The Honduras Government's Truth
The Honduras´ government on May 4 appointed a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) to investigate the coup last June 28 that kicked President Manuel Zelaya from office, but human rights groups worry that it will fail to address right violations stemming from the ouster.
The five-member commission that includes former Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo Stein, former Canadian diplomat Michael Kergin, former Peruvian Justice Minister María Zavala, Honduran legal expert Jorge Omar Caso and president of the National Autonomous University of Honduras, Julieta Castellanos, will have eight months to investigate those responsible for the coup.
The commission “will get to the bottom of what caused the political crisis,” said Stein. “We want it to be clear that we haven´t come to the commission to be chroniclers, because for that they should have hired a historian.”
But rights groups and members of the Honduran opposition said the commission falls short of investigating the repression that followed the coup.
Opposition members have called an alternative truth commission that will include Nobel Peace Prize winners Rigoberta Menchú and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel.
The New York-based International Center for Transitional Justice, or ICTJ, said in a statement that the commission´s mandate is vague and makes no mention of human rights.
“The TRC´s mandate is a cause for concern,” said Javier Ciurlizza, director of ICTJ´s Americas Program, who also was executive secretary of Peru´s truth commission that investigated the deaths during the 1980-2000 internal armed conflict. “It does not cover assassinations and attacks perpetrated against journalists and social activists since June 2009. And it’s alarming that the mandate also appears to omit past events in the history of Honduras, which has a serious history of authoritarianism and de facto regimes.”
"There cannot be reconciliation without full truth and justice for victims. The lack of direct consultation with victims and a broad range of political and civil society actors raises questions about the integrity of this effort,” he added. “The international community should carefully judge the legitimacy of this initiative before normalizing political and economic relations with Honduras.” The government of President Porfirio Lobo, which began on Jan. 27, has only been recognized by Central American governments, except Nicaragua, and Colombia and Peru in South America.
Source: Latinamerica Press
The five-member commission that includes former Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo Stein, former Canadian diplomat Michael Kergin, former Peruvian Justice Minister María Zavala, Honduran legal expert Jorge Omar Caso and president of the National Autonomous University of Honduras, Julieta Castellanos, will have eight months to investigate those responsible for the coup.
The commission “will get to the bottom of what caused the political crisis,” said Stein. “We want it to be clear that we haven´t come to the commission to be chroniclers, because for that they should have hired a historian.”
But rights groups and members of the Honduran opposition said the commission falls short of investigating the repression that followed the coup.
Opposition members have called an alternative truth commission that will include Nobel Peace Prize winners Rigoberta Menchú and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel.
The New York-based International Center for Transitional Justice, or ICTJ, said in a statement that the commission´s mandate is vague and makes no mention of human rights.
“The TRC´s mandate is a cause for concern,” said Javier Ciurlizza, director of ICTJ´s Americas Program, who also was executive secretary of Peru´s truth commission that investigated the deaths during the 1980-2000 internal armed conflict. “It does not cover assassinations and attacks perpetrated against journalists and social activists since June 2009. And it’s alarming that the mandate also appears to omit past events in the history of Honduras, which has a serious history of authoritarianism and de facto regimes.”
"There cannot be reconciliation without full truth and justice for victims. The lack of direct consultation with victims and a broad range of political and civil society actors raises questions about the integrity of this effort,” he added. “The international community should carefully judge the legitimacy of this initiative before normalizing political and economic relations with Honduras.” The government of President Porfirio Lobo, which began on Jan. 27, has only been recognized by Central American governments, except Nicaragua, and Colombia and Peru in South America.
Source: Latinamerica Press
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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EU And Andean Community Agree To Strengthen Fight Against Drug Trafficking
The EU and the four Andean countries of Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, held a summit in Madrid to tackle an important agenda on issues such as drug trafficking, the environment and climate change, migration, the economic crisis and regional integration.
The Sixth EU-Andean Community Summit agreed to give a political boost to the fight against illegal drugs to maintain a joint position on this global problem as well as associated crimes such as money laundering.
The EU and the Andean countries have therefore decided to raise the level of the Specialised Dialogue on Drugs, which currently meets at expert level, so that participants will be political figures with decision making capacity.
This decision is backed by a substantial increase in the financial support that the European Commission gives to the four Andean countries to help in the fight against drug trafficking. For the EU, illegal drugs and drug trafficking are important threats, not only from the point of view of safety but also of democracy.
The President of the Spanish government and head of the current rotating presidency of the EU, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, expressed his satisfaction at the results of the summit that “renews the EU's political will to strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with a region that seeks integration”, something that “we view as extremely favourable”.
In addition to Zapatero, the EU was represented by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso.On the Andean side, the presidents of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe; Ecuador, Rafael Correa; Bolivia, Evo Morales; and Peru, Alan García, were all present.
Climate change and financial crisis
The European and South American leaders also focused an important part of their discussions on the fight against climate change with a view to the upcoming meeting in Cancun (Mexico) in December. According to Van Rompuy, the important thing now is to restore confidence among all the negotiating parties and to work ambitiously but realistically to achieve concrete results: a broad, binding agreement which includes the largest possible number of countries.
They also spoke of the international financial crisis which, according to President Alan García, has shown that subregional economic integration is the best way to create employment, to attract investment and to promote growth.
Agreements
At the end of the summit, a trade agreement was signed between the EU and Peru and Colombia which aims to free up trade in sectors such as industrial products, agriculture and fishing, services and investment, and also encompasses cooperation and political dialogue on human rights.
It is an ambitious agreement that contains important commitments for all three parties, which will generate new opportunities for economic agents and will act as an incentive for the two Andean countries to progress their reform agendas and to develop the means for greater social protection.
This “multi-party” trade agreement respects the right of the rest of the Andean countries to join whenever they consider appropriate. The EU had originally planned to sign a wide-ranging agreement of association with the Andean Community but as a result of the breakdown in negotiations in 2008, a new mandate was proposed, agreeing thematic and geographic separation.
In this framework, "multi-party" trade talks were held with Peru and Colombia, leading to an agreement last March after nine separate rounds of negotiations.
The Sixth EU-Andean Community Summit agreed to give a political boost to the fight against illegal drugs to maintain a joint position on this global problem as well as associated crimes such as money laundering.
The EU and the Andean countries have therefore decided to raise the level of the Specialised Dialogue on Drugs, which currently meets at expert level, so that participants will be political figures with decision making capacity.
This decision is backed by a substantial increase in the financial support that the European Commission gives to the four Andean countries to help in the fight against drug trafficking. For the EU, illegal drugs and drug trafficking are important threats, not only from the point of view of safety but also of democracy.
The President of the Spanish government and head of the current rotating presidency of the EU, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, expressed his satisfaction at the results of the summit that “renews the EU's political will to strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with a region that seeks integration”, something that “we view as extremely favourable”.
In addition to Zapatero, the EU was represented by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso.On the Andean side, the presidents of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe; Ecuador, Rafael Correa; Bolivia, Evo Morales; and Peru, Alan García, were all present.
Climate change and financial crisis
The European and South American leaders also focused an important part of their discussions on the fight against climate change with a view to the upcoming meeting in Cancun (Mexico) in December. According to Van Rompuy, the important thing now is to restore confidence among all the negotiating parties and to work ambitiously but realistically to achieve concrete results: a broad, binding agreement which includes the largest possible number of countries.
They also spoke of the international financial crisis which, according to President Alan García, has shown that subregional economic integration is the best way to create employment, to attract investment and to promote growth.
Agreements
At the end of the summit, a trade agreement was signed between the EU and Peru and Colombia which aims to free up trade in sectors such as industrial products, agriculture and fishing, services and investment, and also encompasses cooperation and political dialogue on human rights.
It is an ambitious agreement that contains important commitments for all three parties, which will generate new opportunities for economic agents and will act as an incentive for the two Andean countries to progress their reform agendas and to develop the means for greater social protection.
This “multi-party” trade agreement respects the right of the rest of the Andean countries to join whenever they consider appropriate. The EU had originally planned to sign a wide-ranging agreement of association with the Andean Community but as a result of the breakdown in negotiations in 2008, a new mandate was proposed, agreeing thematic and geographic separation.
In this framework, "multi-party" trade talks were held with Peru and Colombia, leading to an agreement last March after nine separate rounds of negotiations.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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'Knowledge' To Be Cornerstone Of EU-LAC Cooperation
The economic crisis "calls for renewed efforts, imposes additional responsibilities and also opens new opportunities," according to the Spanish Minister of Science and Innovation, Cristina Garmendia, during the closing ceremony of the 3rd EU-LAC Business Summit held this Monday in Madrid.
She therefore considered that progress toward a knowledge-based society and economy "are called to become the cornerstone" of bi-regional co-operation between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean.
"For Latin America and the Caribbean, more than ever, innovation is the only way to tackle the persistent lag in productivity, economic growth and social inequality", while the EU also wants to become a knowledge-based society in 2020" she summarised.
The Spanish minister also emphasised that the "most innovative" countries are those that best resist the processes of crisis, but insisted that it is not about "investing more, but investing better" to "optimise sustainable resources."
"Science and innovation are powerful tools for promoting human development and social justice, but can also be a source of major socio-economic imbalances. We must take steps to ensure that scientific and technological progress will help to reduce, not enlarge, the social gap between countries, regions, groups and individuals," said Garmendia.
"A cutting-edge agreement"
During the ceremony, the president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, defended security, investment guarantee and defence from the private sector as key elements in his policy to promote commercial ties with the EU. He also referred to the agreement that is expected to be signed on Wednesday between the EU and Colombia and Peru, which he defined as "cutting-edge".
"Faced with the old globalisation", which warranted precaution because it supposed a mercantilist process, there has been a "new globalisation characterised by the defence of human rights, effective protection of the rights of workers and the requirement of strict observance of environmental norms" he said.
According to the Colombian president, "the European Union has contributed to creating the most important predominately middle class democracy in the world", while "doors have been closed to extreme governments" and "there has been more awareness that we all have to fight against terrorism."
The EU-LAC Business Summit is held biennially and brings together business and political leaders from both regions, with the aim of strengthening relations between businesses of Latin America and the European Union, in particular by promoting economic and social development.
Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe (r), and the president of the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organisations (CEOE), Gerardo Díaz Ferrán, on arrival at the closing of the EU-LAC Business Summit
She therefore considered that progress toward a knowledge-based society and economy "are called to become the cornerstone" of bi-regional co-operation between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean.
"For Latin America and the Caribbean, more than ever, innovation is the only way to tackle the persistent lag in productivity, economic growth and social inequality", while the EU also wants to become a knowledge-based society in 2020" she summarised.
The Spanish minister also emphasised that the "most innovative" countries are those that best resist the processes of crisis, but insisted that it is not about "investing more, but investing better" to "optimise sustainable resources."
"Science and innovation are powerful tools for promoting human development and social justice, but can also be a source of major socio-economic imbalances. We must take steps to ensure that scientific and technological progress will help to reduce, not enlarge, the social gap between countries, regions, groups and individuals," said Garmendia.
"A cutting-edge agreement"
During the ceremony, the president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, defended security, investment guarantee and defence from the private sector as key elements in his policy to promote commercial ties with the EU. He also referred to the agreement that is expected to be signed on Wednesday between the EU and Colombia and Peru, which he defined as "cutting-edge".
"Faced with the old globalisation", which warranted precaution because it supposed a mercantilist process, there has been a "new globalisation characterised by the defence of human rights, effective protection of the rights of workers and the requirement of strict observance of environmental norms" he said.
According to the Colombian president, "the European Union has contributed to creating the most important predominately middle class democracy in the world", while "doors have been closed to extreme governments" and "there has been more awareness that we all have to fight against terrorism."
The EU-LAC Business Summit is held biennially and brings together business and political leaders from both regions, with the aim of strengthening relations between businesses of Latin America and the European Union, in particular by promoting economic and social development.
Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe (r), and the president of the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organisations (CEOE), Gerardo Díaz Ferrán, on arrival at the closing of the EU-LAC Business Summit
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Colombia: 30 Years Later 'Controversial' US Peace Corps Return
After around three decades, the American Peace corps will return to Colombia between September and December to work on cooperation and social assistance projects, based on an accord signed in Washington between the director of the Peace corps, Aaron S. William, and Colombian Foreign minister Jaime Bermudez.
The minister specified that their return is not linked to any military matters, but is a “sign of interest, cooperation and friendship between the two countries”, which from the end of 2009 signed a deal that consents US soldiers to use seven Colombian army bases, drawing strong criticism also from some governments of the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations).
According to observers, the return of the Peace Corps, that instituted in 1961 during the administration of John F. Kennedy arrived in Colombia in the same year and left in 1981 amid security problems after abductions and being declared a military target by the guerrilla, will also be strongly criticised by neighbours such as Venezuela.
“The peace corps worked in Colombia in educational programmes, teaching English in remote communities and developing social programmes in the poor areas of the cities and rural areas. But they also taught the indigenous and ‘campesinos’ (peasants) the chemical process of extracting cocaine from the ancestral coca leaf, in a productive manner”, says an editorial ‘Al Día’ main Hispanic newspaper in the US.
“Their presence in the country coincided with the generalisation of marijuana plantations”, adds the editorial, which cites an article in the Colombian Semana magazine. “The knowledge and knowhow of some of them established the infrastructure for the production and trafficking of drugs that still continues today. The growing demand for cocaine in the US in the 70’s made Colombia and other South American countries the forbidden garden that satisfies the voracious North American anxieties. According to some, the Peace Corps were the intermediaries… some were accused in the past of belonging to intelligence agencies such as the CIA”, claims the editorial.
The US is Colombia’s main trade partner and main ally in the fight against drug-trafficking and illegal armed groups.
Source: Original reporting by MISNA
The minister specified that their return is not linked to any military matters, but is a “sign of interest, cooperation and friendship between the two countries”, which from the end of 2009 signed a deal that consents US soldiers to use seven Colombian army bases, drawing strong criticism also from some governments of the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations).
According to observers, the return of the Peace Corps, that instituted in 1961 during the administration of John F. Kennedy arrived in Colombia in the same year and left in 1981 amid security problems after abductions and being declared a military target by the guerrilla, will also be strongly criticised by neighbours such as Venezuela.
“The peace corps worked in Colombia in educational programmes, teaching English in remote communities and developing social programmes in the poor areas of the cities and rural areas. But they also taught the indigenous and ‘campesinos’ (peasants) the chemical process of extracting cocaine from the ancestral coca leaf, in a productive manner”, says an editorial ‘Al Día’ main Hispanic newspaper in the US.
“Their presence in the country coincided with the generalisation of marijuana plantations”, adds the editorial, which cites an article in the Colombian Semana magazine. “The knowledge and knowhow of some of them established the infrastructure for the production and trafficking of drugs that still continues today. The growing demand for cocaine in the US in the 70’s made Colombia and other South American countries the forbidden garden that satisfies the voracious North American anxieties. According to some, the Peace Corps were the intermediaries… some were accused in the past of belonging to intelligence agencies such as the CIA”, claims the editorial.
The US is Colombia’s main trade partner and main ally in the fight against drug-trafficking and illegal armed groups.
Source: Original reporting by MISNA
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Obama Announces Ambassadors To Yemen, Colombia and Cote d’Ivoire
U.S. President Barack Obama announced Friday his intent to nominate the following individuals to key administration posts:
President Obama said, “These dedicated and talented individuals will be valued additions to my Administration. I am grateful for their service and look forward to working with them in the months and years ahead.”
President Obama also announced his intent to appoint Patricia J. Niehaus as a Member of the National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations and John D. Arras as a Member of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. Their bios are below.
President Obama announced his intent to nominate the following individuals to key administration posts:
Phillip Carter, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Department of State
Phillip Carter is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He currently serves as a Senior Advisor to the African Affairs Bureau. He previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs and has also served as the Director for West African Affairs and the Deputy Director in the Office for East African Affairs. Overseas posts include Deputy Chief of Mission in Madagascar and Gabon; Economic and Commercial Officer in Bangladesh and Malawi; Deputy Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Winnipeg, Canada; and Vice Consul at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Ambassador Carter received an M.A in International and Development Economics from Yale University and earned a B.A. in Economics and History from Drew University.
Gerald Feierstein, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, Department of State
Gerald Feierstein is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He currently serves as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. He previously served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Coordinator of Programs in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. His overseas assignments include Tunis, Riyadh, Peshawar, Muscat, Jerusalem and Beirut. Earlier, he served as Desk Office for Nepal, Pakistan and Egypt; Deputy Director in the Office of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs; Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs; and as Director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the Near East Bureau. Feierstein holds a B.A. in Philosophy from Point Park College and an M.A. in International Relations from Duquesne University.
Peter Michael McKinley, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia, Department of State
P. Michael McKinley is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He currently serves as the U.S. Ambassador to Peru. He previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d' Affaires at the U.S. Mission to the European Union in Brussels. He has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Ambassador McKinley was Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d' Affaires at U.S. Embassies in Mozambique, Uganda, and Belgium. Earlier assignments include U.S. Embassy London, three tours in Washington and Bolivia. Ambassador McKinley completed his undergraduate and graduate studies in the United Kingdom, and has a doctorate from Oxford University.
President Obama also announced his intent to appoint the following individuals to key administration posts:
Patricia J. Niehaus, Appointee for Member, National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations
Patricia J. Niehaus is currently the National President of the Federal Managers Association (FMA). Professionally, Ms. Niehaus is the Labor Relations Officer for Travis Air Force Base in California with over 25 years of experience in the federal workforce. Ms. Niehaus currently advises several tenant organizations on Travis AFB on all aspects of labor and employee-management relations issues while also serving as an advisor and facilitator for several pay pool panels. She is also an active member of the management negotiating team for two negotiated agreements currently under consideration, one of which covers the first Air Force bargaining unit of NSPS employees. Ms. Niehaus attended Solano Community College as a part-time student and eventually obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Management in 1992 from St Mary’s College of California.
Dr. John D. Arras, Appointee for Member, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
Dr. John Arras is the Porterfield Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia, where he directs the Program in Bioethics and is affiliated with the Center for Biomedical Ethics and Humanities in the Medical School. Dr. Arras is a longtime Fellow and former Board member of the Hastings Center, the nation's preeminent research institute in bioethics. He also consults regularly at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, MD, and serves on the national ethics committee of the March of Dimes. He was a founding member of the ethics advisory board of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta (2004-08). Prior to his move to U.Va. in 1995, Dr. Arras was, for 14 years, Associate Professor of Bioethics at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine-Montefiore Medical Center, and adjunct Associate Professor of Philosophy at Barnard College/Columbia University. During those years he also served as a member of former Governor Mario Cuomo's New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. In 2006 he received the Outstanding Faculty Award from the Virginia State Council on Higher Education. Dr. Arras received his B.A. from the University of San Francisco and his Ph.D. from Northwestern University.
- Phillip Carter, Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Department of State
- Gerald Feierstein, Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, Department of State
- Peter Michael McKinley, Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia, Department of State
President Obama said, “These dedicated and talented individuals will be valued additions to my Administration. I am grateful for their service and look forward to working with them in the months and years ahead.”
President Obama also announced his intent to appoint Patricia J. Niehaus as a Member of the National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations and John D. Arras as a Member of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. Their bios are below.
President Obama announced his intent to nominate the following individuals to key administration posts:
Phillip Carter, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Department of State
Phillip Carter is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He currently serves as a Senior Advisor to the African Affairs Bureau. He previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs and has also served as the Director for West African Affairs and the Deputy Director in the Office for East African Affairs. Overseas posts include Deputy Chief of Mission in Madagascar and Gabon; Economic and Commercial Officer in Bangladesh and Malawi; Deputy Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Winnipeg, Canada; and Vice Consul at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Ambassador Carter received an M.A in International and Development Economics from Yale University and earned a B.A. in Economics and History from Drew University.
Gerald Feierstein, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, Department of State
Gerald Feierstein is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He currently serves as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. He previously served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Coordinator of Programs in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. His overseas assignments include Tunis, Riyadh, Peshawar, Muscat, Jerusalem and Beirut. Earlier, he served as Desk Office for Nepal, Pakistan and Egypt; Deputy Director in the Office of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs; Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs; and as Director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the Near East Bureau. Feierstein holds a B.A. in Philosophy from Point Park College and an M.A. in International Relations from Duquesne University.
Peter Michael McKinley, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia, Department of State
P. Michael McKinley is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He currently serves as the U.S. Ambassador to Peru. He previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d' Affaires at the U.S. Mission to the European Union in Brussels. He has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Ambassador McKinley was Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d' Affaires at U.S. Embassies in Mozambique, Uganda, and Belgium. Earlier assignments include U.S. Embassy London, three tours in Washington and Bolivia. Ambassador McKinley completed his undergraduate and graduate studies in the United Kingdom, and has a doctorate from Oxford University.
President Obama also announced his intent to appoint the following individuals to key administration posts:
Patricia J. Niehaus, Appointee for Member, National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations
Patricia J. Niehaus is currently the National President of the Federal Managers Association (FMA). Professionally, Ms. Niehaus is the Labor Relations Officer for Travis Air Force Base in California with over 25 years of experience in the federal workforce. Ms. Niehaus currently advises several tenant organizations on Travis AFB on all aspects of labor and employee-management relations issues while also serving as an advisor and facilitator for several pay pool panels. She is also an active member of the management negotiating team for two negotiated agreements currently under consideration, one of which covers the first Air Force bargaining unit of NSPS employees. Ms. Niehaus attended Solano Community College as a part-time student and eventually obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Management in 1992 from St Mary’s College of California.
Dr. John D. Arras, Appointee for Member, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
Dr. John Arras is the Porterfield Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia, where he directs the Program in Bioethics and is affiliated with the Center for Biomedical Ethics and Humanities in the Medical School. Dr. Arras is a longtime Fellow and former Board member of the Hastings Center, the nation's preeminent research institute in bioethics. He also consults regularly at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, MD, and serves on the national ethics committee of the March of Dimes. He was a founding member of the ethics advisory board of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta (2004-08). Prior to his move to U.Va. in 1995, Dr. Arras was, for 14 years, Associate Professor of Bioethics at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine-Montefiore Medical Center, and adjunct Associate Professor of Philosophy at Barnard College/Columbia University. During those years he also served as a member of former Governor Mario Cuomo's New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. In 2006 he received the Outstanding Faculty Award from the Virginia State Council on Higher Education. Dr. Arras received his B.A. from the University of San Francisco and his Ph.D. from Northwestern University.
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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EU-Latin America Summit In Madrid To Be 'Historic' - Moratinos
The Sixth EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit, which will get underway on 17 May in Madrid, will be “a historic summit that the Spanish Presidency wants to be a landmark in relations between the European Union and Latin America”, according to Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos.
"I can assure you there will be a large number of participants. I am sure the summit will be a success because we have already seen that the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean all want it to be successful and achieve positive results", the minister said at the opening of the Sixth EU-Latin America Organised Civil Society Forum, which is the first of the meetings to be held within the process of the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid.
Moratinos said the summit has been "well organised", as can be seen in the fact it "will be attended by practically all the heads of state and government" of the 60 EU-LAC countries. "You don't just put together a summit in two weeks or three months - it takes a very long time", he added.
He emphasised that this biregional summit, which is being held for the sixth time, will mark a turning point, after admitting that Europe had not shown much interest in Latin America in recent years.
"We have to be truthful: things aren't going well between Latin America and the EU. Relations between the two sides aren't living up to ambitions and expectations, nor fulfilling their true potential", he added.
In his opinion, he said, "the Europeans, apart from Portugal, Spain and up to a point Italy have ignored Latin America over recent years". To illustrate this, he pointed out that, on average, barely seven ministers from the EU-27 take part in the yearly meeting between the Foreign Affairs ministers of the two regions.
Moratinos said the EU "is starting to rouse itself and get interested" in working with Latin America to tackle common global challenges such as climate change and the overhaul of the financial markets, since together the two regions make up one-third of the UN - adding that this development came “not a moment too soon”.
"What we need to do at the meeting in Madrid is to consolidate this new interest and prove that it's not going to fade away again and disappear in a lack of action and relations", he added.
This summit "will not just be another one of many", said the minister, who added he was confident it would end with specific results such as the agreements with Central America, Colombia and Peru, and the renewal of talks with Mercosur.
Aside from the final political declaration, a working agenda has already been agreed, which will include mandates to continue with the two-year period between summits.
"I can assure you there will be a large number of participants. I am sure the summit will be a success because we have already seen that the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean all want it to be successful and achieve positive results", the minister said at the opening of the Sixth EU-Latin America Organised Civil Society Forum, which is the first of the meetings to be held within the process of the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid.
Moratinos said the summit has been "well organised", as can be seen in the fact it "will be attended by practically all the heads of state and government" of the 60 EU-LAC countries. "You don't just put together a summit in two weeks or three months - it takes a very long time", he added.
He emphasised that this biregional summit, which is being held for the sixth time, will mark a turning point, after admitting that Europe had not shown much interest in Latin America in recent years.
"We have to be truthful: things aren't going well between Latin America and the EU. Relations between the two sides aren't living up to ambitions and expectations, nor fulfilling their true potential", he added.
In his opinion, he said, "the Europeans, apart from Portugal, Spain and up to a point Italy have ignored Latin America over recent years". To illustrate this, he pointed out that, on average, barely seven ministers from the EU-27 take part in the yearly meeting between the Foreign Affairs ministers of the two regions.
Moratinos said the EU "is starting to rouse itself and get interested" in working with Latin America to tackle common global challenges such as climate change and the overhaul of the financial markets, since together the two regions make up one-third of the UN - adding that this development came “not a moment too soon”.
"What we need to do at the meeting in Madrid is to consolidate this new interest and prove that it's not going to fade away again and disappear in a lack of action and relations", he added.
This summit "will not just be another one of many", said the minister, who added he was confident it would end with specific results such as the agreements with Central America, Colombia and Peru, and the renewal of talks with Mercosur.
Aside from the final political declaration, a working agenda has already been agreed, which will include mandates to continue with the two-year period between summits.
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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Colombia: State Terror In The Name Of Peace
By James Petras
The first casualty of state terror is the corruption of language, the invention of euphemisms, where words mean their opposite and slogans cover great crimes: There is no longer a world consensus that condemns crimes against humanity.
Introduction
The first casualty of state terror is the corruption of language, the invention of euphemisms, where words mean their opposite and slogans cover great crimes: There is no longer a world consensus that condemns crimes against humanity. This is because mass murder and assassinations secure investor ‘confidence’, because Indians are dispossessed so the mines can be exploited; oil workers disappear so the petroleum will flow; and the international financial press praises the success of el Presidente for “pacifying the country”.
When narco-presidents are embraced by the leaders of North America and Europe, it is evident that criminals have become respectable the respectable have become criminals.
But other voices from other regions have put the past and present war criminals on trial. In Argentina, the Generals of the disappeared are spending their last years behind bars. Arrest warrants against Israeli military commanders have been issued in Spain, Dubai and elsewhere. Tony Blair, complicit in Bush’s genocidal war in Iraq runs from a citizens’ arrest in Malaysia for his war crimes. Colombia, the US and Israel, the epicenters of state terror, stand alone in the General Assembly of Nations, condemned but not yet on trial. Their days of impunity are ending. Unending wars, rampant corruption, massive financial swindles – the inner rot – are eroding the outward facades of military power.
Writers and intellectuals have a role to play in hastening this process by exposing the lies that sustain the killing machines. Let us proceed:
Lies of Our Times
Democratic Security Doctrine (neither democratic nor for personal safety):
The corruption of language accompanies every great political crime. The notion of “Democratic Security” is no exception. In the current Colombian context, murdering leaders of social movements to secure the re-election of a party of political assassins is democratic. “Security” is the euphemism for hidden cemeteries of unmarked graves of unnamed persons. “Freedom of the Media” exists when it solemnly announces another “major military triumph”… the killing of unarmed peasants cultivating their fields.
Economists are “experts” when they proclaim that the economy is growing … only the people are suffering. Politicians are “statesmen” when they declare they are “one with the people” – except for the 4 million forcibly dispossessed and the 300,000 family members of the dead and disappeared; the dead and dispossessed have yet to appreciate the One who affirms he is “with the People”.
When el Presidente states that war is peace, militarization is security, inequalities are social justice: only those who fail to understand these Official Truths need fear a midnight knock on the door.
The Official Definition of Terrorist
This is a person or persons who fail to understand that the road to peace is through billions spent on warplanes, helicopter gun ships, military bases and subcontracting military advisers and mercenaries.
Enemies of peace talks
According to el Presidente, those human rights groups who oppose killing adversaries and who propose dialogues instead of monologues are the enemies of peace; only monologues ensure that there is one “official truth” and no other.
The Price of Prosperity
According to el Presidente and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), poverty, unemployment and low wages are the price of democracy and prosperity … but only the workers and peasants pay the price and only the rich prosper.
A Novel Definition of Sovereignty
According to el Presidente, ceding territory to a foreign imperial power to build seven military bases operating with their own laws and jurisdiction is the new definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty equals foreign occupation.
The New Definition of Subversion
According to el Presidente, humanitarian accords and initiatives for peace are pretexts for subversion; their advocates know in advance they will be rejected by the State. Instead, dehumanizing the enemy and the advocates of peace facilitates the bombing of subversive villages, the ‘real’ enemies of peace.
On Praise and Condemnation
What does it tell you about a President when he is condemned by all the human rights groups and social movements and praised by all the financial newspapers and military institutions?
A President with World Records
There is no doubt that President Uribe will enter the Guinness Book of World Records.
El Presidente is backed by more narco-congress members than any other President or Prime Minister in the world (including Afghanistan).
El Presidente presides over the displacement of more people (4 million refugees) in the shortest time (8 years) than any President in the world. (It took Israel over half a century).
El Presidente has allowed more US military bases than all the Latin American presidents combined. El Presidente presided over the killing of more trade union activists and leaders than any other leader in the world (1,500). For every first in death and dispossession, President Uribe deserves a new award, an Ignoble Prize.
But he is not alone. Three US Presidents, Democrats and Republicans, Clinton, Bush and Obama provided billions of dollars in arms, and hundreds of advisers to promote 30,000 narco death squad killers and 300,000 soldiers who are instrumental in Uribe’s achievement of “world records”.
Let us remember, and punish, past and present crimes against humanity, but let us also move ahead in the quest for dialogue among those willing because they are the majority who believe in peace through Justice.
James Petras is the author of more than 62 books published in 29 languages, and over 600 articles in professional journals, including the American Sociological Review, British Journal of Sociology, Social Research, and Journal of Peasant Studies. He has published over 2000 articles in nonprofessional journals such as the New York Times, the Guardian, the Nation, Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, New Left Review, Partisan Review, TempsModerne, Le Monde Diplomatique, and his commentary is widely carried on the internet For more of his writing, check out the The James Petras Website.
The first casualty of state terror is the corruption of language, the invention of euphemisms, where words mean their opposite and slogans cover great crimes: There is no longer a world consensus that condemns crimes against humanity.
Introduction
The first casualty of state terror is the corruption of language, the invention of euphemisms, where words mean their opposite and slogans cover great crimes: There is no longer a world consensus that condemns crimes against humanity. This is because mass murder and assassinations secure investor ‘confidence’, because Indians are dispossessed so the mines can be exploited; oil workers disappear so the petroleum will flow; and the international financial press praises the success of el Presidente for “pacifying the country”.
When narco-presidents are embraced by the leaders of North America and Europe, it is evident that criminals have become respectable the respectable have become criminals.
But other voices from other regions have put the past and present war criminals on trial. In Argentina, the Generals of the disappeared are spending their last years behind bars. Arrest warrants against Israeli military commanders have been issued in Spain, Dubai and elsewhere. Tony Blair, complicit in Bush’s genocidal war in Iraq runs from a citizens’ arrest in Malaysia for his war crimes. Colombia, the US and Israel, the epicenters of state terror, stand alone in the General Assembly of Nations, condemned but not yet on trial. Their days of impunity are ending. Unending wars, rampant corruption, massive financial swindles – the inner rot – are eroding the outward facades of military power.
Writers and intellectuals have a role to play in hastening this process by exposing the lies that sustain the killing machines. Let us proceed:
Lies of Our Times
Democratic Security Doctrine (neither democratic nor for personal safety):
The corruption of language accompanies every great political crime. The notion of “Democratic Security” is no exception. In the current Colombian context, murdering leaders of social movements to secure the re-election of a party of political assassins is democratic. “Security” is the euphemism for hidden cemeteries of unmarked graves of unnamed persons. “Freedom of the Media” exists when it solemnly announces another “major military triumph”… the killing of unarmed peasants cultivating their fields.
Economists are “experts” when they proclaim that the economy is growing … only the people are suffering. Politicians are “statesmen” when they declare they are “one with the people” – except for the 4 million forcibly dispossessed and the 300,000 family members of the dead and disappeared; the dead and dispossessed have yet to appreciate the One who affirms he is “with the People”.
When el Presidente states that war is peace, militarization is security, inequalities are social justice: only those who fail to understand these Official Truths need fear a midnight knock on the door.
The Official Definition of Terrorist
This is a person or persons who fail to understand that the road to peace is through billions spent on warplanes, helicopter gun ships, military bases and subcontracting military advisers and mercenaries.
Enemies of peace talks
According to el Presidente, those human rights groups who oppose killing adversaries and who propose dialogues instead of monologues are the enemies of peace; only monologues ensure that there is one “official truth” and no other.
The Price of Prosperity
According to el Presidente and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), poverty, unemployment and low wages are the price of democracy and prosperity … but only the workers and peasants pay the price and only the rich prosper.
A Novel Definition of Sovereignty
According to el Presidente, ceding territory to a foreign imperial power to build seven military bases operating with their own laws and jurisdiction is the new definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty equals foreign occupation.
The New Definition of Subversion
According to el Presidente, humanitarian accords and initiatives for peace are pretexts for subversion; their advocates know in advance they will be rejected by the State. Instead, dehumanizing the enemy and the advocates of peace facilitates the bombing of subversive villages, the ‘real’ enemies of peace.
On Praise and Condemnation
What does it tell you about a President when he is condemned by all the human rights groups and social movements and praised by all the financial newspapers and military institutions?
A President with World Records
There is no doubt that President Uribe will enter the Guinness Book of World Records.
El Presidente is backed by more narco-congress members than any other President or Prime Minister in the world (including Afghanistan).
El Presidente presides over the displacement of more people (4 million refugees) in the shortest time (8 years) than any President in the world. (It took Israel over half a century).
El Presidente has allowed more US military bases than all the Latin American presidents combined. El Presidente presided over the killing of more trade union activists and leaders than any other leader in the world (1,500). For every first in death and dispossession, President Uribe deserves a new award, an Ignoble Prize.
But he is not alone. Three US Presidents, Democrats and Republicans, Clinton, Bush and Obama provided billions of dollars in arms, and hundreds of advisers to promote 30,000 narco death squad killers and 300,000 soldiers who are instrumental in Uribe’s achievement of “world records”.
Let us remember, and punish, past and present crimes against humanity, but let us also move ahead in the quest for dialogue among those willing because they are the majority who believe in peace through Justice.
James Petras is the author of more than 62 books published in 29 languages, and over 600 articles in professional journals, including the American Sociological Review, British Journal of Sociology, Social Research, and Journal of Peasant Studies. He has published over 2000 articles in nonprofessional journals such as the New York Times, the Guardian, the Nation, Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, New Left Review, Partisan Review, TempsModerne, Le Monde Diplomatique, and his commentary is widely carried on the internet For more of his writing, check out the The James Petras Website.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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Role Of Indigenous Women In Colombia Still Limited
By Jenny Manrique
(Latinamerica Press) -- Colombia´s indigenous women are increasingly becoming visible in local and national politics, but their role remains very limited.
Aída Quilcué Vivas, of the indigenous Nasa people from the southwestern Cauca department, received 66,800 signatures for her Social and Indigenous Movement party to run in the March 14 presidential elections, for which she was vying for one of three seats – two in the Senate and one in the Representative Chamber – allotted for indigenous candidates.
“I decided to participate in the elections because the common people support us, because they see that we take on a great responsibility for what we promise, even though we work with many difficulties and obstacles. We are the ones who became widows and childless in this war, so we have to strengthen our voices,” said Quilcué Vivas, referring to the more than 40-year armed conflict between leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and the military. Indigenous communities have been particularly harmed by the fighting, often caught in the crossfire.
As of April 27, voting officials still do not know which candidate will hold the indigenous member´s seat in the Representatives´ Chamber, as blank votes, at 94 percent of all votes counted, were greater than votes for specific candidates, and there have been multiple allegations of fraud, opening up the possibility of a new election with new candidates. Marco Aníbal Avirama of the Indigenous Social Alliance and Germán Bernardo Carlosama of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia Movement were elected to the Senate.
Quilcué says Congress is not the place to resolve the issues of indigenous communities´ – 84 peoples who speak 75 languages – because they still have scant representation. Some 3.5 percent of Colombia´s 40 million people are indigenous.
Of the 102 seats in the Senate and 166 in the Representatives´ Chamber, “we only have three, and it´s likely that hundreds of legislators are against our projects,” she said. The main issues include an end to the armed conflict, legalization of indigenous lands, environmental protection, an end to women´s discrimination and family planning for the communities.
Quilcué, a short, copper-skinned woman with long dark hair, wearing colorful clothes and cloth slippers, led the 2008 Indigenous and Popular Resistance Minga, a 60-day rights march for Colombia´s native peoples. More than 25,000 indigenous Colombians marched 500 kilometers from Santander de Quilichao in Cauca, to Bogota´s Bolívar Plaza, where they reached the presidential palace to demand security and land, and respect for their human and communal rights.
Quilcué is a strong rights defender, particularly against the stigma against indigenous communities in the armed conflict, who many times are portrayed as guerilla. For her, it´s a personal matter. Quilcué´s husband Edwin Legarda was killed by the army in December 2008. There are only scant details of the incident, which is still under investigation, while her 12-year-old daughter was attacked but survived in May 2009.
A natural leader, Quilcué was first elected in 2007 as councilor, one of the most important positions in the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council, the first time in the organization´s 37-year history that a woman was elected to the post. She was also a high-ranking member on the Pickwe Tha Fiw Reservation in Itaibe and president of the Huila Regional Indigenous Council.
Quilcué has set a powerful example. In the communities´ annual assemblies, women members understand that leadership is one of the foremost goals, along with supporting fellow women.
“Inside the ethnic groups are growing processes of different political participation that seek to end machismo itself even from inside the indigenous hierarchy,” she said proudly.
Landmark victories
Indigenous lawmaker Orsinia Polanco, of the northern Guajira department, is the leader of her Wayuu communities, a group of 23 clans on eight indigenous reserves. She says where she´s from machismo is very strong, even from the women´s side, who continue to dedicate their lives to domestic work, so it was unthinkable for her to achieve her seat in Congress.
But Wayuu men often accept women to represent them politically, socially and economically in specific roles.
“In times of war, it was the woman who went out to defend everything,” Polanco said. “It´s very different in other cultures that are more closed.”
Polanco was elected to Congress in 2006, and had the highest number of votes in the March 14 election, but the count has not been finalized by the National Electoral Council, and it is still unclear whether she will continue for another four-year term on July 20.
The woman has never forgotten her roots and continues to speak her native tongue, Wayuunaiki, in the capital.
“We have a double disadvantage compared with Western women. In addition to being women, we´re indigenous and we have a lot of illiteracy and ignorance in our communities,” she said. “We are isolated from education because we live in a rural area and we are aware that we´re living in a globalized world. We don´t reach the intellectual level of other women and that´s why our political participation is very poor.”
Polanco, who is a professor in the National University and holds a master of linguistics, has a platform that is not limited to Colombia´s indigenous population, but for those displaced by the armed conflict, and the most marginalized populations of the country, which does include native groups, many of whom she argues are on the path to “extinction” because of the threats they face from all sides.
She does, however, hope that the number of indigenous senators and representatives increases.
“On such an important stage for political control and debate, it´s not much what one person can do,” she said.
Local governance
Polanco was elected under the opposition Alternative Democratic Pole. The party has also supported another indigenous elected official, Ati Seygundiba Quinua, who since 2003 has served on the Bogota Municipal Council, where she was elected at 23 years of age five years ago, and was reelected in the 2007 local elections.
Even though Colombian law establishes an age minimum of 25 for this position, the Constitutional Court sided, in this case, with her Arhuaco community that a woman is of age after her first menstruation.
“This ruling defended the cultural values of the indigenous,” said the councilwoman, who authored a project for Bogota that monitors the implementation of an information system on gender economic and labor equality.
“The first debate [on the project] has been positive,” said Seygundiba Quinua, who studied political science.
All indigenous women interviewed recognize that while they aspire to holding positions in national politics, it´s at the local level where they can really see changes.
In the Amazonas department, which borders Brazil and Peru, home to 16 indigenous reservations of 35 ethnicities, a department-wide office allows for greater participation of native peoples in policy-making. Now, indigenous authorities can talk with the local rulers, such as governor, mayor, local representatives or town councilpeople, on their communities´ issues and potential solutions.
According to Juan Carlos Preciado, a lawyer and spokesman for the Gaia Amazonas Foundation, a local organization that seeks education programs that respect local culture, the indigenous peoples “have more interest in indigenous territorial governance than in national issues of the political parties.”
Amazonas has become an important constituency for candidates, and even though many community leaders decide to whom to give their vote, “the hopefuls today see the indigenous with more respect because ... the [indigenous] run [their] communities ... and are looking for interlocutors for their proposals.”
Clemencia Herrera, the third indigenous woman candidate in the Representatives´ Chamber, who ran under the Social Indigenous Alliance, is originally from a Huitoto community in Amazonas. She is working on a training plan for women, particularly young women, to learn about governance and land issues “so they participate in decision-making spheres.”
“In the indigenous world one grows up with this mentality that we women cannot assume responsibilities ... but this is the moment for us to start training ourselves to forge credibility,” said Herrera.
(Latinamerica Press) -- Colombia´s indigenous women are increasingly becoming visible in local and national politics, but their role remains very limited.
Aída Quilcué Vivas, of the indigenous Nasa people from the southwestern Cauca department, received 66,800 signatures for her Social and Indigenous Movement party to run in the March 14 presidential elections, for which she was vying for one of three seats – two in the Senate and one in the Representative Chamber – allotted for indigenous candidates.
“I decided to participate in the elections because the common people support us, because they see that we take on a great responsibility for what we promise, even though we work with many difficulties and obstacles. We are the ones who became widows and childless in this war, so we have to strengthen our voices,” said Quilcué Vivas, referring to the more than 40-year armed conflict between leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and the military. Indigenous communities have been particularly harmed by the fighting, often caught in the crossfire.
As of April 27, voting officials still do not know which candidate will hold the indigenous member´s seat in the Representatives´ Chamber, as blank votes, at 94 percent of all votes counted, were greater than votes for specific candidates, and there have been multiple allegations of fraud, opening up the possibility of a new election with new candidates. Marco Aníbal Avirama of the Indigenous Social Alliance and Germán Bernardo Carlosama of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia Movement were elected to the Senate.
Quilcué says Congress is not the place to resolve the issues of indigenous communities´ – 84 peoples who speak 75 languages – because they still have scant representation. Some 3.5 percent of Colombia´s 40 million people are indigenous.
Of the 102 seats in the Senate and 166 in the Representatives´ Chamber, “we only have three, and it´s likely that hundreds of legislators are against our projects,” she said. The main issues include an end to the armed conflict, legalization of indigenous lands, environmental protection, an end to women´s discrimination and family planning for the communities.
Quilcué, a short, copper-skinned woman with long dark hair, wearing colorful clothes and cloth slippers, led the 2008 Indigenous and Popular Resistance Minga, a 60-day rights march for Colombia´s native peoples. More than 25,000 indigenous Colombians marched 500 kilometers from Santander de Quilichao in Cauca, to Bogota´s Bolívar Plaza, where they reached the presidential palace to demand security and land, and respect for their human and communal rights.
Quilcué is a strong rights defender, particularly against the stigma against indigenous communities in the armed conflict, who many times are portrayed as guerilla. For her, it´s a personal matter. Quilcué´s husband Edwin Legarda was killed by the army in December 2008. There are only scant details of the incident, which is still under investigation, while her 12-year-old daughter was attacked but survived in May 2009.
A natural leader, Quilcué was first elected in 2007 as councilor, one of the most important positions in the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council, the first time in the organization´s 37-year history that a woman was elected to the post. She was also a high-ranking member on the Pickwe Tha Fiw Reservation in Itaibe and president of the Huila Regional Indigenous Council.
Quilcué has set a powerful example. In the communities´ annual assemblies, women members understand that leadership is one of the foremost goals, along with supporting fellow women.
“Inside the ethnic groups are growing processes of different political participation that seek to end machismo itself even from inside the indigenous hierarchy,” she said proudly.
Landmark victories
Indigenous lawmaker Orsinia Polanco, of the northern Guajira department, is the leader of her Wayuu communities, a group of 23 clans on eight indigenous reserves. She says where she´s from machismo is very strong, even from the women´s side, who continue to dedicate their lives to domestic work, so it was unthinkable for her to achieve her seat in Congress.
But Wayuu men often accept women to represent them politically, socially and economically in specific roles.
“In times of war, it was the woman who went out to defend everything,” Polanco said. “It´s very different in other cultures that are more closed.”
Polanco was elected to Congress in 2006, and had the highest number of votes in the March 14 election, but the count has not been finalized by the National Electoral Council, and it is still unclear whether she will continue for another four-year term on July 20.
The woman has never forgotten her roots and continues to speak her native tongue, Wayuunaiki, in the capital.
“We have a double disadvantage compared with Western women. In addition to being women, we´re indigenous and we have a lot of illiteracy and ignorance in our communities,” she said. “We are isolated from education because we live in a rural area and we are aware that we´re living in a globalized world. We don´t reach the intellectual level of other women and that´s why our political participation is very poor.”
Polanco, who is a professor in the National University and holds a master of linguistics, has a platform that is not limited to Colombia´s indigenous population, but for those displaced by the armed conflict, and the most marginalized populations of the country, which does include native groups, many of whom she argues are on the path to “extinction” because of the threats they face from all sides.
She does, however, hope that the number of indigenous senators and representatives increases.
“On such an important stage for political control and debate, it´s not much what one person can do,” she said.
Local governance
Polanco was elected under the opposition Alternative Democratic Pole. The party has also supported another indigenous elected official, Ati Seygundiba Quinua, who since 2003 has served on the Bogota Municipal Council, where she was elected at 23 years of age five years ago, and was reelected in the 2007 local elections.
Even though Colombian law establishes an age minimum of 25 for this position, the Constitutional Court sided, in this case, with her Arhuaco community that a woman is of age after her first menstruation.
“This ruling defended the cultural values of the indigenous,” said the councilwoman, who authored a project for Bogota that monitors the implementation of an information system on gender economic and labor equality.
“The first debate [on the project] has been positive,” said Seygundiba Quinua, who studied political science.
All indigenous women interviewed recognize that while they aspire to holding positions in national politics, it´s at the local level where they can really see changes.
In the Amazonas department, which borders Brazil and Peru, home to 16 indigenous reservations of 35 ethnicities, a department-wide office allows for greater participation of native peoples in policy-making. Now, indigenous authorities can talk with the local rulers, such as governor, mayor, local representatives or town councilpeople, on their communities´ issues and potential solutions.
According to Juan Carlos Preciado, a lawyer and spokesman for the Gaia Amazonas Foundation, a local organization that seeks education programs that respect local culture, the indigenous peoples “have more interest in indigenous territorial governance than in national issues of the political parties.”
Amazonas has become an important constituency for candidates, and even though many community leaders decide to whom to give their vote, “the hopefuls today see the indigenous with more respect because ... the [indigenous] run [their] communities ... and are looking for interlocutors for their proposals.”
Clemencia Herrera, the third indigenous woman candidate in the Representatives´ Chamber, who ran under the Social Indigenous Alliance, is originally from a Huitoto community in Amazonas. She is working on a training plan for women, particularly young women, to learn about governance and land issues “so they participate in decision-making spheres.”
“In the indigenous world one grows up with this mentality that we women cannot assume responsibilities ... but this is the moment for us to start training ourselves to forge credibility,” said Herrera.
Sunday, May 02, 2010 |
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Profile: U.S Policy With Latin American Countries In 'War On Terror'
As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla insurgency.
In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS.
Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years, attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United States.
The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the United States has about them. The United States has included Cuba on its list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.
The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State, including: an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, a Counterterrorism Financing (CTF) program, and a Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). All the programs are funded through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) foreign aid funding account.
The largest of these program is the ATA program that over the years has provided training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing.
Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $9.1 million in FY2008 and an estimated $9.3 million in FY2009. For FY2010, the Administration requested $16.4 million for Latin American countries, with $6 million for Mexico, $4.4 million for Colombia, and $6 million for assistance to other countries through a regional program. The FY2010 budget request states that ATA assistance for Central and South America enhances border control and provides fraudulent document training.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $7.1 million in EXBS assistance in FY2008 and an estimated $2.1 million in FY2009. The FY2010 request is for $2.9 million for assistance to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and a regional program.
CTF assistance provides support in detecting, isolating, and dismantling terrorist financial networks. No CTF assistance was provided for Latin America in FY2008, while in FY2009, an estimated $225,000 was provided. The FY2010 request is for $875,000, with assistance for Mexico, Colombia, and a regional program.
TIP assistance helps foreign immigration authorities with a computer database system that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land or sea ports of entry. No assistance was provided to the region in FY2008 or FY2009, but for FY2010 the Administration requested $1.3 million for a Western Hemisphere regional program.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States.
Ten Latin American ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama participate in the CSI program. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Megaports Initiative, a program which involves deploying radiation detection equipment in order to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. To date, the Megaports Initiative is operational in ports in the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units that facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. To date, TTUs have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Mexico.
The United States also works closely with the governments of the tri-border area - Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay - through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,” established in 2002 to serve as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries. Argentina hosted the fifth plenary session of the 3+1 mechanism in December 2006 that focused on such issues as early warning among states, information exchange in order to prevent illegal activity, and the denial of refuge to those who finance, plan, or commit acts of terrorism.
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States.
At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.”
In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated effort of the of the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE meeting, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which pledged to strengthen hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures.
At the February 2005 CICTE session held in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation against terrorism and addressed threats to aviation, seaport, and cyber security. CICTE’s seventh regular session in Panama in February/March 2007 focused on the protection of critical infrastructure in the region. In March 2008, CICTE’s eighth regular session held in Washington D.C. focused on cyber security, document security and fraud prevention, and port security. CICTE’s ninth regular session held in Washington, D.C. in March 2009 focused on the topic of strengthening border controls. CICTE’s 10th regular session is planned for March 17-19, 2010, in Washington, DC; a featured topic on the agenda is public private partnerships in the fight against terrorism.
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005, the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS.
Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years, attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United States.
The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the United States has about them. The United States has included Cuba on its list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.
The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State, including: an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, a Counterterrorism Financing (CTF) program, and a Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). All the programs are funded through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) foreign aid funding account.
The largest of these program is the ATA program that over the years has provided training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing.
Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $9.1 million in FY2008 and an estimated $9.3 million in FY2009. For FY2010, the Administration requested $16.4 million for Latin American countries, with $6 million for Mexico, $4.4 million for Colombia, and $6 million for assistance to other countries through a regional program. The FY2010 budget request states that ATA assistance for Central and South America enhances border control and provides fraudulent document training.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $7.1 million in EXBS assistance in FY2008 and an estimated $2.1 million in FY2009. The FY2010 request is for $2.9 million for assistance to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and a regional program.
CTF assistance provides support in detecting, isolating, and dismantling terrorist financial networks. No CTF assistance was provided for Latin America in FY2008, while in FY2009, an estimated $225,000 was provided. The FY2010 request is for $875,000, with assistance for Mexico, Colombia, and a regional program.
TIP assistance helps foreign immigration authorities with a computer database system that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land or sea ports of entry. No assistance was provided to the region in FY2008 or FY2009, but for FY2010 the Administration requested $1.3 million for a Western Hemisphere regional program.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States.
Ten Latin American ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama participate in the CSI program. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Megaports Initiative, a program which involves deploying radiation detection equipment in order to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. To date, the Megaports Initiative is operational in ports in the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units that facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. To date, TTUs have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Mexico.
The United States also works closely with the governments of the tri-border area - Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay - through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,” established in 2002 to serve as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries. Argentina hosted the fifth plenary session of the 3+1 mechanism in December 2006 that focused on such issues as early warning among states, information exchange in order to prevent illegal activity, and the denial of refuge to those who finance, plan, or commit acts of terrorism.
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States.
At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.”
In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated effort of the of the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE meeting, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which pledged to strengthen hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures.
At the February 2005 CICTE session held in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation against terrorism and addressed threats to aviation, seaport, and cyber security. CICTE’s seventh regular session in Panama in February/March 2007 focused on the protection of critical infrastructure in the region. In March 2008, CICTE’s eighth regular session held in Washington D.C. focused on cyber security, document security and fraud prevention, and port security. CICTE’s ninth regular session held in Washington, D.C. in March 2009 focused on the topic of strengthening border controls. CICTE’s 10th regular session is planned for March 17-19, 2010, in Washington, DC; a featured topic on the agenda is public private partnerships in the fight against terrorism.
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005, the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
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Terrorism In Latin America
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America has intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation.
In its April 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which triggers a number of economic sanctions.
Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. The State Department terrorism report noted, however, that President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America.
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Concerns about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America center on the country’s ties to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks in Argentina.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410 (Berman), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision calling for a report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 17, 2009, the House approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among other provisions, condemns the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and urges Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (Levin), which included reporting requirements on Venezuela and Cuba, but the provisions were not included in the final enacted measure.
Other introduced measures include H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba; H.R. 2272 (Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list; and H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2009 report maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by “corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, but noted that some other countries “lacked urgency and resolve to address counterterrorism deficiencies.” It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The ELN has a dwindling membership of about 2,000 fighters and reduced offensive capability, but has inflicted casualties through the increased use of land mines and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking.
Peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government remain stalled. With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC renegades continued to engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the terrorism report. According to the report, the Colombian government continued to process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes and return all illicit profits.
The FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s military campaign against it, including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation rescued 15 long-held hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors held since February 2003: Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; and other Colombians. In addition, according to the State Department’s terrorism report, Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders in 2008 and reduced the amount of territory where the FARC could freely operate. Desertions among FARC members also increased in 2008 to more than 3,000 compared to almost 2,500 in 2007.
Nevertheless, the FARC has continued tactical-level terrorist activities, kidnapping for profit (including the holding of 24 “high value” political hostages and hundreds of other kidnap victims), and narcotrafficking activities. The group launched several bombings against civilian and military targets in urban areas and targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and political opponents in dozens of attacks.
Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors, according to the State Department terrorism report. The FARC uses Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training in addition to coca processing and limited planting and production. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia remain tense in the aftermath of Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory, Ecuador’s military has increased the number of operations against the FARC in its northern border region.
Both the FARC and the ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. According to the terrorism report, the Venezuelan government did not systematically police the country’s 1,400-mile border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Moreover, limited amounts of weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, reportedly have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
In September 2008, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of he FARC. In Panama, the terrorism report maintained that the FARC was active in Panama’s Darien province and was reported to have entered several villages in order to steal supplies. Panama’s Public Forces were reported to closely monitor the FARC’s activities and have captured several FARC members. With regard to Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison.
According to the current State Department terrorism report, there are two SL remnants in Peru operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley, which combined were reported to have several hundred armed combatants. Both groups engage in drug trafficking and carried out 64 terrorist acts in 2008, with 31 people killed, including four civilians.
As noted above, the FARC was reported was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department terrorism report, experts contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
Cuba
Since 1982, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism (the other states currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The language in the State Department’s terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.”
While the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.
The terrorism report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also asserts that the Cuban government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006. Most of the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled until February 2010 in order to give him time to prepare his defense. Press reports maintain that Posada is also being investigated by a grand jury in New Jersey for his role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.1
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), introduced May 6, 2009, has a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list.
Venezuela
Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a result, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Eritrea , Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)
The State Department’s annual terrorism report maintained that while Venezuela President Hugo Chávez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the ELN had limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism, President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America. In July 2008, the Venezuelan military detained a senior FARC official and handed him over to Colombian authorities. Nevertheless, in September 2008, the Treasury Department designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for assisting the FARC’s drug trafficking activities.
As noted above, the State Department terrorism report stated that the FARC, ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The Venezuelan government also did not systematically police its country’s border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Some limited amounts of weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities were reported to have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
The State Department terrorism report also cited two other concerns about Venezuela. First, as noted in the past, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Second, the report noted that passengers on weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas.
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. One reason for the concern is Iran’s ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is reported to have been linked to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. In June 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing cooperation with Iran.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within 90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. The provision cited the State Department’s 2008 terrorism report that noted the passengers on the weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to only cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin), with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.
Several other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, includes a provision identical to that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October 27, 2009, would call on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of its alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
NOTES:
1 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007; Jay Weaver, “U.S.Probes Haunt 80-year Old Anti-Castro Cuban,” Houston Chronicle, March 2, 2008; Jay Weaver, “Posada Gets More Time for Perjury Defense,” Miami Herald, June 16, 2009.
In its April 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which triggers a number of economic sanctions.
Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. The State Department terrorism report noted, however, that President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America.
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Concerns about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America center on the country’s ties to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks in Argentina.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410 (Berman), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision calling for a report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 17, 2009, the House approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among other provisions, condemns the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and urges Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (Levin), which included reporting requirements on Venezuela and Cuba, but the provisions were not included in the final enacted measure.
Other introduced measures include H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba; H.R. 2272 (Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list; and H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2009 report maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by “corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, but noted that some other countries “lacked urgency and resolve to address counterterrorism deficiencies.” It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The ELN has a dwindling membership of about 2,000 fighters and reduced offensive capability, but has inflicted casualties through the increased use of land mines and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking.
Peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government remain stalled. With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC renegades continued to engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the terrorism report. According to the report, the Colombian government continued to process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes and return all illicit profits.
The FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s military campaign against it, including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation rescued 15 long-held hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors held since February 2003: Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; and other Colombians. In addition, according to the State Department’s terrorism report, Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders in 2008 and reduced the amount of territory where the FARC could freely operate. Desertions among FARC members also increased in 2008 to more than 3,000 compared to almost 2,500 in 2007.
Nevertheless, the FARC has continued tactical-level terrorist activities, kidnapping for profit (including the holding of 24 “high value” political hostages and hundreds of other kidnap victims), and narcotrafficking activities. The group launched several bombings against civilian and military targets in urban areas and targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and political opponents in dozens of attacks.
Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors, according to the State Department terrorism report. The FARC uses Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training in addition to coca processing and limited planting and production. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia remain tense in the aftermath of Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory, Ecuador’s military has increased the number of operations against the FARC in its northern border region.
Both the FARC and the ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. According to the terrorism report, the Venezuelan government did not systematically police the country’s 1,400-mile border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Moreover, limited amounts of weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, reportedly have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
In September 2008, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of he FARC. In Panama, the terrorism report maintained that the FARC was active in Panama’s Darien province and was reported to have entered several villages in order to steal supplies. Panama’s Public Forces were reported to closely monitor the FARC’s activities and have captured several FARC members. With regard to Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison.
According to the current State Department terrorism report, there are two SL remnants in Peru operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley, which combined were reported to have several hundred armed combatants. Both groups engage in drug trafficking and carried out 64 terrorist acts in 2008, with 31 people killed, including four civilians.
As noted above, the FARC was reported was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department terrorism report, experts contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
Cuba
Since 1982, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism (the other states currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The language in the State Department’s terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.”
While the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.
The terrorism report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also asserts that the Cuban government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006. Most of the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled until February 2010 in order to give him time to prepare his defense. Press reports maintain that Posada is also being investigated by a grand jury in New Jersey for his role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.1
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), introduced May 6, 2009, has a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list.
Venezuela
Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a result, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Eritrea , Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)
The State Department’s annual terrorism report maintained that while Venezuela President Hugo Chávez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the ELN had limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism, President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America. In July 2008, the Venezuelan military detained a senior FARC official and handed him over to Colombian authorities. Nevertheless, in September 2008, the Treasury Department designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for assisting the FARC’s drug trafficking activities.
As noted above, the State Department terrorism report stated that the FARC, ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The Venezuelan government also did not systematically police its country’s border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Some limited amounts of weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities were reported to have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.
The State Department terrorism report also cited two other concerns about Venezuela. First, as noted in the past, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Second, the report noted that passengers on weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas.
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. One reason for the concern is Iran’s ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is reported to have been linked to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. In June 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing cooperation with Iran.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within 90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. The provision cited the State Department’s 2008 terrorism report that noted the passengers on the weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to only cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin), with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.
Several other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, includes a provision identical to that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October 27, 2009, would call on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of its alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.
This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
NOTES:
1 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007; Jay Weaver, “U.S.Probes Haunt 80-year Old Anti-Castro Cuban,” Houston Chronicle, March 2, 2008; Jay Weaver, “Posada Gets More Time for Perjury Defense,” Miami Herald, June 16, 2009.
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Increasing Visibility Of Conflict Victims In Colombia
By Christophe Beney, Head of Delegation in Colombia - International Committee of the Red Cross
Thousands of Colombians are suffering as a consequence of the armed conflict – often in silence. By recognizing them as victims, the ICRC is able to improve the assistance and protection activities it carries out on their behalf. Recognition likewise makes it easier for them to access the services offered by the Colombian government. Foreword to the 2009 Annual Report on Colombia by Christophe Beney, head of delegation in Bogotá.
Foreword
In recent years, fighting has become less intense around densely populated areas of the country and in some regions living conditions have improved. For certain rural communities, however, it is a different story. Thousands still encounter the harsh consequences of the armed conflict in their day-to-day lives – yet they remain anonymous. Many live in the villages of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima and the Catatumbo region.
Though invisible, the victims of the conflict are many:
Rural inhabitants unable to move freely in and out of their villages because of the fighting;
Families mourning the death of a relative or enduring years of agony due to the disappearance of a loved one;
Victims of weapon contamination, whether they have suffered death, mutilation or psychological trauma;
Members of medical teams threatened, attacked or prosecuted, simply for doing their job;
Men, women and children suffering abuse – often sexual – in silence;
Civilians fleeing their homes to escape fighting or threats, leaving almost everything behind;
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities who, among the thousands of civilians exposed to the armed clashes, find themselves especially affected;
Hostages and members of the police and armed forces deprived of their freedom, and their relatives back home, clinging to the hope that one day they will be reunited with their loved ones;
People detained in connection with the armed conflict, in overcrowded prisons.
The humanitarian principles that guide the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement give each of us the individual responsibility to raise awareness of all conflict victims in Colombia. By acknowledging their plight, we are able to improve our prevention, protection and assistance activities for those not, or no longer, participating in the hostilities. Equally, the victims will be able to access the services offered by the Colombian government in accordance with national legislation.
The humanitarian operation run by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Colombia is one of its largest in the world. During 2009, the ICRC continued to work alongside the Colombian Red Cross on a range of programmes and projects designed to meet the most pressing needs of the victims in an impartial and independent manner. The organization focuses on around 20 areas of the country where access is particularly difficult and needs are greatest.
To be able to reach the victims, the ICRC holds regular dialogue with all armed groups, regardless of the label given to them. In order to ensure this exchange is constructive, with the sole aim of enhancing the protection of the victims of the conflict and the provision of aid, the ICRC must not only act in a neutral and independent manner, but must also be seen to be doing so. The same rule applies to its main partner, the Colombian Red Cross, with which the organization carries out part of its humanitarian work.
The ICRC always makes its own decisions and takes direct action using its own staff and financial resources, entirely independently of the State. It does, however, coordinate with government bodies, such as Acción Social, when bringing aid to the internally displaced, in order to ensure tasks are not duplicated.
The government has a responsibility and an obligation to assist and protect its citizens. However, during armed conflict there is a risk of "humanitarian" activities being instrumentalized and used for political or military ends. Such a move would distort the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality, would potentially put civilians in danger, and would undermine the work of humanitarian actors, such as the ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross. For all these reasons, the specific mandate entrusted to the ICRC, and its founding principles, must be preserved.
The ICRC believes that humanitarian action must remain strictly humanitarian. Only in this way is the organization able to be neutral, independent and impartial, and be perceived and recognized as such by all parties to the armed conflict. Neutrality is not easy: no-one is neutral by nature or by simple self-declaration. It is a quality that the parties themselves must recognize in the ICRC, through the way the organization acts and communicates. In Colombia, as in any other context where armed conflict has an impact on the civilian population, the ICRC will continue to bring aid to those in need, in its capacity as a neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian organization.
Thousands of Colombians are suffering as a consequence of the armed conflict – often in silence. By recognizing them as victims, the ICRC is able to improve the assistance and protection activities it carries out on their behalf. Recognition likewise makes it easier for them to access the services offered by the Colombian government. Foreword to the 2009 Annual Report on Colombia by Christophe Beney, head of delegation in Bogotá.
Foreword
In recent years, fighting has become less intense around densely populated areas of the country and in some regions living conditions have improved. For certain rural communities, however, it is a different story. Thousands still encounter the harsh consequences of the armed conflict in their day-to-day lives – yet they remain anonymous. Many live in the villages of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima and the Catatumbo region.
Though invisible, the victims of the conflict are many:
Rural inhabitants unable to move freely in and out of their villages because of the fighting;
Families mourning the death of a relative or enduring years of agony due to the disappearance of a loved one;
Victims of weapon contamination, whether they have suffered death, mutilation or psychological trauma;
Members of medical teams threatened, attacked or prosecuted, simply for doing their job;
Men, women and children suffering abuse – often sexual – in silence;
Civilians fleeing their homes to escape fighting or threats, leaving almost everything behind;
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities who, among the thousands of civilians exposed to the armed clashes, find themselves especially affected;
Hostages and members of the police and armed forces deprived of their freedom, and their relatives back home, clinging to the hope that one day they will be reunited with their loved ones;
People detained in connection with the armed conflict, in overcrowded prisons.
The humanitarian principles that guide the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement give each of us the individual responsibility to raise awareness of all conflict victims in Colombia. By acknowledging their plight, we are able to improve our prevention, protection and assistance activities for those not, or no longer, participating in the hostilities. Equally, the victims will be able to access the services offered by the Colombian government in accordance with national legislation.
The humanitarian operation run by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Colombia is one of its largest in the world. During 2009, the ICRC continued to work alongside the Colombian Red Cross on a range of programmes and projects designed to meet the most pressing needs of the victims in an impartial and independent manner. The organization focuses on around 20 areas of the country where access is particularly difficult and needs are greatest.
To be able to reach the victims, the ICRC holds regular dialogue with all armed groups, regardless of the label given to them. In order to ensure this exchange is constructive, with the sole aim of enhancing the protection of the victims of the conflict and the provision of aid, the ICRC must not only act in a neutral and independent manner, but must also be seen to be doing so. The same rule applies to its main partner, the Colombian Red Cross, with which the organization carries out part of its humanitarian work.
The ICRC always makes its own decisions and takes direct action using its own staff and financial resources, entirely independently of the State. It does, however, coordinate with government bodies, such as Acción Social, when bringing aid to the internally displaced, in order to ensure tasks are not duplicated.
The government has a responsibility and an obligation to assist and protect its citizens. However, during armed conflict there is a risk of "humanitarian" activities being instrumentalized and used for political or military ends. Such a move would distort the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality, would potentially put civilians in danger, and would undermine the work of humanitarian actors, such as the ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross. For all these reasons, the specific mandate entrusted to the ICRC, and its founding principles, must be preserved.
The ICRC believes that humanitarian action must remain strictly humanitarian. Only in this way is the organization able to be neutral, independent and impartial, and be perceived and recognized as such by all parties to the armed conflict. Neutrality is not easy: no-one is neutral by nature or by simple self-declaration. It is a quality that the parties themselves must recognize in the ICRC, through the way the organization acts and communicates. In Colombia, as in any other context where armed conflict has an impact on the civilian population, the ICRC will continue to bring aid to those in need, in its capacity as a neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian organization.
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Exchange Rates Are Important Determinant Of Latin America's Economic Performance
The Center for Economic and Policy Research released a new paper Thursday, coinciding with the IMF/Word Bank Spring Meetings, analyzing the history of exchange rate policy as the region has become more financially globalized.
"This paper indicates that developing countries need to manage their real exchange rate, preferably to keep it stable and competitive," said Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director of CEPR. "The IMF should consider this analysis as it continues the rethinking of macroeconomic policy that it has recently begun."
A recent IMF Staff Position Note co-authored by IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard argues that "Central banks in small open economies should openly recognize that exchange rate stability is part of their objective function."
The CEPR paper, "A Concise History of Exchange Rate Regimes In Latin America," was written by CEPR Senior Research Associate Roberto Frenkel, and Martin Rapetti of the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), an Argentine think tank.
The authors analyze the experience of the major Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru and others in the post-World-War period, up to the crisis caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble.
They find that an overvalued real exchange rate can lead to disastrous outcomes for short and intermediate term growth, as happened in the Southern Cone countries in the 1970s as well as Argentina in the late 1990s.
On the other hand, some of the most successful growth experiences in Latin America have occurred under governments that targeted a stable and competitive exchange rate: the Brazilian "economic miracle" beginning in the late 1960s, Chile in the mid-1980s and mid-90s, Argentina and Colombia between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and Argentina from 2002-2008.
The authors provide a detailed historical analysis that takes into account the most important economic events that helped determine exchange rate policy, and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the various exchange rate regimes, and their impact on outcomes including economic growth and inflation.
"This paper indicates that developing countries need to manage their real exchange rate, preferably to keep it stable and competitive," said Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director of CEPR. "The IMF should consider this analysis as it continues the rethinking of macroeconomic policy that it has recently begun."
A recent IMF Staff Position Note co-authored by IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard argues that "Central banks in small open economies should openly recognize that exchange rate stability is part of their objective function."
The CEPR paper, "A Concise History of Exchange Rate Regimes In Latin America," was written by CEPR Senior Research Associate Roberto Frenkel, and Martin Rapetti of the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), an Argentine think tank.
The authors analyze the experience of the major Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru and others in the post-World-War period, up to the crisis caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble.
They find that an overvalued real exchange rate can lead to disastrous outcomes for short and intermediate term growth, as happened in the Southern Cone countries in the 1970s as well as Argentina in the late 1990s.
On the other hand, some of the most successful growth experiences in Latin America have occurred under governments that targeted a stable and competitive exchange rate: the Brazilian "economic miracle" beginning in the late 1960s, Chile in the mid-1980s and mid-90s, Argentina and Colombia between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and Argentina from 2002-2008.
The authors provide a detailed historical analysis that takes into account the most important economic events that helped determine exchange rate policy, and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the various exchange rate regimes, and their impact on outcomes including economic growth and inflation.
Thursday, April 22, 2010 |
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Colombia Paramilitaries Detain Indigenous Community
The Rastrojos paramilitary group detained 300 indigenous Emberá Colombians in a coastal village in the Choco department on election day to impede the community members from voting in legislative elections.
Víctor Raúl Mosquera, the public defender for the department, told Caracol Radio that 14 people were first detained ahead of the March 14 elections, but that the illegal armed group later took over the entire community. The members were held for at least four days.
The Rastrojos are part of the ultra-right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, which in 2003 agreed to a cease fire.
Sixteen minors were among those detained.
“This seems very serious to us because we don´t know what there intention is,” said Luis Evelis Andrade, president of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia, or ONIC, referring to the armed group. “It´s already a violation of the community´s right to move freely on their lands.”
Earlier this year, the United Nations criticized the Colombian government for failing to protect its most marginalized populations – Afro-Colombians and the indigenous – from the crossfire of the more than 40-year armed conflict between leftist rebels and ultra-right-wing paramilitaries.
Source: Latinamerica Press.
Víctor Raúl Mosquera, the public defender for the department, told Caracol Radio that 14 people were first detained ahead of the March 14 elections, but that the illegal armed group later took over the entire community. The members were held for at least four days.
The Rastrojos are part of the ultra-right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, which in 2003 agreed to a cease fire.
Sixteen minors were among those detained.
“This seems very serious to us because we don´t know what there intention is,” said Luis Evelis Andrade, president of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia, or ONIC, referring to the armed group. “It´s already a violation of the community´s right to move freely on their lands.”
Earlier this year, the United Nations criticized the Colombian government for failing to protect its most marginalized populations – Afro-Colombians and the indigenous – from the crossfire of the more than 40-year armed conflict between leftist rebels and ultra-right-wing paramilitaries.
Source: Latinamerica Press.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010 |
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Colombia Energy Profile - Important Oil And Coal Exporter
Colombia has seen an increase in oil production in recent years following a period of steady decline. The Colombian government has enacted a series of regulatory reforms to make the sector more attractive to foreign investors.
In addition, it has implemented a partial privatization of state oil company Ecopetrol in an attempt to revive its upstream oil industry.
The security situation in the country has also improved, with few attacks against oil and natural gas infrastructure in recent years.
In 2007, Colombia consumed 1.3 quadrillion Btus of total energy. Oil constituted the largest part of this amount, followed by hydroelectricity. Colombia is a large producer of coal, but, because Colombia relies upon hydropower for the bulk of its electricity needs, it is able to export almost all of its coal production.
Oil
According to Oil and Gas Journal (O&GJ), Colombia had 1.36 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves in 2010, the fifth-largest in South America. The country produced an estimated 680,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil in 2009, up from 600,000 bbl/d in 2008. With oil consumption reaching an estimated 282,000 bbl/d in 2008, Colombia exports about half of its oil production, with much of this going to the United States.
Sector Organization
Since 1999, Colombia's government has taken measures to make the investment climate more attractive to foreign oil companies. Upstream sector initiatives include allowing foreign oil companies to own 100 percent stakes in oil ventures; the establishment of a lower, sliding-scale royalty rate on oil projects; longer exploration licenses; and forcing Ecopetrol, the national oil company, to compete with private operators. The government has sold some shares of Ecopetrol to private investors.
The reforms have sparked a renewed interest in Colombia's upstream sector, with record levels of exploratory and development drilling. According to Colombian government, the oil sector received $2.95 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2009, and FDI was expected to increase to $3.5 billion in 2010.
In early 2010, Colombia conducted its latest oil sector bidding round, including 255 exploratory blocks covering 130,000 acres. The round includes acerage in frontier areas as well as more-established parts of the country. In addition, the round includes offshore blocks in both the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
Exploration and Production
Ecopetrol is the largest oil producer in the country, representing about one-third of total national production. The bulk of Colombia's crude oil production occurs in the Andes foothills and the eastern Amazonian jungles. Meta department, in central Colombia, is also becoming an important production area, predominately of heavy crude oil. The largest field in the country is the Rubiales field, located in Meta department. Low levels of production began at Rubiales in the late 1980s, but increasing investment and the completion of a new pipeline have allowed production rates to rise in recent years. Production at Rubiales exceeded 100,000 bbl/d in December 2009, up from only 12,000 bbl/d in June 2007. According to the Colombian government, the field could contain 500 million barrels of total reserves. The crude oil produced at the Rubiales field is very heavy (below 15° API), so a diluent (such as naphtha) must be added to it in order for the crude oil to flow through pipelines.
Other large oil fields include Cano Limon, Castilla, and Cupiagua. In the past, the Cusiana/Cupaigua complex and Cano Limon represented the bulk of Colombia’s oil production, but steep declines have reduced production at each to less than 50,000 bbl/d. Colombia’s current oil production is somewhat more diffuse, with a large number of relatively small oil fields. According to industry analysts, the country is relatively under-appraised, with large parts of the country unexplored and with many of the geological features of its oil-rich neighbor Venezuela.
Prior to 2008, Colombia’s oil production had remained largely flat for many years. This followed a period of steady decline that started in 1999, when Colombia’s oil production peaked at 830,000 bbl/d. The principle cause of the fall in oil production was natural declines at existing oil fields and a lack of sizable new reserve discoveries. However, a combination of changes to the regulatory framework and an improved security situation have contributed to increasing investment in the country.
The improvement in Colombia's security situation has also been a significant contributor to the renewed interest by international oil companies. Pipelines and other energy infrastructure are still the targets of attacks by guerrillas, but the number and severity of these attacks is much lower than the past. According to the Colombian government, there were about 11 attacks against pipelines in 2008, versus hundreds of such incidents that occurred per year in the early 2000s.
As a result of these improvements, Colombia has halted the decline in its oil production and begun to experience some growth. EIA forecasts that Colombia should continue to see an increase in oil production in the next two years: according to the March 2010 edition of the Short Term Energy Outlook, EIA expects Colombian oil production to rise to 760,000 bbl/d in 2010 and 810,000 bbl/d in 2011, versus 680,000 bbl/d in 2009.
Oil Exports
The United States is the largest destination of Colombia’s oil exports. In 2009, Colombia exported 278,000 bbl/d of crude oil and refined products to the United States. The weighted-average API gravity of Colombia’s crude oil exports to the United States was 24° in 2009, and most exports flowed into PADD 3 (Gulf Coast, 79 percent), followed by PADD 5 (West Coast, 17 percent) and PADD 1 (East Coast, 4 percent).
Pipelines
Colombia has six major oil pipelines, four of which connect production fields to the Caribbean export terminal at Covenas. These include the 500-mile Ocensa pipeline, which has the capacity to transport 615,000 bbl/d from the Cusiana/Cupiagua area; the 460-mile Cano Limon pipeline; and the smaller Alto Magdalena and Colombia Oil pipelines. The Llanos Orientales came online in late 2009, which links the Rubiales field to the Ocensa pipeline. The system will eventually have a capacity of 260,000-bbl/d. The sixth pipeline, the TransAndino, transports crude from Colombia's Orito field in the Putumayo basin to Colombia's Pacific port at Tumaco; TransAndino can also carry crude oil produced in Ecuador.
Downstream
According to OGJ, Colombia had 285,850 bbl/d of crude oil refining capacity in 2009. The country has five major refineries, all owned by Ecopetrol. The largest is the Barrancabermeja-Santander facility, with a capacity of 205,000 bbl/d, with the Cartagena refinery (75,000 bbl/d) representing most of the rest of the country’s capacity. In May 2009, Ecopetrol assumed complete ownership of the Cartagena plant after purchasing the stake formerly held by Glencore.
Although Colombia is a net oil exporter, it must import some refined products, as domestic demand outstrips production capacity. As a result, Ecopetrol has begun efforts to expand refining capacity in the country. The company approved a $3.8-billion expansion of the Cartagena refinery in late 2009, which would increase capacity to 165,000 bbl/d and improve the quality of produced refined products. Ecopetrol is also embarking on an expansion plan at the Barrancabermeja plant, which would increase its capacity to 300,000 bbl/d and improve the refinery’s ability to process heavier crude oils.
Natural Gas
According to OGJ, Colombia had proven natural gas reserves of 3.96 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2010. The country produced 318 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of dry natural gas in 2008, while consuming 265 Bcf. A large portion of the country’s gross natural gas production (43 percent in 2008) is re-injected to aid in enhanced oil recovery. Colombia has natural gas reserves spread across 18 basins, seven of which have active production. The bulk of Colombia's natural gas reserves are located in the Llanos basin, although the Guajira basin accounts for the majority of current production. Similar to the oil sector, natural gas production has risen substantially in the last few years, owning to greater investment at existing fields, rising domestic consumption, and new export opportunities.
Exploration and Production
According to Colombia’s Ministry of Energy and Mines, BP and Chevron are the two largest natural gas producers in the country. Chevron operates the offshore Chuchupa field in Guajira department, the largest non-associated natural gas field in the country. In December 2009, the field produced 680 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) of dry natural gas. The company also operates the nearby onshore Ballena and Riohacha fields. BP operates the Cupiagua and Cusiana natural gas fields in Casenare department, which are the two largest natural gas fields in the country. However, almost all natural gas from these fields is utilized for re-injection, leaving dry natural gas production of a combined 200 MMcf/d in December 2009. State-owned Ecopetrol is also an important natural gas producer.
Pipelines
There are some 2,000 miles of natural gas trunk pipelines in Colombia. The three main lines include the Ballena-Barrancabermeja, linking Chevron's Ballena field on the northeast coast to Barrancabermeja in central Colombia; the Barrancabermeja-Nevia-Bogota line, which integrates the Colombian capital into the transmission network, and the Mariquita-Cali line through the western, Andean foothills. There are other small stretches of pipeline operated by private firms.
Export Pipelines
In early 2008, the Antonio Ricaurte pipeline came online, linking northeastern Colombia with Venezuela. Initially, the pipeline will allow Colombia to export natural gas from the Punta Ballenas area to western Venezuela. Current plans call for the flow of the pipeline to then be reversed in 2012, with Venezuela exporting 140 MMcf/d of natural gas to Colombia. While initial contracted volumes for export from Colombia ranged from 80-150 MMcf/d, actual exports to Venezuela have often exceeded these levels. According to media reports, natural gas exports to Venezuela peaked near 300 MMcf/d in late 2009, partly due to rising demand in Venezuela for natural gas for power generation and re-injection. Media reports indicated that export flows had fallen to near contracted volumes by the end of 2009.
Coal
metallurgical coal. The country has the second-largest coal reserves in South America, slightly behind Brazil, with most of those reserves concentrated in the Guajira peninsula in the north and the Andean foothills. Colombia's coal is relatively clean-burning, with a sulfur content of less than 1 percent. Over the past decade, production has more than doubled, reaching 86.7 MMst in 2008. It is likely that Colombia’s coal production will continue to increase in coming years, as exploration and profitable developments continue throughout the north and interior of the country. Colombia’s coal consumption was only 5.2 MMst in 2008, leaving most of the country’s production available for export; in 2008, Colombia was the fourth-largest net coal exporter in the world.
Sector Organization
Colombia completed the privatization of its coal sector in 2004 with the closing of Minercol, the former state-owned coal company. The largest coal producer in Colombia is the Carbones del Cerrejon consortium, composed of Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, and Glencore. The consortium operates the Cerrejon Zona Norte (CZN) project, the largest coal mine in Latin America and the largest open-cast coal mine in the world. CZN, which consists of an integrated mine, railroad, and coastal export terminal, exported over 30 MMst in 2009.
Drummond operates the second-largest coal mine in Colombia, La Loma, also an integrated mine-railway-port project, producing about 20 MMst per year. In 2009, Drummond ships its first coal exports from the El Descanso project, which could reach production of 20 MMst by 2010. Glencore operates the Jagua and Prodeco coal mines, with total production capacity of about 8 MMst per year.
Exports
Currently, most Colombia coal exports go to Europe, North America, and Latin America, as the vast majority of Colombia's coal producing and exporting infrastructure is located on the Caribbean coast. Coal is an important part of the Colombian economy: in 2009, coal represented about one-quarter of total export earnings, and mining taxes and royalties paid to the Colombian government exceeded $1 billion. During the first nine months of 2009, the United States imported 13.6 MMst of coal from Colombia, about 80 percent of total U.S. coal imports.
According to media reports, Colombia began exporting sizable quantities of coal to Asian markets, especially China, in 2009. A combination of higher prices in Asia, lower freight costs, and falling exports to the United States created the conditions for such an opportunity. It is possible that the expansion of the Panama Canal (currently slated for completion by 2015) could facilitate greater exports of Colombian coal to Asia in the future.
Coal Bed Methane
Coal bed methane (CBM) is a gaseous hydrocarbon that occurs along with coal reserves. It is similar to natural gas and can be transported and used in similar ways. Drummond has stated that its Colombian mines could contain up to 2.2 Tcf of CBM, and the company has signed contracts with Ecopetrol to extract CBM from both the La Loma and El Descanso mines. CBM has the potential to dramatically increase Colombia’s proven natural gas reserves, facilitate greater domestic production, and potentially allow additional exports to neighboring countries.
Source: EIA
In addition, it has implemented a partial privatization of state oil company Ecopetrol in an attempt to revive its upstream oil industry.
The security situation in the country has also improved, with few attacks against oil and natural gas infrastructure in recent years.
In 2007, Colombia consumed 1.3 quadrillion Btus of total energy. Oil constituted the largest part of this amount, followed by hydroelectricity. Colombia is a large producer of coal, but, because Colombia relies upon hydropower for the bulk of its electricity needs, it is able to export almost all of its coal production.
Oil
According to Oil and Gas Journal (O&GJ), Colombia had 1.36 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves in 2010, the fifth-largest in South America. The country produced an estimated 680,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil in 2009, up from 600,000 bbl/d in 2008. With oil consumption reaching an estimated 282,000 bbl/d in 2008, Colombia exports about half of its oil production, with much of this going to the United States.
Sector Organization
Since 1999, Colombia's government has taken measures to make the investment climate more attractive to foreign oil companies. Upstream sector initiatives include allowing foreign oil companies to own 100 percent stakes in oil ventures; the establishment of a lower, sliding-scale royalty rate on oil projects; longer exploration licenses; and forcing Ecopetrol, the national oil company, to compete with private operators. The government has sold some shares of Ecopetrol to private investors.
The reforms have sparked a renewed interest in Colombia's upstream sector, with record levels of exploratory and development drilling. According to Colombian government, the oil sector received $2.95 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2009, and FDI was expected to increase to $3.5 billion in 2010.
In early 2010, Colombia conducted its latest oil sector bidding round, including 255 exploratory blocks covering 130,000 acres. The round includes acerage in frontier areas as well as more-established parts of the country. In addition, the round includes offshore blocks in both the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
Exploration and Production
Ecopetrol is the largest oil producer in the country, representing about one-third of total national production. The bulk of Colombia's crude oil production occurs in the Andes foothills and the eastern Amazonian jungles. Meta department, in central Colombia, is also becoming an important production area, predominately of heavy crude oil. The largest field in the country is the Rubiales field, located in Meta department. Low levels of production began at Rubiales in the late 1980s, but increasing investment and the completion of a new pipeline have allowed production rates to rise in recent years. Production at Rubiales exceeded 100,000 bbl/d in December 2009, up from only 12,000 bbl/d in June 2007. According to the Colombian government, the field could contain 500 million barrels of total reserves. The crude oil produced at the Rubiales field is very heavy (below 15° API), so a diluent (such as naphtha) must be added to it in order for the crude oil to flow through pipelines.
Other large oil fields include Cano Limon, Castilla, and Cupiagua. In the past, the Cusiana/Cupaigua complex and Cano Limon represented the bulk of Colombia’s oil production, but steep declines have reduced production at each to less than 50,000 bbl/d. Colombia’s current oil production is somewhat more diffuse, with a large number of relatively small oil fields. According to industry analysts, the country is relatively under-appraised, with large parts of the country unexplored and with many of the geological features of its oil-rich neighbor Venezuela.
Prior to 2008, Colombia’s oil production had remained largely flat for many years. This followed a period of steady decline that started in 1999, when Colombia’s oil production peaked at 830,000 bbl/d. The principle cause of the fall in oil production was natural declines at existing oil fields and a lack of sizable new reserve discoveries. However, a combination of changes to the regulatory framework and an improved security situation have contributed to increasing investment in the country.
The improvement in Colombia's security situation has also been a significant contributor to the renewed interest by international oil companies. Pipelines and other energy infrastructure are still the targets of attacks by guerrillas, but the number and severity of these attacks is much lower than the past. According to the Colombian government, there were about 11 attacks against pipelines in 2008, versus hundreds of such incidents that occurred per year in the early 2000s.
As a result of these improvements, Colombia has halted the decline in its oil production and begun to experience some growth. EIA forecasts that Colombia should continue to see an increase in oil production in the next two years: according to the March 2010 edition of the Short Term Energy Outlook, EIA expects Colombian oil production to rise to 760,000 bbl/d in 2010 and 810,000 bbl/d in 2011, versus 680,000 bbl/d in 2009.
Oil Exports
The United States is the largest destination of Colombia’s oil exports. In 2009, Colombia exported 278,000 bbl/d of crude oil and refined products to the United States. The weighted-average API gravity of Colombia’s crude oil exports to the United States was 24° in 2009, and most exports flowed into PADD 3 (Gulf Coast, 79 percent), followed by PADD 5 (West Coast, 17 percent) and PADD 1 (East Coast, 4 percent).
Pipelines
Colombia has six major oil pipelines, four of which connect production fields to the Caribbean export terminal at Covenas. These include the 500-mile Ocensa pipeline, which has the capacity to transport 615,000 bbl/d from the Cusiana/Cupiagua area; the 460-mile Cano Limon pipeline; and the smaller Alto Magdalena and Colombia Oil pipelines. The Llanos Orientales came online in late 2009, which links the Rubiales field to the Ocensa pipeline. The system will eventually have a capacity of 260,000-bbl/d. The sixth pipeline, the TransAndino, transports crude from Colombia's Orito field in the Putumayo basin to Colombia's Pacific port at Tumaco; TransAndino can also carry crude oil produced in Ecuador.
Downstream
According to OGJ, Colombia had 285,850 bbl/d of crude oil refining capacity in 2009. The country has five major refineries, all owned by Ecopetrol. The largest is the Barrancabermeja-Santander facility, with a capacity of 205,000 bbl/d, with the Cartagena refinery (75,000 bbl/d) representing most of the rest of the country’s capacity. In May 2009, Ecopetrol assumed complete ownership of the Cartagena plant after purchasing the stake formerly held by Glencore.
Although Colombia is a net oil exporter, it must import some refined products, as domestic demand outstrips production capacity. As a result, Ecopetrol has begun efforts to expand refining capacity in the country. The company approved a $3.8-billion expansion of the Cartagena refinery in late 2009, which would increase capacity to 165,000 bbl/d and improve the quality of produced refined products. Ecopetrol is also embarking on an expansion plan at the Barrancabermeja plant, which would increase its capacity to 300,000 bbl/d and improve the refinery’s ability to process heavier crude oils.
Natural Gas
According to OGJ, Colombia had proven natural gas reserves of 3.96 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2010. The country produced 318 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of dry natural gas in 2008, while consuming 265 Bcf. A large portion of the country’s gross natural gas production (43 percent in 2008) is re-injected to aid in enhanced oil recovery. Colombia has natural gas reserves spread across 18 basins, seven of which have active production. The bulk of Colombia's natural gas reserves are located in the Llanos basin, although the Guajira basin accounts for the majority of current production. Similar to the oil sector, natural gas production has risen substantially in the last few years, owning to greater investment at existing fields, rising domestic consumption, and new export opportunities.
Exploration and Production
According to Colombia’s Ministry of Energy and Mines, BP and Chevron are the two largest natural gas producers in the country. Chevron operates the offshore Chuchupa field in Guajira department, the largest non-associated natural gas field in the country. In December 2009, the field produced 680 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) of dry natural gas. The company also operates the nearby onshore Ballena and Riohacha fields. BP operates the Cupiagua and Cusiana natural gas fields in Casenare department, which are the two largest natural gas fields in the country. However, almost all natural gas from these fields is utilized for re-injection, leaving dry natural gas production of a combined 200 MMcf/d in December 2009. State-owned Ecopetrol is also an important natural gas producer.
Pipelines
There are some 2,000 miles of natural gas trunk pipelines in Colombia. The three main lines include the Ballena-Barrancabermeja, linking Chevron's Ballena field on the northeast coast to Barrancabermeja in central Colombia; the Barrancabermeja-Nevia-Bogota line, which integrates the Colombian capital into the transmission network, and the Mariquita-Cali line through the western, Andean foothills. There are other small stretches of pipeline operated by private firms.
Export Pipelines
In early 2008, the Antonio Ricaurte pipeline came online, linking northeastern Colombia with Venezuela. Initially, the pipeline will allow Colombia to export natural gas from the Punta Ballenas area to western Venezuela. Current plans call for the flow of the pipeline to then be reversed in 2012, with Venezuela exporting 140 MMcf/d of natural gas to Colombia. While initial contracted volumes for export from Colombia ranged from 80-150 MMcf/d, actual exports to Venezuela have often exceeded these levels. According to media reports, natural gas exports to Venezuela peaked near 300 MMcf/d in late 2009, partly due to rising demand in Venezuela for natural gas for power generation and re-injection. Media reports indicated that export flows had fallen to near contracted volumes by the end of 2009.
Coal
metallurgical coal. The country has the second-largest coal reserves in South America, slightly behind Brazil, with most of those reserves concentrated in the Guajira peninsula in the north and the Andean foothills. Colombia's coal is relatively clean-burning, with a sulfur content of less than 1 percent. Over the past decade, production has more than doubled, reaching 86.7 MMst in 2008. It is likely that Colombia’s coal production will continue to increase in coming years, as exploration and profitable developments continue throughout the north and interior of the country. Colombia’s coal consumption was only 5.2 MMst in 2008, leaving most of the country’s production available for export; in 2008, Colombia was the fourth-largest net coal exporter in the world.
Sector Organization
Colombia completed the privatization of its coal sector in 2004 with the closing of Minercol, the former state-owned coal company. The largest coal producer in Colombia is the Carbones del Cerrejon consortium, composed of Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, and Glencore. The consortium operates the Cerrejon Zona Norte (CZN) project, the largest coal mine in Latin America and the largest open-cast coal mine in the world. CZN, which consists of an integrated mine, railroad, and coastal export terminal, exported over 30 MMst in 2009.
Drummond operates the second-largest coal mine in Colombia, La Loma, also an integrated mine-railway-port project, producing about 20 MMst per year. In 2009, Drummond ships its first coal exports from the El Descanso project, which could reach production of 20 MMst by 2010. Glencore operates the Jagua and Prodeco coal mines, with total production capacity of about 8 MMst per year.
Exports
Currently, most Colombia coal exports go to Europe, North America, and Latin America, as the vast majority of Colombia's coal producing and exporting infrastructure is located on the Caribbean coast. Coal is an important part of the Colombian economy: in 2009, coal represented about one-quarter of total export earnings, and mining taxes and royalties paid to the Colombian government exceeded $1 billion. During the first nine months of 2009, the United States imported 13.6 MMst of coal from Colombia, about 80 percent of total U.S. coal imports.
According to media reports, Colombia began exporting sizable quantities of coal to Asian markets, especially China, in 2009. A combination of higher prices in Asia, lower freight costs, and falling exports to the United States created the conditions for such an opportunity. It is possible that the expansion of the Panama Canal (currently slated for completion by 2015) could facilitate greater exports of Colombian coal to Asia in the future.
Coal Bed Methane
Coal bed methane (CBM) is a gaseous hydrocarbon that occurs along with coal reserves. It is similar to natural gas and can be transported and used in similar ways. Drummond has stated that its Colombian mines could contain up to 2.2 Tcf of CBM, and the company has signed contracts with Ecopetrol to extract CBM from both the La Loma and El Descanso mines. CBM has the potential to dramatically increase Colombia’s proven natural gas reserves, facilitate greater domestic production, and potentially allow additional exports to neighboring countries.
Source: EIA
Wednesday, March 24, 2010 |
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