EU, Latin American And Caribbean Heads Analyse Global Challenges
Approximately sixty heads of state will attend the VI Summit of European Union, Latin American and Caribbean countries, which will take place today in Madrid. Their aim is to strengthen relations in order to better meet global challenges such as the economic crisis, financial instability, climate change, energy problems, as well as inequality and poverty.
In his opening address, the President of the Government of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, made reference to the improvement in relations between the two continents over the last decade, with the result that they are now 'global allies facing global challenges'.
'Today, Latin America and the Caribbean mutually affirm their partnership in the face of the global agenda's most pressing issues', said Zapatero, the summit's host and President-in-turn of the EU.
Herman van Rompuy, European Council President
The President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, underscored the cultural and historical ties between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, before going onto stress the importance of a strategic partnership, given that together they comprise a quarter of the entire international system, with a combined population of one billion people. 'The EU is the LAC's principal investor and second largest trade partner, he added.
Van Rompuy noted the progress made by Latin America in its progressive integration via regional partnerships, as well as pending challenges with regard to the fact that 'sustainable growth is impossible unless accompanied by social cohesion'.
Alan García, the President of Perú
In his address, the President of Perú, Alan García, who hosted the last EU-LAC summit held in 2008 in Lima, underscored that it was essential for 'a new voice to be heard on the world stage', in order to constructively reorganise the multipolarity which exists at the international level.
After asserting that 'we are Euro-Americans' and that 'Europeans and Latin Americans share a common inspiration that transcends commercial interests' , Alan García confirmed that the agreement which Columbia and Peru will sign up to with the EU at the Madrid Summit is 'more than a trade agreement; it is an economic, social and political agreement as well'.
José Manuel Durao Barroso, European Commission President
The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durao Barroso, underscored the positive results attained by the EU-LAC association in areas such as sustainable development, climate change, immigration, the fight against drugtrafickking, and the struggle for social cohesion.
He stressed the importance of both countries working together to 'carry out more effective multilateral actions', given that they comprise one third of the UN and G20, and represent a quarter of all world trade.
Cristina Fernández, the Argentine President
The Argentine President, Cristina Fernández, who spoke on behalf of all Latin American and Caribbean countries, defended the resurgence of a form of multilateralism 'for which there is an urgent need on the world-wide political and economic stage', and she supported the suppression of protectionist policies 'in all of their forms'.
She also called for an avoidance of 'penalties and discriminatory acts' towards immigrants, despite the international crisis, in favour of a 'realistic economy' based on the economic and social well-being of communities.
Those countries exercising the greatest responsibility in multinational organisations are those which 'bear the most responsibility', underscored the Argentinean head of state, who gave the final address at the opening ceremony.
In his opening address, the President of the Government of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, made reference to the improvement in relations between the two continents over the last decade, with the result that they are now 'global allies facing global challenges'.
'Today, Latin America and the Caribbean mutually affirm their partnership in the face of the global agenda's most pressing issues', said Zapatero, the summit's host and President-in-turn of the EU.
Herman van Rompuy, European Council President
The President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, underscored the cultural and historical ties between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, before going onto stress the importance of a strategic partnership, given that together they comprise a quarter of the entire international system, with a combined population of one billion people. 'The EU is the LAC's principal investor and second largest trade partner, he added.
Van Rompuy noted the progress made by Latin America in its progressive integration via regional partnerships, as well as pending challenges with regard to the fact that 'sustainable growth is impossible unless accompanied by social cohesion'.
Alan García, the President of Perú
In his address, the President of Perú, Alan García, who hosted the last EU-LAC summit held in 2008 in Lima, underscored that it was essential for 'a new voice to be heard on the world stage', in order to constructively reorganise the multipolarity which exists at the international level.
After asserting that 'we are Euro-Americans' and that 'Europeans and Latin Americans share a common inspiration that transcends commercial interests' , Alan García confirmed that the agreement which Columbia and Peru will sign up to with the EU at the Madrid Summit is 'more than a trade agreement; it is an economic, social and political agreement as well'.
José Manuel Durao Barroso, European Commission President
The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durao Barroso, underscored the positive results attained by the EU-LAC association in areas such as sustainable development, climate change, immigration, the fight against drugtrafickking, and the struggle for social cohesion.
He stressed the importance of both countries working together to 'carry out more effective multilateral actions', given that they comprise one third of the UN and G20, and represent a quarter of all world trade.
Cristina Fernández, the Argentine President
The Argentine President, Cristina Fernández, who spoke on behalf of all Latin American and Caribbean countries, defended the resurgence of a form of multilateralism 'for which there is an urgent need on the world-wide political and economic stage', and she supported the suppression of protectionist policies 'in all of their forms'.
She also called for an avoidance of 'penalties and discriminatory acts' towards immigrants, despite the international crisis, in favour of a 'realistic economy' based on the economic and social well-being of communities.
Those countries exercising the greatest responsibility in multinational organisations are those which 'bear the most responsibility', underscored the Argentinean head of state, who gave the final address at the opening ceremony.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Espinosa Highlights Importance Of Restarting Mercosur Talks
Spain's Minister of the Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs, Elena Espinosa, in Brussels on Monday highlighted the importance of restarting talks for an association agreement between the EU and Mercosur, at the summit meeting taking place in Madrid.
At the start of the agriculture council meeting, Espinosa said that she hoped that the EU and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) will relaunch the talks that have been stalled since 2004 in order to reach an agreement that "is fair for everyone".On Monday the ministers of agriculture of the EU opened discussions with Mercosur, at the request of France and seven other countries, that have expressed their concerns about the effects of an agreement with this Latin American block on the European agricultural sector.
The priority of the Spanish Presidency of the EU is to reach an agreement with Mercosur and Espinosa insisted that the intention to restart talks (one of the main issues at the summit between the EU and the countries of Latin America in Madrid) was a decision "taken a long time ago" and could be "beneficial" if the negotiations are "normal and open".
She stressed that the discussions to open up trade between these two blocks must deal with agriculture and livestock farming as well as the industrial and service sectors.
Espinosa said that she was currently talking exclusively about the reopening of negotiations and that when they start "we will try to make a balanced decision that will not prejudice or favour any party in particular".
Espinosa also declared that the EU will try to take into account the more contentious products; in other words, the European sectors that might be affected by an increase in trade and imports from Mercosur, such as beef and pork.
She compared the talks with the discussions to free up world trade in the Doha Round, that were started many years ago and are still not concluded as they have not come to an agreement.
European Agriculture Commissioner, Dacian Ciolos, said that currently, discussions are solely about reopening negotiations with the South American block, emphasising that for the moment there are no new concessions on the table.
At the start of the agriculture council meeting, Espinosa said that she hoped that the EU and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) will relaunch the talks that have been stalled since 2004 in order to reach an agreement that "is fair for everyone".On Monday the ministers of agriculture of the EU opened discussions with Mercosur, at the request of France and seven other countries, that have expressed their concerns about the effects of an agreement with this Latin American block on the European agricultural sector.
The priority of the Spanish Presidency of the EU is to reach an agreement with Mercosur and Espinosa insisted that the intention to restart talks (one of the main issues at the summit between the EU and the countries of Latin America in Madrid) was a decision "taken a long time ago" and could be "beneficial" if the negotiations are "normal and open".
She stressed that the discussions to open up trade between these two blocks must deal with agriculture and livestock farming as well as the industrial and service sectors.
Espinosa said that she was currently talking exclusively about the reopening of negotiations and that when they start "we will try to make a balanced decision that will not prejudice or favour any party in particular".
Espinosa also declared that the EU will try to take into account the more contentious products; in other words, the European sectors that might be affected by an increase in trade and imports from Mercosur, such as beef and pork.
She compared the talks with the discussions to free up world trade in the Doha Round, that were started many years ago and are still not concluded as they have not come to an agreement.
European Agriculture Commissioner, Dacian Ciolos, said that currently, discussions are solely about reopening negotiations with the South American block, emphasising that for the moment there are no new concessions on the table.
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Repsol's 1Q Net Income Up 30% From Previous Year; Upstream Growth Driver
Spanish oil and gas company Repsol said Thursday it posted a net income of 688 million euros in the first quarter of 2010, 30% more than the previous year. The operating income was 1.538 billion euros, 61% more than in the first quarter of 2009.
In a period marked by the recovery of international oil prices (Brent +71.7%), low refining margins (-54.3%) and the depreciation of the dollar against the euro (-6.1%), Repsol increased its hydrocarbons production by 10.4% and also improved its oil realisation prices and its production mix, that had a positive effect on its earnings.
In addition to the improved performance, Repsol said it is continuing to carry out its plan to divest non-strategic assets and execute costs savings.
"Its strong financial situation will allow the Company to finance its foreseen investments for the coming years and to appropriately remunerate its shareholders," Repsol said.
At the end of the first quarter the company’s financial liquidity was 6.481 billion euros, 489 million more than at the end of 2009, at the same time as financial ratios improved. The company's financial net debt at the end of March, excluding Natural Gas Fenosa, was 4.843 billion euros, slightly lower compared to year end in 2009.
Upstream, growth driver
The Upstream unit (Exploration and Production) operating income was 432 million euros, representing a 133.5% increase in comparison to the first quarter of 2009; this was motivated by the sustained rise in oil and gas prices during this period, and higher production, particularly liquids.
The increase in production had a positive impact of 184 million euros, while 82.3% higher oil realization prices and a greater weight of liquids in Repsol’s product mix had a positive impact of 248 million euros.
In the first quarter of 2010, Repsol’s hydrocarbons production was 350,341 boepd, representing 10.4% more than in the same quarter in 2009. This increase consolidates the upward trend started in the last quarter of 2009. An improved product mix was obtained, with an increased liquids weight of 43% compared with 36% in the previous year; this was mainly due to production start-up in the Shenzi field in United States.
During the first quarter of 2010, investments in the Upstream area were 138 million euros which are assigned mainly to field development (55%) and exploration in Brazil and Venezuela.
In the fourth quarter of 2009, the stake in the Alberto Pasqualini Refap, S.A. (REFAP) refinery) was again proportionally integrated into the Group’s earnings. In order to make comparison easier between 2010 and 2009, and in accordance with accounting regulation, the data corresponding to the first quarter of 2009 have been modified accordingly, integrating the proportional earnings from that company for the whole year.
Repsol continued in Brazil its intense exploratory campaign in the first quarter of 2010. The significant discovery in the Perla field in Venezuela, in the Perla 2X well, has increased by at least 30% the original gas resources estimate in that area, which is now 9 and 10 TCF.
In Algeria, another of the company's exploratory growth areas, a consortium operated by Repsol with a 52.5% participation, was awarded the Sud-Est lllizi Block during Algeria's 2nd National and International Bidding Round for exploratory and development blocks, that took place at the end of December 2009.
Also, in the Gulf of Mexico the company was awarded 16 new exploratory blocks. Furthermore, the Norwegian Government awarded two new exploration licenses in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea to two consortiums in which Repsol participates.
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) posted an operating income of 34 million euros, 209.1% more than the first quarter of 2009, mainly the result of increased LNG sales volumes and margins, in addition to the contribution of regasification revenues in the Canaport plant.
Downstream: Improvement in Marketing and Petrochemicals
The Downstream (Refining, Marketing, LPG and Chemical) operating income in the first quarter of 2010 was 390 million euros, representing a 25.8% increase compared to the same quarter in 2009.
The fall in international refining margins, and the low distillation volumes due to the slump in worldwide demand, had a negative impact of 189 million euros on the refining business results. On the other hand, the good performance of the marketing unit had a positive impact of 10 million euros on earnings, consolidating the strength of this business.
Production volumes and margins in the Chemical business improved markedly from their low in the first quarter of 2009, having a positive impact of 73 million euros in the first quarter of 2010.
The LPG bottling margins was inferior to those of the same period in 2009; this was due to the time-lag effect.
During this quarter, Downstream investments totalled 253 million euros, which were assigned mainly to the expansion and conversion projects at the Cartagena and Bilbao refineries.
YPF profit grows
The YPF operating income totalled 411 million euros, 27.2% more than the same period in 2009. The continued increase in domestic and international prices and stable costs explain this rise.
An increase in domestic fuel prices in dollars had a positive impact of 163 million de euros. Also, higher sales volumes contributed positively to the operating income (23 million euros), the increased income from exports and products sold in the domestic market but referenced to international prices (133 million euros) and the Petroleum Plus programme.
YPF production was 549,716 boepd, representing 8.5% fall compared to the same period in the previous year, but slightly better than the previous quarter.
In the first quarter of 2010, YPF investments were 241 million euros, spent mainly on Exploration and Production.
Gas Natural Fenosa increase earnings 51.5%
Gas Natural Fenosa posted an operating income of 256 million euros in the first quarter of this year against 169 million euros of the same period in 2009, representing a 51.5% increase, due to the integration of Union Fenosa’s operating income in Gas Natural SDG.
Gas Natural Fenosa investments corresponding to the proportional consolidation by Repsol during first quarter 2010 were 118 million euros, spent mainly on gas and power distribution activities in Spain and Latin America, and in power generation in Spain and Mexico.
Horizon 2014: Guaranteed growth
The Repsol Board of Directors yesterday approved new projects and investments that will define the company’s strategy through 2014, maintaining the growth vectors outlined in the 2008-2012 Strategic Plan.
In the last two years Repsol's unprecedented success in its exploratory campaign, and the changes caused by the world economic crisis, have set a new framework for company’s strategy, which maintains its main lines of action, keeping to a rigorous financial discipline and shareholder value creation.
In this new scenario, Exploration and Production activity will drive company growth, as the high potential of its recent discoveries is developed. The presence of Repsol in geographical areas which are amongst those with the highest growth potential in the world, and its renowned capacity in ultra deep-water exploration, has turned it into one of the companies with best future outlook.
The main projects undertaken in the last years are already in operation (Canaport, Shenzi, IR/Libya, Peru LNG), or will be he in the short term (Bilbao, Cartagena).
Repsol's investment strategy for Horizon 2014 is based on a larger and more solid portfolio of growth projects in Upstream that include the development of the Guara and Piracuca fields in Brazil, the Kinteroni field in Peru, the Margarita-Huacaya fields in Bolivia and the Cardon IV field in Venezuela, to those that are already underway: Reggane in Algeria, Carioca in Brazil and Peru LNG in Peru.
To these projects, other, more recent discoveries which are undergoing production tests will be added after 2014: Panoramix, Iguazu and Abare West in Brazil, Buckskin in the Gulf of Mexico, blocks NC-200 and NC-186Y1 in Libya, Tanger-Larache in Morocco and Venus in Sierra Leone.
The development of these projects will allow for an estimated annual production growth of between 3% and 4% until 2014 and an even higher production growth until 2019, with a reserve replacement ratio above 110% in the coming five years.
In the Downstream area, the expansion projects at Bilbao and Cartagena are at a very advanced phase and their start-up is planned for the end of 2011, this will allow an improvement in refining margins due to the application of the most advanced technological processes, consolidating the company's leadership in the Spanish refining business.
Additionally, YPF and Gas Natural Fenosa’s leadership in the gas and electricity markets, will give Repsol a stable cash flow.
All of this, subject to the realisation of price assumptions, will allow Repsol, the company said, to finance investments planned for Horizon 2014, to increase dividends and reduce debt through financial discipline based on operative costs savings and disinvestment in non-strategic assets, and to maintain excellence in operations and the internationally recognised advances made in safety and corporate responsibility.
In a period marked by the recovery of international oil prices (Brent +71.7%), low refining margins (-54.3%) and the depreciation of the dollar against the euro (-6.1%), Repsol increased its hydrocarbons production by 10.4% and also improved its oil realisation prices and its production mix, that had a positive effect on its earnings.
In addition to the improved performance, Repsol said it is continuing to carry out its plan to divest non-strategic assets and execute costs savings.
"Its strong financial situation will allow the Company to finance its foreseen investments for the coming years and to appropriately remunerate its shareholders," Repsol said.
At the end of the first quarter the company’s financial liquidity was 6.481 billion euros, 489 million more than at the end of 2009, at the same time as financial ratios improved. The company's financial net debt at the end of March, excluding Natural Gas Fenosa, was 4.843 billion euros, slightly lower compared to year end in 2009.
Upstream, growth driver
The Upstream unit (Exploration and Production) operating income was 432 million euros, representing a 133.5% increase in comparison to the first quarter of 2009; this was motivated by the sustained rise in oil and gas prices during this period, and higher production, particularly liquids.
The increase in production had a positive impact of 184 million euros, while 82.3% higher oil realization prices and a greater weight of liquids in Repsol’s product mix had a positive impact of 248 million euros.
In the first quarter of 2010, Repsol’s hydrocarbons production was 350,341 boepd, representing 10.4% more than in the same quarter in 2009. This increase consolidates the upward trend started in the last quarter of 2009. An improved product mix was obtained, with an increased liquids weight of 43% compared with 36% in the previous year; this was mainly due to production start-up in the Shenzi field in United States.
During the first quarter of 2010, investments in the Upstream area were 138 million euros which are assigned mainly to field development (55%) and exploration in Brazil and Venezuela.
In the fourth quarter of 2009, the stake in the Alberto Pasqualini Refap, S.A. (REFAP) refinery) was again proportionally integrated into the Group’s earnings. In order to make comparison easier between 2010 and 2009, and in accordance with accounting regulation, the data corresponding to the first quarter of 2009 have been modified accordingly, integrating the proportional earnings from that company for the whole year.
Repsol continued in Brazil its intense exploratory campaign in the first quarter of 2010. The significant discovery in the Perla field in Venezuela, in the Perla 2X well, has increased by at least 30% the original gas resources estimate in that area, which is now 9 and 10 TCF.
In Algeria, another of the company's exploratory growth areas, a consortium operated by Repsol with a 52.5% participation, was awarded the Sud-Est lllizi Block during Algeria's 2nd National and International Bidding Round for exploratory and development blocks, that took place at the end of December 2009.
Also, in the Gulf of Mexico the company was awarded 16 new exploratory blocks. Furthermore, the Norwegian Government awarded two new exploration licenses in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea to two consortiums in which Repsol participates.
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) posted an operating income of 34 million euros, 209.1% more than the first quarter of 2009, mainly the result of increased LNG sales volumes and margins, in addition to the contribution of regasification revenues in the Canaport plant.
Downstream: Improvement in Marketing and Petrochemicals
The Downstream (Refining, Marketing, LPG and Chemical) operating income in the first quarter of 2010 was 390 million euros, representing a 25.8% increase compared to the same quarter in 2009.
The fall in international refining margins, and the low distillation volumes due to the slump in worldwide demand, had a negative impact of 189 million euros on the refining business results. On the other hand, the good performance of the marketing unit had a positive impact of 10 million euros on earnings, consolidating the strength of this business.
Production volumes and margins in the Chemical business improved markedly from their low in the first quarter of 2009, having a positive impact of 73 million euros in the first quarter of 2010.
The LPG bottling margins was inferior to those of the same period in 2009; this was due to the time-lag effect.
During this quarter, Downstream investments totalled 253 million euros, which were assigned mainly to the expansion and conversion projects at the Cartagena and Bilbao refineries.
YPF profit grows
The YPF operating income totalled 411 million euros, 27.2% more than the same period in 2009. The continued increase in domestic and international prices and stable costs explain this rise.
An increase in domestic fuel prices in dollars had a positive impact of 163 million de euros. Also, higher sales volumes contributed positively to the operating income (23 million euros), the increased income from exports and products sold in the domestic market but referenced to international prices (133 million euros) and the Petroleum Plus programme.
YPF production was 549,716 boepd, representing 8.5% fall compared to the same period in the previous year, but slightly better than the previous quarter.
In the first quarter of 2010, YPF investments were 241 million euros, spent mainly on Exploration and Production.
Gas Natural Fenosa increase earnings 51.5%
Gas Natural Fenosa posted an operating income of 256 million euros in the first quarter of this year against 169 million euros of the same period in 2009, representing a 51.5% increase, due to the integration of Union Fenosa’s operating income in Gas Natural SDG.
Gas Natural Fenosa investments corresponding to the proportional consolidation by Repsol during first quarter 2010 were 118 million euros, spent mainly on gas and power distribution activities in Spain and Latin America, and in power generation in Spain and Mexico.
Horizon 2014: Guaranteed growth
The Repsol Board of Directors yesterday approved new projects and investments that will define the company’s strategy through 2014, maintaining the growth vectors outlined in the 2008-2012 Strategic Plan.
In the last two years Repsol's unprecedented success in its exploratory campaign, and the changes caused by the world economic crisis, have set a new framework for company’s strategy, which maintains its main lines of action, keeping to a rigorous financial discipline and shareholder value creation.
In this new scenario, Exploration and Production activity will drive company growth, as the high potential of its recent discoveries is developed. The presence of Repsol in geographical areas which are amongst those with the highest growth potential in the world, and its renowned capacity in ultra deep-water exploration, has turned it into one of the companies with best future outlook.
The main projects undertaken in the last years are already in operation (Canaport, Shenzi, IR/Libya, Peru LNG), or will be he in the short term (Bilbao, Cartagena).
Repsol's investment strategy for Horizon 2014 is based on a larger and more solid portfolio of growth projects in Upstream that include the development of the Guara and Piracuca fields in Brazil, the Kinteroni field in Peru, the Margarita-Huacaya fields in Bolivia and the Cardon IV field in Venezuela, to those that are already underway: Reggane in Algeria, Carioca in Brazil and Peru LNG in Peru.
To these projects, other, more recent discoveries which are undergoing production tests will be added after 2014: Panoramix, Iguazu and Abare West in Brazil, Buckskin in the Gulf of Mexico, blocks NC-200 and NC-186Y1 in Libya, Tanger-Larache in Morocco and Venus in Sierra Leone.
The development of these projects will allow for an estimated annual production growth of between 3% and 4% until 2014 and an even higher production growth until 2019, with a reserve replacement ratio above 110% in the coming five years.
In the Downstream area, the expansion projects at Bilbao and Cartagena are at a very advanced phase and their start-up is planned for the end of 2011, this will allow an improvement in refining margins due to the application of the most advanced technological processes, consolidating the company's leadership in the Spanish refining business.
Additionally, YPF and Gas Natural Fenosa’s leadership in the gas and electricity markets, will give Repsol a stable cash flow.
All of this, subject to the realisation of price assumptions, will allow Repsol, the company said, to finance investments planned for Horizon 2014, to increase dividends and reduce debt through financial discipline based on operative costs savings and disinvestment in non-strategic assets, and to maintain excellence in operations and the internationally recognised advances made in safety and corporate responsibility.
Thursday, April 29, 2010 |
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Brazil Replaces Spain In FIFA Rankings
According to the latest edition of the FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking Spains five-month reign has come to end, with Brazil reclaiming pole position and pushing the reigning European champions back into second place.
Brazil according to todays rankings has claimed top spot in the ranking, a position that they have held for a total of 142 months since 1993.
Other moves of note in the top ten include the progress made by Argentina (7th, up 2) and Portugal (3rd, up 1). Third place represents the highest-ever position for the Portuguese since the launch of the world ranking in 1993.
Only five matches have been taken into account in April's edition, which was to be expected, given that there are only 43 days to go until the start of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa.
According to FIFA 150 international matches have been played so far in 2010.
There is likely to be significant movement in next month's edition of the ranking, the last before the big event in South Africa, as the 32 teams start their preparations in earnest by playing friendly matches to decide on their best line-up.
Source: KUNA
Brazil according to todays rankings has claimed top spot in the ranking, a position that they have held for a total of 142 months since 1993.
Other moves of note in the top ten include the progress made by Argentina (7th, up 2) and Portugal (3rd, up 1). Third place represents the highest-ever position for the Portuguese since the launch of the world ranking in 1993.
Only five matches have been taken into account in April's edition, which was to be expected, given that there are only 43 days to go until the start of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa.
According to FIFA 150 international matches have been played so far in 2010.
There is likely to be significant movement in next month's edition of the ranking, the last before the big event in South Africa, as the 32 teams start their preparations in earnest by playing friendly matches to decide on their best line-up.
Source: KUNA
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Profile: U.S Policy With Latin American Countries In 'War On Terror'
As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla insurgency.
In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS.
Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years, attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United States.
The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the United States has about them. The United States has included Cuba on its list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.
The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State, including: an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, a Counterterrorism Financing (CTF) program, and a Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). All the programs are funded through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) foreign aid funding account.
The largest of these program is the ATA program that over the years has provided training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing.
Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $9.1 million in FY2008 and an estimated $9.3 million in FY2009. For FY2010, the Administration requested $16.4 million for Latin American countries, with $6 million for Mexico, $4.4 million for Colombia, and $6 million for assistance to other countries through a regional program. The FY2010 budget request states that ATA assistance for Central and South America enhances border control and provides fraudulent document training.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $7.1 million in EXBS assistance in FY2008 and an estimated $2.1 million in FY2009. The FY2010 request is for $2.9 million for assistance to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and a regional program.
CTF assistance provides support in detecting, isolating, and dismantling terrorist financial networks. No CTF assistance was provided for Latin America in FY2008, while in FY2009, an estimated $225,000 was provided. The FY2010 request is for $875,000, with assistance for Mexico, Colombia, and a regional program.
TIP assistance helps foreign immigration authorities with a computer database system that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land or sea ports of entry. No assistance was provided to the region in FY2008 or FY2009, but for FY2010 the Administration requested $1.3 million for a Western Hemisphere regional program.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States.
Ten Latin American ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama participate in the CSI program. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Megaports Initiative, a program which involves deploying radiation detection equipment in order to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. To date, the Megaports Initiative is operational in ports in the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units that facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. To date, TTUs have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Mexico.
The United States also works closely with the governments of the tri-border area - Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay - through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,” established in 2002 to serve as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries. Argentina hosted the fifth plenary session of the 3+1 mechanism in December 2006 that focused on such issues as early warning among states, information exchange in order to prevent illegal activity, and the denial of refuge to those who finance, plan, or commit acts of terrorism.
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States.
At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.”
In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated effort of the of the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE meeting, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which pledged to strengthen hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures.
At the February 2005 CICTE session held in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation against terrorism and addressed threats to aviation, seaport, and cyber security. CICTE’s seventh regular session in Panama in February/March 2007 focused on the protection of critical infrastructure in the region. In March 2008, CICTE’s eighth regular session held in Washington D.C. focused on cyber security, document security and fraud prevention, and port security. CICTE’s ninth regular session held in Washington, D.C. in March 2009 focused on the topic of strengthening border controls. CICTE’s 10th regular session is planned for March 17-19, 2010, in Washington, DC; a featured topic on the agenda is public private partnerships in the fight against terrorism.
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005, the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS.
Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years, attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United States.
The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the United States has about them. The United States has included Cuba on its list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.
The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State, including: an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, a Counterterrorism Financing (CTF) program, and a Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). All the programs are funded through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) foreign aid funding account.
The largest of these program is the ATA program that over the years has provided training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing.
Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $9.1 million in FY2008 and an estimated $9.3 million in FY2009. For FY2010, the Administration requested $16.4 million for Latin American countries, with $6 million for Mexico, $4.4 million for Colombia, and $6 million for assistance to other countries through a regional program. The FY2010 budget request states that ATA assistance for Central and South America enhances border control and provides fraudulent document training.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $7.1 million in EXBS assistance in FY2008 and an estimated $2.1 million in FY2009. The FY2010 request is for $2.9 million for assistance to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and a regional program.
CTF assistance provides support in detecting, isolating, and dismantling terrorist financial networks. No CTF assistance was provided for Latin America in FY2008, while in FY2009, an estimated $225,000 was provided. The FY2010 request is for $875,000, with assistance for Mexico, Colombia, and a regional program.
TIP assistance helps foreign immigration authorities with a computer database system that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land or sea ports of entry. No assistance was provided to the region in FY2008 or FY2009, but for FY2010 the Administration requested $1.3 million for a Western Hemisphere regional program.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States.
Ten Latin American ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama participate in the CSI program. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Megaports Initiative, a program which involves deploying radiation detection equipment in order to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. To date, the Megaports Initiative is operational in ports in the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units that facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. To date, TTUs have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Mexico.
The United States also works closely with the governments of the tri-border area - Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay - through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,” established in 2002 to serve as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries. Argentina hosted the fifth plenary session of the 3+1 mechanism in December 2006 that focused on such issues as early warning among states, information exchange in order to prevent illegal activity, and the denial of refuge to those who finance, plan, or commit acts of terrorism.
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States.
At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.”
In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated effort of the of the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE meeting, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which pledged to strengthen hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures.
At the February 2005 CICTE session held in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation against terrorism and addressed threats to aviation, seaport, and cyber security. CICTE’s seventh regular session in Panama in February/March 2007 focused on the protection of critical infrastructure in the region. In March 2008, CICTE’s eighth regular session held in Washington D.C. focused on cyber security, document security and fraud prevention, and port security. CICTE’s ninth regular session held in Washington, D.C. in March 2009 focused on the topic of strengthening border controls. CICTE’s 10th regular session is planned for March 17-19, 2010, in Washington, DC; a featured topic on the agenda is public private partnerships in the fight against terrorism.
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005, the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
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Terrorism In Latin America
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America has intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation.
In its April 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which triggers a number of economic sanctions.
Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. The State Department terrorism report noted, however, that President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America.
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Concerns about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America center on the country’s ties to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks in Argentina.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410 (Berman), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision calling for a report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 17, 2009, the House approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among other provisions, condemns the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and urges Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (Levin), which included reporting requirements on Venezuela and Cuba, but the provisions were not included in the final enacted measure.
Other introduced measures include H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba; H.R. 2272 (Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list; and H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2009 report maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by “corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, but noted that some other countries “lacked urgency and resolve to address counterterrorism deficiencies.” It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The ELN has a dwindling membership of about 2,000 fighters and reduced offensive capability, but has inflicted casualties through the increased use of land mines and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking.
Peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government remain stalled. With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC renegades continued to engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the terrorism report. According to the report, the Colombian government continued to process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes and return all illicit profits.
The FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s military campaign against it, including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation rescued 15 long-held hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors held since February 2003: Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; and other Colombians. In addition, according to the State Department’s terrorism report, Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders in 2008 and reduced the amount of territory where the FARC could freely operate. Desertions among FARC members also increased in 2008 to more than 3,000 compared to almost 2,500 in 2007.
Nevertheless, the FARC has continued tactical-level terrorist activities, kidnapping for profit (including the holding of 24 “high value” political hostages and hundreds of other kidnap victims), and narcotrafficking activities. The group launched several bombings against civilian and military targets in urban areas and targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and political opponents in dozens of attacks.
Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors, according to the State Department terrorism report. The FARC uses Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training in addition to coca processing and limited planting and production. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia remain tense in the aftermath of Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory, Ecuador’s military has increased the number of operations against the FARC in its northern border region.
Both the FARC and the ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. According to the terrorism report, the Venezuelan government did not systematically police the country’s 1,400-mile border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Moreover, limited amounts of weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, reportedly have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
In September 2008, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of he FARC. In Panama, the terrorism report maintained that the FARC was active in Panama’s Darien province and was reported to have entered several villages in order to steal supplies. Panama’s Public Forces were reported to closely monitor the FARC’s activities and have captured several FARC members. With regard to Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison.
According to the current State Department terrorism report, there are two SL remnants in Peru operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley, which combined were reported to have several hundred armed combatants. Both groups engage in drug trafficking and carried out 64 terrorist acts in 2008, with 31 people killed, including four civilians.
As noted above, the FARC was reported was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department terrorism report, experts contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
Cuba
Since 1982, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism (the other states currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The language in the State Department’s terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.”
While the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.
The terrorism report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also asserts that the Cuban government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006. Most of the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled until February 2010 in order to give him time to prepare his defense. Press reports maintain that Posada is also being investigated by a grand jury in New Jersey for his role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.1
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), introduced May 6, 2009, has a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list.
Venezuela
Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a result, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Eritrea , Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)
The State Department’s annual terrorism report maintained that while Venezuela President Hugo Chávez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the ELN had limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism, President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America. In July 2008, the Venezuelan military detained a senior FARC official and handed him over to Colombian authorities. Nevertheless, in September 2008, the Treasury Department designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for assisting the FARC’s drug trafficking activities.
As noted above, the State Department terrorism report stated that the FARC, ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The Venezuelan government also did not systematically police its country’s border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Some limited amounts of weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities were reported to have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
The State Department terrorism report also cited two other concerns about Venezuela. First, as noted in the past, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Second, the report noted that passengers on weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas.
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. One reason for the concern is Iran’s ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is reported to have been linked to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. In June 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing cooperation with Iran.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within 90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. The provision cited the State Department’s 2008 terrorism report that noted the passengers on the weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to only cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin), with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.
Several other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, includes a provision identical to that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October 27, 2009, would call on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of its alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
NOTES:
1 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007; Jay Weaver, “U.S.Probes Haunt 80-year Old Anti-Castro Cuban,” Houston Chronicle, March 2, 2008; Jay Weaver, “Posada Gets More Time for Perjury Defense,” Miami Herald, June 16, 2009.
In its April 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which triggers a number of economic sanctions.
Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. The State Department terrorism report noted, however, that President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America.
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Concerns about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America center on the country’s ties to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks in Argentina.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410 (Berman), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision calling for a report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 17, 2009, the House approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among other provisions, condemns the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and urges Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (Levin), which included reporting requirements on Venezuela and Cuba, but the provisions were not included in the final enacted measure.
Other introduced measures include H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba; H.R. 2272 (Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list; and H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2009 report maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by “corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, but noted that some other countries “lacked urgency and resolve to address counterterrorism deficiencies.” It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The ELN has a dwindling membership of about 2,000 fighters and reduced offensive capability, but has inflicted casualties through the increased use of land mines and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking.
Peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government remain stalled. With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC renegades continued to engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the terrorism report. According to the report, the Colombian government continued to process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes and return all illicit profits.
The FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s military campaign against it, including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation rescued 15 long-held hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors held since February 2003: Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; and other Colombians. In addition, according to the State Department’s terrorism report, Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders in 2008 and reduced the amount of territory where the FARC could freely operate. Desertions among FARC members also increased in 2008 to more than 3,000 compared to almost 2,500 in 2007.
Nevertheless, the FARC has continued tactical-level terrorist activities, kidnapping for profit (including the holding of 24 “high value” political hostages and hundreds of other kidnap victims), and narcotrafficking activities. The group launched several bombings against civilian and military targets in urban areas and targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and political opponents in dozens of attacks.
Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors, according to the State Department terrorism report. The FARC uses Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training in addition to coca processing and limited planting and production. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia remain tense in the aftermath of Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory, Ecuador’s military has increased the number of operations against the FARC in its northern border region.
Both the FARC and the ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. According to the terrorism report, the Venezuelan government did not systematically police the country’s 1,400-mile border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Moreover, limited amounts of weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, reportedly have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
In September 2008, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of he FARC. In Panama, the terrorism report maintained that the FARC was active in Panama’s Darien province and was reported to have entered several villages in order to steal supplies. Panama’s Public Forces were reported to closely monitor the FARC’s activities and have captured several FARC members. With regard to Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison.
According to the current State Department terrorism report, there are two SL remnants in Peru operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley, which combined were reported to have several hundred armed combatants. Both groups engage in drug trafficking and carried out 64 terrorist acts in 2008, with 31 people killed, including four civilians.
As noted above, the FARC was reported was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department terrorism report, experts contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
Cuba
Since 1982, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism (the other states currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The language in the State Department’s terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.”
While the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.
The terrorism report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also asserts that the Cuban government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006. Most of the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled until February 2010 in order to give him time to prepare his defense. Press reports maintain that Posada is also being investigated by a grand jury in New Jersey for his role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.1
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), introduced May 6, 2009, has a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list.
Venezuela
Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a result, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Eritrea , Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)
The State Department’s annual terrorism report maintained that while Venezuela President Hugo Chávez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the ELN had limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism, President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America. In July 2008, the Venezuelan military detained a senior FARC official and handed him over to Colombian authorities. Nevertheless, in September 2008, the Treasury Department designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for assisting the FARC’s drug trafficking activities.
As noted above, the State Department terrorism report stated that the FARC, ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The Venezuelan government also did not systematically police its country’s border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Some limited amounts of weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities were reported to have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
The State Department terrorism report also cited two other concerns about Venezuela. First, as noted in the past, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Second, the report noted that passengers on weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas.
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. One reason for the concern is Iran’s ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is reported to have been linked to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. In June 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing cooperation with Iran.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within 90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. The provision cited the State Department’s 2008 terrorism report that noted the passengers on the weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to only cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin), with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.
Several other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, includes a provision identical to that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October 27, 2009, would call on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of its alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
NOTES:
1 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007; Jay Weaver, “U.S.Probes Haunt 80-year Old Anti-Castro Cuban,” Houston Chronicle, March 2, 2008; Jay Weaver, “Posada Gets More Time for Perjury Defense,” Miami Herald, June 16, 2009.
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Exchange Rates Are Important Determinant Of Latin America's Economic Performance
The Center for Economic and Policy Research released a new paper Thursday, coinciding with the IMF/Word Bank Spring Meetings, analyzing the history of exchange rate policy as the region has become more financially globalized.
"This paper indicates that developing countries need to manage their real exchange rate, preferably to keep it stable and competitive," said Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director of CEPR. "The IMF should consider this analysis as it continues the rethinking of macroeconomic policy that it has recently begun."
A recent IMF Staff Position Note co-authored by IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard argues that "Central banks in small open economies should openly recognize that exchange rate stability is part of their objective function."
The CEPR paper, "A Concise History of Exchange Rate Regimes In Latin America," was written by CEPR Senior Research Associate Roberto Frenkel, and Martin Rapetti of the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), an Argentine think tank.
The authors analyze the experience of the major Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru and others in the post-World-War period, up to the crisis caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble.
They find that an overvalued real exchange rate can lead to disastrous outcomes for short and intermediate term growth, as happened in the Southern Cone countries in the 1970s as well as Argentina in the late 1990s.
On the other hand, some of the most successful growth experiences in Latin America have occurred under governments that targeted a stable and competitive exchange rate: the Brazilian "economic miracle" beginning in the late 1960s, Chile in the mid-1980s and mid-90s, Argentina and Colombia between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and Argentina from 2002-2008.
The authors provide a detailed historical analysis that takes into account the most important economic events that helped determine exchange rate policy, and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the various exchange rate regimes, and their impact on outcomes including economic growth and inflation.
"This paper indicates that developing countries need to manage their real exchange rate, preferably to keep it stable and competitive," said Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director of CEPR. "The IMF should consider this analysis as it continues the rethinking of macroeconomic policy that it has recently begun."
A recent IMF Staff Position Note co-authored by IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard argues that "Central banks in small open economies should openly recognize that exchange rate stability is part of their objective function."
The CEPR paper, "A Concise History of Exchange Rate Regimes In Latin America," was written by CEPR Senior Research Associate Roberto Frenkel, and Martin Rapetti of the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), an Argentine think tank.
The authors analyze the experience of the major Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru and others in the post-World-War period, up to the crisis caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble.
They find that an overvalued real exchange rate can lead to disastrous outcomes for short and intermediate term growth, as happened in the Southern Cone countries in the 1970s as well as Argentina in the late 1990s.
On the other hand, some of the most successful growth experiences in Latin America have occurred under governments that targeted a stable and competitive exchange rate: the Brazilian "economic miracle" beginning in the late 1960s, Chile in the mid-1980s and mid-90s, Argentina and Colombia between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and Argentina from 2002-2008.
The authors provide a detailed historical analysis that takes into account the most important economic events that helped determine exchange rate policy, and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the various exchange rate regimes, and their impact on outcomes including economic growth and inflation.
Thursday, April 22, 2010 |
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Argentine Communities Take On Mega-Mining
By Juan Nicastro
For the past seven years, the residents of Esquel, a verdant, picturesque town in Argentine Patagonia, have fought large-scale mining.
In 2003, residents in the Chubut province town fought off a massive gold mine by Meridian Gold, through protest and a popular consultation, fearing damage to their soils and water sources from the mine.
Esquel´s community groups have now teamed up with similar organizations around the country to defend biodiversity, food sovereignty and quality of life from large-scale industrial projects.
The Citizens´ Assemblies Union, an umbrella group composed of community organizations from around Argentina, met in Esquel March 26-28 to debate and strategize how best to defend their values from a largely extractive economic model.
These meetings, held every three months, were first launched in the central city of Córdoba in 2006, and were focused on fighting large-scale mining, cellulose pulping plants and the production of genetically-modified soy.
But their heralded advances are sometimes clipped by the government.
Since 2003, the provincial governments of seven Argentine provinces – Chubut, Río Negro, Mendoza, Tucumán, La Pampa, San Luis and Córdoba – passed laws against large-scale mining. Several state universities decided to reject funding from mining companies.
But in 2008, President Cristina Fernández vetoed a law protecting the country´s glaciers, a piece of legislation that had been approved unanimously by Congress. She argued that the law “could affect economic growth.” In April 2009, Fernández received Barrick Gold´s founder Peter Munk and its president, Aaron Regent, and days later they signed an agreement opening the door for the massive Pascua Lama project, which straddles the icy Argentine-Chilean border. The company says the mine holds 17.8 million ounces of gold and will begin production in 2013.
Mining and other industry
This austral summer, the news was up in Andalgala, in the northern province of Catamarca, where police answered to protests against the Agua Rica gold-copper mine with rubber bullets and arrests.
Community assembly members however, have maintained a block on the project until a popular consultation scheduled for May.
There has also been increasingly vocal and organized opposition to transgenic soy in Argentina´s central provinces. Under the slogan “Stop Fumigating,” dozens of community groups, many of them members of the Citizens´ Assemblies Union, have won court orders against agrotoxins, such as the town of San Jorge in Santa Fe province last December. Some towns in the Córdoba province, including Villa Ciudad Parque, Villa General Belgrano, Amboy, Mendiolaza and San Francisco, have established legal bans against their use.
A place for action, reflection
According to Pablo Quintana, of the Esquel community assembly, the Citizens´ Assemblies Union aims to find production and energy alternatives. The group, which includes members from Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, has no ties to the government or corporations.
At the meeting in Esquel, participants agreed to increase region-wide campaigns and citizens´ actions and push for legislation that favors indigenous and campesino citizens.
“Mining activity run by large transnational companies in alliance with the state and different provincial governments is trying to spread from the north of the country down to Patagonia,” said sociologist Maristella Svampa, co-author of the book Transnational Mining: Narratives of Development and Social Resistance, which explores “new mechanisms of expropriation and domination” and ways to fight these trends.
“We´re trying to bring a real discussion into the fray ... about the levels and senses that the word ´development´ means today.”
Source: Latinamerica Press.
For the past seven years, the residents of Esquel, a verdant, picturesque town in Argentine Patagonia, have fought large-scale mining.
In 2003, residents in the Chubut province town fought off a massive gold mine by Meridian Gold, through protest and a popular consultation, fearing damage to their soils and water sources from the mine.
Esquel´s community groups have now teamed up with similar organizations around the country to defend biodiversity, food sovereignty and quality of life from large-scale industrial projects.
The Citizens´ Assemblies Union, an umbrella group composed of community organizations from around Argentina, met in Esquel March 26-28 to debate and strategize how best to defend their values from a largely extractive economic model.
These meetings, held every three months, were first launched in the central city of Córdoba in 2006, and were focused on fighting large-scale mining, cellulose pulping plants and the production of genetically-modified soy.
But their heralded advances are sometimes clipped by the government.
Since 2003, the provincial governments of seven Argentine provinces – Chubut, Río Negro, Mendoza, Tucumán, La Pampa, San Luis and Córdoba – passed laws against large-scale mining. Several state universities decided to reject funding from mining companies.
But in 2008, President Cristina Fernández vetoed a law protecting the country´s glaciers, a piece of legislation that had been approved unanimously by Congress. She argued that the law “could affect economic growth.” In April 2009, Fernández received Barrick Gold´s founder Peter Munk and its president, Aaron Regent, and days later they signed an agreement opening the door for the massive Pascua Lama project, which straddles the icy Argentine-Chilean border. The company says the mine holds 17.8 million ounces of gold and will begin production in 2013.
Mining and other industry
This austral summer, the news was up in Andalgala, in the northern province of Catamarca, where police answered to protests against the Agua Rica gold-copper mine with rubber bullets and arrests.
Community assembly members however, have maintained a block on the project until a popular consultation scheduled for May.
There has also been increasingly vocal and organized opposition to transgenic soy in Argentina´s central provinces. Under the slogan “Stop Fumigating,” dozens of community groups, many of them members of the Citizens´ Assemblies Union, have won court orders against agrotoxins, such as the town of San Jorge in Santa Fe province last December. Some towns in the Córdoba province, including Villa Ciudad Parque, Villa General Belgrano, Amboy, Mendiolaza and San Francisco, have established legal bans against their use.
A place for action, reflection
According to Pablo Quintana, of the Esquel community assembly, the Citizens´ Assemblies Union aims to find production and energy alternatives. The group, which includes members from Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, has no ties to the government or corporations.
At the meeting in Esquel, participants agreed to increase region-wide campaigns and citizens´ actions and push for legislation that favors indigenous and campesino citizens.
“Mining activity run by large transnational companies in alliance with the state and different provincial governments is trying to spread from the north of the country down to Patagonia,” said sociologist Maristella Svampa, co-author of the book Transnational Mining: Narratives of Development and Social Resistance, which explores “new mechanisms of expropriation and domination” and ways to fight these trends.
“We´re trying to bring a real discussion into the fray ... about the levels and senses that the word ´development´ means today.”
Source: Latinamerica Press.
Sunday, April 18, 2010 |
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Russia, Argentina Sign New Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
Russia and Argentina have signed their third nuclear energy cooperation agreement in 18 months, covering the possible construction of Russian-designed nuclear reactors and the development of fuel cycle facilities in Argentina.
Rosatom head Sergei Kiryenko signed the agreement with Argentina's federal planning minister Julio de Vido during an official visit by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to Argentina. The agreement follows on from a memorandum of understanding on the peaceful uses of atomic energy signed by Rosatom and Argentina's Ministry of Federal Planning, Investment and Service in February, and a joint statement signed in December 2008. The two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1990.
According to Rosatom, the latest agreement expresses its willingness to act as a partner in designing and building nuclear power plants in Argentina based on Russian VVER pressurized water reactors, plus fuel supplies. For its part, the Argentinian ministry undertakes to consider the possibility of establishing various fuel cycle elements in the country, including development of domestic capacity for nuclear fuel fabrication.
In the wake of the meeting, Medvedev told reporters that Rosatom's entry into the Argentinian market would attract "billions" in investments in reactor building and infrastructure.
Argentina has two operating pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR), Atucha 1 and Embalse. Construction work was suspended on the 81%-complete Atucha 2, a German-designed PHWR like Atucha 1, in 1994, but was resumed in 2006, and the unit is scheduled for operation in 2011.
However, Russia is not the only country that Argentina is talking to about a possible fourth nuclear unit. De Vido has been holding discussions with companies and officials from countries including Canada, South Korea, and France as well as Russia, and only days before he signed the agreement with Rosatom, held meetings in Washington with Westinghouse executives to discuss the possible construction of a third unit at Atucha. In the wake of that meeting, de Vido's ministry website reported that significant progress had been made towards cooperation with Westinghouse, and that Westinghouse representatives would visit Argentina in June to continue outlining possible collaborations.
Argentina has some fuel cycle facilities of its own, including a small domestic uranium mining industry, capable of milling up to 150 t/year, a 60 t/year conversion plant and fuel fabrication facilities able to produce fuel for both of the Argentinian reactor types. The country aims to make nuclear power part of an expansion of generating capacity to meet rising demand, and in late 2009 announced plans to build a prototype of its own CAREM simplified pressurised water design in the north-west of the country.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Rosatom head Sergei Kiryenko signed the agreement with Argentina's federal planning minister Julio de Vido during an official visit by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to Argentina. The agreement follows on from a memorandum of understanding on the peaceful uses of atomic energy signed by Rosatom and Argentina's Ministry of Federal Planning, Investment and Service in February, and a joint statement signed in December 2008. The two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1990.
According to Rosatom, the latest agreement expresses its willingness to act as a partner in designing and building nuclear power plants in Argentina based on Russian VVER pressurized water reactors, plus fuel supplies. For its part, the Argentinian ministry undertakes to consider the possibility of establishing various fuel cycle elements in the country, including development of domestic capacity for nuclear fuel fabrication.
In the wake of the meeting, Medvedev told reporters that Rosatom's entry into the Argentinian market would attract "billions" in investments in reactor building and infrastructure.
Argentina has two operating pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR), Atucha 1 and Embalse. Construction work was suspended on the 81%-complete Atucha 2, a German-designed PHWR like Atucha 1, in 1994, but was resumed in 2006, and the unit is scheduled for operation in 2011.
However, Russia is not the only country that Argentina is talking to about a possible fourth nuclear unit. De Vido has been holding discussions with companies and officials from countries including Canada, South Korea, and France as well as Russia, and only days before he signed the agreement with Rosatom, held meetings in Washington with Westinghouse executives to discuss the possible construction of a third unit at Atucha. In the wake of that meeting, de Vido's ministry website reported that significant progress had been made towards cooperation with Westinghouse, and that Westinghouse representatives would visit Argentina in June to continue outlining possible collaborations.
Argentina has some fuel cycle facilities of its own, including a small domestic uranium mining industry, capable of milling up to 150 t/year, a 60 t/year conversion plant and fuel fabrication facilities able to produce fuel for both of the Argentinian reactor types. The country aims to make nuclear power part of an expansion of generating capacity to meet rising demand, and in late 2009 announced plans to build a prototype of its own CAREM simplified pressurised water design in the north-west of the country.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Friday, April 16, 2010 |
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Will Obama's Betrayal Of Britain Cause Second Falklands War?
By Daniel Greenfield
While the lion's share of the attention over the last two weeks has been drawn by the Obama Administration's political campaign against Israel on behalf of Arab-Islamic terrorists, there are worrying developments arising out of the Falkland Islands, which threaten a repeat of the original Falklands War.
The latest wrangling over the Falkland Islands erupted as oil resources near the islands have once again made them a tempting target for Argentina. Yet last month, the Obama Administration could have easily averted the growing crisis by staking out a position on the side of England, America's formerly closest ally. A country whose help is needed in Afghanistan, and whose government could have used a boost after being repeatedly undermined by Obama. Instead the Obama Administration staked out a neutral position, which in the context of geopolitics was a statement that Britain was on its own.
While Obama could have easily put a stop to the escalating crisis by stating clearly that the United States was prepared to back England, just as England had backed the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq-- his declaration of neutrality emboldened left wing Latin American leaders like Hugo Chavez to jump into the fight on Argentina's side. In her meeting with left wing Argentinian President Christina Kirchner, Hillary Clinton could have quietly pressed her to back down. Instead Clinton endorsed a call for talks in order to resolve the status of the Falkland Islands. Which actually moved the United States away from supporting neutrality, and toward supporting the Argentinian position.
The entire matter may seem like a tempest in a teapot to many Americans, but it's actually quite important for a number of reasons.
Christina Kirchner or "Queen Christina" is another one of Chavez's puppets. Two years ago Franklin Duran was convicted of serving as an illegal agent for Chavez's government as part of an attempt to silence Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson, who had tried to relay a suitcase with 800,000 dollars from Chavez to Kirchner's election campaign. The entire incident was heavily tied to the oil industries in Venezuela, Argentina and Chavez's own oil ambitions.
If Chavez and Kirchner can take the Falklands from England, there is a great deal of oil and power in it for them. Under the waters around the Falkland Islands there may be as much as 60 billion barrels of oil. That's almost as three times as much as the oil reserves of the United States. It's more than Libya and Qatar have put together. And it is over 80 percent as large as Venezuela's own hefty oil reserves.
And both Chavez and Kirchner need it. Argentina's debt has risen under Kirchner, and Chavez's hook into Argentina depended on his offer to refinance Argentina's debt on favorable terms. Chavez got access to Argentina and the corrupt Kirchners got an economic savior. But Argentina's economy continues to head downhill and Chavez's influence building is proving to be expensive. Forcing England out of the Falklands would bring him one step closer to a vision of a Latin American OPEC under his control. But losing Kirchner would be a fatal blow to his tenuous Latin American coalition.
And Kirchner has become wildly unpopular in Argentina. And it will take a good deal more than a suitcase with 800,000 dollars to save her. A second successful Falklands war however might do the trick. It might also backfire badly. And while Chavez hates America, he isn't a fool. Which means that if the Obama Administration had sent a clear signal that it would back the UK, the entire affair would have evaporated in a puff of angry rhetoric and fitful lawfare. But that is now less likely to happen than ever. And Obama and Hillary Clinton are to blame for it.
Chavez warned England, "Be sure that the Argentine homeland is not alone, because it is also our homeland." The British government in turn has warned that it will do whatever is necessary to protect the Falklands and dispatched the HMS Spectre, a nuclear powered submarine to the region, in order to protect its shipping and interests, and avert any thoughts of a second surprise Argentine invasion. But while the idea of an Argentinian-Venezuelan war with England might seem a non-starter the second time around, this time Argentina will not only enjoy Latin-American backing, but Russian backing as well.
The Russians have turned Chavez into the new Castro, and Venezuela into the new Cuba, pouring money into it, and helping Chavez buy influence and radicalize the region. Chavez's plans originate from Moscow, much as Nasser's once did. And Venezuelan agents like Franklin Duran, actually began their careers in bed with the Russians. If war does come, the invasion forces will not be flying old Mirages the way they were in the original Falklands War, but they will have top of the line Russian equipment.
In light of this, the Obama Administration's failure to checkmate Putin, Kirchner and Chavez veer on the downright treasonous. Because a Second Falklands War would not only cost the lives of British soldiers, but the lives of American soldiers as well. Whether a Second Falklands War takes place or does not take place, the UK will be forced to divert military resources to coping with the threat. Which means there will be a further strain on the British military, and its ability to offer any assistance in Afghanistan, at a time when a crucial campaign to break the Taliban is underway.
The loss of British support will further undermine our ability to win in Afghanistan. It may well cost American lives. Yet when Hillary Clinton met with Christina Kirchner, she didn't yell at her or berate her, as she did Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Instead she backed her call for negotiations and agreed to have the United States serve as an intermediary. Which was as good as selling England down the river. England naturally rejected the call for meditation, but the damage had already been done.
The Obama Administration has made it clear that despite the presence of thousands of Britons on the islands, they consider the status of the islands open to negotiation. The fact that the Chavez axis is fundamentally hostile to America and American interests and represents a Russian wedge in the hemisphere, means that the Obama Administration once again has sold out an ally at the expense of an enemy.
The Kirchner government celebrated Hillary Clinton's agreement to its proposal for negotiations. As it should. And to understand how grave Obama's betrayal of Britain was, just read their statements.
If Chavez and his allies get their hands on the Falklands oil, it will increase his leverage and power base. It will also inevitably raise the price of oil, which will further damage the US economy. That money will then be used to fuel terror in Columbia and raise up more Marxist regimes in Latin America. It will of course also be used to expand the Islamic-Marxist Red-Green alliance with countries such as Iran.
Meanwhile the British who did stand by the US after 9/11 in the War on Terror have now been left out in the cold by an Obama Administration that prefers to seek solidarity with America's enemies, rather than its allies. And now Britain, like Israel, is discovering just how far the radical in the White House will go to sell out to the free world to its enemies.
Daniel Greenfield is a columnist born in Israel and currently living in New York City. He is a contributing editor at Family Security Matters and writes a daily blog column on Islamic Terrorism, Israeli and American politics and Europe's own clash of civilizations which can be found at Sultanknish.blogspot.com.
While the lion's share of the attention over the last two weeks has been drawn by the Obama Administration's political campaign against Israel on behalf of Arab-Islamic terrorists, there are worrying developments arising out of the Falkland Islands, which threaten a repeat of the original Falklands War.
The latest wrangling over the Falkland Islands erupted as oil resources near the islands have once again made them a tempting target for Argentina. Yet last month, the Obama Administration could have easily averted the growing crisis by staking out a position on the side of England, America's formerly closest ally. A country whose help is needed in Afghanistan, and whose government could have used a boost after being repeatedly undermined by Obama. Instead the Obama Administration staked out a neutral position, which in the context of geopolitics was a statement that Britain was on its own.
While Obama could have easily put a stop to the escalating crisis by stating clearly that the United States was prepared to back England, just as England had backed the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq-- his declaration of neutrality emboldened left wing Latin American leaders like Hugo Chavez to jump into the fight on Argentina's side. In her meeting with left wing Argentinian President Christina Kirchner, Hillary Clinton could have quietly pressed her to back down. Instead Clinton endorsed a call for talks in order to resolve the status of the Falkland Islands. Which actually moved the United States away from supporting neutrality, and toward supporting the Argentinian position.
The entire matter may seem like a tempest in a teapot to many Americans, but it's actually quite important for a number of reasons.
Christina Kirchner or "Queen Christina" is another one of Chavez's puppets. Two years ago Franklin Duran was convicted of serving as an illegal agent for Chavez's government as part of an attempt to silence Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson, who had tried to relay a suitcase with 800,000 dollars from Chavez to Kirchner's election campaign. The entire incident was heavily tied to the oil industries in Venezuela, Argentina and Chavez's own oil ambitions.
If Chavez and Kirchner can take the Falklands from England, there is a great deal of oil and power in it for them. Under the waters around the Falkland Islands there may be as much as 60 billion barrels of oil. That's almost as three times as much as the oil reserves of the United States. It's more than Libya and Qatar have put together. And it is over 80 percent as large as Venezuela's own hefty oil reserves.
And both Chavez and Kirchner need it. Argentina's debt has risen under Kirchner, and Chavez's hook into Argentina depended on his offer to refinance Argentina's debt on favorable terms. Chavez got access to Argentina and the corrupt Kirchners got an economic savior. But Argentina's economy continues to head downhill and Chavez's influence building is proving to be expensive. Forcing England out of the Falklands would bring him one step closer to a vision of a Latin American OPEC under his control. But losing Kirchner would be a fatal blow to his tenuous Latin American coalition.
And Kirchner has become wildly unpopular in Argentina. And it will take a good deal more than a suitcase with 800,000 dollars to save her. A second successful Falklands war however might do the trick. It might also backfire badly. And while Chavez hates America, he isn't a fool. Which means that if the Obama Administration had sent a clear signal that it would back the UK, the entire affair would have evaporated in a puff of angry rhetoric and fitful lawfare. But that is now less likely to happen than ever. And Obama and Hillary Clinton are to blame for it.
Chavez warned England, "Be sure that the Argentine homeland is not alone, because it is also our homeland." The British government in turn has warned that it will do whatever is necessary to protect the Falklands and dispatched the HMS Spectre, a nuclear powered submarine to the region, in order to protect its shipping and interests, and avert any thoughts of a second surprise Argentine invasion. But while the idea of an Argentinian-Venezuelan war with England might seem a non-starter the second time around, this time Argentina will not only enjoy Latin-American backing, but Russian backing as well.
The Russians have turned Chavez into the new Castro, and Venezuela into the new Cuba, pouring money into it, and helping Chavez buy influence and radicalize the region. Chavez's plans originate from Moscow, much as Nasser's once did. And Venezuelan agents like Franklin Duran, actually began their careers in bed with the Russians. If war does come, the invasion forces will not be flying old Mirages the way they were in the original Falklands War, but they will have top of the line Russian equipment.
In light of this, the Obama Administration's failure to checkmate Putin, Kirchner and Chavez veer on the downright treasonous. Because a Second Falklands War would not only cost the lives of British soldiers, but the lives of American soldiers as well. Whether a Second Falklands War takes place or does not take place, the UK will be forced to divert military resources to coping with the threat. Which means there will be a further strain on the British military, and its ability to offer any assistance in Afghanistan, at a time when a crucial campaign to break the Taliban is underway.
The loss of British support will further undermine our ability to win in Afghanistan. It may well cost American lives. Yet when Hillary Clinton met with Christina Kirchner, she didn't yell at her or berate her, as she did Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Instead she backed her call for negotiations and agreed to have the United States serve as an intermediary. Which was as good as selling England down the river. England naturally rejected the call for meditation, but the damage had already been done.
The Obama Administration has made it clear that despite the presence of thousands of Britons on the islands, they consider the status of the islands open to negotiation. The fact that the Chavez axis is fundamentally hostile to America and American interests and represents a Russian wedge in the hemisphere, means that the Obama Administration once again has sold out an ally at the expense of an enemy.
The Kirchner government celebrated Hillary Clinton's agreement to its proposal for negotiations. As it should. And to understand how grave Obama's betrayal of Britain was, just read their statements.
Héctor Timerman, the Argentine Ambassador to the US, said he had never seen “such substantial support” from Washington for his country’s claim. Mrs Clinton had not only offered to mediate but had also signalled that talks should be in line with existing UN resolutions, he insisted, referring to non-binding UN General Assembly resolutions from the 1970s that urge both sides to negotiate.
Ruperto Godoy, the official Argentine government spokesman on the islands, said the new pressure from Mrs Clinton was “very significant, very important” and would help Buenos Aires to force Britain to the negotiating table.
If Chavez and his allies get their hands on the Falklands oil, it will increase his leverage and power base. It will also inevitably raise the price of oil, which will further damage the US economy. That money will then be used to fuel terror in Columbia and raise up more Marxist regimes in Latin America. It will of course also be used to expand the Islamic-Marxist Red-Green alliance with countries such as Iran.
Meanwhile the British who did stand by the US after 9/11 in the War on Terror have now been left out in the cold by an Obama Administration that prefers to seek solidarity with America's enemies, rather than its allies. And now Britain, like Israel, is discovering just how far the radical in the White House will go to sell out to the free world to its enemies.
Daniel Greenfield is a columnist born in Israel and currently living in New York City. He is a contributing editor at Family Security Matters and writes a daily blog column on Islamic Terrorism, Israeli and American politics and Europe's own clash of civilizations which can be found at Sultanknish.blogspot.com.
Thursday, March 18, 2010 |
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How Are South Ossetia And Abkhazia Any Different Than The Falklands?
By Andrei Fedyashin
Britain and Argentina have renewed their unhealthy diplomatic exchange over the ownership and sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, which Argentineans call the Malvinas.
Britain and Argentina waged a 70-odd day war over the islands in 1982. Now all self-proclaimed republics - both recognized and unrecognized - cite the Falklands to support their cause.
London claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were illegally torn from Georgia (along with their inhabitants), whereas the Falklands are legally British territory and are populated exclusively by British people.
Britain retains control of the islands and finds it very unpleasant when the Falklands question is raised because it reminds the world about Britain's complicated colonial past and the British about their glorious imperial past. But beyond this, the Falklands issue prevents the world from seeing Britain's position in the recent disputes over self-proclaimed republics - be they recognized or unrecognized - for what it is.
The Foreign Office's attitude can be summed up as follows: It would be great if the Falklands remained the property of the Crown, and it would be better still if nobody remembered that they exist.
Tensions between the countries flared up again when the British oil company Desire Petroleum started drilling exploration wells some 60 miles north of the archipelago's administrative center, Port Stanley.
Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner reacted immediately, denouncing the move as a violation of UN resolutions on the Malvinas/Falklands, which call on both countries to renew sovereignty negotiations and abstain from taking unilateral measures, and evidence of a lingering colonial attitude, among other things
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the U.K. were cut off after the Malvinas/Falklands War, but were renewed in the early 1990s.
According to geological surveys carried out in 1998, there could be 60 billion barrels of oil in the area around these southern islands. Desire Petroleum's own studies have confirmed close to three billion barrels of oil.
The Falklands issue is more than just a colonial anachronism. They are like an ulcer in today's global body politic, which has become inflamed again and again.
The ulcer is usually aggravated by one side in the Falklands dispute for internal political gains.
This time President Kirchner is responsible for the relapse. Kirchner faces a tough election next year, with Argentineans growing increasingly unhappy with the Kirchners (before Cristina, the president was her husband Nestor, who is currently his wife's chief adviser). Both Argentina's economy and Cristina's popularity have slumped, and there have been numerous scandals regarding the couple's questionable business deals.
Drawing public attention to the Malvinas was a primitive but effective move, as 80% of Argentineans think the islands have been taken from them illegally, which is actually true: the British snatched the islands from Argentina in 1833.
The Falklands resurfaced as a political issue in the spring of 1982 when Argentina declared that the Malvinas were Argentinean territory. Before that, many British people did not even know that they had a dependent territory so far from home.
The campaign for the return of all Argentinean land (the Argentineans also claim South Georgia some 1,200 miles east of the islands) was launched by Constantino Davidoff, an Argentinean scrap-metal merchant of Russian descent, who landed without permission at Leith on the island of South Georgia on December 20, 1981, and hoisted the Argentinean flag above the manager's house.
The British dispatched half of their Falklands garrison to South Georgia. Argentina responded by invading and occupying the islands.
Britain and Argentina fought a war over a territory located 14,000 miles from Britain and some 300 miles from Argentina. It was the most bizarre colonial war of the 20th century.
The war saved British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and ensured the political demise of Argentinean dictator Leopoldo Galtieri.
In 1982, Britain experienced a period of national revival and unity it had not seen since WWII. Thatcher's popularity, which had been hovering near zero, soared as a result of the Falklands War, which put an end to the military dictatorship in Argentina. But the restoration of democracy did not ease tensions.
The Falklands dispute is extremely complicated, but there is a solution. For decades now, British experts on international law have been calling it a 19th-century colonial relic. Britain must grow up and give back the islands, they say. The Falklands' sovereignty could be transferred to Argentina, which would then lease the islands to Britain.
This would satisfy Argentina's territorial claims, while also respecting the interests of the islands' population of British settlers.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article first appeared.
Britain and Argentina have renewed their unhealthy diplomatic exchange over the ownership and sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, which Argentineans call the Malvinas.
Britain and Argentina waged a 70-odd day war over the islands in 1982. Now all self-proclaimed republics - both recognized and unrecognized - cite the Falklands to support their cause.
London claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were illegally torn from Georgia (along with their inhabitants), whereas the Falklands are legally British territory and are populated exclusively by British people.
Britain retains control of the islands and finds it very unpleasant when the Falklands question is raised because it reminds the world about Britain's complicated colonial past and the British about their glorious imperial past. But beyond this, the Falklands issue prevents the world from seeing Britain's position in the recent disputes over self-proclaimed republics - be they recognized or unrecognized - for what it is.
The Foreign Office's attitude can be summed up as follows: It would be great if the Falklands remained the property of the Crown, and it would be better still if nobody remembered that they exist.
Tensions between the countries flared up again when the British oil company Desire Petroleum started drilling exploration wells some 60 miles north of the archipelago's administrative center, Port Stanley.
Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner reacted immediately, denouncing the move as a violation of UN resolutions on the Malvinas/Falklands, which call on both countries to renew sovereignty negotiations and abstain from taking unilateral measures, and evidence of a lingering colonial attitude, among other things
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the U.K. were cut off after the Malvinas/Falklands War, but were renewed in the early 1990s.
According to geological surveys carried out in 1998, there could be 60 billion barrels of oil in the area around these southern islands. Desire Petroleum's own studies have confirmed close to three billion barrels of oil.
The Falklands issue is more than just a colonial anachronism. They are like an ulcer in today's global body politic, which has become inflamed again and again.
The ulcer is usually aggravated by one side in the Falklands dispute for internal political gains.
This time President Kirchner is responsible for the relapse. Kirchner faces a tough election next year, with Argentineans growing increasingly unhappy with the Kirchners (before Cristina, the president was her husband Nestor, who is currently his wife's chief adviser). Both Argentina's economy and Cristina's popularity have slumped, and there have been numerous scandals regarding the couple's questionable business deals.
Drawing public attention to the Malvinas was a primitive but effective move, as 80% of Argentineans think the islands have been taken from them illegally, which is actually true: the British snatched the islands from Argentina in 1833.
The Falklands resurfaced as a political issue in the spring of 1982 when Argentina declared that the Malvinas were Argentinean territory. Before that, many British people did not even know that they had a dependent territory so far from home.
The campaign for the return of all Argentinean land (the Argentineans also claim South Georgia some 1,200 miles east of the islands) was launched by Constantino Davidoff, an Argentinean scrap-metal merchant of Russian descent, who landed without permission at Leith on the island of South Georgia on December 20, 1981, and hoisted the Argentinean flag above the manager's house.
The British dispatched half of their Falklands garrison to South Georgia. Argentina responded by invading and occupying the islands.
Britain and Argentina fought a war over a territory located 14,000 miles from Britain and some 300 miles from Argentina. It was the most bizarre colonial war of the 20th century.
The war saved British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and ensured the political demise of Argentinean dictator Leopoldo Galtieri.
In 1982, Britain experienced a period of national revival and unity it had not seen since WWII. Thatcher's popularity, which had been hovering near zero, soared as a result of the Falklands War, which put an end to the military dictatorship in Argentina. But the restoration of democracy did not ease tensions.
The Falklands dispute is extremely complicated, but there is a solution. For decades now, British experts on international law have been calling it a 19th-century colonial relic. Britain must grow up and give back the islands, they say. The Falklands' sovereignty could be transferred to Argentina, which would then lease the islands to Britain.
This would satisfy Argentina's territorial claims, while also respecting the interests of the islands' population of British settlers.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article first appeared.
Friday, March 05, 2010 |
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Argentina Seeks UN Help To Stop UK Plans To Drill Oil Off Falklands
Argentina's Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana late Wednesday met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to seek his mediation to stop a British plan to drill for oil off the coast of the Falkland Islands over which the two countries fought a war in 1982.
Taiana told reporters following the meeting that Ban is "not happy that the situation is worsening and is willing to continue his good offices Mission and we will let him do his job."
"It is illegal, against international law and contrary to the desire of the United Nations," Taiana said about the exploratory drilling that already started off the coast of the Islands, also known as the Malvinas.
"We will defend ourselves by every means given to us by diplomacy and international law," he added.
A UN official later told reporters that Ban took note of Argentina's concerns and expressed satisfaction at Argentina's commitment to resolving its dispute with the United Kingdom over the islands in a peaceful manner.
The official indicated, however, that Ban reiterated that his good offices are available when requested by "all" parties in a dispute.
In a statement distributed here, the British Mission to the UN said the UK has no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands.
"This position is underpinned by the principle of self-determination as set out in the UN Charter. We are also clear that the Falkland Islands Government is entitled to develop a hydrocarbons industry within its waters, and we support this legitimate business in Falklands' territory," the statement added.
The islands have been the subject of a territorial dispute, first between Britain and Spain, then between Britain and Argentina.
The UK asserted its claim to the islands by establishing a naval garrison there in 1833. Argentina invaded the islands in April 1982. The British responded with an expeditionary force that landed seven weeks later and after fierce fighting forced an Argentine surrender in June of the same year.
The Islands are in the South Atlantic Ocean, east of southern Argentina.
Source: KUNA
Taiana told reporters following the meeting that Ban is "not happy that the situation is worsening and is willing to continue his good offices Mission and we will let him do his job."
"It is illegal, against international law and contrary to the desire of the United Nations," Taiana said about the exploratory drilling that already started off the coast of the Islands, also known as the Malvinas.
"We will defend ourselves by every means given to us by diplomacy and international law," he added.
A UN official later told reporters that Ban took note of Argentina's concerns and expressed satisfaction at Argentina's commitment to resolving its dispute with the United Kingdom over the islands in a peaceful manner.
The official indicated, however, that Ban reiterated that his good offices are available when requested by "all" parties in a dispute.
In a statement distributed here, the British Mission to the UN said the UK has no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands.
"This position is underpinned by the principle of self-determination as set out in the UN Charter. We are also clear that the Falkland Islands Government is entitled to develop a hydrocarbons industry within its waters, and we support this legitimate business in Falklands' territory," the statement added.
The islands have been the subject of a territorial dispute, first between Britain and Spain, then between Britain and Argentina.
The UK asserted its claim to the islands by establishing a naval garrison there in 1833. Argentina invaded the islands in April 1982. The British responded with an expeditionary force that landed seven weeks later and after fierce fighting forced an Argentine surrender in June of the same year.
The Islands are in the South Atlantic Ocean, east of southern Argentina.
Source: KUNA
Thursday, February 25, 2010 |
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