Oil Wealth No Benefit To Angolan Farmers

Joaquina Chitala Jarviso, 40, a small-scale farmer in Huambo, in the central highlands of Angola, is running out of options. Despite careful management and clever innovation, the high cost of fertilizer and the acidity of the soil may defeat her efforts to get a good crop in the next planting season.

So far she has achieved relative success by using only a quarter of the required fertilizer, combined with crop rotation techniques, to produce a rain-fed harvest of Irish potatoes and maize on the same ground in one season - courtesy of a donation of fertilizer from an NGO that has since left the country.

The shelves of the informal shop established by a women's cooperative she belongs to in Kalanga, about 50km west of the city of Huambo, are barren. The shop was part of the NGO initiative that used the shop's profits to offset the crippling costs of fertilizer.

"The need is for chemical fertilizer, but it is very expensive - it costs about US$70 for a 50kg bag, and I need four bags of fertilizer for one hectare each season. Without fertilizer, plants grow - but they don't grow well."

The government has claimed that it provides free seeds and fertilizer benefiting three million people; but a food analyst, who declined to be named, told IRIN the figure was difficult to authenticate because inputs risked being diverted to the commercial market, and there was no assistance for the large majority of subsistence cultivators like Jarviso.

Jarviso will use the cooperative's team of oxen to plough the maize stalks back into the soil to help balance its acidity before planting starts in October, but her future is stark.

The arithmetic for the mother of six school-going children remains the same, no matter which way she calculates it. Some of the food she produces, including vegetable crops, is used for the family's consumption; the rest is sold to pay for education fees, clothing, the other costs of living, and maintaining her home.

The monthly school fees for her children range from $22 for the eldest to $4 for her youngest, while she sells a 50kg sack of potatoes for $50 to $60. Jarviso produced 12 sacks of potatoes this year.

Her other cash crop, maize, could earn more in the capital, Luanda, but the variety that fares better in acidic soils produces a coloured product and consumers in Luanda reject it as "dirty", preferring brilliant white maize.

Angola's reputation as a breadbasket was forged during Portuguese colonial rule, but the almost fabled food production was a consequence of ready access to lime and fertilizer to optimize the acidic soils, and the financial credit lines available to commercial farmers.

Cassava, coffee and cotton were cultivated in the northern regions, in the south low rainfall suited cattle farming, while in the central highlands a temperate climate and a rainy season lasting more than six months favoured the production of maize and beans.

Palm oil, sugar cane, bananas and sisal were grown across the country on large plantations. At one time Angola was the world's fourth largest exporter of coffee and could feed itself.

Prof Joaquim Morais of Huambo's agricultural university told IRIN: "Most people [small-scale farmers] don't understand the relationship of high acidity and stunted growth, and even if they did recognize it, there is no available source of lime, so they can't do anything about it anyway."

There are lime pits in Angola, but they are not being worked. Morais said fertilizer costs had risen nearly threefold in recent years, "although the idea [by government] was to privatise distribution of fertilizers to stimulate competition, there is a strategy [by importers] to limit supply to keep prices high ... vested interests have an interest in maintaining the status quo."

Dutch Disease

A spokesperson for Sirius, one of three private companies importing fertilizer, refuted the notion of price-fixing and told IRIN that their profit margin on a 50kg bag of fertilizer, which sold for about $45 in the cities, was less than 10 percent.

The high cost was attributed to logistics, taxes and import duties, and the price of doing business in Africa's largest oil-exporting country, an economic condition known as "Dutch Disease".

The term was coined in the 1960s by the British journal, The Economist, after the economic distortions created by the discovery of North Sea gas. In the Netherlands an almost immediate currency appreciation made domestically produced goods less competitive, which led to the subsequent deindustrialization of the domestic economy, making imports cheaper.

Angola's oil and diamond wealth, conspicuous in a country with infrastructure shattered by nearly three decades of civil war, has exaggerated the condition. Luanda is rated as the world's most expensive city, while two-thirds of the country's estimated 18 million people survive on less than $2 a day; in rural areas this rises to 94 percent of inhabitants. The last census was conducted in 1973, two years before independence.

Sirius has fertilizer warehouses in Luanda and the two port cities of Lubango and Lobito; it spends about $300,000 a month on renting them, and a further $15,000 a month on a three-roomed head office in the capital.

The spokesperson said neither Sirius nor their competitors envisaged producing fertilizer locally, as the country did not have the necessary industrial capacity.

A sleeping land

More than half of Angola's people rely on subsistence farming, but less than 10 percent of the around 35 million hectares of arable land is under cultivation, and that being worked by small-scale farmers is being done inefficiently.

The UN World Food Programme (WFP) Global Hunger Index, which combines the indicators for child malnutrition, child mortality, and the proportion of people who are calorie-deficient, has classified Angola as 'alarming'.

The WFP estimated that 31 percent of children under the age of five were underweight, while 35 percent of the population were undernourished.

Jorge Panguene, a UN Food and Agriculture Organization consultant in Angola, told IRIN the 2009/10 harvest produced about two million tons of cereal, root and tuber crops, but there was "no systematic way of collecting data".

The war brought huge population shifts, mainly from rural areas to the cities, but also from some rural areas to other parts of the country less ravaged by the war.

Panguene said an associated cost of small-scale agriculture was that people were renting a tract of land for about $250 annually; they had adapted to their new homes and did not want to return to their place of origin.

Aurelio Angelino Viti, a project coordinator in Huambo for the Farmer-to-Farmer initiative by CNFA, formerly known as the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, told IRIN the war years had seen the loss of the man-to-land connection. He said "the land is sleeping", as few farmers understood the need to prepare their plots before planting.

The government has a National Food Security Strategy, which includes establishing a network of food collection points to enable produce to move from the farm to the market and creating a value chain of production, processing, marketing and finance for the agricultural sector.

Sergio Calundungo, general director of the National Association of Rural and Environmental Development (ADRA), lauded the strategy's focus on small-scale farming, but lamented that in practice the money was being directed to the "large-scale farming model".

In 2009 the government announced that it would invest $2 billion in agriculture to reap a cereal harvest of 15 million tons within the next few years. The success of the initiative will depend in part on the rehabilitation of road and rail infrastructure.

The Benguela railway, which runs from the copper- and cobalt-rich city of Lubumbashi in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo in the north and bisects the central highlands, is on the verge of completion; the country's road network is rapidly being restored by foreign construction companies.

But Calundungo fears this may prove a double-edged sword. "The increased mobility will be good for the development of market agriculture and for the distribution of seeds and fertilizer, but it will also mean the well-connected city elite will have easy access to the land, at the expense of small-scale farmers, and that will increase land conflict."

Source: IRIN
Friday, April 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Angola's Oil Wealth Is Eluding Nation’s Poor

The government of Angola has not done enough to combat pervasive corruption and mismanagement, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Even though the oil-rich country's gross domestic product has increased by more than 400 percent in the last six years, Angolans are not seeing their lives improve accordingly, Human Rights Watch said.

The report, "Transparency and Accountability in Angola: An Update," documents how the government took only limited steps to improve transparency after Human Rights Watch disclosed in a 2004 report that billions of dollars in oil revenue illegally bypassed the central bank and disappeared without explanation. The report details newly disclosed evidence of corruption and mismanagement and includes recommendations for reversing the pattern.

"The government needs to take strong action to combat the corruption and secrecy that undermine Angolans' rights," said Arvind Ganesan, director of the Business and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch. "Here is a nation with a wealth of resources while its people live in poverty."

Human Rights Watch said that a recent agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), enacted in the wake of the global financial crisis and drop in the price of oil, offers some hope for improvement if its provisions are carried out.

The government has improved the publication of oil revenue figures, the Human Rights Watch report says, but human indicators in Angola remain abysmal and have not been commensurate with the rapid growth in Angola's national wealth. Angola is the largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa, yet millions of Angolans have limited access to basic social services. Angola ranked 143rd out of 182 countries in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index.

Angola's ranking in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index is growing worse, from 158th out of 180 countries in 2008 down to 162nd in 2009.

The report also details new evidence of corruption and mismanagement, including that of Dr. Aguinaldo Jaime, who served as the governor of the Angolan Central Bank from 1999 to 2002. As documented by a February 2010 US Senate report, Jaime initiated a series of suspicious $50 million transactions with US banks. For each attempt, the banks, concerned about the likelihood of fraud, ultimately rejected the transfer or returned the money shortly after receiving it. During Jaime's three-year tenure as central bank governor, the government could not account for approximately $2.4 billion.

Recent statements by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos seem to indicate a willingness to combat government corruption. He has called for a "zero tolerance" policy against corruption. And as the US Senate conducted its recent investigation into corruption in Angola and elsewhere, he announced a new Law on Administrative Probity, to reduce corruption by government officials.

However, given that the president and ruling party have been in power for more than three decades, including the entire period in which oil-fueled corruption has been rampant, skeptics will wait to see whether meaningful action will accompany these statements, Human Rights Watch said. Further, a new constitution was recently enacted that will enable dos Santos, in power now for 30 years, to remain in power for 13 more years.

"Dr. Jaime's activities underscore the need for accountability," Ganesan said. "If the Angolan government is serious about transparency and reform, it should rigorously investigate government officials, publish audits of its expenditures, and act on President dos Santos' pledge of ‘zero tolerance' for corruption."

While the recently announced reforms have not gone far enough, a new Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF offers both the framework and international impetus to make substantive improvements and combat corruption in Angola.

This may be an opportunity for the Chinese government to address problems with transparency and accountability, Human Rights Watch said. The Chinese government and Chinese companies are some of the largest investors, trading partners, and consumers of Angola's oil. The Chinese government and Chinese companies have invested billions in oil-for-infrastructure deals while remaining relatively silent on governance in Angola and elsewhere.

The China Investment Fund, a prominent private Chinese company that has extensive ties to Sonangol, the Angolan national oil company, is of particular concern. It has been controversial in Angola and other countries, such as Guinea.

Human Rights Watch said that IMF board members, such as the United States and China, should ensure that Angola complies with provisions of the Stand-By Arrangement, specifically by making public the audits of the state oil company Sonangol and providing regular updates detailing Angola's expenditures.

In addition to the role of the United States as an IMF board member, the Obama Administration has been outspoken about corruption, but some of its policy proscriptions are unlikely to have a significant impact. Instead, Human Rights Watch urged the administration to fully implement the recommendations from the US Senate to combat the use of US financial institutions by foreign kleptocrats to spend their money in the United States.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

South Africa Energy Profile - Relies Heavily On Coal

South Africa's energy sector is critical to the economy as the country relies heavily on its large-scale, energy-intensive mining industry. South Africa has only small deposits of oil and natural gas and uses its large coal deposits for most of its energy needs.

As a result, carbon emission and intensity levels for South Africa are relatively high. The country also has a highly developed synthetic fuels industry, producing gasoline and diesel fuels from coal and natural gas.

In 2007, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2007, South Africa consumed an equivalent of 5.3 quadrillion Btu. Of this, coal/peat accounted for 72.1 percent of total primary energy supply, followed by oil (12.6 percent), and combustible renewables and waste (10.2 percent).

South Africa’s economy has grown rapidly since the end of the apartheid era in 1994 and is now one of the most developed economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this rapid growth, approximately 34 percent of the population continues to live on less than US$ 2/day according to the World Bank data. Economic problems remain from the apartheid era, especially poverty and lack of economic empowerment among the disadvantaged groups.

The South African government has committed to ensuring that black-owned companies have access to the energy sector under its black economic empowerment (BEE) program whereby targets of 25 percent black ownership of energy companies by 2014 were set. Large, predominantly white-owned corporations have been selling assets to achieve this objective.

Oil Transit

South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope (Cape) is a significant point for oil tanker transit around the continent. According to Lloyd’s Analysis of Petroleum Exports (APEX) database, approximately 1.25 million barrels a day (bbl/d) of oil from West Africa traveled east around the Cape towards Asian Markets in 2009 while at the same time, 2.25 million bbl/d originating in the Middle East went west around the Cape into the Atlantic Basin.

FIFA 2010 World Cup

South Africa will be hosting the FIFA 2010 World Cup starting in June which, according to the Finance Ministry, could add an additional half a percent to the country’s 2010 economic growth.

The concerns about the country being able to meet the associated demand for oil and electricity are being addressed by both the South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) and the South African Department of Minerals and Energy.

According to SAPIA, the country is expecting approximately 2.7 million spectators for the event involving 64 matches scheduled over a 40 day period around the country starting June 11. To date, announcements have been made with regards to cooperation among the members of the South African Power Pool to provide adequate supplies of electricity and the South African Department of Energy has developed a World Cup Fuel Task Team to ensure that increased demand for gasoline, diesel and jet fuel are met with adequate inventory builds.

Oil

According to Oil and Gas Journal (O&GJ), South Africa had proven oil reserves of 15 million barrels in January of 2010. All of the proven reserves are located offshore southern South Africa in the Bredasdorp basin and off the west coast of the country near the border with Namibia. In 2008, South Africa produced 195,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil, of which about 160,000 bbl/d was synthetic liquids processed from coal and natural gas (see Synthetic Fuels Section below).

South African oil consumption is estimated to be 575,000 bbl/d, of which, approximately 380,000 bbl/d is imported (67 percent of consumption). According to the Global Trade Atlas, the majority of South African oil imports are from Saudi Arabia and Iran followed by Nigeria and Angola. The country is promoting further exploration and development in the petroleum sector but will continue to rely on oil imports in the near-term.

Sector Organization

The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), created in 2005, regulates policy over the entire South African energy industry and is responsible for implementing South Africa’s energy plan. South Africa also has a national oil and natural gas company, the Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (PetroSA), which is responsible for managing and promoting the licensing of oil and natural gas exploration in the country and has exploration and production activities around the world.

Refining and Downstream

South Africa has the second largest refining capacity in Africa at 692,000 bbl/d according to a 2008 SAPIA report, surpassed only by Egypt (726,250 – O&GJ). Major refineries include Sapref (180,000 bbl/d) and Enref (125,000 bbl/d) in Durban, Calref (100,000 bbl/d) in Cape Town, and Natref (108,000 bbl/d) at Sasolburg. PetroSA is also developing a new 400,000 bbl/d refinery in the Eastern Cape to meet rapidly growing product demand.

Refining of Synthetic Fuels from Natural Gas and Coal

South Africa has a highly developed synthetic fuels (synfuel) industry, creating liquid fuels from coal and natural gas. State company PetroSA and petrochemicals giant Sasol are the major players. PetroSA manages the world's largest commercial natural gas-to-liquids plant at Mossel Bay in the Western Cape, with a capacity of 45,000 bbl/d. Sasol, an oil, gas and chemical company, operates the world’s only commercial coal-to-liquids synthetic fuels facility.

According to the Department of Minerals and Energy, approximately 36 percent of liquid fuel demand in South Africa is met by synthetic fuels.

Natural Gas

South Africa had 0.32 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of proven natural gas reserves in 2009 according to Cedigaz. In 2008, South Africa produced 115 Bcf, and consumed 228 Bcf, the remaining 113 Bcf imported from neighboring Mozambique and Namibia. The South African government would like to locate additional natural gas reserves and has provided investment money for exploration in fields in Mossel Bay. Any recoverable natural gas reserves would be developed with the intent of extending the lifespan of the Mossel Bay gas-to-liquids (GTL) plant.

In terms of new production, PetroSA has stated that production from the Jabulani field has been delayed until 2012 and Ibubhesi production is not expected until 2013. As of 2008, South Africa did not import LNG but discussions were underway to import LNG for the Mossel Bay GTL refinery in order to meet the plant’s natural gas requirements until the new fields come online.

Natural gas currently plays a limited role in the South African electricity sector but the government plans to increase imports, and expand domestic production, which could diversify the energy mix and offset some of the country’s overreliance on coal. Exploration rights have also been awarded to study the potential for shale gas developments.

Sector Organization

South Africa has numerous government agencies and companies involved in the natural gas industry, but as with oil and coal, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) is the industry regulator.

Gas to Liquids Refinery

The Gas to Liquids (GTL) refinery at Mossel Bay began operations in 2004 and is one of the largest in the world. The refinery has the capacity to process 45,000 bbl/d of oil equivalent through a Fischer Tropsch Process in which natural gas is converted to synthetic liquid fuels.

Natural Gas Pipelines

Natural gas from Mozambique is imported through a 535-mile transport pipeline, which Sasol, the South African government, and the government of Mozambique own through a joint venture. The pipeline has peak capacity of 524 MMcf/d of natural gas and was part of a U.S. $1.2-billion natural gas project started in 2004. It is designed to eventually be able to transport double its current capacity.

Coal

South Africa’s economy is heavily dependent on coal. According to the World Energy Council (WEC) South African coal resources were estimated to be approximately 34 billion short tons at the end of 2007, accounting for 95 percent of African coal reserves and 4 percent of world reserves.

Coal provided an estimated 72 percent share of the country’s total primary energy supply in 2007 and accounts for approximately 85 percent of electricity generation capacity. Coal is also a major feedstock for the country’s synthetic fuel industry.

Production and consumption of coal has remained relatively stable over the past decade. In 2008, the country produced an estimated 260 million short-tons and consumed 194 short tons. The remaining 66 million were exported, mainly to Europe and East Asia. While there have been some decreases in reserves, production, and consumption in recent years, environmental groups continue to target the industry for air, land, and water pollution through all of the industry’s stages from extraction to end use.

Nonetheless, coal use – especially by Eskom (the state electricity company) and Sasol – is expected to continue or even accelerate over the next few years. Eskom is in the process of returning to service three coal-fired power stations (Camden, Grootvlei and Komati) with a combined capacity of 3,800 megawatts (MW). It has also begun construction of the new 4,800 MW Medupi power station, whose first unit is due to begin generation in 2012, while a second plant called Project Bravo (5,400 MW) is scheduled to start generating power in 2013.

In addition to power generation, the country produces synthetic fuels from low-grade coal and a small amount from natural gas. At the Sasol synfuels plant in Secunda, around 45 million short tons a year are converted into liquid fuels, gas, and other products. The plant itself produces an estimated 150,000 bbl/d of oil equivalent and is the world’s only commercial coal-to-liquids plant in operation.

Source: EIA
Tuesday, March 09, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Examining North Africa Terrorist Threat To Energy Infrastructure

By Jennifer Giroux

In the last decade, major terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US) and the Madrid train bombings have catapulted international terrorism to the top of national security priorities around the globe and bring to light the massive devastation, civilian losses and fear that terrorism can cause. Moreover, images of civilian casualties in these dramatic attacks have influenced our perception of the targeting choices of today’s terrorist groups where civilian targets are largely associated with nearly all terrorist attacks. This view, however, is not supported by the available data on terrorist attack where, according to the United States (US) National Counterterrorism Center’s WITS terrorism database and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), many non-state violent groups carry out attacks that commonly avoid civilian targets. In fact, a significant and in fact increasing number of attacks are on energy infrastructure (this includes oil, gas, and electrical infrastructure as well as energy sector employees).

Examining this trend more closely shows that in 2003, roughly 25 per cent of terrorist attacks were aimed at the energy sector. Notably, this number has jumped to 30 and 35 per cent between 2003 and 2007 - the long-term trend revealing more attacks aimed at energy infrastructure (EI) occurring annually. With oil accounting for nearly “40% of the world’s energy and 96% of its transportation”, the protection of EI has thus become a top priority for most industrialized nations.[2] Efforts have been made to enhance the protection of these assets throughout North America and the European Union (EU) but the most significant sites of oil and gas exploration and production are increasingly located in politically unstable countries that are marred by poor economic and social conditions.[3] Additionally, the benefits that come with attacking the energy sector have risen considerably in the 21st century as such events generate widespread media attention and can create broad economic turbulence – translated into higher global energy costs - due to the energy market’s interconnected nature, growing demand, and short-term supply shortages.

The African continent – which retains 10 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 12 per cent of the proven gas reserves – contains twelve countries that are currently net exporters of oil; the top producers being Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Angola. A closer look, however, reveals that Africa’s web of oil and gas pipelines and critical facilities are oftentimes built within hostile regions that are home to domestic conflicts and transnational terrorist groups. North Africa (NA), specifically, is an important source of energy – mainly gas - for European nations, particularly Spain, Italy, and France who are dependent on NA gas supplies to meet much of their energy needs. However, in line with the trend described herein, resources in this region are threatened by ongoing conflict and politically motivated violent groups, such as Al-Qa`ida of the Islamic Maghreb, who have begun to threaten and/or attack the energy sector in this sensitive region. In light of these developments, this paper sets out to examine the changing global scenario within the energy security environment and highlights the threat to EI in Northern Africa and the implications this has for its European neighbors.

A changing scenario

Since the 1980s, energy infrastructure (EI) has been used as a strategic weapon and symbolic economic target by various non-state armed groups operating in many largely fragile countries. But while targeting EI is not an entirely new phenomenon, the 21st century has opened the door to a world where local events have global consequences, communication and information move rapidly through a variety of media, financial systems are intertwined, and developing nations that once struggled now compete for vital natural resources to feed their burgeoning economies. According to the US State Department, between 1996 and 2004, there were at least 80 terrorist attacks against oil companies worldwide that resulted in kidnappings, casualties, damages, and large monetary losses.[4] As seen in Figure 1, however, attacks aimed at energy resources are on a steady incline over the long-term and have jumped considerably in the last five years.[5]

The trend further reveals that not only are such resources being targeted both inside and outside of conflict zones,[7] but the energy sector is increasingly sensitive to any disruptions, whether perceived or real, due to a number of factors that relate to the ‘peaking’ of supply. Such factors include increased demand by growing developing economies as well as continued robust demand from developed countries, short-term supply shortages, tight production characteristics (little spare capacity for oil production) and lack of growth in OPEC production between 2005 and 2007, accelerated speculation, higher costs for oil exploration and development (much of which is being conducted in deepwater, offshore locations), a weaker US dollar, and increased commodity prices. In short, higher energy costs have been a result of market fears that rising demand will eventually outgrow available supply.[8] These concerns are reinforced by threats to energy supplies. The current climate where crude prices have dropped beneath US$40 per barrel[9] due to circumstances arising from the global credit crunch, largely decreased demand that have led to oversupply, is temporary. OPEC has already begun to make cuts to its supply so to create tighter supply characteristics, in an effort to keep oil prices around US$40-50 per barrel during this downturn. Once the global economy recovers, however, and demand resumes its ascension, oil prices will rise most likely to new heights.[10] Hence in the long-term markets will continue to be sensitive to disruptions.

While market-related factors, such as tighter supply chains and changes in demand, are the primary areas that dictate global energy costs, other events such as geopolitical turbulence and threats of any kind to the oil infrastructure create uncertainty and also weigh into pricing.[11] Such uncertainty results in a security premium being placed on oil prices. According to international energy consultant Dr. Gal Luft, “whether perpetuated for political or criminal reasons, assaults on oil infrastructure have added a ‘fear premium’ of roughly US$10 per barrel of oil.” Thus a single energy ‘event’ can create “shockwaves through the world energy order, push prices up or down, and set off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power.”[12] Thus, while the EI has been targeted for many years in various countries, the effects of attacks have only recently generated more attention.

Grasping the trends

Elements of EI, such as oil pipelines and electrical pylons, are oftentimes easily accessible and present the perfect “soft” target that can result in economic damage and losses if attacked.[13] A global snapshot of recent EI events reveals that various armed groups have incorporated EI into their attacks. Within Asia, since the 1980s the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has threatened and carried out sporadic attacks on oil and gas pipelines in Turkey and northern Iraq – the most recent of which was the bombing of the newly constructed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. In Pakistan, Baloch militias have also carried out numerous attacks against power transmission lines and gas installations resulting in disruptions to electricity in the Punjab region, whereas in nearby India the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have claimed credit for a series of pipeline attacks in 2006. Russia is not immune from such events as demonstrated in 2004 when Chechen terrorists attacked several pipelines near Moscow, Volgograd, and Stavropol. A half a world away in North and South America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) have carried out repeated attacks on Colombia’s Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, which transports on average 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Arauca province to the Caribbean coast. The most recent attack occurred in June 2008 and resulted in a temporary suspension of production activities. Further north in Mexico a string of oil and gas pipeline attacks carried out during 2007 by EPR militants resulted in supply shortages, economic losses, and damages, while news of the attacks caused natural gas futures to increase.

But turning to the threat posed by violent Islamist groups reveals the increasing appeal of EI attacks. In February 2003, members of a violent Muslim extremist group who had realized the value of attacking the EI published an online call to the “mujahideen of all Arab and Muslim countries in which the West has military bases or are involved in the energy industry, to rise against these interests in the name of the Muslim Ummah.” Al-Qa`ida (AQ), which had previously opposed targeting oil in the Middle East, followed suit and announced a major shift in the group’s strategy in late 2004 by calling on members to “Do everything you can to stop the biggest plundering operation in history – the plundering of the resources of the present and future generations in collusion with the agents and the aliens [...] Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf.”[14] Such a statement is stark contrast to previous ones made by Osama bin Laden who acknowledged the strategic importance of the energy sector. In the 1996 “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” bin Laden rejected EI attacks and called on followers “to protect this (oil) wealth and not to include it in the battle as it is a great Islamic wealth and a large economical power essential for the soon to be established Islamic state, by Allah’s Permission and Grace.”[15] However, it should be noted that AQ had begun exploring attacks on energy infrastructure in 2002 when it attacked the Limburg, a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen carrying 397,000 barrels of crude. In its statement claiming credit for the attack, AQ made sure to point out that the incident "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker but [...] on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word."[16]

By 2005, a jihadist website featured the report the “Map of Future Al-Qaeda Operations,” which essentially called for more attacks on EI and stated that such targets should be a priority for AQ. [17] With the presence of such a strategic resource in their own neighborhood, AQ and other violent groups realized that they did not need to carry out all attacks in Europe or North America in order to generate global attention and cause economic damage to these regions. This change in strategy and call for more attacks against EI coupled with increased volatility in the Middle East and elsewhere, has resulted in a jump in security premiums from US$2 to $15 per barrel depending on event.[18] For example, following an April 2008 attack on a Japanese oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, sweet crude rose to a record US$117.40 per barrel.[19] Shortly after, another attack in May 2008 on an oil refinery in Aden, Yemen resulted in prices increasing to US$122.80 per barrel. When al-Qaida attempted to attack the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia in February 2006, the attempt alone drove oil prices up by US$2 per barrel.[20] More recently, AQ affiliates have carried out attacks on oil installations in Yemen, including a June 2008 attack on the Safir oil refinery and a subsequent video of the attack posted online.[21]

Al-Qa`ida’s shift in targeting selection has implications for the Northern African energy security market. As briefly noted NA provides much needed energy resources to its European neighbors as the EU receives 30 per cent of its gas needs from Algeria alone. Thus even the threat to such resources can create future market insecurity and, in a worst case scenario, disrupt supply. With AQ affiliates, such as AQIM, operating throughout the region and other politically motivated armed groups seeing the value in EI attacks, the threat to the energy sector is real and in many cases has already been articulated through attacks aimed at the energy sector in Algeria and Sudan. The following section begins by examining the situation in Algeria and the growing jihadist threat that has taken aim at the energy sector. Sudan will also be discussed as it highlights another regional case where armed groups have attacked EI as a platform to air their grievances to a larger audience.

Algeria

From 1991 until 2002, civil war raged in Algeria between the government and several Islamic insurgent groups, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Foreign workers were killed during the war, and Muslim extremist rebels warned foreign companies investing in the oil sector to withdraw from the country or face serious damage to their installations. Nevertheless, until 1995, the “government-owned Sonatrach hydrocarbon company had escaped the violence that has killed an estimated 30,000 Algerians in three years of strife, largely because its oil and gas operations represent the economic lifeblood of all sides in the conflict. Both the government and the Muslim extremists trying to topple it acknowledge that 95 percent of Algeria’s foreign exchange earnings come from the petroleum sector.”[22] Another group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), had little chance of threatening EI, since at that time it did not control the territory through which pipelines ran. Starting in 1995, however, rebels began to attack energy infrastructure assets. As one Western oil executive at the time commented on the insurgent groups: “Something has changed [...] It could be they are trying to raise the stakes.”[23] Despite a seeming increase of attacks against energy infrastructure and production sites, Algeria’s hydrocarbon industry grew rapidly. As the Financial Post observed, Sonatrach had signed more than a dozen lucrative exploration agreements with international oil companies, which have already spent roughly US$400 million on these projects.[24]

Heavy protection of pipelines and facilities and the location of oil and gas fields have largely provided much of the buffer needed to dissuade attacks and/or limit damage. With the stream of revenues provided by Algeria’s hydrocarbon resources and the political volatility, the government was quick to learn that extensive protection of infrastructure was needed and worthwhile. Also, most of the oil and gas is found far south of Algiers in the Eastern Sahara, whereas most of the fighting took place in the north and the government controls travel to the oil and gas producing region by requiring a special permits. As Porter notes, “Unlike southern Iraq or Nigeria's delta states where insurgents attack those countries' important oil sectors in order to call attention to their grievances and advance their political agenda, the key oil and gas producing areas in Algeria are in the south of the country and are far from population centers.”[25] However, much vulnerability continues to exist at ports - located in heavily populated areas such as Algiers, Oran, Arzew and Skikda - where oil and gas is lifted for transport and Algeria’s main gas liquefaction installation is located in Skikda.

The 2006 merger of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) with Al-Qa`ida, now known as Al-Qa1ida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), marked a revival in the Algerian Islamist militant movement. In 2006 and 2007, respectively, suspected AQIM militants bombed a natural gas pipeline – with the earlier attack temporarily cutting off supply through that line. Other EI related attacks have involved bombing buses carrying employees for the oil sector. Overall, this points to an emerging trend within Algeria to target the energy sector by attacking soft, mobile targets and puts this strategy in harmony with AQ’s call to attack energy resources. However, the attacks on EI are relatively few compared to campaigns in other states and analysts suspect that this may be due to a split within the group between those that “want to bring the group's objectives into line with the broader global al-Qaeda movement and those who want to retain the group's "Algerianist" orientation.”[26] In the short-term it appears that while sporadic EI attacks will occur, mainly on softer targets, most attacks will focus on government targets.

Yet as energy supply channels tighten and global demand surges, the threats aimed at Algeria’s energy sector have great potential to create the perception of vulnerability which will in turn influence pricing. In addition, non-state armed groups, like AQIM, continue to change, innovate and prove their ability to circumvent security measures by carrying out asymmetric attacks. The Nigerian-based Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has carried out repeated attacks (an estimated 60 to 70 annually) on EI in Nigeria since 2006, gaining international notoriety and causing production to be cut by 20 to 25 percent (around 4-600,000 barrels per day). The Northern African groups, who operate within this energy rich region, may see the effects of such attacks and in turn step up and launch more organized and systematic blows to the energy sector. As noted in a 2007 Rand Corporation report, “Chaos and anarchy could threaten production or give rise to short-term strategies of disruption, including terrorist attacks on production facilities and pipelines.”[27] Algeria's increasing significance as a European and U.S. energy supplier makes such threats even more concerning.

Sudan

Since its independence in 1955, Sudan experienced intermittent civil war as a result of economic and political inequalities that were fueled by the divisions between the dominant Arab-Muslim population to the north and a non-Arab, mostly Christian population to the south. Temporary peace in the 1970s, which allowed oil development and exploration to commence, was followed by a resumption of hostilities in 1983 that quickly halted production activities.[28] The discovery of oil, while not the root cause of conflict in Sudan, added another conflict dimension to a volatile region that is torn over economic resource distribution. As Kot aptly noted, “Since oil, like all strategic resources, is a source of power, it illogically becomes an important element in the conflict (1992: 104).” In the case of the conflict in Sudan, the oil region lies in the coveted territory dividing the north and south of the country. Due to the civil war, oil development was suspended until 1997 when peace, albeit a temporary one, was reached. However, it did not take long for conflict to resume, and the energy sector took center stage and soon became a valuable target for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the main rebel group based in the south that fought the government until 2005.

Compared to the campaign of violence in Nigeria, attacks on Sudanese EI have been modest, primarily due to a concerted effort to protect facilities situated in the midst of the conflict zone. But while armed groups have not been able to cause major disruptions, they have managed to limit exploration and development activities through a sustained campaign to destabilize the oil-producing southern region. The first EI attack was recorded in September 1999 – shortly after Sudan began exporting oil – when SPLA rebels bombed a large pipeline that carried oil to a Red Sea coastal facility.[29] While this attack did not cause major damage, it was meant to “deprive the Sudanese government of funds with which to keep itself in power and to finance its war effort against rebels in the south of the country,” according to an SPLA spokesman.[30]

Following the initial attack in 1999, the SPLA continued to carry out smaller EI attacks, all of which were either unsuccessful or resulted in little damage. Between 2000 and 2001, the SPLA managed to launch five successful attacks on installations in the Western Upper Nile. Following a June 2001 warning to oil companies advising them to withdraw from the region, the SPLA ambushed a government-escorted convoy that was carrying oil company equipment.[31] Shortly after this attack, the SPLA claimed credit for a raid on the Heglig oil field, stating that “extensive damage was inflicted [...] the production and flow of the oil came to a complete halt. The main central pumping station and fuel stores were destroyed.”[32] While the government denied this event, Talisman confirmed the attack but noted that little damage had occurred.

From 2001–2004, the SPLA continued its campaign with an intensified effort to cause disruptions to the energy sector by firing rockets, bombing pipelines, kidnapping oil workers, and ambushing convoys. In one attack, the SPLA had reportedly blocked the route between Juba and Malakal, “making the eastern area of Unity State non-operational [...] to all traffic, whether oil companies or government of Sudan security.”[33] In a 2004 attack, Sudanese rebels targeted an oil field and stated that they “chose the oil fields because this is the wealth of Sudan, which this government is not sharing with all of its people.”[34]

The SPLA has also repeatedly accused the central government in Khartoum of using oil revenues to finance the war; however, in response to this claim, Sudan’s first vice-president, Ali Osman Taha, stated: “We do not use the proceeds from petroleum in the civil war,” instead claiming that the government was “directing those revenues towards development and services.” However, in 2000, a government official in the south resigned over the mismanagement of funds and the lack of resources to address development needs, noting that the “oil revenues were intensifying the war in the south.”[35] Today, Sudan is once again attempting to maintain peace. However, such efforts are incredibly sensitive and in many regions violence continues – especially in Darfur. The oil industry is still a major target as demonstrated in an October 2008 attack when Darfur rebels abducted nine Chinese oil workers at an oil field, operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company near Abyei in southern Sudan.[36] The rebels, who have accused China of indirectly helping the central government fund military operations with oil revenues, demanded a share in the oil wealth.[37] The oil resources will continue to be a major issue in this region and drive the region back into war if the socio-economic situation does not improve.

Conclusion: Indications and Counter-Measures

Terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamist groups within the EU borders are a concern and measures to prevent future catastrophic attacks must continue. However, as North Africa becomes a more significant supplier of energy to Western Europe, threats to the energy infrastructure in this region must also be considered. As discussed, due to the 21st century energy picture EI attacks, or the threat of, can lead to uncertainty amongst market players and overall insecurity that raises global energy costs – thus placing additional budgetary pressures on states and consumers. The worst case scenario being that attacks can affect supply along a key route. The natural gas found within the Maghreb is of particular importance to its European neighbors as gas is a regional commodity – thus disruptions that originate in the Maghreb will affect the regional supply chain. The events in Algeria show that there is an interest by AQIM to attack the energy sector; however, there has not been a broader campaign as seen in Sudan or in more extreme cases such as Nigeria or Iraq.

To counter this trend and the inflexibility of the current energy environment, states need to adopt a multifaceted approach. In the long-term, the EU needs to make a concerted effort to diversify its energy portfolio, develop domestic energy sources and invest in alternative energies so not to rely so heavily on oil and gas from unstable neighborhoods. In the short-term however, not only should states address the issue of disruption to energy flows by assisting in the fortification of facilities, but they must also work with the media and financial markets that react to such threats. Energy security can also be improved by increasing global strategic stockpiles in consumer countries[38] and hence the international community – lead by North America and the EU – must press for capacity increases to mitigate the consequences of disruptions.[39]

In addition, oil and gas importing countries can allocate much-needed aid to producing countries – such as Sudan and Algeria– who struggle with securing energy resources. European countries, for instance, could provide funding for costly technology to enhance the security of pipelines and facilities. Other assistance can come in the form of military training, funding police and community patrols, and strengthening capacity and facilities.[40] In Iraq, the US helped fund 14,000 security guards that were placed in critical locations along major pipelines and at facilities. Similar efforts are underway in the Gulf of Guinea and off Somalia’s coast where NATO, the EU and the US Navy, respectively, have provided assistance in maritime security. Southern Europe, who relies on gas supplies from Northern Africa, may also require the assistance of NATO to help protect key installations in the Maghreb. While important, military support may suppress violence aimed at EI but it will not take it completely out of the equation therefore community engagement is also a key element. For example the Algerian extremist groups rely heavily on community support to continue their violent campaign. Should EI attacks be deemed unfavorable within the community then AQIM may continue to avoid serious attacks on EI. Communities can also serve as the eye’s and ear’s for intelligence officials and alert them when such attacks are being planned or, in some cases, who perpetrated the act. In closing, with many new energy sites being discovered offshore and oil tankers traversing over uncertain waters, such external state support will continue to be an important element in securing supplies located in unstable regions.


Jennifer Giroux is a social scientist who focuses on political violence and energy security. This article originally appeared in the January 2009, published under the orginal title, TARGETING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: EXAMINING THE THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS, edition of the Circunstancia Journal published by the Fundacíon José Ortega y Gasset

NOTES:

[1] Perl, R.F. 2008. Protecting critical energy infrastructures against terrorist attacks: threats, challenges and opportunities for international co-operation. Reinforced NATO Economic Committee Meeting. September 22 Available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/atu/2008/09/33084_en.pdf.

[2] Luft, G., 2005. Pipeline sabotage is terrorist’s weapon of choice. Institute for Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) Energy Security. 25 March. Available at: .

[3] The world’s most significant sites of oil and gas exploration and production are located in increasingly politically unstable locations, such as Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela.

[4] Lindsay, M., 2005. The Security Threat to Oil Companies in and out of Conflict Zones, Business Briefing: Exploration and Production: The Oil & Gas Review, 2.

[5] Iraqi Pipeline Watch ; Nigeria: oil infrastructure, delta militants and increased attacks. Stratfor. 30 July 2008. 

[6] This data was compiled using data gathered from the Global Terrorism Database. Additional monitoring was performed to capture attacks that may have not been included in the GTD. The data for 2007 is still being gathered and thus 2007 attacks may be slightly higher than currently listed. Indeed, many of the attacks between June 2003 and March 2008 occurred in Iraq. There have been 469 attack aimed at Iraqi energy infrastructure (2003 = 37; 2004 = 148; 2005 = 100; 2006 = 101; 2007=59; 2008 = 4). However the sustained attacks in Nigeria and EI attacks in other regions during this period have also contributed to the dramatic rise. The recent attacks in Yemen and increasing piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia (which have targeted oil tankers) have also contributed to the increase.

[7] Attacks by Kataeb Jund al-Yemen (Soldiers of Yemen Brigades – an affiliate of AQ) against oil facilities in Yemen and attempted attacks on Saudi facilities, both non-conflict zones, are indications that non-state armed groups can achieve global energy disruptions by targeting installations in their home territory where they can take advantage of security deficits and more local support. Zambelis, C. 2006. Attacks in Yemen reflect al-Qaeda’s global oil strategy. Terrorism Monitor 6(17).

[8] The International Energy Agency has noted that oil could peak as early as 2020. Macalister, T. & Monbiot, G. 2008.. Global oil supply will peak in 2020 says energy agency. The Guardian, 15 December. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/15/global-oil-supply-peak-2020-prediction

[9] At the time of publication, crude prices were slowly climbing and hovering around US$40 per barrel.

[10] IEA 2005: Oil Market Report. International Energy Agency. 12 April. According to the IEA, between the1980s to 2003/04 oil demand rose consistently and thus pushed oil inventories to lower levels. This tight supply coupled with the geopolitical uncertainties and the increased market speculation related to these uncertainties that have characterized the last decade have been the chief reason why prices have increased so dramatically.

[11] For example, a war in an oil-producing country, poor weather conditions (such as tropical storms) in oil-producing region, or direct attacks on the EI all create uncertainty in the market that can result in price volatility.

[12] Roberts, P. 2005. The end of oil. The decline of the petroleum economy and the rise of the new energy order. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 93.

[13] Nuclear facilities, which are typically located in relatively stable and developed nations, have not been targeted. In addition, these facilities are ‘hard’ targets that are operationally challenging to attack. Hydroelectric facilities, on the other hand, were targeted by Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) in Peru and caused a city-wide blackout in 1983. The vast networks of interrelated facilities in the petroleum and natural gas industries, however, are more accessible targets and require less investment.

[14] Website Posts Full Version of New Audiotape Attributed to Bin Ladin, FBIS Report - FEA20041227000762, December 27, 2004.

[15] PBS Online NewsHour. 1996. Bin Laden’s Fatwa. Available at www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.

[16] Daly, J.C.K. 2006. Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda's Next Target? Terrorism Monitor vol. 4, no. 4. 23 February 2006.

[17] At-Taqwa, Z. Al Qaeda and the Battle for Oil. Available at: http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=1226.

[18] Zambelis, 2008.

[19] Fackler, M. 2008. Oil market rattled by attack on Japanese tanker. International Herald Tribune. 21 April. Available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/21/asia/22tanker.php

[20] BBC News Online. 2006. Saudis foil oil facility attack. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4747488.stm. It should be noted that such attacks have little chance for success with Saudi Arabia spending between US$1.2 to 1.5 billion annually to protect its oil and gas industry; however in this case we see that even the threat to supplies resulted in a jump in prices

[21] “Saudis ‘foil oil facility attack’”. BBC News. 24 February 2006. Available at: . Video available at: .

[22] United Press International. 1995. Algeria facing increased sabotage. May 12.

[23] Ibid.

[24] The Financial Post. 1995. Algeria's hydrocarbon industry grows despite unrest. August 4: 37.

[25] Porter, G. 2007. Islamist terrorism and energy sector security in Algeria. The Terrorism Monitor, 5 (12). June 21. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_005_012.pdf.

[26] Ibid

[27] Rand Corporation. 2007. Persian Gulf Security. Improving Allied Military Contributions. P.24.

[28] In 1978, Chevron discovered oil near Bentiu and Heglig, in southern Sudan

[29] Muir. J. 1999. World: African rebels attack Sudan oil pipeline. BBC News. 21 September. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/453552.stm

[30] Ibid.

[31] Blanche, E. 2001. Sudan: oil fuels internal unrest. The Middle East. Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/is_2001_Oct/ai_n25037107/pg_2?tag=artBody;col1

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Luft, 2005.

[35] Blanche, 2001.

[36] BBC News. 2008. China workers abducted in Sudan. October 19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7678829.stm

[37] Ibid. At the time of writing, the fate of the victims was not known.

[38] Schmid, A.P. 2007. Targeting oil and other energy resources and infrastructure. MIPT.

[39] Ibid. Capacity increases can help cushion market sensitivity. For example, despite continued turmoil in Nigeria’s oil-producing region, the price of oil has been declining steadily since August 2008 due to decreased demand from a slowing global economy. Even with OPEC cutting production down in addition to instability in oil-producing regions, the market is cushioned by the, perceived, healthy supply.

[40] Such security measures can involve: burying pipelines, hardening the pipeline against corrosion, increasing patrols and security forces for facilities, security cameras, etc. Technology is another important investment that can provide better protection. Developments using seismic sensing of underground vibrations can identify whether unauthorized personnel are near a pipeline – thus preventing sabotage.

Tuesday, February 02, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Angola Energy Profile - China Playing Key Role In Market

Over the past three years, Angola has become the largest crude oil producing country in Africa, surpassing Nigeria in 2009 due to attacks on the oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. Oil plays an important role in the Angolan economy, accounting for over 90 percent of export revenues and over 80 percent of GDP.

Despite crude oil production limitations imposed by OPEC, Angola is expected to increase oil production and capacity in the short-term as new offshore projects come online and foreign investment continues to flow into the sector.

Natural gas production in Angola is tied directly to oil production and is often vented or flared, with limited volumes consumed domestically. Plans are underway to capture and market this natural gas for domestic electricity generation and to export most of it in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by 2012.

Angola is still rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed during the country’s 27-year civil war that came to an end in 2002. Some security issues remain, specifically in the disputed oil-rich Cabinda exclave where separatist groups are still active.

President José Eduardo dos Santos has been in power since 1979. The most recent presidential elections were held in 1992 which led to a flare-up in the then ongoing conflict. Parliamentary elections were held in 2008 and in January of 2009, the Parliament approved a bill to abolish direct presidential elections. The oil licensing rounds that were initially planned to follow the presidential elections are now expected to go ahead in the short-term.

In recent years, China has agreed to provide multi-billion dollar oil-backed loans to fund infrastructure development. These loans are costly and repayment depends heavily on international oil prices but at the same time, Chinese firms are playing an important role in Angolan recovery while Angola has become one of the leading suppliers of oil to China.

Oil

According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), as of January 2010 Angola has proven oil reserves of 9.5 billion barrels. Statements made by the Angolan oil minister in December 2009 put total reserve numbers as high as 13.1 billion barrels. The majority of Angola’s oil reserves are located in offshore blocks, in part because onshore exploration was limited as a result of the civil war. However, there are some proven reserves onshore around the northern city of Soyo and also, in the disputed Cabinda Province.

In 2007, Angola formally became a member of OPEC and in 2009, held the Organization’s presidency. That year, Angola produced an average of 1.82 million bbl/d of crude oil making it the largest crude oil producer in Africa and placing it seventh among OPEC members according to EIA. Despite increasing oil production capacity, Angola maintained output at approximately 200,000 bbl/d below capacity as a response to OPEC’s most recent production allocation (estimated to be between 1.52 million bbl/d and 1.66 million bbl/d) without cutting production by the full required amount.

Angola’s total oil production capacity has grown considerably over the past decade averaging around 2 million bbl/d in 2009 (compared to 750,000 bbl/d in 1999). Crude oil capacity estimates are now over 2.1 million bbl/d, most of which is offshore. Oil consumption is estimated to be around 65,000 bbl/d, leaving almost all production for export. The majority of Angolan oil is heavy to medium crude (30 degrees – 40 degrees API) with low-sulfur content (0.12 percent - 0.14 percent).

Exports

In the first half of 2009, Angola exported over 1.7 million bbl/d of crude oil, (more than 90% of total production) primarily to China and the United States. The United States imported 535,000 bbl/d of crude oil from Angola (547,000 bbl/d of total oil imports) over the period making the country one of the top sources for U.S. oil imports. Angola also exported approximately 500,000 bbl/d to China and was the third largest source of Chinese imports after Saudi Arabia (740,000 bbl/d) and Iran (530,000 bbl/d) for the first half of 2009 according to FACTS Global Energy.

Sector Organization

In 1976, the Angolan government created a national oil company (NOC) called the Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol). In 1978, Sonangol became the sole concessionaire for oil and gas exploration and production in Angola. Sonangol works with foreign companies through joint ventures (JVs) and production sharing agreements (PSAs), while funding its share of production through oil-backed borrowing. In recent years, Sonangol has become more active in both upstream and downstream operations. Major international oil companies (IOCs) operating in Angola include BP, Chevron, Total, ExxonMobil and Eni. China’s Sinopec and CNOOC are among the newer international companies operating in Angola and are proving to be important players in terms of development aid, oil backed loans and trade.

Exploration and Production

Oil production in Angola is concentrated in numerous offshore blocks. The offshore blocks are divided into three bands; shallow water blocks 0-13 (band A); deepwater blocks 14-30 (band B); and ultra-deepwater blocks 31-40 (band C). Additional blocks are now being designated in the ultra-deepwater offshore lower Congo Basin (click here to view Sonangol’s concession map). Despite the expense of developing the deepwater and ultra-deepwater fields, Angolan oil production has grown rapidly over the past decade and will continue to do so in the short-term. Major existing and future developments are summarized below.

Onshore

Onshore exploration and production activities have mainly focused around the Cabinda province and were halted during Angola’s civil war. The Cabinda province is home to separatist movements demanding access to oil revenues and greater participation in oil policy. While the government has appointed members to political positions, and security has improved, clashes still occur between the military and rebels in the area. Some existing wells that were drilled prior to the war and the neighboring Block Zero have proven to be extremely successful (see below).

Offshore

Block Zero: Block Zero is located offshore Cabinda province and is divided into two separate areas with 21 fields. Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC), a Chevron subsidiary and operator of Block Zero since 1955, has a 39.2 percent share in the JV. Other partners include Total and Eni. According to Chevron, Block Zero accounted for approximately 340,000 bbl/d of production in 2008. Additional production is expected from the Block as drilling and exploration activities continue. In July 2009, Chevron also announced that the Mafumeira project was underway and the first field was to reach peak production of 30,000 bbl/d by 2011.

Block 14: In addition to Block Zero, CABGOC is the operator of neighboring deepwater Block 14 (also offshore Cabinda) with 31 percent interest and is joined by partners Eni, Sonangol, Total and Petrogal. A total of 11 discoveries have been made on the block with Kuito being the first in 1997.

Production in Block 14 centers around the Benguela, Belize, Lobito, Tomboco (BBLT) project which reached its 200,000 bbl/d peak in 2008; the recently started up Tombua-Landana project which is expected to peak in late 2010 at 100,000 bbl/d; and the Kuito field which has been in decline from its 2000 peak of 80,000 bbl/d. As with Block Zero, further exploration is underway.
Block 15: ExxonMobil is operator of Block 15, the largest producing deepwater block in Angola along with partners BP, Eni and StatoilHydro. Block 15 is located in the Congo Basin and has estimated recoverable hydrocarbon reserves of 4.5 billion bbl, and at peak production, Block 15 is expected to exceed 800,000 bbl/d.

In 2003, ExxonMobil brought online Xikomba field, with estimated recoverable reserves of 100 million bbl. Production from Xikomba is currently below 20,000 bbl/d. In August 2004, the first of the Kizomba developments, four floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) facilities were brought online:


  • The Kizomba-A project, which includes the Chocalho and Hungo fields, was the first of the Kizomba projects started in 2004 and peaked at 250,000 bbl/d. Phase 2 of this project started up in 2007 with the Marimba North field adding a further 40,000 bbl/d.
  • The Kizomba-B project, brought online in 2005 includes the Dikanza and Kissanje fields. Kizomba-B contains an estimated one billion bbl of recoverable oil reserves peak production was an estimated 250,000 bbl/d.
  • The Kizomba-C project, consists of the Batuque, Mondo and Saxi fields. Production at the Mondo field came onstream in January of 2008 and the other Kizomba C fields came onstream in mid- 2008 with a combined peak of 200,000 bbl/d.
  • The Kizomba-D fields are expected onstream after 2011 with a peak production capacity of 120,000 bbl/d. There is potential for added production from surrounding satellite fields expected onstream after 2010 that could produce an additional 125,000 bbl/d.
  • Block 17: Total operates Block 17 with a 40 percent share, while Sonangol is the concession holder. Other shareholders include ExxonMobil, BP, and StatoilHydro. According to BP, the block is producing around 250,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day. Field production started in December 2001 with the startup of the Girassol field and production has since been maintained by the startup of Jasimin (2003), Dalia (2006) and Rosa (2007)
  • Future projects on Block 17 include Pazflor and CLOV, which will produce an estimated 200,000 bbl/d and 150,000 bbl/d, respectively, starting in 2011. In 2009, Total also announced a new discovery, Gardenia-1 that confirmed the companies plans to expand activities in the block.
  • Block 18: The Greater Plutonio development in Block 18 (BP operated) came online in October of 2007 at 100,000 bbl/d. The development consists of five fields: Plutonio, Galio, Paladio, Cromio and Cobalto and is currently producing just under 200,000 bbl/d.

Upcoming Projects

Despite limitations imposed by OPEC, companies operating in Angola are on track to significantly ramp up their offshore developments in the short- and medium-term. Major projects summarized below represent tie-ins to support existing developments and also new developments that are underway. Industry analysts have estimated that Angolan production capacity could peak between 2.5 and 3 million bb/d by 2015 based on existing discoveries.


Angola’s Upcoming Oil Projects
Project
Location
Operator
Peak Production (total liquids)
Expected Start-up | Peak
Negage
Block 14
Chevron
75,000 bbl/d
2010+
Pazflor
Block 17
Total
200,000 bbl/d
2011
PSVM (a)
Block 31 NE
BP
150,000 bbl/d
2011
Kizomba D
Block 15
ExxonMobil
120,000 bbl/d
2011+
CLOV
Block 17
Total
150,000 bbl/d
2011+
Other Block 31
Block 31
BP
300,000 bbl/d
2012+
PCC (b)
Block 18
BP
100,000 bbl/d
2012+
Other Block 32
Block 32
Total
120,000 bbl/d
2012+
a) Plutão, Saturno, Vênus and Marte
b) Platino, Chumbo, Cesio

Sources: BP, Total, ExxonMobil, Afroil, Oil and Gas Journal,International Oil Daily, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Reuters, Petroleum Economist

Refining and Downstream

Domestic oil consumption in 2009 was approximately 65,000 bbl/d. The country’s one refinery in Luanda, Fina Petroleos de Angola – a JV between Sonangol Total and private investors – has a crude oil processing capacity of 39,000 bbl/d. The remaining demand is met by imports of gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, and other products.

Angola is developing plans for a new 200,000 bbl/d refinery, SonaRef, in the coastal city of Lobito. The project was initially to be built in partnership with Sinopec but the Chinese company withdrew as a result of disagreements regarding the market for products. Sonangol is now proceeding with the SonaRef project but the project completion date is now slated for 2014-2015. The new refinery will be able to process heavy crudes, such as those found in the Kuito and Dalia fields. In the interim, the expected demand increases will continue to be met by product imports.

Natural Gas

According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Angola has 9.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves as of January 1, 2010—a significant increase from the 2007 estimated reserves of 2 Tcf. According to EIA statistics, in 2008, Angola’s gross natural gas production was approximately 355 billion cubic feet (Bcf). Of this, 244 Bcf (69%) was vented or flared, 81 Bcf (23%) was re-injected to aid in oil recovery and 29 Bcf (8%) was marketed for domestic consumption.

With the considerable increases in proved natural gas reserves and government policies to end natural gas flaring, plans are underway to convert much of the natural gas into LNG for export with some to be used for domestic electricity production.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

Chevron and Sonangol together with other shareholders including Total, BP and Eni are building a five-million-ton LNG plant near Soyo in northern Angola. The plant is expected to be operational by 2012.

The natural gas will come from several offshore fields including Total’s Block 17, BP’s block 18 and Chevron’s blocks Zero and 14. According to the partners, the project will process 1 billion cubic feet of associated gas per day and will eventually produce 5.2 million tons per year of LNG plus process up to 125 million cubic feet per day of gas for the domestic market. Initially, the LNG is to be directed to the US market, currently intended for the regasification plant at Pascagoula on the US Gulf Coast.

Source: EIA
Tuesday, January 26, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

OPEC Could Earn $767 Billion In 2010, $833 billion In 2011 - EIA

Based on projections from the EIA January 2010 Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could earn $767 billion of net oil export revenues in 2010 and $833 billion in 2011.

Last year, OPEC earned $573 billion in net oil export revenues, a 41 percent decrease from 2008. Saudi Arabia earned the largest share of these earnings, $154 billion, representing 27 percent of total OPEC revenues. On a per-capita basis, OPEC net oil export earning reached $1,553 in 2009, a 42 percent decrease from 2008.

Methodology

The EIA report includes estimates of OPEC net oil export revenues. For each country, estimates of oil production and consumption from the latest version of the EIA STEO are used to derive net oil exports.

"We assume that these exports are sold at prevailing spot prices. For countries that export several different crude varieties, we assume that the proportion of total net oil exports represented by each variety is equal to the proportion of the total domestic production represented by that variety; in other words, if we assume that Arab Medium represents 20 percent of total oil production in Saudi Arabia, then we assume that Arab Medium represents 20 percent of total net oil exports from Saudi Arabia," the EIA said.


OPEC Net Oil Export Revenues


OPEC Per Capita Net Oil Export Revenues

OPEC Net Oil Export Revenues
Country Nominal ($B) Real (2005$B)
2009 2010 2011 Jan-Dec 2009 2009 2010 2011 Jan-Dec 2009
Algeria $43 NA NA $43 $38 NA NA $38
Angola $42 NA NA $42 $38 NA NA $38
Ecuador $6 NA NA $6 $5 NA NA $5
Iran $55 NA NA $55 $49 NA NA $49
Iraq $37 NA NA $37 $33 NA NA $33
Kuwait $46 NA NA $46 $41 NA NA $41
Libya $34 NA NA $34 $31 NA NA $31
Nigeria $46 NA NA $46 $41 NA NA $41
Qatar $24 NA NA $24 $21 NA NA $21
Saudi Arabia $154 NA NA $154 $138 NA NA $138
UAE $52 NA NA $52 $47 NA NA $47
Venezuela $33 NA NA $33 $30 NA NA $30
OPEC $573 $767 $833 $573 $512 $671 $715 $512
View entire series (1975-2011): nominal or real
OPEC Per Capita Net Oil Export Revenues
Country Nominal ($) Real (2005$)
2009 2010 2011 Jan-Dec 2009 2009 2010 2011 Jan-Dec 2009
Algeria $1,250 NA NA $1,250 $1,117 NA NA $1,117
Angola $3,294 NA NA $3,294 $2,943 NA NA $2,943
Ecuador $411 NA NA $411 $368 NA NA $368
Iran $821 NA NA $821 $733 NA NA $733
Iraq $1,284 NA NA $1,284 $1,147 NA NA $1,147
Kuwait $17,061 NA NA $17,061 $15,247 NA NA $15,247
Libya $5,421 NA NA $5,421 $4,845 NA NA $4,845
Nigeria $325 NA NA $325 $290 NA NA $290
Qatar $25,221 NA NA $25,221 $22,534 NA NA $22,534
Saudi Arabia $5,368 NA NA $5,368 $4,796 NA NA $4,796
UAE $10,863 NA NA $10,863 $9,707 NA NA $9,707
Venezuela $1,239 NA NA $1,239 $1,108 NA NA $1,108
OPEC $1,553 $2,044 $2,180 $1,553 $1,388 $1,788 $1,871 $1,388
View entire series (1975-2011): nominal or real
Wednesday, January 13, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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