Can-Tex's Activities In Yemen Discussed; Potential Seen For Silver, Nickel
Yemen Governor of Mehweet Ahmed Mohsen held talks on Tuesday with the General Manager of the Canadian Can-Tex Fred Wilki on the company's activities in the field of mineral exploration in the province, reported Yemen state media agency SABA.
The Canadian official noted that the work carried out by the company comes after a number of explorations in the northern and western provinces, SABA reported, adding that the company sees potential, "particularly as it is currently prospecting for nickel and silver in a number of districts in Hajjah, Amran and Mehweet provinces."
According to the SABA report, in the meeting, Mohesen stressed the importance for Yemen of implementing geological studies and exploration to make use of the available different minerals in the province.
Additionally, SABA reported, the governor expressed his appreciation for the work done by the Canadian company in the field of exploration of gold and other minerals.
The Canadian official noted that the work carried out by the company comes after a number of explorations in the northern and western provinces, SABA reported, adding that the company sees potential, "particularly as it is currently prospecting for nickel and silver in a number of districts in Hajjah, Amran and Mehweet provinces."
According to the SABA report, in the meeting, Mohesen stressed the importance for Yemen of implementing geological studies and exploration to make use of the available different minerals in the province.
Additionally, SABA reported, the governor expressed his appreciation for the work done by the Canadian company in the field of exploration of gold and other minerals.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Trucking Toward Climate Change
By Dahr Jamail for Truthout
The tar sands mining project in Alberta, Canada, is possibly the largest industrial project in human history and critics claim it could also be the most destructive. The mining procedure for extracting oil from a region referred to as the “tar sands,” located north of Edmonton, releases at least three times the CO2 emissions as regular oil production procedures and will likely become North America’s single largest industrial contributor to climate change.
Most of the oil produced by the project will likely be consumed by the United States, a country that, along with Canada, is already heavily invested, on many levels, in the project.
The project is operated by Imperial Oil, whose parent company, ExxonMobil Canada, has a long-term production goal of more than 300,000 barrels of bitumen (extra heavy oil) per day. To do this, they will require new equipment to be shipped through the United States.
Trucks and trailers moving specialized, nontoxic mining equipment from where it is manufactured in Korea to the Kearl oil sands project, located in the Athabasca oil sands in northeastern Alberta, are slated to use highways in Idaho and Montana to transport the gear. This would happen after it has been shipped across the Pacific Ocean to Portland, Oregon, where it would then be barged up the Hood and Snake Rivers to Lewiston, Idaho, from which it would be hauled over land into Canada.
Pius Rolheiser, a spokesman for Imperial Oil, said this is the most cost-effective method of moving the equipment, much to the chagrin of many residents in these states.
The basis of most opposition to this idea is that the tar sands project will contribute so heavily toward worsening climate change. There are other criticisms as well, like those aimed at the size of the equipment to be shipped along routes that are designated “wild and scenic” highways that wind precariously through fragile ecosystems.
“We can speculate that this will have a significant impact on Bull Trout habitat, an endangered species and on Grizzly Bear habitat, which the EA [Environmental Agency] in Montana has noted as an issue from the construction itself, sediment buildup, paving equipment and such,” Nick Stocks, co-founder of the group Northern Rockies Rising Tide in Missoula, Montana, a group that promotes local, community-based solutions to the climate crisis and takes direct action toward confronting what it sees as the root causes of climate change, told Truthout.
“In Montana the construction of new pullouts and the repaving and upgrading of existing pullouts is cause for much concern along the Montana portion of Highway 12,” Stocks added. “Community members and organizations have fought to clean up both of these areas and protect them as the wild and scenic places they are. New construction, new turnouts and this proposed new corridor all run contrary to decades of work and investment the community has had in maintaining these places. The risk of spill, mitigation procedures and sediment issues in the rivers have not been adequately taken into account.”
The “modules” from Korea comprise loads that are more than 150 feet long, approximately 30 feet high, 25 feet wide and weigh roughly 500,000 pounds. The giant trucks that will move these are from the Dutch company Mammoet (Dutch for mammoth). The rigs are so tall they do not fit under highway overpasses, are so wide they take up two traffic lanes and the estimated top speed of transporting them is 30 miles per hour. The trucks are 12 times the size of normal tractor-trailer trucks and each one has 48 tires.
Much of the designated route for transport contains only two lanes, with little or no shoulders, and would have to be modified by adding pull-out lanes, removing overhead power lines and traffic lights, as well as moving signs.
“Where are these industrial mega-rigs going to find the room to construct pullouts along the Northwest Scenic Passage Byway?” Brett Haverstick with the group Friends of the Clearwater, said to Truthout. His group is a nonprofit whose mission states that it works to “defend the Idaho Clearwater Bioregion’s wildlands and biodiversity through a forest watch program, litigation, grassroots public involvement, outreach and education.”
Highway 12 in Idaho runs through what is known as “Wild Clearwater Country,” which is “the northern half of central Idaho’s Big Wild” that “contains many unprotected roadless areas and wild rivers and provides crucial habitat for countless rare plant and animal species” according to the group.
“As it stands, the highway is only two lanes wide, with the Middle Fork of the Clearwater River hugging one shoulder and the other being right up against granite cliffs or forested lands,” Haverstick, who is the education and outreach director of the group continued, “There is no place to build a pullover along many stretches of the route.”
Stocks told Truthout that Imperial Oil’s current plan is to have all the construction completed in time for the test run and that much of it is already occurring.
“Members of the Nez Perce tribe and individuals were kept in the dark regarding the reason behind expanding the highway, but many now feel that the expansion was driven through in preparation for this Corridor,” Stocks continued, “More specifically, Idaho doesn’t have the same environmental review process that Montana does where transportation issues are concerned. There has been no review of the damage that might be caused by building the equivalent of a 30 foot wide asphalt football field every two miles.”
Haverstick shares similar concerns.
“Let’s say the pullovers are somehow, someway, modified to fit these behemoth rigs. Is it a good idea to have these 200 foot long, 25 feet wide, 30 feet high drilling rigs parked next to a Wild & Scenic River? What if the pullout cannot support the weight of these 500,000 plus-pound trucks and the road or shoulder collapses and the rig dumps into the Lochsa River? Then what are you going to do? What a potential disaster.”
Under the current proposal, 200 of these loads will be transported across Idaho and Montana during a 12- to 18-month period that could start by the end of this year. A test run is slated to occur by the end of this summer.
Rolheiser said Imperial Oil has spent about two years looking at the most cost-effective way to get the prefabricated equipment from Korea and the Montana-Idaho route is the best option.
The oil company’s plan involves one to two trucks per day using US highways 12 and 200 through Idaho and Montana, theoretically only at night so as to minimize disturbing traffic patterns. Imperial Oil has already given briefings to many local officials along the proposed route.
Yet, this idea also brings up other concerns.
“It sounds pretty goofy to me,” said Missoula County Commissioner Jean Curtiss, who heard about the monster-rig plan when Imperial made a presentation to the county commission in late 2009. “Think of what would happen if they hit ice on Rogers Pass?”
“Obviously, the safety of the people transporting the equipment and the safety of the public are paramount,” spokesman Rolheiser said at the time, “If we didn’t think it was safe, we wouldn’t do it.”
Haverstick feels there is more to be concerned about, in addition to public safety.
“This project should alarm people, whether they live in the states in which this project is being transported through or not,” he told Truthout, “In 1803 President Jefferson commissioned Meriwether Lewis & William Clark to find the Northwest Passage, the link between the Missouri River and the Columbia River through the unexplored Rocky Mountains. US Highway 12 was designated the Northwest Passage Scenic Byway because it parallels the exact route that Lewis & Clark traveled over two hundred years ago. Besides the highway itself, much of the primitive landscape remains the same. This Wild & Scenic River corridor is not only home to the proud and honorable people of the Nez Perce Nation, but it’s the heart and soul of our American heritage.”
The Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) and Idaho Department of Transportation (IDT) agencies have the ultimate authorities to approve the plan.
MDT director Jim Lynch said Imperial won’t get a green light for the plan unless it follows state laws and regulations, mitigates traffic problems and proves that roads and bridges won’t be damaged, among other issues. Lynch said MDT has also asked the oil company to do an environmental review.
“It’s important that they [Imperial] recognize they have to follow Montana environmental law and address the impacts and that they discuss the plans with communities to make sure communities are least impacted,” Lynch said.
Critics of the plan do not believe there is anything Imperial can do to make it possible to carry forward with the project in a way that poses no risk of damage to wilderness, rivers, wildlife and ecosystems along the transport route.
There is much doubt that a thorough and honest environmental impact assessment will be possible before the project begins if the company intends to stay on schedule.
“If we allow this shipping project to go through, the result will be the creation of a heavy use high-and-wide corridor that will be used to ship mining equipment to the Alberta tar sands for decades,” Stocks told Truthout, “As much as the MDT and Imperial Oil want to argue the opposite, this is not a one time deal. The environmental review process thus far has refused to take into account the full scope of the proposed Kearl project and its ramifications as the catalyst for all the needed construction for this Corridor. In fact, the MDT and Governor Brian Schweitzer have refused to acknowledge the possibility that this route will be used as a future transportation corridor even though the MDT gave a presentation to the Montana Legislature last year regarding the development potential of such a ‘high-and-wide corridor’ through our state and the Exxon’s role in the project.”
Imperial Oil has stated it will cover the costs of the trucking project, which will entail hundreds of changes to the route before the massive loads could pass through the area concerned without causing damage.
As an example, in Missoula County alone, a briefing with Missoula County commissioners found that Imperial plans to relocate utility lines at about 230 crossings and place 77 of them underground, make 16 fixes on one street (including moving signs and traffic signals), build or modify dozens of turnouts so the rigs can pull over to let traffic pass.
The equipment is to be used to mine the tar sands that are mixtures of soil, water and bitumen. Northern Alberta contains the largest known deposits of tar sand, with an area roughly the size of Florida that lies under some of the largest old-growth forest remaining in the world. It is believed the area contains 1.7 trillion barrels of oil, an amount equal to the world’s currently known reserves of conventional oil.
The exploitation of the tar sands is the most rapidly growing sector of the petroleum industry and is speeding up as the cost per barrel of oil increases, making the project more appealing, given that it currently requires more energy to extract the oil than the oil itself provides.
The tar sands project has raised great concern from environmental groups around the world, in addition to those in Montana and Idaho.
“The Tar Pit Sands project is one giant nightmare,” Haverstick said, “There are major social, environmental, economic, legal and political consequences. And it’s just not a local issue, but global. This project affects every living being, human or non-human on the planet. The carbon footprint is enormous, possibly bigger than anything we’ve seen before.”
Haverstick feels, “in a time when we are supposed to be working toward reducing our carbon footprint, scaling back the amount of carbon dioxide we pump into the atmosphere and searching and developing renewable energies, this project instead puts us back another hundred years, if not more. From a carbon emissions footprint, Tar Sand Mining may be the filthiest form of energy production we know of. And that’s not including the ecological damage that occurs when drilling for this stuff. Who knows what type of condition the remaining Boreal Forest in Alberta, Canada and the surrounding watershed will be in when this project is completed in 50 years. It will be on par with, if not much worse off than mountain-top removal projects occurring in West Virginia right now.”
There are approximately 100 tar sand projects (comprised of 3,200 mining leases, covering an area the size of Maryland) planned in Canada, with at least $200 billion dollars already invested.
“The tar sands themselves have been called the most destructive industrial project on the face of the plant for good reason,” Stocks, whose group is active on four continents and growing, told Truthout, “The devastation of this mining to the Alberta boreal forest, the Athabasca River, the Athabasca Delta and the communities, both First Nations and not, have been well documented.”
Indigenous communities both downstream from the tar sand mines in Canada as well as those along the proposed trucking route of the mining equipment are concerned about threats to their physical health, sacred sites and the health of their land base.
Some First Nations people who live downstream from the tar sands mines in Canada are reporting increased incidence of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, multiple sclerosis and rare types of cancer due to toxic wastes leaching into the waterway from tailings ponds. Also arsenic, at 33 times the acceptable level, is being found in game meats that First Nations people rely on, as well as some animals being found with tumors and mutations.
The mining of the tar sands, being as much solid as they are liquid, requires great effort. The easiest method is strip mining, though some newer mines heat and dilute the bitumen underground to make it flow easier. Once removed from the ground, bitumen is too viscous to flow through pipelines as conventional crude does, thus, it is next converted into synthetic oil to aid transport. These processes can use huge quantities of water and require so much electricity that one tar sand mine has considered building a nuclear power plant to power the mine itself.
“For Montana, the successful development of this shipping corridor is synonymous with Montana complacency in the destruction of Alberta and the impact that continued mining has on climate change,” Stocks added about the role the shipping corridor would play toward contributing to climate change. “In Montana, further climate change means more beetle killed forests, fewer glaciers, reduced springtime stream flow and more extensive fires in summer. Agricultural lands already feel the impact of drought and our forests feel the impact of warmer winters. It doesn’t matter what industry you belong to in our state, climate change is all inclusive.”
Research shows that tar sands mining causes an extraordinary and often permanent, detriment to the environment. Air monitoring near Fort McMurray, Alberta, for example, has recorded excessive levels of toxic hydrogen sulfide, as well as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide and particulate matters.
Tar sand exploiter, Suncor Energy, received an Environmental Protection Order from the government of Alberta in 2007 as a result.
While the MDT does not yet know what level of environmental review will be required before issuing the permits to transport the mining equipment, MDT Director Jim Lynch has said that only the direct impacts these shipments will have on the state will be considered for issuance.
That means that the MDT environmental review will specifically ignore any concerns about the effects of tar sand mining, or the oil economy on environment.
The permits, if issued, will net Montana and Idaho a few hundred thousand dollars each, but critics claim the economic impact of traffic delays alone could exceed that amount.
The modification of the roadways is believed to require just a few months of construction, thus, job creation from the project will be minimal and temporary.
The success or failure of the initial test run scheduled for this summer in Idaho will determine whether the rest of the permits will be issued.
Haverstick and Stocks say their groups, along with many others, intend to fight the project.
“We have been engaging in building a network opposed to these shipments that runs the length of the route,” Stocks said, “From the Port of Vancouver to the Port of Sweetgrass we hope to build a viable opposition to these shipments that will take many different forms of action to stop them.”
Dahr Jamail is an independent journalist who writes for the Inter Press Service, Le Monde Diplomatique, and many other outlets. His stories have also been published with The Nation, The Sunday Herald in Scotland, Al-Jazeera, the Guardian, Foreign Policy in Focus, and the Independent to name just a few. He maintains the website Dahr Jamail's Mideast Dispatches, where this article appeared and is reprinted with permission.
The tar sands mining project in Alberta, Canada, is possibly the largest industrial project in human history and critics claim it could also be the most destructive. The mining procedure for extracting oil from a region referred to as the “tar sands,” located north of Edmonton, releases at least three times the CO2 emissions as regular oil production procedures and will likely become North America’s single largest industrial contributor to climate change.
Most of the oil produced by the project will likely be consumed by the United States, a country that, along with Canada, is already heavily invested, on many levels, in the project.
The project is operated by Imperial Oil, whose parent company, ExxonMobil Canada, has a long-term production goal of more than 300,000 barrels of bitumen (extra heavy oil) per day. To do this, they will require new equipment to be shipped through the United States.
Trucks and trailers moving specialized, nontoxic mining equipment from where it is manufactured in Korea to the Kearl oil sands project, located in the Athabasca oil sands in northeastern Alberta, are slated to use highways in Idaho and Montana to transport the gear. This would happen after it has been shipped across the Pacific Ocean to Portland, Oregon, where it would then be barged up the Hood and Snake Rivers to Lewiston, Idaho, from which it would be hauled over land into Canada.
Pius Rolheiser, a spokesman for Imperial Oil, said this is the most cost-effective method of moving the equipment, much to the chagrin of many residents in these states.
The basis of most opposition to this idea is that the tar sands project will contribute so heavily toward worsening climate change. There are other criticisms as well, like those aimed at the size of the equipment to be shipped along routes that are designated “wild and scenic” highways that wind precariously through fragile ecosystems.
“We can speculate that this will have a significant impact on Bull Trout habitat, an endangered species and on Grizzly Bear habitat, which the EA [Environmental Agency] in Montana has noted as an issue from the construction itself, sediment buildup, paving equipment and such,” Nick Stocks, co-founder of the group Northern Rockies Rising Tide in Missoula, Montana, a group that promotes local, community-based solutions to the climate crisis and takes direct action toward confronting what it sees as the root causes of climate change, told Truthout.
“In Montana the construction of new pullouts and the repaving and upgrading of existing pullouts is cause for much concern along the Montana portion of Highway 12,” Stocks added. “Community members and organizations have fought to clean up both of these areas and protect them as the wild and scenic places they are. New construction, new turnouts and this proposed new corridor all run contrary to decades of work and investment the community has had in maintaining these places. The risk of spill, mitigation procedures and sediment issues in the rivers have not been adequately taken into account.”
The “modules” from Korea comprise loads that are more than 150 feet long, approximately 30 feet high, 25 feet wide and weigh roughly 500,000 pounds. The giant trucks that will move these are from the Dutch company Mammoet (Dutch for mammoth). The rigs are so tall they do not fit under highway overpasses, are so wide they take up two traffic lanes and the estimated top speed of transporting them is 30 miles per hour. The trucks are 12 times the size of normal tractor-trailer trucks and each one has 48 tires.
Much of the designated route for transport contains only two lanes, with little or no shoulders, and would have to be modified by adding pull-out lanes, removing overhead power lines and traffic lights, as well as moving signs.
“Where are these industrial mega-rigs going to find the room to construct pullouts along the Northwest Scenic Passage Byway?” Brett Haverstick with the group Friends of the Clearwater, said to Truthout. His group is a nonprofit whose mission states that it works to “defend the Idaho Clearwater Bioregion’s wildlands and biodiversity through a forest watch program, litigation, grassroots public involvement, outreach and education.”
Highway 12 in Idaho runs through what is known as “Wild Clearwater Country,” which is “the northern half of central Idaho’s Big Wild” that “contains many unprotected roadless areas and wild rivers and provides crucial habitat for countless rare plant and animal species” according to the group.
“As it stands, the highway is only two lanes wide, with the Middle Fork of the Clearwater River hugging one shoulder and the other being right up against granite cliffs or forested lands,” Haverstick, who is the education and outreach director of the group continued, “There is no place to build a pullover along many stretches of the route.”
Stocks told Truthout that Imperial Oil’s current plan is to have all the construction completed in time for the test run and that much of it is already occurring.
“Members of the Nez Perce tribe and individuals were kept in the dark regarding the reason behind expanding the highway, but many now feel that the expansion was driven through in preparation for this Corridor,” Stocks continued, “More specifically, Idaho doesn’t have the same environmental review process that Montana does where transportation issues are concerned. There has been no review of the damage that might be caused by building the equivalent of a 30 foot wide asphalt football field every two miles.”
Haverstick shares similar concerns.
“Let’s say the pullovers are somehow, someway, modified to fit these behemoth rigs. Is it a good idea to have these 200 foot long, 25 feet wide, 30 feet high drilling rigs parked next to a Wild & Scenic River? What if the pullout cannot support the weight of these 500,000 plus-pound trucks and the road or shoulder collapses and the rig dumps into the Lochsa River? Then what are you going to do? What a potential disaster.”
Under the current proposal, 200 of these loads will be transported across Idaho and Montana during a 12- to 18-month period that could start by the end of this year. A test run is slated to occur by the end of this summer.
Rolheiser said Imperial Oil has spent about two years looking at the most cost-effective way to get the prefabricated equipment from Korea and the Montana-Idaho route is the best option.
The oil company’s plan involves one to two trucks per day using US highways 12 and 200 through Idaho and Montana, theoretically only at night so as to minimize disturbing traffic patterns. Imperial Oil has already given briefings to many local officials along the proposed route.
Yet, this idea also brings up other concerns.
“It sounds pretty goofy to me,” said Missoula County Commissioner Jean Curtiss, who heard about the monster-rig plan when Imperial made a presentation to the county commission in late 2009. “Think of what would happen if they hit ice on Rogers Pass?”
“Obviously, the safety of the people transporting the equipment and the safety of the public are paramount,” spokesman Rolheiser said at the time, “If we didn’t think it was safe, we wouldn’t do it.”
Haverstick feels there is more to be concerned about, in addition to public safety.
“This project should alarm people, whether they live in the states in which this project is being transported through or not,” he told Truthout, “In 1803 President Jefferson commissioned Meriwether Lewis & William Clark to find the Northwest Passage, the link between the Missouri River and the Columbia River through the unexplored Rocky Mountains. US Highway 12 was designated the Northwest Passage Scenic Byway because it parallels the exact route that Lewis & Clark traveled over two hundred years ago. Besides the highway itself, much of the primitive landscape remains the same. This Wild & Scenic River corridor is not only home to the proud and honorable people of the Nez Perce Nation, but it’s the heart and soul of our American heritage.”
The Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) and Idaho Department of Transportation (IDT) agencies have the ultimate authorities to approve the plan.
MDT director Jim Lynch said Imperial won’t get a green light for the plan unless it follows state laws and regulations, mitigates traffic problems and proves that roads and bridges won’t be damaged, among other issues. Lynch said MDT has also asked the oil company to do an environmental review.
“It’s important that they [Imperial] recognize they have to follow Montana environmental law and address the impacts and that they discuss the plans with communities to make sure communities are least impacted,” Lynch said.
Critics of the plan do not believe there is anything Imperial can do to make it possible to carry forward with the project in a way that poses no risk of damage to wilderness, rivers, wildlife and ecosystems along the transport route.
There is much doubt that a thorough and honest environmental impact assessment will be possible before the project begins if the company intends to stay on schedule.
“If we allow this shipping project to go through, the result will be the creation of a heavy use high-and-wide corridor that will be used to ship mining equipment to the Alberta tar sands for decades,” Stocks told Truthout, “As much as the MDT and Imperial Oil want to argue the opposite, this is not a one time deal. The environmental review process thus far has refused to take into account the full scope of the proposed Kearl project and its ramifications as the catalyst for all the needed construction for this Corridor. In fact, the MDT and Governor Brian Schweitzer have refused to acknowledge the possibility that this route will be used as a future transportation corridor even though the MDT gave a presentation to the Montana Legislature last year regarding the development potential of such a ‘high-and-wide corridor’ through our state and the Exxon’s role in the project.”
Imperial Oil has stated it will cover the costs of the trucking project, which will entail hundreds of changes to the route before the massive loads could pass through the area concerned without causing damage.
As an example, in Missoula County alone, a briefing with Missoula County commissioners found that Imperial plans to relocate utility lines at about 230 crossings and place 77 of them underground, make 16 fixes on one street (including moving signs and traffic signals), build or modify dozens of turnouts so the rigs can pull over to let traffic pass.
The equipment is to be used to mine the tar sands that are mixtures of soil, water and bitumen. Northern Alberta contains the largest known deposits of tar sand, with an area roughly the size of Florida that lies under some of the largest old-growth forest remaining in the world. It is believed the area contains 1.7 trillion barrels of oil, an amount equal to the world’s currently known reserves of conventional oil.
The exploitation of the tar sands is the most rapidly growing sector of the petroleum industry and is speeding up as the cost per barrel of oil increases, making the project more appealing, given that it currently requires more energy to extract the oil than the oil itself provides.
The tar sands project has raised great concern from environmental groups around the world, in addition to those in Montana and Idaho.
“The Tar Pit Sands project is one giant nightmare,” Haverstick said, “There are major social, environmental, economic, legal and political consequences. And it’s just not a local issue, but global. This project affects every living being, human or non-human on the planet. The carbon footprint is enormous, possibly bigger than anything we’ve seen before.”
Haverstick feels, “in a time when we are supposed to be working toward reducing our carbon footprint, scaling back the amount of carbon dioxide we pump into the atmosphere and searching and developing renewable energies, this project instead puts us back another hundred years, if not more. From a carbon emissions footprint, Tar Sand Mining may be the filthiest form of energy production we know of. And that’s not including the ecological damage that occurs when drilling for this stuff. Who knows what type of condition the remaining Boreal Forest in Alberta, Canada and the surrounding watershed will be in when this project is completed in 50 years. It will be on par with, if not much worse off than mountain-top removal projects occurring in West Virginia right now.”
There are approximately 100 tar sand projects (comprised of 3,200 mining leases, covering an area the size of Maryland) planned in Canada, with at least $200 billion dollars already invested.
“The tar sands themselves have been called the most destructive industrial project on the face of the plant for good reason,” Stocks, whose group is active on four continents and growing, told Truthout, “The devastation of this mining to the Alberta boreal forest, the Athabasca River, the Athabasca Delta and the communities, both First Nations and not, have been well documented.”
Indigenous communities both downstream from the tar sand mines in Canada as well as those along the proposed trucking route of the mining equipment are concerned about threats to their physical health, sacred sites and the health of their land base.
Some First Nations people who live downstream from the tar sands mines in Canada are reporting increased incidence of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, multiple sclerosis and rare types of cancer due to toxic wastes leaching into the waterway from tailings ponds. Also arsenic, at 33 times the acceptable level, is being found in game meats that First Nations people rely on, as well as some animals being found with tumors and mutations.
The mining of the tar sands, being as much solid as they are liquid, requires great effort. The easiest method is strip mining, though some newer mines heat and dilute the bitumen underground to make it flow easier. Once removed from the ground, bitumen is too viscous to flow through pipelines as conventional crude does, thus, it is next converted into synthetic oil to aid transport. These processes can use huge quantities of water and require so much electricity that one tar sand mine has considered building a nuclear power plant to power the mine itself.
“For Montana, the successful development of this shipping corridor is synonymous with Montana complacency in the destruction of Alberta and the impact that continued mining has on climate change,” Stocks added about the role the shipping corridor would play toward contributing to climate change. “In Montana, further climate change means more beetle killed forests, fewer glaciers, reduced springtime stream flow and more extensive fires in summer. Agricultural lands already feel the impact of drought and our forests feel the impact of warmer winters. It doesn’t matter what industry you belong to in our state, climate change is all inclusive.”
Research shows that tar sands mining causes an extraordinary and often permanent, detriment to the environment. Air monitoring near Fort McMurray, Alberta, for example, has recorded excessive levels of toxic hydrogen sulfide, as well as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide and particulate matters.
Tar sand exploiter, Suncor Energy, received an Environmental Protection Order from the government of Alberta in 2007 as a result.
While the MDT does not yet know what level of environmental review will be required before issuing the permits to transport the mining equipment, MDT Director Jim Lynch has said that only the direct impacts these shipments will have on the state will be considered for issuance.
That means that the MDT environmental review will specifically ignore any concerns about the effects of tar sand mining, or the oil economy on environment.
The permits, if issued, will net Montana and Idaho a few hundred thousand dollars each, but critics claim the economic impact of traffic delays alone could exceed that amount.
The modification of the roadways is believed to require just a few months of construction, thus, job creation from the project will be minimal and temporary.
The success or failure of the initial test run scheduled for this summer in Idaho will determine whether the rest of the permits will be issued.
Haverstick and Stocks say their groups, along with many others, intend to fight the project.
“We have been engaging in building a network opposed to these shipments that runs the length of the route,” Stocks said, “From the Port of Vancouver to the Port of Sweetgrass we hope to build a viable opposition to these shipments that will take many different forms of action to stop them.”
Dahr Jamail is an independent journalist who writes for the Inter Press Service, Le Monde Diplomatique, and many other outlets. His stories have also been published with The Nation, The Sunday Herald in Scotland, Al-Jazeera, the Guardian, Foreign Policy in Focus, and the Independent to name just a few. He maintains the website Dahr Jamail's Mideast Dispatches, where this article appeared and is reprinted with permission.
Monday, May 24, 2010 |
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Husky Energy Appoints New President And Chief Executive Officer
The Board of Directors of Husky Energy announce Friday the appointment of Asim Ghosh as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, effective June 1, 2010.
Mr. Asim Ghosh was appointed to the Husky Board of Directors in May, 2009. He is the former Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Vodafone Essar Limited. Under his leadership, the cellular phone company grew from a virtual startup in 1998 to become one of the largest mobile companies in the world by subscribers, creating substantial shareholder value.
“Mr. Ghosh has demonstrated his vast executive experience and sound business judgment on Husky’s Board of Directors. We are confident in the future of this Company under his leadership,” said Husky Board co-chairmen Victor Li and Canning Fok in a joint statement. “The Board believes Mr. Ghosh’s global perspective and proven ability to take companies to the next level will advance Husky’s mandate of strategic growth and creation of shareholder value.”
Husky Energy is looking forward to its next decade of growth. The Company is well positioned for further development and expansion with a healthy balance sheet and a rich inventory of high-quality assets in Western Canada, offshore Newfoundland, the United States, Greenland and South East Asia.
The Board expresses its thanks to Mr. John Lau for his leadership in guiding Husky Energy over the past two decades and for transforming the Company into a top-performing player in the global energy market.
“John has built Husky into a successful and respected company on the global energy scene and he deserves the highest praise for its performance and success,” said co-chairmen Victor Li and Canning Fok. “John will relocate to Hong Kong, where he will assume responsibility for leading the development of the Company’s businesses in the Asia-Pacific Region.”
Husky Energy is an integrated energy and energy-related company headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Husky Energy is a publicly traded company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol HSE.
Mr. Asim Ghosh was appointed to the Husky Board of Directors in May, 2009. He is the former Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Vodafone Essar Limited. Under his leadership, the cellular phone company grew from a virtual startup in 1998 to become one of the largest mobile companies in the world by subscribers, creating substantial shareholder value.
“Mr. Ghosh has demonstrated his vast executive experience and sound business judgment on Husky’s Board of Directors. We are confident in the future of this Company under his leadership,” said Husky Board co-chairmen Victor Li and Canning Fok in a joint statement. “The Board believes Mr. Ghosh’s global perspective and proven ability to take companies to the next level will advance Husky’s mandate of strategic growth and creation of shareholder value.”
Husky Energy is looking forward to its next decade of growth. The Company is well positioned for further development and expansion with a healthy balance sheet and a rich inventory of high-quality assets in Western Canada, offshore Newfoundland, the United States, Greenland and South East Asia.
The Board expresses its thanks to Mr. John Lau for his leadership in guiding Husky Energy over the past two decades and for transforming the Company into a top-performing player in the global energy market.
“John has built Husky into a successful and respected company on the global energy scene and he deserves the highest praise for its performance and success,” said co-chairmen Victor Li and Canning Fok. “John will relocate to Hong Kong, where he will assume responsibility for leading the development of the Company’s businesses in the Asia-Pacific Region.”
Husky Energy is an integrated energy and energy-related company headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Husky Energy is a publicly traded company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol HSE.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Men With Bigger Wallets Have Bigger Waistlines
In Canada, in stark contrast with the rest of the world, wealthy men increase their likelihood of being overweight with every extra dollar they make. The new study was led by Nathalie Dumas, a graduate student at the University of Montreal Department of Sociology, and presented at the annual conference of the Association francophone pour le savoir (ACFAS).
"Women aren't spared by this correlation, but results are ambiguous," says Dumas. "However, women from rich households are less likely to be obese than women of middle or lower income."
Dumas used data from the 2004 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS). This provided access to information from some 7,000 adults aged 25 to 65. Dumas' research is unique because she took into consideration the sex of individuals as well as their body mass index (BMI) to differentiate the overweight from the obese.
"Many epidemiological studies have established that the odds of being overweight or obese decrease as family income increases," says Dumas. "But we don't know why this relationship is inverted for Canadian men. According to the CCHS, the richer they are, the fatter they are."
So why are rich men and poor women more likely to be obese in Canada? Dumas researched all existing literature and concluded a socioeconomic hypothesis could only explain the link of obesity and income for women. Yet no hypothesis could explain the phenomenon observed in Canadian men.
"Since the 1980s, the greatest increase in obesity levels has been among rich Canadian and Korean men," says Dumas. "We still can't explain why." According to Dumas, one possible explanation is dining out. "Canadians love restaurants. And people who regularly eat out have no control over what they eat. They also tend to eat more calories and consume larger amounts of alcohol."
Too many restaurant meals, combined with a decrease in physical activity, is another possibility. "There are obviously various factors at play: we still haven't empirically proved them," says Dumas.
The 2004 CCHS found 23.1 percent of Canadians 18 years or older – about 5,5 million adults – are obese. By 2030, according to the World Health Organization, 2,3 billion people will be overweight and 700 million of will be obese.
"Women aren't spared by this correlation, but results are ambiguous," says Dumas. "However, women from rich households are less likely to be obese than women of middle or lower income."
Dumas used data from the 2004 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS). This provided access to information from some 7,000 adults aged 25 to 65. Dumas' research is unique because she took into consideration the sex of individuals as well as their body mass index (BMI) to differentiate the overweight from the obese.
"Many epidemiological studies have established that the odds of being overweight or obese decrease as family income increases," says Dumas. "But we don't know why this relationship is inverted for Canadian men. According to the CCHS, the richer they are, the fatter they are."
So why are rich men and poor women more likely to be obese in Canada? Dumas researched all existing literature and concluded a socioeconomic hypothesis could only explain the link of obesity and income for women. Yet no hypothesis could explain the phenomenon observed in Canadian men.
"Since the 1980s, the greatest increase in obesity levels has been among rich Canadian and Korean men," says Dumas. "We still can't explain why." According to Dumas, one possible explanation is dining out. "Canadians love restaurants. And people who regularly eat out have no control over what they eat. They also tend to eat more calories and consume larger amounts of alcohol."
Too many restaurant meals, combined with a decrease in physical activity, is another possibility. "There are obviously various factors at play: we still haven't empirically proved them," says Dumas.
The 2004 CCHS found 23.1 percent of Canadians 18 years or older – about 5,5 million adults – are obese. By 2030, according to the World Health Organization, 2,3 billion people will be overweight and 700 million of will be obese.
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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MEPs Ask Canada To Lift Visa Requirements For All EU Citizens
The European Parliament called on Canada to ensure visa-free travel for all EU citizens in a wide-ranging resolution adopted yesterday (5 May) by a show of hands. EurActiv Czech Republic contributed to this article.
The resolution, adopted on the occasion of yesterday's EU-Canada summit in Brussels, saw MEPs restate their concern that Canada is still imposing visa requirements on citizens of the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria.
"The European Parliament calls for that requirement to be lifted as speedily as possible," the text reads.
Regarding the special case of Czech Republic, with which Canada had a visa-free regime between 2007 and 2009, MEPs called on member states "to adequately address the situation of the Roma people in Europe".
Canada reinstated visa requirements for Czech visitors on July 2009 after hundreds of Roma from the Central European country had sought asylum there (see 'Background').
Parliamentarians also welcomed in their resolution the opening of a visa office at the Canadian Embassy in Prague, as well as the establishment of an expert working group on the issue.
Before last December, because Canada did not had a visa service in Czech Republic, Czechs were forced to apply for Canadian visas in Vienna (EurActiv 22/09/09).
Little progresses during summit
According to the Canadian press, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and EU leaders reaffirmed during yesterday's EU-Canada summit their commitment to resolving the remaining obstacles to achieving the common goal of visa-free travel to Canada for all EU citizens as soon as possible.
However, the two sides appear to have made little progress on the issue at what was the first EU-Canada summit since visa requirements were re-imposed. Harper said that he hoped to lift the restrictions "as soon as possible," but added that improved immigration legislation, currently going through parliament in Ottawa, would have to be introduced beforehand.
The adoption of the new legislation could take several years, EurActiv Czech Republic reports.
"The European Commission is also active. But I can imagine it could be more active or more aggressive," Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout said on Czech television.
Before the summit, Czech MEPs sent a letter to Canadian representatives asking them to determine a precise timetable for lifting visa requirements.
"The head of the [European People's Party] group Joseph Daul's signature of the letter proves that the strongest parliamentary group is in the same boat as Czech citizens," said Christian Democrat MEP Jan Březina, the initiator of the letter.
Source: EurActiv
The resolution, adopted on the occasion of yesterday's EU-Canada summit in Brussels, saw MEPs restate their concern that Canada is still imposing visa requirements on citizens of the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria.
"The European Parliament calls for that requirement to be lifted as speedily as possible," the text reads.
Regarding the special case of Czech Republic, with which Canada had a visa-free regime between 2007 and 2009, MEPs called on member states "to adequately address the situation of the Roma people in Europe".
Canada reinstated visa requirements for Czech visitors on July 2009 after hundreds of Roma from the Central European country had sought asylum there (see 'Background').
Parliamentarians also welcomed in their resolution the opening of a visa office at the Canadian Embassy in Prague, as well as the establishment of an expert working group on the issue.
Before last December, because Canada did not had a visa service in Czech Republic, Czechs were forced to apply for Canadian visas in Vienna (EurActiv 22/09/09).
Little progresses during summit
According to the Canadian press, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and EU leaders reaffirmed during yesterday's EU-Canada summit their commitment to resolving the remaining obstacles to achieving the common goal of visa-free travel to Canada for all EU citizens as soon as possible.
However, the two sides appear to have made little progress on the issue at what was the first EU-Canada summit since visa requirements were re-imposed. Harper said that he hoped to lift the restrictions "as soon as possible," but added that improved immigration legislation, currently going through parliament in Ottawa, would have to be introduced beforehand.
The adoption of the new legislation could take several years, EurActiv Czech Republic reports.
"The European Commission is also active. But I can imagine it could be more active or more aggressive," Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout said on Czech television.
Before the summit, Czech MEPs sent a letter to Canadian representatives asking them to determine a precise timetable for lifting visa requirements.
"The head of the [European People's Party] group Joseph Daul's signature of the letter proves that the strongest parliamentary group is in the same boat as Czech citizens," said Christian Democrat MEP Jan Březina, the initiator of the letter.
Source: EurActiv
Thursday, May 06, 2010 |
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EPA: Denison Operating Arizona Mine 'Illegally'
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has told Canada-based Denison Mines that it has failed to comply with environmental and permitting regulations and is therefore operating its Arizona 1 uranium mine illegally.
In a notice of violation, the EPA said that Denison had failed to apply for and obtain an approval to construct or modify prior to ventilating the Arizona 1 mine, as well as failing to provide notifications regarding start-up of the mine. In addition, the EPA alleges that Denison also failed to obtain EPA approval for an alternative test method to determine compliance with radon emission standards.
Prior to Denison acquiring the property, which lies north of the Grand Canyon, Energy Fuels Nuclear Inc obtained authorization from the EPA to construct and operate the Arizona 1 mine. However, this approval - granted in August 1988 - would only remain in effect as long as "the Arizona 1 mine is operated as an active underground uranium mine" by Energy Fuels. The permit stated that this approval "is not transferable to another owner or operator." Although Energy Fuels had partially developed Arizona 1 for underground mining, the mine was inactive from the early 1990s until late in 2009.
The EPA says that the permit is no longer valid because of the "long period of inactivity at the mine and because of the transfer of ownership."
In June 2008, Denison submitted a letter to the EPA regarding its intention to reactivate the Arizona 1 mine. The letter stated that the mine was projected to produce 182,500 tonnes of uranium ore annually. It also said that Denison intended to "reactivate the mine by rehabilitating the surface facilities and further developing the underground workings using the existing shaft."
The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (Adeq) issued an air quality permit to Denison for Arizona 1 in September 2009. Denison began ventilating the mine in late 2009, causing the release of radon to the air. In December 2009, Denison began removing ore from the mine.
The EPA also claims that Adeq's air quality permit is not valid as the department is not authorized to approve the construction or modification of "a regulated source." It added that Denison violated regulations by ventilating the mine and causing it to become "active" before it had submitted an application to the EPA for approval to construct/modify the Arizona 1 mine. It also claims that Denison restarted the mine without providing EPA with timely notification of the anticipated or actual date of initial start-up.
Denison president Ron Hochstein said that he was surprised by the notice and believed the company was operating within the law, according to an Associated Press report. He said he was working with regulators to address the issues.
A determination on whether to assess fees or civil penalties would not be made until after a hearing is held on the violation notice.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
In a notice of violation, the EPA said that Denison had failed to apply for and obtain an approval to construct or modify prior to ventilating the Arizona 1 mine, as well as failing to provide notifications regarding start-up of the mine. In addition, the EPA alleges that Denison also failed to obtain EPA approval for an alternative test method to determine compliance with radon emission standards.
Prior to Denison acquiring the property, which lies north of the Grand Canyon, Energy Fuels Nuclear Inc obtained authorization from the EPA to construct and operate the Arizona 1 mine. However, this approval - granted in August 1988 - would only remain in effect as long as "the Arizona 1 mine is operated as an active underground uranium mine" by Energy Fuels. The permit stated that this approval "is not transferable to another owner or operator." Although Energy Fuels had partially developed Arizona 1 for underground mining, the mine was inactive from the early 1990s until late in 2009.
The EPA says that the permit is no longer valid because of the "long period of inactivity at the mine and because of the transfer of ownership."
In June 2008, Denison submitted a letter to the EPA regarding its intention to reactivate the Arizona 1 mine. The letter stated that the mine was projected to produce 182,500 tonnes of uranium ore annually. It also said that Denison intended to "reactivate the mine by rehabilitating the surface facilities and further developing the underground workings using the existing shaft."
The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (Adeq) issued an air quality permit to Denison for Arizona 1 in September 2009. Denison began ventilating the mine in late 2009, causing the release of radon to the air. In December 2009, Denison began removing ore from the mine.
The EPA also claims that Adeq's air quality permit is not valid as the department is not authorized to approve the construction or modification of "a regulated source." It added that Denison violated regulations by ventilating the mine and causing it to become "active" before it had submitted an application to the EPA for approval to construct/modify the Arizona 1 mine. It also claims that Denison restarted the mine without providing EPA with timely notification of the anticipated or actual date of initial start-up.
Denison president Ron Hochstein said that he was surprised by the notice and believed the company was operating within the law, according to an Associated Press report. He said he was working with regulators to address the issues.
A determination on whether to assess fees or civil penalties would not be made until after a hearing is held on the violation notice.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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EU27 External Trade Surplus Of 4.7 Bn Euros With Canada In 2009
Between 2000 and 2009, EU27 exports of goods to Canada grew from 21.1 billion euros to 22.4 bn euros , while EU27 imports from Canada fell from 19.0 bn to 17.8 bn.
As a result, the EU27 surplus in trade with Canada grew from 2.1 bn euros in 2000 to 4.7 bn euros in 2009, while the share of Canada in the EU27's total external trade in goods has fallen. In 2009, Canada accounted for 2.0% of EU27 exports and 1.5% of EU27 imports, and was the EU27's eleventh most important trading partner.
On the occasion of the European Union - Canada summit, which will take place on Wednesday 5 May 2010 in Brussels, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, issued the data on trade and investments between the EU and Canada.
Germany has largest surplus and United Kingdom largest deficit
Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (5.2 bn euros or 23% of the total) was the largest exporter to Canada in 2009, followed by the United Kingdom (4.4 bn euros or 20%), France (2.4 bn euros or 11%) and Italy (2.1 bn or 9%).
The United Kingdom (5.8 bn euros or 33%) was by far the largest importer, followed by Germany (2.5 bn euros or 14%) and France (1.9 bn or 11%). The largest surpluses were observed in Germany (+2.6 bn euros) and Italy (+0.9 bn euros), while the largest deficit was registered in the United Kingdom (-1.4 bn euros).
In 2009, just over a third of EU27 exports to Canada were machinery and vehicles, while chemicals and other manufactured articles each accounted for around a fifth of exports. Machinery and vehicles made up more than a quarter of imports, while other manufactured articles accounted for around a fifth. At the detailed level, the main EU27 exports to Canada were medicine, motor cars, aircraft engines and crude and refined oil, while the main imports were aircraft, diamonds, iron ore, medicine and natural uranium.
As a result, the EU27 surplus in trade with Canada grew from 2.1 bn euros in 2000 to 4.7 bn euros in 2009, while the share of Canada in the EU27's total external trade in goods has fallen. In 2009, Canada accounted for 2.0% of EU27 exports and 1.5% of EU27 imports, and was the EU27's eleventh most important trading partner.
On the occasion of the European Union - Canada summit, which will take place on Wednesday 5 May 2010 in Brussels, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, issued the data on trade and investments between the EU and Canada.
Germany has largest surplus and United Kingdom largest deficit
Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (5.2 bn euros or 23% of the total) was the largest exporter to Canada in 2009, followed by the United Kingdom (4.4 bn euros or 20%), France (2.4 bn euros or 11%) and Italy (2.1 bn or 9%).
The United Kingdom (5.8 bn euros or 33%) was by far the largest importer, followed by Germany (2.5 bn euros or 14%) and France (1.9 bn or 11%). The largest surpluses were observed in Germany (+2.6 bn euros) and Italy (+0.9 bn euros), while the largest deficit was registered in the United Kingdom (-1.4 bn euros).
In 2009, just over a third of EU27 exports to Canada were machinery and vehicles, while chemicals and other manufactured articles each accounted for around a fifth of exports. Machinery and vehicles made up more than a quarter of imports, while other manufactured articles accounted for around a fifth. At the detailed level, the main EU27 exports to Canada were medicine, motor cars, aircraft engines and crude and refined oil, while the main imports were aircraft, diamonds, iron ore, medicine and natural uranium.
Monday, May 03, 2010 |
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Europe's Top Innovation Prize Winners Announced
From ecology and nuclear physics to information systems and satellite-based navigation. These were the big winners when the European Commission and the European Patent Office presented the 2010 European Inventor of the Year awards.
Under the presidency of their Royal Highnesses Prince Felipe and Princess Leticia of Asturias, the European Patent Office (EPO) and the European Commission honoured Wednesday the five prize-winners from Germany, Switzerland, the USA and Canada at a gala ceremony in Madrid
An international jury selected the winners in the following four categories:
1. Lifetime Achievement - Wolfgang Krätschmer (Germany)
A whole new field of research in physics has been discovered, laying the foundations for the creation of new materials
He devised a process for producing fullerenes (a new class of carbon molecules) for research purposes, laying the foundations for the creation of new materials. He did the groundwork that allowed these spherical molecules comprising 60 carbon atoms (C60 molecules, also known as "soccer ball molecules" or buckyballs) to be properly investigated. Soon hundreds of new applications for fullerenes were being patented. Thanks to their thermal stability and their semiconducting and superconducting properties, fullerenes are now used all over the world in innovative lubricants, fuels and superconductors.
2. SMEs/research category - Jürgen Pfitzer and Helmut Nägele (Germany)
Breakthrough in the sustainable use of renewable resources reached with Arboform liquid wood
The source of their material is lignin, which is generated in large quantities during paper and pulp production. In combination with other natural fibres, lignin can be made into an easily formable, biodegradable organic polymer. Demand for Arboform is especially high in the car industry, where with its wood-like appearance and high malleability it opens up new prospects in interior design. It is also used in furniture, toys and watches.
3. Industry category - Albert Markendorf (Switzerland) and Raimund Loser (Germany)
3D scanning and measuring system opened up a new level of accuracy in industrial measuring systems and revolutionised the field
Their portable laser scanner not only measures distances, it can also determine the angle at which the laser beam is reflected. The three-dimensional result offers unprecedented accuracy and efficiency in laser-based scanning systems, typically in design and development processes in the car industry. Railway companies and aircraft manufacturers too now use this scanning technique for quality control purposes.
4. Non-European countries category
Sanjai Kohli and Steven Chen (USA)
GPS systems can now also be used commercially and are a part of our everyday lives
They developed the powerful but inexpensive chips which first allowed satellite signals to be put to effective use. The technology they devised triggered off explosive growth in the market for GPS devices and laid the foundations for their commercial use in cars, planes, ships and mobile phones.
Ben Wiens and Danny Epps (Canadians)
Electrochemical fuel cells which are now a commercially successful alternative to fossil fuels
The cells they invented function at low operating temperatures and so do not need energy-intensive cooling. That was a decisive step on the road to greener energy: since 2004 buses with a hydrogen fuel cell drive have been running in 15 cities around the world, including Amsterdam, Barcelona and London, and twenty of them were in service at the Winter Olympics in Vancouver. The fuel cells are also indispensable as emergency power supplies in telecommunication systems in Canada, the EU and India.
This year's award ceremony was held in Madrid. "The conference, organised by EPO and the European Commission, provides a platform for internationally renowned experts to discuss the role of the intellectual property in supporting innovation in fast developing industries".
Under the presidency of their Royal Highnesses Prince Felipe and Princess Leticia of Asturias, the European Patent Office (EPO) and the European Commission honoured Wednesday the five prize-winners from Germany, Switzerland, the USA and Canada at a gala ceremony in Madrid
An international jury selected the winners in the following four categories:
1. Lifetime Achievement - Wolfgang Krätschmer (Germany)
A whole new field of research in physics has been discovered, laying the foundations for the creation of new materials
He devised a process for producing fullerenes (a new class of carbon molecules) for research purposes, laying the foundations for the creation of new materials. He did the groundwork that allowed these spherical molecules comprising 60 carbon atoms (C60 molecules, also known as "soccer ball molecules" or buckyballs) to be properly investigated. Soon hundreds of new applications for fullerenes were being patented. Thanks to their thermal stability and their semiconducting and superconducting properties, fullerenes are now used all over the world in innovative lubricants, fuels and superconductors.
2. SMEs/research category - Jürgen Pfitzer and Helmut Nägele (Germany)
Breakthrough in the sustainable use of renewable resources reached with Arboform liquid wood
The source of their material is lignin, which is generated in large quantities during paper and pulp production. In combination with other natural fibres, lignin can be made into an easily formable, biodegradable organic polymer. Demand for Arboform is especially high in the car industry, where with its wood-like appearance and high malleability it opens up new prospects in interior design. It is also used in furniture, toys and watches.
3. Industry category - Albert Markendorf (Switzerland) and Raimund Loser (Germany)
3D scanning and measuring system opened up a new level of accuracy in industrial measuring systems and revolutionised the field
Their portable laser scanner not only measures distances, it can also determine the angle at which the laser beam is reflected. The three-dimensional result offers unprecedented accuracy and efficiency in laser-based scanning systems, typically in design and development processes in the car industry. Railway companies and aircraft manufacturers too now use this scanning technique for quality control purposes.
4. Non-European countries category
Sanjai Kohli and Steven Chen (USA)
GPS systems can now also be used commercially and are a part of our everyday lives
They developed the powerful but inexpensive chips which first allowed satellite signals to be put to effective use. The technology they devised triggered off explosive growth in the market for GPS devices and laid the foundations for their commercial use in cars, planes, ships and mobile phones.
Ben Wiens and Danny Epps (Canadians)
Electrochemical fuel cells which are now a commercially successful alternative to fossil fuels
The cells they invented function at low operating temperatures and so do not need energy-intensive cooling. That was a decisive step on the road to greener energy: since 2004 buses with a hydrogen fuel cell drive have been running in 15 cities around the world, including Amsterdam, Barcelona and London, and twenty of them were in service at the Winter Olympics in Vancouver. The fuel cells are also indispensable as emergency power supplies in telecommunication systems in Canada, the EU and India.
This year's award ceremony was held in Madrid. "The conference, organised by EPO and the European Commission, provides a platform for internationally renowned experts to discuss the role of the intellectual property in supporting innovation in fast developing industries".
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Khan Files Mongolian Court Case Over Uranium Mining Licence
Khan Resources has filed a claim in Mongolia's administrative court challenging the legality of the invalidation of its uranium mining licence by Mongolia's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).
The claim was filed by Toronto-based Khan's 58%-owned Mongolian joint venture subsidiary, Central Asian Uranium Company (CAUC). It asserts, among other things, that the NEA has no legal authority to make a decision to invalidate the mining licence and in so doing has violated Mongolian law. Khan Mongolia, Khan's 100%-owned Mongolian subsidiary, intends to file a similar claim in respect of NEA's purported invalidation of its exploration licence.
The mining licence for the Dornod uranium deposit was the only uranium mining licence yet to be granted in Mongolia. A definitive feasibility study released by Khan in March 2009 showed that the project was sound, on the basis of 24,780 tU indicated resources (NI 43-101 compliant), including 20,340 tU probable reserves. Annual production of 1150 tU over 15 years was envisaged. However, since July 2009 Khan has faced sudden changes in Mongolian legislation, a new energy law requiring 51% Mongolian state ownership in any uranium mining operation, a Mongolian move to develop Dornod in a joint venture with Russia's AtomRedMetzoloto (ARMZ), a hostile buyout offer by ARMZ, and the retrospective "invalidation" of licences by the NEA.
Khan is also making efforts to engage with the Mongolian government directly concerning its treatment at the hands of the NEA. In a five-page letter to Mongolian prime minister Sukhbaatar Batbold, Khan president and CEO Martin Quick has formally protested about the NEA's actions and pleaded with the government to review and overturn the NEA's decision. "Our lawyers are preparing to bring legal action against the NEA to challenge the invalidation notices and other actions. We would prefer not to do so. Litigation will be costly and, we believe, embarrassing to the government of Mongolia," warns Quick, before outlining his case in detail. Khan has said it will pursue its rights through both the Canadian and Mongolian courts and through international arbitration, if necessary.
To date, Khan and its subsidiaries have made capital investments of over $20 million in Mongolia towards the development of Dornod, and the company's plans for operating the project would involve investment of over $300 million, as well as providing employment for hundreds of Mongolians and "significant" royalty, tax and other benefits to the Mongolian government, Quick points out. However, the latest action by the NEA, coming on top of the regulatory uncertainty of recent years, has prompted many Khan investors to sell their shares and driven the company's stock price down by about 45%. "Meanwhile, development of the Dornod uranium project continues to be delayed, not only to the detriment of Khan, but also to the detriment of Mongolia," says Quick.
Chinese offer still stands
Meanwhile, a friendly take-over bid for Khan by CNNC Overseas Uranium Holding Ltd, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corporation, is still open and has been extended to 25 May. Khan's directors are still recommending shareholders take up the offer, which Khan says is not likely to be adversely affected by the NEA invalidation notices and other recent events in Mongolia.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
The claim was filed by Toronto-based Khan's 58%-owned Mongolian joint venture subsidiary, Central Asian Uranium Company (CAUC). It asserts, among other things, that the NEA has no legal authority to make a decision to invalidate the mining licence and in so doing has violated Mongolian law. Khan Mongolia, Khan's 100%-owned Mongolian subsidiary, intends to file a similar claim in respect of NEA's purported invalidation of its exploration licence.
The mining licence for the Dornod uranium deposit was the only uranium mining licence yet to be granted in Mongolia. A definitive feasibility study released by Khan in March 2009 showed that the project was sound, on the basis of 24,780 tU indicated resources (NI 43-101 compliant), including 20,340 tU probable reserves. Annual production of 1150 tU over 15 years was envisaged. However, since July 2009 Khan has faced sudden changes in Mongolian legislation, a new energy law requiring 51% Mongolian state ownership in any uranium mining operation, a Mongolian move to develop Dornod in a joint venture with Russia's AtomRedMetzoloto (ARMZ), a hostile buyout offer by ARMZ, and the retrospective "invalidation" of licences by the NEA.
Khan is also making efforts to engage with the Mongolian government directly concerning its treatment at the hands of the NEA. In a five-page letter to Mongolian prime minister Sukhbaatar Batbold, Khan president and CEO Martin Quick has formally protested about the NEA's actions and pleaded with the government to review and overturn the NEA's decision. "Our lawyers are preparing to bring legal action against the NEA to challenge the invalidation notices and other actions. We would prefer not to do so. Litigation will be costly and, we believe, embarrassing to the government of Mongolia," warns Quick, before outlining his case in detail. Khan has said it will pursue its rights through both the Canadian and Mongolian courts and through international arbitration, if necessary.
To date, Khan and its subsidiaries have made capital investments of over $20 million in Mongolia towards the development of Dornod, and the company's plans for operating the project would involve investment of over $300 million, as well as providing employment for hundreds of Mongolians and "significant" royalty, tax and other benefits to the Mongolian government, Quick points out. However, the latest action by the NEA, coming on top of the regulatory uncertainty of recent years, has prompted many Khan investors to sell their shares and driven the company's stock price down by about 45%. "Meanwhile, development of the Dornod uranium project continues to be delayed, not only to the detriment of Khan, but also to the detriment of Mongolia," says Quick.
Chinese offer still stands
Meanwhile, a friendly take-over bid for Khan by CNNC Overseas Uranium Holding Ltd, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corporation, is still open and has been extended to 25 May. Khan's directors are still recommending shareholders take up the offer, which Khan says is not likely to be adversely affected by the NEA invalidation notices and other recent events in Mongolia.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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IEA Welcomes Canada’s Sustainable Energy Goals, Calls For Greater Policy Coordination
The International Energy Agency (IEA) commended Canada’s commitment to increase the share of clean energy in electricity supply by 2020.
At the launch of the new publication Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2009 Review Monday in Ottawa, IEA Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka said “the goal to increase to 90% the portion of Canada’s electricity needs that are provided by carbon-free sources such as hydro, nuclear or wind power by the end of the decade is progressive and ambitious”.
He also praised Canada’s recent climate target announcement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 17% below its 2005 levels by 2020 under the Copenhagen Accord - a non-binding document that emerged from the international climate change conference in Denmark in December 2009.
Nonetheless, with a view to the long-standing sustainability of the energy sector, Tanaka stressed that “Canada must continue to develop and implement a comprehensive national energy efficiency strategy, coupled with a coordinated climate change policy targeted at the key emitting sectors, if long-term energy goals are to be realised”.
Canada is one of the highest per-capita CO2 emitters in the OECD and has higher energy intensity than any IEA member country. Yet the IEA report recognises the government’s aim to achieve a balance between the environmentally responsible production and use of energy, the growth and competitiveness of the economy, and secure and competitively priced energy and infrastructure.
Noting the federal government’s support of provincial resource management policies, Tanaka emphasised the need to contribute to the cleaner use and production of fossil energy, especially by reducing the environmental impact of oil-sands and the deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS).
“Indeed, large-scale deployment of CCS is one of the key components of Canada’s long-term energy future and the IEA commends Canada for this position,” added Tanaka.
The IEA publication recognises that CCS is a priority for the federal government and presents Canada with an opportunity to develop a new technology that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a large scale.
Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2009 Review goes on to recommend that Canada provide international leadership in the development of CCS technology. Following the conclusions of the G8 L’Aquila 2009 meeting, the IEA has developed criteria to track the progress toward the G8 goal of launching 20 large-scale CCS demonstration projects globally by 2010 with a view to beginning broad deployment of CCS by 2020, to achieve substantial cuts in CO2 emissions. The Agency will submit its progress report to the Canada G8 summit.
Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2009 Review identifies a number of strategic investment issues facing the oil industry, in particular the sustainable development of the oil-sands and future exploration and development in the North. Furthermore, Tanaka said,
“If Canada is to remain a leading energy supplier it must maintain its commitment to streamlining upstream oil and natural gas regulatory processes”.
Referring to sustainability, Tanaka added that, “the forecast increase in production from the resource-rich oil sands of Alberta will bring with it many challenges. Canada must take care to develop this resource without a disproportionate increase in emissions and other associated environmental risks”.
Even the most ambitious IEA scenario presented in the Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2009 - that aims at stabilising greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) at 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2-equivalent, in line with an increase in global temperature of around 2oC – shows that fossil fuels will still remain the dominant source of primary energy worldwide by 2030 (down from 81% today to 68% in 2030).
Canada, with its diverse and balanced portfolio of energy resources, is one of the largest producers and exporters of energy among IEA member countries. The energy sector plays an increasingly important role for the Canadian economy and for global energy security, as its abundant resource base has the potential to deliver even greater volumes of energy.
At the launch of the new publication Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2009 Review Monday in Ottawa, IEA Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka said “the goal to increase to 90% the portion of Canada’s electricity needs that are provided by carbon-free sources such as hydro, nuclear or wind power by the end of the decade is progressive and ambitious”.
He also praised Canada’s recent climate target announcement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 17% below its 2005 levels by 2020 under the Copenhagen Accord - a non-binding document that emerged from the international climate change conference in Denmark in December 2009.
Nonetheless, with a view to the long-standing sustainability of the energy sector, Tanaka stressed that “Canada must continue to develop and implement a comprehensive national energy efficiency strategy, coupled with a coordinated climate change policy targeted at the key emitting sectors, if long-term energy goals are to be realised”.
Canada is one of the highest per-capita CO2 emitters in the OECD and has higher energy intensity than any IEA member country. Yet the IEA report recognises the government’s aim to achieve a balance between the environmentally responsible production and use of energy, the growth and competitiveness of the economy, and secure and competitively priced energy and infrastructure.
Noting the federal government’s support of provincial resource management policies, Tanaka emphasised the need to contribute to the cleaner use and production of fossil energy, especially by reducing the environmental impact of oil-sands and the deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS).
“Indeed, large-scale deployment of CCS is one of the key components of Canada’s long-term energy future and the IEA commends Canada for this position,” added Tanaka.
The IEA publication recognises that CCS is a priority for the federal government and presents Canada with an opportunity to develop a new technology that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a large scale.
Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2009 Review goes on to recommend that Canada provide international leadership in the development of CCS technology. Following the conclusions of the G8 L’Aquila 2009 meeting, the IEA has developed criteria to track the progress toward the G8 goal of launching 20 large-scale CCS demonstration projects globally by 2010 with a view to beginning broad deployment of CCS by 2020, to achieve substantial cuts in CO2 emissions. The Agency will submit its progress report to the Canada G8 summit.
Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2009 Review identifies a number of strategic investment issues facing the oil industry, in particular the sustainable development of the oil-sands and future exploration and development in the North. Furthermore, Tanaka said,
“If Canada is to remain a leading energy supplier it must maintain its commitment to streamlining upstream oil and natural gas regulatory processes”.
Referring to sustainability, Tanaka added that, “the forecast increase in production from the resource-rich oil sands of Alberta will bring with it many challenges. Canada must take care to develop this resource without a disproportionate increase in emissions and other associated environmental risks”.
Even the most ambitious IEA scenario presented in the Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2009 - that aims at stabilising greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) at 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2-equivalent, in line with an increase in global temperature of around 2oC – shows that fossil fuels will still remain the dominant source of primary energy worldwide by 2030 (down from 81% today to 68% in 2030).
Canada, with its diverse and balanced portfolio of energy resources, is one of the largest producers and exporters of energy among IEA member countries. The energy sector plays an increasingly important role for the Canadian economy and for global energy security, as its abundant resource base has the potential to deliver even greater volumes of energy.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 |
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So, We Are Terrorists - Questioning Canada's Visa Process For Iranians
By Kourosh Ziabari
Once Dr. Hossein Beik-baghban, a renowned Iranian professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Strasbourg, while addressing a gathering in our university, digressed to explain a bitterly interesting memory from his first years as an Iranian scholar in France: "I was standing in a queue in a large shopping mall in Alsace, waiting for my turn to hand the goods over to the salesman and get the receipt, when a rustic old German woman appeared before and started talking to me immediately. We talked for some 10 minutes on different topics, and eventually, it came to nationality. I asked her first and she replied that she is German. Correspondingly, she began guessing about me, before I told her myself, and all of her guesses, one after another, were wrong: Lebanese, Turkish, Azeri, Arab and Russian. I told her that I'm Iranian. She remained silent and somewhat in shock for a few seconds, and suddenly yelled with excitement: Oh! So, you are a terrorist!"
For me, as the member of a developing society, and the citizen of a part of the so-called "Axis of Evil", it would be more than probably a delightful experience to travel to the proximity of the "Beacon of Freedom", and witness what I may never envision or even think of. When I first received the acceptance letter, telling me that my paper had been selected to be presented in an international conference in Calgary, Canada, I instantaneously began to imagine myself in a British Airways flight from Tehran to London, and to Calgary thereafter, wearing a navy-blue suit, addressing a large public of young people and students from all around the world, sharing a series of informative data and figures on energy crises and global warming and so on; however, I could never imagine that such a dream would be in vain within less than 3 weeks.
When I first submitted my forms for the visa application and the relevant travel documentations to the Canadian Embassy in Tehran, I never on earth was aware of the fact that "over 61 percent of Iranian applicants' visa applications had been rejected by the Canadian Embassy in 2007 and 2008," according to Vincent Valai, the member of the Quebec Law Society.
The standoff between Tehran and Ottawa started in mid-2003 on the grounds of the suspicious death of Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian photographer and freelance journalist who was allegedly "murdered" while she was in the custody of Iranian officials in the Evin Prison of Tehran.
In late 2007 and following the escalation of mutual tensions over the frequent complaints of Ottawa against the "negative human rights record" of Iran, Tehran ordered the Canadian Ambassador John Mundy to leave the country and expelled him to degrade the representation of Canada in Iran to the level of Charge d'Affaires.
Canada's then Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier described the act as "retaliatory and entirely unjustifiable" while casting doubts and concerns and expressing that "we stand behind our ambassador, who has performed his diplomatic duties with professionalism and dedication."
Mutually, under the pretext of the possibility of having links with the radical students of the 1970s who subsequently engaged in the U.S. embassy hostage-taking in 1980 in Tehran, Canada refused to accept several candidates who were proposed by Iran for ambassadorship in Ottawa and now, it's the third year that the bilateral presence of the two countries is limited to the level of Charge d'Affaires.
Poor, terrorist Iranians
Following the emergence of new tensions between Iran and Canada and after Michel de Salaberry, the former Canadian Ambassador to Egypt and Jordan, took office as the Charge d'Affaires, confusion and haphazardness culminated to its pinnacle in the Canadian Embassy in Tehran.
According to the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 32 percent of Iranians' applications in 2006 were rejected by the Embassy, while it aggravated to 51 percent in 2007 and hit the record in 2008 of 61 percent.
Netherlands-based Persian-language Radio Zamaneh reported in February 2009 that "200 Iranians apply for temporary residence visas at the Canadian Embassy daily, and the Embassy receives 60 dollars per each applicant regularly. Altogether, the total income of the Embassy exceeds $360,000 per month and amounts to $4,320,000 annually and this accounts for approximately 12% of Canada's yearly imports from Iran!"
Nevertheless, this is not the whole story. Aside from the unreasonable and questionable rejections of visa applications, the mechanism of the Embassy's interaction with applicants is thoroughly unfair and discriminatory.
Daily Star reported in May 2009 that "leading dissidents from Iran were insulted and humiliated by visa officers at the Canadian Embassy in Tehran before two were barred entry to Canada for a conference at York University." Mistreatment and humiliation have long become a routine practice of the Embassy staff who don't even permit the applicants to enter the Embassy and speak to the high-ranking officials.
It has not been precisely identified what objectives the Canadian Embassy pursues by taking such approaches; however, there are some allegations and suspicions which would require an elaborate investigation. In a brief and unbelievable conversation with a middle-age woman who was seeking a temporary visa to meet her sons in Quebec, I figured out that she had paid an extra $200 to the embassy staff and they facilitated the issuance of her visa under 5 days; something which is almost unprecedented and impossible in most cases.
Clearly, the Embassy now considers the procedure of visa issuance a lucrative source of business for itself, though the deterioration of bilateral ties has contributed to the inequitable hostility against Iranian applicants.
After 18 days of submitting my materials to the Embassy, they handed me a piece of paper, explaining that my visa will be issued "possibly" on June 9, and the conference which I was going to attend was slated for June 7. I'll be deprived of attending the conference for which I dedicated 2 months of research, more than probably because "I'm a terrorist".
Kourosh Ziabari is an Iranian media correspondent, freelance journalist and interviewer. He is a contributing writer of Finland’s Award-winning Ovi Magazine and the the Foreign Policy Journal. He is a member of Tlaxcala Translators Network for Linguistic Diversity (Spain). He is also a member of World Student Community for Sustainable Development (WSC-SD). Kourosh Ziabari's articles have appeared in a number of Canadian, Belgian, Italian, French and German websites. He can be reached at kziabari@gmail.com
Once Dr. Hossein Beik-baghban, a renowned Iranian professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Strasbourg, while addressing a gathering in our university, digressed to explain a bitterly interesting memory from his first years as an Iranian scholar in France: "I was standing in a queue in a large shopping mall in Alsace, waiting for my turn to hand the goods over to the salesman and get the receipt, when a rustic old German woman appeared before and started talking to me immediately. We talked for some 10 minutes on different topics, and eventually, it came to nationality. I asked her first and she replied that she is German. Correspondingly, she began guessing about me, before I told her myself, and all of her guesses, one after another, were wrong: Lebanese, Turkish, Azeri, Arab and Russian. I told her that I'm Iranian. She remained silent and somewhat in shock for a few seconds, and suddenly yelled with excitement: Oh! So, you are a terrorist!"
For me, as the member of a developing society, and the citizen of a part of the so-called "Axis of Evil", it would be more than probably a delightful experience to travel to the proximity of the "Beacon of Freedom", and witness what I may never envision or even think of. When I first received the acceptance letter, telling me that my paper had been selected to be presented in an international conference in Calgary, Canada, I instantaneously began to imagine myself in a British Airways flight from Tehran to London, and to Calgary thereafter, wearing a navy-blue suit, addressing a large public of young people and students from all around the world, sharing a series of informative data and figures on energy crises and global warming and so on; however, I could never imagine that such a dream would be in vain within less than 3 weeks.
When I first submitted my forms for the visa application and the relevant travel documentations to the Canadian Embassy in Tehran, I never on earth was aware of the fact that "over 61 percent of Iranian applicants' visa applications had been rejected by the Canadian Embassy in 2007 and 2008," according to Vincent Valai, the member of the Quebec Law Society.
The standoff between Tehran and Ottawa started in mid-2003 on the grounds of the suspicious death of Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian photographer and freelance journalist who was allegedly "murdered" while she was in the custody of Iranian officials in the Evin Prison of Tehran.
In late 2007 and following the escalation of mutual tensions over the frequent complaints of Ottawa against the "negative human rights record" of Iran, Tehran ordered the Canadian Ambassador John Mundy to leave the country and expelled him to degrade the representation of Canada in Iran to the level of Charge d'Affaires.
Canada's then Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier described the act as "retaliatory and entirely unjustifiable" while casting doubts and concerns and expressing that "we stand behind our ambassador, who has performed his diplomatic duties with professionalism and dedication."
Mutually, under the pretext of the possibility of having links with the radical students of the 1970s who subsequently engaged in the U.S. embassy hostage-taking in 1980 in Tehran, Canada refused to accept several candidates who were proposed by Iran for ambassadorship in Ottawa and now, it's the third year that the bilateral presence of the two countries is limited to the level of Charge d'Affaires.
Poor, terrorist Iranians
Following the emergence of new tensions between Iran and Canada and after Michel de Salaberry, the former Canadian Ambassador to Egypt and Jordan, took office as the Charge d'Affaires, confusion and haphazardness culminated to its pinnacle in the Canadian Embassy in Tehran.
According to the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 32 percent of Iranians' applications in 2006 were rejected by the Embassy, while it aggravated to 51 percent in 2007 and hit the record in 2008 of 61 percent.
Netherlands-based Persian-language Radio Zamaneh reported in February 2009 that "200 Iranians apply for temporary residence visas at the Canadian Embassy daily, and the Embassy receives 60 dollars per each applicant regularly. Altogether, the total income of the Embassy exceeds $360,000 per month and amounts to $4,320,000 annually and this accounts for approximately 12% of Canada's yearly imports from Iran!"
Nevertheless, this is not the whole story. Aside from the unreasonable and questionable rejections of visa applications, the mechanism of the Embassy's interaction with applicants is thoroughly unfair and discriminatory.
Daily Star reported in May 2009 that "leading dissidents from Iran were insulted and humiliated by visa officers at the Canadian Embassy in Tehran before two were barred entry to Canada for a conference at York University." Mistreatment and humiliation have long become a routine practice of the Embassy staff who don't even permit the applicants to enter the Embassy and speak to the high-ranking officials.
It has not been precisely identified what objectives the Canadian Embassy pursues by taking such approaches; however, there are some allegations and suspicions which would require an elaborate investigation. In a brief and unbelievable conversation with a middle-age woman who was seeking a temporary visa to meet her sons in Quebec, I figured out that she had paid an extra $200 to the embassy staff and they facilitated the issuance of her visa under 5 days; something which is almost unprecedented and impossible in most cases.
Clearly, the Embassy now considers the procedure of visa issuance a lucrative source of business for itself, though the deterioration of bilateral ties has contributed to the inequitable hostility against Iranian applicants.
After 18 days of submitting my materials to the Embassy, they handed me a piece of paper, explaining that my visa will be issued "possibly" on June 9, and the conference which I was going to attend was slated for June 7. I'll be deprived of attending the conference for which I dedicated 2 months of research, more than probably because "I'm a terrorist".
Kourosh Ziabari is an Iranian media correspondent, freelance journalist and interviewer. He is a contributing writer of Finland’s Award-winning Ovi Magazine and the the Foreign Policy Journal. He is a member of Tlaxcala Translators Network for Linguistic Diversity (Spain). He is also a member of World Student Community for Sustainable Development (WSC-SD). Kourosh Ziabari's articles have appeared in a number of Canadian, Belgian, Italian, French and German websites. He can be reached at kziabari@gmail.com
Monday, April 12, 2010 |
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Canada Underestimates Russia's Arctic Intentions
By Robert Amsterdam
Though my home country Canada often has the reputation as the world's boy scout, seeking the approval of others for its moral conduct, there is also a sense of healthy chauvinism when it comes to defending basic independence, territory, and sovereignty. However the push to claim an enormous slice of the Arctic by the Russian government over the past number of years has put these two national personalities to the acid test.
It is disheartening to see that the current reaction of Canada to Russia's string of provocations, from flag planting to dropping paratroopers into the disputed territory, has been reckless nonchalance. In comments made earlier this week and quoted in the Globe and Mail, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon displayed what is in my opinion a deep misunderstanding of Kremlin motives: "I don't take this Russian initiative very seriously," he said, "it seemed to me that the Russians were just pulling stunts."
I have for some time urged the Canadian government to thoughtfully study the Russian approach to the Arctic, a policy which under the direction of Igor Sechin and others represents a far greater threat to Canadian interests than Cannon appears to realize. These gestures are much more meaningful than simple stunts. This morning I had the opportunity to call a friend and colleague in Moscow, Vladimir Gladyshev, who is an international lawyer and expert on Russia's approach to territorial issues (as well as one of the key witnesses in the precedent-setting Yukos Energy Charter Treaty decision). Gladyshev had the following to say on Cannon's remarks to the Globe and Mail:
My law firm Amsterdam & Peroff is planning on hosting a panel debate on Canadian and Russian interests in the Arctic later this year, so please do get in contact with us if you have interest in attending. Vladimir Gladyshev and I will also be speaking at Chatham House (London, UK) on May 13th on the subject of Russian law.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Though my home country Canada often has the reputation as the world's boy scout, seeking the approval of others for its moral conduct, there is also a sense of healthy chauvinism when it comes to defending basic independence, territory, and sovereignty. However the push to claim an enormous slice of the Arctic by the Russian government over the past number of years has put these two national personalities to the acid test.
It is disheartening to see that the current reaction of Canada to Russia's string of provocations, from flag planting to dropping paratroopers into the disputed territory, has been reckless nonchalance. In comments made earlier this week and quoted in the Globe and Mail, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon displayed what is in my opinion a deep misunderstanding of Kremlin motives: "I don't take this Russian initiative very seriously," he said, "it seemed to me that the Russians were just pulling stunts."
I have for some time urged the Canadian government to thoughtfully study the Russian approach to the Arctic, a policy which under the direction of Igor Sechin and others represents a far greater threat to Canadian interests than Cannon appears to realize. These gestures are much more meaningful than simple stunts. This morning I had the opportunity to call a friend and colleague in Moscow, Vladimir Gladyshev, who is an international lawyer and expert on Russia's approach to territorial issues (as well as one of the key witnesses in the precedent-setting Yukos Energy Charter Treaty decision). Gladyshev had the following to say on Cannon's remarks to the Globe and Mail:
There are two levels to the globe and mail story. One is ostensibly the tug-of-war on the outer limits of the national continental shelves of the Russian Federation and Canada.
However, this is not the whole story. In principle, any temporary physical action either by Russia or Canada are irrelevant for the consideration of the outer limit of the continental shelf by the UN Commission. The latter works on the basis of a complex political-geographical-geological formula of UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Stunts like paratroopers and submarine launchers do not affect such deliberations.
However, a deeper and unarticulated agenda is at work. It is a competition of national creeping jurisdictions of Arctic countries among themselves, with Canada and Russia at the front.
An early indication that Arctic countries might be interested, jointly, just in such thing, was the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was signed in Oslo, November 15, 1973, backed by the five arctic countries. The preamble recognized special responsibility and special interests of the five countries in the ecology of the Arctic area. Foreign ministries of the five countries quietly regarded it as a first step to converting Arctic into the area that would be shared by them.
UNCLOS, signed in 1982, included so-called Canadian article, inserted at the initiative of the Canadian delegation, that gave Arctic coastal state powers to regulate international shipping in the 200-miles exclusive economic zone (in other ocean areas under 200-miles jurisdictional claims by coastal states convention essentially preserved traditional freedom of high seas shipping).
The Soviet Union, meantime, dissatisfied with what it considered as a too modest reach of their Canadian article, strived to extend, step by step, its full sovereignty over the whole "Soviet Arctic Sector" as described in the Supreme Soviet decree of 1926.
However, the main impediment for extending full sovereignty during the Cold War era was not the complex and clever formulas of UNCLOS (which strived to reconcile various maritime interests through heavy reliance on constructive ambiguity), but the strategic games of the superpowers.
Both the United States and Russia were interested in an unimpeded under ice passage for their nuclear submarines as a important part of strategic nuclear deterrence.
Since this particular interest is now radically diminished or non-existent, it no longer impedes a rapid proliferation of creeping national jurisdiction over Arctic polar regions.
However, Arctic players are left with sundry and often incompatible bits of legal regimes, policy positions and conflicting interests - some left over from the previous decades, some brand new.
In this climate of legal uncertainty, symbolic gestures have more that symbolic value - they may plausibly tip the scales of negotiations over the future of Arctics to one or the other country.
The question - should the foreign ministries of the Arctic countries be left to hammer out a legal regime of Arctics quietly in their studies (while regaling the public with publicity stunts), or the topic is too important to be left without input of the industry and environmental concerns?
My law firm Amsterdam & Peroff is planning on hosting a panel debate on Canadian and Russian interests in the Arctic later this year, so please do get in contact with us if you have interest in attending. Vladimir Gladyshev and I will also be speaking at Chatham House (London, UK) on May 13th on the subject of Russian law.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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Many Countries Seeking Arctic Access
By Andrei Fedyashin
Although Arctic issues and those of the Arctic Ocean have only been discussed by the few littoral nations until now, it appears that the region will soon be reorganized on a grand scale.
On March 29, Chelsea, Canada hosted a meeting of Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers from Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark and Norway that share the shores of the Arctic Ocean.
One thing is clear from the meeting: many other countries want access to the region. Nobody would dare tell China, who is openly eyeing the resource-rich Arctic, to keep out. The eventual re-division of the area's mineral resources seems inevitable.
It is high time everybody stopped wondering how many non-Arctic nations want access to the region, including its oil and gas deposits. I addition, the Arctic has a unique natural feature giving it natural-monopolist status. Due to global warming, Arctic sea passages in northern Russia and Canada remain ice-free for increasingly longer periods.
Year-round navigation would shorten merchant-marine traffic routes from China to Germany or the U.S. East Coast by 6,000-7,000 km in one direction.
A carefully orchestrated effort by Ottawa to show international leadership on polar affairs by hosting an Arctic summit near Ottawa ended awkwardly Monday after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized Canada for excluding aboriginal leaders and three northern nations, Iceland, Finland and Sweden, as well as representatives from other indigenous groups, from attending.
"We need all hands on deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it," Clinton said.
She said Iceland, Sweden and Finland were also Arctic nations and had the same rights to resources in the Arctic Ocean and its seabed as the delegates of the upcoming conference on Arctic cooperation called "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue" scheduled for April 22-23 in Moscow.
This unprecedented Arctic forum will become the first large-scale project of the resurgent Russian Geographical Society, with RIA Novosti acting as manager. The conference is expected to include discussions on prospecting operations and the development of natural resources, including the Arctic shelf, environmental protection issues and expanding the region's transportation infrastructure.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had to explain that the Arctic summit did not infringe upon the Arctic Council, a high-level inter-governmental forum addressing issues faced by the Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic.
Established in 1996 at the initiative of Finland, the Arctic Council is considered the main regional organization comprising Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. In reality, the Council is even larger because the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, China, Italy and South Korea have already received observer status with it.
Washington did not rebuke Ottawa and defend the uninvited parties for nothing. The United States and Canada have long been wrangling over large sectors of the Beaufort Sea. Consequently, any prospective allies could help settle this territorial dispute prior to the Arctic's division when claims will be voiced by almost everyone.
Denmark regularly quarrels with Canada for staking claims in Danish-controlled Greenland. Canada also argues with the United States for the same reason. At the same time, Norway lays claim to 175,000 sq. km. of Russia's continental shelf in the Barents Sea.
Moreover, Russia and the United States have not yet reached a consensus on a 1990 bilateral maritime boundary agreement in the north Pacific, also known as the Baker-Shevardnadze line/agreement, after the officials who signed the deal, the Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the US Secretary of State James Baker.
Beijing which is also shifting its gaze in the direction of the Arctic has started converting its theoretical Arctic research programs into applied research. China's completely modernized Soviet-era Ukrainian-built Xuelong or Snow Dragon icebreaker, the largest conventional icebreaker in the world, currently plies Arctic waters.
Although China has no right to own Arctic shelf deposits, it would like littoral countries to establish legal rules in polar seas, as well as transparent and understandable navigation regulations, to demarcate borders, oil and gas fields, etc.
Consequently, China, the world's largest economy, would be able to more easily invest tremendous amounts in regional projects, to export its products and to receive imports accordingly.
Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark and Norway have always held a special interest in the Arctic Ocean by "right of birth." From now on, they will have to coordinate their "hereditary claims" with others. And this will be even more difficult than discovering the North Pole.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article first appeared.
Although Arctic issues and those of the Arctic Ocean have only been discussed by the few littoral nations until now, it appears that the region will soon be reorganized on a grand scale.
On March 29, Chelsea, Canada hosted a meeting of Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers from Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark and Norway that share the shores of the Arctic Ocean.
One thing is clear from the meeting: many other countries want access to the region. Nobody would dare tell China, who is openly eyeing the resource-rich Arctic, to keep out. The eventual re-division of the area's mineral resources seems inevitable.
It is high time everybody stopped wondering how many non-Arctic nations want access to the region, including its oil and gas deposits. I addition, the Arctic has a unique natural feature giving it natural-monopolist status. Due to global warming, Arctic sea passages in northern Russia and Canada remain ice-free for increasingly longer periods.
Year-round navigation would shorten merchant-marine traffic routes from China to Germany or the U.S. East Coast by 6,000-7,000 km in one direction.
A carefully orchestrated effort by Ottawa to show international leadership on polar affairs by hosting an Arctic summit near Ottawa ended awkwardly Monday after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized Canada for excluding aboriginal leaders and three northern nations, Iceland, Finland and Sweden, as well as representatives from other indigenous groups, from attending.
"We need all hands on deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it," Clinton said.
She said Iceland, Sweden and Finland were also Arctic nations and had the same rights to resources in the Arctic Ocean and its seabed as the delegates of the upcoming conference on Arctic cooperation called "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue" scheduled for April 22-23 in Moscow.
This unprecedented Arctic forum will become the first large-scale project of the resurgent Russian Geographical Society, with RIA Novosti acting as manager. The conference is expected to include discussions on prospecting operations and the development of natural resources, including the Arctic shelf, environmental protection issues and expanding the region's transportation infrastructure.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had to explain that the Arctic summit did not infringe upon the Arctic Council, a high-level inter-governmental forum addressing issues faced by the Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic.
Established in 1996 at the initiative of Finland, the Arctic Council is considered the main regional organization comprising Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. In reality, the Council is even larger because the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, China, Italy and South Korea have already received observer status with it.
Washington did not rebuke Ottawa and defend the uninvited parties for nothing. The United States and Canada have long been wrangling over large sectors of the Beaufort Sea. Consequently, any prospective allies could help settle this territorial dispute prior to the Arctic's division when claims will be voiced by almost everyone.
Denmark regularly quarrels with Canada for staking claims in Danish-controlled Greenland. Canada also argues with the United States for the same reason. At the same time, Norway lays claim to 175,000 sq. km. of Russia's continental shelf in the Barents Sea.
Moreover, Russia and the United States have not yet reached a consensus on a 1990 bilateral maritime boundary agreement in the north Pacific, also known as the Baker-Shevardnadze line/agreement, after the officials who signed the deal, the Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the US Secretary of State James Baker.
Beijing which is also shifting its gaze in the direction of the Arctic has started converting its theoretical Arctic research programs into applied research. China's completely modernized Soviet-era Ukrainian-built Xuelong or Snow Dragon icebreaker, the largest conventional icebreaker in the world, currently plies Arctic waters.
Although China has no right to own Arctic shelf deposits, it would like littoral countries to establish legal rules in polar seas, as well as transparent and understandable navigation regulations, to demarcate borders, oil and gas fields, etc.
Consequently, China, the world's largest economy, would be able to more easily invest tremendous amounts in regional projects, to export its products and to receive imports accordingly.
Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark and Norway have always held a special interest in the Arctic Ocean by "right of birth." From now on, they will have to coordinate their "hereditary claims" with others. And this will be even more difficult than discovering the North Pole.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article first appeared.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010 |
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New Brunswick-Quebec Nuclear Energy Deal Off
The Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec have pulled out of an agreement that would have seen Hydro-Quebec acquire most of NB Power's generation assets including the Point Lepreau nuclear power station.
New Brunswick premier Shawn Graham announced that the province would not be proceeding with the agreement-in-principle, which was signed in January and had been due for completion by the end of March.
According to Graham, a number of issues had emerged during the process to move to a legal contract that had resulted in Hydro-Quebec proposing further changes, meaning that the deal would no longer be in the best interests of the province. "The reality is that, when Hydro-Quebec did its due diligence, it found that there were more risks than it was willing to take on," he said. This led to a change in position from Hydro Quebec. "Our government could not accept that," Graham said.
Quebec premier Jean Charest said that Quebec would not be pursuing the transaction. According to a release from the Quebec government, the initial memorandum of understanding for the deal, announced in October 2009, had hinged on several conditions and it had now become apparent that "certain assets" included in the transaction required a greater level of re-investment than previously anticipated. This would have resulted in a significantly higher level of risk for Hydro-Quebec, according to the provincial government.
The government statements offer no details on the assets in question, although New Brunswick's Point Lepreau nuclear power station, currently undergoing major refurbishment, had been included in the deal. The refurbishment will extend the life of the CANDU reactor to 2034 or beyond, but has gone over time and over the original C$1.4 billion ($1.3 billion) budget. Point Lepreau was not due to be transferred to Hydro Quebec until the reactor was back on line.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
New Brunswick premier Shawn Graham announced that the province would not be proceeding with the agreement-in-principle, which was signed in January and had been due for completion by the end of March.
According to Graham, a number of issues had emerged during the process to move to a legal contract that had resulted in Hydro-Quebec proposing further changes, meaning that the deal would no longer be in the best interests of the province. "The reality is that, when Hydro-Quebec did its due diligence, it found that there were more risks than it was willing to take on," he said. This led to a change in position from Hydro Quebec. "Our government could not accept that," Graham said.
Quebec premier Jean Charest said that Quebec would not be pursuing the transaction. According to a release from the Quebec government, the initial memorandum of understanding for the deal, announced in October 2009, had hinged on several conditions and it had now become apparent that "certain assets" included in the transaction required a greater level of re-investment than previously anticipated. This would have resulted in a significantly higher level of risk for Hydro-Quebec, according to the provincial government.
The government statements offer no details on the assets in question, although New Brunswick's Point Lepreau nuclear power station, currently undergoing major refurbishment, had been included in the deal. The refurbishment will extend the life of the CANDU reactor to 2034 or beyond, but has gone over time and over the original C$1.4 billion ($1.3 billion) budget. Point Lepreau was not due to be transferred to Hydro Quebec until the reactor was back on line.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Friday, March 26, 2010 |
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Canada's Traditional Anglicans Move Towards Rome Part Of 'Worldwide Movement' - Bishop
.- On March 12, leaders of the Traditional Anglican Communion (TAC) in Canada sent a letter to the Holy Father formally requesting to become unified with the Catholic Church. This initiative, says a leading bishop, is what he believes to be part of a “worldwide movement.”
Bishop Peter Wilkinson of the TAC Diocese of British Columbia, who authored the March 12 letter, discussed Pope Benedict XVI's publication of the Apostolic Constitution “Anglicanorum coetibus” with CNA in a phone interview on Monday. The document was released last year and addressed measures planned by the Vatican to allow Anglican communities to enter into communion with the Catholic Church.
When the Pope's document first came out, said Bishop Wilkinson, “I had Lutherans calling me saying, 'how do we get in on this?' And Orthodox (Christians) saying, 'how do we get in on this?'”
“It is a worldwide movement largely brought about by the vision of John Paul II” and “the wonderful, gentle firm, intellectual vision of Pope Benedict, who is such an inspiration to us,” noted the Anglican bishop.
Referencing a previous letter written to the Holy See which spoke of unifying with Rome, Bishop Wilkinson wrote to the Vatican on March 12. “Please allow the College of Bishops of the Anglican Catholic Church of Canada (Traditional Anglican Communion) to express our gratitude to you for your positive response of December 16th 2009 to our Letter to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of October 5th 2007 in which we expressed our desire to 'seek a communal and ecclesial way of being Anglican Catholics in communion with the Holy See, at once treasuring the full expression of catholic faith and treasuring our tradition within which we have come to this moment,'” the letter said.
“We have all read and studied with care the Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus with the Complementary Norms and the accompanying Commentary,” the bishop added. “And now, in response to your invitation to contact your Dicastery to begin the process you lay out, we respectfully ask that the Apostolic Constitution be implemented in Canada; that we may establish an interim Governing Council of three priests (or bishops); and that this Council be given the task and authority to propose to His Holiness a terna for appointment of the initial Ordinary.”
“It is our hope and prayer that these proposals may be useful in setting in train the process set out in the most welcome, gracious, and generous response of the Holy Father to our Petition,” the letter concluded.
Other signatories of the letter were The Rt. Rev. Craig Botterill Suffragan Bishop for Atlantic Canada and The Rt. Rev. Carl Reid, Suffragan Bishop for Central Canada.
With approximately 60 bishops, the Traditional Anglican Communion has parishes in 13 ecclesial provinces across Canada.
Bishop Peter Wilkinson of the TAC Diocese of British Columbia, who authored the March 12 letter, discussed Pope Benedict XVI's publication of the Apostolic Constitution “Anglicanorum coetibus” with CNA in a phone interview on Monday. The document was released last year and addressed measures planned by the Vatican to allow Anglican communities to enter into communion with the Catholic Church.
When the Pope's document first came out, said Bishop Wilkinson, “I had Lutherans calling me saying, 'how do we get in on this?' And Orthodox (Christians) saying, 'how do we get in on this?'”
“It is a worldwide movement largely brought about by the vision of John Paul II” and “the wonderful, gentle firm, intellectual vision of Pope Benedict, who is such an inspiration to us,” noted the Anglican bishop.
Referencing a previous letter written to the Holy See which spoke of unifying with Rome, Bishop Wilkinson wrote to the Vatican on March 12. “Please allow the College of Bishops of the Anglican Catholic Church of Canada (Traditional Anglican Communion) to express our gratitude to you for your positive response of December 16th 2009 to our Letter to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of October 5th 2007 in which we expressed our desire to 'seek a communal and ecclesial way of being Anglican Catholics in communion with the Holy See, at once treasuring the full expression of catholic faith and treasuring our tradition within which we have come to this moment,'” the letter said.
“We have all read and studied with care the Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus with the Complementary Norms and the accompanying Commentary,” the bishop added. “And now, in response to your invitation to contact your Dicastery to begin the process you lay out, we respectfully ask that the Apostolic Constitution be implemented in Canada; that we may establish an interim Governing Council of three priests (or bishops); and that this Council be given the task and authority to propose to His Holiness a terna for appointment of the initial Ordinary.”
“It is our hope and prayer that these proposals may be useful in setting in train the process set out in the most welcome, gracious, and generous response of the Holy Father to our Petition,” the letter concluded.
Other signatories of the letter were The Rt. Rev. Craig Botterill Suffragan Bishop for Atlantic Canada and The Rt. Rev. Carl Reid, Suffragan Bishop for Central Canada.
With approximately 60 bishops, the Traditional Anglican Communion has parishes in 13 ecclesial provinces across Canada.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010 |
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Putin Defends Russia's Arctic Rights, Calls For Dialogue
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin justified on Monday Russia's claims for the Arctic continental shelf and urged other nations to resolve all controversial issues through dialogue.
The Arctic territories, believed to hold vast untapped oil and gas reserves, have been at the center of disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice and make hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic Ocean increasingly accessible. This has made the extent of the continental shelf a matter of national interest.
"There has been much ado around the Arctic region. You know how the [Russian] flag was erected [on the seabed] and how negatively our neighbors reacted to this. Nobody has ever stopped them from erecting their own flags. Let them do it. But we work under the rules established by the United Nations and in line with international maritime laws," Putin told members of the Russian Geographic Society.
Russia along with other Arctic Council nations will take part in an international conference on the Arctic on April 22-23 in Moscow.
Putin expressed hope that the participants of the conference "will discuss the existing disputes in a calm and neighborly manner...will listen to each other rather than exchange threats on non-existing issues."
Under international law, each of the five Arctic Circle countries has a 322-kilometer (200-mile) exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean.
However, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, if a country can show its continental shelf extends beyond the 200-mile limit, it can claim rights to more of the ocean floor.
Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov Ridge in the summer of 2007 - to support its territorial claims in the region.
Russia first claimed the territory in 2001, but the United Nations demanded more evidence.
Russia has said it will invest some 1.5 billion rubles ($49.7 million) in defining the extent of its continental shelf in the Arctic in 2010 in order to prove its right to more of the Arctic floor.
Source: RIA Novosti
The Arctic territories, believed to hold vast untapped oil and gas reserves, have been at the center of disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice and make hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic Ocean increasingly accessible. This has made the extent of the continental shelf a matter of national interest.
"There has been much ado around the Arctic region. You know how the [Russian] flag was erected [on the seabed] and how negatively our neighbors reacted to this. Nobody has ever stopped them from erecting their own flags. Let them do it. But we work under the rules established by the United Nations and in line with international maritime laws," Putin told members of the Russian Geographic Society.
Russia along with other Arctic Council nations will take part in an international conference on the Arctic on April 22-23 in Moscow.
Putin expressed hope that the participants of the conference "will discuss the existing disputes in a calm and neighborly manner...will listen to each other rather than exchange threats on non-existing issues."
Under international law, each of the five Arctic Circle countries has a 322-kilometer (200-mile) exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean.
However, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, if a country can show its continental shelf extends beyond the 200-mile limit, it can claim rights to more of the ocean floor.
Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov Ridge in the summer of 2007 - to support its territorial claims in the region.
Russia first claimed the territory in 2001, but the United Nations demanded more evidence.
Russia has said it will invest some 1.5 billion rubles ($49.7 million) in defining the extent of its continental shelf in the Arctic in 2010 in order to prove its right to more of the Arctic floor.
Source: RIA Novosti
Monday, March 15, 2010 |
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Personal Data Protection And The Fight Against Terrorism
By Michele Nino
International terrorism has a transnational character.1 As a consequence, the cooperation, the coordination, and the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities of the EU Member States, their agencies, Europol, and judicial authorities constitute fundamental elements in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism and organized crime.2
In the context of the fight against international terrorism, after 11 September 2001, the European Union concluded Agreements with third States, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, aimed at transferring and processing air passengers’ personal data and is currently preparing a European system for regulating the retention, transmission and treatment of such data.3
Collecting and processing personal data involves two categories of data: PNR data (Passenger Name Records) and API data (Advance Passenger Information). The former, which contains a large and diverse quantity of data, concerns the data collected and extracted from various travel documents (usually air flights), and, in general, it can include data contained in passports, telephone numbers, travel carriers, credit card numbers, seat numbers and other elements.4 Even before 2001, air carriers collected and kept such data but only for commercial purposes, so these activities did not have investigative purposes and were not aimed at combating international terrorism and organised crime. Over the years, collecting and analysing PNR data have become important activities by which police authorities can identify dangerous passengers and take appropriate measures. API data, which consists of official data resulting from passports, contains data concerning passengers that is more limited than PNR data, because it includes the name, the nationality, the passport number, the date of birth and other details concerning passengers on flights. In the European Union, the collection of API data is provided for by Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data.5
The aims of this article are: 1. to identify the normative and structural deficiencies of the EU legal system by which the right to personal data protection is not adequately protected, especially in the context of the activities falling in the second and third pillars of the European Union, such as anti-terrorism activities; 2. to analyze in a detailed manner the dispositions of the above-mentioned PNR tools by examining their negative effects on the right to privacy of individuals in the European Union; 3. to provide innovative and coherent solutions in order that PNR instruments will, in the future, become important and legal tools in the fight against international terrorism, taking into account the positive changes that the Treaty of Lisbon will produce concerning the European Union’s institutional system and structure, and, as a consequence, concerning the protection of the right to personal data protection and EU counterterrorism measures. The Agreement will affect the new choices of the European Union regarding the fight against terrorism and the processing and transfer of PNR data.
As analyzed in the present article, the current structure of the European Union, which is founded on three pillars, is not as such to ensure an adequate and comprehensive protection of the right to personal data protection.6 First of all, the article addresses international and Community norms regarding those rights.7
After having examined the scope of the so-called Convention No. 108 adopted by the Council of Europe, which is the first European regional instrument in this area, the analysis shifts to an examination of Directive 95/46, which is the principal Community norm regarding the right to privacy.8 The scope of application of this Directive is excluded as far as activities falling into the second and third pillars (which involve crucial areas, such as public security, public defence and state security) are concerned. The reduced scope of Directive 95/46 and the pyramidal structure of the European Union have created a legislative lacuna in the EU legal system by which the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, such as the right to personal data protection, have been seriously prejudiced. This also occurred in the context of the anti-terrorism measures. In this regard, the article also examines Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed within the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.9 This decision, that forms part of the third pillar, is an important legal tool, but it is not able to adequately protect personal data.
Thereafter, the article addresses the improvements that the Treaty of Lisbon will produce concerning the institutional organization of the European Union, the protection of the right to privacy, and the counter-terrorism activities.10 In this context, the article examines in a detailed manner the norms provided by the EU-USA PNR Agreement, the EU-Canada API/PNR Agreement, the EU-Australia Agreement, and the EU PNR system.11 The fact that these instruments are likely to violate the right to privacy is evaluated by taking into account not only the abovementioned legislative lacuna but also the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon will eliminate the EU pillar structure, consider more extensively the importance of the protection of individual rights in the European Union, and give significant legislative powers to the European Parliament which will be placed on an equal footing with the Council in several areas of EU legislation. This will contribute to the development of the ‘democratic nature’ of EU institutions.
These circumstances will also produce positive effects for PNR instruments that, once modified, can represent effective tools in the fight against terrorism that are respectful of the right to privacy.
2. The right to privacy: The legal background
2.1. The right to privacy: International law and the European Court of Human Rights’ case law
The right to privacy was recognized for the first time at the international level by Article 12 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks’.12 Subsequently, the wording of this Article was reproduced in Article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.13
At a regional level, Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)14 provides: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’. The European Convention provides that the right to privacy can be subjected to some restrictions provided that certain conditions are satisfied. According to Article 8 (2) of the European Convention: ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.15
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered several decisions on this topic in order to specify the content and the extent of the right to privacy. According to its case law, limitations to the right to privacy are admitted if the restrictive measure in question: 1. is prescribed by law; 2. pursues a legitimate aim; and 3. is necessary in a democratic society in order to pursue that legitimate aim.16
In order to satisfy the first condition it is necessary that the restrictive measure has ‘some basis in domestic law.’17 As far as the quality of the law is concerned, it should be compatible with the rule of law, formulated with sufficient precision and ‘accessible to the person concerned’,18 in order to enable him ‘to regulate his conduct’,19 ‘to foresee its consequences for him’,20 and to be protected against ‘arbitrary interferences’ by public authorities with the right to privacy.21 In order to assess the necessity of a given measure in a democratic society, the existence of a pressing social need must be evaluated:22 in particular, it is possible to restrict the right to privacy provided that the measure employed is ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’23 States have a ‘certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists.’24 The scope of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in the assessment of the proportionality of the measure depends not only ‘on the nature of the legitimate aim’ of the restriction, but also on ‘the nature of the right involved’.25
2.2. The processing of personal data and the free flow of information: Council of Europe: Convention No. 108 and Directive 95/46/EC
The ongoing growth in the automatic elaboration of personal data that occurred in the 1970s has determined a significant flow of information both at transboundary and intercontinental levels.
However, the expansion of the transmission modalities and of the processing of personal data has determined important political and legal debates on the relationship between the protection of privacy and the free flow of information. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the European legal context regarding the protection of personal data and the control of bank data was very fragmentary, and there was no legal uniformity in this particular area.26
As a consequence, the Council of Europe and the European Union adopted instruments in order to fill the legislative gap and to guarantee the legal uniformity between states in matters concerning the right to privacy.
In 1981, the Council of Europe adopted the so-called Convention No. 108.27 The aim of the Convention is to guarantee the privacy of each individual in the ‘automatic processing of personal data regarding him.’28 The Convention has recognized an individual right to privacy and to data protection in the activities concerning the automatic processing of personal data. The Convention identifies the method of personal data transfer which is respectful of the right to privacy, stating that personal data undergoing automatic processing must be: ‘a. obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; b. stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way which is incompatible with those purposes; c. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored’.29 Furthermore, special categories of data, so called sensitive data,30 ‘may not be processed automatically’, save for certain exceptions.31
However, the Convention has one important gap: its scope covers the sole protection of automatically
processed personal data, but it does not include non-automated data.32
Directive 95/46/EC33 has filled this lacuna because it applies to data processed by both automated and non-automated means.34 Indeed, after having defined personal data as any information concerning an ‘identified or identifiable natural person’,35 the Directive affirms the principles regulating the processing of personal data considered as ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means’.36
Principles affirmed in this Directive thus integrate and broaden those affirmed by Convention
No. 108.37 Article 8 of the Directive even excludes the processing of personal sensitive data,38
providing exceptions in that regard.39
With the adoption of Directive 95/46, the European legislation concerning the protection of personal data seemed to be adequate and complete because it, together with Convention No. 108, coherently harmonized the free flow of information and the protection of privacy. However, over the years, these norms have shown their lacunae and their incapacity to face newworld challenges, in the light of the ever-increasing use of automated means, bank data and the strengthening of the EU’s anti-terrorism measures.
2.2.1. The Community principles governing the processing of personal data
According to Directive 95/46, Member States must respect the following principles in the processing of personal data: the purpose limitation, the data quality and proportionality principle, and the transparency principle.40
Article 6 of the Directive provides that personal data must be ‘processed fairly and lawfully (…) and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes’.41 According to the purpose limitation principle, data must be processed for a defined purpose and its subsequent use, transmission or collection must be in compliance with that purpose.42 It is thus necessary that the law provides exactly the aims to be achieved through the processing of personal data. The clear formulation of the disposition is aimed at avoiding the identification of purposes so wide as to allow unjustified intrusions into the private life of the individual subject to the treatment.
The application of the purpose limitation is strictly related to the data quality and proportionality principle. According to Article 6 of the Directive, the personal data must be ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected (…) or further processed (…), accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’.43 The scope of the proportionality principle, which is one of the general principles of Community law, has also been elaborated by the Community courts. It requires that measures adopted by Community institutions ‘should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives (…), and where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued’. 44
According to the transparency principle, individuals must be given precise and detailed information concerning the aims of the collection and processing of data regarding them as well as other information necessary to guarantee the fairness of the operations.45
2.3. The structural incapacity of the European Union to protect the right to personal data protection, and Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA
The situation involving a legislative lacuna examined above is caused by the structural incapacity of the European Union to protect, as a whole, the right to have personal data protected. The structure of the European Union, as outlined by the Maastricht Treaty,46 is based on three pillars: 1. the Community pillar, corresponding to the European Communities (first pillar); 2. the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), provided for by Title V of the EU Treaty (second pillar); 3. police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, provided by Title VI of the EU Treaty (third pillar).47
Directive 95/46 is not to be applied to the processing of personal data in the course of activities falling under the second and third pillars.48 This significant legislative lacuna has deprived individuals of the full protection of their right to privacy, which has been limited by several anti-terrorism measures adopted by the European Union in the second49 and third pillars.
Until 2008, European Union activities falling under the second and third pillars were not completely supported by norms effectively protecting the right to data protection.50 In this regard, the adoption in 2008 of the Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed within the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States is to be welcomed.51 This decision, which forms part of the third pillar, represents a fundamental tool in order to establish and develop an area of freedom, security and justice.52 It provides common standards regarding the processing and protection of personal data processed for purposes of preventing and fighting crime.53 The purpose of the Framework
Decision is ‘to ensure high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, provided for by Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, while guaranteeing a high level of public safety’.54 As a result, the Framework Decision is aimed at balancing two important interests: 1. protecting public safety, by increasing and intensifying the police and judicial cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, and 2. defending personal data processed in activities falling under the third pillar. According to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), these interests can coexist because an effective protection of personal data can improve and reinforce the police and judicial cooperation.55 The Framework Decision is intended to fill the abovementioned lacunae in the European Union legal system: first, it assures that the general principles of the data protection provided for by Directive 95/46 and Convention No. 108 are applied within the area of the third pillar;56 second, it provides common rules defining those principles.57 Indeed, according to Article 3 of the Framework Decision: ‘Personal data may be collected by the competent authorities only for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes (…) and may be processed only for the same purpose for which data were collected. Processing of the data shall be lawful and adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected’.
The Framework Decision covers not only the exchange of personal data between Member States and EU authorities but also the transfer of those data to third States58 or to private parties in Member States.59 According to Article 13 of the Framework Decision, Member States can transmit personal data to third States provided that: ‘(c) the Member State from which the data were obtained has given its consent to transfer (…); and (d) the third State (…) ensures an adequate level of protection for the intended data processing.’60
As to the relationship with previously adopted acts of the Union, the Framework Decision provides that the acts, adopted according to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union prior to the date of the entry into force of the Framework Decision, containing specific provisions on the protection of personal data exchanged or processed pursuant to those acts, prevail over the norms of the Framework Decision.61 As far as the relationship between agreements with third States is concerned, Article 26 provides that the Framework Decision ‘is without prejudice to any obligations and commitments incumbent upon Member States or upon the Union by virtue of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements with third States existing at the time of adoption of this Framework Decision.’62 However, it is provided that in the application of those agreements ‘the
transfer to a third State of personal data obtained from another Member State shall be carried out’ in compliance with Article 13 of the Framework Decision.63
Although the Framework Decision is very important, being the first instrument intended to provide for the protection of personal data in the third pillar, some scholars64 and the EDPS have rightly maintained that it does not offer an adequate and overall protection of personal data.
According to the EDPS, the Framework Decision has some lacunae. First of all, it concerns only the exchange of personal data between Member States and EU authorities, but it does not cover domestic data.65 Furthermore, in the opinion of the EDPS, the Framework Decision should be improved because it does not assure an adequate level of protection for the transfer of personal data to third States ‘according to a common EU standard’ and does not limit ‘the purposes for which personal data may be further processed’ in compliance with the principles contained in Directive 95/46.66
3. The new EU institutional architecture provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007 and has entered into force on 1 December 2009,67 marks an important turning point for strengthening the protection of rights and fundamental freedoms in the European Union, and in particular the protection of personal data. It amends the current EU and EC treaties and renames the latter as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The elimination of the structure of the pillars allows European institutions to carry out a more unitary and coherent activity aimed at protecting personal data as a whole. The end of the pillar structure could also permit, through an amendment of Directive 95/46, the application of this Directive in other important areas regarding the fight against terrorism, such as the common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.68
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon will introduce the Charter of Fundamental Rights into Community primary law,69 making its provisions legally binding. This will strengthen the values and principles on which the European Union is based. In this regard, it is important to recall Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which explicitly recognizes the right to the protection of personal data.70 This disposition is very important, because it classifies the right to the protection of personal data as an autonomous right, as distinguished from the right to respect for private and family life provided for by Article 7 of the same Charter.71 Furthermore, Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union not
only recognizes the importance and the autonomy of the right to protection of personal data, but it also provides that the Council and the Parliament will establish, through the ordinary legislative procedure and thus on an equal footing, common rules aimed at protecting individuals’ privacy.72
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon gives a fundamental legislative role to the European Parliament. The agreement, extending the co-decision procedure in several important areas, such as areas of justice, security and freedom, and substituting the requirement of unanimity with the qualified majority system for the adoption of Community acts, places the European Parliament on the same level as the Council and makes Community legislative activity more democratic.
4. The Agreements concluded between the European Union and the United States on the
transfer of personal PNR data
4.1. The United States anti-terrorism legislation on the security of air transport: Problems of
compliance with Community law
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States adopted important measures both of a repressive and preventive nature, aimed at neutralizing the terrorist threat.73 In the attempt to assure the efficacy of the counter-terrorism measures, the US administration considered it of fundamental importance to control and analyze the flow of personal data relating to air passengers on flights directed to or arriving from the United States.
In November 2001, the United States adopted legislation enhancing border security that obliged each air carrier, operating passenger flights directed to or arriving from the United States, to provide the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with electronic access to PNR data present in the automated reservation system of the air carriers.74
The problems of compatibility between US legislation and Community norms protecting individuals’ privacy were mainly raised by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the European Parliament and the European Commission.
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, by affirming the necessity to reach a proper balance between the security needs and the protection of individual guarantees, and considering the individual’s right to protection of personal data as a part of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual protected by the European Union,75 stated that compliance by the air carriers with the US legislation would probably have caused problems in respect of Directive 95/46/EC76 and expressed concerns as to the level of personal data protection assured in the US.77
The European Parliament, criticizing the initial positions of the Commission, invited it to adopt actions in the area of the transfer of PNR data in the US which could be respectful of Community law and of the ECHR. In particular, the European Parliament, expressing doubts about the real effectiveness of the PNR transfer in the fight against international terrorism, underlined that this strategy could have created a system of mass surveillance, in complete violation of principles provided by Directive 95/46/CE, Article 8 of the ECHR, and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.78
The European Commission, which, according to Article 25 of Directive 95/46, is empowered to evaluate whether the transfer of personal data to a third country assures an adequate level of protection of such data under Community law,79 delayed this examination because of its concerns about the invasiveness of the American legislation and its potential capacity to limit the privacy of individuals. It informed the US authorities that that law could violate some important Community norms concerning personal data protection and computerized reservation systems.80
Following the pressures exercised by the Commission, the US authorities postponed the entry into force of the dispositions provided for by the US legislation; at the same time, they did not renounce their intentions to impose sanctions against airlines that failed to comply with the US legislation after 5 March 2003. After that date, several air carriers operating in the European Union provided US authorities with access to their PNR data.
These circumstances created a situation of legal uncertainty for the airlines that were worried both about the possible American sanctions in case of non-compliance with American legislation and the control activities of the European data protection authorities, which could impose sanctions in cases of a failure to comply with the Community law concerning the protection of personal data.
4.2. The transfer of personal data to third countries under Directive 95/46 and the 2004 PNR
EU-US Agreement
Article 25 Directive 95/46 identifies the requirements for the transfer of personal data from European Union Member States to third countries, providing that ‘the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if (…) the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection’.81 The adequacy of the level of protection constitutes the conditio sine qua non in order that a third country can obtain a transfer of data from the European Union. The European Commission has the power to examine the level of protection afforded by a third country by taking into account several circumstances concerning the data to be evaluated82 and deciding
whether or not a third country ensures an adequate level of protection required for the transfer of personal data under the procedure provided for by Article 31(2) of Directive 95/46.83 On 11 May 2004, the CBP issued Undertakings, which clarified and defined the conditions for the transfer of PNR passengers’ data to US authorities, ensuring that such transfer would have taken place in compliance with Community principles concerning individuals’ right to privacy.84
On 14 May 2004 the Commission, by Decision 2004/535/CE, considered that CBP was able to guarantee ‘an adequate level of protection for PNR data transferred from the Community concerning flights to or from the United States, in accordance with the Undertakings’.85 In the light of this decision on adequacy, on 17 May 2004, by Decision No. 496/2004, the Council of the European Union approved the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United States on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States CBP.86 Finally, on 28 May 2004, the United States and the European Community definitively signed the Agreement, that entered into force on the date of its signature.87
According to the Agreement, the processing and treatment by CBP of PNR personal data was regulated by the Undertakings and US legislation.88 The Agreement was criticized by the European Parliament, humanitarian associations, and the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party for substantially having bypassed the Community principles concerning the protection of individual privacy and, in particular, for having violated the purpose limitation and the proportionality principles.89
As far as the purposes for processing data are concerned, PNR data could be used by CBP in order to ‘prevent and combat: 1. terrorism and related crimes; 2. other serious crimes, including organised crime; 3. and flight from warrants or custody for those crimes’.90 The wording of category no. 2, which was so vague as to encompass criminal activities not properly related with terrorist acts, allowed data transmission not in compliance with the purpose limitation principle.91
It is fundamental that the fight against international terrorism be limited and defined, and not so wide as to admit unjustified limitations to the right to privacy and fundamental freedoms not provided for by international and Community law.
As for PNR data to be transferred, it was provided that the transfer of such data encompasses a list of 34 elements.92 As a rule, the transmission of sensitive data protected by Article 8 of Directive 95/46 was excluded.93 Although the original scheme of the Agreement provided for the transfer of 38 PNR data and thus there was a quantitative reduction of the transmissible data, the number and the quantity of the data to be transferred under the 2004 Agreement remained very wide; therefore, the transfer was not adequate and relevant according to the principles enshrined in Article 6 of Directive 95/46.94
As to the length of time of the data retention, it was provided that the CBP would keep and access the PNR data of passengers for three years and six months.95 PNR data that had not been manually accessed during that time period would be destroyed. PNR data that had been manually accessed during that period would remain for a period of eight years in a CBP record file, and be subsequently destroyed.96 The data retention time appeared not only less effective for investigation purposes, but also excessive and not in compliance with the principle of proportionality.97
The method of data transfer chosen was the ‘pull’ system, according to which US authorities had direct access to air carriers’ reservation systems.98 This system was preferred to the more protective ‘push’ system, under which the authority requesting PNR data received it from the air carriers, without having direct online access to their databases.99
4.3. The European Court of Justice judgment issued in Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04
On 27 July 2004, the European Parliament, supported by the EDPS,100 brought two actions for annulment under Article 230101 EC, which were subsequently joined, before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) in order to seek the annulment of Council Decision no. 496 and Decision no. 535 on adequacy.102 In its Opinion of 22 November 2005, Advocate General Léger103 recommended the annulment of both decisions. He held that the use and processing of PNR data by CBP constitute activities concerning ‘public security and State activities in areas of criminal law’, and, as such, they were excluded from the scope of Directive 95/46.104 The fact that PNR data was initially collected for commercial purposes did not exclude that it had been subsequently collected and processed for protecting ‘public security’ and satisfying ‘law enforcement purposes’.105 Furthermore, the Advocate General excluded that Article 95 EC could constitute an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of Council Decision no. 496 because that article concerns measures aimed at realizing ‘the establishment and functioning of the internal market’,106 and is thus not aimed at countering terrorism.
In its judgment of 30 May 2006, the ECJ, following the conclusions of the Advocate General, annulled both Council Decision no. 496 and the Decision no. 535 on adequacy.107 According to the Court, the decision on adequacy involved the processing of personal data not falling within the scope of Directive 95/46 and, as a consequence, it infringed the Community norm itself.108 As to Council Decision no. 496, the Court held that Article 95 EC could not ‘justify the Community competence to conclude the Agreement’ between the US and the EU on the transfer of PNR data.109 As a consequence, the Court ordered the annulment of the Agreement but, at the same time, it preserved the effect of Decision 2004/535 until 30 September 2006.110
The ECJ focused its attention on procedural aspects, such as those concerning the scope of Directive 95/46 and the Community competence to conclude an agreement in a specific area under Article 95 TCE. The Court did not draw its attention to other important topics, both substantive and procedural, raised by the European Parliament and examined by Advocate General Leger, such as the effects of the contested decisions on the exercise of the right to privacy of individuals. On the one hand, the judgment of the Court in the short term resulted in the annulment of the Agreement and thus the elimination of the negative effects on the right to privacy arising from the application of that Agreement; on the other hand, the ECJ decision did
not contribute to assuring the certainty of the law in the long term as it failed to reach a definitive and clear solution to the problems raised by the Agreement.111 This orientation created a situation of legal uncertainty that led to the 2007 Agreement, which contains dispositions that, even to a greater extent than before, limit the fundamental principles protecting the right to privacy.
4.4. The 2006 interim Agreement
In October 2006, after the conclusion of the negotiations between the Commission and the United States, the EU Council approved an interim Agreement between the European Union and the US on the processing and transfer of PNR data from the European Union to US authorities.112 On 19 October 2006, this Agreement replaced the 2004 Agreement, and it should have expired on 31 July 2007 in order to be replaced by a definitive Agreement.113 The new Agreement did not contain the precise indication of the PNR data that was the object of the processing and the transfer, and it retained the ‘pull system’ as the method of personal data transfer.114 As to the US authorities empowered to have access to PNR data kept by the air carriers, the Agreement provided that not only the CBP – the only entity entitled to have access to PNR data according
to the 2004 Agreement – but also the ‘US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Office of the Secretary and the entities that directly support[ed] it’ could have this power.115 Furthermore, the Agreement established that the processing and transfer of data would have occurred ‘in accordance with applicable US laws and constitutional requirements’,116 mentioning only in the ‘whereas’ clause the Community norms on the protection of privacy.117
The vague definition of PNR data to be transferred, the maintenance of a method of data transfer more susceptible to jeopardizing the protection of privacy and the expansion of the entities empowered to have direct access to PNR data kept by air carriers show that the norms of the 2006 Agreement, although they were less precise and detailed than those of the 2004 Agreement, permitted dangerous abuses and facilitated violations of the fundamental freedoms of individuals.118
4.5. The 2007 definitive Agreement: The concrete risk of the violation of passengers’ privacy
By its Decision of 23 July 2007, the Council of the European Union approved the conclusion of a new Agreement on the processing and transfer of PNR data that replaced the Agreement concluded in 2006.119 The Agreement consists of the document itself and a US letter to the EU that explains the modalities for the storage, use and transfer of PNR data by Homeland Security.120
Title I of this letter specifies the purposes for which US authorities can use PNR data, such as the prevention of and combating ‘1. terrorism and related crimes; 2. other serious crimes, including organized crime; and 3. flight from warrants or custody for those crimes’.121 Furthermore, US authorities can use and process PNR data in order to protect ‘the vital interests of the data subject or other persons, or in any criminal judicial proceedings, or as otherwise required by US law’.122 The wording of the new Agreement not only retains the structure of the previous Agreement but it also widens these purposes.123 As also correctly pointed out by the Article 29 Working Party, the Agreement does not provide definitions of ‘terrorism-related crime an serious crimes including organised crimes’.124 The vagueness of the indicated purposes can legitimize a widespread use of PNR data, not in compliance with the purpose limitation and data quality and proportionality principles. The fact that PNR data can also be used ‘in any criminal judicial proceedings, or as otherwise required by US law’ is not to be welcomed: in this way, the certainty of law is not assured because US authorities could decide to use and process PNR data for less serious offences than terrorism or organised crime, putting at risk individuals’ right to privacy.125
As for data elements to be transferred, the 2007 Agreement reduces the quantity of transmissible data from the original 34 elements of the 2004 Agreement to the current 19 elements.126 Although it seems that, through this reduction, the 2007 Agreement affects the right to privacy less than the 2004 Agreement, paradoxically, the variety of the transmissible data has increased.127 Furthermore, in an exceptional case the US authorities can use sensitive data, an activity that was excluded under the 2004 Agreement.128 As a result, the amount of information that US authorities can obtain and process has become very wide and it is not proportionate to the aims pursued by the Agreement.
The 2004 Agreement identified a limited number of agencies within Homeland Security that were entitled to receive PNR data. Instead, the 2007 Agreement provides that DHS can process PNR data received from the European Union and ‘treat data subjects concerned by such processing in accordance with applicable US laws’,129 thereby not identifying the specific agencies empowered to have access to PNR data. In this way, a general and disproportionate enlargement of entities entitled to have access to air passengers’ personal data is allowed.
Furthermore, the 3½ years of PNR data retention provided for by the 2004 Agreement has been extended to 15 years by the 2007 Agreement. PNR data is retained for seven years in an active database and subsequently moved to a dormant database.130 This data retention time appears disproportionate and excessive in relation to the purposes to be achieved, raising problems of compliance with the Community principles of proportionality and purpose limitation, as well as with Article 8 of the ECHR.131
As to the method of data transfer, the 2007 Agreement has replaced the pull system provided for by the 2004 Agreement with the push system.132 In this way, US authorities do not have direct access to PNR data, but they can receive it from the air carriers. However, the Agreement provides that the pull system remains in effect whereas, by January 2008, some air carriers cannot apply the push system.133 The choice of system for data transmission, whose application allows a better control of US authorities and a reduced risk to the privacy of passengers, is to be welcomed. Yet, the possible coexistence of the pull and push system not only can legitimize possible violations of the air passengers’ right to privacy, but it could also cause a ‘distortion of competition between EU air carriers’.134
The 2007 Agreement identifies US laws as the exclusive point of reference for the processing and transfer of personal data from the European Union to the United States. According to the Agreement, DHS can process and use PNR data ‘in accordance with applicable US laws’,135 and the EU cannot ‘interfere with relationships between the United States and third countries for the exchange of passenger information on data protection grounds’.136 The dependence of the European Union on US laws constitutes a dangerous signal,137 also in the light of the fact that – as held by some scholars – there is no ‘general framework in the US concerning all processing of personal data’.138 The Agreement does not take completely into account the existence of differences between Community law and US laws regarding the processing of personal data, giving an exclusive power to US law and administration, and consequently putting at risk the exercise of individual rights protected by the European Union.
The 2007 Agreement, although it formally reduces the number of transmissible data, adopts mainly the push system, provides a system of periodical review of its implementation139 and for the application of the US Privacy Act to Community citizens, it allows, in a greater way than the 2004 Agreement, a serious limitation of passengers’ right to privacy and is not in compliance with Community norms on the right to privacy.140 As a result, it is necessary that the Agreement be modified through: 1. a clearer definition of the purposes to be achieved; 2. a coherent and adequate evaluation of the data to be transferred; 3. a clear identification of the authorities empowered to receive the data; 4. a uniform application of the push system; and, 5. a moredefined
and binding reference to Community principles concerning the right to privacy.
5. The 2005 Agreement on PNR/API data transfer between the European Union and Canada
In 2005, the European Union entered into another important Agreement on PNR/API data transfer, this time with Canada.141 At the beginning of its negotiation, the Canadian-EU Agreement on the transfer of PNR/API data raised relevant legal problems, such as the difficulty in harmonising the Canadian provisions on personal data transfer with the Community legislation concerning the right to privacy. The proposal for the Agreement, which was subsequently modified following the negative Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party,142 provided some dispositions not completely in compliance with the right to privacy. Following the negotiations between European Union and Canadian representatives, the Canadian authorities complied with
the requirements of the European Union, thereby modifying the original proposals.
According to the Agreement at issue, the transfer and the processing of personal data from the European Union to Canada are regulated by the Commitments of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)143 and by Canadian national legislation concerning the enhancement of security ‘to the extent indicated in the Commitments’.144 CBSA receives personal data ‘under section 107.1 of the Customs Act, paragraph 148(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’.145
As far as the method of data transfer is concerned, Section 7 of the Commitments has accepted the push system, which allows less abuses and more control over the flow of air passengers’ personal data.146 Air carriers, by transferring data selected by them and not being obliged to allow Canadian authorities to have direct access to their data, can avoid potential violations of individuals’ right to privacy.
The Agreement contains a list of 25 data elements to be transferred to the CBSA, but the results are qualitatively very limited.147 The Commitments excluded within this material ‘“sensitive data elements” (…) and all “open text” or “general remarks” fields’.148 This disposition is to be welcomed because it excludes the transmission of sensitive data, thereby complying with Article 8 of Directive 95/46, and it avoids the general transfer of personal data, thus excluding the transmission of ‘open categories’ of data, which – as recalled by the European Parliament – ‘could create confusion …with regard to sensitive aspects of the behaviour of the passenger’.149
However, although the Article 29 Working Party and European Data Protection Supervisor have welcomed the list of PNR data to be transferred under the Agreement, they have expressed some shared doubts. The former has underlined that not all the data elements to be collected are ‘relevant and not excessive’ under Community law.150 The EDPS has stated that the transfer of certain categories of data can give rise to problems as to the protection of the right to privacy.151
As to the data retention time, the Commitments provide for a data retention period of 3½ years for personal data concerning a ‘person who is not subject to an investigation in Canada’.152 This term seems to be in compliance with the proportionality and data quality principles provided for by Community law.
As to the transfer of data to other countries, the Commitments provide that ‘API and PNR information retained in PAXIS will be shared only with a country that has received an adequacy finding under the Directive, or is covered by it’.153 The necessity that the country receiving the information assures an adequate level of protection for the right to privacy is an important factor that guarantees a flow of information which respects the right to privacy.
The system of privacy protection under Canadian law is substantially adequate, and it is very close to the European system provided for by Directive 95/46 and Article 286 TCE.154 The independent Office of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner controls CBSA’s respect for privacy under the conditions provided for by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Privacy Act.155 The Agreement between Canada and the EU on the transfer of API/PNR is to be positively welcomed because it protects passengers’ privacy in a better way than the US-EU Agreement does. However, in the light of the transitional character of the decision on adequacy,156 it is also necessary that in the case of any renewal or renegotiation, the new Agreement primarily respects air passengers’ right to privacy.157
First of all, the new Agreement should provide a more extensive definition of the purposes for which the transfer of the personal data of passengers is allowed. Section 2 allows the transfer of data relating to persons having a ‘relationship with terrorism or terrorism-related crimes, or other serious crimes, including organized crime, that are transnational in nature’.158 The Article 29 Working Party has affirmed that those purposes are well defined and have ‘a clear relationship with fighting acts of terrorism’.159 The wording of Section 2 is not in compliance with the Community principle of purpose limitation, because – as is also explained by EDPS – it has not ‘limited the purpose of the data processing to terrorism, but extended the purposes to other serious crimes’.160 The term ‘serious crime’ is so vague that it allows CBSA to use and process data for purposes not properly related to terrorism.161 In this way, the right to privacy could be jeopardised because the unclear definition of the purposes according to which the transfer of PNR data is admitted can legitimate dangerous abuses by Canadian authorities. Furthermore, certain categories of data such as ‘frequent flyer information’ and ‘APIS information’, whose processing is not necessary and not in compliance with the principles of proportionality and purpose limitation, should be deleted from the list of PNR to be transferred.
6. The 2008 Agreement on EU-sourced PNR data transfer between the European Union and Australia
After having concluded the abovementioned Agreements with the United States and Canada on the transfer of PNR data,162 on 30 June 2008 the European Union entered into an Agreement163 with Australia. As for the scope of application of the Agreement, the Australian customs service can require and obtain only EU-sourced PNR data concerning passengers ‘travelling to, from or through Australia’.164
According to this Agreement, the transfer and process of European Union-sourced PNR data by air carriers to the Australian customs service is governed by Australian legislation.165 The Article 29 Working Party has recognized that Australian legislation on privacy is able to guarantee an adequate level of protection for the privacy of individuals, because it respects individual rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with Community law.166 Although the Agreement contains some norms protecting the right to protection of personal data and has been welcomed by the Australian authorities,167 it can be considered to allow the Australian customs service to limit, in an unjustified way, individuals’ right to privacy.
As to the purposes of processing the data, the Australian customs service can process European Union-sourced PNR data, in order to prevent and contrast: ‘(i) terrorism and related crimes; (ii) serious crimes, including organised crime, that are transnational in nature; (iii) flight from warrants or custody for crimes described above.’168 Furthermore, PNR data can also be processed where this is necessary ‘for the protection of the vital interests of the data subject or other persons’169 or where it is ‘required by court order or Australian law’.170 In this way, the Australian customs service is authorized to process and transfer PNR data for purposes not properly related to the prevention of and combating terrorism. The indication of these broad purposes is neither contained in the 2007 PNR EU-US Agreement nor in the 2005 PNR/API EUCanada Agreement. As a result, the wording of the abovementioned dispositions is so wide as to allow unjustified, inadequate and disproportionate PNR data processing not in compliance with the fundamental purpose limitation principle.171
As to the data elements to be collected and processed, the Agreement contains a list of 19 elements which are very close to the catalogue of PNR data provided for by the 2007 PNR EU-US Agreement:172 it allows excessive and disproportionate data transmission which does not respect the principle of proportionality. However, a positive element contained in the Agreement is represented by the fact that the transmission of sensitive data is excluded.173
As far as the data retention time is concerned, the Agreement provides a comprehensive 5½-year term of duration.174 Generally, this data retention period could be considered adequate; however, the wide purposes for which PNR data can be processed mean that the system is not clearly defined even with respect to the data retention time;175 as a result, the risk of violating individuals’ right to personal data protection can be very high.
As to the disclosure of EU-sourced PNR data by the Australian customs service, the Agreement identifies two forms of disclosure: the disclosure within the Australian Government and the disclosure to third-country governments. As to the former, it is provided that the Australian customs service can transfer PNR data, only when anonymised, to specified Australian Government departments and agencies.176 This disposition is to be welcomed, because it protects the right to privacy of air passengers, avoiding their identification and maintaining their anonymity. 177 As far as the disclosure to third-country governments is concerned, the Agreement provides that customs can decide to transfer PNR data to certain third-country government authorities on a case-by-case analysis.178 This norm does not clearly define the criteria and the requisites
according to which the disclosure of PNR data to third countries is admitted, and does not make reference to the criterion of the appropriateness of the level of protection guaranteed by a third State. As a consequence, it can legitimate abuses by the Australian customs service that could be empowered to violate passengers’ right to personal data protection.
However, there are some norms provided by the Agreement which adequately protect the right to privacy of passengers. First of all, according to Article 7 of the Agreement: ‘Australia shall provide a system, accessible by individuals regardless of their nationality or country of residence, for seeking access to, and correction of, their own personal information.’179 The fact that the Agreement is to apply to all EU citizens without any discrimination is an important element. Furthermore, the existence of a system providing protection for passengers’ right to privacy and able to receive claims by individuals is to be welcomed. Finally, under Article 9 of the Agreement ‘Australia and the EU shall periodically undertake a joint review of the implementation of this Agreement, including the data protection and data-security guarantees, with a view to mutually assuring the effective implementation of the Agreement.’180 The fact that the EU can be represented by data-protection and law enforcement authorities in the joint review of the Agreement’s implementation shows that this procedure is democratic and respects the right to privacy of individuals; however, as has also been reminded by the European Parliament, the Agreement does not provide a precise deadline for this review.181
The Agreement between Australia and the European Union on the transfer and processing of European Union-sourced PNR data contains more guarantees than the 2007 USA-EU Agreement does. This is also due to the fact that, unlike the United States, Australia has uniform legislation protecting the right to privacy of individuals. However, it is necessary that the EUAustralia Agreement be modified in order to better protect passengers’ right to personal data protection. First of all, the purposes for which the processing of PNR data is allowed should be more limited and the list of PNR data to be transferred should be reduced; in this way, the processing and disclosure of PNR data could respect the purpose limitation and proportionality principles. Second, the criteria according to which the transfer of personal data to third countries is allowed should be more defined: in particular, the Agreement should make reference to the adequate level of protection assured by a third State. Third, it is necessary that a definite deadline for the joint review of the implementation of the Agreement be determined.
7. The creation of an EU PNR System: The 2007 proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes
The European Union, considering that PNR data collection is an essential tool in effectively fighting international terrorism and organised crime, is going to equip itself with a system of general surveillance over such data in the European Union. On 25 March 2004, by adopting the Declaration on combating terrorism, the European Council invited the European Commission to bring forward a proposal for a common EU approach to the use of passenger data for border and aviation security and other law enforcement purposes.182 In November 2007, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes (hereinafter ‘the proposal’).183 The proposal has been carefully examined by the Article 29 Working Party and by the European Data Protection Supervisor, who have criticized it.
The proposal is aimed at harmonising the dispositions of the Member States concerning the duties of air carriers, providing flights to or from the European Union, to transfer PNR data to the Member States’ authorities.184 Currently, there are a few EU Member States that have laws and regulations establishing a system for the transfer and processing of PNR data from air carriers to the competent authorities.185
Although the attempt to provide unitary norms in the European Union dealing with the processing of PNR data for combating terrorism and organised crime is a welcome development, this proposal contains dispositions which are very similar to some norms of the PNR EU-USA Agreement and – as recalled by EDPS – is going to be applied to all passengers, regardless of whether they ‘are under investigation or not’.186
The proposal integrates the dispositions provided for by Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate API data to the competent authorities.187 According to the proposal, the collection of PNR data is a much more effective tool in the fight against international terrorism than the collection of API data.188 This evaluation is strictly connected to the ambitious purposes of the proposal: it is aimed not only at identifying known terrorists but also at ‘carrying out risk assessments of the persons, obtaining intelligence and making associations between known and unknown people’.189 The aims of the measures provided by the proposal are thus the identification of both known and unknown persons who could be potential criminals or terrorists.190 However, the proposal does not specify in which manner data will be collected and processed for carrying out these risk assessments.191
The proposal is based on a decentralized system according to which air carriers are required to transfer PNR data to Passenger Information Units (PIUs) that are designated by each Member State.192 Article 4 of the proposal provides that Member States ‘shall adopt a list of competent authorities’ empowered to receive PNR data from the PIUs. Air carriers can also designate intermediaries that have the task of transmitting data to the competent PIUs.193 The proposal is too generic, because it does not provide precise information on PIUs, intermediaries and other authorities. These dispositions could cause legal uncertainty and a heterogeneous enforcement of the PNR system in the Member States, considering that each Member State’s national legislation provides different powers and competence to law enforcement authorities.194
Accordingly, it is necessary that the proposal better defines the competences and duties of intermediaries,
PIUs and other competent authorities.195
According to Article 8 of the proposal, the transfer of PNR data to law enforcement authorities of third countries is allowed, provided that those authorities use the data in order to prevent and combat terrorism and organised crime and that the third country does not transfer the data ‘to another third country without the express consent of the Member State’.196 As reiterated by the European data authorities, the proposal does not specify the conditions under which a Member State can express its consent and does not make reference to the necessity that the third country must assure an adequate level of protection under Article 25 of Directive 95/46.197
As to the data to be transferred, the proposal provides that air carriers should transfer 19 PNR data elements to the competent authorities of the Member States. The number and the nature of PNR data to be transferred according to the proposal are very similar to the data provided by the EU-USA Agreement. The transfer of a such relevant number of data elements, which gives competent authorities wide control and surveillance powers concerning the private lives of individuals, is a measure which is neither necessary to combat international terrorism nor proportionate to the aims pursued by the proposal.198
As to the method of data transfer, the proposal provides that air carriers transmit PNR data using the push method, which ensures an adequate level of control over passengers’ privacy by air carriers. However, if air carriers are not provided with electronic systems to use this method, the proposal allows the PIUs to have direct access to data through the ‘pull’ method, which is a method that does not entirely respect the right to privacy.199
As to the data retention time, Article 9 of the proposal provides a PNR data retention period of five years; once this term expires, the proposal states that data ‘shall be kept for a further period of eight years’, during which the data can be processed and accessed according to specified conditions.200 This 13-year term, very close to the 15-year term provided for by EU-US Agreement, appears to be excessive and disproportionate, and as such does not adequately protect the right to privacy of individuals.
The proposal provides for a mass surveillance system of EU passengers’ privacy, it does not adequately respect the purpose limitation and proportionality principles and it may violate the right to privacy of individuals.201 The proposal’s attempt to harmonise EU Member States’ legislation regarding the transfer of PNR data is to be welcomed because the necessity to make homogenous the processing of such data in the EU is an important element in order to guarantee the certainty of the law and the rule of law. However, there are several doubts about the effectiveness, the proportionality and the necessity of the measures provided by the proposal, even in light of the unclear formulation of the norms contained therein. It is necessary that the proposal be modified following certain guidelines, in order to ensure a proper and uniform application of the law in EU Member States and, at the same time, to protect effectively the right to privacy of individuals in compliance with Community law.
First of all, European institutions should demonstrate unequivocally the necessity to collect PNR data.202 Second, the measures provided by the proposal should also take into account the existing Community systems and legislation aimed at controlling the flow of persons,203 in particular Directive 2004/82.204 This Directive has still not been fully implemented in EU Member States, and it has not demonstrated that the collection of API data is an inadequate tool in order to fight international terrorism.205 As a result, it is necessary to eliminate the obstacles to the implementation of Directive 2004/82 and to understand the real usefulness of API data in the fight against terrorist threats. Only after these evaluations, will it be possible to realize the real and concrete importance of the collection of PNR data in the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, and, consequently, to create a more balanced PNR EU system that can respect passengers’ right to privacy. Furthermore, the proposal should reduce not only the number of PNR data elements to be transferred, providing for only the transmission of essential PNR data that can be necessary in the fight against terrorism, but also the data retention period, by identifying a duration (from 2 to 3½ years) that can balance the protection of privacy with the necessity to protect the Community from a terrorist threat. The proposal should identify the push method as the exclusive method of PNR data transmission. Finally, the proposal should allow data transfer to a third country on condition that the receiving country ensures an adequate level of protection. Following these guidelines, the Council Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes could be an important and essential tool in order to effectively combat terrorism, because it would also respect the Community disposition on the right to privacy and the fundamental principles of proportionality and purpose limitation.
8. Conclusions and perspectives: The necessity to modify the existing PNR instruments in light of the Treaty of Lisbon
PNR Agreements concluded by the European Union on the transfer of PNR data and the proposal for a Council Framework Decision are tools that, on the one hand, pursue a legitimate purpose,such as combating terrorism, but, on the other hand, they do not adequately protect individuals’ right to privacy.
The changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon will have significant effects on EU antiterrorism activities and policies, and, in particular, on PNR Agreements adopted by the European Union, as well as on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision. The recognition of an important value such as the protection of personal data in the EU legal system and the attribution of strong decisional powers to the European Parliament will facilitate significant legal changes to these tools, especially in the light of the fact that the European Parliament has often criticized PNR Agreements as exclusive and important tools in the fight against terrorism. In addition, PNR instruments have been adopted by the European Union without fully taking into account the recommendations of the European Parliament, which is a Community institution that is very mindful of the protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms of EU citizens.206 Through the changes provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament can control and supervise Agreements concluded by the European Union in areas of justice and the police that could violate individuals’ privacy, which would better assure the protection of the right to personal data.207
The solutions proposed in this article (a re-elaboration of the EU Agreements with the United States, Canada and Australia, and a more adequate reconsideration of the proposal for a Council Framework Decision) are sensitive concerning the protection of personal data and its coherent integration into the new institutional architecture and legal background introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which attempts to counterbalance the protection of privacy with the necessity to counter terrorism.208
In conclusion, the Treaty of Lisbon, which has recently entered into force, will attain the appropriate balance between individuals’ right to personal data protection and the collective necessity of countering international terrorism in PNR matters.209 It will provide the European Union with the legislative background and modern institutions to face the new challenges of the world (such as combating terrorism) and to satisfy citizens’ requests.210
Michele Nino Ph.D., Researcher in International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Salerno (Italy). Lawyer at the Naples Bar (Italy). Professional address: University of Salerno, Faculty of Law, Department of International Studies, Via Ponte don Melillo 1, 84048 Fisciano (SA), Italy; email: mnino@unisa.it
This article was originally published under the title "The protection of personal data in the fight against terrorism" in the Utrecht Law Review Volume 6, Issue 1 (January) 2010 pp 62-85 (Here PDF) under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
NOTES:
1 M. Heupel, ‘Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s Evolving Approach to Terrorism’, 2007 Security Dialogue 38, no. 4, pp. 477-499.
2 See Exchange of information between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States, available online at; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 16 June 2004: Towards enhancing access to information by law enforcement agencies, COM(2004) 429; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament – Transfer of Air Passenger Name
Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach, COM(2003) 826; EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007, available online at, p. 36; see also A. Nunzi, ‘Exchange of Information and Intelligence Among Law Enforcement Authorities: A European Union Perspective’, 2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 78, no. 1/2, pp. 143-151; R. Bellanova, ‘The “Prüm Process”: The Way forward for EU Police Cooperation and Data Exchange’, in: E. Guild et al. (eds.), Security Versus Justice?: Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union, 2008, pp. 203-221.
3 See Sections 4-6, infra.
4 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passenger Manifest Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, WP 66, 24 October 2002, available online at, p. 3.
5 Directive 2004/82/EC, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24.
6 See Section 2.3, infra.
7 See Sections 2.1- 2.3, infra.
8 See Section 2.2, infra.
9 See Section 2.3, infra.
10 See Section 3, infra.
11 See Sections 4-7, infra.
12 Art. 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948.
13 Art. 17, 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966.
14 Art. 8, 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950.
15 Ibid., Art. 8, Para. 2.
16 For a detailed analysis of the Court’s case law, see S. Sottiaux, Terrorism and Limitation of Rights: The ECHR and US Constitution, 2008; see also F. Bignami, ‘Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention Directive’, 2007 Chicago Journal of International Law 8, no. 1, pp. 233-255, in particular pp. 242-249.
17 Kruslin v. France, [1990] ECHR (Ser. A176-A), Para. 27; Kopp v. Switzerland, [1998-II] ECHR, Para. 55.
18 Kruslin, supra note 17, Para. 27; Kopp, supra note 17 , Para. 55.
19 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, [1979] ECHR (Ser. A30), Para. 49.
20 Kopp, supra note 17, Para. 55; Amman v. Switzerland, [2000-II] ECHR, Para. 50.
21 Ollson v. Sweden, [1988] ECHR (Ser. A130), Para. 61.
22 Norris v. Ireland, [1988] ECHR (Ser. A142), Para. 44; Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, [1988] ECHR (Ser. A142), Para. 48.
23 Gillow v. The United Kingdom, [1986] ECHR (Ser. A109), Para. 55.
24 Lingens v. Austria, [1986] ECHR (Ser. A103), Para. 39.
25 Ibid., Paras 39-40; Leander v. Sweden, [1987] ECHR (Ser. A116), Para. 59; Gillow, supra note 23, Para. 55.
26 See D. Blonda, La Disciplina della Privacy nel Panorama Internazionale, available online at.
27 1981 COE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, available online at; see also Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data: Convention Opened for Signature on 28 January
1981, 1981.
28 Art. 1, COE Convention, supra note 27.
29 Art. 5, COE Convention, supra note 27.
30 According to Art. 6, COE Convention, supra note 27, sensitive data is ‘personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life’.
31 Art. 6, COE Convention, supra note 27.
32 See Blonda, supra note 26.
33 Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. In the doctrine see M. C. Ponthoreau, ‘La Directive 95/46 CE du 24 Octobre 1995 Relative à la Protection des Personnes Physiques à l’ Égard du Traitement des Données à Caractère Personnel et à la Libre Circulation de ces Données’, 1997 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 13, no. 1, pp. 125-150; R. Castaño Suárez, ‘Directiva 95/46, de 24 de Octubre de
1995, Relativa a la Protección de las Personas Físicas en lo que Respecta al Tratamiento de Datos Personales y a la Libre Circulación de Éstos. Similitudes y Diferencias con la Ley Orgánica 5/1992, de 29 de Octubre (LORTAD)’, 1998 Noticias de la Unión Europea, no. 14, pp. 9-15; A. L. Calvo Cravaca et al., ‘International Data Protection, Privacy and Directive 95/46/EEC’, in: J. Basedow et al. (eds.), Aufbruch
Nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max-Planck-Institut für Privatrecht, 2001, pp. 167-182.
34 See European Union, Summaries of Legislation – Protection of personal data, available online at
summaries/information_society/l14012_en.htm>.
35 Art. 2(a), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
36 Art. 2(b), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33. According to the wording of the Directive these operations can include ‘collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’.
37 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33, 11th Whereas.
38 Art. 8(1), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
39 Art. 8(2)(a)-(e), (3), (4), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
40 Art. 6, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2007 on the level of protection of personal data in Jersey, WP 141, 9 October 2007, available online at, p. 6; Commission of the European Communities, Staff Working Document, The application of Commission Decision 2000/518/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided in Switzerland, 20 October 2004, available online at , p. 4.
41 Art. 6(b), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
42 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 9/2007 on the level of protection of personal data in the Faroe Islands, WP 142, 9 October 2007, available online at, p. 5.
43 Art. 6(c), (d), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
44 Case C-331/88, Fedesa and Others, [1990] ECR I-4023, Para. 13; Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR II-3305, Para. 411; Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR II-3495, Para. 324.
45 Arts. 10, 11, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33; see also Opinion 9/2007, supra note 42, p. 5.
46 1992 Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, OJ C 191, 29.7.1992.
47 See B. Conforti, Diritto Internazionale, 2002, p. 164; F. Pocar, Diritto dell’Unione Europea e delle Comunità Europee, 2004, p. 56.
48 Art. 3(2), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
49 See Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93; and Regulation (EC) no. 2580/2001 implementing this Council Common Position, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70. The European Union has adopted the so-called smart sanctions, imposing travel bans, embargoes and the freezing of assets on individuals or entities included in certain EU lists. On the topic of targeted sanctions and on the problems they raise as to fundamental rights and freedoms, see G. Ziccardi Capaldo, ‘Editorial: Fighting Global Terrorism: Through Global Enforcement Mechanisms’, in: G. Ziccardi Capaldo (ed.), The Global Community. Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2004, pp. xv-xxvii, in particular pp. xxiii-xxv; G. Ziccardi Capaldo & M. Nino, ‘Globalization of Law Enforcement Mechanisms: Issues of Legality and Legitimacy’, in: M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Vol. II - Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms, 2008, pp. 49-71; G. Ziccardi Capaldo, The Pillars of Global Law, 2008, p. 285.
50 A. Scirocco, The Lisbon Treaty and the Protection of Personal Data in the European Union, available online at, p. 2.
51 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 60.
52 Second opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, 29 November 2006, OJ C 91/9, 26.4.2007, also available online at, Point 7; Third opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, 27 April 2007, OJ C 139/1, 23.6.2007, also available online at
Opinions/2007/07-04-27_3dpillar_3_EN.pdf>, Point 7.
53 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, supra note 51, 3rd Whereas.
54 Ibid., Art. 1.
55 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (COM(2005) 475 final), 19 December 2005, OJ C 47/27, 25.2.2006, also available online at, Point 5.
56 Ibid., Points 24, 25, 47.
57 Ibid., Points 25, 47.
58 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, supra note 51, Art. 13.
59 Ibid., Art. 14.
60 Ibid., Art. 13.
61 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, supra note 51, 39th Whereas, Art. 28.
62 Ibid., 38th Whereas, Art. 26.
63 Ibid.
64 See P. De Hert & V. Papakonstantinou, ‘The Data Protection Framework Decision of 27 November 2008 Regarding Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. A Modest Achievement However not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For’, 2009 Computer Law & Security Review 25, no. 5, pp. 403-414.
65 EDPS Press Release, EDPS sees adoption of Data Protection Framework for police and judicial cooperation only as a first step, 28 November 2008, available online at.
66 Ibid.
67 2007 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007.
68 See Scirocco, supra note 50, p. 3; D. Alonso Blas, First Pillar and Third Pillar: Need for a Common Approach on Data Protection, available online at, p. 15.
69 Treaty of Lisbon, The Treaty at a Glance, available online at, Para. 3.
70 2000 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 361/1, Art. 8, also available online at.
71 Ibid., Art. 7. See S. Rodotà, Intervista su Privacy e Libertà, 2005, p. 19. According to Art. 52 of European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (supra note 70), both the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data can be limited, provided that the limitations are ‘provided for by law (…) respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and the principle proportionality, and are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union’.
72 Art. 16 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/47, 9.5.2008. On the importance of this article see Scirocco, supra note 50, pp. 2-3.
73 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (9 March 2006), Public Law No. 109-177 (2006). For a detailed review of US anti- terrorism legislation see S. W. Becker, ‘“Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…”: Assessing the Aftermath of September 11th’, 2003 Valparaiso University Law Review 37, pp. 563 et seq.; J.A.E. Vervaele, ‘The Anti-Terrorist Legislation in the US: Criminal Law for the Enemies’, 2006 European Journal of Law Reform, no. 1, pp. 137-171. The US administration also considered the practice of extraordinary renditions of vital importance in the fight against terrorism: on this topic see M.Nino, ‘The Abu Omar Case in Italy and the Effects of CIA Extraordinary Renditions in Europe on Law Enforcement and Intelligence Activities’, 2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 78, no. 1/2, pp. 113-141; M. Nino, ‘Extraordinary Renditions: The Role of European Security Services in the Fight Against International Terrorism’, 2008 Revue Electronique de l’Association Internationale de Droit Pénal, available online at.
74 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 19 November 2001 (Public Law 107–71, 107th Congress, 49 USC Section 44909(c)(3) (2001)). In 2002, the US passed legislation concerning border security (Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSV), 5 May 2002).
75 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2001 on the need for a balanced approach in the fight against terrorism, 14 December 2001, available online at, p. 3. Reference was made in particular to Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 70, and to two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (Amman, supra note 20, and Rotaru v. Romania, [2000-V] ECHR).
76 Opinion 6/2002, supra note 4.
77 Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the United States for the Transfer of Passengers’ Data, WP 78, 13 June 2003, available online at.
78 European Parliament resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights, 13 March 2003, P5_TA(2003)0097; European Parliament resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights: state of negotiations with the USA, 9 October 2003, P5_TA(2003)0429.
79 See Section 4.2, infra.
80 Reference was made to Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33, and to Regulation (EEC) no. 2299/89 on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems, OJ L 220, 29.7.1989, p. 1, as modified by Regulation (EC) no. 323/1999, OJ L 40, 13.2.1999, p. 1.
81 Art. 25(1), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
82 Ibid., Para. 2.
83 Ibid., Paras 4, 5, 6.
84 Undertakings of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 11 May 2004 (hereinafter Undertakings).
85 Art. 1, Commission Decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004/535/EC, OJ L 235, 6.7.2004, p. 11.
86 Council Decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, 2004/496/EC, OJ L 183, 20.5.2004, p. 83.
87 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 142M, 30.5.2004, p. 50.
88 Commission Decision 2004/535/EC, supra note 85, Para. 1.
89 See also P. De Sena, ‘Esigenze di Sicurezza Nazionale e Tutela dei Diritti dell’Uomo nella Recente Prassi Europea’, in: N. Boschiero (ed.), Ordine Internazionale e Valori Etici, VIII Convegno SIDI, 2003, pp. 196-268, in particular p. 255; B. Siemen, ‘The EU-US Agreement on Passenger Name Records and EC-Law: Data Protection, Competences and Human Rights Issues in International Agreements of the Community’, 2005 German Yearbook of International Law 47, pp. 629-665.
90 Commission Decision 2004/535/EC, supra note 85, 15th Whereas; Undertakings, supra note 84, Point 3.
91 See Opinion 4/2003, supra note 77, pp. 6-7.
92 See Undertakings, supra note 84, Attachment A.
93 Ibid., Points 9-11.
94 Opinion 4/2003, supra note 77, pp. 6-7.
95 Undertakings, supra note 84, Point 15.
96 Ibid.
97 See Opinion 4/2003, supra note 77, p. 8.
98 2004 Agreement, supra note 87, Para. 1.
99 See European PNR, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision of 6 November 2007 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, available online at.
100 See Peter J. Hustinx (EDPS), Presentation of Annual Report 2004, Introductory Speech at Press Conference: Building a new institution, 31 March 2005, available online at, p. 4; EDPS Press Release, EDPS will support Parliament in PNR-cases before the European Court of Justice, 31 March 2005, available online at .
101 Art. 230, 1957 Treaty establishing the European Community, 25 March 1957.
102 See notes 85-86, supra.
103 See Opinion of Advocate General Léger, 22 November 2005.
104 Ibid., Para. 97. According to Art. 3(2), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33, the directive is not to be applied to the processing of personal data ‘in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security (…) and the activities of the
State in areas of criminal law’.
105 Ibid., Para. 103.
106 Ibid., Para. 141.
107 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, [2006] ECR I-4721. For an analysis of the judgment see G. Gilmore et al., ‘Court of Justice: Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council and Commission’, 2007 Common Market Law Review, no. 4, pp. 1081-1099.
108 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, supra note 107, Paras 59-60.
109 Ibid., Paras 67-69; see also P. de Hert & S. Gutwirth, ‘European Data Protection’s constitutional project. Its problematic recognition in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’, in: S. Gutwirth et al. (eds.), Reinventing data protection?, 2009, pp. 3-44.
110 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, supra note 107, Para. 74; see also the reactions of EDPS to ECJ judgment (EDPS Press Release, PNR: EDPS first reaction to the Court of Justice judgment, 30 May 2006, available online at; EDPS, Newsletter, no. 4, 1 June 2006,
PNR Judgement, available online at, p. 4).
111 Some authors have stated that the ECJ judgment has created a ‘lacuna legis’: see E. Kosta et al., ‘Data Protection in the Third Pillar: In the Aftermath of the ECJ Decision on PNR Data and the Data Retention Directive’, 2007 International Review of Law Computers and Technology 21, no. 3, pp. 347-362, also available online at
20in%20the%20third%20pillar%20-%20in%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the%20ECJ%20decision%20on%20PNR%
20data%20and%20the%20data%20retention%20directive.pdf>, p. 3.
112 Council Decision of 16 October 2006 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2006/729/CFSP/JHA, OJ L 298, 27.10.2006, p. 27.
113 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 298, 27.10.2006, p. 2.
114 Ibid., Para. 2.
115 Ibid., 2d Whereas.
116 Ibid., Para. 3.
117 Ibid., 5th Whereas.
118 See also D.R. Rasmussen, ‘Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion of Terrorism?: The Dispute Between the United States and European Union over Passenger Name Record Data Transfers’, 2008 Wisconsin International Law Journal 26, no. 2, pp. 551-590, p. 585.
119 Council Decision of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), 2007/551/CFSP/JHA, OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 16.
120 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 16. In the doctrine see S. Adam, ‘Quelques Réflexions sur les Relations Entre les Procédures a Priori et a Posteriori d’Examen de Compatibilité des Accords Communautaires Suite à l’Affaire dite de “l’Accord PNR”’, 2007 Cahiers de Droit Europeen 42, no. 5-6, pp. 657-696; K. Hailbronner et al., ‘The Agreement on Passenger-Data Transfer (PNR) and the EU-US Cooperation in Data Communication’, 2008 International Migration 46, no. 2, pp. 187-197; J. Argomaniz, ‘When the EU is the ‘Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms’, 2009 Journal of European Integration/Revue d’Integration Europeenne 31, no. 1, pp. 119-136.
121 Ibid., Title I, US letter to EU.
122 Ibid.
123 See also E. Quillatre, ‘The EU-US PNR Agreement: Fight Against Terrorism v. Personal Data Protection’, available at, p. 10.
124 Opinion 5/2007 on the follow-up agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security concluded in July 2007, WP 138, 17 August 2007, available online at, p. 7; see also EDPS, Newsletter, no. 11, 19 September 2007, Article 29 Working Party issues Opinion on PNR Agreement, available online at , p. 4.
125 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
126 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title III, US letter to EU.
127 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR agreement with the United States of America, OJ C 175E, 10.7.2008, p. 564, Point 18; see also M.R. VanWasshnova, ‘Data Protection Conflicts Between the United States and the European Union in the War on Terror: Lessons Learned from the Existing System of Financial Information Exchange’, 2007-2008 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, pp. 827-865, p. 839.
128 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title III, US letter to EU.
129 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Para. 3.
130 Ibid., Title VII, US letter to EU.
131 See Opinion 5/2007, supra note 124, p. 13; see also European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007, supra note 127, Point 18; Quillatre, supra note 123, p. 11.
132 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title VIII, US letter to EU.
133 Ibid.
134 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007, supra note 127, Point 8.
135 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Para. 3.
136 Ibid., Para. 6.
137 See also Rasmussen, supra note 118, pp. 588-589.
138 See Quillatre, supra note 123, p. 9.
139 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title X, US letter to EU.
140 Some authors have stated that the 2007 Agreement violates individuals’ privacy and contains less guarantees than the 2004 Agreement: see Quillatre, supra note 123, pp. 10-12; VanWasshnova, supra note 127, p. 839; Rasmussen, supra note 118, pp. 588-590.
141 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data, OJ L 82, 21.3.2006, p. 14.
142 Opinion 3/2004 on the level of protection ensured in Canada for the transmission of Passenger Name Records and Advanced Passenger Information from airlines, WP 88, 11 February 2004, available online at.
143 See Commission Decision of 6 September 2005 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the Canada Border Services Agency, 2006/253/EC, OJ L 91, 29.3.2006, p. 49, Annex, Commitments by the Canada
Border Service Agency in Relation to the Application of its PNR Program.
144 Ibid., 11th Whereas.
145 Ibid., 6th Whereas.
146 See Commitments, supra note 143, Section 7.
147 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, Attachement A.
148 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, Attachement A, ‘PNR Data Elements Required by CBSA from Air Carriers’; Commitments, supra note 143, Section 4.
149 European Parliament Report on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) data (COM(2005)0200 – C6-0184/2005 – 2005/0095(CNS)), Final A6-0226/2005, available at, p. 10.
150 Opinion 1/2005 on the level of protection ensured in Canada for the transmission of Passenger Name Record and Advance Passenger Information from airlines, WP 103, 19 January 2005, available online at, p. 4.
151 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of an agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) data (COM(2005) 200 final), OJ C 218, 6.9.2005, p. 6, Para. 22. The European Data Protection Supervisor’s Opinion made particular reference to category 10 (frequent flyer information) and category 23 (any collected APIS information), which could reveal data the processing of which is not strictly necessary to the fight against terrorism.
152 See Commitments, supra note 143, Section 8.
153 Ibid., Section 18.
154 European Parliament Report, Final A6-0226/2005, supra note 149, p. 10.
155 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, 22nd Whereas.
156 On this issue see P. Hobbing, Tracing Terrorists: The EU-Canada Agreement in PNR Matters, 2008, available online at, p. 35.
157 The decision on adequacy has a temporary nature and, according to Art. 7 of the Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, it provides: ‘this Decision shall expire three years and six months after the date of its notification, unless extended in accordance with the procedure set out in Art. 31(2) of Directive 95/46/EC’.
158 See Commitments, supra note 143, Section 2.
159 Opinion 1/2005, supra note 150, p. 4.
160 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 151, Para. 24; in this sense see also Hobbing, supra note 156, p. 36.
161 See Hobbing, supra note 156, p. 36.
162 See Sections 4-5, supra.
163 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service, OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 49; see also Council Decision 2008/651/CFSP/JHA of 30 June 2008 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs Service, OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 47.
164 Ibid., Annex, Para. 1.
165 Ibid., 8th Whereas.
166 Opinion 1/2004 on the level of protection ensured in Australia for the transmission of Passenger Name Record data from airlines, WP 85, 16 January 2004, available online at, p. 13.
167 Australia and the EU Sign Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement, available online at.
168 Art. 5(1), 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163.
169 Ibid., Art. 5(2).
170 Ibid., Art. 5(3).
171 See also the European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008 to the Council concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service, 22 October 2008, available online at//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0512+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, lett. (f)-(g).
172 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163, Annex, Para. 9.
173 Ibid., Para. 10.
174 According to Para. 12 of the Annex to the Agreement: ‘Customs shall retain EU-sourced PNR data for no more than three-and-a-half years after the date of receipt of the PNR data by Customs, after which time the data may be archived for two further years.’
175 See European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008, supra note 171, lett. (n).
176 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163, Annex, Paras 2, 5; Schedule to the Annex; see also European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008, supra note 171, lett. (i).
177 Ibid.
178 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163, Annex, Para. 6.
179 Art. 7(1)(2), 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163.
180 Ibid., Art. 9.
181 See European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008, supra note 171, lett. (l).
182 See European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2004, available online at, p. 8.
183 Proposal for a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, SEC(2007) 1422,
SEC(2007) 1453, available online at.
184 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, OJ C 110, 1 May 2008, p. 1.
185 In 2004, the United Kingdom adopted the Semaphore Project, which is a pilot scheme through which large amounts of data concerning air passengers are stored and used to help intelligence agencies in the fight against some forms of crime, including terrorism and organised crime. On this system see H.M. Government, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’ (July 2006), available online at.
186 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 30.
187 See Directive 2004/82/EC, supra note 5.
188 Proposal, supra note 183, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3.
189 Ibid.
190 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 15.
191 Joint Opinion on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, presented by the Commission on 6 November 2007, adopted by Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice, WP 145, 5 December 2007, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp145_en.pdf , p. 7.
192 Art. 3, Proposal, supra note 183.
193 Art. 6, Proposal, supra note 183.
194 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 73.
195 In this sense see the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 73.
196 Art. 8, Proposal, supra note 183.
197 Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 3; Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Paras 76-77; Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, available online at, p. 8, Para. 31.
198 See also the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 95.
199 See European PNR, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision of 6 November 2007 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, supra note 99.
200 Art. 9, Proposal, supra note 183.
201 Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 13.
202 In this sense see Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 197, p. 5, Para. 16; see also MEPs voice serious criticism at EU PNR scheme, available online at.
203 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (in the Opinion, supra note 197, Para. 49) and the EDPS (in the Opinion, supra note 184) both make reference to the VISA System (Council Decision of 8 June 2004, OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, p. 5) and to the Schengen Information System (Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63).
204 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 49.
205 Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 6.
206 See European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007, supra note 127, Point 2. The Parliament in its Resolution concerning the Agreement with Canada did not approve the conclusion of that agreement (European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, OJ C 157E , 6.7.2006, p. 464, Point 1).
207 In this sense see Alonso Blas, supra note 68, p. 17; Scirocco, supra note 50, p. 5.
208 See also the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 129.
209 On the balance between the protection of individual fundamental freedoms and the necessity to fight international terrorism, see G. Ziccardi Capaldo, ‘Terrorismo Globale e Diritti Umani: “A Fair Balance” tra Interesse Generale e Tutela dei Diritti Fondamentali Individuali’, in: A. Cannone et al. (eds.), Studi in Onore di Vincenzo Starace, 2008, vol. I, p. 745; see also Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 4.
210 The Treaty at a glance, supra note 69.
International terrorism has a transnational character.1 As a consequence, the cooperation, the coordination, and the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities of the EU Member States, their agencies, Europol, and judicial authorities constitute fundamental elements in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism and organized crime.2
In the context of the fight against international terrorism, after 11 September 2001, the European Union concluded Agreements with third States, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, aimed at transferring and processing air passengers’ personal data and is currently preparing a European system for regulating the retention, transmission and treatment of such data.3
Collecting and processing personal data involves two categories of data: PNR data (Passenger Name Records) and API data (Advance Passenger Information). The former, which contains a large and diverse quantity of data, concerns the data collected and extracted from various travel documents (usually air flights), and, in general, it can include data contained in passports, telephone numbers, travel carriers, credit card numbers, seat numbers and other elements.4 Even before 2001, air carriers collected and kept such data but only for commercial purposes, so these activities did not have investigative purposes and were not aimed at combating international terrorism and organised crime. Over the years, collecting and analysing PNR data have become important activities by which police authorities can identify dangerous passengers and take appropriate measures. API data, which consists of official data resulting from passports, contains data concerning passengers that is more limited than PNR data, because it includes the name, the nationality, the passport number, the date of birth and other details concerning passengers on flights. In the European Union, the collection of API data is provided for by Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data.5
The aims of this article are: 1. to identify the normative and structural deficiencies of the EU legal system by which the right to personal data protection is not adequately protected, especially in the context of the activities falling in the second and third pillars of the European Union, such as anti-terrorism activities; 2. to analyze in a detailed manner the dispositions of the above-mentioned PNR tools by examining their negative effects on the right to privacy of individuals in the European Union; 3. to provide innovative and coherent solutions in order that PNR instruments will, in the future, become important and legal tools in the fight against international terrorism, taking into account the positive changes that the Treaty of Lisbon will produce concerning the European Union’s institutional system and structure, and, as a consequence, concerning the protection of the right to personal data protection and EU counterterrorism measures. The Agreement will affect the new choices of the European Union regarding the fight against terrorism and the processing and transfer of PNR data.
As analyzed in the present article, the current structure of the European Union, which is founded on three pillars, is not as such to ensure an adequate and comprehensive protection of the right to personal data protection.6 First of all, the article addresses international and Community norms regarding those rights.7
After having examined the scope of the so-called Convention No. 108 adopted by the Council of Europe, which is the first European regional instrument in this area, the analysis shifts to an examination of Directive 95/46, which is the principal Community norm regarding the right to privacy.8 The scope of application of this Directive is excluded as far as activities falling into the second and third pillars (which involve crucial areas, such as public security, public defence and state security) are concerned. The reduced scope of Directive 95/46 and the pyramidal structure of the European Union have created a legislative lacuna in the EU legal system by which the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, such as the right to personal data protection, have been seriously prejudiced. This also occurred in the context of the anti-terrorism measures. In this regard, the article also examines Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed within the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.9 This decision, that forms part of the third pillar, is an important legal tool, but it is not able to adequately protect personal data.
Thereafter, the article addresses the improvements that the Treaty of Lisbon will produce concerning the institutional organization of the European Union, the protection of the right to privacy, and the counter-terrorism activities.10 In this context, the article examines in a detailed manner the norms provided by the EU-USA PNR Agreement, the EU-Canada API/PNR Agreement, the EU-Australia Agreement, and the EU PNR system.11 The fact that these instruments are likely to violate the right to privacy is evaluated by taking into account not only the abovementioned legislative lacuna but also the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon will eliminate the EU pillar structure, consider more extensively the importance of the protection of individual rights in the European Union, and give significant legislative powers to the European Parliament which will be placed on an equal footing with the Council in several areas of EU legislation. This will contribute to the development of the ‘democratic nature’ of EU institutions.
These circumstances will also produce positive effects for PNR instruments that, once modified, can represent effective tools in the fight against terrorism that are respectful of the right to privacy.
2. The right to privacy: The legal background
2.1. The right to privacy: International law and the European Court of Human Rights’ case law
The right to privacy was recognized for the first time at the international level by Article 12 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks’.12 Subsequently, the wording of this Article was reproduced in Article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.13
At a regional level, Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)14 provides: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’. The European Convention provides that the right to privacy can be subjected to some restrictions provided that certain conditions are satisfied. According to Article 8 (2) of the European Convention: ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.15
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered several decisions on this topic in order to specify the content and the extent of the right to privacy. According to its case law, limitations to the right to privacy are admitted if the restrictive measure in question: 1. is prescribed by law; 2. pursues a legitimate aim; and 3. is necessary in a democratic society in order to pursue that legitimate aim.16
In order to satisfy the first condition it is necessary that the restrictive measure has ‘some basis in domestic law.’17 As far as the quality of the law is concerned, it should be compatible with the rule of law, formulated with sufficient precision and ‘accessible to the person concerned’,18 in order to enable him ‘to regulate his conduct’,19 ‘to foresee its consequences for him’,20 and to be protected against ‘arbitrary interferences’ by public authorities with the right to privacy.21 In order to assess the necessity of a given measure in a democratic society, the existence of a pressing social need must be evaluated:22 in particular, it is possible to restrict the right to privacy provided that the measure employed is ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’23 States have a ‘certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists.’24 The scope of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in the assessment of the proportionality of the measure depends not only ‘on the nature of the legitimate aim’ of the restriction, but also on ‘the nature of the right involved’.25
2.2. The processing of personal data and the free flow of information: Council of Europe: Convention No. 108 and Directive 95/46/EC
The ongoing growth in the automatic elaboration of personal data that occurred in the 1970s has determined a significant flow of information both at transboundary and intercontinental levels.
However, the expansion of the transmission modalities and of the processing of personal data has determined important political and legal debates on the relationship between the protection of privacy and the free flow of information. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the European legal context regarding the protection of personal data and the control of bank data was very fragmentary, and there was no legal uniformity in this particular area.26
As a consequence, the Council of Europe and the European Union adopted instruments in order to fill the legislative gap and to guarantee the legal uniformity between states in matters concerning the right to privacy.
In 1981, the Council of Europe adopted the so-called Convention No. 108.27 The aim of the Convention is to guarantee the privacy of each individual in the ‘automatic processing of personal data regarding him.’28 The Convention has recognized an individual right to privacy and to data protection in the activities concerning the automatic processing of personal data. The Convention identifies the method of personal data transfer which is respectful of the right to privacy, stating that personal data undergoing automatic processing must be: ‘a. obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; b. stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way which is incompatible with those purposes; c. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored’.29 Furthermore, special categories of data, so called sensitive data,30 ‘may not be processed automatically’, save for certain exceptions.31
However, the Convention has one important gap: its scope covers the sole protection of automatically
processed personal data, but it does not include non-automated data.32
Directive 95/46/EC33 has filled this lacuna because it applies to data processed by both automated and non-automated means.34 Indeed, after having defined personal data as any information concerning an ‘identified or identifiable natural person’,35 the Directive affirms the principles regulating the processing of personal data considered as ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means’.36
Principles affirmed in this Directive thus integrate and broaden those affirmed by Convention
No. 108.37 Article 8 of the Directive even excludes the processing of personal sensitive data,38
providing exceptions in that regard.39
With the adoption of Directive 95/46, the European legislation concerning the protection of personal data seemed to be adequate and complete because it, together with Convention No. 108, coherently harmonized the free flow of information and the protection of privacy. However, over the years, these norms have shown their lacunae and their incapacity to face newworld challenges, in the light of the ever-increasing use of automated means, bank data and the strengthening of the EU’s anti-terrorism measures.
2.2.1. The Community principles governing the processing of personal data
According to Directive 95/46, Member States must respect the following principles in the processing of personal data: the purpose limitation, the data quality and proportionality principle, and the transparency principle.40
Article 6 of the Directive provides that personal data must be ‘processed fairly and lawfully (…) and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes’.41 According to the purpose limitation principle, data must be processed for a defined purpose and its subsequent use, transmission or collection must be in compliance with that purpose.42 It is thus necessary that the law provides exactly the aims to be achieved through the processing of personal data. The clear formulation of the disposition is aimed at avoiding the identification of purposes so wide as to allow unjustified intrusions into the private life of the individual subject to the treatment.
The application of the purpose limitation is strictly related to the data quality and proportionality principle. According to Article 6 of the Directive, the personal data must be ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected (…) or further processed (…), accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’.43 The scope of the proportionality principle, which is one of the general principles of Community law, has also been elaborated by the Community courts. It requires that measures adopted by Community institutions ‘should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives (…), and where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued’. 44
According to the transparency principle, individuals must be given precise and detailed information concerning the aims of the collection and processing of data regarding them as well as other information necessary to guarantee the fairness of the operations.45
2.3. The structural incapacity of the European Union to protect the right to personal data protection, and Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA
The situation involving a legislative lacuna examined above is caused by the structural incapacity of the European Union to protect, as a whole, the right to have personal data protected. The structure of the European Union, as outlined by the Maastricht Treaty,46 is based on three pillars: 1. the Community pillar, corresponding to the European Communities (first pillar); 2. the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), provided for by Title V of the EU Treaty (second pillar); 3. police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, provided by Title VI of the EU Treaty (third pillar).47
Directive 95/46 is not to be applied to the processing of personal data in the course of activities falling under the second and third pillars.48 This significant legislative lacuna has deprived individuals of the full protection of their right to privacy, which has been limited by several anti-terrorism measures adopted by the European Union in the second49 and third pillars.
Until 2008, European Union activities falling under the second and third pillars were not completely supported by norms effectively protecting the right to data protection.50 In this regard, the adoption in 2008 of the Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed within the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States is to be welcomed.51 This decision, which forms part of the third pillar, represents a fundamental tool in order to establish and develop an area of freedom, security and justice.52 It provides common standards regarding the processing and protection of personal data processed for purposes of preventing and fighting crime.53 The purpose of the Framework
Decision is ‘to ensure high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, provided for by Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, while guaranteeing a high level of public safety’.54 As a result, the Framework Decision is aimed at balancing two important interests: 1. protecting public safety, by increasing and intensifying the police and judicial cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, and 2. defending personal data processed in activities falling under the third pillar. According to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), these interests can coexist because an effective protection of personal data can improve and reinforce the police and judicial cooperation.55 The Framework Decision is intended to fill the abovementioned lacunae in the European Union legal system: first, it assures that the general principles of the data protection provided for by Directive 95/46 and Convention No. 108 are applied within the area of the third pillar;56 second, it provides common rules defining those principles.57 Indeed, according to Article 3 of the Framework Decision: ‘Personal data may be collected by the competent authorities only for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes (…) and may be processed only for the same purpose for which data were collected. Processing of the data shall be lawful and adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected’.
The Framework Decision covers not only the exchange of personal data between Member States and EU authorities but also the transfer of those data to third States58 or to private parties in Member States.59 According to Article 13 of the Framework Decision, Member States can transmit personal data to third States provided that: ‘(c) the Member State from which the data were obtained has given its consent to transfer (…); and (d) the third State (…) ensures an adequate level of protection for the intended data processing.’60
As to the relationship with previously adopted acts of the Union, the Framework Decision provides that the acts, adopted according to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union prior to the date of the entry into force of the Framework Decision, containing specific provisions on the protection of personal data exchanged or processed pursuant to those acts, prevail over the norms of the Framework Decision.61 As far as the relationship between agreements with third States is concerned, Article 26 provides that the Framework Decision ‘is without prejudice to any obligations and commitments incumbent upon Member States or upon the Union by virtue of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements with third States existing at the time of adoption of this Framework Decision.’62 However, it is provided that in the application of those agreements ‘the
transfer to a third State of personal data obtained from another Member State shall be carried out’ in compliance with Article 13 of the Framework Decision.63
Although the Framework Decision is very important, being the first instrument intended to provide for the protection of personal data in the third pillar, some scholars64 and the EDPS have rightly maintained that it does not offer an adequate and overall protection of personal data.
According to the EDPS, the Framework Decision has some lacunae. First of all, it concerns only the exchange of personal data between Member States and EU authorities, but it does not cover domestic data.65 Furthermore, in the opinion of the EDPS, the Framework Decision should be improved because it does not assure an adequate level of protection for the transfer of personal data to third States ‘according to a common EU standard’ and does not limit ‘the purposes for which personal data may be further processed’ in compliance with the principles contained in Directive 95/46.66
3. The new EU institutional architecture provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007 and has entered into force on 1 December 2009,67 marks an important turning point for strengthening the protection of rights and fundamental freedoms in the European Union, and in particular the protection of personal data. It amends the current EU and EC treaties and renames the latter as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The elimination of the structure of the pillars allows European institutions to carry out a more unitary and coherent activity aimed at protecting personal data as a whole. The end of the pillar structure could also permit, through an amendment of Directive 95/46, the application of this Directive in other important areas regarding the fight against terrorism, such as the common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.68
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon will introduce the Charter of Fundamental Rights into Community primary law,69 making its provisions legally binding. This will strengthen the values and principles on which the European Union is based. In this regard, it is important to recall Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which explicitly recognizes the right to the protection of personal data.70 This disposition is very important, because it classifies the right to the protection of personal data as an autonomous right, as distinguished from the right to respect for private and family life provided for by Article 7 of the same Charter.71 Furthermore, Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union not
only recognizes the importance and the autonomy of the right to protection of personal data, but it also provides that the Council and the Parliament will establish, through the ordinary legislative procedure and thus on an equal footing, common rules aimed at protecting individuals’ privacy.72
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon gives a fundamental legislative role to the European Parliament. The agreement, extending the co-decision procedure in several important areas, such as areas of justice, security and freedom, and substituting the requirement of unanimity with the qualified majority system for the adoption of Community acts, places the European Parliament on the same level as the Council and makes Community legislative activity more democratic.
4. The Agreements concluded between the European Union and the United States on the
transfer of personal PNR data
4.1. The United States anti-terrorism legislation on the security of air transport: Problems of
compliance with Community law
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States adopted important measures both of a repressive and preventive nature, aimed at neutralizing the terrorist threat.73 In the attempt to assure the efficacy of the counter-terrorism measures, the US administration considered it of fundamental importance to control and analyze the flow of personal data relating to air passengers on flights directed to or arriving from the United States.
In November 2001, the United States adopted legislation enhancing border security that obliged each air carrier, operating passenger flights directed to or arriving from the United States, to provide the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with electronic access to PNR data present in the automated reservation system of the air carriers.74
The problems of compatibility between US legislation and Community norms protecting individuals’ privacy were mainly raised by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the European Parliament and the European Commission.
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, by affirming the necessity to reach a proper balance between the security needs and the protection of individual guarantees, and considering the individual’s right to protection of personal data as a part of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual protected by the European Union,75 stated that compliance by the air carriers with the US legislation would probably have caused problems in respect of Directive 95/46/EC76 and expressed concerns as to the level of personal data protection assured in the US.77
The European Parliament, criticizing the initial positions of the Commission, invited it to adopt actions in the area of the transfer of PNR data in the US which could be respectful of Community law and of the ECHR. In particular, the European Parliament, expressing doubts about the real effectiveness of the PNR transfer in the fight against international terrorism, underlined that this strategy could have created a system of mass surveillance, in complete violation of principles provided by Directive 95/46/CE, Article 8 of the ECHR, and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.78
The European Commission, which, according to Article 25 of Directive 95/46, is empowered to evaluate whether the transfer of personal data to a third country assures an adequate level of protection of such data under Community law,79 delayed this examination because of its concerns about the invasiveness of the American legislation and its potential capacity to limit the privacy of individuals. It informed the US authorities that that law could violate some important Community norms concerning personal data protection and computerized reservation systems.80
Following the pressures exercised by the Commission, the US authorities postponed the entry into force of the dispositions provided for by the US legislation; at the same time, they did not renounce their intentions to impose sanctions against airlines that failed to comply with the US legislation after 5 March 2003. After that date, several air carriers operating in the European Union provided US authorities with access to their PNR data.
These circumstances created a situation of legal uncertainty for the airlines that were worried both about the possible American sanctions in case of non-compliance with American legislation and the control activities of the European data protection authorities, which could impose sanctions in cases of a failure to comply with the Community law concerning the protection of personal data.
4.2. The transfer of personal data to third countries under Directive 95/46 and the 2004 PNR
EU-US Agreement
Article 25 Directive 95/46 identifies the requirements for the transfer of personal data from European Union Member States to third countries, providing that ‘the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if (…) the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection’.81 The adequacy of the level of protection constitutes the conditio sine qua non in order that a third country can obtain a transfer of data from the European Union. The European Commission has the power to examine the level of protection afforded by a third country by taking into account several circumstances concerning the data to be evaluated82 and deciding
whether or not a third country ensures an adequate level of protection required for the transfer of personal data under the procedure provided for by Article 31(2) of Directive 95/46.83 On 11 May 2004, the CBP issued Undertakings, which clarified and defined the conditions for the transfer of PNR passengers’ data to US authorities, ensuring that such transfer would have taken place in compliance with Community principles concerning individuals’ right to privacy.84
On 14 May 2004 the Commission, by Decision 2004/535/CE, considered that CBP was able to guarantee ‘an adequate level of protection for PNR data transferred from the Community concerning flights to or from the United States, in accordance with the Undertakings’.85 In the light of this decision on adequacy, on 17 May 2004, by Decision No. 496/2004, the Council of the European Union approved the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United States on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States CBP.86 Finally, on 28 May 2004, the United States and the European Community definitively signed the Agreement, that entered into force on the date of its signature.87
According to the Agreement, the processing and treatment by CBP of PNR personal data was regulated by the Undertakings and US legislation.88 The Agreement was criticized by the European Parliament, humanitarian associations, and the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party for substantially having bypassed the Community principles concerning the protection of individual privacy and, in particular, for having violated the purpose limitation and the proportionality principles.89
As far as the purposes for processing data are concerned, PNR data could be used by CBP in order to ‘prevent and combat: 1. terrorism and related crimes; 2. other serious crimes, including organised crime; 3. and flight from warrants or custody for those crimes’.90 The wording of category no. 2, which was so vague as to encompass criminal activities not properly related with terrorist acts, allowed data transmission not in compliance with the purpose limitation principle.91
It is fundamental that the fight against international terrorism be limited and defined, and not so wide as to admit unjustified limitations to the right to privacy and fundamental freedoms not provided for by international and Community law.
As for PNR data to be transferred, it was provided that the transfer of such data encompasses a list of 34 elements.92 As a rule, the transmission of sensitive data protected by Article 8 of Directive 95/46 was excluded.93 Although the original scheme of the Agreement provided for the transfer of 38 PNR data and thus there was a quantitative reduction of the transmissible data, the number and the quantity of the data to be transferred under the 2004 Agreement remained very wide; therefore, the transfer was not adequate and relevant according to the principles enshrined in Article 6 of Directive 95/46.94
As to the length of time of the data retention, it was provided that the CBP would keep and access the PNR data of passengers for three years and six months.95 PNR data that had not been manually accessed during that time period would be destroyed. PNR data that had been manually accessed during that period would remain for a period of eight years in a CBP record file, and be subsequently destroyed.96 The data retention time appeared not only less effective for investigation purposes, but also excessive and not in compliance with the principle of proportionality.97
The method of data transfer chosen was the ‘pull’ system, according to which US authorities had direct access to air carriers’ reservation systems.98 This system was preferred to the more protective ‘push’ system, under which the authority requesting PNR data received it from the air carriers, without having direct online access to their databases.99
4.3. The European Court of Justice judgment issued in Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04
On 27 July 2004, the European Parliament, supported by the EDPS,100 brought two actions for annulment under Article 230101 EC, which were subsequently joined, before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) in order to seek the annulment of Council Decision no. 496 and Decision no. 535 on adequacy.102 In its Opinion of 22 November 2005, Advocate General Léger103 recommended the annulment of both decisions. He held that the use and processing of PNR data by CBP constitute activities concerning ‘public security and State activities in areas of criminal law’, and, as such, they were excluded from the scope of Directive 95/46.104 The fact that PNR data was initially collected for commercial purposes did not exclude that it had been subsequently collected and processed for protecting ‘public security’ and satisfying ‘law enforcement purposes’.105 Furthermore, the Advocate General excluded that Article 95 EC could constitute an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of Council Decision no. 496 because that article concerns measures aimed at realizing ‘the establishment and functioning of the internal market’,106 and is thus not aimed at countering terrorism.
In its judgment of 30 May 2006, the ECJ, following the conclusions of the Advocate General, annulled both Council Decision no. 496 and the Decision no. 535 on adequacy.107 According to the Court, the decision on adequacy involved the processing of personal data not falling within the scope of Directive 95/46 and, as a consequence, it infringed the Community norm itself.108 As to Council Decision no. 496, the Court held that Article 95 EC could not ‘justify the Community competence to conclude the Agreement’ between the US and the EU on the transfer of PNR data.109 As a consequence, the Court ordered the annulment of the Agreement but, at the same time, it preserved the effect of Decision 2004/535 until 30 September 2006.110
The ECJ focused its attention on procedural aspects, such as those concerning the scope of Directive 95/46 and the Community competence to conclude an agreement in a specific area under Article 95 TCE. The Court did not draw its attention to other important topics, both substantive and procedural, raised by the European Parliament and examined by Advocate General Leger, such as the effects of the contested decisions on the exercise of the right to privacy of individuals. On the one hand, the judgment of the Court in the short term resulted in the annulment of the Agreement and thus the elimination of the negative effects on the right to privacy arising from the application of that Agreement; on the other hand, the ECJ decision did
not contribute to assuring the certainty of the law in the long term as it failed to reach a definitive and clear solution to the problems raised by the Agreement.111 This orientation created a situation of legal uncertainty that led to the 2007 Agreement, which contains dispositions that, even to a greater extent than before, limit the fundamental principles protecting the right to privacy.
4.4. The 2006 interim Agreement
In October 2006, after the conclusion of the negotiations between the Commission and the United States, the EU Council approved an interim Agreement between the European Union and the US on the processing and transfer of PNR data from the European Union to US authorities.112 On 19 October 2006, this Agreement replaced the 2004 Agreement, and it should have expired on 31 July 2007 in order to be replaced by a definitive Agreement.113 The new Agreement did not contain the precise indication of the PNR data that was the object of the processing and the transfer, and it retained the ‘pull system’ as the method of personal data transfer.114 As to the US authorities empowered to have access to PNR data kept by the air carriers, the Agreement provided that not only the CBP – the only entity entitled to have access to PNR data according
to the 2004 Agreement – but also the ‘US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Office of the Secretary and the entities that directly support[ed] it’ could have this power.115 Furthermore, the Agreement established that the processing and transfer of data would have occurred ‘in accordance with applicable US laws and constitutional requirements’,116 mentioning only in the ‘whereas’ clause the Community norms on the protection of privacy.117
The vague definition of PNR data to be transferred, the maintenance of a method of data transfer more susceptible to jeopardizing the protection of privacy and the expansion of the entities empowered to have direct access to PNR data kept by air carriers show that the norms of the 2006 Agreement, although they were less precise and detailed than those of the 2004 Agreement, permitted dangerous abuses and facilitated violations of the fundamental freedoms of individuals.118
4.5. The 2007 definitive Agreement: The concrete risk of the violation of passengers’ privacy
By its Decision of 23 July 2007, the Council of the European Union approved the conclusion of a new Agreement on the processing and transfer of PNR data that replaced the Agreement concluded in 2006.119 The Agreement consists of the document itself and a US letter to the EU that explains the modalities for the storage, use and transfer of PNR data by Homeland Security.120
Title I of this letter specifies the purposes for which US authorities can use PNR data, such as the prevention of and combating ‘1. terrorism and related crimes; 2. other serious crimes, including organized crime; and 3. flight from warrants or custody for those crimes’.121 Furthermore, US authorities can use and process PNR data in order to protect ‘the vital interests of the data subject or other persons, or in any criminal judicial proceedings, or as otherwise required by US law’.122 The wording of the new Agreement not only retains the structure of the previous Agreement but it also widens these purposes.123 As also correctly pointed out by the Article 29 Working Party, the Agreement does not provide definitions of ‘terrorism-related crime an serious crimes including organised crimes’.124 The vagueness of the indicated purposes can legitimize a widespread use of PNR data, not in compliance with the purpose limitation and data quality and proportionality principles. The fact that PNR data can also be used ‘in any criminal judicial proceedings, or as otherwise required by US law’ is not to be welcomed: in this way, the certainty of law is not assured because US authorities could decide to use and process PNR data for less serious offences than terrorism or organised crime, putting at risk individuals’ right to privacy.125
As for data elements to be transferred, the 2007 Agreement reduces the quantity of transmissible data from the original 34 elements of the 2004 Agreement to the current 19 elements.126 Although it seems that, through this reduction, the 2007 Agreement affects the right to privacy less than the 2004 Agreement, paradoxically, the variety of the transmissible data has increased.127 Furthermore, in an exceptional case the US authorities can use sensitive data, an activity that was excluded under the 2004 Agreement.128 As a result, the amount of information that US authorities can obtain and process has become very wide and it is not proportionate to the aims pursued by the Agreement.
The 2004 Agreement identified a limited number of agencies within Homeland Security that were entitled to receive PNR data. Instead, the 2007 Agreement provides that DHS can process PNR data received from the European Union and ‘treat data subjects concerned by such processing in accordance with applicable US laws’,129 thereby not identifying the specific agencies empowered to have access to PNR data. In this way, a general and disproportionate enlargement of entities entitled to have access to air passengers’ personal data is allowed.
Furthermore, the 3½ years of PNR data retention provided for by the 2004 Agreement has been extended to 15 years by the 2007 Agreement. PNR data is retained for seven years in an active database and subsequently moved to a dormant database.130 This data retention time appears disproportionate and excessive in relation to the purposes to be achieved, raising problems of compliance with the Community principles of proportionality and purpose limitation, as well as with Article 8 of the ECHR.131
As to the method of data transfer, the 2007 Agreement has replaced the pull system provided for by the 2004 Agreement with the push system.132 In this way, US authorities do not have direct access to PNR data, but they can receive it from the air carriers. However, the Agreement provides that the pull system remains in effect whereas, by January 2008, some air carriers cannot apply the push system.133 The choice of system for data transmission, whose application allows a better control of US authorities and a reduced risk to the privacy of passengers, is to be welcomed. Yet, the possible coexistence of the pull and push system not only can legitimize possible violations of the air passengers’ right to privacy, but it could also cause a ‘distortion of competition between EU air carriers’.134
The 2007 Agreement identifies US laws as the exclusive point of reference for the processing and transfer of personal data from the European Union to the United States. According to the Agreement, DHS can process and use PNR data ‘in accordance with applicable US laws’,135 and the EU cannot ‘interfere with relationships between the United States and third countries for the exchange of passenger information on data protection grounds’.136 The dependence of the European Union on US laws constitutes a dangerous signal,137 also in the light of the fact that – as held by some scholars – there is no ‘general framework in the US concerning all processing of personal data’.138 The Agreement does not take completely into account the existence of differences between Community law and US laws regarding the processing of personal data, giving an exclusive power to US law and administration, and consequently putting at risk the exercise of individual rights protected by the European Union.
The 2007 Agreement, although it formally reduces the number of transmissible data, adopts mainly the push system, provides a system of periodical review of its implementation139 and for the application of the US Privacy Act to Community citizens, it allows, in a greater way than the 2004 Agreement, a serious limitation of passengers’ right to privacy and is not in compliance with Community norms on the right to privacy.140 As a result, it is necessary that the Agreement be modified through: 1. a clearer definition of the purposes to be achieved; 2. a coherent and adequate evaluation of the data to be transferred; 3. a clear identification of the authorities empowered to receive the data; 4. a uniform application of the push system; and, 5. a moredefined
and binding reference to Community principles concerning the right to privacy.
5. The 2005 Agreement on PNR/API data transfer between the European Union and Canada
In 2005, the European Union entered into another important Agreement on PNR/API data transfer, this time with Canada.141 At the beginning of its negotiation, the Canadian-EU Agreement on the transfer of PNR/API data raised relevant legal problems, such as the difficulty in harmonising the Canadian provisions on personal data transfer with the Community legislation concerning the right to privacy. The proposal for the Agreement, which was subsequently modified following the negative Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party,142 provided some dispositions not completely in compliance with the right to privacy. Following the negotiations between European Union and Canadian representatives, the Canadian authorities complied with
the requirements of the European Union, thereby modifying the original proposals.
According to the Agreement at issue, the transfer and the processing of personal data from the European Union to Canada are regulated by the Commitments of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)143 and by Canadian national legislation concerning the enhancement of security ‘to the extent indicated in the Commitments’.144 CBSA receives personal data ‘under section 107.1 of the Customs Act, paragraph 148(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’.145
As far as the method of data transfer is concerned, Section 7 of the Commitments has accepted the push system, which allows less abuses and more control over the flow of air passengers’ personal data.146 Air carriers, by transferring data selected by them and not being obliged to allow Canadian authorities to have direct access to their data, can avoid potential violations of individuals’ right to privacy.
The Agreement contains a list of 25 data elements to be transferred to the CBSA, but the results are qualitatively very limited.147 The Commitments excluded within this material ‘“sensitive data elements” (…) and all “open text” or “general remarks” fields’.148 This disposition is to be welcomed because it excludes the transmission of sensitive data, thereby complying with Article 8 of Directive 95/46, and it avoids the general transfer of personal data, thus excluding the transmission of ‘open categories’ of data, which – as recalled by the European Parliament – ‘could create confusion …with regard to sensitive aspects of the behaviour of the passenger’.149
However, although the Article 29 Working Party and European Data Protection Supervisor have welcomed the list of PNR data to be transferred under the Agreement, they have expressed some shared doubts. The former has underlined that not all the data elements to be collected are ‘relevant and not excessive’ under Community law.150 The EDPS has stated that the transfer of certain categories of data can give rise to problems as to the protection of the right to privacy.151
As to the data retention time, the Commitments provide for a data retention period of 3½ years for personal data concerning a ‘person who is not subject to an investigation in Canada’.152 This term seems to be in compliance with the proportionality and data quality principles provided for by Community law.
As to the transfer of data to other countries, the Commitments provide that ‘API and PNR information retained in PAXIS will be shared only with a country that has received an adequacy finding under the Directive, or is covered by it’.153 The necessity that the country receiving the information assures an adequate level of protection for the right to privacy is an important factor that guarantees a flow of information which respects the right to privacy.
The system of privacy protection under Canadian law is substantially adequate, and it is very close to the European system provided for by Directive 95/46 and Article 286 TCE.154 The independent Office of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner controls CBSA’s respect for privacy under the conditions provided for by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Privacy Act.155 The Agreement between Canada and the EU on the transfer of API/PNR is to be positively welcomed because it protects passengers’ privacy in a better way than the US-EU Agreement does. However, in the light of the transitional character of the decision on adequacy,156 it is also necessary that in the case of any renewal or renegotiation, the new Agreement primarily respects air passengers’ right to privacy.157
First of all, the new Agreement should provide a more extensive definition of the purposes for which the transfer of the personal data of passengers is allowed. Section 2 allows the transfer of data relating to persons having a ‘relationship with terrorism or terrorism-related crimes, or other serious crimes, including organized crime, that are transnational in nature’.158 The Article 29 Working Party has affirmed that those purposes are well defined and have ‘a clear relationship with fighting acts of terrorism’.159 The wording of Section 2 is not in compliance with the Community principle of purpose limitation, because – as is also explained by EDPS – it has not ‘limited the purpose of the data processing to terrorism, but extended the purposes to other serious crimes’.160 The term ‘serious crime’ is so vague that it allows CBSA to use and process data for purposes not properly related to terrorism.161 In this way, the right to privacy could be jeopardised because the unclear definition of the purposes according to which the transfer of PNR data is admitted can legitimate dangerous abuses by Canadian authorities. Furthermore, certain categories of data such as ‘frequent flyer information’ and ‘APIS information’, whose processing is not necessary and not in compliance with the principles of proportionality and purpose limitation, should be deleted from the list of PNR to be transferred.
6. The 2008 Agreement on EU-sourced PNR data transfer between the European Union and Australia
After having concluded the abovementioned Agreements with the United States and Canada on the transfer of PNR data,162 on 30 June 2008 the European Union entered into an Agreement163 with Australia. As for the scope of application of the Agreement, the Australian customs service can require and obtain only EU-sourced PNR data concerning passengers ‘travelling to, from or through Australia’.164
According to this Agreement, the transfer and process of European Union-sourced PNR data by air carriers to the Australian customs service is governed by Australian legislation.165 The Article 29 Working Party has recognized that Australian legislation on privacy is able to guarantee an adequate level of protection for the privacy of individuals, because it respects individual rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with Community law.166 Although the Agreement contains some norms protecting the right to protection of personal data and has been welcomed by the Australian authorities,167 it can be considered to allow the Australian customs service to limit, in an unjustified way, individuals’ right to privacy.
As to the purposes of processing the data, the Australian customs service can process European Union-sourced PNR data, in order to prevent and contrast: ‘(i) terrorism and related crimes; (ii) serious crimes, including organised crime, that are transnational in nature; (iii) flight from warrants or custody for crimes described above.’168 Furthermore, PNR data can also be processed where this is necessary ‘for the protection of the vital interests of the data subject or other persons’169 or where it is ‘required by court order or Australian law’.170 In this way, the Australian customs service is authorized to process and transfer PNR data for purposes not properly related to the prevention of and combating terrorism. The indication of these broad purposes is neither contained in the 2007 PNR EU-US Agreement nor in the 2005 PNR/API EUCanada Agreement. As a result, the wording of the abovementioned dispositions is so wide as to allow unjustified, inadequate and disproportionate PNR data processing not in compliance with the fundamental purpose limitation principle.171
As to the data elements to be collected and processed, the Agreement contains a list of 19 elements which are very close to the catalogue of PNR data provided for by the 2007 PNR EU-US Agreement:172 it allows excessive and disproportionate data transmission which does not respect the principle of proportionality. However, a positive element contained in the Agreement is represented by the fact that the transmission of sensitive data is excluded.173
As far as the data retention time is concerned, the Agreement provides a comprehensive 5½-year term of duration.174 Generally, this data retention period could be considered adequate; however, the wide purposes for which PNR data can be processed mean that the system is not clearly defined even with respect to the data retention time;175 as a result, the risk of violating individuals’ right to personal data protection can be very high.
As to the disclosure of EU-sourced PNR data by the Australian customs service, the Agreement identifies two forms of disclosure: the disclosure within the Australian Government and the disclosure to third-country governments. As to the former, it is provided that the Australian customs service can transfer PNR data, only when anonymised, to specified Australian Government departments and agencies.176 This disposition is to be welcomed, because it protects the right to privacy of air passengers, avoiding their identification and maintaining their anonymity. 177 As far as the disclosure to third-country governments is concerned, the Agreement provides that customs can decide to transfer PNR data to certain third-country government authorities on a case-by-case analysis.178 This norm does not clearly define the criteria and the requisites
according to which the disclosure of PNR data to third countries is admitted, and does not make reference to the criterion of the appropriateness of the level of protection guaranteed by a third State. As a consequence, it can legitimate abuses by the Australian customs service that could be empowered to violate passengers’ right to personal data protection.
However, there are some norms provided by the Agreement which adequately protect the right to privacy of passengers. First of all, according to Article 7 of the Agreement: ‘Australia shall provide a system, accessible by individuals regardless of their nationality or country of residence, for seeking access to, and correction of, their own personal information.’179 The fact that the Agreement is to apply to all EU citizens without any discrimination is an important element. Furthermore, the existence of a system providing protection for passengers’ right to privacy and able to receive claims by individuals is to be welcomed. Finally, under Article 9 of the Agreement ‘Australia and the EU shall periodically undertake a joint review of the implementation of this Agreement, including the data protection and data-security guarantees, with a view to mutually assuring the effective implementation of the Agreement.’180 The fact that the EU can be represented by data-protection and law enforcement authorities in the joint review of the Agreement’s implementation shows that this procedure is democratic and respects the right to privacy of individuals; however, as has also been reminded by the European Parliament, the Agreement does not provide a precise deadline for this review.181
The Agreement between Australia and the European Union on the transfer and processing of European Union-sourced PNR data contains more guarantees than the 2007 USA-EU Agreement does. This is also due to the fact that, unlike the United States, Australia has uniform legislation protecting the right to privacy of individuals. However, it is necessary that the EUAustralia Agreement be modified in order to better protect passengers’ right to personal data protection. First of all, the purposes for which the processing of PNR data is allowed should be more limited and the list of PNR data to be transferred should be reduced; in this way, the processing and disclosure of PNR data could respect the purpose limitation and proportionality principles. Second, the criteria according to which the transfer of personal data to third countries is allowed should be more defined: in particular, the Agreement should make reference to the adequate level of protection assured by a third State. Third, it is necessary that a definite deadline for the joint review of the implementation of the Agreement be determined.
7. The creation of an EU PNR System: The 2007 proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes
The European Union, considering that PNR data collection is an essential tool in effectively fighting international terrorism and organised crime, is going to equip itself with a system of general surveillance over such data in the European Union. On 25 March 2004, by adopting the Declaration on combating terrorism, the European Council invited the European Commission to bring forward a proposal for a common EU approach to the use of passenger data for border and aviation security and other law enforcement purposes.182 In November 2007, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes (hereinafter ‘the proposal’).183 The proposal has been carefully examined by the Article 29 Working Party and by the European Data Protection Supervisor, who have criticized it.
The proposal is aimed at harmonising the dispositions of the Member States concerning the duties of air carriers, providing flights to or from the European Union, to transfer PNR data to the Member States’ authorities.184 Currently, there are a few EU Member States that have laws and regulations establishing a system for the transfer and processing of PNR data from air carriers to the competent authorities.185
Although the attempt to provide unitary norms in the European Union dealing with the processing of PNR data for combating terrorism and organised crime is a welcome development, this proposal contains dispositions which are very similar to some norms of the PNR EU-USA Agreement and – as recalled by EDPS – is going to be applied to all passengers, regardless of whether they ‘are under investigation or not’.186
The proposal integrates the dispositions provided for by Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate API data to the competent authorities.187 According to the proposal, the collection of PNR data is a much more effective tool in the fight against international terrorism than the collection of API data.188 This evaluation is strictly connected to the ambitious purposes of the proposal: it is aimed not only at identifying known terrorists but also at ‘carrying out risk assessments of the persons, obtaining intelligence and making associations between known and unknown people’.189 The aims of the measures provided by the proposal are thus the identification of both known and unknown persons who could be potential criminals or terrorists.190 However, the proposal does not specify in which manner data will be collected and processed for carrying out these risk assessments.191
The proposal is based on a decentralized system according to which air carriers are required to transfer PNR data to Passenger Information Units (PIUs) that are designated by each Member State.192 Article 4 of the proposal provides that Member States ‘shall adopt a list of competent authorities’ empowered to receive PNR data from the PIUs. Air carriers can also designate intermediaries that have the task of transmitting data to the competent PIUs.193 The proposal is too generic, because it does not provide precise information on PIUs, intermediaries and other authorities. These dispositions could cause legal uncertainty and a heterogeneous enforcement of the PNR system in the Member States, considering that each Member State’s national legislation provides different powers and competence to law enforcement authorities.194
Accordingly, it is necessary that the proposal better defines the competences and duties of intermediaries,
PIUs and other competent authorities.195
According to Article 8 of the proposal, the transfer of PNR data to law enforcement authorities of third countries is allowed, provided that those authorities use the data in order to prevent and combat terrorism and organised crime and that the third country does not transfer the data ‘to another third country without the express consent of the Member State’.196 As reiterated by the European data authorities, the proposal does not specify the conditions under which a Member State can express its consent and does not make reference to the necessity that the third country must assure an adequate level of protection under Article 25 of Directive 95/46.197
As to the data to be transferred, the proposal provides that air carriers should transfer 19 PNR data elements to the competent authorities of the Member States. The number and the nature of PNR data to be transferred according to the proposal are very similar to the data provided by the EU-USA Agreement. The transfer of a such relevant number of data elements, which gives competent authorities wide control and surveillance powers concerning the private lives of individuals, is a measure which is neither necessary to combat international terrorism nor proportionate to the aims pursued by the proposal.198
As to the method of data transfer, the proposal provides that air carriers transmit PNR data using the push method, which ensures an adequate level of control over passengers’ privacy by air carriers. However, if air carriers are not provided with electronic systems to use this method, the proposal allows the PIUs to have direct access to data through the ‘pull’ method, which is a method that does not entirely respect the right to privacy.199
As to the data retention time, Article 9 of the proposal provides a PNR data retention period of five years; once this term expires, the proposal states that data ‘shall be kept for a further period of eight years’, during which the data can be processed and accessed according to specified conditions.200 This 13-year term, very close to the 15-year term provided for by EU-US Agreement, appears to be excessive and disproportionate, and as such does not adequately protect the right to privacy of individuals.
The proposal provides for a mass surveillance system of EU passengers’ privacy, it does not adequately respect the purpose limitation and proportionality principles and it may violate the right to privacy of individuals.201 The proposal’s attempt to harmonise EU Member States’ legislation regarding the transfer of PNR data is to be welcomed because the necessity to make homogenous the processing of such data in the EU is an important element in order to guarantee the certainty of the law and the rule of law. However, there are several doubts about the effectiveness, the proportionality and the necessity of the measures provided by the proposal, even in light of the unclear formulation of the norms contained therein. It is necessary that the proposal be modified following certain guidelines, in order to ensure a proper and uniform application of the law in EU Member States and, at the same time, to protect effectively the right to privacy of individuals in compliance with Community law.
First of all, European institutions should demonstrate unequivocally the necessity to collect PNR data.202 Second, the measures provided by the proposal should also take into account the existing Community systems and legislation aimed at controlling the flow of persons,203 in particular Directive 2004/82.204 This Directive has still not been fully implemented in EU Member States, and it has not demonstrated that the collection of API data is an inadequate tool in order to fight international terrorism.205 As a result, it is necessary to eliminate the obstacles to the implementation of Directive 2004/82 and to understand the real usefulness of API data in the fight against terrorist threats. Only after these evaluations, will it be possible to realize the real and concrete importance of the collection of PNR data in the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, and, consequently, to create a more balanced PNR EU system that can respect passengers’ right to privacy. Furthermore, the proposal should reduce not only the number of PNR data elements to be transferred, providing for only the transmission of essential PNR data that can be necessary in the fight against terrorism, but also the data retention period, by identifying a duration (from 2 to 3½ years) that can balance the protection of privacy with the necessity to protect the Community from a terrorist threat. The proposal should identify the push method as the exclusive method of PNR data transmission. Finally, the proposal should allow data transfer to a third country on condition that the receiving country ensures an adequate level of protection. Following these guidelines, the Council Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes could be an important and essential tool in order to effectively combat terrorism, because it would also respect the Community disposition on the right to privacy and the fundamental principles of proportionality and purpose limitation.
8. Conclusions and perspectives: The necessity to modify the existing PNR instruments in light of the Treaty of Lisbon
PNR Agreements concluded by the European Union on the transfer of PNR data and the proposal for a Council Framework Decision are tools that, on the one hand, pursue a legitimate purpose,such as combating terrorism, but, on the other hand, they do not adequately protect individuals’ right to privacy.
The changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon will have significant effects on EU antiterrorism activities and policies, and, in particular, on PNR Agreements adopted by the European Union, as well as on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision. The recognition of an important value such as the protection of personal data in the EU legal system and the attribution of strong decisional powers to the European Parliament will facilitate significant legal changes to these tools, especially in the light of the fact that the European Parliament has often criticized PNR Agreements as exclusive and important tools in the fight against terrorism. In addition, PNR instruments have been adopted by the European Union without fully taking into account the recommendations of the European Parliament, which is a Community institution that is very mindful of the protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms of EU citizens.206 Through the changes provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament can control and supervise Agreements concluded by the European Union in areas of justice and the police that could violate individuals’ privacy, which would better assure the protection of the right to personal data.207
The solutions proposed in this article (a re-elaboration of the EU Agreements with the United States, Canada and Australia, and a more adequate reconsideration of the proposal for a Council Framework Decision) are sensitive concerning the protection of personal data and its coherent integration into the new institutional architecture and legal background introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which attempts to counterbalance the protection of privacy with the necessity to counter terrorism.208
In conclusion, the Treaty of Lisbon, which has recently entered into force, will attain the appropriate balance between individuals’ right to personal data protection and the collective necessity of countering international terrorism in PNR matters.209 It will provide the European Union with the legislative background and modern institutions to face the new challenges of the world (such as combating terrorism) and to satisfy citizens’ requests.210
Michele Nino Ph.D., Researcher in International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Salerno (Italy). Lawyer at the Naples Bar (Italy). Professional address: University of Salerno, Faculty of Law, Department of International Studies, Via Ponte don Melillo 1, 84048 Fisciano (SA), Italy; email: mnino@unisa.it
This article was originally published under the title "The protection of personal data in the fight against terrorism" in the Utrecht Law Review Volume 6, Issue 1 (January) 2010 pp 62-85 (Here PDF) under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
NOTES:
1 M. Heupel, ‘Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s Evolving Approach to Terrorism’, 2007 Security Dialogue 38, no. 4, pp. 477-499.
2 See Exchange of information between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States, available online at
Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach, COM(2003) 826; EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007, available online at
3 See Sections 4-6, infra.
4 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passenger Manifest Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, WP 66, 24 October 2002, available online at
5 Directive 2004/82/EC, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24.
6 See Section 2.3, infra.
7 See Sections 2.1- 2.3, infra.
8 See Section 2.2, infra.
9 See Section 2.3, infra.
10 See Section 3, infra.
11 See Sections 4-7, infra.
12 Art. 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948.
13 Art. 17, 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966.
14 Art. 8, 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950.
15 Ibid., Art. 8, Para. 2.
16 For a detailed analysis of the Court’s case law, see S. Sottiaux, Terrorism and Limitation of Rights: The ECHR and US Constitution, 2008; see also F. Bignami, ‘Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention Directive’, 2007 Chicago Journal of International Law 8, no. 1, pp. 233-255, in particular pp. 242-249.
17 Kruslin v. France, [1990] ECHR (Ser. A176-A), Para. 27; Kopp v. Switzerland, [1998-II] ECHR, Para. 55.
18 Kruslin, supra note 17, Para. 27; Kopp, supra note 17 , Para. 55.
19 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, [1979] ECHR (Ser. A30), Para. 49.
20 Kopp, supra note 17, Para. 55; Amman v. Switzerland, [2000-II] ECHR, Para. 50.
21 Ollson v. Sweden, [1988] ECHR (Ser. A130), Para. 61.
22 Norris v. Ireland, [1988] ECHR (Ser. A142), Para. 44; Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, [1988] ECHR (Ser. A142), Para. 48.
23 Gillow v. The United Kingdom, [1986] ECHR (Ser. A109), Para. 55.
24 Lingens v. Austria, [1986] ECHR (Ser. A103), Para. 39.
25 Ibid., Paras 39-40; Leander v. Sweden, [1987] ECHR (Ser. A116), Para. 59; Gillow, supra note 23, Para. 55.
26 See D. Blonda, La Disciplina della Privacy nel Panorama Internazionale, available online at
27 1981 COE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, available online at
1981, 1981.
28 Art. 1, COE Convention, supra note 27.
29 Art. 5, COE Convention, supra note 27.
30 According to Art. 6, COE Convention, supra note 27, sensitive data is ‘personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life’.
31 Art. 6, COE Convention, supra note 27.
32 See Blonda, supra note 26.
33 Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. In the doctrine see M. C. Ponthoreau, ‘La Directive 95/46 CE du 24 Octobre 1995 Relative à la Protection des Personnes Physiques à l’ Égard du Traitement des Données à Caractère Personnel et à la Libre Circulation de ces Données’, 1997 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 13, no. 1, pp. 125-150; R. Castaño Suárez, ‘Directiva 95/46, de 24 de Octubre de
1995, Relativa a la Protección de las Personas Físicas en lo que Respecta al Tratamiento de Datos Personales y a la Libre Circulación de Éstos. Similitudes y Diferencias con la Ley Orgánica 5/1992, de 29 de Octubre (LORTAD)’, 1998 Noticias de la Unión Europea, no. 14, pp. 9-15; A. L. Calvo Cravaca et al., ‘International Data Protection, Privacy and Directive 95/46/EEC’, in: J. Basedow et al. (eds.), Aufbruch
Nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max-Planck-Institut für Privatrecht, 2001, pp. 167-182.
34 See European Union, Summaries of Legislation – Protection of personal data, available online at
summaries/information_society/l14012_en.htm>.
35 Art. 2(a), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
36 Art. 2(b), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33. According to the wording of the Directive these operations can include ‘collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’.
37 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33, 11th Whereas.
38 Art. 8(1), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
39 Art. 8(2)(a)-(e), (3), (4), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
40 Art. 6, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2007 on the level of protection of personal data in Jersey, WP 141, 9 October 2007, available online at
41 Art. 6(b), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
42 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 9/2007 on the level of protection of personal data in the Faroe Islands, WP 142, 9 October 2007, available online at
43 Art. 6(c), (d), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
44 Case C-331/88, Fedesa and Others, [1990] ECR I-4023, Para. 13; Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR II-3305, Para. 411; Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR II-3495, Para. 324.
45 Arts. 10, 11, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33; see also Opinion 9/2007, supra note 42, p. 5.
46 1992 Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, OJ C 191, 29.7.1992.
47 See B. Conforti, Diritto Internazionale, 2002, p. 164; F. Pocar, Diritto dell’Unione Europea e delle Comunità Europee, 2004, p. 56.
48 Art. 3(2), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
49 See Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93; and Regulation (EC) no. 2580/2001 implementing this Council Common Position, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70. The European Union has adopted the so-called smart sanctions, imposing travel bans, embargoes and the freezing of assets on individuals or entities included in certain EU lists. On the topic of targeted sanctions and on the problems they raise as to fundamental rights and freedoms, see G. Ziccardi Capaldo, ‘Editorial: Fighting Global Terrorism: Through Global Enforcement Mechanisms’, in: G. Ziccardi Capaldo (ed.), The Global Community. Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2004, pp. xv-xxvii, in particular pp. xxiii-xxv; G. Ziccardi Capaldo & M. Nino, ‘Globalization of Law Enforcement Mechanisms: Issues of Legality and Legitimacy’, in: M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Vol. II - Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms, 2008, pp. 49-71; G. Ziccardi Capaldo, The Pillars of Global Law, 2008, p. 285.
50 A. Scirocco, The Lisbon Treaty and the Protection of Personal Data in the European Union, available online at
51 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 60.
52 Second opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, 29 November 2006, OJ C 91/9, 26.4.2007, also available online at
Opinions/2007/07-04-27_3dpillar_3_EN.pdf>, Point 7.
53 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, supra note 51, 3rd Whereas.
54 Ibid., Art. 1.
55 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (COM(2005) 475 final), 19 December 2005, OJ C 47/27, 25.2.2006, also available online at
56 Ibid., Points 24, 25, 47.
57 Ibid., Points 25, 47.
58 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, supra note 51, Art. 13.
59 Ibid., Art. 14.
60 Ibid., Art. 13.
61 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, supra note 51, 39th Whereas, Art. 28.
62 Ibid., 38th Whereas, Art. 26.
63 Ibid.
64 See P. De Hert & V. Papakonstantinou, ‘The Data Protection Framework Decision of 27 November 2008 Regarding Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. A Modest Achievement However not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For’, 2009 Computer Law & Security Review 25, no. 5, pp. 403-414.
65 EDPS Press Release, EDPS sees adoption of Data Protection Framework for police and judicial cooperation only as a first step, 28 November 2008, available online at
66 Ibid.
67 2007 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007.
68 See Scirocco, supra note 50, p. 3; D. Alonso Blas, First Pillar and Third Pillar: Need for a Common Approach on Data Protection, available online at
69 Treaty of Lisbon, The Treaty at a Glance, available online at
70 2000 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 361/1, Art. 8, also available online at
71 Ibid., Art. 7. See S. Rodotà, Intervista su Privacy e Libertà, 2005, p. 19. According to Art. 52 of European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (supra note 70), both the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data can be limited, provided that the limitations are ‘provided for by law (…) respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and the principle proportionality, and are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union’.
72 Art. 16 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/47, 9.5.2008. On the importance of this article see Scirocco, supra note 50, pp. 2-3.
73 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (9 March 2006), Public Law No. 109-177 (2006). For a detailed review of US anti- terrorism legislation see S. W. Becker, ‘“Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…”: Assessing the Aftermath of September 11th’, 2003 Valparaiso University Law Review 37, pp. 563 et seq.; J.A.E. Vervaele, ‘The Anti-Terrorist Legislation in the US: Criminal Law for the Enemies’, 2006 European Journal of Law Reform, no. 1, pp. 137-171. The US administration also considered the practice of extraordinary renditions of vital importance in the fight against terrorism: on this topic see M.Nino, ‘The Abu Omar Case in Italy and the Effects of CIA Extraordinary Renditions in Europe on Law Enforcement and Intelligence Activities’, 2007 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 78, no. 1/2, pp. 113-141; M. Nino, ‘Extraordinary Renditions: The Role of European Security Services in the Fight Against International Terrorism’, 2008 Revue Electronique de l’Association Internationale de Droit Pénal, available online at
74 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 19 November 2001 (Public Law 107–71, 107th Congress, 49 USC Section 44909(c)(3) (2001)). In 2002, the US passed legislation concerning border security (Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSV), 5 May 2002).
75 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2001 on the need for a balanced approach in the fight against terrorism, 14 December 2001, available online at
76 Opinion 6/2002, supra note 4.
77 Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the United States for the Transfer of Passengers’ Data, WP 78, 13 June 2003, available online at
78 European Parliament resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights, 13 March 2003, P5_TA(2003)0097; European Parliament resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights: state of negotiations with the USA, 9 October 2003, P5_TA(2003)0429.
79 See Section 4.2, infra.
80 Reference was made to Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33, and to Regulation (EEC) no. 2299/89 on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems, OJ L 220, 29.7.1989, p. 1, as modified by Regulation (EC) no. 323/1999, OJ L 40, 13.2.1999, p. 1.
81 Art. 25(1), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33.
82 Ibid., Para. 2.
83 Ibid., Paras 4, 5, 6.
84 Undertakings of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 11 May 2004 (hereinafter Undertakings).
85 Art. 1, Commission Decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004/535/EC, OJ L 235, 6.7.2004, p. 11.
86 Council Decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, 2004/496/EC, OJ L 183, 20.5.2004, p. 83.
87 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 142M, 30.5.2004, p. 50.
88 Commission Decision 2004/535/EC, supra note 85, Para. 1.
89 See also P. De Sena, ‘Esigenze di Sicurezza Nazionale e Tutela dei Diritti dell’Uomo nella Recente Prassi Europea’, in: N. Boschiero (ed.), Ordine Internazionale e Valori Etici, VIII Convegno SIDI, 2003, pp. 196-268, in particular p. 255; B. Siemen, ‘The EU-US Agreement on Passenger Name Records and EC-Law: Data Protection, Competences and Human Rights Issues in International Agreements of the Community’, 2005 German Yearbook of International Law 47, pp. 629-665.
90 Commission Decision 2004/535/EC, supra note 85, 15th Whereas; Undertakings, supra note 84, Point 3.
91 See Opinion 4/2003, supra note 77, pp. 6-7.
92 See Undertakings, supra note 84, Attachment A.
93 Ibid., Points 9-11.
94 Opinion 4/2003, supra note 77, pp. 6-7.
95 Undertakings, supra note 84, Point 15.
96 Ibid.
97 See Opinion 4/2003, supra note 77, p. 8.
98 2004 Agreement, supra note 87, Para. 1.
99 See European PNR, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision of 6 November 2007 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, available online at
100 See Peter J. Hustinx (EDPS), Presentation of Annual Report 2004, Introductory Speech at Press Conference: Building a new institution, 31 March 2005, available online at
101 Art. 230, 1957 Treaty establishing the European Community, 25 March 1957.
102 See notes 85-86, supra.
103 See Opinion of Advocate General Léger, 22 November 2005.
104 Ibid., Para. 97. According to Art. 3(2), Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 33, the directive is not to be applied to the processing of personal data ‘in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security (…) and the activities of the
State in areas of criminal law’.
105 Ibid., Para. 103.
106 Ibid., Para. 141.
107 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, [2006] ECR I-4721. For an analysis of the judgment see G. Gilmore et al., ‘Court of Justice: Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council and Commission’, 2007 Common Market Law Review, no. 4, pp. 1081-1099.
108 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, supra note 107, Paras 59-60.
109 Ibid., Paras 67-69; see also P. de Hert & S. Gutwirth, ‘European Data Protection’s constitutional project. Its problematic recognition in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’, in: S. Gutwirth et al. (eds.), Reinventing data protection?, 2009, pp. 3-44.
110 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, supra note 107, Para. 74; see also the reactions of EDPS to ECJ judgment (EDPS Press Release, PNR: EDPS first reaction to the Court of Justice judgment, 30 May 2006, available online at
PNR Judgement, available online at
111 Some authors have stated that the ECJ judgment has created a ‘lacuna legis’: see E. Kosta et al., ‘Data Protection in the Third Pillar: In the Aftermath of the ECJ Decision on PNR Data and the Data Retention Directive’, 2007 International Review of Law Computers and Technology 21, no. 3, pp. 347-362, also available online at
20in%20the%20third%20pillar%20-%20in%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the%20ECJ%20decision%20on%20PNR%
20data%20and%20the%20data%20retention%20directive.pdf>, p. 3.
112 Council Decision of 16 October 2006 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2006/729/CFSP/JHA, OJ L 298, 27.10.2006, p. 27.
113 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 298, 27.10.2006, p. 2.
114 Ibid., Para. 2.
115 Ibid., 2d Whereas.
116 Ibid., Para. 3.
117 Ibid., 5th Whereas.
118 See also D.R. Rasmussen, ‘Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion of Terrorism?: The Dispute Between the United States and European Union over Passenger Name Record Data Transfers’, 2008 Wisconsin International Law Journal 26, no. 2, pp. 551-590, p. 585.
119 Council Decision of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), 2007/551/CFSP/JHA, OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 16.
120 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 16. In the doctrine see S. Adam, ‘Quelques Réflexions sur les Relations Entre les Procédures a Priori et a Posteriori d’Examen de Compatibilité des Accords Communautaires Suite à l’Affaire dite de “l’Accord PNR”’, 2007 Cahiers de Droit Europeen 42, no. 5-6, pp. 657-696; K. Hailbronner et al., ‘The Agreement on Passenger-Data Transfer (PNR) and the EU-US Cooperation in Data Communication’, 2008 International Migration 46, no. 2, pp. 187-197; J. Argomaniz, ‘When the EU is the ‘Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms’, 2009 Journal of European Integration/Revue d’Integration Europeenne 31, no. 1, pp. 119-136.
121 Ibid., Title I, US letter to EU.
122 Ibid.
123 See also E. Quillatre, ‘The EU-US PNR Agreement: Fight Against Terrorism v. Personal Data Protection’, available at
124 Opinion 5/2007 on the follow-up agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security concluded in July 2007, WP 138, 17 August 2007, available online at
125 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
126 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title III, US letter to EU.
127 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR agreement with the United States of America, OJ C 175E, 10.7.2008, p. 564, Point 18; see also M.R. VanWasshnova, ‘Data Protection Conflicts Between the United States and the European Union in the War on Terror: Lessons Learned from the Existing System of Financial Information Exchange’, 2007-2008 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, pp. 827-865, p. 839.
128 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title III, US letter to EU.
129 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Para. 3.
130 Ibid., Title VII, US letter to EU.
131 See Opinion 5/2007, supra note 124, p. 13; see also European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007, supra note 127, Point 18; Quillatre, supra note 123, p. 11.
132 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title VIII, US letter to EU.
133 Ibid.
134 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007, supra note 127, Point 8.
135 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Para. 3.
136 Ibid., Para. 6.
137 See also Rasmussen, supra note 118, pp. 588-589.
138 See Quillatre, supra note 123, p. 9.
139 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 120, Title X, US letter to EU.
140 Some authors have stated that the 2007 Agreement violates individuals’ privacy and contains less guarantees than the 2004 Agreement: see Quillatre, supra note 123, pp. 10-12; VanWasshnova, supra note 127, p. 839; Rasmussen, supra note 118, pp. 588-590.
141 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data, OJ L 82, 21.3.2006, p. 14.
142 Opinion 3/2004 on the level of protection ensured in Canada for the transmission of Passenger Name Records and Advanced Passenger Information from airlines, WP 88, 11 February 2004, available online at
143 See Commission Decision of 6 September 2005 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the Canada Border Services Agency, 2006/253/EC, OJ L 91, 29.3.2006, p. 49, Annex, Commitments by the Canada
Border Service Agency in Relation to the Application of its PNR Program.
144 Ibid., 11th Whereas.
145 Ibid., 6th Whereas.
146 See Commitments, supra note 143, Section 7.
147 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, Attachement A.
148 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, Attachement A, ‘PNR Data Elements Required by CBSA from Air Carriers’; Commitments, supra note 143, Section 4.
149 European Parliament Report on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) data (COM(2005)0200 – C6-0184/2005 – 2005/0095(CNS)), Final A6-0226/2005, available at
150 Opinion 1/2005 on the level of protection ensured in Canada for the transmission of Passenger Name Record and Advance Passenger Information from airlines, WP 103, 19 January 2005, available online at
151 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of an agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) data (COM(2005) 200 final), OJ C 218, 6.9.2005, p. 6, Para. 22. The European Data Protection Supervisor’s Opinion made particular reference to category 10 (frequent flyer information) and category 23 (any collected APIS information), which could reveal data the processing of which is not strictly necessary to the fight against terrorism.
152 See Commitments, supra note 143, Section 8.
153 Ibid., Section 18.
154 European Parliament Report, Final A6-0226/2005, supra note 149, p. 10.
155 Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, 22nd Whereas.
156 On this issue see P. Hobbing, Tracing Terrorists: The EU-Canada Agreement in PNR Matters, 2008, available online at
157 The decision on adequacy has a temporary nature and, according to Art. 7 of the Commission Decision 2006/253/EC, supra note 143, it provides: ‘this Decision shall expire three years and six months after the date of its notification, unless extended in accordance with the procedure set out in Art. 31(2) of Directive 95/46/EC’.
158 See Commitments, supra note 143, Section 2.
159 Opinion 1/2005, supra note 150, p. 4.
160 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 151, Para. 24; in this sense see also Hobbing, supra note 156, p. 36.
161 See Hobbing, supra note 156, p. 36.
162 See Sections 4-5, supra.
163 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service, OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 49; see also Council Decision 2008/651/CFSP/JHA of 30 June 2008 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs Service, OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 47.
164 Ibid., Annex, Para. 1.
165 Ibid., 8th Whereas.
166 Opinion 1/2004 on the level of protection ensured in Australia for the transmission of Passenger Name Record data from airlines, WP 85, 16 January 2004, available online at
167 Australia and the EU Sign Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement, available online at
168 Art. 5(1), 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163.
169 Ibid., Art. 5(2).
170 Ibid., Art. 5(3).
171 See also the European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008 to the Council concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service, 22 October 2008, available online at
172 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163, Annex, Para. 9.
173 Ibid., Para. 10.
174 According to Para. 12 of the Annex to the Agreement: ‘Customs shall retain EU-sourced PNR data for no more than three-and-a-half years after the date of receipt of the PNR data by Customs, after which time the data may be archived for two further years.’
175 See European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008, supra note 171, lett. (n).
176 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163, Annex, Paras 2, 5; Schedule to the Annex; see also European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008, supra note 171, lett. (i).
177 Ibid.
178 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163, Annex, Para. 6.
179 Art. 7(1)(2), 2008 EU-sourced PNR data Agreement, supra note 163.
180 Ibid., Art. 9.
181 See European Parliament recommendation of 22 October 2008, supra note 171, lett. (l).
182 See European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2004, available online at
183 Proposal for a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, SEC(2007) 1422,
SEC(2007) 1453, available online at
184 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, OJ C 110, 1 May 2008, p. 1.
185 In 2004, the United Kingdom adopted the Semaphore Project, which is a pilot scheme through which large amounts of data concerning air passengers are stored and used to help intelligence agencies in the fight against some forms of crime, including terrorism and organised crime. On this system see H.M. Government, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’ (July 2006), available online at
186 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 30.
187 See Directive 2004/82/EC, supra note 5.
188 Proposal, supra note 183, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3.
189 Ibid.
190 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 15.
191 Joint Opinion on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, presented by the Commission on 6 November 2007, adopted by Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice, WP 145, 5 December 2007, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp145_en.pdf , p. 7.
192 Art. 3, Proposal, supra note 183.
193 Art. 6, Proposal, supra note 183.
194 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 73.
195 In this sense see the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 73.
196 Art. 8, Proposal, supra note 183.
197 Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 3; Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Paras 76-77; Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, available online at
198 See also the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 95.
199 See European PNR, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision of 6 November 2007 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, supra note 99.
200 Art. 9, Proposal, supra note 183.
201 Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 13.
202 In this sense see Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 197, p. 5, Para. 16; see also MEPs voice serious criticism at EU PNR scheme, available online at
203 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (in the Opinion, supra note 197, Para. 49) and the EDPS (in the Opinion, supra note 184) both make reference to the VISA System (Council Decision of 8 June 2004, OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, p. 5) and to the Schengen Information System (Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63).
204 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 49.
205 Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 6.
206 See European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007, supra note 127, Point 2. The Parliament in its Resolution concerning the Agreement with Canada did not approve the conclusion of that agreement (European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, OJ C 157E , 6.7.2006, p. 464, Point 1).
207 In this sense see Alonso Blas, supra note 68, p. 17; Scirocco, supra note 50, p. 5.
208 See also the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 184, Para. 129.
209 On the balance between the protection of individual fundamental freedoms and the necessity to fight international terrorism, see G. Ziccardi Capaldo, ‘Terrorismo Globale e Diritti Umani: “A Fair Balance” tra Interesse Generale e Tutela dei Diritti Fondamentali Individuali’, in: A. Cannone et al. (eds.), Studi in Onore di Vincenzo Starace, 2008, vol. I, p. 745; see also Joint Opinion, supra note 191, p. 4.
210 The Treaty at a glance, supra note 69.
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