Insurgent (Maoist?) Attack On Passenger Train
By B.Raman
At least 76 railway passengers are reported to have been killed in an incident attributed to the Maoists in the West Midnapore District of West Bengal on the morning of May 28,2010. The incident took place at around 1-30 AM at a place about 150 KMs from Kolkata.
The incident occurred when 13 coaches of a Super Deluxe Express train going from Howrah in Kolkata to Mumbai derailed. A goods train coming at the same time from the opposite direction hit five of the 13 derailed coaches.
It is clear the derailment was a criminal act, but the cause of the derailment, which led to the tragedy, is under investigation. The Railway Minister, Ms. Mamata Banerjee, blamed it on a "bomb blast" on the rail track while the West Bengal Police said it was an act of sabotage since fish plates were found removed from the railway track. The Union Home Minister, Shri P Chidamabaram said in New Delhi that the disaster appeared to be an act of sabotage, but it was not yet clear whether explosives were used to cause the derailment.
Ms.Mamta Banerjee has been quoted by sections of the media as saying that a patrol engine had passed through the disaster spot half an hour earlier. If so, it is not clear how it missed the explosive device if it had been planted on the track. If the claim that a patrol engine had passed over the track about 30 minutes before the derailment is correct, it would weaken the possibility of sabotage. Thirty minutes after the patrol engine had passed would have been insufficient for the perpetrators to remove the fish-plates from the track. The picture is not clear. It is important to keep an open mind while investigating the responsibility for the criminal act.
The present suspicion is that the Maoists must be responsible for the criminal act-----whether it was caused by an act of terrorism or an act of sabotage. The criminal act was committed in an area, where the Maoists have been active. The Maoists of the State have been observing a Black Week to protest against alleged atrocities by the security forces against them. Inspector-General of Police (Law and Order) Shri S. Karpurakayastha of the West Bengal Police was reported to have told the Press Trust of India (PTI) that the Maoist-backed People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) had left two posters near the rail track "clearly owning responsibility" for the derailment. However, a PCPA spokesman Shri Asit Mahato has denied the group's involvement.
The history of terrorism and insurgency in India has seen many attacks directed against railway transport---- against inter-city long-distance trains as well as against urban trains. The first anniversary in 1993 of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by a Hindu mob saw a number of explosions in railway trains allegedly caused by members of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Over the years there has been a number of attacks against railway transport in the rural areas allegedly carried out by the Maoists. The mass casualty attacks against some urban trains in Mumbai in July 2006, were allegedly the work of members of the Indian Mujahideen and/ or the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).
Generally, while the Maoists' preferred modus operandi has been to cause deaths by tampering with the railway track either by planting an explosive device or by removing the fish-plates, that of the jihadis----indigenous as well as Pakistan-sponsored--- has been to plant timed explosive devices inside railway coaches. The jihadis have more sanctuaries and sleeper cells in urban than in rural areas. The reverse is true in the case of the Maoists. Hence, the Maoists' tendency to attack rural than urban transport. Both the MO are followed by the insurgents and terrorists of the North-East.
The tragedy of May 28,2010, underlines weaknesses in our capability for protecting the railway infrastructure. The Mumbai July 2006 attacks were followed by measures to strengthen physical security in urban railway networks. Weaknesses in physical security in rural railway networks have been exploited by the perpetrators on May 28.
Protecting the rural inter-city railway traffic is a much more complex and difficult job than protecting urban traffic. How to strengthen the physical security for rural inter-city trains is a question which needs urgent attention. Anti-explosive checks inside trains, frequent foot patrolling and patrol car patrolling of the railway tracks are the normal security precautions already followed by the Railways and our security agencies. Can they be further strengthened and supplemented by other measures?
If the investigation establishes that the Maoists were responsible for the criminal act, it proves once again that they have become indifferent to the impact of their actions on the general public. Fears of public aversion to their acts are no longer a restraining factor on their activities. When the jihadis developed a similar indifference to public aversion some years ago, we were faced with an increase in their attacks on soft targets. We could face a similar increase in Maoist attacks on soft targets in rural areas and small towns.
The increasing attacks on soft targets in the rural areas and small towns would call for a new strategy aimed at the identification and targeted neutralization of the Maoist leadership. There is no other way of countering attacks on soft targets. Physical security, however strong, cannot guarantee total protection against attacks on soft targets.
The need for a two-pronged approach---- suitable political handling to address the grievances and anger of the tribals and other poor people who flock to the Maoist groups and a strong security response to the Maoist organizations and their leadership in order to make them give up violence or face neutralization--- remains valid even after what happened on May 28. But our sympathy for the grievances of the tribals and other poor people should not be allowed to come in the way of strong action against the Maoist organizations and their leadership. The initiative for evolving and implementing a suitable strategy has to come from the Government of India, with the co-operation of the affected States.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
At least 76 railway passengers are reported to have been killed in an incident attributed to the Maoists in the West Midnapore District of West Bengal on the morning of May 28,2010. The incident took place at around 1-30 AM at a place about 150 KMs from Kolkata.
The incident occurred when 13 coaches of a Super Deluxe Express train going from Howrah in Kolkata to Mumbai derailed. A goods train coming at the same time from the opposite direction hit five of the 13 derailed coaches.
It is clear the derailment was a criminal act, but the cause of the derailment, which led to the tragedy, is under investigation. The Railway Minister, Ms. Mamata Banerjee, blamed it on a "bomb blast" on the rail track while the West Bengal Police said it was an act of sabotage since fish plates were found removed from the railway track. The Union Home Minister, Shri P Chidamabaram said in New Delhi that the disaster appeared to be an act of sabotage, but it was not yet clear whether explosives were used to cause the derailment.
Ms.Mamta Banerjee has been quoted by sections of the media as saying that a patrol engine had passed through the disaster spot half an hour earlier. If so, it is not clear how it missed the explosive device if it had been planted on the track. If the claim that a patrol engine had passed over the track about 30 minutes before the derailment is correct, it would weaken the possibility of sabotage. Thirty minutes after the patrol engine had passed would have been insufficient for the perpetrators to remove the fish-plates from the track. The picture is not clear. It is important to keep an open mind while investigating the responsibility for the criminal act.
The present suspicion is that the Maoists must be responsible for the criminal act-----whether it was caused by an act of terrorism or an act of sabotage. The criminal act was committed in an area, where the Maoists have been active. The Maoists of the State have been observing a Black Week to protest against alleged atrocities by the security forces against them. Inspector-General of Police (Law and Order) Shri S. Karpurakayastha of the West Bengal Police was reported to have told the Press Trust of India (PTI) that the Maoist-backed People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) had left two posters near the rail track "clearly owning responsibility" for the derailment. However, a PCPA spokesman Shri Asit Mahato has denied the group's involvement.
The history of terrorism and insurgency in India has seen many attacks directed against railway transport---- against inter-city long-distance trains as well as against urban trains. The first anniversary in 1993 of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by a Hindu mob saw a number of explosions in railway trains allegedly caused by members of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Over the years there has been a number of attacks against railway transport in the rural areas allegedly carried out by the Maoists. The mass casualty attacks against some urban trains in Mumbai in July 2006, were allegedly the work of members of the Indian Mujahideen and/ or the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).
Generally, while the Maoists' preferred modus operandi has been to cause deaths by tampering with the railway track either by planting an explosive device or by removing the fish-plates, that of the jihadis----indigenous as well as Pakistan-sponsored--- has been to plant timed explosive devices inside railway coaches. The jihadis have more sanctuaries and sleeper cells in urban than in rural areas. The reverse is true in the case of the Maoists. Hence, the Maoists' tendency to attack rural than urban transport. Both the MO are followed by the insurgents and terrorists of the North-East.
The tragedy of May 28,2010, underlines weaknesses in our capability for protecting the railway infrastructure. The Mumbai July 2006 attacks were followed by measures to strengthen physical security in urban railway networks. Weaknesses in physical security in rural railway networks have been exploited by the perpetrators on May 28.
Protecting the rural inter-city railway traffic is a much more complex and difficult job than protecting urban traffic. How to strengthen the physical security for rural inter-city trains is a question which needs urgent attention. Anti-explosive checks inside trains, frequent foot patrolling and patrol car patrolling of the railway tracks are the normal security precautions already followed by the Railways and our security agencies. Can they be further strengthened and supplemented by other measures?
If the investigation establishes that the Maoists were responsible for the criminal act, it proves once again that they have become indifferent to the impact of their actions on the general public. Fears of public aversion to their acts are no longer a restraining factor on their activities. When the jihadis developed a similar indifference to public aversion some years ago, we were faced with an increase in their attacks on soft targets. We could face a similar increase in Maoist attacks on soft targets in rural areas and small towns.
The increasing attacks on soft targets in the rural areas and small towns would call for a new strategy aimed at the identification and targeted neutralization of the Maoist leadership. There is no other way of countering attacks on soft targets. Physical security, however strong, cannot guarantee total protection against attacks on soft targets.
The need for a two-pronged approach---- suitable political handling to address the grievances and anger of the tribals and other poor people who flock to the Maoist groups and a strong security response to the Maoist organizations and their leadership in order to make them give up violence or face neutralization--- remains valid even after what happened on May 28. But our sympathy for the grievances of the tribals and other poor people should not be allowed to come in the way of strong action against the Maoist organizations and their leadership. The initiative for evolving and implementing a suitable strategy has to come from the Government of India, with the co-operation of the affected States.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Sunday, May 30, 2010 |
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Intelligence: No More Co-Ordination Czar?
By B. Raman
The Times of India has reported (May 28,2010) that the Government of India is contemplating the setting up under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) of a coordination committee on all matters concerning security and intelligence. This committee will initially comprise the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Cabinet Secretary and the Union Home Secretary.
If this proposal is approved and comes into being, it could mean the retention of the co-ordination responsibility in the PMO, but with the NSA, who is part of the PMO, sharing that responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary,instead of exercising that responsibility exclusively as has been the practice till now.
The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, had recommended a two-tier mechanism for co-ordination---- the first consisting of all intelligence agencies and the second in respect of technical intelligence. It recommended that the Principal Secretary to the PM, in his concurrent capacity as the NSA, should head both. Shri Brajesh Mishra thus became the Co-ordination Czar of the then Government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Shri J.N.Dixit, who succeeded Shri Mishra as the NSA in 2004, and Shri M.K. Narayanan, who succeeded Shri Dixit after his death in January 2005, continued to exercise exclusively the responsibility for co-ordination with the Principal Secretary to the PM having no responsibility in the matter. While the intelligence agencies were not quite comfortable with Shri Dixit inheriting this role, they were quite happy with Shri Narayanan, a former head of the Intelligence Bureau and a former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, exercising this responsibility.
Ever since Shri P.Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there were indications that he was not happy over the marginalization of the role of his Ministry in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence community. It was apparent from his 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture at New Delhi on December 23, 2009, that he wanted his role and that of his Ministry in matters relating to internal security management to be strengthened. His desire for a more participatory and active role for the MHA in the co-ordination of the functioning of the TECHINT agencies became clear during his intervention in the Lok Sabha at the time of the recent debate over allegations of phone-tapping by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
If Shri Chidambaram has his way it would dilute the role of the PMO in general and the new NSA, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, in particular in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence and security agencies. If the TOI report is correct, the PMO is trying to find a new mechanism under which the PMO will continue to exercise the co-ordination responsibilities through the NSA, while at the same time partly satisfying the desire of Shri Chidambaram by making the NSA share this responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary.
Before 2000, the responsibility for co-ordination was being exercised by the Secretaries' Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Home, Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Principal Secretary to the PM. This collective responsibility for co-ordination, which was replaced in 2000 by the exclusive responsibility of the NSA, is now sought to be revived in a modified form under which the NSA will still be responsible for co-ordination but with his powers shared with the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. Shri Menon will not be an intelligence and security Czar as his predecessors were.
Nor will Shri Chidambaram be the Co-ordination Czar. He will have a more important role than his predecessors since 2000, but not as important as he would have liked it to be.
This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 24, 2009, titled the Internal Security Czar at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3564.html.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The Times of India has reported (May 28,2010) that the Government of India is contemplating the setting up under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) of a coordination committee on all matters concerning security and intelligence. This committee will initially comprise the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Cabinet Secretary and the Union Home Secretary.
If this proposal is approved and comes into being, it could mean the retention of the co-ordination responsibility in the PMO, but with the NSA, who is part of the PMO, sharing that responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary,instead of exercising that responsibility exclusively as has been the practice till now.
The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, had recommended a two-tier mechanism for co-ordination---- the first consisting of all intelligence agencies and the second in respect of technical intelligence. It recommended that the Principal Secretary to the PM, in his concurrent capacity as the NSA, should head both. Shri Brajesh Mishra thus became the Co-ordination Czar of the then Government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Shri J.N.Dixit, who succeeded Shri Mishra as the NSA in 2004, and Shri M.K. Narayanan, who succeeded Shri Dixit after his death in January 2005, continued to exercise exclusively the responsibility for co-ordination with the Principal Secretary to the PM having no responsibility in the matter. While the intelligence agencies were not quite comfortable with Shri Dixit inheriting this role, they were quite happy with Shri Narayanan, a former head of the Intelligence Bureau and a former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, exercising this responsibility.
Ever since Shri P.Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there were indications that he was not happy over the marginalization of the role of his Ministry in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence community. It was apparent from his 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture at New Delhi on December 23, 2009, that he wanted his role and that of his Ministry in matters relating to internal security management to be strengthened. His desire for a more participatory and active role for the MHA in the co-ordination of the functioning of the TECHINT agencies became clear during his intervention in the Lok Sabha at the time of the recent debate over allegations of phone-tapping by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
If Shri Chidambaram has his way it would dilute the role of the PMO in general and the new NSA, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, in particular in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence and security agencies. If the TOI report is correct, the PMO is trying to find a new mechanism under which the PMO will continue to exercise the co-ordination responsibilities through the NSA, while at the same time partly satisfying the desire of Shri Chidambaram by making the NSA share this responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary.
Before 2000, the responsibility for co-ordination was being exercised by the Secretaries' Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Home, Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Principal Secretary to the PM. This collective responsibility for co-ordination, which was replaced in 2000 by the exclusive responsibility of the NSA, is now sought to be revived in a modified form under which the NSA will still be responsible for co-ordination but with his powers shared with the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. Shri Menon will not be an intelligence and security Czar as his predecessors were.
Nor will Shri Chidambaram be the Co-ordination Czar. He will have a more important role than his predecessors since 2000, but not as important as he would have liked it to be.
This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 24, 2009, titled the Internal Security Czar at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3564.html.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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North Korea: Obama In A Quandary
By B. Raman
The increasingly adventuristic policies and actions of North Korea and China's reluctance to tame North Korea to oblige President Barack Obama have placed him in a quandary where the US will be damned if it acts against North Korea for sinking the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March last and will be equally damned if it does not.
Nothing brings out the helpless state of the US under Mr.Obama more dramatically than the reported plea of Mrs. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, who has just completed a high-profile visit to Beijing for a bilateral strategic dialogue. News agencies have quoted her as saying: "The US and China must work together to fashion an effective response to the sinking of the Cheonan. Maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula is a shared responsibility between the countries."
Ever since Mr.Obama assumed office as the President in January 2009, there has been a weakening of the US will and readiness to act independently in crisis situations -- whether these related to the global economic melt-down or peace and security in regions of vital interest to the US or nuclear proliferation or counter-terrorism. The beneficiaries of Mr.Obama's lack of will to act firmly and independently have been rogue states such as Iran, Pakistan and North Korea.
In foreign policy matters, the US has practically been reduced by Mr.Obama to the position of a dependency of China -- depending on the goodwill and co-operation of China for dealing with these States and for protecting vital US national interests-- whether in the Pacific region or in the Af-Pak area or in the Gulf.
The inability of Mr.Obama to fashion a coherent and deterrent response to the rogue states has further encouraged the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and strengthened their determination to go ahead with their nuclear projects without having to worry about a robust US response. Both Iran and North Korea have convinced themselves that they don't have to worry about the response of the US so long as they have the support of China.
It is amazing that in less than 18 months, Mr.Obama has reduced the US to the position of a mediocre Pacific power, which has to depend on China for protecting its regional interests. The policy of containing China followed under Mr.George Bush has given way under Mr.Obama to one of pathetically courting China to spare Mr.Obama the dilemma of having to act against the rogue States. Mr.Obama's power-sharing willingness in the Pacific has given China an importance which it had never dreamt of having till 2020.
So long as the rogue States have the confidence that China will not let them down, the US is going to find itself confronted more and more with Cheonan-like situations. North Korea's action in sinking the Cheonan without worrying about the implications dramatically illustrates the contempt that it has for the US power in the region. It is not bothered about condemnation by the UN Security Council or by the likelihood of international sanctions.
Fears of a US determined to act even at the risk of a military confrontation are what kept States such as Iran and North Korea under some control in the past. The disappearance of these fears and the US-encouraged rise of the Chinese influence and role led to the adventuristic naval action by North Korea in March last and could one day lead to an adventuristic Iranian action against Israel.
The fear of the US Pacific Fleet once acted as the deterrent. It no longer does so. The result: The US finds itself with zero options in the Pacific either for acting against North Korea or for enforcing its will in the region as a whole.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The increasingly adventuristic policies and actions of North Korea and China's reluctance to tame North Korea to oblige President Barack Obama have placed him in a quandary where the US will be damned if it acts against North Korea for sinking the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March last and will be equally damned if it does not.
Nothing brings out the helpless state of the US under Mr.Obama more dramatically than the reported plea of Mrs. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, who has just completed a high-profile visit to Beijing for a bilateral strategic dialogue. News agencies have quoted her as saying: "The US and China must work together to fashion an effective response to the sinking of the Cheonan. Maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula is a shared responsibility between the countries."
Ever since Mr.Obama assumed office as the President in January 2009, there has been a weakening of the US will and readiness to act independently in crisis situations -- whether these related to the global economic melt-down or peace and security in regions of vital interest to the US or nuclear proliferation or counter-terrorism. The beneficiaries of Mr.Obama's lack of will to act firmly and independently have been rogue states such as Iran, Pakistan and North Korea.
In foreign policy matters, the US has practically been reduced by Mr.Obama to the position of a dependency of China -- depending on the goodwill and co-operation of China for dealing with these States and for protecting vital US national interests-- whether in the Pacific region or in the Af-Pak area or in the Gulf.
The inability of Mr.Obama to fashion a coherent and deterrent response to the rogue states has further encouraged the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and strengthened their determination to go ahead with their nuclear projects without having to worry about a robust US response. Both Iran and North Korea have convinced themselves that they don't have to worry about the response of the US so long as they have the support of China.
It is amazing that in less than 18 months, Mr.Obama has reduced the US to the position of a mediocre Pacific power, which has to depend on China for protecting its regional interests. The policy of containing China followed under Mr.George Bush has given way under Mr.Obama to one of pathetically courting China to spare Mr.Obama the dilemma of having to act against the rogue States. Mr.Obama's power-sharing willingness in the Pacific has given China an importance which it had never dreamt of having till 2020.
So long as the rogue States have the confidence that China will not let them down, the US is going to find itself confronted more and more with Cheonan-like situations. North Korea's action in sinking the Cheonan without worrying about the implications dramatically illustrates the contempt that it has for the US power in the region. It is not bothered about condemnation by the UN Security Council or by the likelihood of international sanctions.
Fears of a US determined to act even at the risk of a military confrontation are what kept States such as Iran and North Korea under some control in the past. The disappearance of these fears and the US-encouraged rise of the Chinese influence and role led to the adventuristic naval action by North Korea in March last and could one day lead to an adventuristic Iranian action against Israel.
The fear of the US Pacific Fleet once acted as the deterrent. It no longer does so. The result: The US finds itself with zero options in the Pacific either for acting against North Korea or for enforcing its will in the region as a whole.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 |
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Dr. Manmohan Singh: Illusions Towards Pakistan And Excuses for Non-Action Against Maoists
By B. Raman
The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, addressed a press conference on May 24, 2010, to mark the completion of one year of his second tenure as the Prime Minister. Hopes that he will be more forthcoming than he usually is on matters of concern to the people such as the internal security situation and India's relations with Pakistan were belied. He was evasive and avoided going into specifics. This has led to considerable criticism.
It would be unfair to say that Dr. Manmohan Singh has not had achievements to his credit during the six years he has been in office. He has had. The economy has been in good shape without being affected seriously by the global melt-down. Greater attention has been paid to the problems of the common man. India's relations with the US have improved without affecting its relations with Russia. It has maintained its interest in Afghanistan without being deterred by terrorist attacks on the Indian mission in Kabul and without letting itself be forced by the US pressure to reduce its presence in that country to address Pakistani concerns. Frictions over border and security-related issues have not been allowed to come in the way of the developing economic relations with China. Following the Copenhagen summit, the comfort level between India and China has increased. Relations with Sri Lanka have improved and India has played a quiet role in ensuring the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan Government without losing sight of the interests of the Tamils. Relations with Bangladesh are in a better shape than before with greater attention to India's security concerns by the Government in Dhaka. Despite misunderstanding with the Maoists of Nepal, India has not lost the goodwill of the political class in Nepal. The low-profile relations with Myanmar have served India's security interests. Relations with Bhutan, the Maldives, the ASEAN countries and Japan continue to improve. While maintaining its interest in the countries to the East of India, India has been paying more attention to the countries to the West of India. The Look East policy has been supplemented by a much-needed Look West policy. India has been playing an important role in multilateral institutions and mechanisms -- whether in matters relating to the economy or regional security. India is accepted as a benign regional power though there is continuing skepticism over its capability to play the role of a global power on par with China.
Lack of public enthusiasm over his policies have been confined to his handling of Pakistan's use of terrorism against India and the increase in the activities of the Maoists, who pose a challenge to the political stability and internal security of India. His desire for better relations with Pakistan in spite of its continuing use of terrorism against India to achieve a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir and to keep India weak came out clearly at the press conference. No one can question his interest in keeping the dialogue going with Pakistan in the hope of one day persuading the Pakistani leadership to realise the folly of using terrorism to serve its national agenda. What one finds disturbing is his tendency to romanticise India's relation with Pakistan and his ill-conceived assertion that India's emergence as a major power depended on better relations with Pakistan.
His remarks linking India's future as a major power with an improvement in its relations with Pakistan are likely to be misinterpreted in Islamabad as indicating that its use of terrorism against India has started paying dividends. There will be more and not less terrorism as a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's penchant for softness towards Pakistan. Ever since he took over as the Prime Minister in 2004, one has not come across a single statement of his indicating in clear terms what India can do and what it will not do to improve relations with Pakistan.
There has been an unfortunate impression in Pakistan that Dr. Manmohan Singh does not attach the same seriousness to Pakistan's use of terrorism against India as large sections of our public and political class do. As a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's perceived softness towards Pakistan and his disinclination to use the stick against Pakistan, there is an impression in Pakistan's military and intelligence circles that Dr. Manmohan Singh lacks the will and the desire to be tough with Pakistan and , hence, they can do anything against India and get away with it so long as he is the Prime Minister.
Unless this impression is corrected through a clear enunciation of our policy, we are not going to have any respite from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. India has suffered two acts of mass casualty terrorism emanating from Pakistan during the tenure of Dr. Manmohan Singh---- the July 2006 attack on suburban trains in Mumbai and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai--- and more are likely so long as our Prime Minister does not act to remove this impression of Pakistan.
Unwilling to strike and hesitant to wound Pakistan. Repeated expressions of goodwill towards Pakistan seem to be more important to him than assurances to his own people that he will not tolerate any more act of mass casualty terrorism against his people from Pakistan.
This is not an argument against talks with Pakistan. This is an argument to hold our feet firmly to the ground while talking to Pakistan and to avoid talks based on illusions. This is an argument to underline that Dr. Manmohan Singh, as the Prime Minister, has an important responsibility to protect the lives and property of his people from acts of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. The exercise of this responsibility should have greater priority over any goodwill for Pakistan.
His conviction that India's rise as a major power depends on better relations with Pakistan is not totally correct. Better relations with Pakistan will definitely help, but the absence of it will not mean the end of the world for India. We have reached where we are today despite our bad relations with Pakistan and we can continue to keep moving forward even if there is no significant improvement in the bilateral relations. Talk to Pakistan, but avoid the defeatist impression that talking to Pakistan is the only salvation for India. It is not.
His remarks on the Maoist challenge brought out clearly the bureaucrat-turned-politician in him and not the statesman. The realisation that the Maoist problem is no longer a localised regional problem was missing in his remarks. It has become a political and humanitarian challenge and a security problem with pan-Indian dimensions that has to be dealt with at a pan-Indian level. A pan-Indian response to this challenge has to come from New Delhi and the Prime Minister has to play the leadership role in the search for such a response.
Instead of admitting his responsibility and expressing his determination to exercise that responsibility, he sought to pass the buck on to the States by projecting it as still in the stage of a localised, regional problem which has to be handled by the affected States to the best of their ability with the required assistance from the Govt. of India.
His remarks on relations with Pakistan and on the Maoist issue do not bode well for our success in dealing with these two challenges to our national security in an effective manner.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, addressed a press conference on May 24, 2010, to mark the completion of one year of his second tenure as the Prime Minister. Hopes that he will be more forthcoming than he usually is on matters of concern to the people such as the internal security situation and India's relations with Pakistan were belied. He was evasive and avoided going into specifics. This has led to considerable criticism.
It would be unfair to say that Dr. Manmohan Singh has not had achievements to his credit during the six years he has been in office. He has had. The economy has been in good shape without being affected seriously by the global melt-down. Greater attention has been paid to the problems of the common man. India's relations with the US have improved without affecting its relations with Russia. It has maintained its interest in Afghanistan without being deterred by terrorist attacks on the Indian mission in Kabul and without letting itself be forced by the US pressure to reduce its presence in that country to address Pakistani concerns. Frictions over border and security-related issues have not been allowed to come in the way of the developing economic relations with China. Following the Copenhagen summit, the comfort level between India and China has increased. Relations with Sri Lanka have improved and India has played a quiet role in ensuring the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan Government without losing sight of the interests of the Tamils. Relations with Bangladesh are in a better shape than before with greater attention to India's security concerns by the Government in Dhaka. Despite misunderstanding with the Maoists of Nepal, India has not lost the goodwill of the political class in Nepal. The low-profile relations with Myanmar have served India's security interests. Relations with Bhutan, the Maldives, the ASEAN countries and Japan continue to improve. While maintaining its interest in the countries to the East of India, India has been paying more attention to the countries to the West of India. The Look East policy has been supplemented by a much-needed Look West policy. India has been playing an important role in multilateral institutions and mechanisms -- whether in matters relating to the economy or regional security. India is accepted as a benign regional power though there is continuing skepticism over its capability to play the role of a global power on par with China.
Lack of public enthusiasm over his policies have been confined to his handling of Pakistan's use of terrorism against India and the increase in the activities of the Maoists, who pose a challenge to the political stability and internal security of India. His desire for better relations with Pakistan in spite of its continuing use of terrorism against India to achieve a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir and to keep India weak came out clearly at the press conference. No one can question his interest in keeping the dialogue going with Pakistan in the hope of one day persuading the Pakistani leadership to realise the folly of using terrorism to serve its national agenda. What one finds disturbing is his tendency to romanticise India's relation with Pakistan and his ill-conceived assertion that India's emergence as a major power depended on better relations with Pakistan.
His remarks linking India's future as a major power with an improvement in its relations with Pakistan are likely to be misinterpreted in Islamabad as indicating that its use of terrorism against India has started paying dividends. There will be more and not less terrorism as a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's penchant for softness towards Pakistan. Ever since he took over as the Prime Minister in 2004, one has not come across a single statement of his indicating in clear terms what India can do and what it will not do to improve relations with Pakistan.
There has been an unfortunate impression in Pakistan that Dr. Manmohan Singh does not attach the same seriousness to Pakistan's use of terrorism against India as large sections of our public and political class do. As a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's perceived softness towards Pakistan and his disinclination to use the stick against Pakistan, there is an impression in Pakistan's military and intelligence circles that Dr. Manmohan Singh lacks the will and the desire to be tough with Pakistan and , hence, they can do anything against India and get away with it so long as he is the Prime Minister.
Unless this impression is corrected through a clear enunciation of our policy, we are not going to have any respite from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. India has suffered two acts of mass casualty terrorism emanating from Pakistan during the tenure of Dr. Manmohan Singh---- the July 2006 attack on suburban trains in Mumbai and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai--- and more are likely so long as our Prime Minister does not act to remove this impression of Pakistan.
Unwilling to strike and hesitant to wound Pakistan. Repeated expressions of goodwill towards Pakistan seem to be more important to him than assurances to his own people that he will not tolerate any more act of mass casualty terrorism against his people from Pakistan.
This is not an argument against talks with Pakistan. This is an argument to hold our feet firmly to the ground while talking to Pakistan and to avoid talks based on illusions. This is an argument to underline that Dr. Manmohan Singh, as the Prime Minister, has an important responsibility to protect the lives and property of his people from acts of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. The exercise of this responsibility should have greater priority over any goodwill for Pakistan.
His conviction that India's rise as a major power depends on better relations with Pakistan is not totally correct. Better relations with Pakistan will definitely help, but the absence of it will not mean the end of the world for India. We have reached where we are today despite our bad relations with Pakistan and we can continue to keep moving forward even if there is no significant improvement in the bilateral relations. Talk to Pakistan, but avoid the defeatist impression that talking to Pakistan is the only salvation for India. It is not.
His remarks on the Maoist challenge brought out clearly the bureaucrat-turned-politician in him and not the statesman. The realisation that the Maoist problem is no longer a localised regional problem was missing in his remarks. It has become a political and humanitarian challenge and a security problem with pan-Indian dimensions that has to be dealt with at a pan-Indian level. A pan-Indian response to this challenge has to come from New Delhi and the Prime Minister has to play the leadership role in the search for such a response.
Instead of admitting his responsibility and expressing his determination to exercise that responsibility, he sought to pass the buck on to the States by projecting it as still in the stage of a localised, regional problem which has to be handled by the affected States to the best of their ability with the required assistance from the Govt. of India.
His remarks on relations with Pakistan and on the Maoist issue do not bode well for our success in dealing with these two challenges to our national security in an effective manner.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Pakistan: Stoking Jihadi Anger Against US, Sweden
By B. Raman
During four days of demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan over what many Muslims regard as a blasphemous contest on sketches of Prophet Mohammad sought to be organised by one of the users of Facebook -- his controversial page which sparked the anger in Pakistan has since been removed by Facebook -- religious parties and jihadi organisations associated with Al Qaeda and the Talibans have directed the anger against the US and Sweden because of the alleged caricatures of the Holy Prophet by a Swedish and an American national. It is alleged that it was their caricatures which inspired the person who called for blasphemous contest on Facebook.
During the demonstrations, slogans were shouted against the US and Sweden, US and Swedish flags were burnt and calls were issued by religious clerics for the death of the Swedish and American cartoonists. A ruling by the Lahore High Court calling for blocking the site of Facebook also added to the anger of pro-Al Qaeda elements because it sought to project the US as partly responsible for the perceived insult to the Prophet. It claimed that Facebook operates from the US and is subject to US laws and regulations. The US had, therefore, a responsibility to act against it.
The ruling, which was delivered by Justice Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry said: "As per laws of commerce and business, Facebook is governed by legal jurisdiction of the United States of America and this global social networking has deliberately or recklessly been responsible for hurting feelings and causing discomfort to the majority of Muslim population of Pakistan. Facebook has deliberately or recklessly not taken effective measures for preventing, stopping or blocking blasphemous contest to which it has complete and autonomous authority and a built-in mechanism to block such profane misbehaviour or misconduct. These mechanisms have either been deliberately or recklessly not administered for preventing, stopping or blocking this blasphemous content taking place on Facebook. The announcement of this very blasphemous contest has caused an immense furor and enraged millions of majority Muslims of Pakistan and around the globe, who attach an immense sanctity to the holy status granted to prophet of Islam, Prophet Muhammad.”
Al Qaeda and its associates including the so-called Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which were already exploiting the anger against the US over the Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal belt, have now been exploiting the anger against Facebook for adding to the anti-US feelings in the Pakistani religious circles.
Fears of acts of street violence after the Friday prayers on May 21 did not prove correct. There were angry demonstrations outside many mosques and madrasas and the flags of the US and Sweden were burnt, but beyond that there were no other incidents. Al Qaeda has not yet come out with a statement on the issue, but some clerics known to be close to Al Qaeda have called for deaths to the American and Swedish cartoonists, who have allegedly emulated the Danish cartoonist who in 2005 drew up cartoons of the Holy Prophet in a Danish paper.
There has been no reaction so far in Pakistan to the alleged publication of a cartoon of the Holy Prophet by a South African journal. The cartoon shows the Holy Prophet as lamenting that Muslims have no sense of humour. This cartoon has already caused protests in South Africa. Since many Muslims in South Africa are of sub-continental origin, reactions in the Indian sub-continent could happen.
While Pakistani newspapers have refrained from playing up photographs of the anti-Facebook demonstrations in Pakistan, some have carried photographs purporting to show protest demonstrations by some Muslims in Mumbai after the Friday prayers. Attention has been drawn to the fact that the Government of India was the first to act against Salman Rushdie's book “Satanic Verses" in the 1980s. The insinuation seems to be that while India acted against “Satanic Verses”, it has not against Facebook. We should not allow this to make us act against Facebook. Anyhow, since Facebook has already removed the controversial page, the issue should be treated as closed. Mischievous elements in Pakistan are trying to keep it alive to serve their anti-US agenda. Unless this controversy dies down, it has considerable scope for mischief which could overflow from Pakistan and give a fresh impetus to organizations such as the LET. There is a need to closely monitor the goings-on in Pakistan on this issue.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
During four days of demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan over what many Muslims regard as a blasphemous contest on sketches of Prophet Mohammad sought to be organised by one of the users of Facebook -- his controversial page which sparked the anger in Pakistan has since been removed by Facebook -- religious parties and jihadi organisations associated with Al Qaeda and the Talibans have directed the anger against the US and Sweden because of the alleged caricatures of the Holy Prophet by a Swedish and an American national. It is alleged that it was their caricatures which inspired the person who called for blasphemous contest on Facebook.
During the demonstrations, slogans were shouted against the US and Sweden, US and Swedish flags were burnt and calls were issued by religious clerics for the death of the Swedish and American cartoonists. A ruling by the Lahore High Court calling for blocking the site of Facebook also added to the anger of pro-Al Qaeda elements because it sought to project the US as partly responsible for the perceived insult to the Prophet. It claimed that Facebook operates from the US and is subject to US laws and regulations. The US had, therefore, a responsibility to act against it.
The ruling, which was delivered by Justice Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry said: "As per laws of commerce and business, Facebook is governed by legal jurisdiction of the United States of America and this global social networking has deliberately or recklessly been responsible for hurting feelings and causing discomfort to the majority of Muslim population of Pakistan. Facebook has deliberately or recklessly not taken effective measures for preventing, stopping or blocking blasphemous contest to which it has complete and autonomous authority and a built-in mechanism to block such profane misbehaviour or misconduct. These mechanisms have either been deliberately or recklessly not administered for preventing, stopping or blocking this blasphemous content taking place on Facebook. The announcement of this very blasphemous contest has caused an immense furor and enraged millions of majority Muslims of Pakistan and around the globe, who attach an immense sanctity to the holy status granted to prophet of Islam, Prophet Muhammad.”
Al Qaeda and its associates including the so-called Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which were already exploiting the anger against the US over the Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal belt, have now been exploiting the anger against Facebook for adding to the anti-US feelings in the Pakistani religious circles.
Fears of acts of street violence after the Friday prayers on May 21 did not prove correct. There were angry demonstrations outside many mosques and madrasas and the flags of the US and Sweden were burnt, but beyond that there were no other incidents. Al Qaeda has not yet come out with a statement on the issue, but some clerics known to be close to Al Qaeda have called for deaths to the American and Swedish cartoonists, who have allegedly emulated the Danish cartoonist who in 2005 drew up cartoons of the Holy Prophet in a Danish paper.
There has been no reaction so far in Pakistan to the alleged publication of a cartoon of the Holy Prophet by a South African journal. The cartoon shows the Holy Prophet as lamenting that Muslims have no sense of humour. This cartoon has already caused protests in South Africa. Since many Muslims in South Africa are of sub-continental origin, reactions in the Indian sub-continent could happen.
While Pakistani newspapers have refrained from playing up photographs of the anti-Facebook demonstrations in Pakistan, some have carried photographs purporting to show protest demonstrations by some Muslims in Mumbai after the Friday prayers. Attention has been drawn to the fact that the Government of India was the first to act against Salman Rushdie's book “Satanic Verses" in the 1980s. The insinuation seems to be that while India acted against “Satanic Verses”, it has not against Facebook. We should not allow this to make us act against Facebook. Anyhow, since Facebook has already removed the controversial page, the issue should be treated as closed. Mischievous elements in Pakistan are trying to keep it alive to serve their anti-US agenda. Unless this controversy dies down, it has considerable scope for mischief which could overflow from Pakistan and give a fresh impetus to organizations such as the LET. There is a need to closely monitor the goings-on in Pakistan on this issue.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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LET Exploits Anger Against Facebook: Need For Caution In India
By B.Raman
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and other Pakistani jihadi organizations associated with Al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been organizing protest demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan to condemn an attempt by an user of "Facebook" to organise an "Everyone Draw Mohammed Day" competition to promote "freedom of expression". His attempt was allegedly inspired by an American woman cartoonist.
According to the Agence France Presse (AFP), Molly Norris, the American cartoonist whose work inspired the controversial page, condemned the Facebook spin-off and apologised to Muslims. She allegedly drew a cartoon in April to protest against the cancellation of an episode of popular show "South Park". Norris satirically proposed May 20 as an "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day." An "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" page quickly turned up on Facebook, but Norris, writing on her website, said she had nothing to do with it. "The vitriol this 'day' has brought out of people who only want to draw obscene images, is offensive to Muslims who did nothing to endanger our right to expression in the first place," she said. "I apologise to people of Muslim faith and ask that this 'day' be called off," she said
The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) has banned access to Facebook, YouTube and more than 450 links to "derogatory" Internet material in view of what it called "growing sacrilegious content". Sweden said it has closed its embassy in Islamabad for more than two weeks due to the security situation. An Al Qaeda front organisation has reportedly offered US $ 100,000 to anyone who kills Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who has angered many Muslims by drawing what they regard a highly blasphemous caricature of the Prophet.
In view of the interest taken by the LET and other Al Qaeda associates to exploit this issue to whip up anger in Pakistan, one has to be watchful to the possibility of LET elements in India including members of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) indulging in similar provocative acts in India. It is an emotional issue which can be easily exploited to create similar anger in sections of the Indian Muislim community.
In this connection, reference is invited to my earlier article of April 3,2010, titled "Was Jihad Jane A Recruit of LET?" annexed below for easy reference.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
WAS JIHAD JANE A RECRUIT OF LASHKAR-E-TOIBA? International Terrorism Monitor- Paper N0. 638 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3745.html
By B.Raman
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was "desperate to do something somehow to help" suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission "till I achieve it or die trying," according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and other Pakistani jihadi organizations associated with Al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been organizing protest demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan to condemn an attempt by an user of "Facebook" to organise an "Everyone Draw Mohammed Day" competition to promote "freedom of expression". His attempt was allegedly inspired by an American woman cartoonist.
According to the Agence France Presse (AFP), Molly Norris, the American cartoonist whose work inspired the controversial page, condemned the Facebook spin-off and apologised to Muslims. She allegedly drew a cartoon in April to protest against the cancellation of an episode of popular show "South Park". Norris satirically proposed May 20 as an "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day." An "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" page quickly turned up on Facebook, but Norris, writing on her website, said she had nothing to do with it. "The vitriol this 'day' has brought out of people who only want to draw obscene images, is offensive to Muslims who did nothing to endanger our right to expression in the first place," she said. "I apologise to people of Muslim faith and ask that this 'day' be called off," she said
The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) has banned access to Facebook, YouTube and more than 450 links to "derogatory" Internet material in view of what it called "growing sacrilegious content". Sweden said it has closed its embassy in Islamabad for more than two weeks due to the security situation. An Al Qaeda front organisation has reportedly offered US $ 100,000 to anyone who kills Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who has angered many Muslims by drawing what they regard a highly blasphemous caricature of the Prophet.
In view of the interest taken by the LET and other Al Qaeda associates to exploit this issue to whip up anger in Pakistan, one has to be watchful to the possibility of LET elements in India including members of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) indulging in similar provocative acts in India. It is an emotional issue which can be easily exploited to create similar anger in sections of the Indian Muislim community.
In this connection, reference is invited to my earlier article of April 3,2010, titled "Was Jihad Jane A Recruit of LET?" annexed below for easy reference.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
WAS JIHAD JANE A RECRUIT OF LASHKAR-E-TOIBA? International Terrorism Monitor- Paper N0. 638 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3745.html
By B.Raman
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was "desperate to do something somehow to help" suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission "till I achieve it or die trying," according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Obama Drops Intelligence Czar
By B.Raman
The decision of President Barack Obama to drop retired Admiral Dennis Blair, his Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has led to his resignation from the post with effect from May 28,2010. He has chosen to resign instead of waiting for the President to name his successor after being informed by Mr.Obama of his decision to replace him. His announcement that he was quitting came on May 21, 2010, three days after the Senate Intelligence Committee had come out with a report specifying 14 intelligence failures relating to the unsuccessful attempt by a Nigerian student trained by Al Qaeda in Yemen to blow up a US flight from Amsterdam as it was about to land in Detroit on December 25,2009. The list of 14 failures named by the Committee is annexed.
Ever since the Christmas Day incident, there were indications that Admiral Blair had lost the confidence of Mr.Obama. His role as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community of 16 agencies, as the supervisor of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and as the driving force behind efforts to improve the collection of human and technical intelligence relating to terrorism came under a cloud. There were reports that Mr.Obama had started dealing directly with other officials like the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mr.Leon Panetta, and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser Mr.John Brennan. Media reports had alleged that Mr.Obama had sidelined Admiral Blair without removing him from his post.
The exit of Admiral Blair was, therefore, not a surprise, but it was interesting that Mr.Obama took five months to decide to replace him even though it became evident after the Christmas Day incident that the DNI had not been able to perform effectively the tasks of co-ordination and joint action for which he was handpicked by Mr.Obama in January 2009.
Mr.Obama’s decision to replace Admiral Blair has come at a time when Mr.Obama has failed to make headway with his policies in Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea and has been unable to make Pakistan act vigorously against Al Qaeda and the Talibans, which continue to target the US homeland. While the ground situation in Afghanistan continues to be bad, that in Iraq has started deteriorating with renewed Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. He has been unable to make Iran and North Korea reverse their nuclear policy. North Korea’s action in sinking a South Korean naval ship killing many South Korean naval personnel is a challenge not only to South Korea, but also to the US presence and leadership in the Pacific area. There has been an erosion of US leadership in the East as well as the West Asian regions and the problem states of the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan no longer have a fear of the US.
The replacement of Admiral Blair in the wake of the nervousness caused in the US by the failed attempt of Faisal Shahzad, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, to cause an incendiary explosion in the Times Square, New York, on May 1 would help in diverting public attention away from the gaps in Mr.Obama’s own leadership by focusing on the gaps in the leadership qualities of Admiral Blair, which have enabled foreign-based terrorists-- whether Al Qaeda or the Tehrik-a-Taliban Pakistan -- to revive their attacks against the US, whether in the Khost area of Afghanistan where they killed seven CIA officers in the last week of December last or in the US homeland where two surprise attacks planned in stealth failed not because of the capabilities of the US intelligence, but thanks to the alertness of the public.
The post of DNI was created in 2004 to coordinate the work of the US intelligence community and to supervise that of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This was one of the recommendations of the National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. Admiral Blair was the third incumbent of the post. The previous two under Mr.George Bush were Mr. John Negroponte and Mr. John McConell. One had expected that the fact that the DNI works directly under the President and draws his status and authority from him would enable him to perform the role of intelligence co-ordinator effectively. But the expectations were belied.
Admiral Blair, like his two predecessors, was able to co-ordinate effectively only the budgetary part of the work -- that is, having the total intelligence budget approved by the Congress and deciding on the allocations of individual agencies. He was unable to co-ordinate effectively the operational part of his work -- that is, setting the intelligence collection tasks for different agencies and getting the intelligence collected by different agencies integrated in a single stream, analysed, assessed and followed up. A DNI can perform the operational co-ordination effectively only if the heads of the agencies keep him in the picture regarding their important operations and share with him all important intelligence at every stage of their processing.
None of the three DNIs since the post was created in 2004 was able to make the chiefs of individual agencies share with him all that needed to be shared. There was no common understanding of what needed to be shared. The chief of every agency decided this according to his own whims and fancies. Neither Mr.Bush nor Mr.Obama was able to call the heads of individual agencies to order. The US intelligence community lacked the culture of joint action similar to what one finds in the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism in the Armed Forces. Instead of creating and heading an integrated intelligence staff, the DNIs were functioning in an ad hoc non-integrated manner.
The National Commission wanted the creation of the NCTC under the leadership of the DNI to ensure the integration of the entire intelligence process relating to terrorism-----collection, collation, analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The terrorist attempts on Christmas Day and on May 1 showed weaknesses in the integration process six years after the post of DNI and the NCTC were created.
The exit of Admiral Blair will not remove the deficiencies unless and until the entire counter-terrorism mechanism is overhauled and made to function in an integrated manner. There are lessons for India too because one has the impression that after his visit to the US earlier this year, Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seems to have come back with some admiration for the NCTC and has been trying to create a similar set-up in India. It is necessary to study what went wrong with it in the US so that we can ensure that similar weaknesses do not creep into our system.
What makes the difference between a good intelligence community and a bad one is not the number of its staff, its gadgetry and budgets alone, but its culture of joint action. If this culture is missing, thousands of intelligence personnel and billions of dollars alone will not win the fight against terrorism. None of the three DNIs who have held office since 2004 has succeeded in creating this culture.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
LIST OF 14 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES CITED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE DOTS
The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14 intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit on Christmas Day :
— The State Department should have revoked Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa based on information available to the department.
— Abdulmutallab wasn't placed on any of the terrorist watchlists because the standards were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats.
— Key intelligence reports weren't reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.
— A CIA division at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.
— The CIA didn't disseminate key reports until after the attempted attack.
— A name search by the CIA Counterterrorism Center was too limited and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts at the CIA Counterterrorism Center didn't connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab, focusing instead on Yemen -based threats from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .
— Because her computer was wrongly configured, an FBI counterterrorism analyst couldn't access all the relevant reports even though they were in the FBI's system.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence wasn't properly organized to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.
— The National Security Agency didn't take all available actions that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab and didn't disseminate all relevant reporting.
— The NSA didn't select Abdulmutallab for watchlists based on information that only partly identified him.
— Intelligence analysts were focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula rather than on potential threats to the U.S.
The decision of President Barack Obama to drop retired Admiral Dennis Blair, his Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has led to his resignation from the post with effect from May 28,2010. He has chosen to resign instead of waiting for the President to name his successor after being informed by Mr.Obama of his decision to replace him. His announcement that he was quitting came on May 21, 2010, three days after the Senate Intelligence Committee had come out with a report specifying 14 intelligence failures relating to the unsuccessful attempt by a Nigerian student trained by Al Qaeda in Yemen to blow up a US flight from Amsterdam as it was about to land in Detroit on December 25,2009. The list of 14 failures named by the Committee is annexed.
Ever since the Christmas Day incident, there were indications that Admiral Blair had lost the confidence of Mr.Obama. His role as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community of 16 agencies, as the supervisor of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and as the driving force behind efforts to improve the collection of human and technical intelligence relating to terrorism came under a cloud. There were reports that Mr.Obama had started dealing directly with other officials like the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mr.Leon Panetta, and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser Mr.John Brennan. Media reports had alleged that Mr.Obama had sidelined Admiral Blair without removing him from his post.
The exit of Admiral Blair was, therefore, not a surprise, but it was interesting that Mr.Obama took five months to decide to replace him even though it became evident after the Christmas Day incident that the DNI had not been able to perform effectively the tasks of co-ordination and joint action for which he was handpicked by Mr.Obama in January 2009.
Mr.Obama’s decision to replace Admiral Blair has come at a time when Mr.Obama has failed to make headway with his policies in Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea and has been unable to make Pakistan act vigorously against Al Qaeda and the Talibans, which continue to target the US homeland. While the ground situation in Afghanistan continues to be bad, that in Iraq has started deteriorating with renewed Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. He has been unable to make Iran and North Korea reverse their nuclear policy. North Korea’s action in sinking a South Korean naval ship killing many South Korean naval personnel is a challenge not only to South Korea, but also to the US presence and leadership in the Pacific area. There has been an erosion of US leadership in the East as well as the West Asian regions and the problem states of the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan no longer have a fear of the US.
The replacement of Admiral Blair in the wake of the nervousness caused in the US by the failed attempt of Faisal Shahzad, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, to cause an incendiary explosion in the Times Square, New York, on May 1 would help in diverting public attention away from the gaps in Mr.Obama’s own leadership by focusing on the gaps in the leadership qualities of Admiral Blair, which have enabled foreign-based terrorists-- whether Al Qaeda or the Tehrik-a-Taliban Pakistan -- to revive their attacks against the US, whether in the Khost area of Afghanistan where they killed seven CIA officers in the last week of December last or in the US homeland where two surprise attacks planned in stealth failed not because of the capabilities of the US intelligence, but thanks to the alertness of the public.
The post of DNI was created in 2004 to coordinate the work of the US intelligence community and to supervise that of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This was one of the recommendations of the National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. Admiral Blair was the third incumbent of the post. The previous two under Mr.George Bush were Mr. John Negroponte and Mr. John McConell. One had expected that the fact that the DNI works directly under the President and draws his status and authority from him would enable him to perform the role of intelligence co-ordinator effectively. But the expectations were belied.
Admiral Blair, like his two predecessors, was able to co-ordinate effectively only the budgetary part of the work -- that is, having the total intelligence budget approved by the Congress and deciding on the allocations of individual agencies. He was unable to co-ordinate effectively the operational part of his work -- that is, setting the intelligence collection tasks for different agencies and getting the intelligence collected by different agencies integrated in a single stream, analysed, assessed and followed up. A DNI can perform the operational co-ordination effectively only if the heads of the agencies keep him in the picture regarding their important operations and share with him all important intelligence at every stage of their processing.
None of the three DNIs since the post was created in 2004 was able to make the chiefs of individual agencies share with him all that needed to be shared. There was no common understanding of what needed to be shared. The chief of every agency decided this according to his own whims and fancies. Neither Mr.Bush nor Mr.Obama was able to call the heads of individual agencies to order. The US intelligence community lacked the culture of joint action similar to what one finds in the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism in the Armed Forces. Instead of creating and heading an integrated intelligence staff, the DNIs were functioning in an ad hoc non-integrated manner.
The National Commission wanted the creation of the NCTC under the leadership of the DNI to ensure the integration of the entire intelligence process relating to terrorism-----collection, collation, analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The terrorist attempts on Christmas Day and on May 1 showed weaknesses in the integration process six years after the post of DNI and the NCTC were created.
The exit of Admiral Blair will not remove the deficiencies unless and until the entire counter-terrorism mechanism is overhauled and made to function in an integrated manner. There are lessons for India too because one has the impression that after his visit to the US earlier this year, Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seems to have come back with some admiration for the NCTC and has been trying to create a similar set-up in India. It is necessary to study what went wrong with it in the US so that we can ensure that similar weaknesses do not creep into our system.
What makes the difference between a good intelligence community and a bad one is not the number of its staff, its gadgetry and budgets alone, but its culture of joint action. If this culture is missing, thousands of intelligence personnel and billions of dollars alone will not win the fight against terrorism. None of the three DNIs who have held office since 2004 has succeeded in creating this culture.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
LIST OF 14 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES CITED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE DOTS
The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14 intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit on Christmas Day :
— The State Department should have revoked Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa based on information available to the department.
— Abdulmutallab wasn't placed on any of the terrorist watchlists because the standards were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats.
— Key intelligence reports weren't reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.
— A CIA division at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.
— The CIA didn't disseminate key reports until after the attempted attack.
— A name search by the CIA Counterterrorism Center was too limited and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts at the CIA Counterterrorism Center didn't connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab, focusing instead on Yemen -based threats from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .
— Because her computer was wrongly configured, an FBI counterterrorism analyst couldn't access all the relevant reports even though they were in the FBI's system.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence wasn't properly organized to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.
— The National Security Agency didn't take all available actions that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab and didn't disseminate all relevant reporting.
— The NSA didn't select Abdulmutallab for watchlists based on information that only partly identified him.
— Intelligence analysts were focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula rather than on potential threats to the U.S.
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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US: Addressing Intelligence Gaps In Pakistan
By B. Raman
Gen. James Jones, the National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, and Mr. Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reached Pakistan from Washington DC on May 18, 2010, for talks with President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Mr. Yousef Raza Gilani, Gen. Asfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and senior intelligence officials of Pakistan. They are also to hold discussions with US intelligence officials based in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
While the visit has been projected by the Pakistani authorities as one of the periodic consultations on intelligence-sharing and liaison between the two countries, it is reliably learnt from Pakistani sources that the visit has been sparked by US concerns over serious gaps in intelligence coverage, which made possible a successful suicide bomber attack through a Jordanian double agent on a group of seven CIA officers based in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, and the attempt of Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, to make an incendiary attack in the Times Square of New York on the evening of May 1, 2010. Shahzad had almost completed the task which he had been given by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) during his training in the North Waziristan area. The Times Square escaped a major disaster partly due to the malfunctioning of the incendiary car bomb left by Shahzad and partly due to the alertness of a T-Shirt vendor, who had alerted a policeman after noticing smoke coming out of the car.
The TTP headed by Hakimullah Mehsud had been involved in the successful strike against the CIA officers in the Khost area and in the failed attempt in the Times Square. In both cases, US intelligence was badly caught napping. Human intelligence (HUMINT) has always been a weak point for the US despite the recent improvement which has made possible some successful Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on terrorist suspects in the two Waziristans, but the technical intelligence coverage of the US was of a high order. It was the better TECHINT coverage by the National Security Agency (NSA) which led to the arrests of many Al Qaeda operatives in the Af-Pak region since the US forces went into action in Afghanistan in October, 2001.
Both HUMINT and TECHINT agencies of the US failed to detect the preparations of the TTP for the Khost attack and the attempt in the Times Square. According to the Pakistani sources, the NSA failed to pick up any intercept even remotely connected to the two incidents in Khost and New York. Faisal had been frequently visiting Pakistan and was in Pakistan for about five months the last time during which he underwent training and went back to the US to launch the attack. Neither the HUMINT agencies nor the NSA picked up any piece of intelligence related to his being groomed by the TTP for the Times Square attack. The US immigration too failed to notice anything worrisome about his frequent travels to Pakistan despite the financial difficulties faced by him.
How to address these serious gaps in intelligence coverage? One way is by the US strengthening its intelligence presence in Pakistan for which a request is to be made to the Pakistani authorities by the visiting officials. They are unlikely to reject this request. A more difficult proposition is to make the Pakistani intelligence agencies improve their intelligence coverage not only in the tribal belt, but also in Karachi and other cities. A nagging question without answer is whether the Pakistani intelligence had noticed the suspicious activities of Faisal, but refrained from alerting their US counterparts.
One could understand the poor intelligence coverage of the Pakistani agencies in North Waziristan, but their coverage ought to be better in Karachi, where Faisal initially met elements in the Jaish-e-Mohammad and took their help for going to the TTP camp in North Waziristan. Jihadi elements in Karachi seem to have played an important role in assisting Faisal in obtaining money for his attempted attack and in contacting the TTP just as jihadi elements of Karachi had played an important role in assisting Richard Reid, the thwarted shoe bomber, in 2001. It was to identify the Karachi elements that Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", went to Karachi from Mumbai, where he was based, in the beginning of 2002 and paid with his life.
Under US prodding, the Gilani Government has strengthened the intelligence collection role of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the Pakistani Ministry of the Interior, and restored the leadership role of the police officers in the IB. The IB does not have much of a capability in the tribal belt where one has to depend on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but one would have expected the IB’s coverage to have been better in Karachi through the local police, but even the IB seems to have missed the contacts of Faisal with the JEM elements in Karachi before he went to Peshawar and from there to North Waziristan.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary, (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Gen. James Jones, the National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, and Mr. Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reached Pakistan from Washington DC on May 18, 2010, for talks with President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Mr. Yousef Raza Gilani, Gen. Asfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and senior intelligence officials of Pakistan. They are also to hold discussions with US intelligence officials based in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
While the visit has been projected by the Pakistani authorities as one of the periodic consultations on intelligence-sharing and liaison between the two countries, it is reliably learnt from Pakistani sources that the visit has been sparked by US concerns over serious gaps in intelligence coverage, which made possible a successful suicide bomber attack through a Jordanian double agent on a group of seven CIA officers based in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, and the attempt of Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, to make an incendiary attack in the Times Square of New York on the evening of May 1, 2010. Shahzad had almost completed the task which he had been given by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) during his training in the North Waziristan area. The Times Square escaped a major disaster partly due to the malfunctioning of the incendiary car bomb left by Shahzad and partly due to the alertness of a T-Shirt vendor, who had alerted a policeman after noticing smoke coming out of the car.
The TTP headed by Hakimullah Mehsud had been involved in the successful strike against the CIA officers in the Khost area and in the failed attempt in the Times Square. In both cases, US intelligence was badly caught napping. Human intelligence (HUMINT) has always been a weak point for the US despite the recent improvement which has made possible some successful Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on terrorist suspects in the two Waziristans, but the technical intelligence coverage of the US was of a high order. It was the better TECHINT coverage by the National Security Agency (NSA) which led to the arrests of many Al Qaeda operatives in the Af-Pak region since the US forces went into action in Afghanistan in October, 2001.
Both HUMINT and TECHINT agencies of the US failed to detect the preparations of the TTP for the Khost attack and the attempt in the Times Square. According to the Pakistani sources, the NSA failed to pick up any intercept even remotely connected to the two incidents in Khost and New York. Faisal had been frequently visiting Pakistan and was in Pakistan for about five months the last time during which he underwent training and went back to the US to launch the attack. Neither the HUMINT agencies nor the NSA picked up any piece of intelligence related to his being groomed by the TTP for the Times Square attack. The US immigration too failed to notice anything worrisome about his frequent travels to Pakistan despite the financial difficulties faced by him.
How to address these serious gaps in intelligence coverage? One way is by the US strengthening its intelligence presence in Pakistan for which a request is to be made to the Pakistani authorities by the visiting officials. They are unlikely to reject this request. A more difficult proposition is to make the Pakistani intelligence agencies improve their intelligence coverage not only in the tribal belt, but also in Karachi and other cities. A nagging question without answer is whether the Pakistani intelligence had noticed the suspicious activities of Faisal, but refrained from alerting their US counterparts.
One could understand the poor intelligence coverage of the Pakistani agencies in North Waziristan, but their coverage ought to be better in Karachi, where Faisal initially met elements in the Jaish-e-Mohammad and took their help for going to the TTP camp in North Waziristan. Jihadi elements in Karachi seem to have played an important role in assisting Faisal in obtaining money for his attempted attack and in contacting the TTP just as jihadi elements of Karachi had played an important role in assisting Richard Reid, the thwarted shoe bomber, in 2001. It was to identify the Karachi elements that Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", went to Karachi from Mumbai, where he was based, in the beginning of 2002 and paid with his life.
Under US prodding, the Gilani Government has strengthened the intelligence collection role of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the Pakistani Ministry of the Interior, and restored the leadership role of the police officers in the IB. The IB does not have much of a capability in the tribal belt where one has to depend on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but one would have expected the IB’s coverage to have been better in Karachi through the local police, but even the IB seems to have missed the contacts of Faisal with the JEM elements in Karachi before he went to Peshawar and from there to North Waziristan.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary, (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Thursday, May 20, 2010 |
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Need To Strengthen Protective Security In Chattisgarh
By B. Raman
About thirty innocent civilians and 20 other civilians serving as Special Police Officers (SPOs) are reported to have been killed on May 17,2010, when a group of Maoists (Naxals) blew up a rural public transport bus in the Dantewada District of the Chattisgarh State. The bus was reportedly blown up with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) using gelatin sticks. It was going from Sukma to Dantewada.
On April 6, 2010, 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and one District Police member were killed in a Maoist ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in Dantewada. On May 8, seven CRPF members were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle in the Bijapur district. The Maoists also killed six villagers, including a sarpanch (village chief) , near Teregaon in the Rajnandgaon district on May 16 and threw their bodies outside their villages.
These incidents coming in quick succession within a period of six weeks indicate a weak protective security strategy in the Chattisgarh State, which needs urgent attention. The ghastly mass casualty attack of May 17 on a public transport bus has revived calls for a selective use of air strikes in the Dantewada area, which has a thick jungle cover. Even if the Government authorises limited air strikes, they would not have an immediate impact in the terrain in the Dantewada area, which favours insurgents and poses problems in providing effective protective security to the civilians.
There is a danger that in retaliation for the air strikes the Maoists would step up their attacks on civilians and, if they are successful, it would further damage the credibility of the security forces in the eyes of the public. The immediate step required is the strengthening pf protective security measures in the Chattisgarh State in general and in the Dantewada area in particular. The State's determination and ability to protect the civilians has to be demonstrated first before we embark on extreme measures such as air strikes. We should avoid over-reaction in panic and rhetoric which distorts our response.
SPOs are not regular police officers on the permanent pay rolls of the State. They are civilians too, who come forward to assist the Police, in the performance of certain essential police tasks while continuing in their normal professions. They are given free food when they function as SPOs and a token payment. SPOs are useful in rural areas. They played a useful role in the counter-terrorism operations against the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab. They were often the targets of attack by the terrorists in order to punish villagers who volunteer to assist the police. Immediately after the death of Sukhdev Singh Babbar, the then leader of the Babbar Khalsa, in an encounter with the Punjab Police in August, 1992, terrorists of the Babbar Khalsa attacked and killed in their villages not only a number of SPOs, but also their family members.
The targeted attack on the bus carrying about 20 SPOs and other civilians by the Maoists on May 17 was meant to punish the civilians who were helping the police as SPOs and to intimidate the public into not helping the police in any manner. The travel of such a large group of SPOs in a bus carrying civilians was unwise. The Maoists apparently knew this and decided to kill them with an IED even at the risk of killing a number of other civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. It was not an opportunistic planting of an IED after noticing the SPOs in the bus. It was an attack planned in advance after coming to know that such a large number of SPOs would be travelling by this bus.
The incident of April 6 exposed a certain casualness in the counter-insurgency approach of the local security forces and the latest attack on the bus shows disturbingly that this casualness continues unrectified six weeks after the earlier incident.
The Maoists should have known that their attempt to kill the SPOs by blowing a rural public transport bus could result in the deaths of a large number of civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. The fact that despite this they undertook this attack shows that the Maoists, in their strategy, have reached a stage where they are indifferent to the impact of their actions on the general public. They are prepared to face the risk of temporary spells of public aversion in order to achieve their objective of demoralising and discrediting the police. Will this be an isolated attack involving mass civilian fatalities, or is it going to become a trend?
Public transport attracts terrorists and insurgents----- urban transport in the case of the jihadis and rural transport in remote areas in the case of insurgents. Attacks on rural public transport are more difficult to prevent and it is more difficult to protect the travelling public in the rural areas than in urban areas. In the urban areas, attacks on public transport result in much larger casualties than in rural areas as we saw in Mumbai in July,2006, but the psychological impact on the public is the same -- whether in urban or rural areas.
In their attempts to discredit the Government of India's counter-insurgency strategy, the Maoists are focussing on Chattisgarh -- Dantewada in particular. While there is a need for a pan-Indian strategy to deal with the Maoists under the leadership and co-ordination of the Government of India, a special strategy to protect the people of Chattisgarh and to neutralise Maoist activities in the Chattisgarh area has to be worked out based on a larger surge of better equipped, better motivated and better informed security forces to help the local police. The special strategy for Chattisgarh cannot wait till a pan-Indian strategy is worked out.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
About thirty innocent civilians and 20 other civilians serving as Special Police Officers (SPOs) are reported to have been killed on May 17,2010, when a group of Maoists (Naxals) blew up a rural public transport bus in the Dantewada District of the Chattisgarh State. The bus was reportedly blown up with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) using gelatin sticks. It was going from Sukma to Dantewada.
On April 6, 2010, 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and one District Police member were killed in a Maoist ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in Dantewada. On May 8, seven CRPF members were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle in the Bijapur district. The Maoists also killed six villagers, including a sarpanch (village chief) , near Teregaon in the Rajnandgaon district on May 16 and threw their bodies outside their villages.
These incidents coming in quick succession within a period of six weeks indicate a weak protective security strategy in the Chattisgarh State, which needs urgent attention. The ghastly mass casualty attack of May 17 on a public transport bus has revived calls for a selective use of air strikes in the Dantewada area, which has a thick jungle cover. Even if the Government authorises limited air strikes, they would not have an immediate impact in the terrain in the Dantewada area, which favours insurgents and poses problems in providing effective protective security to the civilians.
There is a danger that in retaliation for the air strikes the Maoists would step up their attacks on civilians and, if they are successful, it would further damage the credibility of the security forces in the eyes of the public. The immediate step required is the strengthening pf protective security measures in the Chattisgarh State in general and in the Dantewada area in particular. The State's determination and ability to protect the civilians has to be demonstrated first before we embark on extreme measures such as air strikes. We should avoid over-reaction in panic and rhetoric which distorts our response.
SPOs are not regular police officers on the permanent pay rolls of the State. They are civilians too, who come forward to assist the Police, in the performance of certain essential police tasks while continuing in their normal professions. They are given free food when they function as SPOs and a token payment. SPOs are useful in rural areas. They played a useful role in the counter-terrorism operations against the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab. They were often the targets of attack by the terrorists in order to punish villagers who volunteer to assist the police. Immediately after the death of Sukhdev Singh Babbar, the then leader of the Babbar Khalsa, in an encounter with the Punjab Police in August, 1992, terrorists of the Babbar Khalsa attacked and killed in their villages not only a number of SPOs, but also their family members.
The targeted attack on the bus carrying about 20 SPOs and other civilians by the Maoists on May 17 was meant to punish the civilians who were helping the police as SPOs and to intimidate the public into not helping the police in any manner. The travel of such a large group of SPOs in a bus carrying civilians was unwise. The Maoists apparently knew this and decided to kill them with an IED even at the risk of killing a number of other civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. It was not an opportunistic planting of an IED after noticing the SPOs in the bus. It was an attack planned in advance after coming to know that such a large number of SPOs would be travelling by this bus.
The incident of April 6 exposed a certain casualness in the counter-insurgency approach of the local security forces and the latest attack on the bus shows disturbingly that this casualness continues unrectified six weeks after the earlier incident.
The Maoists should have known that their attempt to kill the SPOs by blowing a rural public transport bus could result in the deaths of a large number of civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. The fact that despite this they undertook this attack shows that the Maoists, in their strategy, have reached a stage where they are indifferent to the impact of their actions on the general public. They are prepared to face the risk of temporary spells of public aversion in order to achieve their objective of demoralising and discrediting the police. Will this be an isolated attack involving mass civilian fatalities, or is it going to become a trend?
Public transport attracts terrorists and insurgents----- urban transport in the case of the jihadis and rural transport in remote areas in the case of insurgents. Attacks on rural public transport are more difficult to prevent and it is more difficult to protect the travelling public in the rural areas than in urban areas. In the urban areas, attacks on public transport result in much larger casualties than in rural areas as we saw in Mumbai in July,2006, but the psychological impact on the public is the same -- whether in urban or rural areas.
In their attempts to discredit the Government of India's counter-insurgency strategy, the Maoists are focussing on Chattisgarh -- Dantewada in particular. While there is a need for a pan-Indian strategy to deal with the Maoists under the leadership and co-ordination of the Government of India, a special strategy to protect the people of Chattisgarh and to neutralise Maoist activities in the Chattisgarh area has to be worked out based on a larger surge of better equipped, better motivated and better informed security forces to help the local police. The special strategy for Chattisgarh cannot wait till a pan-Indian strategy is worked out.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Indian Dependence On Chinese Technology
By B.Raman
The Pakistan Railways is reportedly facing a crisis because of the unserviceability of 32 of the 69 locomotives bought from a Chinese company. It has been alleged that the Railways were forced to buy these locomotives by President Asif Ali Zardari and his advisers even though expert opinion in the Railways was against buying locomotives from a Chinese company, which turned out to be sub-standard. It has been reported that to keep the Railways going, they are thinking of ordering 75 new locomotives from non-Chinese sources. The text of a report on this subject carried by "The News" of Pakistan on May 15,2010, is attached.
This has an important lesson for India, which has been developing a dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in key sectors of the economy such as electricity production and mobile telephone networks. Procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from Chinese companies by Indian private companies on which there were no major restrictions till last year, has now been slowed down following concerns reportedly voiced by the Indian intelligence agencies over the security implications of a growing dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in this sensitive sector. It has been reported that the Government has not cleared any proposal for fresh procurement during the last four months and has undertaken a study of the concerns voiced by the intelligence agencies. In the meanwhile, pressure has been mounted on the Government to reverese its curbs by the Chinese authorities through their Embassy in New Delhi and by officials of the Chinese companies.
A point made by the Chinese companies is that while India has suspended the procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from China on security grounds, it continues to import similar equipment and technology from Western countries. The question posed by them is:If similar Western equipment and technology do not pose a security threat, why should Chinese equipment and technology pose a threat? An insinuation made is that the real reason for the suspension of the procurement from China is not secuity, but concealed commercial motives to favour Western companies.
Even if what the Chinese companies say is correct, the Government's caution in buying similar equipment and technology from China, even at much lower prices, is understandable because China is still perceived in India as a possible adversary. India and China had fought a war in 1962 and one should factor into our decision-making the possibility that there could be another military conflict if the border dispute is not satisfactoily settled.When the intelligence agencies talk of the security implications, they keep in view not only the circumstances of today, but also what could happen in future if the bilateral relations deteriorate.
While the Chinese and their supporters in India are unhappy over the curbs imposed by India on security grounds, they tend to play down the fact that the Chinese themselves had imposed similar restrictions on security grounds on Indian information technology companies in China. Mr.Zhu Rongji, the former Chinese Prime Minister, had allowed Indian IT companies to open branches in Shanghai. But for many years, they were not allowed to have a presence in Beijing. Chinese Governmental and non-Governmental entities were secretly advised not to give any contracts to the Indian companies. The Indian companies survived in Shanghai with the contracts won by them from the local offices of Western multinationals. Only now the Chinese have allowed Indian IT companies to have a presence in Beijing and other cities and permitted some of their banks to award contracts to the Indian companies. Even now, will the Chinese authorities allow Indian IT companies to operate in Tibet and Xinjiang?
While security is and ought to be an important consideration in the case of telecommunication equipment, serviceability of the equipment and assured future supplies of spare parts should be equally important considerations in sectors relating to key segments of our economy such as power production. The Pakistan Railways developed an unhealthy dependence on Chinese equipment and it is now threatened with serious dislocation despite the excellent state-to-state relations between the two countries.
We have been developing a dependence on the Chinese for our thermal power stations because the Chinese power equipment like their telecommunication equipment is much cheaper as compared to Western and Japanese equipment and the Chinese have a reputation of completing their projects in time. Other important considerations such as the quality and serviceability of the equipment and the guarantee of future supplies of spare parts are not given the attention they deserve.
Before deciding to order any equipment and technolgy from the West, an important question considered by us is: What are the chances of the Western Governments suspending the supply of spare parts in future to exercise political pressure on India? The US had not hesitated to use this weapon on some occasions in the past. If tomorrow there is a military conflict between India and Pakistan and the Chinese authorities, to help out Pakistan, suspend the supply of spare parts for our power projects set up with their assistance, what will happen to our power production and the economy as a whole?
Are such questions carefully considered before allowing the procurement of Chinese equipment and tchnology? One has the impression that in our keenness to improve bilateral trade with China, which is racing towards the annual target of US $ 60 billion with China being the main benficiary with a big trade surplus in its favour, we are not paying attention to important questions such as what I have explained above.Let us by all means allow a free hand in India to Chinese manufacturers of consumer goods, but in respect of other goods of a sensitive nature which could affect our national security or future economic stability, we have to be more careful.
Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good. Security and guarantee of future supplies should be important considerations in the case of Western companies too, but certain risks which we can afford to take in the case of Western companies, we cannot in the case of Chinese companies.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEX
FROM " THE NEWS" OF MAY 15, 2010
Chinese suppliers fail to deliver
By Ahmad Noorani
ISLAMABAD: The shortage of locomotives in the Pakistan Railways has reached such a crisis stage that an emergency plan to procure 150 engines from reliable international suppliers has been put together as the Chinese suppliers have failed to deliver, senior officials of Railways told The News.
General Manager Railways Shahid Ahmad on Thursday night confirmed to The News that the top Railways management had finally decided to drop the idea of acquiring 75 locomotives from the Chinese company as 32 previously supplied engines out of 69 have been scrapped after they became unserviceable.
The 75 locomotives were ordered from China after President Zardari himself intervened and forced the Railways to oblige the Chinese suppliers despite large-scale opposition within the Railways Ministry. Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had gone on record against the Chinese suppliers but he was given a shut-up call.
The GM Railways disclosed that already an advertisement to purchase 150 locomotives has been published internationally and now the Railways will ensure that no substandard locomotives are procured.
Sources say the Chinese supplier has also refused to honour the warranty on these 32 locomotives as they are rotting in Railways sheds in Karachi and Lahore. Purchase of 69 sub-standard locomotives from China by spending billions of rupees was one of the initial mega corruption scandals against General Pervez Musharraf and his team.
However, vested interests succeeded to even get the present government fall in line and to award the contract of another 75 locomotives from the same Chinese company. “12 locomotives of 2,000 HP and 20 locomotives of 3,000 HP, all under warranty, have now been totally scrapped. There is no way that these could be used and a great loss has been inflicted on the national exchequer,” GM Shahid said.
He added: “The total cost of these locomotives has proved to be very high as these outdated engines have a very high maintenance cost. Whenever we want to change a very important device in the engine, a turbo super charger, it become out of order within two to three months because of inferior quality of the engine and causes unbearable loss to the locomotive itself.”
The senior Railways official revealed that 15 per cent advance amount has already been paid to the Chinese company and now a letter has been sent to them seeking a reply within 14 days regarding complete breakdown of the 32 locomotives costing Pakistan billions of rupees.
He said after receiving the reply of this letter proceedings to get back 15 per cent advance amount would be initiated. He said the Pakistan Railways needs sturdy and tough diesel engines as it runs services on long routes from Karachi to Peshawar which also include hilly areas.
The GM said the Pakistan Railways is in dire need of the engines otherwise the whole railway system was going to collapse. The Pakistan Railways procured 69 locomotives from China in 2001 which were technically approved by the then management of Pakistan Railways in spite of excessive axle load. These locomotives did not perform very well and had developed lot of major faults that caused huge revenue losses. The cracking of underframe of more than 9 locomotives of 3,000 HP in 2005 is one example.
The Railways officials say in spite of this bad performance the previous Railways administration committed serious violations of tender conditions, PPRA Rules and international competitive bidding procedures and awarded the contract of another 75 locomotives to China. The recommendations of technical committee were ignored wherein they had disqualified the Chinese proposal thrice due to non-compliance of relevant clauses.
The Pakistan Railways is reportedly facing a crisis because of the unserviceability of 32 of the 69 locomotives bought from a Chinese company. It has been alleged that the Railways were forced to buy these locomotives by President Asif Ali Zardari and his advisers even though expert opinion in the Railways was against buying locomotives from a Chinese company, which turned out to be sub-standard. It has been reported that to keep the Railways going, they are thinking of ordering 75 new locomotives from non-Chinese sources. The text of a report on this subject carried by "The News" of Pakistan on May 15,2010, is attached.
This has an important lesson for India, which has been developing a dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in key sectors of the economy such as electricity production and mobile telephone networks. Procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from Chinese companies by Indian private companies on which there were no major restrictions till last year, has now been slowed down following concerns reportedly voiced by the Indian intelligence agencies over the security implications of a growing dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in this sensitive sector. It has been reported that the Government has not cleared any proposal for fresh procurement during the last four months and has undertaken a study of the concerns voiced by the intelligence agencies. In the meanwhile, pressure has been mounted on the Government to reverese its curbs by the Chinese authorities through their Embassy in New Delhi and by officials of the Chinese companies.
A point made by the Chinese companies is that while India has suspended the procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from China on security grounds, it continues to import similar equipment and technology from Western countries. The question posed by them is:If similar Western equipment and technology do not pose a security threat, why should Chinese equipment and technology pose a threat? An insinuation made is that the real reason for the suspension of the procurement from China is not secuity, but concealed commercial motives to favour Western companies.
Even if what the Chinese companies say is correct, the Government's caution in buying similar equipment and technology from China, even at much lower prices, is understandable because China is still perceived in India as a possible adversary. India and China had fought a war in 1962 and one should factor into our decision-making the possibility that there could be another military conflict if the border dispute is not satisfactoily settled.When the intelligence agencies talk of the security implications, they keep in view not only the circumstances of today, but also what could happen in future if the bilateral relations deteriorate.
While the Chinese and their supporters in India are unhappy over the curbs imposed by India on security grounds, they tend to play down the fact that the Chinese themselves had imposed similar restrictions on security grounds on Indian information technology companies in China. Mr.Zhu Rongji, the former Chinese Prime Minister, had allowed Indian IT companies to open branches in Shanghai. But for many years, they were not allowed to have a presence in Beijing. Chinese Governmental and non-Governmental entities were secretly advised not to give any contracts to the Indian companies. The Indian companies survived in Shanghai with the contracts won by them from the local offices of Western multinationals. Only now the Chinese have allowed Indian IT companies to have a presence in Beijing and other cities and permitted some of their banks to award contracts to the Indian companies. Even now, will the Chinese authorities allow Indian IT companies to operate in Tibet and Xinjiang?
While security is and ought to be an important consideration in the case of telecommunication equipment, serviceability of the equipment and assured future supplies of spare parts should be equally important considerations in sectors relating to key segments of our economy such as power production. The Pakistan Railways developed an unhealthy dependence on Chinese equipment and it is now threatened with serious dislocation despite the excellent state-to-state relations between the two countries.
We have been developing a dependence on the Chinese for our thermal power stations because the Chinese power equipment like their telecommunication equipment is much cheaper as compared to Western and Japanese equipment and the Chinese have a reputation of completing their projects in time. Other important considerations such as the quality and serviceability of the equipment and the guarantee of future supplies of spare parts are not given the attention they deserve.
Before deciding to order any equipment and technolgy from the West, an important question considered by us is: What are the chances of the Western Governments suspending the supply of spare parts in future to exercise political pressure on India? The US had not hesitated to use this weapon on some occasions in the past. If tomorrow there is a military conflict between India and Pakistan and the Chinese authorities, to help out Pakistan, suspend the supply of spare parts for our power projects set up with their assistance, what will happen to our power production and the economy as a whole?
Are such questions carefully considered before allowing the procurement of Chinese equipment and tchnology? One has the impression that in our keenness to improve bilateral trade with China, which is racing towards the annual target of US $ 60 billion with China being the main benficiary with a big trade surplus in its favour, we are not paying attention to important questions such as what I have explained above.Let us by all means allow a free hand in India to Chinese manufacturers of consumer goods, but in respect of other goods of a sensitive nature which could affect our national security or future economic stability, we have to be more careful.
Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good. Security and guarantee of future supplies should be important considerations in the case of Western companies too, but certain risks which we can afford to take in the case of Western companies, we cannot in the case of Chinese companies.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEX
FROM " THE NEWS" OF MAY 15, 2010
Chinese suppliers fail to deliver
By Ahmad Noorani
ISLAMABAD: The shortage of locomotives in the Pakistan Railways has reached such a crisis stage that an emergency plan to procure 150 engines from reliable international suppliers has been put together as the Chinese suppliers have failed to deliver, senior officials of Railways told The News.
General Manager Railways Shahid Ahmad on Thursday night confirmed to The News that the top Railways management had finally decided to drop the idea of acquiring 75 locomotives from the Chinese company as 32 previously supplied engines out of 69 have been scrapped after they became unserviceable.
The 75 locomotives were ordered from China after President Zardari himself intervened and forced the Railways to oblige the Chinese suppliers despite large-scale opposition within the Railways Ministry. Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had gone on record against the Chinese suppliers but he was given a shut-up call.
The GM Railways disclosed that already an advertisement to purchase 150 locomotives has been published internationally and now the Railways will ensure that no substandard locomotives are procured.
Sources say the Chinese supplier has also refused to honour the warranty on these 32 locomotives as they are rotting in Railways sheds in Karachi and Lahore. Purchase of 69 sub-standard locomotives from China by spending billions of rupees was one of the initial mega corruption scandals against General Pervez Musharraf and his team.
However, vested interests succeeded to even get the present government fall in line and to award the contract of another 75 locomotives from the same Chinese company. “12 locomotives of 2,000 HP and 20 locomotives of 3,000 HP, all under warranty, have now been totally scrapped. There is no way that these could be used and a great loss has been inflicted on the national exchequer,” GM Shahid said.
He added: “The total cost of these locomotives has proved to be very high as these outdated engines have a very high maintenance cost. Whenever we want to change a very important device in the engine, a turbo super charger, it become out of order within two to three months because of inferior quality of the engine and causes unbearable loss to the locomotive itself.”
The senior Railways official revealed that 15 per cent advance amount has already been paid to the Chinese company and now a letter has been sent to them seeking a reply within 14 days regarding complete breakdown of the 32 locomotives costing Pakistan billions of rupees.
He said after receiving the reply of this letter proceedings to get back 15 per cent advance amount would be initiated. He said the Pakistan Railways needs sturdy and tough diesel engines as it runs services on long routes from Karachi to Peshawar which also include hilly areas.
The GM said the Pakistan Railways is in dire need of the engines otherwise the whole railway system was going to collapse. The Pakistan Railways procured 69 locomotives from China in 2001 which were technically approved by the then management of Pakistan Railways in spite of excessive axle load. These locomotives did not perform very well and had developed lot of major faults that caused huge revenue losses. The cracking of underframe of more than 9 locomotives of 3,000 HP in 2005 is one example.
The Railways officials say in spite of this bad performance the previous Railways administration committed serious violations of tender conditions, PPRA Rules and international competitive bidding procedures and awarded the contract of another 75 locomotives to China. The recommendations of technical committee were ignored wherein they had disqualified the Chinese proposal thrice due to non-compliance of relevant clauses.
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Maldives To Re-Settle Two Terrorism Suspects From Guantanamo Bay
By B. Raman
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
- Opposition to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, to New York for trial.
- Some of the suspects from Afghanistan and Yemen, who were released and re-settled in their country because there was no evidence against them to warrant a trial, took to terrorism after their release due to their anger against their alleged ill-treatment in the detention centre by the US. There is a danger that many others, who were arrested by the US authorities on mere suspicion without any evidence of their involvement in terrorism might similarly take to terrorism after their release due to their anger against the US. Yemenis, Pakistanis and Afghans constitute a bulk of such suspects in the detention centre.
- Difficulty in finding countries which would accept those whom the US did not want to send to their home country such as the Uighur suspects. China has been demanding that the Uighurs should be handed over to it for trial. Human rights organizations have been opposing this due to fears that they might be sentenced to death and executed by the Chinese authorities. While willing host- countries have been found to re-settle some of the Uighurs, others are without a willing host-country and hence continue to be at Guantanamo Bay.
Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Is Copy-Cat Of Mumbai 26/11 Possible In Indonesia?
By B.Raman
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August, 2010.
This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August, 2010.
This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Warning Signals From Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir
By B.Raman
Quoting local political sources in Jammu & Kashmir, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported in its web site on May 14,2010, that terrorists ( it calls them as always militants) have regrouped in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).
It quoted Mr.Arif Shahid, Secretary-General of the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), as saying as follows: " Jihadi activities have been restarted during the last few weeks.Most of the activities are concentrated in the Neelum Valley along the Line of Control.Militants were based there in large numbers and have set up camps in the area. The men are not locals - they have long hair and beards. Most do not speak the local language."
The BBC added that local citizens in the Neelum Valley told it much the same thing. It quoted a local resident as saying: "We are scared.The armed men are moving around the area and are trying to cross the border. We can make out from their appearances and languages they are not from any part of Kashmir."
Mr Shahid said that he believed that the militants were planning to sabotage the ongoing Pakistan-India peace negotiations. He added: "They have set up camps in the region and many are crossing the border.This is the start of another proxy war."
According to the BBC, Mr.Shahid's comments were corroborated by Shaukat Maqbool Bhat, head of the anti-Indian Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF).Bhat told the BBC: "The fighters are there and they are regularly crossing into India.The local people are very scared - they believe the [militant] crossings are going to restart artillery exchanges between the Pakistani and Indian armies."
An ominous part of the BBC report is the claim that the people who are re-grouping in the POK do not seem to be locals and speak a different language. Generally, Pakistani terrorists trained and infiltrated into J&K from the POK speak either one of the Kashmiri dialects or Punjabi. The local residents can identify both. The fact that the BBC's sources have not been able to identify the language spoken by the people re-grouping in the POK would indicate that these persons could be Pashtuns recruited either by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or one of the Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, which used to be a wing of the HUJI, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) or the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).
Pakistan's political and military leadership, its intelligence agencies, its judiciary and civil society do not admit that there is terrorism in J&K. They always project what is happening in J&K as a freedom struggle. They justify the activities of these organisations in J&K on the ground that J&K is Pakistani territory where they have a right to act in solidarity with the Kashmiris.The Government of Pervez Musharraf as well as the present Government headed by Prime Minister Yousefv Raza Gilani make a clear distinction between the so-called freedom struggle in J&K and acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.
They regard whatever assurances they had given since January 2004 regarding not supporting terrorism as applicable only to Indian territory outside J&K. They also feel that while the US and other Western countries would be against any Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K, they would not react strongly against renewed acts of violence in J&K, which they regard as a disputed territory.
The TTP and the Punjabi Taliban organisations criticise the Pakistani Government on two grounds----- firstly, its implied support to the US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes in South and North Waziristan and, secondly, its alleged restrictions on the activities of the Pakistani terrorist organisations not only in Indian territory outside J&K, but also even in J&K.
The Pakistan Government is not in a position to stop the Drone strikes. Moreover, the Pakistan Army looks upon the Drone strikes as necessary for the success of its own ground operations against the TTP. However, to soften the TTP it would not hesitate to give it and its Punjabi associates a free hand in J&K. An increase in acts of terrorism in J&K, with the participation of not only Pakistani Punjabis, but also the Pashtuns of the Taliban, is a risk to be guarded against in the months and weeks to come.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Quoting local political sources in Jammu & Kashmir, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported in its web site on May 14,2010, that terrorists ( it calls them as always militants) have regrouped in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).
It quoted Mr.Arif Shahid, Secretary-General of the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), as saying as follows: " Jihadi activities have been restarted during the last few weeks.Most of the activities are concentrated in the Neelum Valley along the Line of Control.Militants were based there in large numbers and have set up camps in the area. The men are not locals - they have long hair and beards. Most do not speak the local language."
The BBC added that local citizens in the Neelum Valley told it much the same thing. It quoted a local resident as saying: "We are scared.The armed men are moving around the area and are trying to cross the border. We can make out from their appearances and languages they are not from any part of Kashmir."
Mr Shahid said that he believed that the militants were planning to sabotage the ongoing Pakistan-India peace negotiations. He added: "They have set up camps in the region and many are crossing the border.This is the start of another proxy war."
According to the BBC, Mr.Shahid's comments were corroborated by Shaukat Maqbool Bhat, head of the anti-Indian Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF).Bhat told the BBC: "The fighters are there and they are regularly crossing into India.The local people are very scared - they believe the [militant] crossings are going to restart artillery exchanges between the Pakistani and Indian armies."
An ominous part of the BBC report is the claim that the people who are re-grouping in the POK do not seem to be locals and speak a different language. Generally, Pakistani terrorists trained and infiltrated into J&K from the POK speak either one of the Kashmiri dialects or Punjabi. The local residents can identify both. The fact that the BBC's sources have not been able to identify the language spoken by the people re-grouping in the POK would indicate that these persons could be Pashtuns recruited either by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or one of the Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, which used to be a wing of the HUJI, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) or the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).
Pakistan's political and military leadership, its intelligence agencies, its judiciary and civil society do not admit that there is terrorism in J&K. They always project what is happening in J&K as a freedom struggle. They justify the activities of these organisations in J&K on the ground that J&K is Pakistani territory where they have a right to act in solidarity with the Kashmiris.The Government of Pervez Musharraf as well as the present Government headed by Prime Minister Yousefv Raza Gilani make a clear distinction between the so-called freedom struggle in J&K and acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.
They regard whatever assurances they had given since January 2004 regarding not supporting terrorism as applicable only to Indian territory outside J&K. They also feel that while the US and other Western countries would be against any Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K, they would not react strongly against renewed acts of violence in J&K, which they regard as a disputed territory.
The TTP and the Punjabi Taliban organisations criticise the Pakistani Government on two grounds----- firstly, its implied support to the US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes in South and North Waziristan and, secondly, its alleged restrictions on the activities of the Pakistani terrorist organisations not only in Indian territory outside J&K, but also even in J&K.
The Pakistan Government is not in a position to stop the Drone strikes. Moreover, the Pakistan Army looks upon the Drone strikes as necessary for the success of its own ground operations against the TTP. However, to soften the TTP it would not hesitate to give it and its Punjabi associates a free hand in J&K. An increase in acts of terrorism in J&K, with the participation of not only Pakistani Punjabis, but also the Pashtuns of the Taliban, is a risk to be guarded against in the months and weeks to come.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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India-Pakistan: Need For Police-Police Relations
By B. Raman
Shri P. Chidambaram, India's Home Minister, is to visit Islamabad in the last week of June to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference due on June 26, 2010. He is to be accompanied among others by Smt. Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary. During his stay in Islamabad, he is expected to have bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister.
Mr. Malik was an officer of the Pakistani Police Service, the Pakistani equivalent of the Indian Police Service. He used to be No.2 (Additional Director-General) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1993-96). The FIA is Pakistan's equivalent of our Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency combined. It plays an active role in the investigation of serious terrorism cases.
He was closely associated with the Bhutto family and paid heavily for it. When Mr. Farooq Leghari, the then President, dismissed her in 1996 with the implicit consent of the Army, he suspended Malik and had him arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges. He jumped bail and went to London where he started looking after the physical security of Benazir. He continued to exercise this responsibility till her assassination in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007.
Following her assassination, there were allegations of negligence against him. Despite this, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who later became the President, retained his tremendous confidence in him. He was initially appointed Adviser on Internal Security and subsequently Minister of the Interior. He is a controversial and unpopular person, who has been the persistent target of the detractors of Zardari, who continue to accuse him of indulging in corruption when he was in the FIA for which, according to them, he should be held accountable. They also continue to accuse him of negligence, which, according to them, contributed to the assassination of Benazir.
All this has not shaken Zardari's confidence in him. The Chinese, who know this, cultivate him. He has just now returned from China after his second visit to discuss Sino-Pakistan co-operation in counter-terrorism and Chinese assistance for capacity-building in the civilian counter-terrorism agencies. The Chinese have not been putting all their eggs in the military basket. They maintain lines of communications with the civilian security bureaucracy too. During Mr. Malik's recent visit to China they announced an aid package of US $ 180 million for capacity-building in counter-terrorism. It is not clear whether this is an additional package or this was merely a reference to the package announced during his first visit to China.
Mr. Zardari's faith in Mr. Malik would be evident from the fact that shortly after the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani assumed office in 2008, an attempt was made to transfer the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Ministry of the Interior, which would have made it the overlord of the Pakistani intelligence community minus the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If this attempt had succeeded, the Army's role in internal security management would have been curtailed. The Army protested and got the order reversed.
Mr.Zardari has inherited Benazir's idea that the only way of curtailing the internal role of the ISI is by re-building the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, demilitarising it by once again restoring the pre-eminence of the Pakistani Police Service in the organisation and by reversing the process of castration of the Police and other segments of the civilian security bureaucracy by the Army over the years since its debacle in the then East Pakistan in 1971.
The Army has not been opposing Mr.Zardari's attempts to restore to the IB its past pre-eminent role in internal security management because some of his ideas in this regard enjoy the blessings of the US , which too feels that one way of reducing the role of the ISI without provoking the Army is by strengthening the role of the police and the IB.
These are developments which India should be happy about. In our preoccupation with the ISI's use of jihadi terrorist organisations against India, we have not been paying any attention to the advisability of building a relationship with the Pakistani Police and IB. The IB has been playing an increasingly active role in the collection of intelligence about India, just as our IB and Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have been playing an active role in the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. In the past, the Government of Pervez Musharraf had used serving and retired officers of the IB in peripheral countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal for assisting the ISI in its operations against India. The close personal and professional relationships of the Pakistani police officers with their counterparts in these countries were sought to be used for this purpose. It is likely that the IB will continue to be used by the ISI for this purpose in future too.
Since 1947, no attempt has been made by any Government in New Delhi to build a police-police relationship between the two countries through means such as exchanges of visits by senior police officers, liaison between the professional police organisations such as the FIA and the IB in Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the IB in India and laying down the ground rules for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The only relationship, which has continued even in the worst of times, has been between the narcotics control agencies of the two countries.
During his forthcoming visit to Islamabad, Shri Chidambaram should be accompanied not only by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, but also by the heads of our IB, the CBI and the newly-created National Investigation Agency (NIA) to lay the groundwork for a police- police relationship. It is in our strategic interest to contribute to a strengthening of the role of the civilian security bureaucracy in Pakistan's internal security management.
Arguments such as the lack of adequate co-operation of Pakistan's Interior Ministry in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based co-conspirators involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the continuing dominance of the military in national security management in Pakistan which might not permit any hobnobbing by the police officers etc should not be allowed to inhibit any initiatives in this regard.
The Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up at the meeting between Gen. Musharraf and Dr. Manmohan Singh at Havana in September, 2006, was born dead. There is no point in hugging on to it. It should be given a decent burial and we should try the proposed experiment of a police-police relationship even if there be a risk of failure due to the negative attitude of the Pakistani Army.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Shri P. Chidambaram, India's Home Minister, is to visit Islamabad in the last week of June to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference due on June 26, 2010. He is to be accompanied among others by Smt. Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary. During his stay in Islamabad, he is expected to have bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister.
Mr. Malik was an officer of the Pakistani Police Service, the Pakistani equivalent of the Indian Police Service. He used to be No.2 (Additional Director-General) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1993-96). The FIA is Pakistan's equivalent of our Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency combined. It plays an active role in the investigation of serious terrorism cases.
He was closely associated with the Bhutto family and paid heavily for it. When Mr. Farooq Leghari, the then President, dismissed her in 1996 with the implicit consent of the Army, he suspended Malik and had him arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges. He jumped bail and went to London where he started looking after the physical security of Benazir. He continued to exercise this responsibility till her assassination in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007.
Following her assassination, there were allegations of negligence against him. Despite this, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who later became the President, retained his tremendous confidence in him. He was initially appointed Adviser on Internal Security and subsequently Minister of the Interior. He is a controversial and unpopular person, who has been the persistent target of the detractors of Zardari, who continue to accuse him of indulging in corruption when he was in the FIA for which, according to them, he should be held accountable. They also continue to accuse him of negligence, which, according to them, contributed to the assassination of Benazir.
All this has not shaken Zardari's confidence in him. The Chinese, who know this, cultivate him. He has just now returned from China after his second visit to discuss Sino-Pakistan co-operation in counter-terrorism and Chinese assistance for capacity-building in the civilian counter-terrorism agencies. The Chinese have not been putting all their eggs in the military basket. They maintain lines of communications with the civilian security bureaucracy too. During Mr. Malik's recent visit to China they announced an aid package of US $ 180 million for capacity-building in counter-terrorism. It is not clear whether this is an additional package or this was merely a reference to the package announced during his first visit to China.
Mr. Zardari's faith in Mr. Malik would be evident from the fact that shortly after the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani assumed office in 2008, an attempt was made to transfer the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Ministry of the Interior, which would have made it the overlord of the Pakistani intelligence community minus the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If this attempt had succeeded, the Army's role in internal security management would have been curtailed. The Army protested and got the order reversed.
Mr.Zardari has inherited Benazir's idea that the only way of curtailing the internal role of the ISI is by re-building the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, demilitarising it by once again restoring the pre-eminence of the Pakistani Police Service in the organisation and by reversing the process of castration of the Police and other segments of the civilian security bureaucracy by the Army over the years since its debacle in the then East Pakistan in 1971.
The Army has not been opposing Mr.Zardari's attempts to restore to the IB its past pre-eminent role in internal security management because some of his ideas in this regard enjoy the blessings of the US , which too feels that one way of reducing the role of the ISI without provoking the Army is by strengthening the role of the police and the IB.
These are developments which India should be happy about. In our preoccupation with the ISI's use of jihadi terrorist organisations against India, we have not been paying any attention to the advisability of building a relationship with the Pakistani Police and IB. The IB has been playing an increasingly active role in the collection of intelligence about India, just as our IB and Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have been playing an active role in the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. In the past, the Government of Pervez Musharraf had used serving and retired officers of the IB in peripheral countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal for assisting the ISI in its operations against India. The close personal and professional relationships of the Pakistani police officers with their counterparts in these countries were sought to be used for this purpose. It is likely that the IB will continue to be used by the ISI for this purpose in future too.
Since 1947, no attempt has been made by any Government in New Delhi to build a police-police relationship between the two countries through means such as exchanges of visits by senior police officers, liaison between the professional police organisations such as the FIA and the IB in Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the IB in India and laying down the ground rules for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The only relationship, which has continued even in the worst of times, has been between the narcotics control agencies of the two countries.
During his forthcoming visit to Islamabad, Shri Chidambaram should be accompanied not only by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, but also by the heads of our IB, the CBI and the newly-created National Investigation Agency (NIA) to lay the groundwork for a police- police relationship. It is in our strategic interest to contribute to a strengthening of the role of the civilian security bureaucracy in Pakistan's internal security management.
Arguments such as the lack of adequate co-operation of Pakistan's Interior Ministry in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based co-conspirators involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the continuing dominance of the military in national security management in Pakistan which might not permit any hobnobbing by the police officers etc should not be allowed to inhibit any initiatives in this regard.
The Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up at the meeting between Gen. Musharraf and Dr. Manmohan Singh at Havana in September, 2006, was born dead. There is no point in hugging on to it. It should be given a decent burial and we should try the proposed experiment of a police-police relationship even if there be a risk of failure due to the negative attitude of the Pakistani Army.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Pakistan-Based Terrorism: Diminishing US Options
By B. Raman
The US is faced with diminishing options in its efforts to neutralise Al Qaeda, the Talibans and other terrorist organisations operating from North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any successful terrorist strike in the US Homeland would most probably originate from this area -- whether it be one involving conventional modus operandi or one involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material.
So long as the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory -- particularly in North Waziristan which has been and which will continue to be the launching pad of strikes directed at the US -- is not neutralised once and for all, the US cannot be free of the fear of the terrorists succeeding one day.
The present US operations in North Waziristan are focussed on the neutralisation of senior and middle level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations operating from sanctuaries in this area. The Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on their hide-outs and vehicular movements have not been without success, but most of those killed were easily replaceable.
But eliminating the leaders alone will not be adequate. It is equally necessary to destroy their infrastructure. The damage suffered by the terrorist infrastructure from the Drone strikes has been insignificant. The ground-based infrastructure can be destroyed only through ground operations -- classical or covert -- and Cruise missile strikes. Predator strikes from Drones will not destroy infrastructure.
Ground-based operations -- whether of the hit and run variety or the hit and stay kind -- would need the involvement of ground troops of the US or Pakistan or both. Involvement of US troops in ground-based operations, whether alone or in tandem with Pakistani troops, could prove messy and counter-productive.
The Pakistani Army is reluctant to undertake any operations in this area because of its dependence on the non-Al Qaeda groups based in this area such as the Haqqani network, the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Punjabi Taliban groups etc for advancing its own strategic agenda against India and Afghanistan.
Having followed since 9/11 a policy of incentives for action and nothing but incentives with no disincentives for inaction, the US finds itself helpless to counter Pakistani inaction. Its policy is inhibited by the fear that any punitive action against Pakistan might end even the inadequate co-operation that it has presently been getting from Pakistan.
If the US is not able to use its ground forces and is reluctant to force Pakistan to use its forces through appropriate disincentives if it does not do so, it has only one alternative left -- encourage the Afghan Army and special forces to undertake covert actions in North Waziristan directed against the infrastructure. This is an option worth exploring even if the chances for success appear low at present. The Afghan elements to be used for covert actions should be appropriately trained and equipped.
Cruise missile attacks can be more effective against infrastructure than Predator strikes from Drones if those are sustained and without respite. The civilian casualties may go up, but the risk has to be faced in the absence of other alternatives. The Cruise missile attacks of 1998 against Al Qaeda's training infrastructure were ineffective because it was an one-shot affair. To be effective, they have to be sustained.
Instead of continuing to depend only on Drone strikes, the US should adopt a three-pronged strategy of a sustained campaign involving the use of Drones, Cruise missiles and the Afghan covert action forces.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The US is faced with diminishing options in its efforts to neutralise Al Qaeda, the Talibans and other terrorist organisations operating from North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any successful terrorist strike in the US Homeland would most probably originate from this area -- whether it be one involving conventional modus operandi or one involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material.
So long as the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory -- particularly in North Waziristan which has been and which will continue to be the launching pad of strikes directed at the US -- is not neutralised once and for all, the US cannot be free of the fear of the terrorists succeeding one day.
The present US operations in North Waziristan are focussed on the neutralisation of senior and middle level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations operating from sanctuaries in this area. The Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on their hide-outs and vehicular movements have not been without success, but most of those killed were easily replaceable.
But eliminating the leaders alone will not be adequate. It is equally necessary to destroy their infrastructure. The damage suffered by the terrorist infrastructure from the Drone strikes has been insignificant. The ground-based infrastructure can be destroyed only through ground operations -- classical or covert -- and Cruise missile strikes. Predator strikes from Drones will not destroy infrastructure.
Ground-based operations -- whether of the hit and run variety or the hit and stay kind -- would need the involvement of ground troops of the US or Pakistan or both. Involvement of US troops in ground-based operations, whether alone or in tandem with Pakistani troops, could prove messy and counter-productive.
The Pakistani Army is reluctant to undertake any operations in this area because of its dependence on the non-Al Qaeda groups based in this area such as the Haqqani network, the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Punjabi Taliban groups etc for advancing its own strategic agenda against India and Afghanistan.
Having followed since 9/11 a policy of incentives for action and nothing but incentives with no disincentives for inaction, the US finds itself helpless to counter Pakistani inaction. Its policy is inhibited by the fear that any punitive action against Pakistan might end even the inadequate co-operation that it has presently been getting from Pakistan.
If the US is not able to use its ground forces and is reluctant to force Pakistan to use its forces through appropriate disincentives if it does not do so, it has only one alternative left -- encourage the Afghan Army and special forces to undertake covert actions in North Waziristan directed against the infrastructure. This is an option worth exploring even if the chances for success appear low at present. The Afghan elements to be used for covert actions should be appropriately trained and equipped.
Cruise missile attacks can be more effective against infrastructure than Predator strikes from Drones if those are sustained and without respite. The civilian casualties may go up, but the risk has to be faced in the absence of other alternatives. The Cruise missile attacks of 1998 against Al Qaeda's training infrastructure were ineffective because it was an one-shot affair. To be effective, they have to be sustained.
Instead of continuing to depend only on Drone strikes, the US should adopt a three-pronged strategy of a sustained campaign involving the use of Drones, Cruise missiles and the Afghan covert action forces.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 |
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The Surrogate Jihadis In US
By B.Raman
The Agence France Presse (AFP) has quoted Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, as warning Pakistan in a recorded TV interview for the CBS Channel to be telecast on May 9,2010, that it would face " very severe consequences" if a terror plot like the failed Times Square bombing of May 1 was traced to that country. She said:"We've made it very clear that if -- heaven-forbid-- an attack like this that we can trace back to Pakistan were to have been successful, there would be very severe consequences." However, she added: "We've gotten more cooperation and it's been a real sea change in the commitment we've seen from the Pakistan Government.We want more. We expect more."
Her warning has received greater attention in India than in Pakistan. The lack of an impact in Pakistan could be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, a careful reading of her remarks shows that her so-called warning is not with reference to the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, on May 1,2010, to cause an incendiary car bomb explosion in the Times Square of New York, but with reference to any future attack that might be successful. What she meant was that if there was a successful attack in future and the investigation traced it back to Pakistan, it would face severe consequences. Secondly, comments emanating from White House spokesmen, Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, and Gen.David Petraeus, the head of the US Central Command, after the May 1 attempt show continued appreciation of the operations mounted by the Pakistan Army against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Swat Valley of the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province and in South Waziristan and seek to project the Pakistani co-operation against terrorism in positive colours. Mrs.Clinton also projected it in positive colours, but added a warning as to what could happen in future. The White House and the Pentagon have refrained from uttering any such warning.
This has been interpreted by the Pakistani authorities as indicating that Islamabad continues to enjoy the support of the White House and the Pentagon despite the unsuccussful attempt by Faisal. The Pakistani reaction to the identification of Faisal as the perpetrator of the attempt has been typical. Firstly,to assure all co-operation to the US in the investigation of the case. Secondly, to round up about about 20 persons in Karachi, Peshawar and other places, including four alleged members of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). Thirdly, to point out that Faisal is an American and not a Pakistani citizen and hence causes for his radicalisation are to be found in the US and not in Pakistan. And fourthly, to start releasing those arrested one after the other on grounds of lack of evidence. The ultimate outcome of the investigation at the Pakistan end is zero.
Cases detected in the US during the last two years or so show a trend which should be of concern to the US. Individual Muslims resident in the US, most of them of Pakistani origin, have been going to Pakistan in small groups to assist the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in their operations in the Af-Pak territory. Their original intention when they left the US for Pakistan was not to indulge in acts of terrorism in the US Homeland. They wanted to attack US nationals and interests in the Af-Pak region.Al Qaeda, the myriad Talibans in Pakistan and Punjabi terrorist organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the JEM and the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri with whom they came into contact in Pakistani territory, played them back into the US.
What, in effect, these organisations told the American Muslims was: "We can handle the jihad in the Af-Pak region. You will better serve the cause of Islam by going back to the US and starting a jihad in the US Homeland. We will give you the necessary training for this." This has come out very clearly in the testimonies in the US case against Najibullah Zazi, a US resident of Afghan origin, and two others, who had been motivated by Al Qaeda and the JEM to mount an attack in the New York subway system similar to the Madrid bombing of March 2004 and the London bombing of July,2005.
Al Qaeda, the Talibans and their associates have been trying to turn these US Muslims going to Pakistan in the hope of fighting in the Af-Pak region into surrogarte jihadis who will fight for them in the US Homeland. US officials and non-Governmental analysts have been playing down the threats of the TTP to indulge in reprisal attacks in the US Homeland on the ground that the TTP has no known presence in the US and does not have such a long reach. The TTP and others are not trying to create a presence for themselves in US territory, but are trying to manipulate American Muslims going to Pakistan to wage a jihad to go back to the US and wage a hihad in the US Homeland instead,
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Police in different US cities have till now succeeded in thwarting the attempts of these surrogate jihadis. Luck has also favoured them. But so long as more and more surrogate jihadis keep coming back to the US after having been motivated and trained in the training camps in Pakistani territory, there will always be a danger of one or more planned attacks being successful.
This danger will continue to confront the US so long as the jihadi infrastructure in Pakistani territory continues. The US has to act pre-emptively against the jihadi infrastructure instead of acting only if there is a successful terrorist strike in the US Homeland launched from Pakistan. All US warnings and admonitions have no effect on the Pakistani authorities because of their conviction that the importance of Pakistan for US policies in Afghanistan would protect Pakistan from any reprisals by the US and that anyhow, whatever the State Department might think and say, the Pentagon would oppose any action against Pakistan.
This conviction in the minds of the Pakistani leaders has to be removed and the Pakistani Army made to act against all jihadi infrastrcture whether directed against India, the US or anyone else and wherever it is located--- whether in North Waziristan, the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province, Punjab, Sindh or Balochistan. Unless this is done now, more and more surrogate jihadis will keep going back to the US to start a jihad in the US Homeland. There is a need for a clear-cut enunciation of the US policy articulated by President Barack Obama himself.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The Agence France Presse (AFP) has quoted Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, as warning Pakistan in a recorded TV interview for the CBS Channel to be telecast on May 9,2010, that it would face " very severe consequences" if a terror plot like the failed Times Square bombing of May 1 was traced to that country. She said:"We've made it very clear that if -- heaven-forbid-- an attack like this that we can trace back to Pakistan were to have been successful, there would be very severe consequences." However, she added: "We've gotten more cooperation and it's been a real sea change in the commitment we've seen from the Pakistan Government.We want more. We expect more."
Her warning has received greater attention in India than in Pakistan. The lack of an impact in Pakistan could be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, a careful reading of her remarks shows that her so-called warning is not with reference to the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, on May 1,2010, to cause an incendiary car bomb explosion in the Times Square of New York, but with reference to any future attack that might be successful. What she meant was that if there was a successful attack in future and the investigation traced it back to Pakistan, it would face severe consequences. Secondly, comments emanating from White House spokesmen, Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, and Gen.David Petraeus, the head of the US Central Command, after the May 1 attempt show continued appreciation of the operations mounted by the Pakistan Army against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Swat Valley of the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province and in South Waziristan and seek to project the Pakistani co-operation against terrorism in positive colours. Mrs.Clinton also projected it in positive colours, but added a warning as to what could happen in future. The White House and the Pentagon have refrained from uttering any such warning.
This has been interpreted by the Pakistani authorities as indicating that Islamabad continues to enjoy the support of the White House and the Pentagon despite the unsuccussful attempt by Faisal. The Pakistani reaction to the identification of Faisal as the perpetrator of the attempt has been typical. Firstly,to assure all co-operation to the US in the investigation of the case. Secondly, to round up about about 20 persons in Karachi, Peshawar and other places, including four alleged members of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). Thirdly, to point out that Faisal is an American and not a Pakistani citizen and hence causes for his radicalisation are to be found in the US and not in Pakistan. And fourthly, to start releasing those arrested one after the other on grounds of lack of evidence. The ultimate outcome of the investigation at the Pakistan end is zero.
Cases detected in the US during the last two years or so show a trend which should be of concern to the US. Individual Muslims resident in the US, most of them of Pakistani origin, have been going to Pakistan in small groups to assist the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in their operations in the Af-Pak territory. Their original intention when they left the US for Pakistan was not to indulge in acts of terrorism in the US Homeland. They wanted to attack US nationals and interests in the Af-Pak region.Al Qaeda, the myriad Talibans in Pakistan and Punjabi terrorist organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the JEM and the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri with whom they came into contact in Pakistani territory, played them back into the US.
What, in effect, these organisations told the American Muslims was: "We can handle the jihad in the Af-Pak region. You will better serve the cause of Islam by going back to the US and starting a jihad in the US Homeland. We will give you the necessary training for this." This has come out very clearly in the testimonies in the US case against Najibullah Zazi, a US resident of Afghan origin, and two others, who had been motivated by Al Qaeda and the JEM to mount an attack in the New York subway system similar to the Madrid bombing of March 2004 and the London bombing of July,2005.
Al Qaeda, the Talibans and their associates have been trying to turn these US Muslims going to Pakistan in the hope of fighting in the Af-Pak region into surrogarte jihadis who will fight for them in the US Homeland. US officials and non-Governmental analysts have been playing down the threats of the TTP to indulge in reprisal attacks in the US Homeland on the ground that the TTP has no known presence in the US and does not have such a long reach. The TTP and others are not trying to create a presence for themselves in US territory, but are trying to manipulate American Muslims going to Pakistan to wage a jihad to go back to the US and wage a hihad in the US Homeland instead,
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Police in different US cities have till now succeeded in thwarting the attempts of these surrogate jihadis. Luck has also favoured them. But so long as more and more surrogate jihadis keep coming back to the US after having been motivated and trained in the training camps in Pakistani territory, there will always be a danger of one or more planned attacks being successful.
This danger will continue to confront the US so long as the jihadi infrastructure in Pakistani territory continues. The US has to act pre-emptively against the jihadi infrastructure instead of acting only if there is a successful terrorist strike in the US Homeland launched from Pakistan. All US warnings and admonitions have no effect on the Pakistani authorities because of their conviction that the importance of Pakistan for US policies in Afghanistan would protect Pakistan from any reprisals by the US and that anyhow, whatever the State Department might think and say, the Pentagon would oppose any action against Pakistan.
This conviction in the minds of the Pakistani leaders has to be removed and the Pakistani Army made to act against all jihadi infrastrcture whether directed against India, the US or anyone else and wherever it is located--- whether in North Waziristan, the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province, Punjab, Sindh or Balochistan. Unless this is done now, more and more surrogate jihadis will keep going back to the US to start a jihad in the US Homeland. There is a need for a clear-cut enunciation of the US policy articulated by President Barack Obama himself.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
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