New US National Security Strategy

By Ali Younes

The Obama administration released its National Security Strategy Thursday (May 27) which is consistent with president Obama's approach on issues of international cooperation, terrorism, and nuclear policy. The document is largely an internationalist approach by an internationalist president who seeks cooperation with the world’s economic powers and international institutions in order to ensure continuity of American economic prosperity and its position as the world’s only superpower.

On the issue of terrorism the document did not make any significant changes from those of the Bush administration. Terrorism is still dealt with as an issue of “war” as oppose to “criminal” matter. Obama’s terrorism policies are a continuation of the same policies under Bush; that said, however, the new strategy no longer uses the words “Islam” or “Jihad” in the same sentences as “terrorism, so as to deny terrorist groups the claim that the United States is at war with all Muslims or with Islam. This is also meant to prevent the flourishing of smaller local extremist groups anywhere in the world from joining Al Qaida in its global “Jihad” by re-defining the US battle against one specific organization and not its conceptual underpinnings.

From the outset, this is significant; the document reads: “the United States is not at war with Islam” and mentioned that the US is battling Al Qaida specifically “the US is waging a global campaign against Al Qaida and its terrorist affiliates”.

The change in terminology is important but it is largely symbolic because the Obama administration terrorism policies are largely a continuation of Bush terrorism policies minus words like “jihadists” extremist Islam” that, according to this administration were empowering groups like Al Qaida by making the United States look like a country at war “or waging a crusade” against Islam itself.

Despite using the term “global campaign” in the document to refer to the war against Al Qaida in one place, and using “we are at war with a specific network, Al Qaida, and its terrorist affiliates” in another, this is only a minor change from the Bush approach.

The term “War” is a legal term; the Bush administration declared that the United States is at “war with Al Qaida” same as this administration; in so doing, this declaratory policy gives the president extraordinary “war powers” as a wartime president. Wartime powers enable the president to override the Congress and the Constitution of the United States as practiced from Abraham Lincoln until George .W. Bush, who, as a “wartime president” invaded both Iraq and Afghanistan under the nose of a terrified congress.

Also, as a wartime president, Bush was able to cow congress into silence and complacency when kidnapping foreign persons in foreign countries, surveillance against American citizens without court warrants, imprisoning American citizens without legal charges, the Rendition program (also practiced under Clinton) and establishing secret prisons in foreign countries to extract confessions through torture. (Several Arab countries were shamelessly participating in this program).

International law was also violated by President Bush when dealing with US-held detainees as enemy combatants depriving them, therefore, of Geneva Conventions protocols protections.

Under Obama these practices continued to be practiced with only minor cosmetic changes if any at all such as authorizing the CIA to kill or assassinate Anwar Al Awlaki, an American citizen of Yemeni origins who is affiliated with Al Qaida in Yemen.

Despite Obama’s promises to close Guantanamo Bay prison, it is still holds its inmates, some indefinitely and the administration is expanding the Bagram prison, in Afghanistan, which will be outside the jurisdiction of US laws and international laws as well.

Overall, the document, emphasized a “soft power “approach to international relations and broke with Bush’s neoconic grand designs to change the world in the US image.

Ali Younes is a writer and political analyst based in Washington D.C. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. He can be reached at: ali.younes@charter.net.
Sunday, May 30, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Hundreds Of Taliban Attack Afghan Province, 10 Killed

(KUNA) -- Hundreds of Taliban have attacked Afghanistans eastern province of Nuristan, reportedly under the leadership of a Pakistani Taliban commander, who is at large since Pakistani military launched operation in northern Swat valley in 2008.

Local media reports citing Afghan interior ministry spokesman said that about 300 Taliban militants, led by Mullah Fazlullah, have attacked Burgmittal district of Nuristan province.

Fierce gunbattle is going on between the militants and police, said reports, adding that at least seven militants and three policemen have been killed in trade of fire.

Reports said that the provincial government requested Kabul for help and that a team of police has already been dispatched to the area.

Mullah Fazullah had formed his own extremist Islamic government in the lush-green Swat valley of Pakistan.

When his activities started spreading to the other areas of the province, already rattling with insurgency in the bordering tribal areas, military launched operation and dismantled his network.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Karzai Visits United States: A Mutual Opportunity To Bury Hatchets?

By Shanthie Mariet D’Souza for ISAS

The recent visit of President Karzai to Washington DC brought to the fore the differences that have frayed the relationship under the new US administration, at a time when they need each other the most. The fraud-marred 2009 Afghan presidential elections and the subsequent repeated hurling of accusations of cronyism, inefficiency and corruption of the Afghan government by the Obama administration, had strained the relationship between the two countries. President Karzai too had lashed out at the foreign involvement in the elections and repeatedly pointed at the mounting civilian casualties. He visited China, hosted the Iranian president and even threatened to join the Taliban, none of these actions were music to Washington’s ears. Obama’s public lecturing in Kabul during his March 2009 unannounced visit to Afghanistan looked like another step downhill.

Karzai enjoyed a rather close relationship with President Bush, whereas his ties with President Obama are at best ‘distant’. His relationship with Obama’s two key administration emissaries – Richard C. Holbrooke and Karl Eikenberry remain strained. He has clashed with Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr over issues of corruption in the Afghan government. The only exception being the top US military commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley A. McChrystal, with whom Karzai shares a close relationship.

In a way, these tensions are reflective of the internal stresses within the civil and military component of the American-Afghan team, including friction between Eikenberry, American Ambassador to Afghanistan and the military, and between Holbrooke and the White House. These stresses have further exacerbated in the absence of a coherent strategy and consensus of the means to address the present quagmire Afghanistan.

Even with his serious differences with the Obama administration, President Karzai is obliged to take the first step to make amends, for the US aid and support remains crucial for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and recovery. Reports indicate that the Afghans are pressing the Obama administration to designate Afghanistan ‘a major non-NATO ally’2, a status enjoyed by Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and more importantly – Pakistan. The designation brings with it access to the US military technology and other benefits. Afghans also want to ‘update the US-Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement of 2005’,3 and in line with the recently held US-Pakistan strategic dialogue, are vying for greater US commitment and resources long after the summer of 2011. The establishment of the US-Afghan strategic dialogue is seen as a step in that direction.

If ‘kiss and make up’4 is a matter of compulsion for Karzai, for Obama too, it is a choice between the devil and deep blue sea. With less than a year to go before the announced exit, the Obama administration appears to have come to terms with dealing with the de jure power centre in Kabul. After a year of sniping, realisation seems to have dawned in the US policy-making circles about the need to maintain working relationship with Karzai. Given that the US troop numbers would rise above 100,000 in that country by 2011 and for the draw down to actualise in the stated time frame, it is imperative that Afghans take the lead. For this, enhancing Karzai government’s capacity and credibility would be crucial.

A Pentagon report submitted to Congress in April 2010 said that the security situation in Afghanistan has improved from what it was a year ago although it can be sustained only through the Afghan government’s ability and willingness to expand governance to areas that international forces clear of Taliban. In light of the troop increase and heightened military activity, the US is now spending more in Afghanistan than Iraq, for the first time since 2003. In February 2010, Pentagon spent US$6.7 billion in Afghanistan compared with US$5.5 billion in Iraq. For the fiscal year 2008, Iraq was three times as expensive and in 2009, it was twice as costly.5

Having announced a troop surge and an arbitrary date for the drawdown of forces, President Obama has a limited window of opportunity to demonstrate success to his domestic constituency where public opinion in support of the war is waning. The new counter-insurgency approach has not turned the situation around as quickly as President Obama had hoped. The lack of capacity of the Afghan state and uncoordinated international development efforts have been a force multiplier for the rapid spread of the insurgency and has largely undercut General McChrystal's counter-insurgency strategy, which has sought to gain the support of the Afghan population. The result is a quagmire in which ‘nobody is winning’,6 as General McChrystal admits.

As the recent Operation Moshtarek at Marjah demonstrated, concerns remain about shoring up local government capacity to ‘hold’ on the cleared area. For instance, General McChrystal’s ‘government in a box’ idea for a local Afghan government that would start functioning and delivering in former Taliban stronghold of Marjah once the US troops cleared out the insurgents has not taken off. The Marjah campaign offers important lessons for the upcoming offensive in Kandahar this spring, described as ‘decisive’, in the overall Afghanistan war effort. The US efforts of improving local governance in Kandahar will have to be done concurrently with clearing operations. Good governance through strengthening government at the district and local levels would remain central to the operations attempting to dislodge the Taliban control. However, reining in Karzai’s controversial half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, tainted with charges of corruption and drug trafficking who wields enormous power as the chairman of the provincial council, would require Karzai’s good offices.

Karzai is seeking the US support for his plan for reconciliation with and reintegration of the Taliban, an attempt at fracturing the insurgency at a time when the US military action is slated to intensify and before the US withdrawal. Ahead of the peace jirga (consultative assembly) to be held on 29 May 2010, Karzai has managed to get a pledge that most of the Afghan detainees will be transferred from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Afghan custody. As the military stalemate continues, many allies like France, Holland, Britain, Germany and Italy are under intense political pressure at home to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan, providing increasing credence to the talks of negotiating with the Taliban. The forthcoming peace jirga is an outreach effort to some 1,500 Afghan community leaders to discuss the way forward in reconciliation. Likewise, the talks to negotiate a broad agreement with the Taliban leadership that forms a national unity government and guarantees that Al-Qaeda and other radical groups do not return to Afghanistan, are gaining currency in the Western policy-making circles.

While civilian deaths from aerial bombings have declined, American officials now admit shootings of Afghan civilians by American and NATO convoys and at military checkpoints have spiked sharply this year, becoming the leading cause of combined civilian deaths and injuries at the hands of Western forces.

According to the US military statistics, at least 28 Afghans have been killed and 43 wounded in convoy and checkpoint shootings this year – 42 per cent of total civilian deaths and injuries and the largest overall source of casualties at the hands of American and NATO troops. The shootings alienate Afghans, who see them as proof of impunity with which the international forces operate. The US is seemingly taking steps to address these issues. Military commanders are issuing new troop guidelines that include soliciting local Afghan village and tribal elders and other leaders for information to prevent such convoy and checkpoint shootings.

Not surprisingly, the public criticism of Karzai government has been toned down. There is much less reference now to the prevailing level of corruption, inefficiency of the administration and the drug trade. The US Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry, who had warned against the troop surge and had denounced Karzai in a diplomatic cable last year as not being ‘an adequate strategic partner’7, personally escorted Karzai on the flight from Kabul to Washington. In contrast to the visit last year where Karzai had to share the spotlight with Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, the US administration this time rolled out the red carpet for Karzai, who arrived with nearly 20 members of his cabinet. Amidst much fanfare and symbolism, President Karzai attended a state dinner with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, met with President Obama, and had a formal head of state press conference at the White House.

In its desperation to find a solution from the present morass, the Obama administration is more than willing to bury its hatchets with Karzai. For the beleaguered Afghan President too, it is a matter of the US support or deluge. Circumstances do necessitate such strange alliances.


Dr Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. She can be contacted at isassmd@nus.edu.sg. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institute (ISAS), where this article was published (PDF) and is reprinted with permission.


2 David S. Cloud, Julian E. Barnes and Paul Richter, ‘Afghanistan wants to be designated a significant U.S. ally’, Los Angeles Times (12 May 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/world/la-fg-afghan-karzai-20100512. Accessed on 18 May 2010
3 ibid.
4 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, Karzai’s Warm Reception Reflects New U.S. Approach, New York Times (10 May 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/world/asia/11karzai.html. Accessed on 18 May 2010.
5 Richard Wolf, ‘Afghan war costs now outpace Iraq’s’, USA Today (13 May 2010), www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm. Accessed on 18 May 2010.
6 Patrick Cockburn, ‘“Nobody is winning”, admits McChrystal’, Independent (16 May 2010), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/nobody-is-winning-admits-mcchrystal-1974697.html. Accessed on 18 May 2010.
7 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘This Time We Really Mean It’, New York Times (30 March 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/opinion/31friedman.html. Accessed on 5 May 2010.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Statement On Wartime Contracting In Iraq And Afghanistan

Statement Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 

By Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation


Good morning, Co-chair Thibault, Co-Chair Shays, and members of the commission. I am pleased to be here with you today to discuss the FBI’s efforts to combat international contract corruption.

Since the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002, the United States government has privatized hundreds of functions that were conducted by military personnel in previous contingency operations and, in the process, has spent over $770 billion on private contractors. These contractors provide services and supplies as well as logistical and tactical support to the U.S. military in both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the reconstruction efforts of these two countries. While the vast majority of these contractors are legitimate, the FBI and its partners have also seen the emergence of complex and wide-ranging contractor fraud schemes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.

Specifically, the majority of International Contract Corruption Task Force investigations involve two principal characters: U.S. contracting officers (both uniform and civilian) and government contractors. As is the case in most white-collar crimes, the primary motivating force is greed. The illegal conduct predominantly involves the illegal payment of bribes/kickbacks in exchange for government contracts and theft of government property such as diesel fuel.

To combat these and other fraud schemes, the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI established the International Contract Corruption Initiative (ICCI) in November 2005. The mission of ICCI was to evaluate the extent of the crime problem, engage with other law enforcement agencies designated with oversight, develop a strategy to address the problem, and provide support to field offices conducting related corruption and fraud investigations.

The ICCI quickly revealed that the crime problem was immense and that it would take a coordinated approach to tackle the issue effectively. In 2006, after consulting with U.S. Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies tasked with investigating fraud related to the war, reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts, we joined our partners in standing up the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF). Participants initially included: Department of Defense Inspector General - Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Department of State, Office of Inspector General (DOS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Agency for International Development - Office of Inspector General (USAID), and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division - Major Procurement Fraud Unit (Army CID/MPFU).

In early 2009, three additional agencies joined the ICCTF—Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS). The ICCTF works closely with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force.

Joint Operations Center

To further interagency cooperation and coordination, we worked together once again to establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in 2007. The JOC, staffed by representatives from all nine ICCTF agencies and co-located in FBI space, goes along way in ensuring de-confliction of cases. The FBI’s International Corruption Unit (ICU) unit chief manages the daily administration of the JOC. The Board of Governors (BOGs), comprised of executive managers from each of the task force agencies, oversee both the ICCTF and JOC, to ensure standardization of operation and real-time sharing of information. Agency representatives work shoulder to shoulder, de-conflicting investigations, sharing intelligence, and supporting operations overseas. Task force agents are currently investigating nearly 300 joint cases in the U.S. and overseas which are directly supported by the JOC.

The FBI has also committed seven supervisory special agents, four intelligence analysts, two management and program analysts, and two administrative support personnel to the JOC in support of the ICCTF mission. Other ICCTF agencies have committed a total of eight intelligence analysts to the JOC, as well as a special agent from each agency to serve as that agencies’ JOC representative. JOC personnel collect and disseminate intelligence to ICCTF agencies, FBI field offices, and the intelligence community at large in furtherance of the intelligence cycle and in support of ICCTF field operations. To date, JOC analysts have responded to more than 300 requests for assistance (RFAs), provided direct support to top priority ICCTF cases, and initiated proactive intelligence assessments to identify trends and patterns.

Coordination with DOJ and the National Procurement Fraud Task Force

DOJ has established a coordinated and unified approach to combating procurement fraud, including fraud relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and reconstruction efforts in those countries. DOJ has devoted an array of resources and expertise to this important mission. The Antitrust Division, the Civil Division, and numerous U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have devoted substantial resources and coordinated their efforts with the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Public Integrity Section, Office of International Affairs Section, and the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.

DOJ has been working closely with the ICCTF and the JOC to investigate and prosecute procurement fraud relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rebuilding of those countries.

In an arrangement that ensures the maximum degree of coordination, the Director of the National Procurement Fraud Task Force serves as a primary point of contact for both the JOC and the ICCTF. He provides guidance to law enforcement agents during the early stages of their investigations, and assists the agents in identifying the best venue to prosecute cases. In addition, the Director tracks all prosecutions of contract fraud cases associated with the wars and rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to the efforts undertaken by the Department’s Criminal, Civil, and Antitrust Divisions, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country also have brought numerous warzone cases. Among them are many high-profile and sophisticated procurement fraud cases, such as those handled by the LOGCAP Working Group in the Central District of Illinois, and the United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York, among others.

As of May 2010, the Department had brought criminal charges against approximately 100 individuals and six companies for public corruption and government fraud relating to wars and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to civil claims brought or settled against a number of contractors.

FBI TDY Program in Support of ICCTF

Since June 2007, FBI agents have been deployed on 120-day temporary duty (TDY) rotations to conduct investigations in support of the ICCTF mission. The FBI currently deploys 35-40 agents per year to locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. These agents work with other ICCTF partners to initiate and conduct investigations. FBI agents in theater report to the FBI legat and coordinate operations with the FBI’s International Operations Division (IOD). In cooperation with IOD, an assistant legal attaché (ALAT) position was created to oversee the ICCTF mission in Iraq and recently, a similar ALAT position was created to oversee the ICCTF mission in Kuwait. In June of this year, the FBI will deploy a senior-level agent to Afghanistan for a one-year assignment; the FBI anticipates that this position will eventually be converted into a third ICCTF ALAT slot.

International Corruption Unit

The International Corruption Unit (ICU) was created in 2008 to oversee the increasing number of corruption and fraud investigations with an international nexus requiring extensive coordination with FBI field offices, legal attaché offices, U.S. federal agencies, and the law enforcement agencies of host countries. Specifically, the ICU oversees ICCTF matters, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigations, and antitrust investigations. These violations all have an international nexus and are therefore housed within the ICU, which has developed strong liaison relationships with law enforcement entities around the world. The ICU, which also initiates exchange programs with overseas law enforcement partners, is contemplating expansion of its mission into other theaters of operation, such as Pakistan and the continent of Africa.

Since its formation, the ICU has overseen all fraud and corruption cases related to the OCO. This includes all fraud against the U.S. government where the illegal conduct occurred outside the United States and involves United States persons or funds. Since 2004, the ICCTF has initiated nearly 700 investigations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. To date for FY 2010, the ICCTF has 273 pending cases. Only seven months into the fiscal year (FY), the ICCTF has already generated 80 percent of the prior year’s case load. In FY 2009 alone, the ICCTF obtained over $3.3 million in forfeitures/seizures, over $1 million in fines/penalties, and over $1.1 million in restitution. To date in FY 2010, the ICCTF has obtained over $47 million in restitution, and $1 million in forfeitures/seizures.

Successes

Working closely with our partners, sharing information and leveraging all available resources and expertise, the FBI has made significant strides in the area of international corruption. Clearly, there is more work to be done but through a coordinated approach we have become more nimble in our efforts and more able to combat the most egregious offenders.

In December 2009, a former U.S. Army contracting officer was sentenced to over 17 years for his participation in a bribery and money laundering scheme related to bribes paid for contracts awarded in support of the Iraq war. Major John Lee Cockerham, Jr. (U.S. Army) was a former contracting officer responsible for soliciting and reviewing bids for Department of Defense contracts in support of operations in the Middle East, including Operation Iraqi Freedom. The contracts were for the purchase of various products and services, including bottled water destined for soldiers serving in Kuwait and Iraq. The investigation determined Cockerham received favors, cash, and items of value from contractors in exchange for favorable treatment and consideration on contracts awarded in Iraq and Kuwait. Once he agreed to take money in exchange for awarding contracts, John Cockerham directed the contractors to pay his wife, her sister, and others to hide the fact that contractors were paying bribes. His wife has since been sentenced to 41 months in prison. Her sister received 70 months for her role in the scheme. The total restitution orders included more than $14 million.

In January 2010, Michael Wheeler, a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves, was sentenced to 42 months in prison for his participation in a wide-ranging bribery conspiracy involving the U.S. government, the Republic of Iraq and the Coalition Provisional Authority - South Central Region (CPA-SC) in Al-Hillah, Iraq.

Specifically, Wheeler conspired from December 2003 to December 2005 with at least three others to rig bids on contracts being awarded by the CPA-SC so that more than 20 contracts—worth approximately $8 million—were awarded to a co-conspirator. That individual, in turn, provided Wheeler and several other co-conspirators with more than $1 million in cash, SUVs, sports cars, a motorcycle, jewelry, computers, business class airline tickets, liquor, and promises of future employment.

In March of this year, Michel Jamil was sentenced to 40 months in prison for his participation in a scheme to steal approximately 10 million gallons of fuel from the U.S. Army in Iraq. In his guilty plea, Jamil admitted that he and two of his co-conspirators arranged for the creation of a false memorandum for record (MFR) authorizing individuals, purportedly on behalf of a company serving as a contractor to the U.S. government, to draw fuel from the Victory Bulk Fuel Point (VBFP), Camp Liberty, Iraq, which was owned and operated by the United States. The VBFP supplies aviation and diesel fuel to both military units and U.S. government contractors operating in and around the Victory Base Complex. Jamil admitted that he and his co-conspirators used false MFRs to steal large quantities of fuel from the U.S. Army for subsequent sale on the black market. Jamil admitted that he escorted the trucks to retrieve fuel from the VBFP using false MFRs on approximately 10 to 15 occasions. As a result of the scheme, Jamil received between $75,000 and $87,500 in personal profits.

Unfortunately, these cases represent a small sample of the cases our ICCTF team investigates each and every day. Together, though, we will continue root out the most egregious offenders.

Co-chair Thibault, Co-Chair Shays, and members of the commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you on this important issue. I am now happy to answer any questions.
Monday, May 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Bomb Attack On Bus In Afghanistan Kills Five, Wounds Eight

(KUNA) -- Five people were killed and eight others were wounded in a bomb attack on a bus in Western Afghanistan on Monday, local media reported, citing the Afghan Interior Ministry.

A bomb ripped through a passenger bus carrying passengers from Pusht district to Khaki Safed district in Farah province of Afghanistan, said interior ministry officials.

They said the blast killed five people and wounded eight others.
Monday, May 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Taliban Claims Responsibility For Assault On Kandahar Air Base

The Taliban claimed responsibility Sunday for a nighttime assault on NATO's base in Kandahar, as Afghan officials confirmed that a traditional gathering of elders and community leaders will be postponed for a second time.

NATO officials said militants fired rockets and mortar shells at the Kandahar Air Field late Saturday, and tried unsuccessfully to storm the northern perimeter of the base.

Several coalition troops and civilian employees were wounded, but there were no reports of deaths.

Also Sunday, Afghan officials said the three-day "jirga" to discuss prospects for peace has been postponed again. The gathering was to start on May 29, but now will be held from June 2-4.

In other violence Sunday, the police chief of Andar district in eastern Ghazni province was killed in a gunbattle with militants.

The attack at Kandahar was the second Taliban assault on a large military installation in Afghanistan in less than a week.

On Wednesday, militants attacked the main U.S. military base at Bagram, killing an American contractor.

Source: VOA
Monday, May 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russia Gives US Information On Afghan, Central Asian Drug Traffickers

Russia has handed over information on nine major drug traffickers, living in Afghanistan and Central Asia, to the U.S. drug police in a framework of Russian-U.S. bilateral presidential commission, the head of the State Anti-Narcotics Committee, Viktor Ivanov, said.

Ivanov is also the Russian side head of the commission's working group on combating drug trafficking.

"In a framework of a strategic cooperation, the Russian side handed over [information on] nine objects, living in Afghanistan and Central Asia, who are involved in drug trafficking, in supply of bulk of drugs," Ivanov said.

Russia's drug control chief said that the information was handed over int the Moscow's Sheremetievo airport during his meeting with the U.S. Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske adding that earlier Russia passed over data on another 25 individuals involved in drug trafficking.

In March, Ivanov said that Russia would boost its drug control mission staff in Afghanistan as "the drug situation in Russia is rather difficult, and needs fast decisions, both in Russia and within the framework of international cooperation."

Moscow will hold an international forum on combating Afghan drug trafficking on June 9-10. Representatives of key anti-drugs agencies and leading experts are expected to attend it.

Afghan drug production increased dramatically after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban in 2001, and Russia has been one of the most affected countries, with heroin consumption rising steeply. An estimated 90% of heroin consumed in Russia is trafficked from Afghanistan via Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

According to the Federal Drug Control Service, Afghan opium causes the deaths of around 100,000 people around the world annually. In Russia alone Afghan heroin kills around 30,000 young people each year.

Source: RIA Novosti
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Yemeni-American Muslim Cleric Urges Muslims To Kill US Soldiers

A radical U.S.-born Muslim cleric is urging Muslims serving in the U.S. Army to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In a video posted Sunday on Islamist militant websites, Anwar al-Awlaki said he justifies the deaths of U.S. soldiers because Americans have intentionally killed what he said were millions of Muslim civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq.

He also praised U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people last year at Fort Hood, a U.S. military base in the southern state of Texas. He said in the video that Hasan performed a "heroic act."

Last month, U.S. officials said the Obama administration had authorized the CIA to capture or kill Awlaki, an al-Qaida operative born in the U.S. to Yemeni parents.

Awlaki is believed to be hiding in a mountainous region in southeastern Yemen's Shabwa province.

Yemen intensified its campaign against al-Qaida militants after the group's local branch, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, claimed responsibility for the failed bombing of a U.S.-bound passenger jet last December.

Source: VOA
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The Financial Crisis And Leviathan

By Robert Higgs

Since the early twentieth century, periods of real or perceived national emergency have been “critical episodes” in the growth of government’s size, scope, and power in the United States and in many other countries. Hence, the concise conceptualization: Crisis and Leviathan (the main title of my 1987 book on the growth of government in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century).

In the past century, the first five such critical episodes in the United States were: World War I; the Great Depression; World War II; a multi-faceted set of crises associated with the civil-rights revolution and the Vietnam War, roughly coincident with the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon; and the post 9/11 events associated with the so-called War on Terror and the U.S. attacks on and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We are now amid another such critical episode, which springs from the housing bust that began in 2006, the economic recession that began late in 2007, and the financial debacle that reached its climax in September 2008.

The current troubles are complex and raise a multitude of questions. Many books and articles no doubt will be written to analyze these various issues in scholarly depth and detail, and certainly anything we might say today must be regarded as preliminary, at best. I focus here on a few aspects of the present episode that relate closely to my own research on the growth of government, a field of study to which I have returned again and again over the past thirty years.

I

The current recession has elicited many comparisons with earlier business downturns, especially with the Great Depression. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke is often described as an expert on the Great Depression who takes its lessons, as he understands them, deeply into account as he formulates and implements Fed policies. Likewise, many other economists have revisited the Great Depression recently in search of lessons applicable to current policy-making. In all of these reflections, the mainstream economics profession in general has distinguished itself by an astonishing superficiality of historical knowledge and lack of theoretical prowess.

The swiftness with which a great many mainstream economists have reverted to the simplistic “vulgar Keynesianism” that had its heyday from the late 1940s to the late 1960s has been nothing short of shocking, given that by the end of the 1970s such old-fashioned Keynesianism seemed to have been completely discredited and superseded in the leading echelons of the mainstream economics profession. Now it has come roaring back. Of course, the general public, whose understanding of such matters is always primitive, and the politicians, who are always looking for plausible intellectual rationales to excuse their insatiable spending, borrowing, and power-grabbing, had never abandoned vulgar Keynesianism, so they were elated to find that the economic “experts” were again confirming their own self-interested inclinations.

From such vulgar Keynesian thinking flowed the succession of “stimulus” spending measures, beginning with the Bush administration’s, carried out in the spring of 2008. Other governments have gone down the same foolish path. Of course, as any competent economist could have testified even fifty years ago, such temporary government-spending surges give people money that, for the most part, they save or use to pay off debts, rather than spending it along the lines envisioned by Keynesian “multiplier” analysis to set in motion an upward spiral of income, expenditure, real output, and employment. Much of the so-called stimulus spending in the United States has served only to bulk up the pay and benefits of government employees (federal, state, and local), effectively transferring income from the private sector to the government sector, and to reward other groups, such as the United Auto Workers and low-income home buyers, for their support of the Obama administration—past, present, or future.

At the same time, Bernanke and other central bankers, obsessed by an irrational fear of deflation, set in motion liquidity-enhancing measures so vast that no one could reasonably have anticipated them. Excess reserves of depository institutions in the United States now substantially exceed $1 trillion, as the banks have simply absorbed the effusions of dollars the Fed has spent to acquire an unprecedented variety of “securities,” including various “toxic” assets that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other ill-managed firms had acquired during the housing boom and later.


Bernanke and his colleagues in other central banks are taking credit for saving the financial system and even for saving the world from a repetition of the Great Depression—claims that must be treated with extreme skepticism. In any event, however, they have certainly created the potential for rapidly accelerating consumer-price inflation, should the banks become less apprehensive about their balance sheets and employ their vast excess-reserve balances to resume their lending and investing on a more normal basis.

Bernanke expresses confidence that he has the “tools” to rein in such potentially inflationary bank action, mainly by raising the interest rate the Fed pays banks on their deposits at the Fed, but one may well doubt whether he will be able to use those tools effectively. When interest rates begin to rise substantially, as they must sooner or later, great political pressure will be brought against tighter-money actions by the Fed and other central banks; the politicians will protest increases in interest rates at a time when unemployment remains at an elevated rate and other aspects of the recession linger, as well. So, even if Bernanke has the effective tools he claims to have, the question remains as to whether he will have the personal courage and the political support required to use those tools effectively.

II

One aspect of the current crisis that has come as anything but a surprise is that the politicians and their supporting coalition of crony capitalists and other backers have certainly not (in the immortal words of Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel) allowed “a crisis to go to waste.” The past two years have witnessed one power-grab or institutional takeover after another, most notably of AIG, Fannie, Freddie, General Motors, and Chrysler. Under the TARP scheme, the Treasury has taken ownership positions in hundreds of large banks by acquiring preferred shares and warrants. Virtually all residential mortgage lending now ultimately springs from the secondary market and guarantees provided by Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie Mae, FHA, and VA. This aspect of the government’s power-grab has been especially important because by continuing to pump funds into dodgy mortgages, the government is preventing the necessary restructuring of the housing-construction industry and the mortgage-credit sector, propping up unqualified and underwater borrowers and ill-managed and even insolvent lenders, and thereby creating great potential for a second round of the housing/housing-finance bust in the near-term future.

As the huge recent expansion of the government’s size and scope has proceeded, the Treasury’s fiscal condition has deteriorated badly. The federal deficit jumped from an amount equal to about 3 percent of GDP in fiscal 2008 to an amount equal to about 10 percent of GDP in fiscal 2009, and even the government’s forecasts now project deficits in the neighborhood of $1 trillion per year for the next decade. Thus, the U.S. government’s debt has exploded, and will continue to rise relentlessly—or, it will do so as long as willing buyers can be found for bonds promising only modest nominal yields, a market that Uncle Sam can no longer assume will persist indefinitely. (The Chinese and other major buyers are already grousing and insisting that the U.S. Treasury act more prudently.)

While the government proper was expanding its size, scope, and power, the Fed was greatly expanding the magnitude and scope of its own balance sheet and, in effect, engaging in “industrial policy” by singling out particular firms and industries for assistance, while steering clear of others in equally dire condition. If the Fed is not “picking winners,” it is certainly deciding who will be spared a market-determined fate as a loser. Fed officials insist that they intend to withdraw from many of the new areas they have recently entered, once the crisis has passed, but it will be surprising if the recent “emergency” policies do not remain in the Fed’s arsenal, bulking up its power, and equally surprising if it sloughs off all of the unusual types of “securities” it has acquired in the past two years.

At the moment, the Fed is seeking—and it, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity may well be given—wide-ranging statutory authority to reorganize preemptively any seemingly failing firm (not only banks) whose failure would pose, in the Fed’s estimation, a “systemic risk.” Such authority would greatly expand the Fed’s current power as a monetary central planner by adding a role as risk-management central planner. Regardless of whether the Fed, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity ends up the winner of the current power scramble, the possible repercussions of this expanded power on the operation of the capital markets is frightful to contemplate.

III

As the current troubles have led many economists and others to revisit the government’s policies during the 1930s, some have concluded that even though the New Deal’s hodgepodge of policies never brought about full recovery, the action that most economists believe did effect a full recovery—in Paul Krugman’s words, “the large public works program, otherwise known as World War II, that ended the Great Depression”—suggests a remedy for today’s recession along similar lines. In retrospect, it is clear that this belief in the creation of “wartime prosperity” by massive government spending and deficit financing did more than anything else to bring about acceptance of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s. Even today, not only the general public but most professional economists remain firmly convinced that, as the familiar saying maintains, “the war got the economy out of the Great Depression,” and hence a serious recession such as the present one naturally causes them to recall this supposed “lesson” of economic history. Among many lesser lights, Martin Feldstein, one of the country’s most eminent and influential economists, has recently proposed what amounts to an exercise in military Keynesianism as a stimulus measure.

The fly in this ointment, however, is that the lesson almost everyone has drawn from the events of the 1940s is false; the common belief is a myth. When we take apart the simplistic Keynesian analysis of the war’s effect on the economy and look carefully at what actually happened to the various components of the labor force, the capital stock, and the gross domestic product, we see that the economic events of the war years represent a classic case of a command economy’s sacrificing butter—not to mention life, liberty, and property—for the sake of producing and deploying more guns.
 
A single graph suffices to give us a more accurate portrayal of the economy’s performance in the 1930s and 1940s (for a complete analysis, see the first five chapters of my 2006 book Depression, War, and Cold War).


As the graph shows, real GDP dropped sharply in the early 1930s, then recovered rapidly after 1933, but it did not reach its high-employment growth trend until 1941, when the nature of the economy’s output (shifting rapidly into war production) was beginning to obscure the meaning of data that purport to measure “real output.” If we accept the standard data, a huge war boom appears to have occurred during the war years, followed by a sharp downturn, concentrated in 1946, after which the economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend (shown in the figure by the straight line connecting the [logarithms of the] values for 1929 and 1948).

Looking at the private part of GDP—the part with a much clearer meaning, owing to its derivation from freely-made consumer and investor choices about the use of privately owned funds—we see a similar pattern during the 1930s, but a completely different pattern during the 1940s. After 1941, private output of both consumer and investor goods fell to much lower levels and remained submerged far below the high-employment growth trend throughout the war years. Private real output did not exceed its 1941 rate until 1946, when it shot up by about 30 percent in a single year. Afterward, the private economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend. Real prosperity had been achieved at last, for the first time since 1929.

But wait, the critics protest: didn’t the war wipe out mass unemployment? Of course, it did. However, this elimination of mass unemployment had nothing to do with Keynesian fiscal policy (or, for that matter, with the concurrent, highly expansive monetary policy) and everything to do with the military draft, which pulled the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar labor force into the armed forces. If the economy has 5–7 million persons unemployed, then drafting 10 million prime-age workers (and thereby inducing millions of others to enlist “voluntarily”) will “solve” the unemployment problem every time. To use the same policy today, the U.S. authorities need only to conscript about 30 million men—not, I daresay, a political idea whose time has come.

Indeed, the idea is preposterous, and so, more generally, is looking to the government’s alleged “large public works program, otherwise known as World War II” as a model of how to deal with today’s economic crisis. Rather than allow ourselves to be mesmerized by a statistically spurious bulge of real GDP during World War II, we are better advised to recall the wartime rationing of many ordinary consumer goods, the shortages or complete production closures of many consumer goods (e.g., automobiles, most consumer durables), the preemption of public transport by the military authorities, and the wage, price, and rent controls that caused, among many other undesirable consequences, drastic deterioration in the quality of many goods and services. Whatever else the war might have accomplished, it certainly did not produce conditions that we may properly describe as genuine prosperity.

IV

Even if policy makers decline to adopt World War II-type policies as remedies for the current recession, the immense magnitude of the present-day military-industrial complex certainly complicates all efforts to effect a recovery, by draining more than $1 trillion a year from the economy’s potential to produce private consumer and producer goods. The current long-running wars and military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will probably never end, although eventually they may be scaled back somewhat, only add to the economic drain on U.S. resources. So far, more than $1 trillion has been expended for these ill-fated adventures, and their total cost may eventually cumulate to several times this amount, not simply because they, like the U.S. military presence in Japan, Korea, and various European countries, will continue indefinitely, but also because of the need to care for a multitude of physically and psychologically disabled veterans over a span of several decades.

Even if the wars in the Middle East were concluded overnight, however, a huge distortion would continue to affect the U.S. economy, owing to the normal operation of the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of the current armed forces and their far-flung empire of more than 800 large overseas bases. This military hypertrophy reflects not an attempt to pump up the macroeconomy, as military Keynesians would have it, but rather the devotion of U.S. ruling elites to the maintenance of global military hegemony, ultimately capped by the attainment of “full-spectrum dominance”—“control of land, sea, air and space and all attendant resources” over the entire world.

Why do U.S. policy makers seek such god-like control of the planet? To the extent that the military leadership itself contributes to shaping national-security policies, this o’erleaping ambition merely expresses the latest phase of the military’s longstanding maniacal quest for total power—the undoubted ability to win any and all conceivable wars. Among the civilian leadership, the motives range more widely. An important impulse, though it is never mentioned frankly in polite company, is to maintain a foreign military presence configured so as to make the state of Israel as secure as possible. Another abiding interest is to control the worldwide distribution of petroleum, if necessary by bribing, intimidating, or taking military action against the governments of important oil-producing countries, especially in the Persian Gulf region.

Related to this wholly unnecessary quest to control the world’s oil-distribution channels—after all, it does not serve the interests of the oil producers to withhold their product from the world market—is the ambition to play the Great Game by throwing up barriers to the expanding influence of China and India and the residual potential of Russia in southwest Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea region, where vast stores of oil and gas remain to be tapped and brought to market. For more than half a century, U.S. leaders have been obsessed with projecting their country’s power into petro-military adventures of all sorts. However senseless this fixation might seem in a purely economic perspective, we can scarcely deny that the coziest crony capitalists in the oil and related industries have reaped a great deal of income along the way, and owing to their extraordinary political clout, they have every expectation of continuing to reap such income in the future, with the vital assistance of U.S. diplomats and armed forces to grease the skids.

Although the military-industrial-congressional complex is one of the most powerful interest groups in U.S. politics, and we may certainly expect it to struggle forcefully to retain or even to increase the flow of wealth placed at its disposal, the U.S. government’s increasingly precarious financial condition may compel even this powerful coalition to settle for a smaller space at the trough, especially if stagflation sets in as the U.S. economy’s normal condition during the next decade (as I suspect it will). If America’s economic future turns out to be even worse than I now foresee—for example, with rapid inflation, price and capital controls, and a flight from the dollar—then even greater retrenchment of the U.S. military presence abroad will be unavoidable. Such economic ruin would be a heavy price to pay for reining in America’s global hegemony, but, nevertheless, the military retrenchment itself would be a consequence that most of the world’s people would celebrate.


Acknowledgment: This commentary was originally prepared for presentation at a meeting convened by Diapason Commodities Management S.A. in Venice, Italy, April 30, 2010. I am grateful to Sean Corrigan and his colleagues at Diapason for inviting me to speak at this meeting.

Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institute’s quarterly journal The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague. He has been a visiting scholar at Oxford University and Stanford University, and a fellow for the Hoover Institution and the National Science Foundation. He is the author of many books, including Depression, War, and Cold War. This article was published by The Independent Institute  and reprinted with permission.
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

As An Afghan River Border Shifts, Murder Follows

By Zarif Nazar, Charles Recknagel

(RFE/RL) -- Every spring, as the Amu Darya floods, the border it marks with Turkmenistan moves deeper into this corner of northwestern Afghanistan.

Now, the river is as much as 25 kilometers farther south than it was 30 years ago in parts of Jawzjan Province. In the village of Yaz Ariq Dinar, just a stone's throw from the advancing border, fear runs high.

The villagers are losing their land to an advancing foreign country. And though both they and those across the border are ethnic Turkmen, there seems to be little room for understanding.

Abdul Jabar, a cowherd from Yaz Ariq Dinar on the Afghan side of the border, was unwilling to give up the grazing land that once adjoined his village. So, he put the cattle aboard a makeshift raft and poled it across the water. Then he moved out of sight with the animals through the scrubland and scattered trees.

When Turkmenistan border guards returned his badly mutilated body to the Afghan side the next day, it was clear he had suffered a terrible fate.

"From the pelvis to the chin, the front of the body had been cut open and then stitched back together," says the village notary, Noor Mohammed, who saw the corpse.

"The doctor said there was no need to look more, it was obvious everything (all the organs) had been removed from inside. There was also a bullet wound that was stitched up at both the entry and the exit."

Jabar's wife, Ana Beg, says he "he took two loaves of bread and went away," adding that "when (his body) came back like that, I understood."

A Series Of Victims

The Turkmenistan authorities have offered only the sketchiest of explanations.

They told officials in the provincial capital, Sheberghan, that the 31-year-old cowherd was beaten by border guards, then taken to a hospital for treatment. They said his body was opened as a routine part of an autopsy.

The bizarre removal of Jabar's organs has only added to the shock of his killing. Some in the village think the hospital removed them to put in an organ bank, others think they were stolen for the illegal organ trade. But the truth will probably never be known.

What is certain is he is far from the only person who has crossed the river to graze livestock or collect firewood and then paid with his life.

At the start of this year, three people were killed and their bodies thrown into the river to float downstream until their bodies washed up on the Afghan side.

Ten months ago, shepherds crossing over the river found the body of one of their neighbors lying burned almost beyond recognition in the scrub. His body had apparently been doused with gasoline.

Another villager is still missing after disappearing. And these are just the cases of recent years.

Just who is doing the killing is unclear. But other villagers who have crossed the river say they have frequently been harassed by border guards claiming the grazing land has now become part of Turkmenistan.

Sometimes, the villagers are released after giving up one of their animals as a fine, sometimes they are released after a beating.

Each year, the situation seems to get worse as the river inexorably moves farther south.

Lost Land

Hadji Khaleq, one of the elders in Yaz Ariq Dinar village, recalls that when he was young the Amu Darya River was far from his door.

"The river has already taken one part of our village and now it is taking more. But when we were children, the river was 1 1/2 hour's walk away," he says, adding that the village has no other grazing land other than that which is now across the water.

The river changes course when it swells with snow melt because its mud embankment in this area easily erodes under the pressure of the fast-moving water. Once part of the embankment caves in, the river gouges out a bigger and bigger section, changing the river bed.

The same thing happens locally in other places as the Amu Darya -- Central Asia's longest river -- flows from the Pamir Mountains to the Aral Sea. And there, too, the changes create land disputes.

But the dispute in Jawzjan Province is particularly brutal and difficult to understand because it contrasts with otherwise good relations between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.

The good relations include Ashgabat's sponsoring of several development projects on the Afghan side of the border, where the ethnically Turkmen population speak the same language and share the same culture found in Turkmenistan.

In the neighboring Shortepa district of Balkh Province, the Turkmen government has provided the funding for a model school in Hazara-Toqai village.

Inside the school building's main entrance is a plaque noting it is a gift from Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. The Afghan-Turkmen parents and teachers show their gratitude by hanging his portrait, as well as Afghan President Hamid Karzai's, beside the blackboard.

Ashgabad also funded a clinic in Karamkol district of Faryab Province last year.

Appealing To Kabul

At the national level, too, ties are good. Turkmenistan is the one neighbor which Kabul has never accused of trying to back various factions in Afghanistan's past 30 years of warfare. And both Ashgabat and Kabul hope for Afghanistan to become the transit country for a lucrative future gas pipeline running from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India.

But if that means interstate hostility can be ruled out in the killings it seems to do nothing to safeguard Afghan Turkmen villagers who cross the Amu Darya from being killed.

The villagers themselves have appealed to Kabul for help but so far with little effect.

"This confused situation with the border has continued for several decades. Until now, Afghanistan has not reached the point where it could solve the problem," says Khalid Pashtun, a member of parliament who serves on a committee overseeing border security.

"In my view, the only solution is to strengthen the embankment and to reach an interstate agreement with the neighboring country. The other is side is always doing a lot to strengthen its own embankment to avoid such problems."

Pashtun has promised to bring the matter up in parliament, but that is only the start of what is sure to be a long decision-making process.

Meanwhile, the villagers do temporarily what they hope the government will one day do permanently.

As the river floods with this year's snow melt, they are trying to sandbag places where they fear it might break through further into their fields.

"Just now we are at Kabek village (also in the border area) and we have no resources except that a member of the provincial council is here and he brought 4,000 bags for us to fill with sand. There are 200 people two nearby villages volunteering," says Khaleq, the village elder.

But there is little likelihood the sandbags can hold the river long or that villagers will stop crossing over the river to try to retain use of their already lost land. And those two conditions make it certain that the situation along this part of the Amu Darya will remain deadly for months to come.



RFE/RL Turkmen Service correspondent Shahmurdan Muradi, who recently traveled to northern Afghanistan from Kabul, contributed to this report. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The Foreign Policy Legacy Of George W. Bush

By Deepak Tripathi

Despite the 'surge' that General Stanley McChrystal asked for and President Obama approved after weeks of reflection, militants on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border continue to defy American power. High-profile military operations against the Taliban in Helmand and elsewhere illustrate both abilities and limitations of a superpower. This is not new. The Soviet occupation forces went through a similar experience during their occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Like the Soviets, the Americans are increasingly finding that it is possible to wrest control of specific areas, but only as long as their troops are in occupation of those areas. As they move on for other operations, the insurgents make a come back.

There are similarities between the recent American surge approved by President Obama and the increase in the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the USSR in 1985. Early on, Gorbachev had decided to bring his troops home following a costly war in Afghanistan. But he also ordered reinforcements similar in size to the American surge now. Ostensibly, it was to give the Soviet armed forces one last chance to win the Afghan war, but more realistically because before a planned withdrawal, the Soviet Union needed to reinforce. Troops being withdrawn have to partially disarm. The heavy equipment to be transported cannot be operational at the same time. Soldiers moving out carry light arms for self-defense, not heavy lethal weapons for attack. At the same time, the surge of more mobile units is intended to warn the enemy of more trouble coming.

President Obama has already announced that American troops will begin to leave Afghanistan by the middle of 2011. My recent visit to South Asia reinforced this impression. Obama is smart enough to know history and its lessons. He has disappointed many of his liberal supporters who had expected much more from him. But there is not much doubt that he would like to withdraw from Afghanistan. Re-election in 2012 would depend on it to a considerable degree, along with the economy. The wreckage of military ventures abroad and economic collapse at home left by the preceding administration must be prominent on Obama’s mind. What Obama will achieve is by no means certain. But there are lessons to be learned from the past.

The presidency of George W Bush was rooted in a manifesto we know as the Project for the New American Century. The project was born in reaction to the Clinton presidency in the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s. The alliance of neoconservatives and the Christian Right provided George W Bush with core support. Above all, the Bush presidency will be remembered for America’s foreign military ventures in the shape of three wars: the Afghan war, the Iraq war, and a third war, borderless and timeless – the ‘global war on terror’.

The events of 9/11 posed an unprecedented security challenge. The most important questions in Washington at the time should have been: Where to start and where to stop? What should be the scale and proportion of America’s response? However, such considerations were absent as the talk of a ‘long war’ or ‘generational war’ illustrated, certainly in the first term of President Bush.

The record of great powers fighting long or generational wars against insurgents is not good. The United States learned this in Vietnam. The Soviet Union did so in Afghanistan. A long war suits insurgent forces deeply embedded in the locale and culture of the theater. They enjoy considerable support in the battleground. Denial of this reality is often fatal. A United States president has numerous issues to deal with. But the overwhelming weight of events of the last decade leads to the conclusion that the Bush presidency was all about war. The foreign ventures he embarked on within months of inauguration eclipsed everything else during his presidency. It is therefore appropriate to evaluate the Bush presidency’s legacy in terms of the ‘war on terrorism’.

The objective of the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was regime change. There has been a long debate about the true objective of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq: weapons of mass destruction or regime change. Time and events seem to have settled that debate. It was claimed that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons that could be activated within 45 minutes. Such weapons were not found. A lot more about the considerations and deliberations between Washington and London, and in each capital, has come to light. We know more about the private communication between President Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the run up to the Iraq invasion – communication that other significant figures who should have been made aware of did not know. And we have learned from Tony Blair that even with knowledge of there being no weapons of mass destruction, he would have employed other arguments to remove Saddam Hussein.

Much has been said about mistakes being made in Afghanistan and, more specifically, Iraq. The biggest error of judgment was that two very different countries were given the same treatment of military power. In doing do, the intervenors appeared to act with vengeance more than a planned strategy. Otherwise, why would Afghanistan – an utterly failed state – be subjected to sustained destructive air power and left without a serious attempt at rebuilding for so long. And the primary intervenor moved on to Iraq to dismantle a well-organized state structure, after the dictator had been overthrown. By treating Afghanistan and Iraq in the same way, the intervenors did the opposite of what was needed in each country.

To view al Qaeda and the various nationalist movements in the Arab world as one ‘enemy’ in the ‘war on terror’ was an historic miscalculation. The determination under the Bush presidency to crush nationalism in the Muslim world exacted a high price from the West. But countries in the region paid, and continue to pay, a price even greater. Al Qaeda’s terrorist violence has been answered by the terror of American military power. Differing agendas of regional powers became fused with America’s aims in the ‘war on terror’. The impact was huge across the region, producing anger, resentment and outright rebellion in the wider populace.

In a country without national infrastructure, or where infrastructure is destroyed, there will be certain consequences. The essence of the state’s role is maintaining order. It does so by means of coercion, taxation and distribution. In a country such as Afghanistan, self, family, clan, tribe and ethnic group acquire much greater significance. In a failed or weak state, other agencies – a village elder, tribal chief or warlord – replace the state. They command popular following, because they make things happen.

In Iraq, two early decisions by the American administrator Paul Bremer after the 2003 invasion triggered a multi-layered conflict. By Order Number 1 of May 16, Bremer dissolved the Ba’ath Party. In an article in Le Monde diplomatique, the British academic Toby Dodge described the Iraqi population a month after the arrival of the US forces as dominated by a Hobbesian nightmare. Dodge estimated that between 20000 and 120000 senior and middle-ranking Iraqi officials lost their jobs in the civil service purge alone. They would have constituted the very force capable of restoring order amid chaos and violence. Dodge wrote that 17 of Baghdad’s 23 ministries were completely gutted, stripped of all portable items like computers, furniture and fittings – all within three weeks. There were not enough American troops to stop it.

Bremer’s Order Number 2 dismantled the most important state institutions and subordinates such as government ministries, Iraqi military and paramilitary organizations, the National Assembly, courts and emergency forces. To be prepared with alternatives to take over the functions of these organizations was essential in a country of 30 million people. Bremer’s two edicts left a vacuum that was rapidly filled by new violent players.

I want to offer a brief explanation of the nature of the other conflict – Afghan war – since the 1970s. It also applies to an extent to Iraq. Afghanistan has striking parallels with other conflicts in Palestine, Yemen and elsewhere. These conflicts can be seen in four separate yet overlapping, often simultaneous stages. This is how.

Stage 1: internal conflict. In Afghanistan, internal conflict is a fact of history. For simplicity, let’s begin from the ‘decade of liberalism and modernization’ in the 1960s. The conflict escalated after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 – and again after the 1978 coup by young Soviet-oriented military officers, who feared that President Daud was taking the country too close to the United States.

Stage 2: increase in great power involvement. External intervention fuels the unrest, and upsets the balance of forces locally. This, in turn, attracts more external forces, until they begin to dictate the scale and course of events. But their unacceptability among local players, and active resistance by local groups, hinder the creation and functioning of institutions.

Stage 3: state disintegration. In Afghanistan, the death of the state was slow, taking more than two decades. In Iraq, too, considering the effects of sanctions and isolation, we are talking about more than a decade. After Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, the final blow came relatively quickly.

Stage 4: foreign indifference and rise of extremism. I have in mind the decade of the 1990s and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Soviet state had been defeated and had disintegrated. For the United States, exhausted and occupied with the urgency to manage the wreckage of the Soviet Union, most importantly its nuclear arsenal, Afghanistan was simply not a priority.

There is a general lesson to be learned. A prolonged war leads to fatigue and indifference among external intervenors. A culture of violence matures. Expectations on all sides are altered and violence becomes a way of life. Actors left behind acquire a habit of using coercion. And citizens come to expect solutions to be found through violence. That few intervening powers grasp this lesson is a tragedy.

We have at present a mix of the McChrystal plan of military surge and counterinsurgency and President Obama’s wish to start drawing down the combat forces in mid-2011. His wish is driven by the 2012 presidential election in America. And it is dependent upon recruitment, training and ultimately guaranteed discipline of a 300000-strong Afghan national force.

However, history shows that integrity in the Afghan armed forces is difficult to achieve. Tribal realities among Pashtun officers and rank-and-file soldiers – and distrust for Pashtuns among non-Pashtuns – cannot be wished away. It would require a generation to transform the culture of the armed forces and the country even if the United States and allies had the will. In the absence of that will, I have some fears. They are –

1. As soon as President Obama begins to draw down the combat forces in mid-2011, altering the balance of power, or that prospect is near, dramatic shifts of loyalties will occur in the Afghan armed forces. This has happened before and could happen again.

2. The Karzai government cannot survive if the military disintegrates along tribal and ethnic lines. The Afghan armed forces and police lack cohesion already.

3. Afghanistan has weapons in abundance. Guns poured into the country, with the best possible intention of equipping the military, would fall into the wrong hands. And I am not even talking about increased activity by Pakistan’s ISI and other regional players.

All these are ingredients of a state of nature again.

The answer is a long-term regional project, led but not dictated by the United States, involving Iran, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and India; and a deliberate policy of demilitarization, however difficult and painful. Internally, a type of tribal democracy, certainly outside Kabul and other main cities, is what is realistic to hope for.

But the current state of America’s relations with China, Iran and Russia does not favor such a prospect. Tensions have grown with Pakistan and Turkey. And I know there is uncertainty, if not outright unhappiness, over the Obama administration’s policies elsewhere in the region. This makes cooperation much more difficult. The current strategy in Afghanistan lays too much emphasis on military tactics. And it does not appreciate nearly enough how objectionable, how provocative, foreign military presence is to Afghans. The sentiment goes beyond the Taliban – and the primary reason why external intervenors have found it impossible to tame the independent spirit of Afghans permanently.


Deepak Tripathi has taken a close interest in the United States, great power relations and South and West Asia for more than 30 years. His book Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, D.C.) has just been published. He recently presented an earlier version of this paper at the Eccles Center for American Studies at the British Library in London. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: http://deepaktripathi.wordpress.com. This article is reprinted with permission.
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Afghanistan: Marja Residents Flee Unrest

Caught between government and Taleban forces, locals say their only choice is to seek refuge elsewhere.

By Mohammad Ilyas Dayee

 (IWPR) -- Sayed Mohammad, 55, is preparing to leave his Marja home with his children, wife and brother, all piled onto a tractor alongside some furniture and three chickens.

Mohammad's dirty turban signals his poverty, and his four children, covered in dust, look frightened and try to hide in their mother's arms.

"Marja will never be secure," he said. "In the past, there was only Taleban oppression; but now the government and foreigners have also joined in. I don't know who is more cruel. I had to leave Marja."

Pale-faced and angry, Mohammad claimed that the Taleban warn they will soon triumph in Marja, and have called for residents to send their brothers and sons to fight in the cause of jihad. "I don't want my poor brother to be killed," he said.

Some 15,000 Afghan and international troops forced 2,000 Taleban fighters to retreat from their stronghold of Marja in Helmand province earlier this year during Operation Moshtarak.

After the offensive, aimed at taking control of a major heroine-producing area, the Afghan defence minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, told reporters, "Our objectives are to strengthen government control in Marja, to reconstruct Marja and to make Marja people secure."

But the deteriorating security situation in the province is now causing increasing numbers of Marja residents to flee. Caught between fear of the foreign forces and counter-attacks by Taleban fighters, many say they have no choice but to seek refuge in the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.

According to the Red Cross office in Helmand, most of the displaced are poor families who have left their homes for Lashkar Gah due to security concerns.

The head of the Afghan Red Crescent Society Helmand office, Ahmadullah Ahmadi, said that 117 families had left in early May alone and he warned that the situation was deteriorating, "People are living in very bad conditions; there are no jobs, the fighting is starting again, and this situation has compelled the residents to leave Marja. And we don't have enough resources to help them."

Crossing the bridge over the Helmand river in a small Mazda lorry filled with women wearing green burqas, and children, Khan Zaman said he was moving to Lashkar Gah because his house had been repeatedly searched by American troops.

"It was terrifying. One day they might accuse me of being a Taleban or al-Qaeda member and send me to Guantanamo prison. So I have to leave," he said.

A spokesman for US forces could not be reached for comment on the charge but the Marja district governor, Haji Mohammad Zaher, has denied the existence of any such problem.

At a news conference in early May, he told journalists that reports of internally displaced residents were false, "These families are mainly those who have committed major crimes in the past. Now, when the area is under government control, they do not feel safe and flee the district."

Colonel Ghulam Sakhi, head of the public order department in Marja, also claimed the situation in Marja was satisfactory. He said that those who were leaving the province were not residents.

"I can show you the list of 16 families who had migrated from Uruzgan during Taleban rule and were active in the poppy trade. Now they have harvested their poppy and left Marja. This has nothing to do with the security situation in Marja," he said.

However, a source close to the Marja district governor, who asked to remain anonymous, confirmed that security conditions were deteriorating and people were leaving the district.

"The Taleban are changing their tactics day by day; they keep planting mines and are also conducting small arms attacks, but they mainly put pressure on those who have connections with the government," he said.

Since the beginning of Operation Moshtarak, 13 tribal elders have been assassinated by the Taleban for assisting the government, according to security sources.

The head of the Helmand rural rehabilitation and development department, Mohammad Omer Qani, also said that people were leaving Marja because of the troubles they face.

"Those leaving Marja are not government officials or Taleban fighters who should be afraid of their criminal deeds. The truth is that they are faced with challenges and everybody is making trouble for them," he said.

Local people complain that the Taleban punish people they find in possession of US dollar banknotes, taking this as a sign they have been collaborating with American forces. Afghan government forces, they also say, punish those they find with Pakistani rupees as a sign of cooperation with the Taleban.

Ata Mohammad, a local driver for the Red Crescent, said, "Arif, my cousin, was arrested by Taleban on his way to Marja. They found 60 US dollars in his pocket and beat him so badly that he was in bed for a week."

Mohammad Omer, who ran a fertiliser shop in Karwa Charrahi, in the south of Marja, said he had left due to fear of both the Afghan police and the Taleban.

"I was selling in rupees, dollars and afghanis, and sometimes I had to stay the whole night in the shop, because I could not leave for fear of harassment by the police and by the Taleban," he said.

Spokesmen for both the government and the Taleban denied these accusations.

Colonel Sakhi said, "No police officer would bother anyone for keeping rupees or dollars in their pockets and I reject these accusations."

Taleban spokesman Qari Ahmadi denied that they were making life difficult for local people. "I don't agree with the accusations that the Taleban are making trouble for the people. Those who harass people in the name of Taleban are government people," he said.


Mohammad Ilyas Dayee is an IWPR staff reporter in Helmand. This article originally appeared in ARR, produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Britain Reaffirms Support For Afghanistan

By Tom Rivers

Three top officials from Britain's new coalition government flew in to Afghanistan for high-level discussions Saturday with political and military leaders there. With many Britons back home now openly questioning why its troops are still in the country, a big part of the trip was to clarify the British mission in Afghanistan.

Just weeks into a new administration here in London, a high-powered British delegation spent Saturday discussing the current situation in Afghanistan with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. commander of international forces, General Stanley McChrystal.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague called it a stock taking exercise by the incoming government, but as Prime Minister David Cameron stated on the campaign trail, it was his belief that British forces should start coming home within the next five years.

Opinion polls repeatedly show that the British public has grown weary of the nearly nine-year-long deployment.

Upon meeting the Afghan President in Kabul, Mr. Hague was very diplomatic in his language. "Afghanistan will find in the new government in Britain a steady friend in helping to tackle the problems that we have suffered in this area of world for too long," he said.

But speaking to the Times of London newspaper on Saturday, new Defense Secretary Liam Fox said he would like to see British soldiers come home as soon as possible and that he said would mean accelerating the training of Afghan forces if at all possible.

Meanwhile, interviewed by the BBC, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, Colonel Richard Kemp says increasing the tempo of training of Afghan soldiers could be done but it would come with a price.

"In my opinion, to do that which is a very laudable objective, the sooner we can do it the more capable they are and more quickly we can write down the Taliban the quicker we will be able to withdraw from Afghanistan. But to do that I think we need more resources. Now are we prepared to put in more forces, more troops to help train the Afghan national army? Are we prepared to dedicate more resources to do that? If not, I suspect we probably cannot speed it up hugely," he said.

Britain supplies the second largest contingent of NATO troops in Afghanistan. Most are based in Helmand province in the south.

Nearly 300 British military personnel have been killed in Afghanistan since 2001.

Britain's new coalition government has promised an urgent defense review and many observers believe that will mean deep cuts as the new administration grapples with the country's huge and growing deficit problem.

Source: VOA
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

As U.S. Says 'Do More,' Pakistan Highlights Its Own Limitations

By Abubakar Siddique

(RFE/RL) -- This week's visit by the U.S. president's national-security adviser and the head of the Central Intelligence Agency to Pakistan was portrayed as a feel-good trip that highlighted the high level of cooperation between Washington and Islamabad.

But despite what may have been written about CIA chief Leon Panetta's and General James Jones's meetings with civilian and military leadership during their visit, analysts in Pakistan say all is not well between the two sides.

They note that as senior U.S. officials visit Islamabad to make new demands -- mostly about increasing military or law enforcement efforts against myriad extremist groups in Pakistan's western border regions -- Pakistani officials continue to respond by urging patience, asking for more money and weapons, and calling for a true understanding of their military, political, and economic limitations.

Former Pakistani diplomat Tayyab Siddiqui says the U.S.-Pakistani relationship is currently on a "bumpy road" and the visit by the two senior U.S. officials a week ahead of a planned second round of strategic dialogue was significant.

He says that the attempted car bombing in New York's Times Square has intensified U.S. demands for an all-out offensive in North Waziristan, a district in the western Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan. He says the Pakistani military is wary of signing on to such an operation until it can be sure that it would work to its advantage and not backfire in the form of a huge backlash, possibly resulting in terrorist attacks.

"There has been a lack of understanding between the American administration and Pakistan Army in particular," Siddiqui says. "The losses that [the] Pakistan Army has suffered in earlier operations in South Waziristan in FATA region and [the northwestern region] of Swat and the like [will prompt] questions in their minds about what exactly has been achieved. And how the purposes of Pakistan's territorial security has been advanced or ensured."

Pakistan was the West's major Muslim ally during the Cold War and received upwards of $50 billion in military hardware and economic assistance from Washington. But relations were strained by Islamabad's inability -- or unwillingness -- to go after Islamist extremists on its soil after the 9/11 attacks. And as the United States has continued to supply Pakistan with aid money -- more than $25 billon over the past nine years -- its demands for military and law enforcement action against extremist groups and individuals have increased.

Showing Patience

In Islamabad, security analyst Talat Masood says that the Obama administration is under a lot of domestic pressure to do something about the security threats emanating from Pakistan's tribal regions. This, he says, prompts frequent visits by senior U.S. officials who use "their economic and military clout to influence political and military decisions [in Pakistan]."

Former General Masood says that as U.S. officials pressure and cajole Pakistanis, leaders in Islamabad are resisting Washington. This he says, is evidenced today by the slow pace with which they are responding to U.S. demands for an all-out offensive in North Waziristan, where CIA drones frequently target Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

"When it comes to something which they [Pakistani leaders] think would be detrimental to Pakistan's national integrity or security, they do take positions like what they are taking in respect of North Waziristan at the moment because they think they are already overstretched," Masood says. "And it may be counterproductive to take them on at this stage and make all the militant factions get united. So, I think, they are resisting that. But at the same time, it doesn't mean that they don't understand that they will undertake this [operation]."

He says that Washington and Islamabad need to harmonize their views on achieving stability in Pakistan and the surrounding region. This, he says, cannot be achieved by military means alone.

Masood suggests that Islamabad may be wary of losing the support of citizens who might be endangered by military operations. In addition, he says, Pakistan is well aware of the need to consolidate its gains in the Swat and South Waziristan regions, where militants still launch sporadic attacks after they were forced out by large-scale military operations last year.

"America must understand the limitations of Pakistan. You cannot expect the type of efficiency that is expected of a develop[ed] country," Masood says. "Pakistan's resources, its infrastructure, both human as well as physical infrastructure, can only take up to a point."

Calm On The Surface

Western officials, for their part, appear to be well aware of Islamabad's limitations, but would nevertheless like to see genuine commitment to the effort to root out extremist groups on Pakistani soil. While details of Panetta's and Jones's discussions in Islamabad are slim, experts suggest the portrayal of that message was the main objective of their visit.

Pakistani and international media reported that Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, and army chief General Pervez Kayani have agreed to target the militant stronghold in North Waziristan. The two sides also reportedly expressed their mutual appreciation for their cooperation in the ongoing investigation into the failed Times Square car bombing allegedly attempted by a Pakistani-American, who has claimed to have undergone training in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Unnamed officials have told Pakistani media that the visiting U.S. delegation also delivered a message from President Barack Obama that warned of serious consequences in the event that a future attack on U.S. soil were to originate from Pakistan. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publically aired the same message earlier this month.

The public posturing of both sides, however, was calm and measured.

"Both countries are, and will be, taking to confront the common threat we face from extremists and prevent such potential attacks from occurring again," read a short official statement describing the discussions. "Both sides pledged to intensify efforts, increase cooperation, and do everything possible to protect our citizens."


RFE/RL correspondent Ahmadullah contributed to this report from Islamaba. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

NATO Restructures In Afghanistan; Creates Regional Command South-West

The North Atlantic Council, in consultation with non-NATO ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, Friday gave final authorisation for the reorganisation of ISAF’s Regional Command South and the establishment of an additional Regional Command South-West – RC(SW) – in Afghanistan.

This new organisation will be effective later this summer.


The new RC(SW) will have responsibility for the Helmand and Nimruz provinces and will be placed initially under the command of the United States. Regional Command South, which is under the command of British Major General Nick Carter, will retain the provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Daikundi.

The decision was taken upon the recommendation by General McChrystal, Commander of ISAF, to optimize the command and control of a Regional Command that has grown exponentially since its transfer to NATO’s command in 2006.

With more than 50,000 ISAF troops and eight Afghan National Army Brigades operating in six different provinces, the strain on the span of control would have been too high for Regional Command South in its present configuration.

The new structure will ease the burden of Regional Command South and enable more adapted and efficient counter-insurgency operations at the local level.

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has now been authorized to implement the restructuring. Work in-theatre has already started for the new Regional Command to become fully operational in the summer of 2010.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Afghanistan Farmers' Dilemma - Wheat, Fruit Or Saffron?

(IRIN) - Pointing to his flourishing wheat field in the western Afghan province of Herat, Abdullah says he regrets cultivating the crop.

"Wheat is very cheap," he told IRIN, adding that he would hardly make 50,000 Afghanis (about US$1,050) from his two hectares. "I won't be able to feed my family properly with this income."

Several farmers contacted by IRIN in Helmand, Kandahar and Balkh provinces had similar sentiments.

Wheat is considered a strategic crop and a staple food, but imports are always required, even when there is a bumper harvest.

About seven million (over 24 percent of the country's estimated 27 million population) are food-insecure and many others are highly vulnerable to food price fluctuations, according to aid agencies.

MAIL distributes certified wheat seeds to encourage cultivation in rain-fed areas where other crops cannot be cultivated, but in irrigated areas it is not pushing wheat.

"We don't encourage farmers to grow wheat because it's not a lucrative crop," Majeed Qarar, spokesman of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), told IRIN. "We encourage them to produce fruit and saffron instead."

A farmer can earn $500-600 per hectare of wheat but the same land area can yield $25,000 if saffron  is cultivated, $16,000 for pomegranates and $13,000 for almonds, MAIL officials said.

Irrigation

However, not all wheat-growers can easily switch from wheat to more lucrative crops: Only about a third of farmland in Afghanistan is irrigated. The rest is only suitable for rain-fed wheat cultivation, experts say.

Of the 5,064 tons of wheat produced nationwide last year 1,677 was from rain-fed fields, MAIL says.

For high-profit fruit and saffron production farmers need to invest in irrigation systems, use more labour and seek processing and marketing opportunities for their products.

"Our fruits are well-known for their high quality in international markets and the government is striving to facilitate better and wider export opportunities," said MAIL's Qarar, adding that the country could become a major exporter of fresh and dry fruit, but not a big wheat exporter.

Donors such as the US Agency for International Development have been encouraged by MAIL to fund fruit growing and exporting projects as the country tries to enter regional and international markets.

Humanitarian wheat procurement

Aid agency operations can seriously affect wheat farmers: They can help them by purchasing their grain, or they can drive down local prices by importing huge quantities from abroad. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says it procured food aid items mostly from abroad in order to avoid distorting local markets.

Afghanistan is largely a food-deficit country and millions of its people have been recipients of food aid from the UN World Food Programme (WFP), other aid agencies, and the ICRC for many years.

To respond to the needs of Afghans affected by drought, conflict and high food prices WFP distributed over 212,000 tons of wheat in 2009 - almost all of which was imported and dispatched to the different provinces along insecure routes.

In a bid to help vulnerable farmers MAIL bought 100,000 tons of wheat from provinces with a surplus in 2009, and called on WFP to follow suit.

WFP initially agreed to procure 20,000 tons from Afghan farmers but could not do so because the prices quoted by local vendors were considerably higher than international prices, Challiss McDonough, WFP's spokeswoman in Kabul, told IRIN.

However, WFP is still keen to buy local wheat through a five-year programme called "Purchase for Progress".

"In 2010 WFP plans to procure 10,000 tons of wheat directly from farmers' organizations," said McDonough, adding that other products such as fortified biscuits could also be considered for local procurement provided quality and pricing standards were met.

In March WFP purchased wheat from Kazakhstan at a cost of $255 per ton including transportation (about 25 US cents per kg), while in the same month prices were 24-34 US cents per kg in Afghanistan.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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