IMF which looks at the various aspects of the programme, including the impact of the structural measures on growth, the sustainability analysis or other features of the programme. Not one review of the realism of the assessments made by the staff of the IMF and the Commission. In fact, I suspect most market analysts have not even looked at the adjustment path for the primary surplus which is embedded in the programme, which aims to reach 6% of GDP in 2015, a level no different from the ones that other countries in the past have implemented to consolidate their public finances. It’s a level that a number of other countries – including some outside the euro area – will have to achieve if they want to stabilise their debt. Most market analysts and other observers have probably not even looked at the structural measures that are embedded in the programme, affecting for instance the labour market, or at several liberalisations, and their impact on economic growth. The inefficiencies in the tax collection system, which have been aggravated before the elections, have also been overlooked. The perception that the Greek programme will not work looks more like an assumption than the result of a serious assessment.
To summarise, I wonder which analysis is more serious and credible: the many one-pagers, very well publicised – I must admit – which probably aim to influence the rest of the market; or the IMF’s 120 pages of rather tedious analysis describing the contents of the programme, together with its risks.
Let me add that I have not read a single page on what a (partial) default of an industrial country would mean for the country itself, for the euro area and for the global economy. It’s often been stated – or should I say assumed? – that there is such a thing as an “organised” or “orderly” default. Argentina is sometimes mentioned, as if anything orderly happened there since it defaulted. On top of this, several of those who propose an “orderly default” also favoured letting Lehman fail, as a way to eliminate moral hazard and achieve better functioning markets. We saw what happened.
The way the markets move every day shows what implications a default would have for the Greek economy, its financial system and even the country’s membership of the European Union. Just look at the screens and you’ll see the contagion under way, spreading not only to peripheral countries but also to the largest euro area countries and through the financial system.
The second argument of those who foresee a Greek default is political. The government of that country – they claim – will not have the political stamina to sustain the adjustment effort over time, in the face of domestic protests, and will sooner or later give up.
It’s an argument that seems to ignore events and facts, at least from the Greek side. The Greek government was certainly slow in recognising the problem, but as soon as it did it reacted swiftly. On 11 February the European Council asked Greece to take measures to reduce its deficit by 4% of GDP. It did so in a few days and brought them to Parliament. The same happened for the IMF programme, which was quickly negotiated and adopted by Parliament in less than a week. The prime minister even expelled three members from his parliamentary group because they abstained from voting. So far all the measures contained in the programme have been approved. The fiscal adjustment has been frontloaded. Budget data available for the first four months of the year show an improvement of over 40% of the deficit compared with last year, whereas the target was 35%. A schedule for privatisation has just been approved by the government.
This is not to say that it’s going to be an easy ride. But what’s the alternative? Is it politically more palatable for a government to default? How would the millions of Greek savers react if suddenly they found out that part of their savings is worth substantially less? Would any government get away with it?
And what would be the political future of Greece in the European Union if it did not repay its debt to the German, French, Irish and all the other countries’ taxpayers? What would happen to the millions of euros in structural and cohesion funds that Greece receives every year from the EU?
Maybe you need a bit more than one page to give proper consideration to these factors.
Let me now turn to the euro area and consider the third argument which is sometimes made by market participants, namely that euro area governance has substantial weaknesses that undermine the viability of the single currency. I have already talked about the weaknesses of the current system. We should not forget, however, what has been created and what it has created. Overall, the combination of monetary and budgetary policies in the euro area has brought price stability and budgetary results which on average are better than those of most other economies. The problem is that this is true on average, but not for all the members of the Union, as it should be.
What is needed is a more resilient system, which avoids bad policies by the Member States and the contagion they can cause for the area as a whole. This requires working both on the numerator and on the denominator, i.e. on the budget and on economic growth. The way forward is twofold. It requires changes in the Member States’ economic policies. And it requires a strengthening of the institutional framework for budgetary surveillance.
The European Commission has published its first proposals to be considered by the task force on economic governance chaired by President Van Rompuy, which met for the first time last week. Some Member States have already made their own proposals. There is a vast convergence on the direction to take. Some of the proposals are controversial, like sanctioning countries that break the rules, for instance, with a loss of voting rights or of other means of financial aid. The task force’s deliberations are intended to lead to concrete proposals for the European Council by this autumn.
It is understandable to nurse doubts about the results of all these efforts. However, looking at the decisions which have been taken in recent weeks and months, one cannot doubt the determination of the 16 euro area countries to stick together and do the necessary to defend what has been achieved over the past ten years, and to improve it. The 16 countries believe, as do we at the ECB, that sticking to commitments, in particular in the case of the Greek programme, is essential for the credibility of the currency and the prosperity of its members, as would be the case for any other advanced economy or country. This is why the governments of the Member States and the representatives of EU institutions will do all that is needed to preserve that credibility and that prosperity. As I said earlier, monetary union is de facto a political union. It has to function and it will function.
Let me conclude. What we are currently experiencing is a crisis of public finances in advanced economies. It started with Greece, and the euro, because of the specific institutional framework which prevents Greece and the other euro area countries from using the inflation tax to overcome their budgetary problems. This will force euro area countries to address their fiscal positions earlier. It’s not easy. But it will be done, because it can be done and it has to be done in any case. And, last but not least, because there are no alternatives.
“The Group of Thirty”, 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem, Rabat, 28 May 2010
It is a pleasure to be here today, in the Group of Thirty, to discuss the main challenges on the road to a sustained recovery. I actually ask myself whether the title of the first session – “Crisis of the Eurosystem” – adequately reflects what is happening in Europe and more generally in the global financial markets. My impression is that what we are now seeing primarily in the euro area reflects a broader phenomenon, namely the sustainability of public finances in advanced economies. To repeat a much used metaphor recently, we could say that euro area tensions are “the canary in the coal mine” of the challenges that policy-makers worldwide are going to face.
Let me elaborate by looking at the origin of the problem, i.e. the sustainability of public finances. In the aftermath of the Lehman failure, governments around the world seemed to rediscover Keynes. They injected huge amounts of borrowed money – public funds – to stabilise the economy after the shock of the Lehman failure. These policies worked, and averted a global depression. The success of those policies has led governments – encouraged by international organisations – to continue using expansionary fiscal policies to try pulling the economy out of the recession and getting it back to the pre-crisis level.
The strategy is based on a model which may turn out to be inappropriate in the current conjuncture. Let me discuss some of the underlying assumptions of the model. First, the initial fiscal impulse was successful in avoiding a depression because it helped to coordinate agents’ expectations, in the Keynesian or Knightian way of reducing uncertainty, thereby avoiding a vicious circle of recession and deflation. The direct impact on domestic demand may have been more modest, as shown in countries where the size of the fiscal stimulus was more contained but nevertheless fared equally well. Second, potential growth might have been severely affected by the crisis. As a result, the pre-crisis level of output, achieved in a bubble economy, would not represent a sustainable objective over the policy-relevant horizon. Third, the level achieved by the public debt in many countries may have impaired the effectiveness of further expansionary fiscal policy.
To sum up, while the fiscal expansion was successful immediately after the Lehman crisis, it may not be sustainable over time and may have to be corrected rapidly. Financial markets seem to be giving increasing attention to this hypothesis. And they have started to test it.
They have focused on the euro area, even though it has on average a lower deficit and a lower debt ratio than other economies. There are two reasons for this. They have to do with the particular institutional construction of the euro area, which is built on two pillars.
One is the monetary pillar, which is supported by an independent central bank with a clear price stability objective. This implies that the ECB will not use an inflation tax to reduce the real value of government debt. Euro area governments have thus to rely on budgetary measures to address their own fiscal problems. These measures are difficult to adopt, especially in countries with fragile political systems, such as those with minority governments or weak leadership, or where growth is projected to be slow due in particular to lost competitiveness or heavy reliance on external borrowing. Financial markets are testing each country, one by one, to see whether they are willing to adopt the necessary budgetary measures, starting with those which seem to be facing the greatest hurdles to consolidation.
Let me digress briefly on this point. Some may think that the fact that the ECB cannot use the inflation tax to bail out Governments is a weakness of the euro area’s construction, because it obliges some countries to make fiscal adjustments earlier than others. In my view, this is a strength. To believe that an inflation tax can solve the problem posed by the mounting public debt is an illusion that some people like to cultivate. For several reasons. First, people are less naïve than some might think – they dislike an inflation tax as much as other forms of fiscal adjustment. Second, it’s not so easy to generate inflation, in particular ‘surprise’ inflation, without provoking a more-than-proportional increase in interest rates, also in light of the short average maturity of public debt in most countries. Third, a rise in inflation, and inflation expectations, would produce a major upward shift in the yield curve, inflicting major losses on the banks and financial institutions which have been heavily investing in these markets, potentially undermining the recovery.
In short, the impossibility of resorting to an inflation tax is forcing euro area countries to tackle the burden of public debt sooner rather than later. In other countries the illusion of being able to resort to the inflation tax might delay the adjustment, but the longer the treatment is postponed the harsher it’s likely to be. End of digression.
The second pillar of the euro area construction concerns the economic and fiscal dimension. It was based on four key assumptions. The first was that markets would exert strong pressure on euro area fiscal policies. The second assumption was that if the first assumption were insufficient to discipline public finances, then the Stability and Growth Pact, based on monitoring, peer pressure and sanctions, would do the job. The third assumption, reinforcing the previous ones, is that if a member of the euro area were unable to implement sound fiscal policies, it would be left to its own devices. The final assumption was that national economic policies would be geared to ensure convergence among euro area economies, within a strengthened single market.
These assumptions turned out to be misplaced. Why?
One reason was that markets did not impose the necessary discipline on the Member States, in particular during the first years of Monetary Union, as spreads narrowed on different government bonds independently of emerging potential problems. Markets moved in a binary way, from all good to all bad, in an abrupt and pro-cyclical way.
Another reason was that the Pact did not work as expected. Surveillance proved difficult to implement, technically and politically. Sanctions gave rise to tensions between national authorities and European institutions. The latter became a scapegoat; they were accused of interpreting the Pact too rigidly and rigorously. As a result, the rules were weakened and ‘politicised’, leading to less stringent monitoring.
The third reason was that, in the midst of the worst crisis since World War II, the belief that countries could be left to their own devices, and eventually fail, without infecting others, proved wrong. Several academics and commentators are still flirting with the idea that a partial default could be organised in an orderly fashion, with minor repercussions on the country itself and on its neighbours. But financial markets have shown how exposed they are to contagion – contagion which, by the way, is not limited to the euro area. It’s global.
The final reason for these misplaced assumptions was that, during its first 11 years, the euro area economy experienced a strong convergence in real economic activity together with a significant divergence in nominal cost and price developments, which gave rise to large payments imbalances within the Union. Countries with lower income per capita grew faster than the richer ones, in some cases catching up with them, partly through excessive external borrowing and a decline in competitiveness. These developments were not offset by conservative fiscal policies to moderate domestic demand growth and to provide a buffer for any shocks.
The unique nature of the euro area institutional framework and the policies implemented by some of its members offer explanations for why the crisis erupted. I will not dwell too much on how the crisis developed and why it took so long to find a solution. The reasons are mainly political. They are not exclusive to the euro area, but are part of life in all democracies, where the trade-offs between the short-term costs and the long-term benefits of optimal solutions are difficult to perceive for the average taxpayer, and sometimes even for their elected representatives. Ultimately, the time it took to work out a solution – three months – was largely due to problems like those experienced in other countries faced with similar challenges. Remember the opposition by many members of the US Congress to the 1995 rescue package for Mexico, which was skilfully circumvented when the US Administration found USD 20 billion in the Exchange Stabilization Fund (which did not require Congressional approval). Remember also the initial vote against the TARP by Congress, even after the failure of Lehman Brothers, until markets slid further. These are all examples of the difficulties our democracies face in mobilising the appropriate resources to tackle major financial crises. They need to be explained to the public.
In the case of Greece, there was an additional complication: the previous government, in an election year, had hidden the sharp increase in the deficit (from 5% to over 13% of GDP). This shocked the other governments in the euro area and ordinary people too.
A further dimension, in the European context, is the difference in cultures and sensitivities. They affect how issues are communicated within countries, in particular between politicians and their electorates. These are differences which totally disconcert financial markets. For instance, in one large euro area country it was thought that public support for swift action could be achieved only by dramatising the situation, for instance, by telling the public that “the euro is in danger” or by considering the possibility of expelling a country from the euro area. But it was not realised that, in the midst of a financial upheaval, such words are like fanning the flames and that the cost of the support package could only increase following such dramatic declarations. By contrast, in other countries, leaders want to be seen as being in control of the situation and taking all sorts of initiatives to reassure their electorates. The media, of course, have a field day reporting on such apparently inconsistent activities.
What is clear is that Europeans have found out during this crisis that sharing a common currency entails much deeper links than they might have initially thought. Monetary Union is to some extent also a political union and subject to the challenges that such unions face, possibly even on a larger scale.
All in all, a series of decisions have been taken, both at the national and European level over the last three months. First, Greece has negotiated an adjustment programme with the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB. It is a very tough fiscal programme and contains major structural measures that will fundamentally change the Greek economy. The programme is accompanied by a €110 billion financial support package from the IMF and the euro area countries, which has been passed by the 16 euro area countries’ parliaments. Second, measures have been taken to avert contagion. A European fund, consisting of €500 billion, to be supplemented by €250 billion from the IMF, has been designed to prevent other potential cases. Third, measures have been taken by several countries to speed up fiscal consolidation. In particular, Portugal and Spain have announced additional fiscal and structural measures to accelerate the stabilisation of their debt/GDP dynamics as from 2012. Other countries have announced that they will step up consolidation of their budgets for the coming year. Finally, the ECB has decided to intervene in specific segments of euro area debt securities markets to improve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The way in which some of these decisions have been taken might appear cumbersome, or even clumsy, especially to outside observers unfamiliar with European decision-making processes. However, whenever a decision was needed it was ultimately taken. We experienced nothing like the TARP being voted down by a national parliament.
Each of these decisions had a positive, though short-lived, effect on market sentiment. Several market participants seem to be sceptical, in particular about whether the Greek adjustment programme will succeed. In their view – as far as I can understand – the programme is bound to fail for economic, political and European governance reasons. The logical conclusion is that Greece will default, at least partially, or restructure its debt. They are probably taking positions based on this conviction. The IMF, the euro area governments, the Greek government and the ECB however take a different view. They all consider that a default is not a viable solution. And they have taken decisions consistent with this view and put money – taxpayers’ money – where their mouths are.
Let me consider the arguments put forward by those who regard a Greek default as unavoidable.
Their first argument is economic. The adjustment programme is too harsh, given the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio reached in Greece. It will produce a debt spiral which will lead the country into a recession and deflation. The problem is made worse by the loss of competitiveness suffered by Greece over the last decade and the impossibility of devaluing the currency. Their reasoning is generally no more sophisticated than that. Some analysts have put together a few numbers to show that they are aware of the problem. But I have not seen a serious analysis of the 120-page report produced by the IMF which looks at the various aspects of the programme, including the impact of the structural measures on growth, the sustainability analysis or other features of the programme. Not one review of the realism of the assessments made by the staff of the IMF and the Commission. In fact, I suspect most market analysts have not even looked at the adjustment path for the primary surplus which is embedded in the programme, which aims to reach 6% of GDP in 2015, a level no different from the ones that other countries in the past have implemented to consolidate their public finances. It’s a level that a number of other countries – including some outside the euro area – will have to achieve if they want to stabilise their debt. Most market analysts and other observers have probably not even looked at the structural measures that are embedded in the programme, affecting for instance the labour market, or at several liberalisations, and their impact on economic growth. The inefficiencies in the tax collection system, which have been aggravated before the elections, have also been overlooked. The perception that the Greek programme will not work looks more like an assumption than the result of a serious assessment.
To summarise, I wonder which analysis is more serious and credible: the many one-pagers, very well publicised – I must admit – which probably aim to influence the rest of the market; or the IMF’s 120 pages of rather tedious analysis describing the contents of the programme, together with its risks.
Let me add that I have not read a single page on what a (partial) default of an industrial country would mean for the country itself, for the euro area and for the global economy. It’s often been stated – or should I say assumed? – that there is such a thing as an “organised” or “orderly” default. Argentina is sometimes mentioned, as if anything orderly happened there since it defaulted. On top of this, several of those who propose an “orderly default” also favoured letting Lehman fail, as a way to eliminate moral hazard and achieve better functioning markets. We saw what happened.
The way the markets move every day shows what implications a default would have for the Greek economy, its financial system and even the country’s membership of the European Union. Just look at the screens and you’ll see the contagion under way, spreading not only to peripheral countries but also to the largest euro area countries and through the financial system.
The second argument of those who foresee a Greek default is political. The government of that country – they claim – will not have the political stamina to sustain the adjustment effort over time, in the face of domestic protests, and will sooner or later give up.
It’s an argument that seems to ignore events and facts, at least from the Greek side. The Greek government was certainly slow in recognising the problem, but as soon as it did it reacted swiftly. On 11 February the European Council asked Greece to take measures to reduce its deficit by 4% of GDP. It did so in a few days and brought them to Parliament. The same happened for the IMF programme, which was quickly negotiated and adopted by Parliament in less than a week. The prime minister even expelled three members from his parliamentary group because they abstained from voting. So far all the measures contained in the programme have been approved. The fiscal adjustment has been frontloaded. Budget data available for the first four months of the year show an improvement of over 40% of the deficit compared with last year, whereas the target was 35%. A schedule for privatisation has just been approved by the government.
This is not to say that it’s going to be an easy ride. But what’s the alternative? Is it politically more palatable for a government to default? How would the millions of Greek savers react if suddenly they found out that part of their savings is worth substantially less? Would any government get away with it?
And what would be the political future of Greece in the European Union if it did not repay its debt to the German, French, Irish and all the other countries’ taxpayers? What would happen to the millions of euros in structural and cohesion funds that Greece receives every year from the EU?
Maybe you need a bit more than one page to give proper consideration to these factors.
Let me now turn to the euro area and consider the third argument which is sometimes made by market participants, namely that euro area governance has substantial weaknesses that undermine the viability of the single currency. I have already talked about the weaknesses of the current system. We should not forget, however, what has been created and what it has created. Overall, the combination of monetary and budgetary policies in the euro area has brought price stability and budgetary results which on average are better than those of most other economies. The problem is that this is true on average, but not for all the members of the Union, as it should be.
What is needed is a more resilient system, which avoids bad policies by the Member States and the contagion they can cause for the area as a whole. This requires working both on the numerator and on the denominator, i.e. on the budget and on economic growth. The way forward is twofold. It requires changes in the Member States’ economic policies. And it requires a strengthening of the institutional framework for budgetary surveillance.
The European Commission has published its first proposals to be considered by the task force on economic governance chaired by President Van Rompuy, which met for the first time last week. Some Member States have already made their own proposals. There is a vast convergence on the direction to take. Some of the proposals are controversial, like sanctioning countries that break the rules, for instance, with a loss of voting rights or of other means of financial aid. The task force’s deliberations are intended to lead to concrete proposals for the European Council by this autumn.
It is understandable to nurse doubts about the results of all these efforts. However, looking at the decisions which have been taken in recent weeks and months, one cannot doubt the determination of the 16 euro area countries to stick together and do the necessary to defend what has been achieved over the past ten years, and to improve it. The 16 countries believe, as do we at the ECB, that sticking to commitments, in particular in the case of the Greek programme, is essential for the credibility of the currency and the prosperity of its members, as would be the case for any other advanced economy or country. This is why the governments of the Member States and the representatives of EU institutions will do all that is needed to preserve that credibility and that prosperity. As I said earlier, monetary union is de facto a political union. It has to function and it will function.
Let me conclude. What we are currently experiencing is a crisis of public finances in advanced economies. It started with Greece, and the euro, because of the specific institutional framework which prevents Greece and the other euro area countries from using the inflation tax to overcome their budgetary problems. This will force euro area countries to address their fiscal positions earlier. It’s not easy. But it will be done, because it can be done and it has to be done in any case. And, last but not least, because there are no alternatives.
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RWE Dea Soon TO Start Development Of UK Natural Gas Fields
RWE Dea said that with an operating profit of roughly 128 million euro in the first quarter 2010 the company remains on its growth track in the international gas and oil business. While several field development projects in the UK and Northern Africa are on the brink, RWE Dea also successfully accomplished the acquisition of two new licence areas in the United Kingdom.
“I am confident of likewise making substantial progress with our announced growth targets as well as the planned production increase”, said Thomas Rappuhn, CEO of RWE Dea AG. The company will invest in promising projects, such as field developments in the UK, Norway, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. “By developing successfully explored gas fields in the UK, we lay the foundations for further growth of the company,” Thomas Rappuhn continued.
The last two years have changed the face of RWE Dea UK. RWE Dea has almost doubled its acreage in UK and has shares in 10 exploration and 21 production licences. For about 60 percent of the acreage, RWE Dea holds operatorship including the producing fields Cavendish and Topaz. This month, RWE Dea UK was awarded the blocks 43/17a and 43/18a remaining from the 25th licence round. These adjacent blocks are situated in the Southern North Sea. RWE Dea will be operator for both blocks.
RWE Dea UK is now at the beginning of key field development work. Three development projects are about to start, two of them operated by RWE Dea UK - Clipper South and Breagh, the other - Devenick under BP operatorship.
The biggest RWE Dea project in the UK is the development of the Breagh field, one of the largest natural gas fields still to be developed in the Southern North Sea: The Breagh field is a conventional Carboniferous reservoir in the north of the UK Southern North Sea some 65 km off the NE coast of England. After last year’s acquisition of the Breagh area (RWE Dea as operator with 70 %) with own reserves of up to 13 billion m³ of gas, RWE Dea as operator is intensifying the development with the aim of launching production as early as 2012.
Last Sunday the drilling rig Ensco 72 came on hire for RWE Dea’s 2010 exploration campaign. The rig has arrived in the Breagh area on location in Block 42/19a and is about to spud the Airidh exploration well to explore further potential in this area. “The anticipated drilling time is about a month, that means we will have the results by the end of June. Drilled back to back, the next well will be Macanta in Block 42/14. Here the target is slightly deeper and it will take about two months to reach it”, Managing Director of RWE Dea UK, René Pawel, explained.
For the second development project, Clipper South RWE Dea (operator with a 50% stake) is well placed to develop the gas field located in Blocks 48/19a, 19c, 20a and 20b in the Southern North Sea approximately 60 kilometres north east of the eastern coastline of Great Britain. In the base plan, the field will be developed by horizontal multi-fraced wells. The platform installation is planned for late summer 2011 with drilling to begin thereafter. First gas is expected end of 2011.
The Devenick development operated by BP, where RWE Dea has a share of 11.3% is a gas condensate reservoir located in UKCS Blocks 9/29a and 9/24b in the northern North Sea approximately 187 km south east of the Fair Isle, 192 km south east of Shetland. The Devenick development lies in a water depth of approximately 114 m. Drilling will start later in 2010, offshore installation of pipeline and facilities will start in 2011. First gas is planned mid 2012.
René Pawel said, “Our current development projects will enable us to significantly increase our production by 2012. Further appraisal and exploration potential in the Breagh area and our other licences will contribute to our efforts to maintain this production level in the future.”
RWE Dea will continue to participate as competent partner in upcoming licence rounds, in order to further extend the portfolio accordingly, the company added.
“I am confident of likewise making substantial progress with our announced growth targets as well as the planned production increase”, said Thomas Rappuhn, CEO of RWE Dea AG. The company will invest in promising projects, such as field developments in the UK, Norway, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. “By developing successfully explored gas fields in the UK, we lay the foundations for further growth of the company,” Thomas Rappuhn continued.
The last two years have changed the face of RWE Dea UK. RWE Dea has almost doubled its acreage in UK and has shares in 10 exploration and 21 production licences. For about 60 percent of the acreage, RWE Dea holds operatorship including the producing fields Cavendish and Topaz. This month, RWE Dea UK was awarded the blocks 43/17a and 43/18a remaining from the 25th licence round. These adjacent blocks are situated in the Southern North Sea. RWE Dea will be operator for both blocks.
RWE Dea UK is now at the beginning of key field development work. Three development projects are about to start, two of them operated by RWE Dea UK - Clipper South and Breagh, the other - Devenick under BP operatorship.
The biggest RWE Dea project in the UK is the development of the Breagh field, one of the largest natural gas fields still to be developed in the Southern North Sea: The Breagh field is a conventional Carboniferous reservoir in the north of the UK Southern North Sea some 65 km off the NE coast of England. After last year’s acquisition of the Breagh area (RWE Dea as operator with 70 %) with own reserves of up to 13 billion m³ of gas, RWE Dea as operator is intensifying the development with the aim of launching production as early as 2012.
Last Sunday the drilling rig Ensco 72 came on hire for RWE Dea’s 2010 exploration campaign. The rig has arrived in the Breagh area on location in Block 42/19a and is about to spud the Airidh exploration well to explore further potential in this area. “The anticipated drilling time is about a month, that means we will have the results by the end of June. Drilled back to back, the next well will be Macanta in Block 42/14. Here the target is slightly deeper and it will take about two months to reach it”, Managing Director of RWE Dea UK, René Pawel, explained.
For the second development project, Clipper South RWE Dea (operator with a 50% stake) is well placed to develop the gas field located in Blocks 48/19a, 19c, 20a and 20b in the Southern North Sea approximately 60 kilometres north east of the eastern coastline of Great Britain. In the base plan, the field will be developed by horizontal multi-fraced wells. The platform installation is planned for late summer 2011 with drilling to begin thereafter. First gas is expected end of 2011.
The Devenick development operated by BP, where RWE Dea has a share of 11.3% is a gas condensate reservoir located in UKCS Blocks 9/29a and 9/24b in the northern North Sea approximately 187 km south east of the Fair Isle, 192 km south east of Shetland. The Devenick development lies in a water depth of approximately 114 m. Drilling will start later in 2010, offshore installation of pipeline and facilities will start in 2011. First gas is planned mid 2012.
René Pawel said, “Our current development projects will enable us to significantly increase our production by 2012. Further appraisal and exploration potential in the Breagh area and our other licences will contribute to our efforts to maintain this production level in the future.”
RWE Dea will continue to participate as competent partner in upcoming licence rounds, in order to further extend the portfolio accordingly, the company added.
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Russian Railways Orders Locomotives With Siemens Technology
Russian Railways (RZD) ordered 221 locomotives from “OOO Ural Locomotives”, a Siemens joint venture.
The new company which was formed last week as a joint venture with the Russian freight locomotive manufacturer OJSC Sinara Transport Machines (Sinara) will build modern electric locomotives in Verkhnyaya Pyshma near Yekaterinburg. Siemens has a 49 percent stake in the joint venture.
The contract was awarded at the international rail business forum “1520 Strategic Partnership” in Sochi on Russia’s Black Sea coast. The parties have agreed not to disclose the order volume. Furthermore Siemens and RZD have agreed on expanding their partnership in the long term. A memorandum of understanding between both parties makes provision for the future production of regional trains with Siemens technology in Russia.
The contract signed calls for the supply of 221 electric freight locomotives, which will be built by "OOO Ural Locomotives" as of 2011.
Siemens is set to invest over EUR 100 million in setting up a modern freight locomotive production, thereby creating around 800 jobs for highly qualified personnel. Siemens' role in the joint venture will be to supply the electric traction components, which will be manufactured in St. Petersburg.
At the same time, work has begun on setting up an engineering center for rolling stock in Moscow, which will create around 200 jobs at Siemens in Russia.
The new company which was formed last week as a joint venture with the Russian freight locomotive manufacturer OJSC Sinara Transport Machines (Sinara) will build modern electric locomotives in Verkhnyaya Pyshma near Yekaterinburg. Siemens has a 49 percent stake in the joint venture.
The contract was awarded at the international rail business forum “1520 Strategic Partnership” in Sochi on Russia’s Black Sea coast. The parties have agreed not to disclose the order volume. Furthermore Siemens and RZD have agreed on expanding their partnership in the long term. A memorandum of understanding between both parties makes provision for the future production of regional trains with Siemens technology in Russia.
The contract signed calls for the supply of 221 electric freight locomotives, which will be built by "OOO Ural Locomotives" as of 2011.
Siemens is set to invest over EUR 100 million in setting up a modern freight locomotive production, thereby creating around 800 jobs for highly qualified personnel. Siemens' role in the joint venture will be to supply the electric traction components, which will be manufactured in St. Petersburg.
At the same time, work has begun on setting up an engineering center for rolling stock in Moscow, which will create around 200 jobs at Siemens in Russia.
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Siemens Hands Over Netherlands Power Plant Ahead Of Schedule
Siemens Energy said it has handed over the MaasStroom Energie combined cycle power plant (CCPP) formerly known as Rijnmond 2 ahead of schedule.
Owner and operator of the plant is InterGen, the leading IPP developer in the Netherlands. The natural-gas-fired plant has an installed capacity of 428 megawatts (MW). With a very high efficiency level of more than 59 percent, maximized flexibility and low nitrogen oxide emissions, it will supply ecofriendly electricity for approximately 400,000 Dutch households.
MaasStroom Energie (MECV) located in the Port of Rotterdam is after Timelkam in Austria, Sloecentrale in the Netherlands, Pont sur Sambre and Emile Huchet in France, Irsching 5 in Germany, another advanced high-efficiency project with fast start and fast cycling features.
"Thanks to the state-of-the-art burner technology and SCR (selective catalytic reduction) the plant’s nitrogen oxide emissions are very low at <15 ppm. MECV is designed for 250 starts per year and is capable of supplying power to the grid within a mere 30 to 40 minutes. It thus backs up the capacity provided by CO2-free wind farms," the company said.
MECV makes use of advanced turbine technology and its combined-cycle design even with air cooled condenser makes the plant 25% more efficient than older gas-fired facilities currently in operation in the Netherlands. “We are very pleased to be bringing MaasStroom online. With this project, InterGen is now meeting 7.5% of the country’s total electricity demand, further reinforcing our commitment to power development in this country,” said Neil H. Smith, President and CEO of InterGen.
Siemens built the MECV plant as a turnkey project and supplied the main components – one SGT5-4000F gas turbine, one SST5-3000 steam turbine, one hydrogen-cooled generator, and the entire electrical and SPPA-T3000 instrumentation & control equipment, allowing the integration of several special features for fast start and fast cycling capabilities. “Siemens is proud to have joined with InterGen in bringing the state-of-the-art MaasStroom plant online ahead of schedule and with a progressive safety culture,” said Lothar Balling, Vice President of Siemens Energy Solutions. “At MECV Siemens’ advanced gas turbine and SCR technologies, coupled with the integrated air cooled condenser and fast start, will reduce emissions like CO and NOx, and greatly reduce the amount of water consumed without hampering performance or flexibility.”
Owner and operator of the plant is InterGen, the leading IPP developer in the Netherlands. The natural-gas-fired plant has an installed capacity of 428 megawatts (MW). With a very high efficiency level of more than 59 percent, maximized flexibility and low nitrogen oxide emissions, it will supply ecofriendly electricity for approximately 400,000 Dutch households.
MaasStroom Energie (MECV) located in the Port of Rotterdam is after Timelkam in Austria, Sloecentrale in the Netherlands, Pont sur Sambre and Emile Huchet in France, Irsching 5 in Germany, another advanced high-efficiency project with fast start and fast cycling features.
"Thanks to the state-of-the-art burner technology and SCR (selective catalytic reduction) the plant’s nitrogen oxide emissions are very low at <15 ppm. MECV is designed for 250 starts per year and is capable of supplying power to the grid within a mere 30 to 40 minutes. It thus backs up the capacity provided by CO2-free wind farms," the company said.
MECV makes use of advanced turbine technology and its combined-cycle design even with air cooled condenser makes the plant 25% more efficient than older gas-fired facilities currently in operation in the Netherlands. “We are very pleased to be bringing MaasStroom online. With this project, InterGen is now meeting 7.5% of the country’s total electricity demand, further reinforcing our commitment to power development in this country,” said Neil H. Smith, President and CEO of InterGen.
Siemens built the MECV plant as a turnkey project and supplied the main components – one SGT5-4000F gas turbine, one SST5-3000 steam turbine, one hydrogen-cooled generator, and the entire electrical and SPPA-T3000 instrumentation & control equipment, allowing the integration of several special features for fast start and fast cycling capabilities. “Siemens is proud to have joined with InterGen in bringing the state-of-the-art MaasStroom plant online ahead of schedule and with a progressive safety culture,” said Lothar Balling, Vice President of Siemens Energy Solutions. “At MECV Siemens’ advanced gas turbine and SCR technologies, coupled with the integrated air cooled condenser and fast start, will reduce emissions like CO and NOx, and greatly reduce the amount of water consumed without hampering performance or flexibility.”
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BYD And Daimler Form JVTo Develop Electric Vehicles In China
China's BYD Company Limited and Daimler AG have signed a contract creating a 50:50 research and technology joint venture called “Shenzhen BYD Daimler New Technology Co. Ltd,” that will develop an electric vehicle for China.
BYD and Daimler will invest RMB 600 million to use as registered capital for the Joint venture. The new generation of electric vehicles developed by the joint venture will capitalize on Daimler’s know-how in electric vehicle architecture and safety as well as BYD’s excellence in battery technology and e-drive systems. The vehicle will be marketed under a new brand jointly created and owned by Daimler and BYD.
According to Mr. Wang Chuanfu, Chairman and President of BYD, “Together with Daimler we are making excellent progress identifying opportunities to utilize the strengths of both companies to create a new brand of electric cars for China. This is a unique and exciting initiative and together we are pushing hard to bring this new electric vehicle to market as soon as possible.”
Dr. Dieter Zetsche, Chairman of the Board of Management of Daimler AG added, “Our new joint venture is well positioned to make the most of the vast potential of electric mobility in China. We are fortunate to have excellent joint venture partners in China and the establishment of this research and technology center with BYD adds another dimension to our growing presence in this important market.”
Chairman Wang and Dr. Zetsche signed the joint venture contract Thursday in Beijing. This follows the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on March 1. Engineers, designers and other executives from both companies established working teams after the signing of the MOU to begin working on the vehicle concept. The business license for the new joint venture is subject to relevant government approval.
BYD and Daimler will invest RMB 600 million to use as registered capital for the Joint venture. The new generation of electric vehicles developed by the joint venture will capitalize on Daimler’s know-how in electric vehicle architecture and safety as well as BYD’s excellence in battery technology and e-drive systems. The vehicle will be marketed under a new brand jointly created and owned by Daimler and BYD.
According to Mr. Wang Chuanfu, Chairman and President of BYD, “Together with Daimler we are making excellent progress identifying opportunities to utilize the strengths of both companies to create a new brand of electric cars for China. This is a unique and exciting initiative and together we are pushing hard to bring this new electric vehicle to market as soon as possible.”
Dr. Dieter Zetsche, Chairman of the Board of Management of Daimler AG added, “Our new joint venture is well positioned to make the most of the vast potential of electric mobility in China. We are fortunate to have excellent joint venture partners in China and the establishment of this research and technology center with BYD adds another dimension to our growing presence in this important market.”
Chairman Wang and Dr. Zetsche signed the joint venture contract Thursday in Beijing. This follows the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on March 1. Engineers, designers and other executives from both companies established working teams after the signing of the MOU to begin working on the vehicle concept. The business license for the new joint venture is subject to relevant government approval.
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Thales Wins EUR136 Mln High Speed Rail Contract To Galicia
Thales, as part of a consortium, has been awarded by the Spanish Administrator of Railway Infrastructures (ADIF) a €136 million contract for the signalling, train protection, safety and security systems as well as the centralised control centre and fixed telecommunication network for the Orense-Santiago de Compostela section of the North-Northwest high-speed tunnel.
The Orense-Santiago de Compostela section, 87.5 km in length (38.5 km less than the current section), is part of the Madrid-Galicia high-speed line, included in the so-called North-Northwest high-speed corridor, that will connect the Northwest of the Iberian peninsula with its centre.
The awarded section is the end section of the Madrid-Galicia high-speed line which, starting in the current Madrid-Valladolid high-speed line, will link Madrid with the Northwest of Spain. It is the first high-speed railway section in the region of Galicia and will also provide connection with the Atlantic Axis (only partially in service) linking the Atlantic cities of the region with the Portuguese border.
Once in service, travel time between Orense and Santiago de Compostela will be reduced by 70%, which will also significantly reduce connection time between Madrid and Galicia.
Within the scope of the awarded contract, Thales will be responsible for the design, installation and maintenance of the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 1 and 2, track circuits, axle counters and auxiliary systems, all that fixed telecommunications encompasses, part of the technical buildings and signalling shelters, as well as 3 years maintenance for all of the installed systems.
This new award acknowledges the track record and experience in the railway sector that Thales holds in Spain, in the planning and execution of signalling and train control projects for high-speed lines. This leadership position is backed by the successes achieved in both quality and delivery in the high-speed lines connecting Madrid-Seville, Madrid-Toledo, Córdoba-Málaga, Madrid-Valladolid and Lérida-Barcelona, including a significant presence in the Atlantic Axis. At present, Thales is also executing the contracts for signalling and train control as well as telecommunications of the Madrid-Levante and Barcelona-Figueras high-speed lines.
The Orense-Santiago de Compostela section, 87.5 km in length (38.5 km less than the current section), is part of the Madrid-Galicia high-speed line, included in the so-called North-Northwest high-speed corridor, that will connect the Northwest of the Iberian peninsula with its centre.
The awarded section is the end section of the Madrid-Galicia high-speed line which, starting in the current Madrid-Valladolid high-speed line, will link Madrid with the Northwest of Spain. It is the first high-speed railway section in the region of Galicia and will also provide connection with the Atlantic Axis (only partially in service) linking the Atlantic cities of the region with the Portuguese border.
Once in service, travel time between Orense and Santiago de Compostela will be reduced by 70%, which will also significantly reduce connection time between Madrid and Galicia.
Within the scope of the awarded contract, Thales will be responsible for the design, installation and maintenance of the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 1 and 2, track circuits, axle counters and auxiliary systems, all that fixed telecommunications encompasses, part of the technical buildings and signalling shelters, as well as 3 years maintenance for all of the installed systems.
This new award acknowledges the track record and experience in the railway sector that Thales holds in Spain, in the planning and execution of signalling and train control projects for high-speed lines. This leadership position is backed by the successes achieved in both quality and delivery in the high-speed lines connecting Madrid-Seville, Madrid-Toledo, Córdoba-Málaga, Madrid-Valladolid and Lérida-Barcelona, including a significant presence in the Atlantic Axis. At present, Thales is also executing the contracts for signalling and train control as well as telecommunications of the Madrid-Levante and Barcelona-Figueras high-speed lines.
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Austerity Must Not Jeopardise Growth, Says Van Rompuy
The key tasks in front of the crisis task force of the European Union are to simultaneously ensure economic recovery and growth, and to guarantee a strong economic governance, said President of the European Council Mr. Herman Van Rompuy addressing the plenary session of the EESC for the first time during his tenure. EESC members urged concrete and rapid action and a real involvement of civil society.
In his introductory remarks, EESC President Mr. Mario Sepi said that the social aspects that social effects of any recovery package must not be neglected while re-launching Europe's economy.
"We wanted socially sensitive issues such as poverty, immigration and education to be considered as part of any recovery project," he said.
"You bring to the Union a capacity to synthesise diverging interests and the wide range of perspectives of those actively involved in society through organised groups," said Mr. Van Rompuy, who went on to talk about the current economic woes of the Member States.
He stressed the importance of not only tackling public deficits, which even Euro-zone countries were stretching far beyond the Maastricht criterion of 3 percent, but also of dealing with the rapidly accumulating sovereign debts.
"We tend to look through the keyhole of public deficit, forgetting the bay window of public debt," he said. But while curbing the budget shortfall and decreasing sovereign debt entails austerity measures already taken in several Member States, countries must not jeopardize their future growth on the altar of fiscal order.
"The EU must start growing economically, which is the only way to recover from the debt problem. We cannot solve the budgetary issues without tackling growth therefore austerity must not have detrimental effects on nascent recovery" he said, adding that research and development as well as innovation must be key areas of investment.
Reflecting on how Greek sovereign debt triggered a loss of confidence in the stability of other Euro-zone countries, Mr. Van Rompuy stressed the mutual responsibilities among EU countries.
"If there is a doubt in the state bonds of one country, it has a ripple effect on all the EU because the banking systems are interlinked. Therefore the sovereign debt of one country is the problem of all countries," he said, adding that delayed EU action in the wake of the Greek crisis multiplied the bill for treatment.
In response to Mr. Van Rompuy, Mr. Georgios Dassis (president of Employees' Group, Greece) criticized slow EU reaction to the Greek crisis and urged further steps to follow the massive financial package agreed by EU leaders to guarantee ailing EU economies.
"The 750-billion-euro package is but one step in the right direction. But when will we see an institution called the European Monetary Fund, lending to governments at normal interest rates instead of the usurp rates? How much poverty do we need to bring about a decision establishing a financial transaction tax?" said Mr. Dassis in a speech followed by a loud applause from the plenary.
Mr. Staffan Nilsson (president of Various Interests Group, Sweden) on his part, called Mr. Van Rompuy's attention to the task of involving societies in the necessary economic measures. He urged the Council President to push for a clear mandate for the EESC in the June European Council.
"It is up to the Member States to carry out the austerity measures, but the understanding of their citizens is essential. This is key to emerging from the crisis," he stressed.
"Instead of always focusing on austerity, let's focus more on the resilience of the European economy. And rather than being defensive, let's go on the offensive," said Mr. Joost van Iersel (Employers' Group, The Netherlands), also highlighting the necessity for strong economic governance.
Thanking for the interventions he considered "frank and open", Mr. Van Rompuy reiterated his intention to return to the EESC later in the year.
In his introductory remarks, EESC President Mr. Mario Sepi said that the social aspects that social effects of any recovery package must not be neglected while re-launching Europe's economy.
"We wanted socially sensitive issues such as poverty, immigration and education to be considered as part of any recovery project," he said.
"You bring to the Union a capacity to synthesise diverging interests and the wide range of perspectives of those actively involved in society through organised groups," said Mr. Van Rompuy, who went on to talk about the current economic woes of the Member States.
He stressed the importance of not only tackling public deficits, which even Euro-zone countries were stretching far beyond the Maastricht criterion of 3 percent, but also of dealing with the rapidly accumulating sovereign debts.
"We tend to look through the keyhole of public deficit, forgetting the bay window of public debt," he said. But while curbing the budget shortfall and decreasing sovereign debt entails austerity measures already taken in several Member States, countries must not jeopardize their future growth on the altar of fiscal order.
"The EU must start growing economically, which is the only way to recover from the debt problem. We cannot solve the budgetary issues without tackling growth therefore austerity must not have detrimental effects on nascent recovery" he said, adding that research and development as well as innovation must be key areas of investment.
Reflecting on how Greek sovereign debt triggered a loss of confidence in the stability of other Euro-zone countries, Mr. Van Rompuy stressed the mutual responsibilities among EU countries.
"If there is a doubt in the state bonds of one country, it has a ripple effect on all the EU because the banking systems are interlinked. Therefore the sovereign debt of one country is the problem of all countries," he said, adding that delayed EU action in the wake of the Greek crisis multiplied the bill for treatment.
In response to Mr. Van Rompuy, Mr. Georgios Dassis (president of Employees' Group, Greece) criticized slow EU reaction to the Greek crisis and urged further steps to follow the massive financial package agreed by EU leaders to guarantee ailing EU economies.
"The 750-billion-euro package is but one step in the right direction. But when will we see an institution called the European Monetary Fund, lending to governments at normal interest rates instead of the usurp rates? How much poverty do we need to bring about a decision establishing a financial transaction tax?" said Mr. Dassis in a speech followed by a loud applause from the plenary.
Mr. Staffan Nilsson (president of Various Interests Group, Sweden) on his part, called Mr. Van Rompuy's attention to the task of involving societies in the necessary economic measures. He urged the Council President to push for a clear mandate for the EESC in the June European Council.
"It is up to the Member States to carry out the austerity measures, but the understanding of their citizens is essential. This is key to emerging from the crisis," he stressed.
"Instead of always focusing on austerity, let's focus more on the resilience of the European economy. And rather than being defensive, let's go on the offensive," said Mr. Joost van Iersel (Employers' Group, The Netherlands), also highlighting the necessity for strong economic governance.
Thanking for the interventions he considered "frank and open", Mr. Van Rompuy reiterated his intention to return to the EESC later in the year.
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EU27 Deficit In Trade In Goods With Russia Was EUR50.0 Bln In 2009
EU27 trade in goods with Russia had increased steadily until 2008, before dropping sharply in 2009. EU27 exports to Russia rose from 23 billion euro in 2000 to 105 bn in 2008, then fell to 66 bn in 2009. Imports rose from 64 bn in 2000 to 178 bn in 2008, then decreased to 115 bn in 2009. As a result, the EU27 trade deficit with Russia increased significantly from 41 bn euro in 2000 to 73 bn in 2008, then fell to 50 bn in 2009.
The share of Russia in the EU27's total external trade in goods went steadily upwards between 2000 and 2008, but went down in 2009. In 2009, Russia was the EU27's third most important trading partner after the USA and China, accounting for 6% of EU27 exports and 10% of EU27 imports.
On the occasion of the 25th European Union - Russia summit, which will take place on 31 May and 1 June in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, issued the above data on trade and investments between Russia and the EU.
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy: largest trading partners of Russia
Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (20.5 bn euro or 31% of EU exports) was by far the largest exporter to Russia in 2009, followed by Italy (6.5 bn or 10%), France (5.0 bn or 8%) and the Netherlands (4.7 bn or 7%). Germany (23.7 bn or 20%) was also the largest importer, followed by the Netherlands1 (14.2 bn or 12%), Italy (12.1 bn or 10%), Poland (9.1 bn or 8%) and France (9.0 bn or 8%).
Most Member States recorded deficits in trade with Russia in 2009, the largest being observed in the Netherlands1 (-9.5 bn euro), Italy (-5.6 bn), Poland (-5.5 bn) and France (-4.0 bn). The highest surpluses were recorded in Austria (0.7 bn) and Denmark (0.6 bn).
Around 85% of EU27 exports to Russia in 2009 were manufactured goods, while energy accounted for almost three quarters of imports. At the detailed level, the main EU27 exports to Russia included medicine, aircraft, motor cars and mobile phones, while the main imports included oil, gas and coal.
The share of Russia in the EU27's total external trade in goods went steadily upwards between 2000 and 2008, but went down in 2009. In 2009, Russia was the EU27's third most important trading partner after the USA and China, accounting for 6% of EU27 exports and 10% of EU27 imports.
On the occasion of the 25th European Union - Russia summit, which will take place on 31 May and 1 June in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, issued the above data on trade and investments between Russia and the EU.
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy: largest trading partners of Russia
Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (20.5 bn euro or 31% of EU exports) was by far the largest exporter to Russia in 2009, followed by Italy (6.5 bn or 10%), France (5.0 bn or 8%) and the Netherlands (4.7 bn or 7%). Germany (23.7 bn or 20%) was also the largest importer, followed by the Netherlands1 (14.2 bn or 12%), Italy (12.1 bn or 10%), Poland (9.1 bn or 8%) and France (9.0 bn or 8%).
Most Member States recorded deficits in trade with Russia in 2009, the largest being observed in the Netherlands1 (-9.5 bn euro), Italy (-5.6 bn), Poland (-5.5 bn) and France (-4.0 bn). The highest surpluses were recorded in Austria (0.7 bn) and Denmark (0.6 bn).
Around 85% of EU27 exports to Russia in 2009 were manufactured goods, while energy accounted for almost three quarters of imports. At the detailed level, the main EU27 exports to Russia included medicine, aircraft, motor cars and mobile phones, while the main imports included oil, gas and coal.
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Credit Storm In Europe; Politics On Capital Hill
By Mike Whitney
Credit market turmoil in the Eurozone has ignited frenzied trading on global markets. On Tuesday, shares tumbled nearly 300 points on the Dow Jones before launching an unconvincing 257-point late-day comeback. Wednesday the mayhem continued; all the major indexes seesawed wildly as positive news on durable goods was nixed by reports on wobbly EU banks. Erratic selling pushed the S&P down to 1,067 while the Dow slipped below 10,000 for the first time since February 7. Rising Libor is increasing volatility, a red flag indicating trouble in interbank lending. Banks are wary of each others collateral as Greece and other underwater Club Med members appear to be headed for debt-restructuring. Libor is not yet at pre-Lehman levels, but the rate that banks charge each other for short-term loans has rocketed to a 10-month high. Improving economic data has not eased fears of another meltdown or removed the rot at the heart of the system. The banks are still loaded with loans and assets that are losing value. The credit system is breaking down.
When banks post collateral overnight for short-term loans, the collateral is effectively downgraded limiting the banks access to capital. This is what triggered the financial crisis two years ago, a run on repo. Regulated "depository" institutions now rely on a funding system that operates beyond government oversight, a shadow banking system. The banks exchange collateral, in the form of bundled securities and bonds with institutional investors (aka---"shadow banks"; investment banks, hedge funds, insurers) via repurchase agreements (repo) for short-term loans. The repo market now rivals the the traditional banking system in terms of size but lacks the guard rails and stop signs that make the regulated system safe. The system is inherently unstable and crisis-prone as a recently released paper by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) admits. Moody's rating agency summarized the paper's findings like this: the tri-party repo "market will remain a major source of systemic risk, especially given the current market volatility and the fact that the Federal Reserve’s primary dealer emergency lending facilities are no longer in place...... the market remains structurally vulnerable to a repo run...... If cash investors pulled away in a stressed environment, the clearing banks would be faced with a choice (as they were several times in 2008) of taking on large secured credit exposure to dealers or severely constraining intra-day credit to them. Such market mechanics can exacerbate the effect of a systemic and/or a dealer-specific crisis.....Until the remaining issues in the tri-party repo market are resolved, the risk of a repo run remains in place. (Moody's, thanks to zero hedge)
It's too bad Congress doesn't take time to read Moody's analysis before gutting the derivatives and capital requirements provisions in the new reform bill. It might help them understand that by placating Wall Street they're laying the groundwork for another financial disaster.
When Lehman failed, Fed chair Ben Bernanke stepped in as lender of last resort to keep the banking system functioning. He deftly shifted from lending facilities to quantitative easing (QE)--a ploy that allowed the Fed to relieve the Wall Street behemoths of their toxic assets and non performing loans. The Fed's efforts revived the economy but transferred gigantic losses onto its own balance sheet. The EU lacks the political infrastructure to enact a similar fiscal strategy. When banks collapse in Spain or Greece, the losses must be written down, adding to deflationary pressures. That has world leaders worried that their economies will be pulled back into recession. Here's a recent post from David Rosenberg which sums up the present situation:
"The downdraft in the market in recent weeks reflects the financial risk related to the European debt crisis, the monetary tightening in China and the re-regulation of the financial sector that is currently making its way through to Congress. The next leg down in the equity market specifically and cyclical assets more generally is economic risk. Equities went into this period of turbulence priced for peak earnings in 2011 and with a tailwind of positive earnings revision and positive guidance ratios from the corporate sector. If the ECRI and the Conference Board’s own index of leading economic indicators, which dipped 0.1% in April, are prescient, then they are portending a period of sub-par economic growth ahead." (Breakfast with Dave, David Rosenberg, Gluskin Sheff)
The media characterizes troubles in the EU as a "sovereign debt crisis", reflecting "deficit cutting" the political agenda of its authors. In fact, this is a straightforward banking crisis, undercapitalized banks whose downgraded assets are leading them towards default. The banks alone are responsible. In the US the problem has been resolved by the historic bank/state merger. "Too big to fail" implies that the primary function of the state is to preserve its core financial institutions. For many reasons, this remedy won't work in Europe. The individual countries will have to bailout banks at their own expense or resolve them through the bankruptcy courts.
Austerity measures in the Eurozone will derail Obama's efforts to increase exports to compensate for the slowdown in consumer spending. The administration's economic strategy, to large extent, depends on a weak dollar, a strong EU and a prosperous China. That plan vaporized earlier this week when Spanish regulators took over CajaSur one of the country's biggest mortgage lenders. Spain's property crash is intensifying the contraction and pushing banks to the brink. As credit tightens and economic activity slows, the prospects of a strong recovery become more remote. The downturn could last for years.
Deteriorating conditions in Europe have set off alarms at the Fed. For Fed chair Ben Bernanke, the trouble in the EU money markets and commercial paper markets, must seem like a recurrent nightmare, Lehman all over again. Bernanke wants to stop the repricing of bank assets that would trigger firesales and another round of deflation. So, he's reopening "swap lines" to help EU banks roll over their short-term loans. His proposal would slash rates to near-zero and make the Fed liable in the exchange of questionable loans and assets, putting both the taxpayer and the dollar at risk. Here's a clip from the Wall Street Journal:
"The Federal Reserve has a lever it can pull to help European officials combat a worsening financial crisis: Reducing the interest rate it charges on U.S. dollar loans it makes through the European Central Bank to dollar-starved commercial banks in Europe....
The loans currently are priced one percentage point above a market rate called Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS), which tracks the expected path of the Fed's benchmark federal funds rate. The loans are set above OIS to discourage foreign banks from using the government program too aggressively. But the Fed could reduce that penalty to encourage more borrowing and ease some of the financial strain on foreign banks in need of dollars....Many European banks, and their U.S. branches, need dollar funds because they hold U.S. dollar assets. But lenders have become more wary of extending them the cash. That's made dollar loans more costly for European borrowers and the funding they do get is has been for shorter maturities." ("Fed's Next Move Could Be Reduced Rate on Dollar-Euro Swaps", Jon Hilsenrath, Wall Street Journal)
The Fed is operating far beyond its mandate to maintain price stability and full employment. It's applying its own arbitrary pricing mechanism and usurping the authority of the EU central bank. Here's how Clifford Rossi explains the Fed's action in a recent post on Institutional Risk Analysis:
"The mechanism for the bailout of Europe is the Fed's provision of dollar credit in virtually unlimited amounts via central bank swaps lines.....the Fed swap lines help the bankrupt nations of the EU ignore their mounting fiscal problems......Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is engaged in a little geopolitical engineering in Europe -- and the people of the EU do not yet realize that a political change in control has occurred.... the leaders of Europe now find themselves beholden to the Fed for their continued political existence.... Chairman Bernanke and the FOMC have but to terminate the Fed's swap lines with the various central banks of Europe or start selling the MBS portfolio in the US, and governments from Washington to Berlin will start to fall." ("More fed swap Lines for Europe and the End of Globalization", Clifford Rossi, Institutional Risk Analysis)
The swap lines are designed to keep asset prices artificially high, so the contagion doesn't spread to the US where accounting gimmickry helps to hide bank losses. Bernanke is perpetuating the repo-scam, by assisting banks and other financial institutions to amplify crumbs of capital into humongous bubbles which can take down the whole economy. The Wall Street Journal exposed a similar repo scam this week in an above-the-fold article on Wednesday. Here's an excerpt:
"Three big banks--Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup Inc.—are among the most active at temporarily shedding debt just before reporting their finances to the public, a Wall Street Journal analysis shows. The practice, known as end-of-quarter "window dressing" on Wall Street, suggests that the banks are carrying more risk most of the time than their investors or customers can easily see....
Over the past 10 quarters, the three banks have lowered their net borrowings in the "repurchase," or repo, market by an average of 41% at the ends of the quarters, compared with their average net repo borrowings for the entire quarter, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data. Once a new quarter begins, they boost those levels...
The data suggest "conscious balance-sheet management," said Robert Willens, an accounting specialist who heads Robert Willens LLC. If there are big gaps between average quarterly and quarter-end data, he said, the quarter-end numbers "are at best meaningless and at worst misleading and disingenuous." ("Banks trim Debt, Obscuring Risks", Michael Rapoport and Tom Mcginty, Wall Street Journal)
So the banks are intentionally masking their leverage to conceal their true condition to investors. And its all done with derivatives and repo; the lethal combo that led to the crisis of '08. Unfortunately, Wall Street's lobbying campaign has been so successful that, even now, real change is unlikely. In fact, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank openly opposes Blanche Lincoln's comprehensive derivatives legislation saying that it "goes too far". Frank has signaled that the bill would be killed or rewritten in committee. Derivatives trading is a main profit-center for the nation's largest banks and they have spent millions to preserve the status quo.
"I don't see the need for a separate rule regarding derivatives because the restriction on banks engaging in proprietary activities would apply to derivatives as well as everything else," Frank said on Monday.
Even without Frank's support, the bill would have faced fierce resistance from a contingent of Wall Street Democrats who were planning to strip the critical provisions from the legislation.
Rep Michael McMahon (NY-D) defended the banks saying, “The House bill is based on principles on how to reduce risk and make the system more transparent, it’s not based on wiping out the system or destroying the system and that’s what the provision does."
The credit storm in the EU has had no effect on Congress. Wall Street has won this round. The window for real reform has closed, and now it's "business as usual" until the next catastrophe.
Mike Whitney lives in Washington state. He can be reached at fergiewhitney@msn.com
Credit market turmoil in the Eurozone has ignited frenzied trading on global markets. On Tuesday, shares tumbled nearly 300 points on the Dow Jones before launching an unconvincing 257-point late-day comeback. Wednesday the mayhem continued; all the major indexes seesawed wildly as positive news on durable goods was nixed by reports on wobbly EU banks. Erratic selling pushed the S&P down to 1,067 while the Dow slipped below 10,000 for the first time since February 7. Rising Libor is increasing volatility, a red flag indicating trouble in interbank lending. Banks are wary of each others collateral as Greece and other underwater Club Med members appear to be headed for debt-restructuring. Libor is not yet at pre-Lehman levels, but the rate that banks charge each other for short-term loans has rocketed to a 10-month high. Improving economic data has not eased fears of another meltdown or removed the rot at the heart of the system. The banks are still loaded with loans and assets that are losing value. The credit system is breaking down.
When banks post collateral overnight for short-term loans, the collateral is effectively downgraded limiting the banks access to capital. This is what triggered the financial crisis two years ago, a run on repo. Regulated "depository" institutions now rely on a funding system that operates beyond government oversight, a shadow banking system. The banks exchange collateral, in the form of bundled securities and bonds with institutional investors (aka---"shadow banks"; investment banks, hedge funds, insurers) via repurchase agreements (repo) for short-term loans. The repo market now rivals the the traditional banking system in terms of size but lacks the guard rails and stop signs that make the regulated system safe. The system is inherently unstable and crisis-prone as a recently released paper by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) admits. Moody's rating agency summarized the paper's findings like this: the tri-party repo "market will remain a major source of systemic risk, especially given the current market volatility and the fact that the Federal Reserve’s primary dealer emergency lending facilities are no longer in place...... the market remains structurally vulnerable to a repo run...... If cash investors pulled away in a stressed environment, the clearing banks would be faced with a choice (as they were several times in 2008) of taking on large secured credit exposure to dealers or severely constraining intra-day credit to them. Such market mechanics can exacerbate the effect of a systemic and/or a dealer-specific crisis.....Until the remaining issues in the tri-party repo market are resolved, the risk of a repo run remains in place. (Moody's, thanks to zero hedge)
It's too bad Congress doesn't take time to read Moody's analysis before gutting the derivatives and capital requirements provisions in the new reform bill. It might help them understand that by placating Wall Street they're laying the groundwork for another financial disaster.
When Lehman failed, Fed chair Ben Bernanke stepped in as lender of last resort to keep the banking system functioning. He deftly shifted from lending facilities to quantitative easing (QE)--a ploy that allowed the Fed to relieve the Wall Street behemoths of their toxic assets and non performing loans. The Fed's efforts revived the economy but transferred gigantic losses onto its own balance sheet. The EU lacks the political infrastructure to enact a similar fiscal strategy. When banks collapse in Spain or Greece, the losses must be written down, adding to deflationary pressures. That has world leaders worried that their economies will be pulled back into recession. Here's a recent post from David Rosenberg which sums up the present situation:
"The downdraft in the market in recent weeks reflects the financial risk related to the European debt crisis, the monetary tightening in China and the re-regulation of the financial sector that is currently making its way through to Congress. The next leg down in the equity market specifically and cyclical assets more generally is economic risk. Equities went into this period of turbulence priced for peak earnings in 2011 and with a tailwind of positive earnings revision and positive guidance ratios from the corporate sector. If the ECRI and the Conference Board’s own index of leading economic indicators, which dipped 0.1% in April, are prescient, then they are portending a period of sub-par economic growth ahead." (Breakfast with Dave, David Rosenberg, Gluskin Sheff)
The media characterizes troubles in the EU as a "sovereign debt crisis", reflecting "deficit cutting" the political agenda of its authors. In fact, this is a straightforward banking crisis, undercapitalized banks whose downgraded assets are leading them towards default. The banks alone are responsible. In the US the problem has been resolved by the historic bank/state merger. "Too big to fail" implies that the primary function of the state is to preserve its core financial institutions. For many reasons, this remedy won't work in Europe. The individual countries will have to bailout banks at their own expense or resolve them through the bankruptcy courts.
Austerity measures in the Eurozone will derail Obama's efforts to increase exports to compensate for the slowdown in consumer spending. The administration's economic strategy, to large extent, depends on a weak dollar, a strong EU and a prosperous China. That plan vaporized earlier this week when Spanish regulators took over CajaSur one of the country's biggest mortgage lenders. Spain's property crash is intensifying the contraction and pushing banks to the brink. As credit tightens and economic activity slows, the prospects of a strong recovery become more remote. The downturn could last for years.
Deteriorating conditions in Europe have set off alarms at the Fed. For Fed chair Ben Bernanke, the trouble in the EU money markets and commercial paper markets, must seem like a recurrent nightmare, Lehman all over again. Bernanke wants to stop the repricing of bank assets that would trigger firesales and another round of deflation. So, he's reopening "swap lines" to help EU banks roll over their short-term loans. His proposal would slash rates to near-zero and make the Fed liable in the exchange of questionable loans and assets, putting both the taxpayer and the dollar at risk. Here's a clip from the Wall Street Journal:
"The Federal Reserve has a lever it can pull to help European officials combat a worsening financial crisis: Reducing the interest rate it charges on U.S. dollar loans it makes through the European Central Bank to dollar-starved commercial banks in Europe....
The loans currently are priced one percentage point above a market rate called Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS), which tracks the expected path of the Fed's benchmark federal funds rate. The loans are set above OIS to discourage foreign banks from using the government program too aggressively. But the Fed could reduce that penalty to encourage more borrowing and ease some of the financial strain on foreign banks in need of dollars....Many European banks, and their U.S. branches, need dollar funds because they hold U.S. dollar assets. But lenders have become more wary of extending them the cash. That's made dollar loans more costly for European borrowers and the funding they do get is has been for shorter maturities." ("Fed's Next Move Could Be Reduced Rate on Dollar-Euro Swaps", Jon Hilsenrath, Wall Street Journal)
The Fed is operating far beyond its mandate to maintain price stability and full employment. It's applying its own arbitrary pricing mechanism and usurping the authority of the EU central bank. Here's how Clifford Rossi explains the Fed's action in a recent post on Institutional Risk Analysis:
"The mechanism for the bailout of Europe is the Fed's provision of dollar credit in virtually unlimited amounts via central bank swaps lines.....the Fed swap lines help the bankrupt nations of the EU ignore their mounting fiscal problems......Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is engaged in a little geopolitical engineering in Europe -- and the people of the EU do not yet realize that a political change in control has occurred.... the leaders of Europe now find themselves beholden to the Fed for their continued political existence.... Chairman Bernanke and the FOMC have but to terminate the Fed's swap lines with the various central banks of Europe or start selling the MBS portfolio in the US, and governments from Washington to Berlin will start to fall." ("More fed swap Lines for Europe and the End of Globalization", Clifford Rossi, Institutional Risk Analysis)
The swap lines are designed to keep asset prices artificially high, so the contagion doesn't spread to the US where accounting gimmickry helps to hide bank losses. Bernanke is perpetuating the repo-scam, by assisting banks and other financial institutions to amplify crumbs of capital into humongous bubbles which can take down the whole economy. The Wall Street Journal exposed a similar repo scam this week in an above-the-fold article on Wednesday. Here's an excerpt:
"Three big banks--Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup Inc.—are among the most active at temporarily shedding debt just before reporting their finances to the public, a Wall Street Journal analysis shows. The practice, known as end-of-quarter "window dressing" on Wall Street, suggests that the banks are carrying more risk most of the time than their investors or customers can easily see....
Over the past 10 quarters, the three banks have lowered their net borrowings in the "repurchase," or repo, market by an average of 41% at the ends of the quarters, compared with their average net repo borrowings for the entire quarter, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data. Once a new quarter begins, they boost those levels...
The data suggest "conscious balance-sheet management," said Robert Willens, an accounting specialist who heads Robert Willens LLC. If there are big gaps between average quarterly and quarter-end data, he said, the quarter-end numbers "are at best meaningless and at worst misleading and disingenuous." ("Banks trim Debt, Obscuring Risks", Michael Rapoport and Tom Mcginty, Wall Street Journal)
So the banks are intentionally masking their leverage to conceal their true condition to investors. And its all done with derivatives and repo; the lethal combo that led to the crisis of '08. Unfortunately, Wall Street's lobbying campaign has been so successful that, even now, real change is unlikely. In fact, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank openly opposes Blanche Lincoln's comprehensive derivatives legislation saying that it "goes too far". Frank has signaled that the bill would be killed or rewritten in committee. Derivatives trading is a main profit-center for the nation's largest banks and they have spent millions to preserve the status quo.
"I don't see the need for a separate rule regarding derivatives because the restriction on banks engaging in proprietary activities would apply to derivatives as well as everything else," Frank said on Monday.
Even without Frank's support, the bill would have faced fierce resistance from a contingent of Wall Street Democrats who were planning to strip the critical provisions from the legislation.
Rep Michael McMahon (NY-D) defended the banks saying, “The House bill is based on principles on how to reduce risk and make the system more transparent, it’s not based on wiping out the system or destroying the system and that’s what the provision does."
The credit storm in the EU has had no effect on Congress. Wall Street has won this round. The window for real reform has closed, and now it's "business as usual" until the next catastrophe.
Mike Whitney lives in Washington state. He can be reached at fergiewhitney@msn.com
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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A Crew Of Incompetents
By Dean Baker
The world is suffering from the worst downturn since the Great Depression. The crisis has left tens of millions unemployed in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere. The huge baby boomer generation in the United States, now on the edge of retirement, has seen much of its wealth destroyed with the collapse of the housing bubble.
It would be difficult to imagine a worse economic disaster. Prior periods of bad performance, like the inflation ridden seventies, look like mild flurries compared to the blizzard of bad economic news in which we are now enmeshed.
None of this is new. People don't need economists to tell them that times are bad. However, what the public may not recognize is that the same people who caused this disaster are still calling the shots. Specifically, there has been little change in personnel and no acknowledgment of error at the central banks whose incompetence was responsible for the crisis.
Remarkably, this crew of incompetents is still claiming papal infallibility, warning governments and the general public that bad things will happen if they are subjected to more oversight. Instead, the central bankers and their accomplices at the IMF are dictating policies to democratically elected governments. Their agenda seems to be the same everywhere, cut back retirement benefits, reduce public support for health care, weaken unions and make ordinary workers take pay cuts.
Given how much they have messed up, it is amazing that these central bankers have the gall to even show their face in public. They are lucky that they still have jobs -- and very good paying ones at that. (Many of the boys and girls at the IMF can retire with six figure pensions at the age of 50.) Ordinary workers, like teachers, autoworkers, or custodians, would be fired in a second if they performed as badly as the world's central bankers.
What was going through their heads when they saw house prices in the United States, the UK, Spain and elsewhere spiral upward with no basis in any of the fundamentals of the housing market? How did they think this bubble would end; did they think that trillions of dollars of housing bubble wealth could just disappear without any impact on the economy. Or, did they think the bubble would never end and that house prices would just continue to go skyward forever?
How about the central bankers who allowed the euro to be imposed on a mix of economies with very little in common and no controlling governmental organization? Did they think that wages and prices would follow the same pattern in Greece and Germany? If not, what adjustment mechanism did they envision once these widely different economies were tied to together in a single currency?
Yes, many of the central bankers are now saying that they knew the euro was a bad idea back when it was established. Some of them even muttered quietly to this effect. But the central bankers and the IMF in 1998 were not making the same bold pronouncements and issuing the same directives to elected governments about structuring the euro zone that they are now doing in telling them to dismantle their welfare states. In other words, these central bankers failed disastrously -- why do they still have jobs and why on earth is anyone listening to them?
At the top of the list of villains in this story is the IMF. Its ineptitude managed to reverse the fundamental flows of capital in the world economy. In normal times capital is supposed to flow from wealthy countries with large amounts of capital, like the United States and the European countries, to the developing countries who need capital to fuel their development. Due to the failure of the IMF to establish a workable system of international finance, the flows went in the opposite direction in a huge way. The world's poor were sending their capital to the United States because the IMF gave them little choice.
It is important to be clear about the responsibility of the central bankers and the IMF for this totally preventable disaster. The first reason is accountability, something that is very important to economists who believe in economics. Economic theory teaches us that if workers are not held accountable for poor work, then they have no incentive to do their jobs well. If the central banker and IMF crew can mess up disastrously and continue to draw their paychecks as though everything is fine, what is their incentive to do better next time?
The other reason why it is important to recognize the responsibility of the central bankers and the IMF for this disaster is so that we don't continue to take advice from people who apparently don't have a clue. Before anyone listens to Ben Bernanke, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, or IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, they should first be forced to tell us when they stopped being wrong about the economy. We cannot afford to let these subprime central bankers control economic policy any longer.
Dean Baker is the co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). He is the author of Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy and False Profits: Recoverying From the Bubble Economy. This column was originally published by Huffington Post and reprinted with permission of the author.
The world is suffering from the worst downturn since the Great Depression. The crisis has left tens of millions unemployed in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere. The huge baby boomer generation in the United States, now on the edge of retirement, has seen much of its wealth destroyed with the collapse of the housing bubble.
It would be difficult to imagine a worse economic disaster. Prior periods of bad performance, like the inflation ridden seventies, look like mild flurries compared to the blizzard of bad economic news in which we are now enmeshed.
None of this is new. People don't need economists to tell them that times are bad. However, what the public may not recognize is that the same people who caused this disaster are still calling the shots. Specifically, there has been little change in personnel and no acknowledgment of error at the central banks whose incompetence was responsible for the crisis.
Remarkably, this crew of incompetents is still claiming papal infallibility, warning governments and the general public that bad things will happen if they are subjected to more oversight. Instead, the central bankers and their accomplices at the IMF are dictating policies to democratically elected governments. Their agenda seems to be the same everywhere, cut back retirement benefits, reduce public support for health care, weaken unions and make ordinary workers take pay cuts.
Given how much they have messed up, it is amazing that these central bankers have the gall to even show their face in public. They are lucky that they still have jobs -- and very good paying ones at that. (Many of the boys and girls at the IMF can retire with six figure pensions at the age of 50.) Ordinary workers, like teachers, autoworkers, or custodians, would be fired in a second if they performed as badly as the world's central bankers.
What was going through their heads when they saw house prices in the United States, the UK, Spain and elsewhere spiral upward with no basis in any of the fundamentals of the housing market? How did they think this bubble would end; did they think that trillions of dollars of housing bubble wealth could just disappear without any impact on the economy. Or, did they think the bubble would never end and that house prices would just continue to go skyward forever?
How about the central bankers who allowed the euro to be imposed on a mix of economies with very little in common and no controlling governmental organization? Did they think that wages and prices would follow the same pattern in Greece and Germany? If not, what adjustment mechanism did they envision once these widely different economies were tied to together in a single currency?
Yes, many of the central bankers are now saying that they knew the euro was a bad idea back when it was established. Some of them even muttered quietly to this effect. But the central bankers and the IMF in 1998 were not making the same bold pronouncements and issuing the same directives to elected governments about structuring the euro zone that they are now doing in telling them to dismantle their welfare states. In other words, these central bankers failed disastrously -- why do they still have jobs and why on earth is anyone listening to them?
At the top of the list of villains in this story is the IMF. Its ineptitude managed to reverse the fundamental flows of capital in the world economy. In normal times capital is supposed to flow from wealthy countries with large amounts of capital, like the United States and the European countries, to the developing countries who need capital to fuel their development. Due to the failure of the IMF to establish a workable system of international finance, the flows went in the opposite direction in a huge way. The world's poor were sending their capital to the United States because the IMF gave them little choice.
It is important to be clear about the responsibility of the central bankers and the IMF for this totally preventable disaster. The first reason is accountability, something that is very important to economists who believe in economics. Economic theory teaches us that if workers are not held accountable for poor work, then they have no incentive to do their jobs well. If the central banker and IMF crew can mess up disastrously and continue to draw their paychecks as though everything is fine, what is their incentive to do better next time?
The other reason why it is important to recognize the responsibility of the central bankers and the IMF for this disaster is so that we don't continue to take advice from people who apparently don't have a clue. Before anyone listens to Ben Bernanke, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, or IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, they should first be forced to tell us when they stopped being wrong about the economy. We cannot afford to let these subprime central bankers control economic policy any longer.
Dean Baker is the co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). He is the author of Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy and False Profits: Recoverying From the Bubble Economy. This column was originally published by Huffington Post and reprinted with permission of the author.
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Spain Adopts Austerity Plan By Razor-Thin Majority
Spain, the country holding the rotating presidency of the EU, managed to win approval for a 15-billion-euro austerity package by a single vote in parliament yesterday (27 May). The narrow margin of the victory raised doubts as to the government's ability to steer the country through an economic crisis.
The razor-thin majority piled pressure on Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who has been forced to ditch his party's traditional alliances in pushing through spending cuts and labor reforms as markets fret Spain could suffer a similar crisis to Greece but on a larger scale.
The vote was won by 169 parliament members, all from the Socialist Party, voting in favour, and 168 against, from the opposition European People's Party-affiliated Popular Party, the Basque nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Izquierda Unida, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Nafarroa Bai and Unión Progreso y Democracia.
The Popular Party even made sure one of its deputies was brought to the session in an ambulance.
There were 13 abstentions, from representatives of Convergència i Unió (CiU), Coalición Canaria and Unión del Pueblo Navarro.
It was the abstention of 10 members of CiU, a Catalan nationalist party regarded as conservative or centrist, which saved the plan, EurActiv Spain writes.
CiU parliamentary leader Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida told parliament he did not want to plunge Spain into an immediate Greek-style crisis by blocking the austerity measures, but called on Zapatero to call elections early next year.
"The problem is you and your government," Duran i Lleida told Zapatero, adding that his party would vote against the 2011 budget bill towards the end of the year.
The prime minister called off a scheduled trip to Brazil on Thursday, as an end-May deadline loomed for an agreement with unions and business on wide-ranging labour reforms - a key policy demand by international markets.
Unions met on Thursday and warned that they would call a general strike if the government goes ahead with changes to labour market rules without their consent, saying there were still big differences with business on the reform.
They said agreement may not come before the end-May deadline set by the government. A regular Europe-wide meeting of unions is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 1 June.
"The government can set whatever deadlines it wants, we work at our own pace," the head of the CCOO union, Ignacio Fernandez Toxo, told journalists.
Defeat for the budget would make it much more difficult for Zapatero, lagging the Popular Party in opinion polls, to stay in power.
"This law is improvised, insufficient and unjust," PP leader Mariano Rajoy told parliament.
Source: EurActiv
The razor-thin majority piled pressure on Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who has been forced to ditch his party's traditional alliances in pushing through spending cuts and labor reforms as markets fret Spain could suffer a similar crisis to Greece but on a larger scale.
The vote was won by 169 parliament members, all from the Socialist Party, voting in favour, and 168 against, from the opposition European People's Party-affiliated Popular Party, the Basque nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Izquierda Unida, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Nafarroa Bai and Unión Progreso y Democracia.
The Popular Party even made sure one of its deputies was brought to the session in an ambulance.
There were 13 abstentions, from representatives of Convergència i Unió (CiU), Coalición Canaria and Unión del Pueblo Navarro.
It was the abstention of 10 members of CiU, a Catalan nationalist party regarded as conservative or centrist, which saved the plan, EurActiv Spain writes.
CiU parliamentary leader Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida told parliament he did not want to plunge Spain into an immediate Greek-style crisis by blocking the austerity measures, but called on Zapatero to call elections early next year.
"The problem is you and your government," Duran i Lleida told Zapatero, adding that his party would vote against the 2011 budget bill towards the end of the year.
The prime minister called off a scheduled trip to Brazil on Thursday, as an end-May deadline loomed for an agreement with unions and business on wide-ranging labour reforms - a key policy demand by international markets.
Unions met on Thursday and warned that they would call a general strike if the government goes ahead with changes to labour market rules without their consent, saying there were still big differences with business on the reform.
They said agreement may not come before the end-May deadline set by the government. A regular Europe-wide meeting of unions is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 1 June.
"The government can set whatever deadlines it wants, we work at our own pace," the head of the CCOO union, Ignacio Fernandez Toxo, told journalists.
Defeat for the budget would make it much more difficult for Zapatero, lagging the Popular Party in opinion polls, to stay in power.
"This law is improvised, insufficient and unjust," PP leader Mariano Rajoy told parliament.
Source: EurActiv
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Eni Sells Gas Brasiliano Distribuidora To Petrobras Gas
Petróleo Brasileiro S.A., through its subsidiary Petrobras Gas S.A., has agreed to buy Eni’s 100% participation interest in Gas Brasiliano Distribuidora S.A. (GBD), a company that markets and distributes natural gas in Brazil, for a total consideration of around US$ 250 million, subject to adjustments based on net debt and working capital at closing.
Following the execution of a sale and purchase agreement, the completion of the transaction is now subject to certain pre-conditions, including regulatory approvals from relevant authorities in Brazil.
GBD holds the concession to execute gas distribution activities in the Northwest region of the State of São Paulo, an area covering 375 municipalities, supplying to the industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation sectors. GBD’s concession was granted in December 1999, for a period of 30 years, extendable for an additional period of 20 years.
During 2009, GBD’s distribution network reached 734.5 km supporting gas sales of approximately 193 million cubic meters.
Eni has been present in the Brazilian upstream since 1999. Eni will continue its upstream activities in the country and in particular is looking forward to beginning operations on BMS 857 which has been won in the 8th round but has not yet been assigned.
Following the execution of a sale and purchase agreement, the completion of the transaction is now subject to certain pre-conditions, including regulatory approvals from relevant authorities in Brazil.
GBD holds the concession to execute gas distribution activities in the Northwest region of the State of São Paulo, an area covering 375 municipalities, supplying to the industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation sectors. GBD’s concession was granted in December 1999, for a period of 30 years, extendable for an additional period of 20 years.
During 2009, GBD’s distribution network reached 734.5 km supporting gas sales of approximately 193 million cubic meters.
Eni has been present in the Brazilian upstream since 1999. Eni will continue its upstream activities in the country and in particular is looking forward to beginning operations on BMS 857 which has been won in the 8th round but has not yet been assigned.
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Cameroon Sets Out Plans For UK Economy
(KUNA) -- UK Prime Minister David Cameron outlined his Government's strategy to "transform" the economy Friday, saying it had been "heading in the wrong direction" for years under Labour.
In his first major speech as Prime Minister, he stressed the need to cut the 156 billion pounds deficit and get millions of people back into work, according to extracts from his remarks released officially.
He also set out the coalition's plans to support private enterprise and reduce reliance on the public sector.
Speaking in Yorkshire, northern England, Cameron said that transforming the economy is the "first priority" of the Government.
"Britain is at a turning point today," he argued.
"The decisions we make now will live with us for decades to come. For many years we have been heading in the wrong direction. Our economy has become more and more unbalanced, with our fortunes hitched to a few industries in one corner of the country, while we let other sectors like manufacturing slide," he said.
Cameron added that the economy has become "over-reliant" on welfare, with mass worklessness accepted as a fact of life and around five million people now on out-of-work benefits.
"It has become increasingly hostile to enterprise, with business investment in the past decade growing at around one percent each year - only a quarter of what it was the decade before. It has become far too dependent on the public sector, with over half of all jobs created in the last 10 years associated in some way with public spending," he added.
He also said that as a country, the UK has become indebted on "an unprecedented scale," with its "huge" public debt being the "clearest manifestation of our economic mistakes - the glaring warning sign overhead telling us we have taken the wrong route. We have been sleepwalking our way to an economy that is unsustainable, unstable, unfair and, frankly, uninspiring."
The Prime Minister said that people around the world wanted to know whether the British economy could be turned around.
He added, "Can we rebalance economic power across our regions, across different industries, so that more people have a stake in our success? Can we end the inevitability of millions on long-term welfare and bring hope to those unemployed? Can we inject new life into the private sector, so that enterprise can drive not just our recovery but the re-building beyond it? Can we go from an economy built on debt and borrowing to one built on saving and investment? Can we re-open Britain for business? My answer is an unequivocal, emphatic yes."
In his first major speech as Prime Minister, he stressed the need to cut the 156 billion pounds deficit and get millions of people back into work, according to extracts from his remarks released officially.
He also set out the coalition's plans to support private enterprise and reduce reliance on the public sector.
Speaking in Yorkshire, northern England, Cameron said that transforming the economy is the "first priority" of the Government.
"Britain is at a turning point today," he argued.
"The decisions we make now will live with us for decades to come. For many years we have been heading in the wrong direction. Our economy has become more and more unbalanced, with our fortunes hitched to a few industries in one corner of the country, while we let other sectors like manufacturing slide," he said.
Cameron added that the economy has become "over-reliant" on welfare, with mass worklessness accepted as a fact of life and around five million people now on out-of-work benefits.
"It has become increasingly hostile to enterprise, with business investment in the past decade growing at around one percent each year - only a quarter of what it was the decade before. It has become far too dependent on the public sector, with over half of all jobs created in the last 10 years associated in some way with public spending," he added.
He also said that as a country, the UK has become indebted on "an unprecedented scale," with its "huge" public debt being the "clearest manifestation of our economic mistakes - the glaring warning sign overhead telling us we have taken the wrong route. We have been sleepwalking our way to an economy that is unsustainable, unstable, unfair and, frankly, uninspiring."
The Prime Minister said that people around the world wanted to know whether the British economy could be turned around.
He added, "Can we rebalance economic power across our regions, across different industries, so that more people have a stake in our success? Can we end the inevitability of millions on long-term welfare and bring hope to those unemployed? Can we inject new life into the private sector, so that enterprise can drive not just our recovery but the re-building beyond it? Can we go from an economy built on debt and borrowing to one built on saving and investment? Can we re-open Britain for business? My answer is an unequivocal, emphatic yes."
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BHP Billiton Finalises Joint Venture Arrangements For Indonesian Coal Project
BHP Billiton has confirmed the formation of the new joint venture for its Indonesian Coal Project (ICP) with a subsidiary of PT Adaro Energy TBK (Adaro) following the completion of Government approvals.
Adaro has acquired a 25 per cent interest in the ICP joint venture, with BHP Billiton holding the remaining 75 per cent.
BHP Billiton President Metallurgical Coal, Hubie van Dalsen, said, "We are very pleased that the Indonesian Government has approved the formation of the joint venture with Adaro, a strong Indonesian partner who shares our values and our commitment to the protection of the region's outstanding biodiversity."
"We are progressing study work to identify development options across the seven Coal Contracts of Work (CCOWs). In future, the project will be known as the IndoMet Coal project," he added.
Adaro has acquired a 25 per cent interest in the ICP joint venture, with BHP Billiton holding the remaining 75 per cent.
BHP Billiton President Metallurgical Coal, Hubie van Dalsen, said, "We are very pleased that the Indonesian Government has approved the formation of the joint venture with Adaro, a strong Indonesian partner who shares our values and our commitment to the protection of the region's outstanding biodiversity."
"We are progressing study work to identify development options across the seven Coal Contracts of Work (CCOWs). In future, the project will be known as the IndoMet Coal project," he added.
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Santos' GLNG Wins Queensland Environmental Approval
Santos said Friday that GLNG became Australia’s first major coal seam gas to LNG project to receive its environmental approval from the Queensland government.
The GLNG project is a joint venture between Australia’s largest domestic gas producer, Santos, and Malaysia’s national oil and gas company, PETRONAS, the world’s second largest LNG exporter.
The environmental approval follows review of the project’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) by the Queensland Coordinator-General. The review involved widespread community consultation.
The environmental approval process will now continue with Federal Government consideration of the project.
The Queensland Government approval covers the development of coal seam gas resources in the Bowen and Surat Basins around Roma, construction of a pipeline from the gas fields to the coast, and construction of up to three processing trains at a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant and export facility on Curtis Island, off Gladstone.
President GLNG and Queensland, Rick Wilkinson said approval of the EIS by the Queensland Government was a significant milestone for GLNG as the project builds momentum towards a final investment decision this year.
“We acknowledge the Queensland Government’s foresight in encouraging the development of the coal seam gas-to-LNG industry. An industry which promises billions of dollars of investment and the creation of thousands of jobs,” Mr Wilkinson said.
“As our EIS submission outlined, we are committed to implementing comprehensive environmental management plans and are supportive of the conditions outlined by the Coordinator-General.
“We will work with the Government and the communities involved to deliver an outcome which will provide massive benefits in terms of jobs, regional development and export income for the nation.”
GLNG will create about 5,000 construction jobs and 1,000 permanent operational jobs when the project commences shipments of LNG in 2014.
Santos and PETRONAS will complete detailed engineering studies on the project before a final investment decision is made on GLNG.
The project partners remain concerned about the potential impact of the Federal Government’s proposed new resources tax.
The GLNG project is a joint venture between Australia’s largest domestic gas producer, Santos, and Malaysia’s national oil and gas company, PETRONAS, the world’s second largest LNG exporter.
The environmental approval follows review of the project’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) by the Queensland Coordinator-General. The review involved widespread community consultation.
The environmental approval process will now continue with Federal Government consideration of the project.
The Queensland Government approval covers the development of coal seam gas resources in the Bowen and Surat Basins around Roma, construction of a pipeline from the gas fields to the coast, and construction of up to three processing trains at a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant and export facility on Curtis Island, off Gladstone.
President GLNG and Queensland, Rick Wilkinson said approval of the EIS by the Queensland Government was a significant milestone for GLNG as the project builds momentum towards a final investment decision this year.
“We acknowledge the Queensland Government’s foresight in encouraging the development of the coal seam gas-to-LNG industry. An industry which promises billions of dollars of investment and the creation of thousands of jobs,” Mr Wilkinson said.
“As our EIS submission outlined, we are committed to implementing comprehensive environmental management plans and are supportive of the conditions outlined by the Coordinator-General.
“We will work with the Government and the communities involved to deliver an outcome which will provide massive benefits in terms of jobs, regional development and export income for the nation.”
GLNG will create about 5,000 construction jobs and 1,000 permanent operational jobs when the project commences shipments of LNG in 2014.
Santos and PETRONAS will complete detailed engineering studies on the project before a final investment decision is made on GLNG.
The project partners remain concerned about the potential impact of the Federal Government’s proposed new resources tax.
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Shell To Pay $4.7 Billion For New Positions In US Tight Gas
Shell said that it has agreed to acquire subsidiaries which own substantially all of the business of East Resources, Inc for a cash consideration of $4.7 billion, from East Resources, its private equity investor, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and its advisors Jefferies & Company.
The transaction is subject to certain regulatory approvals. East Resources is a privately-owned business with its primary activity focused on the Marcellus shale, in the northeastern US. East Resources has some 650,000 net acres (2,600 square kilometers) of highly contiguous, operated acreage in the Marcellus, and 1.05 million net acres (4,250 square kilometers) of acreage overall. East Resources has some 60 mmscfe/d (10,000 barrels oil equivalent per day) of production, predominantly in natural gas, with substantial medium-term growth potential.
In addition, as part of its on-going acreage build strategy, Shell has acquired around 250,000 net acres (1,000 square kilometers) of mineral rights in the Eagle Ford shale play, in South Texas, in 2010. These undeveloped acreage positions are in the liquids rich window of the Eagle Ford play. Shell will be the operator in this highly contiguous acreage, and will be able to integrate these new assets into its existing South Texas operations, where Shell has been active for many years.
All together in 2010, Shell has added some 1.3 million acres (5,250 square kilometers) of North America tight gas acreage. Shell estimates that these new positions have the potential to yield over 16 trillion cubic feet of gas equivalent (tcfe) of resources (>2.7 billion boe).
According to Shell’s Chief Executive Officer Peter Voser, “We are enhancing our world-wide Upstream portfolio for profitable growth, through exploration and focused acquisitions, and through divestment of non-core positions. These acreage additions form part of an on-going strategy, which also includes divestments, with an objective to grow and to upgrade the quality of Shell’s North America tight gas portfolio.”
Voser continued: “East Resources’ management have built an excellent organization, with high quality assets in the Marcellus, which we are pleased to have as our centrepiece as we enter the premier shale gas play in the north east US. The opportunity now is to consolidate our tight gas portfolio, divest from non-core positions across North America, and to invest for profitable growth, by deploying Shell’s technology and capabilities on a large scale.”
The transaction is subject to certain regulatory approvals. East Resources is a privately-owned business with its primary activity focused on the Marcellus shale, in the northeastern US. East Resources has some 650,000 net acres (2,600 square kilometers) of highly contiguous, operated acreage in the Marcellus, and 1.05 million net acres (4,250 square kilometers) of acreage overall. East Resources has some 60 mmscfe/d (10,000 barrels oil equivalent per day) of production, predominantly in natural gas, with substantial medium-term growth potential.
In addition, as part of its on-going acreage build strategy, Shell has acquired around 250,000 net acres (1,000 square kilometers) of mineral rights in the Eagle Ford shale play, in South Texas, in 2010. These undeveloped acreage positions are in the liquids rich window of the Eagle Ford play. Shell will be the operator in this highly contiguous acreage, and will be able to integrate these new assets into its existing South Texas operations, where Shell has been active for many years.
All together in 2010, Shell has added some 1.3 million acres (5,250 square kilometers) of North America tight gas acreage. Shell estimates that these new positions have the potential to yield over 16 trillion cubic feet of gas equivalent (tcfe) of resources (>2.7 billion boe).
According to Shell’s Chief Executive Officer Peter Voser, “We are enhancing our world-wide Upstream portfolio for profitable growth, through exploration and focused acquisitions, and through divestment of non-core positions. These acreage additions form part of an on-going strategy, which also includes divestments, with an objective to grow and to upgrade the quality of Shell’s North America tight gas portfolio.”
Voser continued: “East Resources’ management have built an excellent organization, with high quality assets in the Marcellus, which we are pleased to have as our centrepiece as we enter the premier shale gas play in the north east US. The opportunity now is to consolidate our tight gas portfolio, divest from non-core positions across North America, and to invest for profitable growth, by deploying Shell’s technology and capabilities on a large scale.”
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TAP Oil's Managing Director Not TO Renew Contract
ap Oil Limited advises that the Company’s CEO and Managing Director, Mr Peter Stickland, has given notice to the Board that due to family reasons he does not intend to renew his Employment Agreement.
Tap Oil and Mr Stickland have agreed to a 12 month notice period to enable the company to replace Mr Stickland with minimum disruption to business activities while at the same time meeting Mr Stickland’s desire to relocate his family back to Victoria.
Mr Stickland will remain in his current position until 28 May 2011. If a suitable replacement can be found before then an expedited handover may be arranged.
“This has been a very difficult decision for me to make but has been brought about by recent personal events, and I appreciate the board’s support and understanding,” Mr Stickland said.
Tap Oil Chairman, Dr Neale Taylor, said that through Mr Stickland’s leadership, Tap Oil has developed significant exploration, commercial and operating capabilities.
“Tap Oil will benefit well into the future from Peter’s good work,” Dr Taylor said.
“Peter has invested significant effort in identifying new exploration opportunities and increasing Tap’s gas sales. We have every confidence his legacy at Tap will be realised in discoveries made from the Company’s upcoming drilling program.”
Mr Stickland said it has been a privilege to work for Tap Oil for the past five years.
“I have enjoyed working with the Board and staff as we have strived together to capitalise on Tap’s existing assets and identify new opportunities that will lead to potential discoveries. I strongly believe in Tap’s strategy and I will continue to do everything I can to pursue that strategy and realise its aims.”
“My focus over the next 12 months will be on delivering success from Tap’s exploration and other activities, as well as facilitating a smooth changeover to the new CEO.”
Tap Oil intends to initiate a search for a replacement CEO soon.
Tap Oil and Mr Stickland have agreed to a 12 month notice period to enable the company to replace Mr Stickland with minimum disruption to business activities while at the same time meeting Mr Stickland’s desire to relocate his family back to Victoria.
Mr Stickland will remain in his current position until 28 May 2011. If a suitable replacement can be found before then an expedited handover may be arranged.
“This has been a very difficult decision for me to make but has been brought about by recent personal events, and I appreciate the board’s support and understanding,” Mr Stickland said.
Tap Oil Chairman, Dr Neale Taylor, said that through Mr Stickland’s leadership, Tap Oil has developed significant exploration, commercial and operating capabilities.
“Tap Oil will benefit well into the future from Peter’s good work,” Dr Taylor said.
“Peter has invested significant effort in identifying new exploration opportunities and increasing Tap’s gas sales. We have every confidence his legacy at Tap will be realised in discoveries made from the Company’s upcoming drilling program.”
Mr Stickland said it has been a privilege to work for Tap Oil for the past five years.
“I have enjoyed working with the Board and staff as we have strived together to capitalise on Tap’s existing assets and identify new opportunities that will lead to potential discoveries. I strongly believe in Tap’s strategy and I will continue to do everything I can to pursue that strategy and realise its aims.”
“My focus over the next 12 months will be on delivering success from Tap’s exploration and other activities, as well as facilitating a smooth changeover to the new CEO.”
Tap Oil intends to initiate a search for a replacement CEO soon.
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OPEC Basket Price Still Below USD 70 Mark: At $68.21 pb
(KUNA) -- The price of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) basket of crudes was up 1.37 USD per barrel (pb) on Wednesday, thus coming to USD 68.21 pb and failing to regain the USD 70 pb range, after registering 66.84 pb on Tuesday.
The annual average price thus comes to USD 76.11 pb.
The OPEC Reference Basket (ORB), introduced on 16 June 2005, is currently made up of Saharan Blend (Algeria), Girassol (Angola), Oriente (Ecuador), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), Bonny Light (Nigeria), Qatar Marine (Qatar), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE), and Merey (Venezuela).
The basket price was below the USD 70 mark for the last two weeks, and the range is considered detrimental to producers and detrimental also to interest in investment in oil production.
Despite the loss of some 20 percent of price over the last two weeks, OPEC sources indicated there are no plans for an extraordinary meeting ahead of the regular meeting in October.
Observers meanwhile believe the slump is not due to the customary supply-demand mechanism but rather to anxiety over economic growth in the EU under the pull of the Greek debt crisis.
OPEC ministers had in their meeting in March decided to extend the 24.8 million barrel per day production cap and stressed it was vital all members stick to their quotas.
As the organization failed to stem the drop in prices, it is now urging members most strongly to honor the production cut approved in late 2008.
After the Vienna meeting on October 14, the OPEC ministers are also planned to convene in Ecuador, which currently presides the organization, late in the year.
The annual average price thus comes to USD 76.11 pb.
The OPEC Reference Basket (ORB), introduced on 16 June 2005, is currently made up of Saharan Blend (Algeria), Girassol (Angola), Oriente (Ecuador), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), Bonny Light (Nigeria), Qatar Marine (Qatar), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE), and Merey (Venezuela).
The basket price was below the USD 70 mark for the last two weeks, and the range is considered detrimental to producers and detrimental also to interest in investment in oil production.
Despite the loss of some 20 percent of price over the last two weeks, OPEC sources indicated there are no plans for an extraordinary meeting ahead of the regular meeting in October.
Observers meanwhile believe the slump is not due to the customary supply-demand mechanism but rather to anxiety over economic growth in the EU under the pull of the Greek debt crisis.
OPEC ministers had in their meeting in March decided to extend the 24.8 million barrel per day production cap and stressed it was vital all members stick to their quotas.
As the organization failed to stem the drop in prices, it is now urging members most strongly to honor the production cut approved in late 2008.
After the Vienna meeting on October 14, the OPEC ministers are also planned to convene in Ecuador, which currently presides the organization, late in the year.
Thursday, May 27, 2010 |
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Russia's X5 Posts 1Q 2010 Net Profit Of $78.9 Million
Russian retail chain, X5 Retail Group, has posted a 1Q 2010 net profit of $78.9 million under IFRS.
The bottom line is a turnaround of the 1Q 2009 net losses of $82.1 million, with EBITDA up 10% year-on-year to $178.5 million and sales revenue up 36% to $2.54 billion.
The company noted that it had reduced debt by $133 million during the quarter, and added that due to the significantly lower inflation over the first quarter it was anticipating revenue growth in the low 20% range in nominal rouble terms, subject to inflationary trends and an upturn in consumer spending.
X5 Retail Group CEO, Lev Khasis, said the low inflation environment with the economy still gaining traction on a rebound during the quarter had placed the low end stores of the group into focus.
“Discounters delivered industry-leading performance. We have introduced a streamlined operational structure for supermarkets and hypermarkets and are adding more affordable choices and loyalty program upgrades for our customers to drive higher basket and benefit from future economic recovery. Integration of Paterson resulted in temporary closings and inventory clearance sales during Q1. All acquired stores have been converted as of May, setting the stage for improved performance. We expect consumer spending to begin to show improvement towards the end of the year. This, in combination with new store openings and post-integration contribution from Paterson, should enable X5 to deliver top-line growth in the low-20% range in a significantly lower than projected inflationary environment.”
X5 Retail Group CFO Evgeny Kornilov added that improved cost controls and the company’s sales policies had helped underpin like for like sales, with the integration of the Paterson chain acquired in 2009 adding to the outlook for improved margins during 2H 2010.
“Consistent execution of our “Close to the Customer” policy resulted in solid LFL sales growth of 7% compared to Q1 2009, the strongest quarter last year prior to the onset of trading down trends. We drove a 60 basis point improvement in X5’s key performance indicator for cost control, SG&A before ESOP as a percent of sales. We used our strong cash position this quarter to continue selective expansion of new stores while reducing total debt by net USD 133 million and further limiting currency exposure.
For the rest of 2010 we expect reduced levels of gross margin investment and improving EBITDA margin, driven by continuing efficiency improvement and cash generation, postintegration upside of converted Paterson stores and higher overall second half 2010 sales growth. We are well-positioned in terms of our upcoming loan refinancing later this year, with good access to RUR bank facilities more than sufficient for our funding needs.”
The bottom line is a turnaround of the 1Q 2009 net losses of $82.1 million, with EBITDA up 10% year-on-year to $178.5 million and sales revenue up 36% to $2.54 billion.
The company noted that it had reduced debt by $133 million during the quarter, and added that due to the significantly lower inflation over the first quarter it was anticipating revenue growth in the low 20% range in nominal rouble terms, subject to inflationary trends and an upturn in consumer spending.
X5 Retail Group CEO, Lev Khasis, said the low inflation environment with the economy still gaining traction on a rebound during the quarter had placed the low end stores of the group into focus.
“Discounters delivered industry-leading performance. We have introduced a streamlined operational structure for supermarkets and hypermarkets and are adding more affordable choices and loyalty program upgrades for our customers to drive higher basket and benefit from future economic recovery. Integration of Paterson resulted in temporary closings and inventory clearance sales during Q1. All acquired stores have been converted as of May, setting the stage for improved performance. We expect consumer spending to begin to show improvement towards the end of the year. This, in combination with new store openings and post-integration contribution from Paterson, should enable X5 to deliver top-line growth in the low-20% range in a significantly lower than projected inflationary environment.”
X5 Retail Group CFO Evgeny Kornilov added that improved cost controls and the company’s sales policies had helped underpin like for like sales, with the integration of the Paterson chain acquired in 2009 adding to the outlook for improved margins during 2H 2010.
“Consistent execution of our “Close to the Customer” policy resulted in solid LFL sales growth of 7% compared to Q1 2009, the strongest quarter last year prior to the onset of trading down trends. We drove a 60 basis point improvement in X5’s key performance indicator for cost control, SG&A before ESOP as a percent of sales. We used our strong cash position this quarter to continue selective expansion of new stores while reducing total debt by net USD 133 million and further limiting currency exposure.
For the rest of 2010 we expect reduced levels of gross margin investment and improving EBITDA margin, driven by continuing efficiency improvement and cash generation, postintegration upside of converted Paterson stores and higher overall second half 2010 sales growth. We are well-positioned in terms of our upcoming loan refinancing later this year, with good access to RUR bank facilities more than sufficient for our funding needs.”
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Disappointing Results For Novartis' New Patupilone Ovarian Cancer Drug
Novartis said Thursday that patupilone (EPO906) did not show a significant overall survival advantage in a phase III trial of patients with advanced ovarian cancer, refractory or resistant to platinum-based therapy The comparator arm in the trial was Doxil®/Caelyx® (pegylated liposomal doxorubicin).
Investigators involved in the study and regulatory agencies have been notified of the trial outcome. No new or unexpected serious adverse events in the patupilone arm were identified in the trial. Novartis does not plan to proceed with regulatory filings based on these data.
Study details
The Phase III study, conducted in approximately 168 sites in 22 countries, was an open label, active controlled, parallel group, multicenter trial of 829 patients with epithelial ovarian, primary fallopian or primary peritoneal cancer, who were randomized to receive patupilone or Doxil®/Caelyx®. Before enrollment in the trial, patients had received up to a maximum of three prior chemotherapeutic regimens, of which the first was a taxane/platinum therapy. Patients were randomly assigned to intravenous patupilone (10 mg/m2) once every three weeks or Doxil®/Caelyx® (50 mg/m2) once every four weeks and were evaluated for disease status by Ca-125 and CT scans every eight weeks until disease progression. The primary endpoint of the trial was overall survival. Secondary endpoints included progression-free survival, safety and overall response rate.
About patupilone
Patupilone belongs to a class of microtubule stabilizers called epothilones and is being evaluated in ongoing trials in multiple tumor types, including metastatic colorectal cancer, brain metastases in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) and hormone-refractory prostate cancer (HRPC).
Because it is an investigational compound, the safety and efficacy profile of patupilone has not yet been established. This investigational compound is available only through carefully controlled and monitored clinical trials. These trials are designed to better understand the potential benefits and risks of the compound. Because of uncertainty of clinical trials, there is no guarantee that patupilone will ever be commercially available anywhere in the world.
Investigators involved in the study and regulatory agencies have been notified of the trial outcome. No new or unexpected serious adverse events in the patupilone arm were identified in the trial. Novartis does not plan to proceed with regulatory filings based on these data.
Study details
The Phase III study, conducted in approximately 168 sites in 22 countries, was an open label, active controlled, parallel group, multicenter trial of 829 patients with epithelial ovarian, primary fallopian or primary peritoneal cancer, who were randomized to receive patupilone or Doxil®/Caelyx®. Before enrollment in the trial, patients had received up to a maximum of three prior chemotherapeutic regimens, of which the first was a taxane/platinum therapy. Patients were randomly assigned to intravenous patupilone (10 mg/m2) once every three weeks or Doxil®/Caelyx® (50 mg/m2) once every four weeks and were evaluated for disease status by Ca-125 and CT scans every eight weeks until disease progression. The primary endpoint of the trial was overall survival. Secondary endpoints included progression-free survival, safety and overall response rate.
About patupilone
Patupilone belongs to a class of microtubule stabilizers called epothilones and is being evaluated in ongoing trials in multiple tumor types, including metastatic colorectal cancer, brain metastases in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) and hormone-refractory prostate cancer (HRPC).
Because it is an investigational compound, the safety and efficacy profile of patupilone has not yet been established. This investigational compound is available only through carefully controlled and monitored clinical trials. These trials are designed to better understand the potential benefits and risks of the compound. Because of uncertainty of clinical trials, there is no guarantee that patupilone will ever be commercially available anywhere in the world.
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