ASEAN And SAARC: Intra Regional Trade Forums

By Tuli Sinha for IPCS

This article evaluates ASEAN and SAARC as two pivotal regional platforms for actuating economic cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. A comparative study reveals that despite asymmetrical sizes AFTA has surpassed SAFTA in terms of trade benefits and value addition to the overall regional economic growth. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine AFTA and SAFTA relatively and ascertain reasons for the failure of SAARC and SAFTA in relation to ASEAN’s initiatives. Why has SAARC failed to forge conditions of cooperation on the economic and political fronts? What have been the probable impediments in the growth of SAFTA as compared to AFTA? What can be done to restructure and revive the SAFTA to propel the South Asian economy towards greater economic integration and regional consolidation? What was decided in the 16th SAARC Summit in terms of regional trade cooperation?

The European Union (EU) is spearheading the process of developing inter-regional economic networks among other regional organizations of the world. However, many factors are responsible for the success of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which realized the logic of an apropos economic group consciousness which completely lacked in SAARC. It is a collective effort by ASEAN member countries to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade in the goods sector. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN’s position as a competitive production base producing for both regional and global markets. An analysis reveals that the formation of AFTA has led to a remarkable expansion of intra-ASEAN trade since its inception. The statistics so far substantiates the fact that Intra-ASEAN trade has been consistently increasing over the years from US$81.98 billion in 1993. Today, the intra-ASEAN trade incorporates approximately 25 per cent of the total external trade in comparison to merely 2 per cent of the intra-SAARC trade.

Among the countries, Singapore continues to be a major contributor in the intra-regional trade, accounting for 39.5 per cent of the total intra-ASEAN trade, followed by Malaysia (24.2 per cent), Thailand (15.6 per cent), Indonesia (9.5 per cent) and the Philippines (5.7 per cent). Also, the role of great power interventions especially of the US has been vital in determining the fate of AFTA. ASEAN has been an important economic partner for the United States; shared convergent commercial interests are a major driving force for ASEAN and the success of its forums. For the last two years, the cumulative American investment in ASEAN has been greater than the total investments in China, Japan and Korea. ASEAN receives the fifth largest share of US foreign investment and this is rendering a subtle counter to the China block in Asia. Such an external pressure in terms of performance is completely missing in SAARC.

Moreover, despite initial gains, SAFTA has not really achieved much in terms of internal or external trade. It is interesting to observe incessant efforts by the SAARC members, especially India, being the most prosperous, to ameliorate conditions of intra regional trade in South Asia. The robust rise in India’s total imports from SAARC has been underpinned by the sharp increase in imports from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. India generally maintains a positive trade balance with the other SAARC member countries, and the trade surplus has risen from US$2.3 billion to US$5.0 billion until recently. Sri Lanka is again the leading partner, accounting for 31 per cent of India’s total imports from the region, followed by Pakistan (21 per cent), Nepal (20 per cent), Bangladesh (15 per cent) and Bhutan (9 per cent). The region also lacks the impetus to incur the unforeseen costs and investments to initiate any new agenda for economic prosperity unlike ASEAN.

Although SAARC has been working towards enhancing its regional trade, it certainly requires a structural revival. There are several steps that should be incorporated in the working process of SAFTA and SAARC on the whole to improve the conditions of trade. First, SAFTA experiences high trade deficit in terms of its global trade, thus more emphasis could be given to boost exports from the region. Second, SAARC countries are mainly exporting agricultural commodities and agro-based products. With trade being competitive and identical, more diversification of goods is extremely essential. Third, while SAARC countries have effected reduction in tariff levels, it can be reduced even further to increase the benefits of the trade bloc in future. Adequate steps could also be implemented to attract more FDI into the region from other sources. Fourth, the direct relationship between bilateral exports and GDP in the SAARC region reveals the potential for export-led growth in the region. With further opening of the economy, the bilateral exports will also increase. As there is a positive relation between the bilateral trade agreement and bilateral export flows in the SAARC region, the creation of bilateral agreements in the region must be encouraged. Finally, strengthening of economic relations can be used to reinforce improving political relations in the region, for instance, the relationship between India and Pakistan, as economic ties could help improve political relations to a great extent.


Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at  tuli_sn@yahoo.com. This article was published by IPCS.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russia And Bangladesh Sign Nuclear Agreement; Namibia Next

Russia and Bangladesh have signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the field of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Meanwhile, Russia plans to cooperate with Namibia in uranium mining and processing.

The agreement was signed in Moscow by Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Russian state nuclear company Rosatom, and Yafesh Osman, Bangladesh's minister of state for science, information and communication technologies. The agreement is valid for five years, but includes the option of renewing it every subsequent five years.

The agreement provides a legal framework for cooperation between the two countries in the field of nuclear energy. It covers a wide range of possible areas for cooperation, including site selection, design, construction and operation of nuclear power and research reactors, desalination plants and particle accelerators. It also covers cooperation in the exploration and development of uranium and thorium deposits, the supply of nuclear fuel for power and research reactors, radioactive waste management, regulation, ensuring nuclear and radiation safety and security, and the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials. Notably, it includes the "export of Russian-origin used nuclear fuel," implying the possible return to Russia for long-term management and permanent disposal.

In addition, the agreement also stipulates that Russia will assist Bangladesh in creating a national nuclear regulatory body, as well as training and educating specialists in Russia in the field of nuclear physics, nuclear energy and related applied research. Specific areas for cooperation include basic and applied research in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular, in neutron physics, thermo hydraulics, the handling of nuclear fuel, measurement and control systems and automation, as well as the production and use of radioisotopes in industry, medicine and agriculture.

The agreement follows the signing of a memorandum of understanding in May 2009 between the two countries on cooperation in nuclear energy. To implement the agreement, Russia and Bangladesh plan to establish a joint coordinating committee.

On signing the agreement, Osman said that the "historic character" of the accord will allow Bangladesh to resolve its energy crisis.

Russia, China and South Korea have earlier offered financial and technical help to establish nuclear power in Bangladesh, and in March 2009 Russia made a formal proposal to build a nuclear power plant in the country. In April 2009, the government approved the Russian proposal to build a 1000 MWe nuclear plant at Rooppur for about $2 billion, with the hope of having it operating in 2014.

Russia eyes Namibian uranium

Meanwhile, Russia has signed an intergovernmental memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Namibia on cooperation in uranium exploration, mining and processing.

According to the MoU, Russian uranium mining company AtomRedMetZoloto (ARMZ) and Namibian state-owned Epangelo Mining will form a working group to prepare an action plan for implementing joint projects.

Vadim Zhivov, general director of ARMZ, commented: "Signing of the memorandum of understanding opens up new opportunities for mutually beneficial development of the richest mineral resources of the Republic of Namibia." He added, "We are ready, in collaboration with the Namibian side, to participate in finding and developing natural uranium deposits, to promote skills training for the mining industry of the Republic of Namibia, to ensure the implementation of the mined uranium."

Rosatom is ready to invest $1 billion in uranium exploration in Namibia, according to the Moscow Times. "We're ready to start investing already this year," Kiriyenko was reported as saying.

Namibia is home to about 7% of the world's uranium reserves and has two operational uranium mines, both run by overseas companies: Rio Tinto's Rossing mine and Paladin's Langer Heinrich mine.

Source:  Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Islamists Oppose NGOs In Bangladesh

Schools and offices burnt down, assaults and harassment, women rejected by their husbands and turned into social outcasts, pregnant women prevented by force from seeking healthcare. These are some of the incidents that have resulted from the opposition to various aid organisations in Bangladesh, an opposition that is primarily led by Islamist groups.

The most violent protests against NGOs (non-governmental organisations) took place during the 1990s. Among the organisations affected were BRAC, one of the world's largest aid organisations; Grameen Bank, which offers micro-loans to poor people; and Proshika, one of the largest NGOs in the country. Today the situation is calmer, but the conflict between those who are trying to strengthen the status of women and those who want to maintain the patriarchal norms remains below the surface.

"And the Islamists' position has become stronger in recent years, with the support of Saudi Arabia, among others. For example, a few years ago 10 smuggled lorries full of weapons were found, believed to be intended for Islamist groups", says religious historian Abdel Baten Miaji at Lund University. He has written about the conflicts between religious groups and NGOs in his thesis, which he will soon be defending.

It is uncertain whether the Islamists will once again turn against the many non-governmental organisations in Bangladesh - at the moment the conflict is primarily with the country's Government, as the Government has recently launched a tribunal against war criminals of 1971. However, it is clear that the Islamist groups, the traditional village elite and the money lenders do not look kindly on anyone who disturbs the norms and upsets the balance of power between men and women, rich and poor.

"The textile industry has strengthened the position of women by giving them work. But this is not viewed as being as dangerous as the non-governmental organisations. They not only want to strengthen women's finances, but also their self-confidence", says Abdel Baten Miaji.

Seeing women go to courses and meetings, and sometimes even spend a night away from home in connection with a course, angers those who consider that a woman's place is in the home. The NGOs are also criticised for trying to bring in Christianity on the sly, for being corrupt and badly run, and for charging excessive interest.

According to Abdel Baten Miaji, it is primarily the latter criticism that may hold some water. While the normal interest rates from the banks in Bangladesh are between 10 and 12 per cent, the total cost of a micro-loan can be over 30 per cent.

"But the alternative for a poor woman is not taking a bank loan. If she needs money she has to go to the village money lenders, who charge at least 120 per cent interest!" he explains.

Abdel Baten Miaji personally sees it as self-evident that the NGOs have given women better access to credit, healthcare and education, and have also got the authorities to take more interest in the status of women. Bangladesh is a Muslim country and this of course influences both the Government and public authorities. However, the traditional form of Islam in Bangladesh is Sufism, a form which takes a more open view of the role of women in society than the Wahhabi Islam that has spread from the Middle East since the 1990s.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Bangladesh: World Banks Sees Robust Economic Growth For Now

Bangladesh has maintained fiscal discipline despite recurring external economic shocks, natural disasters, and widespread poverty and social needs. Given a highly constrained revenue capacity, Bangladesh has allocated spending well to meet strategic priorities with healthy GDP growth.

"Growth in the next fiscal year hinges on remittances, easing of energy constraints, and pursuit of structural reforms. We expect GDP growth in the range of 5.5-6%. Achieving growth at the higher end of the range will require major efforts to address the country’s energy constraints,” said Sanjay Kathuria, Lead Economist for Bangladesh.

Growth still robust in FY10

GDP growth in FY 2010 (July 1, 2009 - June 30, 2010) has been driven by growth in consumption and public development expenditure. Growth throughout FY 2007-09 in Bangladesh was driven mainly by consumption, over 60% of growth in GDP. In FY 2010, private consumption growth is likely to be sustained by remittances, which grew by 17.4% in the first nine months.

In addition, growth in non-rice agriculture appears to have sustained growth in rural incomes and hence private consumption. Public consumption expenditures received a boost from a 52% average increase in public sector pay and an additional stimulus package for the export-oriented sectors.

Energy shortages stifling growth

Energy shortages, however, pose perhaps the biggest threat to Bangladesh’s growth recovery. The present demand for electricity varies between 4,200 MW and 5,500 MW and it is expected to rise to 6,850 MW within the next two years. Maximum generation currently available is between 3,800 MW and 4200 MW. The estimated demand supply gap currently is 2,000 MW in peak hours.

Gas shortages account for at least half of this gap. Power and gas shortages have undermined external competitiveness. According to garment industry leaders, garment orders cannot be fulfilled because of energy constraints. Frequent power cuts and low gas pressure add to shipment time, forcing exporters to airfreight the merchandise at their own cost. Power cuts and gas shortages have reportedly rendered a significant part of the country’s garment capacity idle.

Progress in expanding power generation remains slow. To combat the acute power shortages, the government plans to increase power generation to around 7,000 MW by 2013. However, power plants continue to suffer from gas shortages, despite some recent measures to increase gas supplies for power production. Short-term solutions being floated include diesel - and furnace oil-based rental power plants which can start generation within a short period of time, but these are higher cost routes and will reduce competitiveness of firms. In 2009 and 2010 so far, 586 MW of power were added to the national grid.

Inflationary pressure rising

Inflation rose to 9% in February 2010, from 2.2%in June 2009. This sharp increase was driven by food inflation arising from a shortfall in domestic rice production, rising world food prices, and high food inflation in India. Non-food inflation also rose, from 3.7% in July 2009 to 6.1%in February 2010. While domestic agriculture output and world food prices are likely to have a strong bearing on inflation in the next few months, an incremental tightening of monetary policy, as announced in the Monetary Policy Statement for the second half of FY10, can also help dampen inflationary pressures. An incremental tightening of monetary policy, announced in the Monetary Policy Statement for the second half of FY10, may help dampen inflationary pressures.

Aggregate Fiscal balance sustainable

The fiscal deficit remains sustainable, underpinned by good revenue performance. It is projected to be contained at around 4% of GDP in FY10, well within the sustainable threshold. This is slightly higher than last year’s fiscal deficit of 3.7% of GDP - and derives from the implementation, retrospectively, of the public sector wage increase, higher safety net expenditures, a likely further boost to the Annual Development Program (ADP) this year, and a potential increase in energy and fertilizer subsidies because of rising international prices.

Growth Outlook

FY11 growth outlook is dependent on the easing of domestic supply constraints, particularly energy. Global recovery is off to a stronger start than initially anticipated. Currently, supply issues are more problematic than those of demand; Energy shortages will continue to stifle Bangladesh’s recovery. The estimated demand-supply gap is currently one-third of demand (2,000 MW) in peak hours. Gas shortages account for nearly half of this gap.

Maintaining growth at its recent 6% average over the medium term will thus be a challenge for Bangladesh, given the current infrastructure and energy deficits. Redressing this will require domestic reforms and increasing trade integration with countries in the region and the rest of the world.

The Bangladesh Prime Minister’s visit to New Delhi earlier this year helped to promote Bangladesh-India cooperation in security, power, trade, connectivity, water sharing, and resolution of other long-standing bilateral concerns. If fully implemented, these will lay the basis for higher investment and growth by improving energy security and connectivity.
Monday, May 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Rejection Of Proposed Indian Uranium Mine

Plans to develop a uranium deposit within the Balphakran National Park in Meghalaya state, India, have been rejected by a federal ministry because local authorities had failed to prevent illegal coal mining in the area.

The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) had sought approval from the Ministry of Environment and Forests to conduct exploratory drilling for uranium in the Garo Hill District. However, at a recent meeting of its Standing Committee of the National Board on Wildlife, the ministry decided to reject the proposal.

In a statement, the committee said that, while acknowledging India's urgent need to augment domestic uranium supplies, it "took this decision keeping in view of the sentiments of the local people and a number of representations received from local civil society groups."

During its meeting, the committee was presented with a report by one of its members - Asad Rahmani of the Bombay Natural History Society - on illegal private coal mining around the Balphakran National Park. Having visited the area, he found that there were private coal mines operating in Meghalaya state, close to the Bangladesh border, in violation of national environmental and mining regulations.

In his report, Rahmani said, "The Chief Executive Council of Garo Hills Autonomous District Council has all the powers to stop these illegal mines. Similarly, the District Magistrate of Baghmara can also take action to stop illegal mines. However, in effect neither of these agencies appears to have any control on the ground situation." He added, "After visiting the area, I found that it gives the appearance of an untamed wild frontier where anyone can occupy the land and loot the natural resources."

Rahmani noted, "The most shocking fact was that all this illegally extracted coal is being exported 'legally' to Bangladesh through a border outpost at Gasaupara." He added, "Interestingly, the office of the Department of Mines and Minerals in located at Gasaupara. The whole area around Gasaupara village is spoiled due to coal dumps (on any open space), movement of trucks, pollution of water bodies, noise, and black exhaust by rickety old trucks."

The Standing Committee subsequently decided to press the state government of Meghalaya to implement the recommendations contained within the report. These included the immediate ban on all mining and road construction activity within the Balphakran National Park and to introduce strict regulation of all coal mines in Garo Hills and other parts of the state. It also called for the implementation of "proper mining plans which will ensure that local people avail the greatest benefit from mining."

There are currently 19 nuclear power reactors in commercial operation in India, with a combined generating capacity of 4183 MW. The country expects to have 20,000 MWe of nuclear capacity online by 2020 and 63,000 MWe by 2032. However, India's uranium resources are modest with 54,000 tonnes as reasonably assured resources and 23,500 tonnes as estimated additional resources in situ. Accordingly, from 2009 India is expecting to import an increasing proportion of its uranium fuel needs.

Mining and processing of uranium is carried out by Uranium Corporation of India Ltd, a subsidiary of the DAE, at Jaduguda, Bhatin, Narwapahar and Turamdih - all in Jharkhand state near Calcutta. A common mill is located near Jaduguda that processes some 2090 tonnes of ore per day.


Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Monday, May 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Awami League In Power: Lost Priorities And Opportunities

By Smruti S. Pattanaik for ISDA

Did the two year intervention by the military that backed Fakruddin Ahmed’s caretaker government teach any political lessons to the political parties in Bangladesh? The answer is unfortunately no. The culture of confrontation and ideological contestation are very much parts of Bangladesh’s political culture where the two political parties refuse to cooperate. The Awami League (AL) won a landslide victory in December 2008, which generated the hope of democratization and a change in the confrontational politics that has plagued the nation. People sincerely believed that the two years of military intervention has certainly taught the parties a lesson. Expressing such sentiment the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) General Secretary said “We should replace the existing political culture with a fair one. I won't see your face just because you hold different political ideals or there's a difference of opinion…this attitude can never be helpful for democracy."

Though Awami League assumed office on 6 January 2009, it is yet to make its presence felt and is gradually losing popular appeal. The level of its unpopularity is yet to reach a critical point where the opposition can enforce a successful hartal, but there is a general disillusionment about the lack of change. AL has been going slow on many important issues that were vital to its success in the last election. Apart from the issue of price rise and power shortage, the government faces crucial challenges on two fronts that would impinge on its performance.

First, the Party’s inability to control the violence unleashed by its Student organization, the Bangladesh Chattro League (BCL), in various University campuses has been one factor that has reflected badly on the Party leadership. Violence by the student organization of the incumbent party is not a new phenomenon in campus politics. Capturing residential halls and providing political patronage to students in lieu of support is a method of recruiting cadres, exerting influence and distributing patronage. Many of the student leaders are involved in criminal activities and are patronized by law-makers for political reasons and the police have chosen to remain a mute spectator. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s repeated calls to rein in the Chattro League has fallen on deaf ears. Unruly incidents have been reported from all over the country adding to the unpopularity of the AL. At universities like Dhaka University and Jehangirnagar University, the BCL is engaged in a confrontation with the Jatiyobadi Chatra Dal (JCD). At Rajshahi University and Chittagong University the BCL has fought pitched battles against Chattro Shibir, the student organization of Jamaat Islami. At various Engineering colleges and technical organizations such violence has resulted in disruption of classes. In some cases it has resulted in the death of students as seen in Dhaka University and Rajshahi University. In the May 11 clash in the Jaganath University, choppers, machetes and axes were used between two factions of the BCL. These incidents and their frequent recurrence are reflecting poorly on the AL leadership.

Second is the issue of trial of the war criminals for their role during the liberation war. The government could have done well to avoid controversy regarding the constitution of the tribunal and appointment of Abdul Matin as Chief investigator of a seven member probing agency. Matin was alleged to have been a member of Chatra Sangha, the student body of Jamaat Islami in the pre-independence days, which is accused of collaborating with the Pakistan Army and killing freedom fighters. Though most of the political parties are supporting the government effort to establish a war crime tribunal, BNP has kept its position ambivalent. Initially, given the popular mood, BNP Secretary General Khondokar Delwar Hossain had said, “We support the demand for the trial of war criminals in principle and none should have any objection against it.” However, the BNP has raised several questions about the Government’s motive in constituting the tribunal. To generate a controversy and create doubts the BNP says that it doubts the transparency and fairness of the tribunal. It has accused the government of holding the trials to eliminate the political opposition. The government has formed a 3 member tribunal and 12 member panel of lawyers under the International Crimes (tribunal) Act of 1973. Since one of the prominent BNP member S.Q Chowdhury’s name figures among the list of war criminals, the BNP has demanded that the government probe and initiate actions against some of the war criminals within the AL itself. Controversy and political bickering has not helped the process of the trial. It has created unnecessary doubts regarding the independent functioning of the tribunal. It is important that the tribunal has independent members without political bias. If unnecessary doubts are created, the credibility of the tribunal will suffer and thus render the entire exercise futile.

The two political parties neither share cordial relations nor have made any attempt to develop a consensus in spite of their promises to the people soon after the election. On the 16th of January 2009 in the first Parliamentary Party meeting of the BNP, the leader proclaimed, “we want to assist the government and we want the government to create that atmosphere and maintain it.” Soon after, a major problem arose out of seat sharing arrangement in the Parliament leading to the opposition boycotting the parliament – a tradition that continues. The opposition returned to the Parliament on the 11 February 2010 after having boycotted the Parliament for ten months.

AL needs to work with the BNP on many of the issues that remain fundamental to the AL. It has the majority and needs to show magnanimity. Instead, the AL has kept itself involved in trivial issues like the renaming of the airport, renaming University, questioning Zia’s leadership and whether Zia was buried in the Jatiyo Sangsad premise or not. What has perhaps helped the AL is BNP’s poor political health. Rivalry within the party and differences between leaders has afflicted the party organization. BNP is yet to shed its image of corruption, militancy and misrule. Their poor performances in the election and its inability to come out of the election debacle and reorganize the party have resulted in the demoralization of its cadre. Even if Begum Khaleda Zia gave a call to launch a movement against ‘government’s misrule’ the party is not in a position to demonstrate its strength. Given the state of the BNP, the AL has time to resuscitate itself, to prioritise issues and prepare itself for the next election from now. For AL time is running out and it has miles to go in translating promises into action.


Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/AwamiLeagueinPowerLostPrioritiesandOpportunities_sspattanaik_140510
Friday, May 14, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Global Warming: The New Ombudsman?

By Sonali Huria for IPCS

Global warming has purportedly put to rest a long standing dispute between India and Bangladesh which had proved to be a significant impediment to the demarcation of the maritime boundary between the two neighbouring states. The disputed island territory of New Moore or South Talpatti as it is known in India and Bangladesh respectively, in the Sunderban Delta, sank in March 2010, thereby ‘settling’ a territorial dispute which has existed between the two states since the 1970s. According to news reports, scientists at the School of Oceanographic Studies, Jadavpur University confirmed the island’s disappearance, based on satellite imagery, sea patrols and reports received from local fishermen.

The island, located at the mouth of the Hariabhanga River, first emerged in the aftermath of the Bhola cyclone in the Bay of Bengal in 1970; it was discovered by an American satellite in 1974 and had since become a major issue in maritime boundary talks between the two countries, especially since the island was believed to have large potential reserves of oil and gas. Bangladesh and India both laid claim over the island territory and although there were no permanent settlements on the isle given its geological changeability, India is believed to have set up a temporary base of the Border Security Force (BSF) on the tiny deltaic island, undertaking regular visits with naval gun ships.

The news of the island’s disappearance has evoked varied responses – while some in the political and media quarters view the event as an end to a major irritant in India-Bangladesh relations, many, especially environmentalists, have reacted with considerable concern to a development which they regard as a harbinger of worse things to come. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has estimated that a quarter of the low-lying deltaic country’s coastline could be swamped and 15-18 per cent of its land mass submerged if the sea level rises above one meter in the next 50 years, which would displace roughly 30 million people from their homes and farms, thus, swelling the ranks of ‘environmental refugees’ in the region.


The displacement of people in the Sunderban delta due to rising sea waters is believed to have started with the migration of nearly 500,000 people in 1995 from Bhola Island to mainland Bangladesh, after more than half the island, considered Bangladesh’s largest, was covered by invading sea waters. The submergence of the inhabited Lohachara Island in 1996, encroaching sea waters in other smaller islands in the Bay of Bengal, and now South Talpatti are indicative of the colossal security challenge that is in the making. These developments are of significant concern not only to Bangladesh, but also India, since displacement of people from these areas will mean a greater influx of climate refugees into Indian territory apart from affecting agricultural produce in the region, thereby leading to heightened food insecurity in South Asia.

The recent declaration by Union Minister of State for Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh and his Bangladeshi counterpart, Hasan Mahmud that the two countries will set up an India-Bangladesh Sunderbans Ecosystem Forum this year to address the multiple challenges faced by the ‘ecologically vulnerable’ Sunderban region and its inhabitants, is perhaps indicative of the growing recognition that cooperation between the two countries in the face of this emerging challenge is inevitable. Further, the Union Cabinet has already approved a World Bank-funded Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) project for the preservation of the Sunderbans, aimed at, among other things, preventing the erosion of islands, building storm shelters, and taking measures to improve life opportunities and means of livelihood for the inhabitants of the region.

The upcoming summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) scheduled to be held in Bhutan from 28-30 April 2010 is also expected to have climate change high on its agenda with Bangladesh and Maldives indicating that they might push for the establishment of a regional body to deal with climate change, which these two states are likely to be impacted by the most. The Global Climate Risk Index 2010, compiled by Germanwatch, an international NGO, has ranked Bangladesh as the most vulnerable and severely impacted country on account of ‘extreme weather events’ owing to climate change; it tops the ranking in terms of both, loss to human life and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) due to the vagaries of climate change.

While the political debate surrounding New Moore island refuses to die down despite its disappearance, especially in view of Bangladesh’s assertion of ‘full sovereignty’ over the island, it is time for states of South Asia to seriously debate a problem which threatens both, human and food security in the region. The sixteenth SAARC Summit might provide the perfect forum to debate the issue and help build an understanding among the countries on how best to address this new security challenge to the states and people of South Asia.


Sonali Huria is a Research Officer, the Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) - where this article first appeared - and may be reached at sonali@ipcs.org.
Saturday, April 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

India: Caught Between China And The Deep Sea

By B.Raman

On April 1,2010, India and China embarked on a six-month programme to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. S.M.Krishna, the Indian Foreign Minister, is visiting China for four days from April 5 to join the celebrations.

Forgotten -- at least for the time being -- are the suspicions, distrust and harsh words of last year over the visits of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh to India’s Arunachal Pradesh State on the Chinese border in the North-East to campaign for local candidates in the elections and of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh at the invitation of the local people. China claims Arunachal Pradesh as its territory and calls it Southern Tibet. It wants India to hand over to China under the border negotiations under way without progress at least Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh.

The Chinese have a long memory. They have not forgotten that one of the old Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang and that the present His Holiness fled from Tibet into India in 1959 across the border in the Tawang area. They have made it clear that there will be no border agreement unless India transfers at least Tawang to China. That would mean the exodus of the Indian population from the territory handed over to China. No Indian Government, however popular, may be able to sell such a transfer favourable to the Chinese to the Indian Parliament and people.

2009 was full of alarming reports about the Chinese further strengthening their military infrastructure in Tibet and Chinese military patrols repeatedly intruding into Indian territory. Faced with opposition criticism of its perceived inaction against the growing trans-border assertiveness of China, the Government of India pressed ahead with an already ongoing programme for strengthening its military infrastructure in the Indian territory. India is many years behind China in developing its infrastructure in the border areas.

2009 also saw non-governmental Chinese analysts discussing in seemingly unofficial web sites and blogs the options available to China for teaching India a lesson should it become necessary. A repeat of the humiliating defeat of 1962 was one such option discussed. Taking advantage of the various separatist movements in India in an attempt to balkanize the country was another. An article on possible Indian balkanization by an unknown and insignificant Chinese analyst added to the already strong Indian suspicions of China.

China was active and assertive not only in the border areas. It has been equally so right around India’s periphery. Taking advantage of the suspicions and distrust of India in the other States of the South Asian region, China, which is not a South Asian power, has acquired a growing South Asian presence.

It continues to help Pakistan in further strengthening its nuclear and missile capabilities which are directed against India. After having completed the construction of the Gwadar commercial port on the Baloch coast, it has promised to develop it further into a modern naval base which would be available for use to the Chinese Navy too.

It won the gratitude of Sri Lanka by supplying it arms and ammunition to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and is embarked on the expansion of the Hambantota commercial port, which might one day be developed into a naval base. A grateful Sri Lanka has given a block for gas exploration to a Chinese company without inviting bids. India was given a block for exploration without bids and China was treated on par with India.

There are as many Chinese tourists visiting the Maldives as Indian and a Chinese bank has been allowed to operate in the Maldives to meet the foreign exchange needs of the Chinese tourists.

In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China in March, an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.

At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar have sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.

Sheikh Hasina also discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed.

In Nepal, China is looking for a road link to connect Nepalese roads with those in Tibet and for an extension of the railway line from Lhasa to Nepal.

Thus, the Chinese have been developing their infrastructure of potential military significance around India’s periphery. The Chinese think and plan long-term. Indian response is ad hoc. Just as New Delhi woke up late to the likely threats by land from the North, one realizes belatedly that the threats are from the South, East and West as well.

Whatever limited influence India has in South Asia is in danger of being eroded by the Chinese inroads. India is yet to work out a comprehensive response to it. All the sweet words of the 60th anniversary cannot hide this harsh reality. ( 3-4-10)

B. Raman is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Sunday, April 04, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

South Asia 2010 Terror Assessment - Greater Fragility In South Asia

By SATP

The qualified good news first.

In Sri Lanka, one of the world’s most lethal and pitiless terrorist organizations, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has been comprehensively defeated, bringing to an end a relentless 33-year long conflict, and 26 years of full scale civil war. On May 20, 2009, the Sri Lanka Army officially declared the end of Eelam War IV after the fall of the garrison town of Paranthan. The top leadership of the LTTE, including its chief Vellupillai Prabhakaran, intelligence chief Pottu Amman and Sea Tigers chief, Soosai, were dead. Defeated remnants of the armed cadres surrendered or sought obscurity among the thousands of the Tamil displaced in refugee camps, while the Diaspora leadership squabbled over succession, eventually to publicly renounce the option of violence.

Had this been a Western victory, there would have been a sense of "unadulterated and righteous triumph", a quick forgetfulness of all that was done in the darkness of war, and an accelerated effort of reconstruction. In Sri Lanka, however, the peace has been quickly poisoned, first by "a seething and barely concealed outrage" among various international agencies who had been involved in the ‘peace efforts’ in the country; then by a Sinhala triumphalism that sought to deny or at least defer a fair deal to the Tamils; thereafter, by a bitter and polarizing presidential election that saw a face-off between two of the war’s most prominent heroes, President Mahinda Rajapakse, and his victorious Army Chief, General (Retd.) Sarath Fonseka; and finally, by a vicious personalized politics of vendetta that finds General Fonseka arrested and currently in detention under less than credible charges of conspiring to assassinate the President.

There is, of course, little possibility of a resurgence of terrorist violence in the foreseeable future. The LTTE has been entirely decimated but, more significantly, Sri Lankan intelligence penetration of the structures of the organization and its accumulated information resources on the rebel cadres and leadership, are now so complete that any possibility of revival would quickly – and ruthlessly – be crushed. The enduring tragedy of Sri Lanka is that the opportunities of a hard won peace are quickly being frittered away in a blind, polarizing and fractious politics.

Another bitter peace prevails in Nepal, where the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (now Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist, UCPN-M) led a decade-long insurgency against what was then the country’s decaying monarchy. A deal between the Seven Party Alliance of democratic parties and the Maoists brought hostilities to an end in April 2006, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006, and the abolition of the monarchy and creation of a Republic in 2008. The years of bloody violence, the worst of which, 2002, saw 4,896 fatalities (SATP data), are now in the past, though sporadic violence between various armed groups still resulted in 50 fatalities in 2009, and 12 have already been killed in 2010 (till March 21). Though these numbers are negligible in comparison to the slaughters of the war years, a culture of intransigence and armed intimidation has now become entrenched in the country’s politics, and various political formations have raised armed groupings to secure a privileged position at the negotiating table. As a result, the work of the Constituent Assembly, elected in April 2008, has been stalled, even as an unremitting succession of crises paralyses governance. A worsening political deadlock saw the fall of the UCPN-Maoist led Government on May 4, 2009, even as disruptive protests by the Maoists, and by smaller militant political formations crippled the Administration. There has been much acrimony, and the ruling Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML)-led Government and the Maoists have, each, repeatedly accused the other of working to subvert the peace process. As the two year deadline of May 28, 2010, for the completion of the Constitution drafting process approaches, with the process barely begun, the Maoists have threatened to take to the streets – if not worse – again if the Constitution is not completed in time. The outlook for Nepal is, evidently, more than uncertain. The political deadlock is, in any event, worsening rapidly, with no single one of the parties demonstrating the sagacity to pull the country out of the political and constitutional logjam, and Maoist belligerence mounting.

Bangladesh is probably the source of the best news in the region in recent times, as it pulls back dramatically from what, just three years ago, had begun to look like the brink. Since the election of the Sheikh Hasina Government in December 2008, with a thumping majority, the country has experienced an abrupt stabilization, as the regime moves strongly to curb the activities of powerful terrorist groupings who had operated under significant state acquiescence, if not direct support, under earlier administrations. This includes Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) as well as subversive political formations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, whose leadership is now at serious risk as a result of the Government’s determination to bring the guilty in the war crimes of 1971 to book. At the same time, Dhaka has acted decisively against the many terrorist groupings operating in India’s Northeast, who had found safe haven on Bangladeshi soil for decades. Their camps have been shut down, even as most of their leaders have been quietly handed over to Indian authorities, while others – most prominently including Paresh Baruah, the ‘commander-in-chief’ of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)– have fled. Prime Minister Hasina has also initiated several measures to address institutional deficits in the security apparatus, including the formation of a 17-member National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention’, and has called for a South Asian Anti-Terrorism Task Force, to curb cross-border terrorism.

But the transition from radicalism to stability in Bangladesh is far from complete. Groups such as HuJI-B and the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) retain a significant presence in the country, though they are currently lying low. The Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), which was the principal architect of the serial blasts across the country on August 17, 2005, has a substantial surviving presence, despite the execution of its top leadership that was found guilty of the serial bombings, and the arrest of many second-rung leaders. There are at least some signs that, despite the Governments very effective campaign against them, Islamist extremist organizations in the country are regrouping. At least part of the Government’s anti-terrorist campaign, moreover, appears to be misdirected. There were 86 ‘terrorism related’ fatalities in 2009, 80 of them enumerated as ‘terrorists’ (the remaining six were civilians) every one of them purported members of a Left Wing Extremist (LWE) movement of which there is little evidence on the ground, other than the large numbers of alleged militants who are routinely bumped off by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). Not a single Islamist terrorist was killed in the country in 2009, though one has already been killed in 2010.

India has been another mixed bag. Total terrorism / insurgency related fatalities have plummeted, from a peak of 5,839 in 2001, to 2,611 in 2008, and further to 2226 in 2009 (SATP data). Through 2009, India experienced no major Islamist terrorist attack outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), after the succession of attacks in 2008, culminating in the Mumbai 26/11 outrage, which killed at least 166. While this must bring some relief to the security establishment in the country, there is little ground for complacency. 2010 has already seen a major terrorist attack in Pune, suspected to have been engineered by Pakistan-backed Islamists, and Union Home Minister Chidambaram referred repeatedly to some 13 Islamist terrorist conspiracies that had been thwarted through 2009. Crucially, the steep decline in total fatalities is overwhelmingly the consequence of the precipitate fall in Jammu & Kashmir, where fatalities have dropped from 4,507 in 2001, to 377 in 2009, principally as a consequence, not of any dramatic Indian initiatives or successes, but of Pakistan’s growing internal difficulties and the overwhelming media and international focus on the support regional and international terrorism secures from that country’s establishment and on its soil. While the scale of terrorism exported from Pakistan has certainly been calibrated downward, the reality is that the infrastructure of the anti-India jihad continues to be held in reserve by the Pakistani State. There is also mounting evidence of an escalation of tensions along the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border (IB) in J&K, with Pakistan troops repeatedly firing on Indian Forces, usually to facilitate terrorist infiltration. At least 28 incidents of ceasefire violation were recorded along the LoC in 2009.

Across India’s Northeast, total fatalities in the multiplicity of ethnicity based conflicts dropped from 1,054 in 2008 to 843 in 2009. These trends were further consolidated by Bangladeshi initiatives that divested the major Northeast insurgent groupings of their safe havens in that country, and handed over their leaderships to Indian authorities.

But the Maoist rampage has escalated. SATP data suggest at least 998 killed in 2009, but partial data released by the Government indicates that the total for the year will mount well above the High Intensity Conflict mark of 1,000 fatalities. The Maoists have established a presence in 223 Districts across 20 States, out of a total of 636 Districts in 28 States and seven Union Territories. The situation is not, however, as alarming as this spread may suggest. Home Minister Chidambaram indicated that violence "has been consistently witnessed in about 400 Police Station areas of around 90 Districts in 13 States" (there are over 14,000 Police Stations in the country). More troubling, however is the breakup of data on Maoist-related fatalities, with Security Forces(SF) accounting for as much as 71 per cent of the total of 998 fatalities enumerated by SATP in 2009 (as against 66 per cent of 638 fatalities in 2008), demonstrating the degree to which the Maoists have monopolized the initiative. India’s Maoist troubles threaten to augment, even as the notorious ‘flailing state’ continues to flounder through contradictory and uncertain policy and operational responses.

And now, the unmitigated bad news:

Despite the expanding theatres of palpable, though fragile, peace in South Asia, total fatalities in the region continue in a sustained upward spiral, rising to as much as 31,824, up from 20,242 in 2008, 10,599 in 2007; 8,760 in 2006, and 6,129 in 2005. The terminal stages of the war in Sri Lanka, of course, account for nearly half of this total (15,565).

It is, however, in Pakistan – and in the wider AfPak region (it is no longer possible to divorce developments in Afghanistan from the trajectories of Islamist terrorism in South Asia) – that the heart of an abiding darkness lies. The Afghanistan-Pakistan complex has, for more than a decade now, been the principal source of the global crisis of Islamist terrorism. Over the past years of intense, but conflicting and uncertain, efforts, the situation in both countries has worsened steadily. 2009 was a year of escalating violence and widening disorder across the AfPak region. The ‘surge’ of US troops in Afghanistan in 2010 and the uncertain tactical gains in Marjah notwithstanding, there is little reason to believe that the troubling fundamentals of the region are going to experience any significant change.

In Pakistan, at least 11,585 persons were killed in terrorism-related violence in 2009 (the actual numbers could be significantly higher, since Pakistan denies access to the media and independent monitors in most areas of conflict), a number that comes close to the cumulative fatalities between 2003 and 2008, at 13,485. The 2009 figure represented an increase of 73 per cent over the 2008 fatalities, at 6,715. The 2009 fatalities included 2,307 civilians, 1,011 SF personnel and 8,267 ‘terrorists’ (the last category is arbitrary, since, on most accounts, every person killed by State Forces is simply so labeled, and no independent verification is possible). By March 8, 1,521 people had already been killed in terrorism-related violence in 2010, including 428 civilians, 126 SF personnel and 916 ‘terrorists’.

In Afghanistan, Coalition military fatalities in 2009 were the highest since the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, and, at 520, were higher by more than 76 per cent over the 295 killed in 2008. Coalition losses between 2001 and 2009 totalled 1,567. Coalition fatalities for 2010 had already reached 126 by March 21, suggesting that this could be the bloodiest year yet. Reliable data on Afghan fatalities is unavailable in the open source, and no such data is released by Coalition authorities or the Afghan Government. One unconfirmed source, citing "lowest credible estimates", however, put Afghan civilian fatalities at 2,014 between January and October 2009, while total civilian fatalities were estimated at 2,118 in 2008; at 1523 in 2007; and 929 in 2006. Anecdotal reportage on continuous Taliban attacks and incessant reports of ‘collateral’ fatalities in Coalition and Afghan National Army (ANA) operations would, however, suggest a far worse and escalating scenario. No authoritative estimate of the total number of militants killed is available.

As could easily have been anticipated, the ‘surge’ of 2009 in Afghanistan has been a clear failure. A second ‘surge’, equally poorly conceptualized, has now been initiated, even as a fresh deadline for a phased ‘exit’ of Western Forces, possibly commencing in July 2011 (on some accounts, 2012), preceded by the integration of the ‘good Taliban’ in the power structure, is now being envisaged. The consequences can only be disastrous.

The ‘London Summit’ (London Conference on Afghanistan, January 10, 2010), represented the ‘consensual’ approach of the international community, led by the US and the UK, outlining the proposed ‘strategy’ to support the Afghan Government "to secure, stabilize and develop Afghanistan". The Summit led to a measure of optimism, and to at least some positive commentary. Significantly, the Summit included the participation of five ‘moderate Taliban’ leaders – Abdul Wakil Mutawakil, Faiz Mohammad Faizan, Shams-us-Safa, Mohammad Musa, and Abdul Hakim – after their names were dropped from the United Nations’ listing of terrorists.

The London Summit is a clear admission of defeat by the Western powers, and demonstrates that they lack the will and capabilities to fight terrorism within a protracted war framework. Whatever the rhetoric, this is, at best, a plan for ordered flight. It is a plan, moreover, based on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the adversary, and on the misconception that the Western powers can simply ‘walk away’ from the mess in Afghanistan after ‘co-opting’ the ‘moderate Taliban’ into the ‘political process’.

The reality is that a Western withdrawal will surrender Afghanistan to extremism, and will be seen as the triumph of radical Islam not only by its adherents, but also by hundreds of thousands of fence sitters, among whom a significant proportion will certainly be inspired by this ‘victory’ to join the terrorist jihad. The only consequence of this will be that the West itself – and Europe most particularly – will become the principal battlefield of Islamist terrorism, even as the South Asian neighbourhood comes under unprecedented jihadi attack. As for Afghanistan, once the cover of Coalition Forces is lifted, the moderates would be wiped out. It can also be anticipated that an alliance of extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan (including elements in the state structure in these countries) will come to dominate the global jihad. This alliance would operate with a new impunity, since it will then be clear that no power in the world has the capacity or the will to intervene effectively in the region. Such confidence can only be increased by Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

While Pakistan’s internal disorders escalate exponentially, this calculus has evidently not been missed by its leaderships. Violence now engulfs every region of Pakistan. Balochistan, the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Punjab, Sindh, Gilgit-Baltistan and ‘Azad Kashmir’ – is each experiencing augmenting levels of violence. But, even as the military and political heartlands of Punjab – Rawalpindi and Islamabad – come under direct radical extremist attack, Pakistan has not abandoned its duplicity on terrorism. While selective action has been taken against the ‘renegade’ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistan establishment continues to extend support to the Taliban and various warlord factions in Afghanistan, even as it nourishes a multiplicity of India–directed terrorist formations, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen, and the 16-group United Jihad Council headed by Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen chief, Mohammad Yusuf Shah aka Syed Salahuddin. As Ashley Tellis notes, for instance, in his testimony to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on March 11, 2020,

LeT remains primarily Pakistani in its composition, uses Pakistani territory as its main base of operation, and continues to be supported extensively by the Pakistani state, especially the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)… The United States should stop pretending that LeT is an independent actor.
Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism in India and Afghanistan is now one of the world’s worst kept secrets. This was further confirmed, through December 2009, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation interrogation of David Coleman Headley alias Daood Gilani [one of the prime suspect in the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks]; the FBI found that "a section of serving Pakistan Army officers" were working in close collaboration with India-specific jihadi groups like the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). That Islamabad also continues to harbour Taliban militants fighting against the Allied forces, led by US, in Afghanistan, was confirmed, albeit obliquely, from the highest US Office: on February 10, 2009, President Barack Obama asserted that his Administration would not allow ‘safe havens’ for al Qaeda and the Taliban operating with ‘impunity’ in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan.

And yet it is increasingly evident, now, that the US-led coalition in Afghanistan is only looking for a face saving ‘exit strategy’. A premature Western withdrawal from Afghanistan would, however, have a devastating impact on security and stability, not only in South Asia, but immediately across the Eurasian mass, and beyond, to comprehend a global stage. Unprecedented forces would be unleashed by a perceived jihadi ‘victory’ in Afghanistan, and such forces would not only target the South Asian neighbourhood, but, overwhelmingly, the Western world as well. This is not Vietnam; the US cannot simply turn its back on Afghanistan, without the risk of being attacked on an unprotected rear. The US-Western perspective on AfPak remains incoherent, and, unless drastically re-envisioned, can only add to global chaos.

For all her millennia of history, there is little political wisdom in contemporary South Asia. For centuries now, outsiders have defined the critical turning points of destiny across these territories, and this does not appear to have changed. There is an evident collapse of leadership across much of the region, and an incapacity to capitalize even on the tremendous gains that have been secured in many of the constituent countries. Once again, it seems, the decisions of outside forces will overwhelmingly determine the trajectory of violence and the receding possibilities of peace, in this vast, populous and troubled region of the world.

This article was prepared by, and first appeared at, the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Bangladesh Muslim Attacks Send Catholics Into A Panic

Attacks by Muslim extremists on tribal Catholic villagers in a northwestern parish have left about 50 people injured, with 10 in a serious condition.

The attacks in Boldipukur, in Rangpur district, have raised tensions and created panic in the area, according to a local parish priest. Some of the victims were women and children, he added.

“They [Muslims] said they will kill some of our people. We’re in a panic and are afraid to go out,” said Father Leo Desai, pastor of Christ the Savior Church which is in Dinajpur diocese, about 440 kilometers northwest of Dhaka.

Father Desai, who is also secretary of the diocesan Catechetical-Liturgical Commission, spoke to UCA News on March 22 following the attacks on his parishioners on March 20.

According to Father Desai, Muslims armed with sticks, bricks and knives attacked villagers who had gathered around noon to watch construction work on a piece of land the parish owns.

“We were watching construction work on Church land when they attacked us. I ran for safety but 10-12 men beat me up,” said Nirod Bakla, 40, who is in charge of the parish hostel.

“I have cuts all over my body. All the parishioners are afraid to leave their homes, even though they have to go to work,” he told UCA News.

It is believed the attack is a result of a seven-year land dispute in which a local court recently sided with the parish. Part of the Church land had previously been occupied by a Muslim-run high school.

But some disgruntled Muslims allegedly led by the school management committee instigated the attack in response to the court verdict.

Father Desai said he has already filed complaints against 17 of the attackers with help from a lawyer sent by Holy Cross Bishop Moses M. Costa of Dinajpur.

“Local authorities and the police asked me not to file any complaints. They said the dispute can be settled, but we doubt that because the Muslims became so violent,” the priest said.

Another tribal Catholic, Sushil Ekka, 35 recounted his terrifying ordeal. “I went to the market to buy betel-leaves when five to six Muslims attacked me and beat me with sticks,” he told UCA News.

“I saved myself by running away,” the farmer said.

“About five out of a total of 14 parishes in the diocese have land-related problems,” Father Anthony Sen, secretary of the diocesan Justice and Peace Commission that deals with Church land issues, told UCA News.

“Most tribal people are illiterate and have no land documents for their ancestral lands. Local Muslims occupy their lands and land disputes arise,” he said.

Source: UCAN
Thursday, March 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation And Security Issues

By Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, for CRS

Chronic political instability in Pakistan and the current offensive against the Taliban in the northwest of the country have called attention to the issue of the security of the country’s nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen described U.S. concern about the matter during a September 22, 2008, speech:

To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven't changed. That said, they are their weapons. They're not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I've spoken with on both the military and civilian side understand that.

U.S. officials continue to be concerned about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons in a destabilized Pakistan. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified March 31, 2009, that “Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.”

Nevertheless, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. President Obama addressed this issue in an April 29, 2009, press conference, stating, “I’m confident that we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We've got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation.” He also recognized the sensitivity of the issue for Pakistan, saying, “We want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don't end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.”1 Declining to engage in “hypotheticals” when asked if the United States is ready to secure the nuclear arsenal if the Pakistani government could not do so, President Obama said he felt “confident that that nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.”

General Petraeus reaffirmed this confidence on May 10: “With respect to the—the nuclear weapons and—and sites that are controlled by Pakistan … we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.”2 Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a May 14, 2009, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told a journalist that Islamabad has “given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures,”3 but U.S. knowledge of Pakistan’s arsenal remains limited, according to U.S. officials. Mullen stated that “we’re limited in what we actually know” about Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Leon Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, similarly acknowledged in a May 18 speech that the United States does not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons-related sites.

Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia.

The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.

Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles—steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that probably triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.4 Deterring India’s nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan’s inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Observers point to India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program.

Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. The country’s main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have other enrichment sites.5

Islamabad gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to have included uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, and missile technology from China.

The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs,6 but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device is unclear. A 1985 National Intelligence Council report stated that Pakistan “probably has a workable design for a nuclear explosive device” and was “probably ... a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough” highly enriched uranium for such a device. A 1993 National Security Council report to Congress stated that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons efforts “culminated with the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear device if necessary by the end of the 1980s.”7 A.Q. Khan stated in an interview published in May 1998 that Islamabad “attained” the capability to detonate such a device “at the end of 1984.”8 In any case, President Bush’s failure to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not “possess a nuclear explosive device” led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment.9

When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998, Pakistan’s government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.10 The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. According to most public estimates, Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, though it could have more;11 a recent public estimate from two prominent experts on the subject stated that the country has between 70 and 90 nuclear weapons.12 Pakistan’s nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU.13 Islamabad reportedly continues to produce HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year.14

Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads and continues to produce plutonium for weapons. Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998.15 It appears that Islamabad is constructing two additional heavy-water reactors, which will expand considerably Pakistan’s plutonium production capacity, at the same site.16 Additionally, Pakistan has a reprocessing facility17 at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and is apparently constructing other such facilities. Nuclear Fuel reported in 2000 that, according to “senior U.S. government officials,” Islamabad had begun operating a “pilot-scale” reprocessing facility at the New Laboratories facility at PINSTECH.18

Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing facility at the site 19 and may be completing a reprocessing facility located at Chasma.20

Islamabad’s construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities could indicate plans to increase and improve Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal in the near future. Indeed, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Maples told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that “Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems.”21

Similarly, Admiral Mullen confirmed during the May 14 hearing that the United States has “evidence” that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal.

Responding to India?

Pakistani officials have indicated that they have already determined the arsenal size needed for a minimum nuclear deterrent and that they will not engage in an arms race with India.

Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India’s nuclear arsenal. Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts.

India has stated that it needs only a “credible minimum deterrent,” but New Delhi has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both the agreement and associated 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to exempt India from some of its export guidelines will renew New Delhi’s access to the international uranium market. This access will result in more indigenous Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India’s newly safeguarded reactors.22

Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same. According to an April 2006 television broadcast, Pakistani officials from the government’s National Command Authority expressed “concern” that the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could tilt the strategic balance between India and Pakistan in favor of the former. The officials suggested that Islamabad may need to increase or improve its nuclear arsenal in order to “to meet all requirements of minimum credible defence deterrence.”23 (See the “Nuclear Doctrine” section for more on Pakistan’s deterrence concept.) Similarly, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wrote in July 2008 that the agreement could cause a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.24 Moreover, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson indicated during a May 21, 2009, press briefing that, despite the government’s continued opposition to a “nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia,” Pakistan may need to increase its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian conventional and nuclear arms expansion.

Illustrating this point, a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson reacted to India’s July 26, 2009, launch of its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine by asserting that “continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability,” adding that “[w]ithout entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance in South Asia.” The submarine, which has not yet been deployed, will reportedly be capable of carrying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.25

Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the U.S.-India agreement is unclear, partly because the government’s decisions regarding those facilities are not publicly available.

In addition to making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons. For example, Peter Lavoy has argued that India’s efforts to improve its conventional military capabilities could enable New Delhi to achieve “technical superiority” in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as precision targeting, providing India with “the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan.”26 Islamabad could respond by lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons, according to Lavoy. Indeed, a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned in May 2009 that Islamabad could take this step. (See the “Nuclear Doctrine” section.)

Nevertheless, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program apparently faces some budget constraints.

Maples testified that “the economic decline will likely slow” the government’s progress in improving its nuclear and conventional military forces. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is reportedly facing “severe financial cuts.”27

Delivery Vehicles Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s purchased from the United States, provided that modifications are made. It is widely believed that Islamabad has made modifications to the F-16s previously sold to them.28 Although concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia,29 the U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F-16s to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power.30 The contract for provision of an additional 36 aircraft was signed on September 30, 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those aircraft and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan’s F-16A/B model aircraft. Pakistan’s F-16 fleet will therefore be expanded, but it is unclear what portion of the fleet will be capable of a nuclear mission. Mirage III and V aircraft could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5’s may have been modified to carry a nuclear payload.31

After India’s first test of its Prithvi ballistic missile in 1988, Pakistan jump-started its own missile program and has three types of ballistic missiles thought to be nuclear-capable: the solid-fuel Hatf-III (Ghaznavi), with a range of about 400 kilometers; the solid-fuel Hatf-IV (Shaheen), with a range of over 450 kilometers32; and the liquid-fuel Hatf-V (Ghauri), with an approximate range of almost 1,300 kilometers.33 34 The solid-fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2) missile, when deployed, will be “capable of reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers,” Maples stated March 10,35 adding that Islamabad has made “significant progress” on the missile. A 2009 National Air and Space Intelligence Center report appears to support this conclusion, stating that the missile “probably will soon be deployed.”

Islamabad continues to carry out ballistic missile tests, but notifies India in advance in accordance with an October 2005 bilateral missile pre-notification pact.36 Maples also indicated that Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles; the Babur (groundlaunched) and the Ra’ad (air-launched), both of which will have estimated ranges of 320 kilometers.37

Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, but prominent officials and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic tenets.38 Describing the guiding principle as minimum credible nuclear deterrence, high-level officials’ statements point to four policy objectives for Islamabad’s nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia.39 Pakistani officials have also indicated that this nuclear posture is designed to preserve territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main rival’s conventional superiority.40

Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out firstuse against a nuclear-armed aggressor, such as India.41 Some analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence against India’s conventional superiority; the Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21 that “there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbour which will disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower the nuclear threshold.” Other analysts argue that keeping the first-use option against New Delhi allows Islamabad to conduct sub-conventional operations, such as support for low intensity conflict or proxy war in Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at the strategic level.42 Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles, deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures.43

Command and Control

Pakistan’s command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. The government’s command and control system is based on “C4I2SR” (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). Islamabad’s Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands.

The NCA, established in 2000, supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces.44 The Prime Minister, as Head of Government, is Chairperson of the NCA.45 The NCA also includes the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Finance, the Director- General of the SPD, and the Commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA; the Chairperson must cast the final vote. The NCA is comprised of two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), each of which includes a mix of civilian and military officials. The ECC’s functions include establishing a command and control system over the use of nuclear weapons. The DCC “exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons.”46 The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA.

The SPD’s functions include formulating Islamabad’s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. 47

On December 13, 2007, then-President Musharraf formalized these authorities and structure in the “National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007.”48 The NCA was established by administrative order, but now has a legal basis. Analysts point out that the timing of this ordinance was meant to help the command and control system weather political transitions and potentially preserve the military’s strong control over the system. The ordinance also addresses the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of “secured information,” gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws. As a result, Pakistani authorities say that the ordinance should strengthen their control over strategic organizations and their personnel.

Security Concerns

According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are probably stored in component form,”49 which suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives.50 But whether this is actually the case is unclear; one report states that the warheads and delivery vehicles are probably stored separately in facilities close to one another, but says nothing about the fissile cores.51 And, according to an account of a 2008 experts’ group visit to Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of the SPD, suggested that the nuclear warheads (containing the fissile cores) may be mated with their delivery vehicles.52 According to Kidwai, the report says, the SPD’s official position is that the weapons “will be ready when required, at the shortest notice; [but] the Pakistani doctrine is not endorsing a US-USSR model with weapons on hair trigger alert.” The 2001 Defense Department report says that Pakistan can probably assemble its weapons fairly quickly.53

It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized people to remove a weapon’s fissile material core if it is not assembled. Dispersal of the assets may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of diversion.54

As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after September 11, 2001, President Musharraf reportedly ordered that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal be redeployed to “at least six secret new locations.”55 This action came at a time of uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad’s leadership was uncertain whether the United States would decide to conduct military strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban. Indeed, President Musharraf cited protection of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for Islamabad’s dramatic policy shift.56

These events, in combination with the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict with India at the Line of Control, and revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, inspired a variety of reforms to secure the nuclear complex. Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999 Kargil crisis, when the Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped missiles.57 It should be noted that, even at the high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no reports of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems.58

In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the country’s arsenal if political instability were to persist.59 Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the country.60 Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that “a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country’s President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief” could jeopardize the army’s unity of command, which “is essential for nuclear security.”61 During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.62 Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons.63 Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.64

However, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed greater confidence regarding the security of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on November 7, 2007 said he believed that there is “plenty of succession planning that’s going on in the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”65 Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience May 29, 2008, that the Pakistani military’s control of the nuclear weapons is “a good thing because that’s an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.” A Department of Defense spokesperson told reporters December 9, 2008, that Washington has “no reason at this point to have any concern with regards to the security” of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. More recently, Maples stated March 10, 2009, that Islamabad “has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons,” although he pointed out that “vulnerabilities exist.” Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

For example, Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances.66 Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under pretty close lock and key.” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, however, sounded somewhat less optimistic in a March 24, 2009, television interview, stating that Moscow is “very much concerned” about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal.67

Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country’s nuclear arsenal. Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “total custodial controls.”68 More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN December 2, 2008, that the country’s nuclear command and control system “is working well.” Additionally, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009, that “there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. We have full confidence in our procedures, mechanisms and command and control systems.”

In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could also be jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining that an “escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons.” This is because [w]hen tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapon storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites—and therefore targeted by opposing forces—the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and launchers in motion are also more susceptible to “insider” threats and accidents.69

Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army’s unity of command. Krepon has also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India.70

U.S. Assistance and Pakistani Nuclear Security

U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani government were famously addressed during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s confirmation hearing in January 2005. In response to a question from Senator John Kerry asking what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”71 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said, “Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty,” emphasizing that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons have been under “strong multi-layered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998.” 72 The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan’s government.73

More recently, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, responding to a report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad’s nuclear weapons, stated November 8, 2009, that Pakistan “does not require any foreign assistance in this regard.” Pakistan will never “allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities,” the spokesperson said, adding that “no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with US officials.”74 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stated the same day that the United States “has no intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material.”

The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon after September 11, 2001.75 U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability.76 Some press reports say that the United States provided Pakistan with Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, although former Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed PALs for its warheads without assistance.77

PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. As noted above, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.78 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000-member security force, commanded by a two-star general.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview that there has been U.S. assistance in this area, explaining that the United States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.”79 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed out in May 2009 that “there’s not a lot of transparency into” how Islamabad spends the U.S. funds, but he nevertheless characterized them as “money well spent.”80 A Pakistani official said in November 2009 that Pakistan reserves the right to “pick and choose” the nuclear security measures it will undertake, adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are “nonintrusive.” 81

The extent to which Pakistan has shared information about its nuclear arsenal with the United States is unclear. Although, as noted, former President Musharraf has acknowledged Islamabad’s sharing of some information, General Tariq Majid, Chair of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated November 9, 2009, that “there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear assets.”82

The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country.83 Pakistan’s response to these proposals is unclear.

It is worth noting that, according to some observers, spent fuel from Pakistan’s Karachi and Chasma nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to theft or attack.84 Pakistani officials have expressed confidence in the security of its facilities, however.85

Proliferation Threat

Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.86 Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.87

Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States “received fragmentary information from an intelligence service” that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had “sent emissaries to establish contact” with the network.88 Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda “had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.”89 Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.

The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S. reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007, statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.”90

More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said that the network “is no longer operating.” For its part, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated February 7, 2009, that Pakistan “has dismantled the nuclear black market network.” Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview whether North Korea was transferring “nuclear weapons” or related advice to North Korea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied that there is “no evidence” that Pakistan is doing so However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:

I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say that.

Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007 report that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could ... resume their black-market business.”91

Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had “personal, consistent access” to Khan, but added that he did not “have all the details of everything we’ve done.” Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the agency’s investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.92 Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation “closed”—a position an Office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009.

The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on 13 individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The sanctions were imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and Executive Orders 12938 and 13382.

Pakistan’s Response to the Proliferation Threat

Undersecretary Burns testified in July 2007 that the Bush administration has “told the Pakistani government that it is its responsibility ... to make sure” that neither the Khan network nor a “similar organization” resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the Khan network, Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to what extent these efforts have been successful is not yet clear. It is worth noting that, because Khan conducted his proliferation activities as a government official, they do not necessarily indicate a failure of Islamabad’s export controls.

Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials.93 For example, Islamabad adopted in September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for “goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use” of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali, Director of Pakistan’s Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV),94 the lists, which were issued in October 2005 and are to be periodically updated, include items controlled by multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.95 The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.96

The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has established the SECDIV and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary.

Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear security. For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is “implementing a National Security Action Plan with the [IAEA’s] assistance.” That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S.- and Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As noted above, the December 2007 National Command Authority Ordinance also includes measures to prevent the spread of nuclear related materials and expertise.

Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making security clearance procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.97 Similarly, Admiral Mullen stated May 14, 2009, that the country’s personnel reliability system must “continue to improve.”

The United States has also provided export control assistance to Pakistan. Burns described several such efforts in his July 2007 testimony.98 And according to an October 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Islamabad was during FY2003-FY2006 the second-largest recipient of bilateral U.S. assistance designed to improve target countries’ export controls. Pakistan received such assistance from the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security.99

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security-Designate Ellen Tauscher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Obama administration does not support conditioning aid to Pakistan on permitting direct U.S. access to Khan, arguing, in part, that the United States has “obtained a great deal of information about the Khan network without havingdirect access to A.Q. Khan.”100

Issues for Congress

Members of Congress have also expressed concerns regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and related material. Senator Richard Lugar has spoken out in favor of using the cooperative threat reduction tools in Pakistan to help with the security of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and weapons in the country.101

Additionally, a number of pieces of legislation appear designed to influence Islamabad’s policies regarding the Khan network. Section 2 of H.R. 1463, which was introduced March 12, 2009, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the same day, states that U.S. military assistance may be provided to Pakistan only if the President certifies that Islamabad is both making A.Q.

Khan available to the United States for questioning and “providing adequate assurances to the United States Government that it will monitor Khan’s movements and activities in such a manner as to prevent his participation in any efforts to disseminate nuclear technology or know-how.”

This section allows the President to waive restrictions on U.S. assistance imposed pursuant to the proposed legislation if the President “certifies to Congress that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so.”

H.R. 2481, the United States-Pakistan Security and Stability Act, which was introduced May 19, 2009, and referred the same day to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Intelligence Committee, would require the President to “develop and transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan for long-term security and stability in Pakistan.”

The strategy is to include a “description of how United States assistance” authorized by the bill “will be used to achieve the objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan,” one of which is “to empower and enable” Islamabad to “maintain robust command and control over its nuclear weapons technology.” The bill would authorize foreign assistance for Pakistan, including funds for improving the government’s counter-insurgency capability.

H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009, would authorize U.S. assistance to Pakistan for a variety of purposes. These include strengthening democratic institutions and law enforcement, as well as supporting economic development, education, human rights, and heath care. The bill would also authorize additional U.S. security assistance for Islamabad. However, Section 206 of the bill places conditions on some of this assistance; it states that no U.S. military assistance shall be provided to Pakistan if the President has not made a series of determinations, one of which is that the government “is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials, including, as necessary, providing access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.” The section includes a national security waiver. The bill also requires a report to Congress that includes a “description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise” and an “assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan pursuant to this Act has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.” The committee report underlines continuing concerns about getting full information about the activities of the Khan network and development of Pakistan’s own nuclear arsenal:

Pakistan’s history of nuclear development and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s establishment of a nuclear proliferation network remain a source for concern to many in the United States, particularly since the Committee understands that representatives of the United States have not interviewed certain individuals involved in the network. The Committee believes the United States should continue to engage the Government of Pakistan on the network, and should, as necessary, obtain direct access to the individuals covered by this subsection, including Dr. Khan. The Committee also maintains strong concerns regarding recent reports of Pakistan expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Given the expanding threat of Pakistan’s domestic insurgency, the Government of Pakistan’s further development of nuclear materials appears inconsistent with its immediate security threats and is unhelpful in the context of efforts to strengthen U.S.-Pakistani relations.

H.R. 1886 was introduced April 2, 2009, and referred the same day to both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Rules Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported the bill May 22, and the Rules Committee discharged it the same day. The bill was referred to the House Armed Services Committee May 22 and discharged June 2. On June 11, the House passed H.R. 1886, which was appended to H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. H.R. 2410 has been received by the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Senate passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962) unanimously on June 24, 2009. This bill would provide aid to Pakistan but does not include conditions regarding the nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear weapons activities. The Senate report (S.Rept. 111-33) says that “Any use of funds contained in this legislation for the purpose of augmenting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program would be directly contrary to Congressional intent.”

S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 represents a compromise between H.R. 1886 and S. 962. It passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 24, 2009. The House passed the bill on September 30. It became public law (P.L. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060) on October 15, 2009.

Section 203 (c) of S. 1707 requires that the President certifies that Pakistan is “continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.” It also requires a Semi-Annual Monitoring Report that would include a detailed description of Pakistan’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts and an assessment of whether assistance has “directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program.”

In response to concerns expressed in Pakistan over the intent of the bill, a “Joint Explanatory Statement” was submitted for the Congressional Record by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman. The statement emphasizes that “the legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations.” Regarding reporting requirements on nuclear nonproliferation cooperation, the statement says:

The many requirements of this report are intended as a way for Congress to assess how effectively U.S. funds are being spent, shortfalls in U.S. resources that hinder the use of such funds, and steps the Government of Pakistan has taken to advance our mutual interests in countering extremism and nuclear proliferation and strengthening democratic institutions.

There is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any U.S. role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military.102

Authors: Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation and Mary Beth Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation. This report was prepared for by the Congressional Report Service, December 9, 2009 and may be found here at the FAS website (PDF)

NOTES:

1 President Obama’s 100th-Day Press Briefing transcript, April 29, 2009, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/29text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
2 Interview with General David H. Petraeus, FOX News Sunday, May 10, 2009. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,519696,00.html.
3 Seymour M. Hersh, “Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be Kept Safe?” The New Yorker, November 16, 2009.
4 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 37.
5 Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 and David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” in A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) May 2002. For a list of Pakistani nuclear facilities, see chart in Pakistan chapter of Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
6 See, for example, a 1978 Central Intelligence Agency report, available at http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/44/
0000107983/(UNTITLED)-RE.html, as well as a 1983 State Department document, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf.
7 National Security Council, Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, 1993. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/930728-wmd.htm.
8 “Pakistan: Qadeer Khan Interviewed on Pakistan N-Test,” The News, May 30, 1998.
9 The Pressler Amendment (August 1985) linked aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid ‘will reduce significantly the risk’ that Pakistan will possess such a device. For background summary of sanctions legislation, see CRS Report 98-486, Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and CRS Report RS22757, U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan, by Richard F. Grimmett.
10 Seismic data showed yields less than those officially announced by Pakistan and India. See Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennet, “False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty,” Arms Control Today, May 1998 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_05/vimy98.asp.
11Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.asp; “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” International Panel on Fissile Materials http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf; SIPRI Yearbook 2007. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that Pakistan has enough fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for 65-80 nuclear weapons; this estimate assumes 25 kilograms of HEU per weapon and 4.5-6 kilograms of plutonium per weapon (“Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr08cv.pdf).
12 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2009.
13 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007.
14 “Global Fissile Material Report 2007.”
15 A Pakistani newspaper reported in April 1998 that, according to a “top government source,” the reactor had begun operating (“Pakistan’s Indigenous Nuclear Reactor Starts Up,” The Nation, April 13, 1998). A June 15, 2000 article cited “U.S. officials” who indicated that the reactor had begun operating two years earlier (Mark Hibbs, “After 30 Years, PAEC Fulfills Munir Khan’s Plutonium Ambition,” Nucleonics Week, June 15, 2000). A 2001 Department of Defense report stated that the reactor “will produce plutonium,” but did not say whether it was operating (U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27).
16 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Update on Khushab Plutonium Production Reactor Construction Projects in Pakistan,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 23, 2009; Mark Hibbs and Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan Civilian Fuel Cycle Plan Linked To NSG Trade Exception,” Nuclear Fuels, August 27, 2007.
17 “Reprocessing” refers to the process of separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.
18 Hibbs, June 15, 2000. According to a 1983 State Department document, the New Laboratories facility was “capable of extracting small quantities of plutonium,” but large enough to “allow for expansion of reprocessing capacity.” Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf.
19 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 19, 2009. The 2001 Defense Department report stated that reprocessing facilities “are under construction,” but did not identify any sites (Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27).
20 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma Nuclear Site in Pakistan with Possible Reprocessing Plant,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 18, 2007. Construction on the facility was begun during the 1970s with French assistance, but France cancelled its assistance for the project later that decade.
21 Norris and Kristensen explain that plutonium reactors “provide the Pakistani military with several options: fabricating weapons that use plutonium cores, mixing plutonium with HEU to make composite cores, or using tritium to ‘boost’ the warheads’ yield.” (Norris and Kristensen, 2007).
22 See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
23 “Pakistan Command Meeting Voices Concern Over Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” Pakistan TV, April 12, 2006.
24 Available at http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/07/indian-separation-plan.html.
25 Bappa Majumdar, “India Launches Its First Nuclear-Powered Submarine,” Reuters, July 26, 2009; Nasir Jaffry, “Pakistan Hits Out At ‘Detrimental’ Indian Nuclear Sub,” Agence France Presse, July 28, 2009; “Induction Of Indigenous Nuke Sub Into Navy Longway Off: Experts,” The Press Trust of India, July 26, 2009; “N-Submarine Still Wrapped In Secrecy,” Indo-Asian News Service, July 27, 2009.
26 Peter Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future:Worries Beyond War, Henry Sokolski, Ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute) January 2008. p. 158.
27 “Pak Nuclear Program Faces 35% Cut,” The News, May 1, 2009.
28 The 1993 National Security Council report indicated that Pakistan would use these aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. See National Security Council, Report to Congress.
29 CRS Report RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications, by Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmett, and K. Alan Kronstadt; Zachary Ginsburg, “US Renews Fighter Exports to Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, September 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/USPakistan.asp.
30 “Release of these systems would not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage. Release of these modifications to Pakistan will neither affect the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology as this level of capability or higher already exists in other countries in the region.” Defense Security and Cooperation Agency news release, June 28, 2006. http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2006/Pakistan_06-11.pdf.
31 CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
32 Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman of Pakistan’s National Engineering and Scientific Commission, gave the missile’s range as 700 kilometers during a 2004 television interview (“Capital Talk Special,” GEO-TV, May 3, 2004).
33 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009.
34 All ballistic missiles described in this paragraph are road-mobile.
35 See also, Nuclear Notebook, ibid.; “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” Arms Control Today Fact Sheet, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp; and Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, July 2004. http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2004-3375p.pdf. Mubarakmand gave the missile’s range as 2,500 kilometers in the 2004 interview.
36“Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.” Full text on the Henry L. Stimson Center website: http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207949.
37 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2009.
38 Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Paper presented to the Conference on Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, Nonproliferation Education Center, Washington, DC, April 28, 2006: http://www.npecweb.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070121-Lavoy-PakistanNuclearPosture&PDFFolder=Essays.
39 Durrani, 2004.
40 For an in-depth discussion of minimum deterrence, see Naeem Salik, “Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan,” Landau Network Centro Volta South Asia Security Project Case Study, January 2006. http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/South%20Asia%20Security%20Program_file%5CDocumenti%5CCase%20Studies%5CSalik%20-
%20S.A.%20Case%20Study%202006.pdf.
41 It is worth noting, however, that President Zardari stated in late 2008 that Pakistan would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against India. See James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan In Trade And Arms Offer To India,” Financial Times, November 23, 2008; “Pakistan Against Use Of Nuclear Weapons: Zardari,” Associated Press of Pakistan, November 22, 2008; “Interview with President Asif Ali Zardari,” CNN Larry King Live, December 2, 2008.
42 Kanti Bajpai, “No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context,” Pugwash Workshop No. 279, November 2002. http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/bajpai.htm.
43 Lavoy, 2006.
44 December 2007 Ordinance To Provide For The Constitution And Establishment Of National Command Authority.
45 When the NCA was established in 2000, the government’s announcement designated the Head of Government, or Prime Minister, as Chairperson. At that time, General Musharraf, as Chief Executive, became Chairperson and stayed in that position after becoming President in 2002. He appointed the Prime Minister as Vice Chairman. However, President Zardari returned the NCA to its original structure when, in a November 2009 re-promulgation of the 2007 NCA Ordinance, he specified that the Prime Minister would be Chairperson, removing himself from that position (this re-promulgation also abolished the position of Vice Chairman). Zardari may have done this in reaction to Parliamentary pressure, and perhaps to boost his waning political support. According to Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik, the change in Chairmanship may have only a symbolic impact on nuclear policy-making, since no changes were made to the Strategic Plans Division itself. The Pakistani Parliament is now considering a bill, the National Command Bill of 2009, which includes these provisions, and could add reporting requirements on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. A July 2009 Supreme Court decision required that the Ordinances from the Musharraf era be made law. 46 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2007. p. 111; Pakistan Announcement of Nuclear-Weapons Command-and-Control Mechanism, Associated Press of Pakistan, February 3, 2000. Nuclear Black Markets, pp. 110-111, has organization charts of the NCA and SPD.
47 See P. Cotta-Ramusino and M. Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability And Nuclear Strategy In Pakistan: A Concise Report Of A Visit By Landau Network - Centro Volta,” January 14, 2002. Available at http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm; Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, December 2007; Robin Walker, “Pakistan’s Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State: Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai’s CCC Address, Strategic Insights, November 1, 2006.
48 “President Promulgated National Command Authority Ordinance,” Associated Press of Pakistan, December 13, 2007.
49 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27.
50 Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned; Lack of Knowledge About Arsenal May Limit U.S. Options,” Washington Post, November 11, 2007; Peter Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan’s Drive To Guard Its A-Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007; David E. Sanger, “Trust Us: So, What About Those Nukes?,” New York Times, November 11, 2007; Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p.33; Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, 2002. See also, George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace quoted in Nigel Hawkes, “Pakistan Could Lose Control of its Arsenal,” The Times (London), September 20, 2001.
51 Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation.” p. 141.
52 Maurizio Martellini, “Security and Safety Issues about the Nuclear Complex: Pakistan’s Standpoints. A Concise Report Of A Visit To Islamabad By Landau Network Centro Volta (LNCV) Mission Carried Out On February 9-13
2008.”
53 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 28.
54 See Graham Allison, “What About the Nukes?” Newsweek Web, December 28, 2007. http://www.newsweek.com/id/82259
55 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons - Musharraf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure,” Washington Post, November 11, 2001.
56 “Partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf’s televised speech asking the people of Pakistan to support his course of action,” September 19, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/pakistantext_091901.html.
57 Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series, 2002. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/reidel.pdf.
58 Lavoy, 2006.
59 “Opinions Mixed on Pakistani Nuclear Security,” Global Security Newswire, November 6, 2007. http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/recent_stories.asp?category=nuclear#6783E660.
60 Also see comments by David Albright in the same interview (“Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir Bhutto,” CNN, November 5, 2007).
61 “U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relations,” Statement before the Committee on Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security June 12, 2008.
62 “Lieutenant General Carter Ham Holds a Defense Department Briefing,” CQ Transcripts, November 7, 2007.
63 “Al Baradei to Al Hayat,” Dar Al Hayat, English Edition on-line, January 10, 2008, http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/01-2008/Article-20080110-639032eb-c0a8-10ed-01ae-81ab2ea588db/story.html.
64 Also see comments by David Albright in “Pakistan in Crisis,” 2007.
65 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Democracy, Authoritarianism and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan, November 7, 2007.
66 “Pak Nukes Safely Guarded, Says Narayanan,” The Press Trust of India, December 16, 2007.
67 Lyubov Pronina and Ellen Pinchuk, “Russia ‘Concerned’ About Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Bloomberg, March 25, 2009.
68 “Pakistan Nukes Under Control: Musharraf,” Agence France Presse, November 13, 2007.
69 Krepon, June 12, 2008.
70 Michael Krepon, “Complexities Of Nuclear Risk Reduction In South Asia,” The Hindu, May 29, 2009.
71 “The Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State,” Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18 and 19, 2005. The concept of a contingency plan to take over Pakistan’s nuclear assets was first written about by Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads,” The New Yorker, November 5, 2001.
72 “Strategic Assets Are Safe, Says FO,” Dawn, November 12, 2007.
73 “Pentagon Readies Plan for Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” The Guardian, December 28, 2007. For a discussion of the difficulties of such a scenario, see Shaun Gregory, “The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief_22finalised.pdf
74 “Pakistan Foreign Office Rejects U.S. Media Report on Nuclear Arsenal,” Associated Press of Pakistan, November 9, 2009.
75 Alex Wagner, “U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, December 2001. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/paknucsecdec01.asp.
76 Joby Warrick, “U.S. Has Concerns Over Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, November 11, 2007; David Sanger and William Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 17, 2007.
77 Kaushik Kapisthalam, “Guarding Pakistan’s Nuclear Estate,” Asia Times, April 6, 2005. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD06Df04.html; Robert Windrem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear History Worries Insiders,” NBC News, November 6, 2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660667/. General Kidwai has stated that “if a country can make complex nuclear weapons and ballistic cruise missiles grant it that PALs is a far simpler technology.” (Cited in Martellini, 2008).
78 Mubarakmand provided some details about Pakistan’s use of such codes in the 2004 interview.
79 “A Conversation With Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,” PBS: The Charlie Rose Show, November 6, 2007.
80 Ben Arnoldy, “Could Taliban Get Keys To Pakistan’s A-Bomb? Experts See The Islamic Fighters As Less Of A Risk Than Radical Insiders Gaining Access To Nuclear Materials,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 2009.
81 Mariana Baabar, “Pak N-safety Plan,” The News International, November 10, 2009.
82 Ibid.
83 Bryan Bender, “Pakistan, US In Talks On Nuclear Security,” The Boston Globe, May 5, 2009.
84 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008.
85 Martellini, 2008.
86 For more information on Pakistani proliferation, see CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options, by Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni. Also see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
87 Libya obtained uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weapons designs that could support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea currently has a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and may also have a uranium-based program. Iran is suspected of pursuing both plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs.
88 Tenet, George and Harlow, Bill, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, HarperCollins: New York, 2007. p. 261.
89 The report is available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html.
90 Unclassified Statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.
91 Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p. 159.
92 Personal communication, November 9, 2007.
93 Details of Pakistan’s nuclear-related legislation can be found in the country’s reports to the UN 1540 Committee. Both can be found at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/597/46/PDF/N0459746.pdf?OpenElement.
94 Presentation given to Partnership for Global Security Workshop, “Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan,” February 21-22, 2008. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/zafar_export.pdf.
95 The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multilateral, voluntary group of nuclear supplier states which have agreed to coordinate their exports of civilian nuclear technology and materials in order to prevent importers from using them to produce nuclear weapons. The Australia Group is a voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement through which participating countries coordinate their national export controls to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents, as well as related equipment, technologies, and knowledge, to countries and nonstate entities suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons capabilities. The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal, voluntary arrangement in which participants agree to adhere to common export policy guidelines applied to an “annex” that lists items related to the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
96 The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance of 2000 regulates the import and export of chemicals in accordance with the convention.
97 Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security: Workshop Synopsis. April 30, 2007.
98 Burns mentioned Pakistan’s participation in the Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative. Under these programs, “the United States and Pakistan worked together to install screening and radiation detection equipment to scan U.S.-bound cargo.” He also stated that the Department of Energy “is working with Pakistan on radiation source security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings.”
99 GAO Report, Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results, October 31, 2007.
100 Question #54, Pre-Hearing Questions for the Record by Senator Richard Lugar Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination of Ellen M. Tauscher to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/TauscherQFR.pdf.
101 “Statement by Sen. Lugar on Nunn-Lugar and Pakistan,” May 6, 2009, http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=312588&
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