Challenges For The Euro Area And The World Economy
Speech by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
“The Group of Thirty”, 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem, Rabat, 28 May 2010
It is a pleasure to be here today, in the Group of Thirty, to discuss the main challenges on the road to a sustained recovery. I actually ask myself whether the title of the first session – “Crisis of the Eurosystem” – adequately reflects what is happening in Europe and more generally in the global financial markets. My impression is that what we are now seeing primarily in the euro area reflects a broader phenomenon, namely the sustainability of public finances in advanced economies. To repeat a much used metaphor recently, we could say that euro area tensions are “the canary in the coal mine” of the challenges that policy-makers worldwide are going to face.
Let me elaborate by looking at the origin of the problem, i.e. the sustainability of public finances. In the aftermath of the Lehman failure, governments around the world seemed to rediscover Keynes. They injected huge amounts of borrowed money – public funds – to stabilise the economy after the shock of the Lehman failure. These policies worked, and averted a global depression. The success of those policies has led governments – encouraged by international organisations – to continue using expansionary fiscal policies to try pulling the economy out of the recession and getting it back to the pre-crisis level.
The strategy is based on a model which may turn out to be inappropriate in the current conjuncture. Let me discuss some of the underlying assumptions of the model. First, the initial fiscal impulse was successful in avoiding a depression because it helped to coordinate agents’ expectations, in the Keynesian or Knightian way of reducing uncertainty, thereby avoiding a vicious circle of recession and deflation. The direct impact on domestic demand may have been more modest, as shown in countries where the size of the fiscal stimulus was more contained but nevertheless fared equally well. Second, potential growth might have been severely affected by the crisis. As a result, the pre-crisis level of output, achieved in a bubble economy, would not represent a sustainable objective over the policy-relevant horizon. Third, the level achieved by the public debt in many countries may have impaired the effectiveness of further expansionary fiscal policy.
To sum up, while the fiscal expansion was successful immediately after the Lehman crisis, it may not be sustainable over time and may have to be corrected rapidly. Financial markets seem to be giving increasing attention to this hypothesis. And they have started to test it.
They have focused on the euro area, even though it has on average a lower deficit and a lower debt ratio than other economies. There are two reasons for this. They have to do with the particular institutional construction of the euro area, which is built on two pillars.
One is the monetary pillar, which is supported by an independent central bank with a clear price stability objective. This implies that the ECB will not use an inflation tax to reduce the real value of government debt. Euro area governments have thus to rely on budgetary measures to address their own fiscal problems. These measures are difficult to adopt, especially in countries with fragile political systems, such as those with minority governments or weak leadership, or where growth is projected to be slow due in particular to lost competitiveness or heavy reliance on external borrowing. Financial markets are testing each country, one by one, to see whether they are willing to adopt the necessary budgetary measures, starting with those which seem to be facing the greatest hurdles to consolidation.
Let me digress briefly on this point. Some may think that the fact that the ECB cannot use the inflation tax to bail out Governments is a weakness of the euro area’s construction, because it obliges some countries to make fiscal adjustments earlier than others. In my view, this is a strength. To believe that an inflation tax can solve the problem posed by the mounting public debt is an illusion that some people like to cultivate. For several reasons. First, people are less naïve than some might think – they dislike an inflation tax as much as other forms of fiscal adjustment. Second, it’s not so easy to generate inflation, in particular ‘surprise’ inflation, without provoking a more-than-proportional increase in interest rates, also in light of the short average maturity of public debt in most countries. Third, a rise in inflation, and inflation expectations, would produce a major upward shift in the yield curve, inflicting major losses on the banks and financial institutions which have been heavily investing in these markets, potentially undermining the recovery.
In short, the impossibility of resorting to an inflation tax is forcing euro area countries to tackle the burden of public debt sooner rather than later. In other countries the illusion of being able to resort to the inflation tax might delay the adjustment, but the longer the treatment is postponed the harsher it’s likely to be. End of digression.
The second pillar of the euro area construction concerns the economic and fiscal dimension. It was based on four key assumptions. The first was that markets would exert strong pressure on euro area fiscal policies. The second assumption was that if the first assumption were insufficient to discipline public finances, then the Stability and Growth Pact, based on monitoring, peer pressure and sanctions, would do the job. The third assumption, reinforcing the previous ones, is that if a member of the euro area were unable to implement sound fiscal policies, it would be left to its own devices. The final assumption was that national economic policies would be geared to ensure convergence among euro area economies, within a strengthened single market.
These assumptions turned out to be misplaced. Why?
One reason was that markets did not impose the necessary discipline on the Member States, in particular during the first years of Monetary Union, as spreads narrowed on different government bonds independently of emerging potential problems. Markets moved in a binary way, from all good to all bad, in an abrupt and pro-cyclical way.
Another reason was that the Pact did not work as expected. Surveillance proved difficult to implement, technically and politically. Sanctions gave rise to tensions between national authorities and European institutions. The latter became a scapegoat; they were accused of interpreting the Pact too rigidly and rigorously. As a result, the rules were weakened and ‘politicised’, leading to less stringent monitoring.
The third reason was that, in the midst of the worst crisis since World War II, the belief that countries could be left to their own devices, and eventually fail, without infecting others, proved wrong. Several academics and commentators are still flirting with the idea that a partial default could be organised in an orderly fashion, with minor repercussions on the country itself and on its neighbours. But financial markets have shown how exposed they are to contagion – contagion which, by the way, is not limited to the euro area. It’s global.
The final reason for these misplaced assumptions was that, during its first 11 years, the euro area economy experienced a strong convergence in real economic activity together with a significant divergence in nominal cost and price developments, which gave rise to large payments imbalances within the Union. Countries with lower income per capita grew faster than the richer ones, in some cases catching up with them, partly through excessive external borrowing and a decline in competitiveness. These developments were not offset by conservative fiscal policies to moderate domestic demand growth and to provide a buffer for any shocks.
The unique nature of the euro area institutional framework and the policies implemented by some of its members offer explanations for why the crisis erupted. I will not dwell too much on how the crisis developed and why it took so long to find a solution. The reasons are mainly political. They are not exclusive to the euro area, but are part of life in all democracies, where the trade-offs between the short-term costs and the long-term benefits of optimal solutions are difficult to perceive for the average taxpayer, and sometimes even for their elected representatives. Ultimately, the time it took to work out a solution – three months – was largely due to problems like those experienced in other countries faced with similar challenges. Remember the opposition by many members of the US Congress to the 1995 rescue package for Mexico, which was skilfully circumvented when the US Administration found USD 20 billion in the Exchange Stabilization Fund (which did not require Congressional approval). Remember also the initial vote against the TARP by Congress, even after the failure of Lehman Brothers, until markets slid further. These are all examples of the difficulties our democracies face in mobilising the appropriate resources to tackle major financial crises. They need to be explained to the public.
In the case of Greece, there was an additional complication: the previous government, in an election year, had hidden the sharp increase in the deficit (from 5% to over 13% of GDP). This shocked the other governments in the euro area and ordinary people too.
A further dimension, in the European context, is the difference in cultures and sensitivities. They affect how issues are communicated within countries, in particular between politicians and their electorates. These are differences which totally disconcert financial markets. For instance, in one large euro area country it was thought that public support for swift action could be achieved only by dramatising the situation, for instance, by telling the public that “the euro is in danger” or by considering the possibility of expelling a country from the euro area. But it was not realised that, in the midst of a financial upheaval, such words are like fanning the flames and that the cost of the support package could only increase following such dramatic declarations. By contrast, in other countries, leaders want to be seen as being in control of the situation and taking all sorts of initiatives to reassure their electorates. The media, of course, have a field day reporting on such apparently inconsistent activities.
What is clear is that Europeans have found out during this crisis that sharing a common currency entails much deeper links than they might have initially thought. Monetary Union is to some extent also a political union and subject to the challenges that such unions face, possibly even on a larger scale.
All in all, a series of decisions have been taken, both at the national and European level over the last three months. First, Greece has negotiated an adjustment programme with the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB. It is a very tough fiscal programme and contains major structural measures that will fundamentally change the Greek economy. The programme is accompanied by a €110 billion financial support package from the IMF and the euro area countries, which has been passed by the 16 euro area countries’ parliaments. Second, measures have been taken to avert contagion. A European fund, consisting of €500 billion, to be supplemented by €250 billion from the IMF, has been designed to prevent other potential cases. Third, measures have been taken by several countries to speed up fiscal consolidation. In particular, Portugal and Spain have announced additional fiscal and structural measures to accelerate the stabilisation of their debt/GDP dynamics as from 2012. Other countries have announced that they will step up consolidation of their budgets for the coming year. Finally, the ECB has decided to intervene in specific segments of euro area debt securities markets to improve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The way in which some of these decisions have been taken might appear cumbersome, or even clumsy, especially to outside observers unfamiliar with European decision-making processes. However, whenever a decision was needed it was ultimately taken. We experienced nothing like the TARP being voted down by a national parliament.
Each of these decisions had a positive, though short-lived, effect on market sentiment. Several market participants seem to be sceptical, in particular about whether the Greek adjustment programme will succeed. In their view – as far as I can understand – the programme is bound to fail for economic, political and European governance reasons. The logical conclusion is that Greece will default, at least partially, or restructure its debt. They are probably taking positions based on this conviction. The IMF, the euro area governments, the Greek government and the ECB however take a different view. They all consider that a default is not a viable solution. And they have taken decisions consistent with this view and put money – taxpayers’ money – where their mouths are.
Let me consider the arguments put forward by those who regard a Greek default as unavoidable.
Their first argument is economic. The adjustment programme is too harsh, given the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio reached in Greece. It will produce a debt spiral which will lead the country into a recession and deflation. The problem is made worse by the loss of competitiveness suffered by Greece over the last decade and the impossibility of devaluing the currency. Their reasoning is generally no more sophisticated than that. Some analysts have put together a few numbers to show that they are aware of the problem. But I have not seen a serious analysis of the 120-page report produced by the IMF which looks at the various aspects of the programme, including the impact of the structural measures on growth, the sustainability analysis or other features of the programme. Not one review of the realism of the assessments made by the staff of the IMF and the Commission. In fact, I suspect most market analysts have not even looked at the adjustment path for the primary surplus which is embedded in the programme, which aims to reach 6% of GDP in 2015, a level no different from the ones that other countries in the past have implemented to consolidate their public finances. It’s a level that a number of other countries – including some outside the euro area – will have to achieve if they want to stabilise their debt. Most market analysts and other observers have probably not even looked at the structural measures that are embedded in the programme, affecting for instance the labour market, or at several liberalisations, and their impact on economic growth. The inefficiencies in the tax collection system, which have been aggravated before the elections, have also been overlooked. The perception that the Greek programme will not work looks more like an assumption than the result of a serious assessment.
To summarise, I wonder which analysis is more serious and credible: the many one-pagers, very well publicised – I must admit – which probably aim to influence the rest of the market; or the IMF’s 120 pages of rather tedious analysis describing the contents of the programme, together with its risks.
Let me add that I have not read a single page on what a (partial) default of an industrial country would mean for the country itself, for the euro area and for the global economy. It’s often been stated – or should I say assumed? – that there is such a thing as an “organised” or “orderly” default. Argentina is sometimes mentioned, as if anything orderly happened there since it defaulted. On top of this, several of those who propose an “orderly default” also favoured letting Lehman fail, as a way to eliminate moral hazard and achieve better functioning markets. We saw what happened.
The way the markets move every day shows what implications a default would have for the Greek economy, its financial system and even the country’s membership of the European Union. Just look at the screens and you’ll see the contagion under way, spreading not only to peripheral countries but also to the largest euro area countries and through the financial system.
The second argument of those who foresee a Greek default is political. The government of that country – they claim – will not have the political stamina to sustain the adjustment effort over time, in the face of domestic protests, and will sooner or later give up.
It’s an argument that seems to ignore events and facts, at least from the Greek side. The Greek government was certainly slow in recognising the problem, but as soon as it did it reacted swiftly. On 11 February the European Council asked Greece to take measures to reduce its deficit by 4% of GDP. It did so in a few days and brought them to Parliament. The same happened for the IMF programme, which was quickly negotiated and adopted by Parliament in less than a week. The prime minister even expelled three members from his parliamentary group because they abstained from voting. So far all the measures contained in the programme have been approved. The fiscal adjustment has been frontloaded. Budget data available for the first four months of the year show an improvement of over 40% of the deficit compared with last year, whereas the target was 35%. A schedule for privatisation has just been approved by the government.
This is not to say that it’s going to be an easy ride. But what’s the alternative? Is it politically more palatable for a government to default? How would the millions of Greek savers react if suddenly they found out that part of their savings is worth substantially less? Would any government get away with it?
And what would be the political future of Greece in the European Union if it did not repay its debt to the German, French, Irish and all the other countries’ taxpayers? What would happen to the millions of euros in structural and cohesion funds that Greece receives every year from the EU?
Maybe you need a bit more than one page to give proper consideration to these factors.
Let me now turn to the euro area and consider the third argument which is sometimes made by market participants, namely that euro area governance has substantial weaknesses that undermine the viability of the single currency. I have already talked about the weaknesses of the current system. We should not forget, however, what has been created and what it has created. Overall, the combination of monetary and budgetary policies in the euro area has brought price stability and budgetary results which on average are better than those of most other economies. The problem is that this is true on average, but not for all the members of the Union, as it should be.
What is needed is a more resilient system, which avoids bad policies by the Member States and the contagion they can cause for the area as a whole. This requires working both on the numerator and on the denominator, i.e. on the budget and on economic growth. The way forward is twofold. It requires changes in the Member States’ economic policies. And it requires a strengthening of the institutional framework for budgetary surveillance.
The European Commission has published its first proposals to be considered by the task force on economic governance chaired by President Van Rompuy, which met for the first time last week. Some Member States have already made their own proposals. There is a vast convergence on the direction to take. Some of the proposals are controversial, like sanctioning countries that break the rules, for instance, with a loss of voting rights or of other means of financial aid. The task force’s deliberations are intended to lead to concrete proposals for the European Council by this autumn.
It is understandable to nurse doubts about the results of all these efforts. However, looking at the decisions which have been taken in recent weeks and months, one cannot doubt the determination of the 16 euro area countries to stick together and do the necessary to defend what has been achieved over the past ten years, and to improve it. The 16 countries believe, as do we at the ECB, that sticking to commitments, in particular in the case of the Greek programme, is essential for the credibility of the currency and the prosperity of its members, as would be the case for any other advanced economy or country. This is why the governments of the Member States and the representatives of EU institutions will do all that is needed to preserve that credibility and that prosperity. As I said earlier, monetary union is de facto a political union. It has to function and it will function.
Let me conclude. What we are currently experiencing is a crisis of public finances in advanced economies. It started with Greece, and the euro, because of the specific institutional framework which prevents Greece and the other euro area countries from using the inflation tax to overcome their budgetary problems. This will force euro area countries to address their fiscal positions earlier. It’s not easy. But it will be done, because it can be done and it has to be done in any case. And, last but not least, because there are no alternatives.
“The Group of Thirty”, 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem, Rabat, 28 May 2010
It is a pleasure to be here today, in the Group of Thirty, to discuss the main challenges on the road to a sustained recovery. I actually ask myself whether the title of the first session – “Crisis of the Eurosystem” – adequately reflects what is happening in Europe and more generally in the global financial markets. My impression is that what we are now seeing primarily in the euro area reflects a broader phenomenon, namely the sustainability of public finances in advanced economies. To repeat a much used metaphor recently, we could say that euro area tensions are “the canary in the coal mine” of the challenges that policy-makers worldwide are going to face.
Let me elaborate by looking at the origin of the problem, i.e. the sustainability of public finances. In the aftermath of the Lehman failure, governments around the world seemed to rediscover Keynes. They injected huge amounts of borrowed money – public funds – to stabilise the economy after the shock of the Lehman failure. These policies worked, and averted a global depression. The success of those policies has led governments – encouraged by international organisations – to continue using expansionary fiscal policies to try pulling the economy out of the recession and getting it back to the pre-crisis level.
The strategy is based on a model which may turn out to be inappropriate in the current conjuncture. Let me discuss some of the underlying assumptions of the model. First, the initial fiscal impulse was successful in avoiding a depression because it helped to coordinate agents’ expectations, in the Keynesian or Knightian way of reducing uncertainty, thereby avoiding a vicious circle of recession and deflation. The direct impact on domestic demand may have been more modest, as shown in countries where the size of the fiscal stimulus was more contained but nevertheless fared equally well. Second, potential growth might have been severely affected by the crisis. As a result, the pre-crisis level of output, achieved in a bubble economy, would not represent a sustainable objective over the policy-relevant horizon. Third, the level achieved by the public debt in many countries may have impaired the effectiveness of further expansionary fiscal policy.
To sum up, while the fiscal expansion was successful immediately after the Lehman crisis, it may not be sustainable over time and may have to be corrected rapidly. Financial markets seem to be giving increasing attention to this hypothesis. And they have started to test it.
They have focused on the euro area, even though it has on average a lower deficit and a lower debt ratio than other economies. There are two reasons for this. They have to do with the particular institutional construction of the euro area, which is built on two pillars.
One is the monetary pillar, which is supported by an independent central bank with a clear price stability objective. This implies that the ECB will not use an inflation tax to reduce the real value of government debt. Euro area governments have thus to rely on budgetary measures to address their own fiscal problems. These measures are difficult to adopt, especially in countries with fragile political systems, such as those with minority governments or weak leadership, or where growth is projected to be slow due in particular to lost competitiveness or heavy reliance on external borrowing. Financial markets are testing each country, one by one, to see whether they are willing to adopt the necessary budgetary measures, starting with those which seem to be facing the greatest hurdles to consolidation.
Let me digress briefly on this point. Some may think that the fact that the ECB cannot use the inflation tax to bail out Governments is a weakness of the euro area’s construction, because it obliges some countries to make fiscal adjustments earlier than others. In my view, this is a strength. To believe that an inflation tax can solve the problem posed by the mounting public debt is an illusion that some people like to cultivate. For several reasons. First, people are less naïve than some might think – they dislike an inflation tax as much as other forms of fiscal adjustment. Second, it’s not so easy to generate inflation, in particular ‘surprise’ inflation, without provoking a more-than-proportional increase in interest rates, also in light of the short average maturity of public debt in most countries. Third, a rise in inflation, and inflation expectations, would produce a major upward shift in the yield curve, inflicting major losses on the banks and financial institutions which have been heavily investing in these markets, potentially undermining the recovery.
In short, the impossibility of resorting to an inflation tax is forcing euro area countries to tackle the burden of public debt sooner rather than later. In other countries the illusion of being able to resort to the inflation tax might delay the adjustment, but the longer the treatment is postponed the harsher it’s likely to be. End of digression.
The second pillar of the euro area construction concerns the economic and fiscal dimension. It was based on four key assumptions. The first was that markets would exert strong pressure on euro area fiscal policies. The second assumption was that if the first assumption were insufficient to discipline public finances, then the Stability and Growth Pact, based on monitoring, peer pressure and sanctions, would do the job. The third assumption, reinforcing the previous ones, is that if a member of the euro area were unable to implement sound fiscal policies, it would be left to its own devices. The final assumption was that national economic policies would be geared to ensure convergence among euro area economies, within a strengthened single market.
These assumptions turned out to be misplaced. Why?
One reason was that markets did not impose the necessary discipline on the Member States, in particular during the first years of Monetary Union, as spreads narrowed on different government bonds independently of emerging potential problems. Markets moved in a binary way, from all good to all bad, in an abrupt and pro-cyclical way.
Another reason was that the Pact did not work as expected. Surveillance proved difficult to implement, technically and politically. Sanctions gave rise to tensions between national authorities and European institutions. The latter became a scapegoat; they were accused of interpreting the Pact too rigidly and rigorously. As a result, the rules were weakened and ‘politicised’, leading to less stringent monitoring.
The third reason was that, in the midst of the worst crisis since World War II, the belief that countries could be left to their own devices, and eventually fail, without infecting others, proved wrong. Several academics and commentators are still flirting with the idea that a partial default could be organised in an orderly fashion, with minor repercussions on the country itself and on its neighbours. But financial markets have shown how exposed they are to contagion – contagion which, by the way, is not limited to the euro area. It’s global.
The final reason for these misplaced assumptions was that, during its first 11 years, the euro area economy experienced a strong convergence in real economic activity together with a significant divergence in nominal cost and price developments, which gave rise to large payments imbalances within the Union. Countries with lower income per capita grew faster than the richer ones, in some cases catching up with them, partly through excessive external borrowing and a decline in competitiveness. These developments were not offset by conservative fiscal policies to moderate domestic demand growth and to provide a buffer for any shocks.
The unique nature of the euro area institutional framework and the policies implemented by some of its members offer explanations for why the crisis erupted. I will not dwell too much on how the crisis developed and why it took so long to find a solution. The reasons are mainly political. They are not exclusive to the euro area, but are part of life in all democracies, where the trade-offs between the short-term costs and the long-term benefits of optimal solutions are difficult to perceive for the average taxpayer, and sometimes even for their elected representatives. Ultimately, the time it took to work out a solution – three months – was largely due to problems like those experienced in other countries faced with similar challenges. Remember the opposition by many members of the US Congress to the 1995 rescue package for Mexico, which was skilfully circumvented when the US Administration found USD 20 billion in the Exchange Stabilization Fund (which did not require Congressional approval). Remember also the initial vote against the TARP by Congress, even after the failure of Lehman Brothers, until markets slid further. These are all examples of the difficulties our democracies face in mobilising the appropriate resources to tackle major financial crises. They need to be explained to the public.
In the case of Greece, there was an additional complication: the previous government, in an election year, had hidden the sharp increase in the deficit (from 5% to over 13% of GDP). This shocked the other governments in the euro area and ordinary people too.
A further dimension, in the European context, is the difference in cultures and sensitivities. They affect how issues are communicated within countries, in particular between politicians and their electorates. These are differences which totally disconcert financial markets. For instance, in one large euro area country it was thought that public support for swift action could be achieved only by dramatising the situation, for instance, by telling the public that “the euro is in danger” or by considering the possibility of expelling a country from the euro area. But it was not realised that, in the midst of a financial upheaval, such words are like fanning the flames and that the cost of the support package could only increase following such dramatic declarations. By contrast, in other countries, leaders want to be seen as being in control of the situation and taking all sorts of initiatives to reassure their electorates. The media, of course, have a field day reporting on such apparently inconsistent activities.
What is clear is that Europeans have found out during this crisis that sharing a common currency entails much deeper links than they might have initially thought. Monetary Union is to some extent also a political union and subject to the challenges that such unions face, possibly even on a larger scale.
All in all, a series of decisions have been taken, both at the national and European level over the last three months. First, Greece has negotiated an adjustment programme with the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB. It is a very tough fiscal programme and contains major structural measures that will fundamentally change the Greek economy. The programme is accompanied by a €110 billion financial support package from the IMF and the euro area countries, which has been passed by the 16 euro area countries’ parliaments. Second, measures have been taken to avert contagion. A European fund, consisting of €500 billion, to be supplemented by €250 billion from the IMF, has been designed to prevent other potential cases. Third, measures have been taken by several countries to speed up fiscal consolidation. In particular, Portugal and Spain have announced additional fiscal and structural measures to accelerate the stabilisation of their debt/GDP dynamics as from 2012. Other countries have announced that they will step up consolidation of their budgets for the coming year. Finally, the ECB has decided to intervene in specific segments of euro area debt securities markets to improve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The way in which some of these decisions have been taken might appear cumbersome, or even clumsy, especially to outside observers unfamiliar with European decision-making processes. However, whenever a decision was needed it was ultimately taken. We experienced nothing like the TARP being voted down by a national parliament.
Each of these decisions had a positive, though short-lived, effect on market sentiment. Several market participants seem to be sceptical, in particular about whether the Greek adjustment programme will succeed. In their view – as far as I can understand – the programme is bound to fail for economic, political and European governance reasons. The logical conclusion is that Greece will default, at least partially, or restructure its debt. They are probably taking positions based on this conviction. The IMF, the euro area governments, the Greek government and the ECB however take a different view. They all consider that a default is not a viable solution. And they have taken decisions consistent with this view and put money – taxpayers’ money – where their mouths are.
Let me consider the arguments put forward by those who regard a Greek default as unavoidable.
Their first argument is economic. The adjustment programme is too harsh, given the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio reached in Greece. It will produce a debt spiral which will lead the country into a recession and deflation. The problem is made worse by the loss of competitiveness suffered by Greece over the last decade and the impossibility of devaluing the currency. Their reasoning is generally no more sophisticated than that. Some analysts have put together a few numbers to show that they are aware of the problem. But I have not seen a serious analysis of the 120-page report produced by the IMF which looks at the various aspects of the programme, including the impact of the structural measures on growth, the sustainability analysis or other features of the programme. Not one review of the realism of the assessments made by the staff of the IMF and the Commission. In fact, I suspect most market analysts have not even looked at the adjustment path for the primary surplus which is embedded in the programme, which aims to reach 6% of GDP in 2015, a level no different from the ones that other countries in the past have implemented to consolidate their public finances. It’s a level that a number of other countries – including some outside the euro area – will have to achieve if they want to stabilise their debt. Most market analysts and other observers have probably not even looked at the structural measures that are embedded in the programme, affecting for instance the labour market, or at several liberalisations, and their impact on economic growth. The inefficiencies in the tax collection system, which have been aggravated before the elections, have also been overlooked. The perception that the Greek programme will not work looks more like an assumption than the result of a serious assessment.
To summarise, I wonder which analysis is more serious and credible: the many one-pagers, very well publicised – I must admit – which probably aim to influence the rest of the market; or the IMF’s 120 pages of rather tedious analysis describing the contents of the programme, together with its risks.
Let me add that I have not read a single page on what a (partial) default of an industrial country would mean for the country itself, for the euro area and for the global economy. It’s often been stated – or should I say assumed? – that there is such a thing as an “organised” or “orderly” default. Argentina is sometimes mentioned, as if anything orderly happened there since it defaulted. On top of this, several of those who propose an “orderly default” also favoured letting Lehman fail, as a way to eliminate moral hazard and achieve better functioning markets. We saw what happened.
The way the markets move every day shows what implications a default would have for the Greek economy, its financial system and even the country’s membership of the European Union. Just look at the screens and you’ll see the contagion under way, spreading not only to peripheral countries but also to the largest euro area countries and through the financial system.
The second argument of those who foresee a Greek default is political. The government of that country – they claim – will not have the political stamina to sustain the adjustment effort over time, in the face of domestic protests, and will sooner or later give up.
It’s an argument that seems to ignore events and facts, at least from the Greek side. The Greek government was certainly slow in recognising the problem, but as soon as it did it reacted swiftly. On 11 February the European Council asked Greece to take measures to reduce its deficit by 4% of GDP. It did so in a few days and brought them to Parliament. The same happened for the IMF programme, which was quickly negotiated and adopted by Parliament in less than a week. The prime minister even expelled three members from his parliamentary group because they abstained from voting. So far all the measures contained in the programme have been approved. The fiscal adjustment has been frontloaded. Budget data available for the first four months of the year show an improvement of over 40% of the deficit compared with last year, whereas the target was 35%. A schedule for privatisation has just been approved by the government.
This is not to say that it’s going to be an easy ride. But what’s the alternative? Is it politically more palatable for a government to default? How would the millions of Greek savers react if suddenly they found out that part of their savings is worth substantially less? Would any government get away with it?
And what would be the political future of Greece in the European Union if it did not repay its debt to the German, French, Irish and all the other countries’ taxpayers? What would happen to the millions of euros in structural and cohesion funds that Greece receives every year from the EU?
Maybe you need a bit more than one page to give proper consideration to these factors.
Let me now turn to the euro area and consider the third argument which is sometimes made by market participants, namely that euro area governance has substantial weaknesses that undermine the viability of the single currency. I have already talked about the weaknesses of the current system. We should not forget, however, what has been created and what it has created. Overall, the combination of monetary and budgetary policies in the euro area has brought price stability and budgetary results which on average are better than those of most other economies. The problem is that this is true on average, but not for all the members of the Union, as it should be.
What is needed is a more resilient system, which avoids bad policies by the Member States and the contagion they can cause for the area as a whole. This requires working both on the numerator and on the denominator, i.e. on the budget and on economic growth. The way forward is twofold. It requires changes in the Member States’ economic policies. And it requires a strengthening of the institutional framework for budgetary surveillance.
The European Commission has published its first proposals to be considered by the task force on economic governance chaired by President Van Rompuy, which met for the first time last week. Some Member States have already made their own proposals. There is a vast convergence on the direction to take. Some of the proposals are controversial, like sanctioning countries that break the rules, for instance, with a loss of voting rights or of other means of financial aid. The task force’s deliberations are intended to lead to concrete proposals for the European Council by this autumn.
It is understandable to nurse doubts about the results of all these efforts. However, looking at the decisions which have been taken in recent weeks and months, one cannot doubt the determination of the 16 euro area countries to stick together and do the necessary to defend what has been achieved over the past ten years, and to improve it. The 16 countries believe, as do we at the ECB, that sticking to commitments, in particular in the case of the Greek programme, is essential for the credibility of the currency and the prosperity of its members, as would be the case for any other advanced economy or country. This is why the governments of the Member States and the representatives of EU institutions will do all that is needed to preserve that credibility and that prosperity. As I said earlier, monetary union is de facto a political union. It has to function and it will function.
Let me conclude. What we are currently experiencing is a crisis of public finances in advanced economies. It started with Greece, and the euro, because of the specific institutional framework which prevents Greece and the other euro area countries from using the inflation tax to overcome their budgetary problems. This will force euro area countries to address their fiscal positions earlier. It’s not easy. But it will be done, because it can be done and it has to be done in any case. And, last but not least, because there are no alternatives.
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European Commission Proposes Visa Free Travel For Albania And Bosnia And Herzegovina
The European Commission has adopted a proposal to enable citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to travel with biometric passports to the Schengen countries without needing a visa. The proposal is conditional on both countries fulfilling three outstanding requirements.
"I know how much visa free travel means to the people of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Granting visa free travel is a cornerstone of the EU's integration policy for the Western Balkans. Facilitating people to people contacts enhances business opportunities and gives the possibility for the people of the region to get to know the EU better", said Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs.
She added: "Today's proposal is the result of intensive and hard work for the authorities and the people of these countries in meeting the conditions. I am certain that the two countries, building on the good results already shown, will be able to fulfil the remaining criteria in due time in order to allow the European Parliament and the Council of EU Ministers to give the final green light to this proposal as soon as possible. Let me also stress that this freedom would come with responsibility. So I encourage national authorities in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue informing their citizens about the rights and obligations stemming from short-term visa-free travel''.
Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, said "This proposal for visa free travel is of the utmost importance for the citizens of the countries concerned, since it will bring them closer to the EU. The visa-free regime will contribute to making the European perspective more tangible. I am as confident as Commissioner Malmström that relevant national authorities in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina will soon be able to fulfil all outstanding requirements and continue to guarantee consistent results in the implementation of the roadmaps."
The proposal aims at simplifying travel to EU countries (except the UK and Ireland, which do not take part in the common visa policy) and those associated to the Schengen area (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) for the citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, abolishing the obligation to apply for a short-term visa.
It is the result of more than two years' intensive work in the framework of the visa liberalisation dialogue, which started with these two countries during the first semester of 2008: on the basis of roadmaps presented by the European Commission, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have made important progress in improving passport security, strengthening border controls and reinforcing the institutional framework to fight organised crime and corruption. Substantial progress has been done also in the field of external relations and fundamental rights.
Despite these good results, both countries still have to make progresses in some areas where shortcomings have still been identified (for more details see MEMO/10/218). The European Commission will continue to monitor the efforts put in place to effectively tackle the outstanding issues and will report timely to the EP and the Council on the findings. The monitoring exercise could take place over the summer in order to allow the Council and the Parliament to take a final decision in autumn.
The proposal follows last year's Council Decision exempting from the short-term visa obligation the citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.
It will be now up to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union to take a final decision on the Commission proposal.
"I know how much visa free travel means to the people of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Granting visa free travel is a cornerstone of the EU's integration policy for the Western Balkans. Facilitating people to people contacts enhances business opportunities and gives the possibility for the people of the region to get to know the EU better", said Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs.
She added: "Today's proposal is the result of intensive and hard work for the authorities and the people of these countries in meeting the conditions. I am certain that the two countries, building on the good results already shown, will be able to fulfil the remaining criteria in due time in order to allow the European Parliament and the Council of EU Ministers to give the final green light to this proposal as soon as possible. Let me also stress that this freedom would come with responsibility. So I encourage national authorities in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue informing their citizens about the rights and obligations stemming from short-term visa-free travel''.
Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, said "This proposal for visa free travel is of the utmost importance for the citizens of the countries concerned, since it will bring them closer to the EU. The visa-free regime will contribute to making the European perspective more tangible. I am as confident as Commissioner Malmström that relevant national authorities in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina will soon be able to fulfil all outstanding requirements and continue to guarantee consistent results in the implementation of the roadmaps."
The proposal aims at simplifying travel to EU countries (except the UK and Ireland, which do not take part in the common visa policy) and those associated to the Schengen area (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) for the citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, abolishing the obligation to apply for a short-term visa.
It is the result of more than two years' intensive work in the framework of the visa liberalisation dialogue, which started with these two countries during the first semester of 2008: on the basis of roadmaps presented by the European Commission, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have made important progress in improving passport security, strengthening border controls and reinforcing the institutional framework to fight organised crime and corruption. Substantial progress has been done also in the field of external relations and fundamental rights.
Despite these good results, both countries still have to make progresses in some areas where shortcomings have still been identified (for more details see MEMO/10/218). The European Commission will continue to monitor the efforts put in place to effectively tackle the outstanding issues and will report timely to the EP and the Council on the findings. The monitoring exercise could take place over the summer in order to allow the Council and the Parliament to take a final decision in autumn.
The proposal follows last year's Council Decision exempting from the short-term visa obligation the citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.
It will be now up to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union to take a final decision on the Commission proposal.
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European Parliament President Buzek Meets Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
"'One tree is not enough to build a temple': we need multilateral governance - we need China as a strong partner," said EP President Jerzy Buzek after his meeting with China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Beijing. "I explained that the European Parliament represents 500 million citizens of the EU who deeply believe in respect for fundamental political rights and freedoms."
During his visit to China, President Jerzy Buzek discussed with Chinese leaders economic and trade relations, the financial crisis, energy and climate change, the enhancement of political relations and the joint tackling of major global security issues.
President Jerzy Buzek said: "We want to engage China and we want to engage with China.
'One tree is not enough to build a temple': we need multilateral governance - we need China as a strong partner. We must face the challenges of climate change, energy and financial crisis together.
China plays an important role in the world economy. We very much appreciate its steady commitment to macroeconomic stability and its recent development.
I think we need to finish constructing a solid bridge between China and Europe and we need to build this bridge from both sides. There is one essential element to finish this bridge: respect for rule of law, civil rights and minorities."
During the meeting with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao President Buzek mentioned specific cases.
Buzek said, "I explained that the European Parliament represents 500 million citizens of the EU who deeply believe in respect for fundamental political rights and freedoms."
President Buzek reminded that over ten years ago China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a document still to be ratified.
Buzek said, "I came in a spirit of friendship and I'm looking for progress in all areas, which will help us to become stronger global partners."
During his visit to China, President Jerzy Buzek discussed with Chinese leaders economic and trade relations, the financial crisis, energy and climate change, the enhancement of political relations and the joint tackling of major global security issues.
President Jerzy Buzek said: "We want to engage China and we want to engage with China.
'One tree is not enough to build a temple': we need multilateral governance - we need China as a strong partner. We must face the challenges of climate change, energy and financial crisis together.
China plays an important role in the world economy. We very much appreciate its steady commitment to macroeconomic stability and its recent development.
I think we need to finish constructing a solid bridge between China and Europe and we need to build this bridge from both sides. There is one essential element to finish this bridge: respect for rule of law, civil rights and minorities."
During the meeting with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao President Buzek mentioned specific cases.
Buzek said, "I explained that the European Parliament represents 500 million citizens of the EU who deeply believe in respect for fundamental political rights and freedoms."
President Buzek reminded that over ten years ago China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a document still to be ratified.
Buzek said, "I came in a spirit of friendship and I'm looking for progress in all areas, which will help us to become stronger global partners."
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EU To Monitor Local Elections In Georgia
Members of the Committee of the Regions will join their counterparts in the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities to monitor local elections in Georgia on 30 May 2010. Voters there will elect mayors and councillors in 64 municipalities, including five self-governing cities. For the first time, the mayor of Tbilisi will be directly elected.
On 27 and 28 May, the joint delegation will meet representatives of government and electoral bodies, including the speaker of the parliament, Davit Bakradze and the Minister for Regional Development and Infrastructure, Davit Tkeshelalvili. Meetings are also scheduled with media and local NGO representatives. Discussions will be held with members of the OSCE/ODIHR delegation.
Four CoR members are among the delegation of locally-elected representatives – Teet Kallasvee, member of Haapsalu Town Council (EE/EPP), Sharon Taylor, member of Stevenage Borough Council (UK/PES), Jasmina Vidmar, member of Maribor City Council (SI/ALDE) and Uno Silberg, member of Kose Municipality Council (EE/EA) – joining ten members of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Congress vice-president Günther Krug (DE, SOC) will head the delegation.
As part of its cooperation with the Congress, the CoR regularly participates in election monitoring at local and regional levels. Past joint missions have included elections in Serbia (2008) and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2009), the aim being to bolster the integrity of the democratic process by bringing to light any irregularities and issuing recommendations to enable improvements. This work is aimed at fostering confidence in local and regional elected representatives and increases voter turnout.
This mission further cements the cooperation agreement signed by the CoR and the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Renewed in 2009, the agreement enables the two bodies to deepen European cooperation on local and regional democracy, devolution and self-governance in Europe.
Please click the following link for more information on the elections in Georgia.
Note to editors
A pre-election mission was carried out by the Congress at the beginning of May in Tbilisi and Rustavi to assess the situation in the country prior to the elections. Congress members met representatives of electoral commissions, government and parliament, as well as candidates from the ruling party and the opposition standing for the post of mayor of Tbilisi.
The delegation will present its findings at a press conference in Tbilisi scheduled for 11 a.m. on Monday 31 May (Hotel Ambasadori, 13 Shavteli St., Tbilisi).
The post-mission report will be the subject of a consultation process between the Congress and the CoR, following which the presidents of the two bodies will work together on the follow-up and implementation of its recommendations.
The mission's findings will feed into the own-initiative opinion on "Localand regional government in Georgia and the development of cooperation between Georgia and the EU" being drafted for the CoR by Jacek Protas, marshall of the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region (PL/EPP). The draft opinion is due to be discussed at the meeting of the CIVEX commission on 2 July, and adopted at the CoR's autumn plenary session.
On 27 and 28 May, the joint delegation will meet representatives of government and electoral bodies, including the speaker of the parliament, Davit Bakradze and the Minister for Regional Development and Infrastructure, Davit Tkeshelalvili. Meetings are also scheduled with media and local NGO representatives. Discussions will be held with members of the OSCE/ODIHR delegation.
Four CoR members are among the delegation of locally-elected representatives – Teet Kallasvee, member of Haapsalu Town Council (EE/EPP), Sharon Taylor, member of Stevenage Borough Council (UK/PES), Jasmina Vidmar, member of Maribor City Council (SI/ALDE) and Uno Silberg, member of Kose Municipality Council (EE/EA) – joining ten members of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Congress vice-president Günther Krug (DE, SOC) will head the delegation.
As part of its cooperation with the Congress, the CoR regularly participates in election monitoring at local and regional levels. Past joint missions have included elections in Serbia (2008) and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2009), the aim being to bolster the integrity of the democratic process by bringing to light any irregularities and issuing recommendations to enable improvements. This work is aimed at fostering confidence in local and regional elected representatives and increases voter turnout.
This mission further cements the cooperation agreement signed by the CoR and the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Renewed in 2009, the agreement enables the two bodies to deepen European cooperation on local and regional democracy, devolution and self-governance in Europe.
Please click the following link for more information on the elections in Georgia.
Note to editors
A pre-election mission was carried out by the Congress at the beginning of May in Tbilisi and Rustavi to assess the situation in the country prior to the elections. Congress members met representatives of electoral commissions, government and parliament, as well as candidates from the ruling party and the opposition standing for the post of mayor of Tbilisi.
The delegation will present its findings at a press conference in Tbilisi scheduled for 11 a.m. on Monday 31 May (Hotel Ambasadori, 13 Shavteli St., Tbilisi).
The post-mission report will be the subject of a consultation process between the Congress and the CoR, following which the presidents of the two bodies will work together on the follow-up and implementation of its recommendations.
The mission's findings will feed into the own-initiative opinion on "Localand regional government in Georgia and the development of cooperation between Georgia and the EU" being drafted for the CoR by Jacek Protas, marshall of the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region (PL/EPP). The draft opinion is due to be discussed at the meeting of the CIVEX commission on 2 July, and adopted at the CoR's autumn plenary session.
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Austerity Must Not Jeopardise Growth, Says Van Rompuy
The key tasks in front of the crisis task force of the European Union are to simultaneously ensure economic recovery and growth, and to guarantee a strong economic governance, said President of the European Council Mr. Herman Van Rompuy addressing the plenary session of the EESC for the first time during his tenure. EESC members urged concrete and rapid action and a real involvement of civil society.
In his introductory remarks, EESC President Mr. Mario Sepi said that the social aspects that social effects of any recovery package must not be neglected while re-launching Europe's economy.
"We wanted socially sensitive issues such as poverty, immigration and education to be considered as part of any recovery project," he said.
"You bring to the Union a capacity to synthesise diverging interests and the wide range of perspectives of those actively involved in society through organised groups," said Mr. Van Rompuy, who went on to talk about the current economic woes of the Member States.
He stressed the importance of not only tackling public deficits, which even Euro-zone countries were stretching far beyond the Maastricht criterion of 3 percent, but also of dealing with the rapidly accumulating sovereign debts.
"We tend to look through the keyhole of public deficit, forgetting the bay window of public debt," he said. But while curbing the budget shortfall and decreasing sovereign debt entails austerity measures already taken in several Member States, countries must not jeopardize their future growth on the altar of fiscal order.
"The EU must start growing economically, which is the only way to recover from the debt problem. We cannot solve the budgetary issues without tackling growth therefore austerity must not have detrimental effects on nascent recovery" he said, adding that research and development as well as innovation must be key areas of investment.
Reflecting on how Greek sovereign debt triggered a loss of confidence in the stability of other Euro-zone countries, Mr. Van Rompuy stressed the mutual responsibilities among EU countries.
"If there is a doubt in the state bonds of one country, it has a ripple effect on all the EU because the banking systems are interlinked. Therefore the sovereign debt of one country is the problem of all countries," he said, adding that delayed EU action in the wake of the Greek crisis multiplied the bill for treatment.
In response to Mr. Van Rompuy, Mr. Georgios Dassis (president of Employees' Group, Greece) criticized slow EU reaction to the Greek crisis and urged further steps to follow the massive financial package agreed by EU leaders to guarantee ailing EU economies.
"The 750-billion-euro package is but one step in the right direction. But when will we see an institution called the European Monetary Fund, lending to governments at normal interest rates instead of the usurp rates? How much poverty do we need to bring about a decision establishing a financial transaction tax?" said Mr. Dassis in a speech followed by a loud applause from the plenary.
Mr. Staffan Nilsson (president of Various Interests Group, Sweden) on his part, called Mr. Van Rompuy's attention to the task of involving societies in the necessary economic measures. He urged the Council President to push for a clear mandate for the EESC in the June European Council.
"It is up to the Member States to carry out the austerity measures, but the understanding of their citizens is essential. This is key to emerging from the crisis," he stressed.
"Instead of always focusing on austerity, let's focus more on the resilience of the European economy. And rather than being defensive, let's go on the offensive," said Mr. Joost van Iersel (Employers' Group, The Netherlands), also highlighting the necessity for strong economic governance.
Thanking for the interventions he considered "frank and open", Mr. Van Rompuy reiterated his intention to return to the EESC later in the year.
In his introductory remarks, EESC President Mr. Mario Sepi said that the social aspects that social effects of any recovery package must not be neglected while re-launching Europe's economy.
"We wanted socially sensitive issues such as poverty, immigration and education to be considered as part of any recovery project," he said.
"You bring to the Union a capacity to synthesise diverging interests and the wide range of perspectives of those actively involved in society through organised groups," said Mr. Van Rompuy, who went on to talk about the current economic woes of the Member States.
He stressed the importance of not only tackling public deficits, which even Euro-zone countries were stretching far beyond the Maastricht criterion of 3 percent, but also of dealing with the rapidly accumulating sovereign debts.
"We tend to look through the keyhole of public deficit, forgetting the bay window of public debt," he said. But while curbing the budget shortfall and decreasing sovereign debt entails austerity measures already taken in several Member States, countries must not jeopardize their future growth on the altar of fiscal order.
"The EU must start growing economically, which is the only way to recover from the debt problem. We cannot solve the budgetary issues without tackling growth therefore austerity must not have detrimental effects on nascent recovery" he said, adding that research and development as well as innovation must be key areas of investment.
Reflecting on how Greek sovereign debt triggered a loss of confidence in the stability of other Euro-zone countries, Mr. Van Rompuy stressed the mutual responsibilities among EU countries.
"If there is a doubt in the state bonds of one country, it has a ripple effect on all the EU because the banking systems are interlinked. Therefore the sovereign debt of one country is the problem of all countries," he said, adding that delayed EU action in the wake of the Greek crisis multiplied the bill for treatment.
In response to Mr. Van Rompuy, Mr. Georgios Dassis (president of Employees' Group, Greece) criticized slow EU reaction to the Greek crisis and urged further steps to follow the massive financial package agreed by EU leaders to guarantee ailing EU economies.
"The 750-billion-euro package is but one step in the right direction. But when will we see an institution called the European Monetary Fund, lending to governments at normal interest rates instead of the usurp rates? How much poverty do we need to bring about a decision establishing a financial transaction tax?" said Mr. Dassis in a speech followed by a loud applause from the plenary.
Mr. Staffan Nilsson (president of Various Interests Group, Sweden) on his part, called Mr. Van Rompuy's attention to the task of involving societies in the necessary economic measures. He urged the Council President to push for a clear mandate for the EESC in the June European Council.
"It is up to the Member States to carry out the austerity measures, but the understanding of their citizens is essential. This is key to emerging from the crisis," he stressed.
"Instead of always focusing on austerity, let's focus more on the resilience of the European economy. And rather than being defensive, let's go on the offensive," said Mr. Joost van Iersel (Employers' Group, The Netherlands), also highlighting the necessity for strong economic governance.
Thanking for the interventions he considered "frank and open", Mr. Van Rompuy reiterated his intention to return to the EESC later in the year.
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EU27 Deficit In Trade In Goods With Russia Was EUR50.0 Bln In 2009
EU27 trade in goods with Russia had increased steadily until 2008, before dropping sharply in 2009. EU27 exports to Russia rose from 23 billion euro in 2000 to 105 bn in 2008, then fell to 66 bn in 2009. Imports rose from 64 bn in 2000 to 178 bn in 2008, then decreased to 115 bn in 2009. As a result, the EU27 trade deficit with Russia increased significantly from 41 bn euro in 2000 to 73 bn in 2008, then fell to 50 bn in 2009.
The share of Russia in the EU27's total external trade in goods went steadily upwards between 2000 and 2008, but went down in 2009. In 2009, Russia was the EU27's third most important trading partner after the USA and China, accounting for 6% of EU27 exports and 10% of EU27 imports.
On the occasion of the 25th European Union - Russia summit, which will take place on 31 May and 1 June in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, issued the above data on trade and investments between Russia and the EU.
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy: largest trading partners of Russia
Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (20.5 bn euro or 31% of EU exports) was by far the largest exporter to Russia in 2009, followed by Italy (6.5 bn or 10%), France (5.0 bn or 8%) and the Netherlands (4.7 bn or 7%). Germany (23.7 bn or 20%) was also the largest importer, followed by the Netherlands1 (14.2 bn or 12%), Italy (12.1 bn or 10%), Poland (9.1 bn or 8%) and France (9.0 bn or 8%).
Most Member States recorded deficits in trade with Russia in 2009, the largest being observed in the Netherlands1 (-9.5 bn euro), Italy (-5.6 bn), Poland (-5.5 bn) and France (-4.0 bn). The highest surpluses were recorded in Austria (0.7 bn) and Denmark (0.6 bn).
Around 85% of EU27 exports to Russia in 2009 were manufactured goods, while energy accounted for almost three quarters of imports. At the detailed level, the main EU27 exports to Russia included medicine, aircraft, motor cars and mobile phones, while the main imports included oil, gas and coal.
The share of Russia in the EU27's total external trade in goods went steadily upwards between 2000 and 2008, but went down in 2009. In 2009, Russia was the EU27's third most important trading partner after the USA and China, accounting for 6% of EU27 exports and 10% of EU27 imports.
On the occasion of the 25th European Union - Russia summit, which will take place on 31 May and 1 June in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, issued the above data on trade and investments between Russia and the EU.
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy: largest trading partners of Russia
Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (20.5 bn euro or 31% of EU exports) was by far the largest exporter to Russia in 2009, followed by Italy (6.5 bn or 10%), France (5.0 bn or 8%) and the Netherlands (4.7 bn or 7%). Germany (23.7 bn or 20%) was also the largest importer, followed by the Netherlands1 (14.2 bn or 12%), Italy (12.1 bn or 10%), Poland (9.1 bn or 8%) and France (9.0 bn or 8%).
Most Member States recorded deficits in trade with Russia in 2009, the largest being observed in the Netherlands1 (-9.5 bn euro), Italy (-5.6 bn), Poland (-5.5 bn) and France (-4.0 bn). The highest surpluses were recorded in Austria (0.7 bn) and Denmark (0.6 bn).
Around 85% of EU27 exports to Russia in 2009 were manufactured goods, while energy accounted for almost three quarters of imports. At the detailed level, the main EU27 exports to Russia included medicine, aircraft, motor cars and mobile phones, while the main imports included oil, gas and coal.
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EU Telecoms Ministers To Tackle Bill Shocks
A code of rights will be discussed at the next EU Telecoms Council scheduled for Monday (31 May), as ministers will consider introducing pan-European rules to protect users of electronic communications from expensive bills. But no formal debate will take place on the thorny issue of funding and regulating investment in super-fast Internet.
The Spanish EU Presidency will push ahead a proposal to introduce guarantees to limit or control expenditure for all end-users of electronic communications services, as is already the case for telecoms roaming services.
A document obtained by EurActiv lists among possible measures the introduction of a "minimum degree of itemised billing," meaning a regularly updated account of expenses.
The paper also proposes that "users should be able to switch off certain type of calls" and that "different prepayment options should be offered to users".
Moreover, the interruption of services should be forbidden, except for free services, explains the document.
The code of rights of electronic communications' users should also guarantee a higher level of transparency, the availability of comparable information about the quality of services offered by different operators, better protection for consumers and easier dispute-resolution procedures.
Ministers will hold their first debate on the issue next Monday in Brussels. "It remains to be seen how these measures might be applied, and whether new legislation will be necessary as a result," a diplomatic source told EurActiv.
Optical fibre still out of the agenda
The complex issue of how to fund and regulate crucial investment in super-fast Internet is expected to be left out of the ministerial debate. "It is not on the agenda, and it is likely to be left aside," said an EU diplomat.
Member states lament that the Commission acquired de facto power to regulate the EU telecoms market by issuing non-binding regulations, which are applied as legally-binding rules despite not requiring the involvement of the European Parliament and the Council.
However, a long-awaited Commission regulation on so-called 'Next Generation Networks' (NGNs) access has not been adopted yet, after almost two years of behind-the-scenes negotiations. The Council keeps postponing the debate on the premise of waiting for the EU executive's document.
As a result, the debate is stalling and investment in a crucial sector to boost the EU's economic recovery is slowing down, as pointed out by the Commission itself in its recent report on the implementation of EU telecoms legislation.
Industry plea to improve regulation
Against this background and ahead of the EU Telecoms Council next week, emerging operators are urging the European institutions to address the regulatory shortfalls of national markets, in particular regarding rules on optical fibre deployment, which widely differ between member states.
In a report to be officially released next week, the European Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA) argues that "countries with the most effective telecoms regulation have open and competitive markets that foster higher broadband penetration," which in turn generates more jobs and boosts economic growth.
The Commission recommendation is seen by ECTA as "a key opportunity to eliminate inconsistencies fragmenting the single market and incentivise open and competitive fibre networks," therefore no more time should be lost, said ECTA Chairman Hubertus von Roenne.
The different regulations have a direct impact on prices. Consumers pay an average of €17 per month in the Netherlands - the country with the best regulation in place - for a basic broadband connection, but have to pay €34 for the same service in Poland and €61 in Portugal, according to figures contained in the last competitiveness report published by the Commission in mid-May.
BEREC seat to be Riga
Telecoms ministers are also expected to reach on Monday final agreement on the location of the newly-established body of European telecoms regulators, which is one of the cornerstones of the regulatory overhaul of the sector completed by the former commissioner in charge of telecoms, Viviane Reding.
"At the moment we have only one candidature and it is Riga," explained a Spanish Presidency source.
The only possible alternative is to have the seat of the body in Brussels in order to facilitate the work of an authority which brings together national representatives. But currently this option does not seem to represent a genuine challenge to the Latvian candidature.
Source: EurActiv
The Spanish EU Presidency will push ahead a proposal to introduce guarantees to limit or control expenditure for all end-users of electronic communications services, as is already the case for telecoms roaming services.
A document obtained by EurActiv lists among possible measures the introduction of a "minimum degree of itemised billing," meaning a regularly updated account of expenses.
The paper also proposes that "users should be able to switch off certain type of calls" and that "different prepayment options should be offered to users".
Moreover, the interruption of services should be forbidden, except for free services, explains the document.
The code of rights of electronic communications' users should also guarantee a higher level of transparency, the availability of comparable information about the quality of services offered by different operators, better protection for consumers and easier dispute-resolution procedures.
Ministers will hold their first debate on the issue next Monday in Brussels. "It remains to be seen how these measures might be applied, and whether new legislation will be necessary as a result," a diplomatic source told EurActiv.
Optical fibre still out of the agenda
The complex issue of how to fund and regulate crucial investment in super-fast Internet is expected to be left out of the ministerial debate. "It is not on the agenda, and it is likely to be left aside," said an EU diplomat.
Member states lament that the Commission acquired de facto power to regulate the EU telecoms market by issuing non-binding regulations, which are applied as legally-binding rules despite not requiring the involvement of the European Parliament and the Council.
However, a long-awaited Commission regulation on so-called 'Next Generation Networks' (NGNs) access has not been adopted yet, after almost two years of behind-the-scenes negotiations. The Council keeps postponing the debate on the premise of waiting for the EU executive's document.
As a result, the debate is stalling and investment in a crucial sector to boost the EU's economic recovery is slowing down, as pointed out by the Commission itself in its recent report on the implementation of EU telecoms legislation.
Industry plea to improve regulation
Against this background and ahead of the EU Telecoms Council next week, emerging operators are urging the European institutions to address the regulatory shortfalls of national markets, in particular regarding rules on optical fibre deployment, which widely differ between member states.
In a report to be officially released next week, the European Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA) argues that "countries with the most effective telecoms regulation have open and competitive markets that foster higher broadband penetration," which in turn generates more jobs and boosts economic growth.
The Commission recommendation is seen by ECTA as "a key opportunity to eliminate inconsistencies fragmenting the single market and incentivise open and competitive fibre networks," therefore no more time should be lost, said ECTA Chairman Hubertus von Roenne.
The different regulations have a direct impact on prices. Consumers pay an average of €17 per month in the Netherlands - the country with the best regulation in place - for a basic broadband connection, but have to pay €34 for the same service in Poland and €61 in Portugal, according to figures contained in the last competitiveness report published by the Commission in mid-May.
BEREC seat to be Riga
Telecoms ministers are also expected to reach on Monday final agreement on the location of the newly-established body of European telecoms regulators, which is one of the cornerstones of the regulatory overhaul of the sector completed by the former commissioner in charge of telecoms, Viviane Reding.
"At the moment we have only one candidature and it is Riga," explained a Spanish Presidency source.
The only possible alternative is to have the seat of the body in Brussels in order to facilitate the work of an authority which brings together national representatives. But currently this option does not seem to represent a genuine challenge to the Latvian candidature.
Source: EurActiv
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Spain Adopts Austerity Plan By Razor-Thin Majority
Spain, the country holding the rotating presidency of the EU, managed to win approval for a 15-billion-euro austerity package by a single vote in parliament yesterday (27 May). The narrow margin of the victory raised doubts as to the government's ability to steer the country through an economic crisis.
The razor-thin majority piled pressure on Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who has been forced to ditch his party's traditional alliances in pushing through spending cuts and labor reforms as markets fret Spain could suffer a similar crisis to Greece but on a larger scale.
The vote was won by 169 parliament members, all from the Socialist Party, voting in favour, and 168 against, from the opposition European People's Party-affiliated Popular Party, the Basque nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Izquierda Unida, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Nafarroa Bai and Unión Progreso y Democracia.
The Popular Party even made sure one of its deputies was brought to the session in an ambulance.
There were 13 abstentions, from representatives of Convergència i Unió (CiU), Coalición Canaria and Unión del Pueblo Navarro.
It was the abstention of 10 members of CiU, a Catalan nationalist party regarded as conservative or centrist, which saved the plan, EurActiv Spain writes.
CiU parliamentary leader Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida told parliament he did not want to plunge Spain into an immediate Greek-style crisis by blocking the austerity measures, but called on Zapatero to call elections early next year.
"The problem is you and your government," Duran i Lleida told Zapatero, adding that his party would vote against the 2011 budget bill towards the end of the year.
The prime minister called off a scheduled trip to Brazil on Thursday, as an end-May deadline loomed for an agreement with unions and business on wide-ranging labour reforms - a key policy demand by international markets.
Unions met on Thursday and warned that they would call a general strike if the government goes ahead with changes to labour market rules without their consent, saying there were still big differences with business on the reform.
They said agreement may not come before the end-May deadline set by the government. A regular Europe-wide meeting of unions is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 1 June.
"The government can set whatever deadlines it wants, we work at our own pace," the head of the CCOO union, Ignacio Fernandez Toxo, told journalists.
Defeat for the budget would make it much more difficult for Zapatero, lagging the Popular Party in opinion polls, to stay in power.
"This law is improvised, insufficient and unjust," PP leader Mariano Rajoy told parliament.
Source: EurActiv
The razor-thin majority piled pressure on Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who has been forced to ditch his party's traditional alliances in pushing through spending cuts and labor reforms as markets fret Spain could suffer a similar crisis to Greece but on a larger scale.
The vote was won by 169 parliament members, all from the Socialist Party, voting in favour, and 168 against, from the opposition European People's Party-affiliated Popular Party, the Basque nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Izquierda Unida, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Nafarroa Bai and Unión Progreso y Democracia.
The Popular Party even made sure one of its deputies was brought to the session in an ambulance.
There were 13 abstentions, from representatives of Convergència i Unió (CiU), Coalición Canaria and Unión del Pueblo Navarro.
It was the abstention of 10 members of CiU, a Catalan nationalist party regarded as conservative or centrist, which saved the plan, EurActiv Spain writes.
CiU parliamentary leader Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida told parliament he did not want to plunge Spain into an immediate Greek-style crisis by blocking the austerity measures, but called on Zapatero to call elections early next year.
"The problem is you and your government," Duran i Lleida told Zapatero, adding that his party would vote against the 2011 budget bill towards the end of the year.
The prime minister called off a scheduled trip to Brazil on Thursday, as an end-May deadline loomed for an agreement with unions and business on wide-ranging labour reforms - a key policy demand by international markets.
Unions met on Thursday and warned that they would call a general strike if the government goes ahead with changes to labour market rules without their consent, saying there were still big differences with business on the reform.
They said agreement may not come before the end-May deadline set by the government. A regular Europe-wide meeting of unions is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 1 June.
"The government can set whatever deadlines it wants, we work at our own pace," the head of the CCOO union, Ignacio Fernandez Toxo, told journalists.
Defeat for the budget would make it much more difficult for Zapatero, lagging the Popular Party in opinion polls, to stay in power.
"This law is improvised, insufficient and unjust," PP leader Mariano Rajoy told parliament.
Source: EurActiv
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Greek Debt Crisis Temporary - Putin
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he is confident the European Union will overcome Greece's economic crisis.
"I naturally believe our partners will overcome the difficulties; they are temporary," Putin told a press conference, which followed talks with Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen.
"The EU is, without doubt, our main partner in the economic sphere ... we want everything to be normal in the eurozone, we don't want to see any crises or cataclysms," he said.
"I do not doubt that the eurozone and the EU will overcome these problems. The question is how much it will cost. But this depends on the concrete steps taken by the EU leadership."
The Russian premier described the recent controversial move by the eurozone countries, namely Germany, to ban short-selling of financial products as "reasonable."
Putin noted that the weakening of the euro had both advantages and disadvantages, as the euro's weakness created good export conditions, which is the focus of many EU countries' economies.
The 11-year old single European currency fell to its weakest level in four years last week in the wake of the Greek debt crisis. Fears remain about the future of the euro, despite a huge financial bail out package from EU governments and the International Monetary Fund.
Source: RIA Novosti
"I naturally believe our partners will overcome the difficulties; they are temporary," Putin told a press conference, which followed talks with Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen.
"The EU is, without doubt, our main partner in the economic sphere ... we want everything to be normal in the eurozone, we don't want to see any crises or cataclysms," he said.
"I do not doubt that the eurozone and the EU will overcome these problems. The question is how much it will cost. But this depends on the concrete steps taken by the EU leadership."
The Russian premier described the recent controversial move by the eurozone countries, namely Germany, to ban short-selling of financial products as "reasonable."
Putin noted that the weakening of the euro had both advantages and disadvantages, as the euro's weakness created good export conditions, which is the focus of many EU countries' economies.
The 11-year old single European currency fell to its weakest level in four years last week in the wake of the Greek debt crisis. Fears remain about the future of the euro, despite a huge financial bail out package from EU governments and the International Monetary Fund.
Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Internet Search Engines Scolded By EU Regulators
EU regulators have reprimanded major search engines Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft's Bing for storing data search queries for too long and by so doing overlooking the bloc's Data Protection Directive.
A letter issued by the Article 29 Working Party, a group of EU privacy regulators, warned the three companies that their "methods of making users' search data anonymous" were out of step with the EU's rules on data protection.
The regulators sent copies of these letters to the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and to Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship.
The letter asked the US authorities to see if the search engines' use of search data complied with their own Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive practices".
The regulators specifically take aim at Google's nine-month retention rate of its search logs, which compile data from users' search queries.
The Working Party asks Google to cut the retention period from the current nine months to six months.
"The company's apparent lack of focus in data retention is concerning," according to the statement.
"Considering Google's dominant position in almost every EU member state, with a market share of up to 95% in some national search engine markets, the company has a significant role in European citizens' daily lives," the letter continued.
The group is also insisting that the company must get an outside auditor to assess how anonymous users' data actually was.
Google said it has not received the working party's letter but issued a statement insisting that the company needed to keep the data for nine months in order to make searches both safer and more relevant.
"We develop our policies based on what provides the best experience for users both in terms of respect for their privacy and the quality and security of our services. Our current retention policy represents the most responsible balance between these two important concerns," reads a statement from the company.
Last week, Google was also in the EU's line of fire for inadvertently collecting Internet users' personal data via wireless receivers installed in cars that provide the images for its street mapping service, StreetView.
Source: EurActiv
A letter issued by the Article 29 Working Party, a group of EU privacy regulators, warned the three companies that their "methods of making users' search data anonymous" were out of step with the EU's rules on data protection.
The regulators sent copies of these letters to the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and to Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship.
The letter asked the US authorities to see if the search engines' use of search data complied with their own Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive practices".
The regulators specifically take aim at Google's nine-month retention rate of its search logs, which compile data from users' search queries.
The Working Party asks Google to cut the retention period from the current nine months to six months.
"The company's apparent lack of focus in data retention is concerning," according to the statement.
"Considering Google's dominant position in almost every EU member state, with a market share of up to 95% in some national search engine markets, the company has a significant role in European citizens' daily lives," the letter continued.
The group is also insisting that the company must get an outside auditor to assess how anonymous users' data actually was.
Google said it has not received the working party's letter but issued a statement insisting that the company needed to keep the data for nine months in order to make searches both safer and more relevant.
"We develop our policies based on what provides the best experience for users both in terms of respect for their privacy and the quality and security of our services. Our current retention policy represents the most responsible balance between these two important concerns," reads a statement from the company.
Last week, Google was also in the EU's line of fire for inadvertently collecting Internet users' personal data via wireless receivers installed in cars that provide the images for its street mapping service, StreetView.
Source: EurActiv
Thursday, May 27, 2010 |
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Hedegaard Backtracks On EU Climate Goals
EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard yesterday (26 May) presented a paper making the case for moving towards a unilateral 30% cut in EU greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But she failed to stand behind it, bowing to pressure from France and Germany.
The EU's climate chief unveiled a new communication arguing that increasing the EU's 2020 climate goal to a 30% emission reduction from 1990 levels would be both affordable and technically feasible.
The European Commission estimates that as a result of the economic downturn, the cost of meeting the current 20% target has dropped to €48bn per year until 2020, down from an initial estimate of €70 billion when the package was agreed.
Consequently, making the extra effort to reach 30% would now cost just€11bn more than what EU governments signed up to two years ago, it argued (EurActiv 03/05/10).
The crisis has also taken its toll on the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), the bloc's flagship tool for cutting global warming emissions, by bringing down carbon prices.
Hedegaard warned that carbon prices might not automatically go up when Europe exits the crisis, requiring greater carbon-cutting ambitions to stimulate green investment.
Climate climb-down
But despite making the case for moving to 30%, the commissioner did not lend her support to unilateral EU action, saying that the shift would remain conditional on progress towards a new international climate treaty.
"Are the conditions right now? Would it make sense at this moment? My answer would be 'no'," she said.
Hedegaard said the next step would be to analyse the impact of raising the targets for individual member states so that they can revise their positions. The Spanish EU Presidency is planning to hold preliminary discussions on the issue at a June meeting of environment ministers, she added.
The ambiguity may have been an effort to manage expectations, as many member states are opposed to any move by the Commission to impose further carbon restraints on their industries. They will ultimately make the call if the target is to be raised.
On Tuesday, French and German industry ministers told journalists that Paris and Berlin would only back a move to -30% if other nations were to make comparable efforts.
Hedegaard insisted that the conditional offer remains the best strategy to leverage further commitments from other countries in the international negotiations, despite accusations that the strategy has so far seen few results. She said the EU could review the situation ahead of the Cancún climate conference to see how it could play its cards most effectively.
Safeguarding industrial competitiveness
The communication also assessed the risk of businesses relocating from the EU to countries with less stringent carbon constraints, known as 'carbon leakage'.
It concluded that the unused free allowances accruing to companies struggling with falling orders make it "less likely" that energy-intensive industries will lose ground to foreign businesses as a result of EU climate policies.
The extra effort required to move to a 30% target would only result in extra production losses of 1% for energy-intensive industries, with the chemicals industry worst hit, it added.
Hedegaard said that current measures to combat carbon leakage in the form of free allocations of emission allowances and the option to use offset credits thus "remain justified and should remain in place".
The Commission is continuing to look into border tariffs as an option, she said, before warning that it would be "extremely difficult" to create a system without placing a huge bureaucratic burden on industries.
A flux of recent studies have argued that the risk of carbon leakage has been hugely over-estimated and in fact only a few sectors are affected.
Source: EurActiv
The EU's climate chief unveiled a new communication arguing that increasing the EU's 2020 climate goal to a 30% emission reduction from 1990 levels would be both affordable and technically feasible.
The European Commission estimates that as a result of the economic downturn, the cost of meeting the current 20% target has dropped to €48bn per year until 2020, down from an initial estimate of €70 billion when the package was agreed.
Consequently, making the extra effort to reach 30% would now cost just€11bn more than what EU governments signed up to two years ago, it argued (EurActiv 03/05/10).
The crisis has also taken its toll on the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), the bloc's flagship tool for cutting global warming emissions, by bringing down carbon prices.
Hedegaard warned that carbon prices might not automatically go up when Europe exits the crisis, requiring greater carbon-cutting ambitions to stimulate green investment.
Climate climb-down
But despite making the case for moving to 30%, the commissioner did not lend her support to unilateral EU action, saying that the shift would remain conditional on progress towards a new international climate treaty.
"Are the conditions right now? Would it make sense at this moment? My answer would be 'no'," she said.
Hedegaard said the next step would be to analyse the impact of raising the targets for individual member states so that they can revise their positions. The Spanish EU Presidency is planning to hold preliminary discussions on the issue at a June meeting of environment ministers, she added.
The ambiguity may have been an effort to manage expectations, as many member states are opposed to any move by the Commission to impose further carbon restraints on their industries. They will ultimately make the call if the target is to be raised.
On Tuesday, French and German industry ministers told journalists that Paris and Berlin would only back a move to -30% if other nations were to make comparable efforts.
Hedegaard insisted that the conditional offer remains the best strategy to leverage further commitments from other countries in the international negotiations, despite accusations that the strategy has so far seen few results. She said the EU could review the situation ahead of the Cancún climate conference to see how it could play its cards most effectively.
Safeguarding industrial competitiveness
The communication also assessed the risk of businesses relocating from the EU to countries with less stringent carbon constraints, known as 'carbon leakage'.
It concluded that the unused free allowances accruing to companies struggling with falling orders make it "less likely" that energy-intensive industries will lose ground to foreign businesses as a result of EU climate policies.
The extra effort required to move to a 30% target would only result in extra production losses of 1% for energy-intensive industries, with the chemicals industry worst hit, it added.
Hedegaard said that current measures to combat carbon leakage in the form of free allocations of emission allowances and the option to use offset credits thus "remain justified and should remain in place".
The Commission is continuing to look into border tariffs as an option, she said, before warning that it would be "extremely difficult" to create a system without placing a huge bureaucratic burden on industries.
A flux of recent studies have argued that the risk of carbon leakage has been hugely over-estimated and in fact only a few sectors are affected.
Source: EurActiv
Thursday, May 27, 2010 |
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China, US 'Moving Faster Than EU' On Innovation
Martin Schuurmans, chairman of the newly-formed European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), says he is "not pessimistic" about Europe's ability to lead on research and innovation. But it needs to speed up if it wants to keep up with global competitors, the EIT chairman told EurActiv in an interview.
According to Dr. Schuurmans, Europe is not in a bad position when it comes to research and innovation.
"If you look at it from the perspective of research and technology in – let's say environment technology and energy – clearly Europe belongs to the leaders in the world. So, we do have a very good starting point."
However, he says Europe is at risk of losing ground in relation to other countries. "Many of our competitors – and you mentioned China and the United Sates – are moving more quickly than we are," Schuurmans warns.
"I am not pessimistic but we need to speed up, speed up, speed up."
According to the Dutchman, who was appointed chairman of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) in July 2008, the EIT's modest budget – €309 million up to 2013 – means it is just one of the many tools that Europe will need to respond to the innovation challenge.
"Will there be other contributions? I am sure there will have to be. But I think we can still pull this off."
Knowledge and innovation communities
The EIT's first major decision, taken in December last year, was to launch a set of three innovation clusters, called Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs), which will bring together academia and private businesses around the following fields of research:
But Schuurmans says a little patience is required before the KICs start to produce their first results, as private partners are still holding discussions with the EIT on finalising the contracts for this year and beyond.
"The KICs are still very much in the planning process," he says. "They are not yet fully up and running."
One of the keys to success, Schuurmans says, is that KICs are sustained over a long period of time. "In principle, the KICs will be moving forward for a period of 13 years. And innovation - as you know - can be a slow process and so there will be money available for a long period of time. So that is the key."
However, he says there should be results throughout the life duration of the KICs. "What we expect is a business plan that will describe goals for the long term but then there will also be intermediate delivery steps on a yearly basis."
But according to the EIT chairman, entrepreneurship represents the key to the KICs' success. "We have always said that for us, a key driver of the knowledge triangle is entrepreneurship. We believe it is not only the glue but also the driving force that will lead to new business creation."
Private funding crucial
Schuurmans believes it is too early to say whether the EIT will manage to attract private funding, which will be a major benchmark for measuring the success of the Budapest-based institute.
But he said the amount must stand up to comparisons with EU funding for the institute, which stands at a modest €309 million for the next four years. "If it is much, much smaller than that, then you cannot speak about private funding," he warned.
The hunt for money has only just begun, he says, with an EIT foundation set to be launched this autumn to attract private funding. "We are looking at every source of funding possible. There are many organisations in Europe: not only businesses, but also foundations."
Source: EurActiv
According to Dr. Schuurmans, Europe is not in a bad position when it comes to research and innovation.
"If you look at it from the perspective of research and technology in – let's say environment technology and energy – clearly Europe belongs to the leaders in the world. So, we do have a very good starting point."
However, he says Europe is at risk of losing ground in relation to other countries. "Many of our competitors – and you mentioned China and the United Sates – are moving more quickly than we are," Schuurmans warns.
"I am not pessimistic but we need to speed up, speed up, speed up."
According to the Dutchman, who was appointed chairman of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) in July 2008, the EIT's modest budget – €309 million up to 2013 – means it is just one of the many tools that Europe will need to respond to the innovation challenge.
"Will there be other contributions? I am sure there will have to be. But I think we can still pull this off."
Knowledge and innovation communities
The EIT's first major decision, taken in December last year, was to launch a set of three innovation clusters, called Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs), which will bring together academia and private businesses around the following fields of research:
- Climate change mitigation and adaptation
- Sustainable energy
- Future information and communication society
But Schuurmans says a little patience is required before the KICs start to produce their first results, as private partners are still holding discussions with the EIT on finalising the contracts for this year and beyond.
"The KICs are still very much in the planning process," he says. "They are not yet fully up and running."
One of the keys to success, Schuurmans says, is that KICs are sustained over a long period of time. "In principle, the KICs will be moving forward for a period of 13 years. And innovation - as you know - can be a slow process and so there will be money available for a long period of time. So that is the key."
However, he says there should be results throughout the life duration of the KICs. "What we expect is a business plan that will describe goals for the long term but then there will also be intermediate delivery steps on a yearly basis."
But according to the EIT chairman, entrepreneurship represents the key to the KICs' success. "We have always said that for us, a key driver of the knowledge triangle is entrepreneurship. We believe it is not only the glue but also the driving force that will lead to new business creation."
Private funding crucial
Schuurmans believes it is too early to say whether the EIT will manage to attract private funding, which will be a major benchmark for measuring the success of the Budapest-based institute.
But he said the amount must stand up to comparisons with EU funding for the institute, which stands at a modest €309 million for the next four years. "If it is much, much smaller than that, then you cannot speak about private funding," he warned.
The hunt for money has only just begun, he says, with an EIT foundation set to be launched this autumn to attract private funding. "We are looking at every source of funding possible. There are many organisations in Europe: not only businesses, but also foundations."
Source: EurActiv
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 |
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EU Proposes 'Preventive' Bank Levy
To prevent taxpayers from footing the bill for bailing out collapsing banks, the European Commission will propose today (26 May) that banks set up "preventive" funds, primarily financed from their liabilities and possibly their profits.
The Commission's proposal is based on the so-called 'polluter pays' principle. It is designed to establish "a system which ensures that the financial sector will pay the cost of banking crises in the future," according to the EU commissioner responsible for financial services, Michel Barnier.
"It is not acceptable that taxpayers should continue to bear the heavy cost of rescuing the banking sector," reads a statement from the commissioner to be delivered today. To address this possibility, banks will be forced to put extra money aside as a sort of levy to finance resolution funds.
The proposals must still be approved by member states, possibly at the next summit of EU leaders, set to take place in Brussels in mid-June.
Should the leaders give the proposals their green light, the European Union will be in a position to present the plan at the next G20 summit in Toronto at the end of June, paving the way for global bank resolution funds.
How large will the funds be?
Brussels underlines that it is still too early to define the actual amount of money needed to set up a bank resolution fund or, as is more likely, many such national funds.
However, the draft Commission proposal makes clear that funds "will need to be sufficiently resourced to cope with different resolution costs, and the approach taken will need to be tailored to entities of different sizes and nature".
In the beginning, banks are likely to be the only financial actors affected by the new funds. "At this stage, it does not seem appropriate to extend resolution funds to other financial institutions, such as investment funds or insurance institutions," reads the EU document.
Preventive action
Funding a preventive tool rather than making ex-post payments is preferable for the Commission, because it is a more effective means of avoiding wider economic turmoil in the event of bank failure, argues the EU document.
"The Commission takes the view that resolution funds should be built up on the basis of contributions from banks ex ante. Fully ex post-funded schemes may imply upfront taxpayer funding and therefore increase the risk that banking failures would be accompanied by broader negative economic impacts," explains the paper.
However, Brussels acknowledges the risk of moral hazard, which is governed by the implicit idea that if there is a resolution fund, then risk will be lower. To prevent resolution funds from encouraging risk-taking rather than preventing risks, the Commission makes clear that "resolution funds must not be used as an insurance against failure or to bail out failing banks, but rather to facilitate an orderly failure".
How can banks' risk be calculated?
The Commission is keeping its options open regarding the criteria for assessing the risk of bank failure, but it already tends to favour the use of liabilities rather than assets to establish the fair price to be paid by a bank versus its possible failure.
"Banks' assets are good indicators of their risk" but they "are already subject to risk-weighted prudential capital requirements in the form of capital charges," the Commission paper reads. "Imposing a levy based on assets could therefore amount to an additional capital requirement and would have to be considered carefully."
Banks' liabilities appear to be "the most appropriate indicators of the amounts that might be needed when facing the need to resolve a bank," although they could prove less effective at calculating the degree of risk, the document argues.
As an alternative or complementary solution, "levies could be related to profits and bonuses as an indicator of a bank's size and more reflective of the 'polluter pays' principle," the paper suggests. However, they "may not be closely correlated to the amount of resolution financing a bank might require or the probability of its failure," it adds.
Public finance temptations
Since the size of a bank resolution fund is likely to be significant in most economies, Brussels recognises that "some member states could find it attractive to use these contributions to reduce their public deficit".
In other words, the Commission assumes that the money put aside by banks could be used to temporary tackle public imbalances. However, in the longer term, this "may further reinforce the moral hazard problem associated with 'too big to fail' institutions," the paper stresses.
"The Commission therefore takes the view that bank resolution funds should remain separate from the national budget and dedicated only to resolution costs," concludes the document.
Source: EurActiv
The Commission's proposal is based on the so-called 'polluter pays' principle. It is designed to establish "a system which ensures that the financial sector will pay the cost of banking crises in the future," according to the EU commissioner responsible for financial services, Michel Barnier.
"It is not acceptable that taxpayers should continue to bear the heavy cost of rescuing the banking sector," reads a statement from the commissioner to be delivered today. To address this possibility, banks will be forced to put extra money aside as a sort of levy to finance resolution funds.
The proposals must still be approved by member states, possibly at the next summit of EU leaders, set to take place in Brussels in mid-June.
Should the leaders give the proposals their green light, the European Union will be in a position to present the plan at the next G20 summit in Toronto at the end of June, paving the way for global bank resolution funds.
How large will the funds be?
Brussels underlines that it is still too early to define the actual amount of money needed to set up a bank resolution fund or, as is more likely, many such national funds.
However, the draft Commission proposal makes clear that funds "will need to be sufficiently resourced to cope with different resolution costs, and the approach taken will need to be tailored to entities of different sizes and nature".
In the beginning, banks are likely to be the only financial actors affected by the new funds. "At this stage, it does not seem appropriate to extend resolution funds to other financial institutions, such as investment funds or insurance institutions," reads the EU document.
Preventive action
Funding a preventive tool rather than making ex-post payments is preferable for the Commission, because it is a more effective means of avoiding wider economic turmoil in the event of bank failure, argues the EU document.
"The Commission takes the view that resolution funds should be built up on the basis of contributions from banks ex ante. Fully ex post-funded schemes may imply upfront taxpayer funding and therefore increase the risk that banking failures would be accompanied by broader negative economic impacts," explains the paper.
However, Brussels acknowledges the risk of moral hazard, which is governed by the implicit idea that if there is a resolution fund, then risk will be lower. To prevent resolution funds from encouraging risk-taking rather than preventing risks, the Commission makes clear that "resolution funds must not be used as an insurance against failure or to bail out failing banks, but rather to facilitate an orderly failure".
How can banks' risk be calculated?
The Commission is keeping its options open regarding the criteria for assessing the risk of bank failure, but it already tends to favour the use of liabilities rather than assets to establish the fair price to be paid by a bank versus its possible failure.
"Banks' assets are good indicators of their risk" but they "are already subject to risk-weighted prudential capital requirements in the form of capital charges," the Commission paper reads. "Imposing a levy based on assets could therefore amount to an additional capital requirement and would have to be considered carefully."
Banks' liabilities appear to be "the most appropriate indicators of the amounts that might be needed when facing the need to resolve a bank," although they could prove less effective at calculating the degree of risk, the document argues.
As an alternative or complementary solution, "levies could be related to profits and bonuses as an indicator of a bank's size and more reflective of the 'polluter pays' principle," the paper suggests. However, they "may not be closely correlated to the amount of resolution financing a bank might require or the probability of its failure," it adds.
Public finance temptations
Since the size of a bank resolution fund is likely to be significant in most economies, Brussels recognises that "some member states could find it attractive to use these contributions to reduce their public deficit".
In other words, the Commission assumes that the money put aside by banks could be used to temporary tackle public imbalances. However, in the longer term, this "may further reinforce the moral hazard problem associated with 'too big to fail' institutions," the paper stresses.
"The Commission therefore takes the view that bank resolution funds should remain separate from the national budget and dedicated only to resolution costs," concludes the document.
Source: EurActiv
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 |
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Challenges Of Credit Risk Management: Lessons Learned From Crisis
Speech by José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
Risk Europe 2010, Frankfurt am Main, 26 May 2010
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure for me to address again this year, for the second time in a row, the annual Risk Europe conference here in Frankfurt. I would have liked to say that this simply shows the great importance that the ECB places in the development of sound and effective risk management practices in the financial industry. However, I must admit that my eagerness to address this forum is also a result of the great challenges that we, central banks and private financial institutions alike, continue to face collectively in managing risk. These challenges seem to persist, although they have been changing face. The high levels of uncertainty manifested in unprecedented levels of asset volatility in the years 2007-2009 emanated originally from liquidity shortages in the off-balance sheet management of highly complex assets. In late 2009 and 2010 we have seen again high levels of volatility, this time associated with concerns about the large fiscal imbalances in some EU Member States.
In both phases of the crisis, financial markets have reacted to the increasing fear that some market participants may fail to honour their obligations; they have in other words experienced an increase in credit risk. Under the general concept of credit risk I would include both the risk of default of issuers of securities held in portfolios as well the counterparty risk faced in over-the-counter transactions. Today I would like to share with you some thoughts on the management of such risks in general and in central banks in particular.
General principles in the management of credit risk
It is widely accepted (but not appropriately emphasised) that one of the causes of the deep financial crisis witnessed since mid 2007 has been the deviation from well established principles in the management of risk (in particular credit risk) by financial institutions. Common sense risk management practices such as “know your counterparties”, “invest only in products you understand”, “do not outsource credit risk management by relying exclusively on external credit assessments”, “do not rely exclusively on quantitative models, however sophisticated” had been abandoned. It is interesting to recall at this stage the work of the original Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group [1] co-chaired by E. Gerald Corrigan and Stephen G. Thieke which already in 1999 stressed that “better knowledge of one’s counterparty represents the foundation upon which the other pillars of risk management rest”. Re-establishing these principles in risk management practice is essential for the resilience of the financial system.
I would like to highlight in particular the trend witnessed in recent years for many market participants to exclusively rely on external assessments for the management of their credit risk. These assessments have been often provided by only a small number of specialised institutions (rating agencies). The critique on the role of rating agencies has become a recurring theme in all analysis of the current crisis. In addition to potential conflicts of interest embedded in their business models, rating agencies have faced questions on their methodology, in particular in the area of structured finance, and the lack of transparency in their activities. The ex-post assessment of the performance of their ratings in the last two years has raised serious concerns. At the same time the use of credit rating in legislation, regulations, and other supervisory policies is so widespread [2] that I would agree with the Financial Stability Forum which has questioned whether it is not these policies that unintentionally give credit ratings an official seal of approval and discourage investors from performing their own due diligence. This should certainly be one of the main concerns of regulatory authorities in the immediate future.
How central banks address credit risk
Central banks are unique as market participants because they do not face liquidity risk in their own currency. However, they are not immune to credit risk. Losses occurred because of a default of one of their counterparties or an issuer of a security they hold in their portfolio can deplete their financial buffers. Although their financial survival does not depend in any vital way on such buffers, their perceived lack of financial resources could irrevocably damage their credibility in the market and thus their ability to implement monetary policy and safeguard financial stability. Furthermore, if a recapitalisation of the central bank by the government becomes ultimately necessary, it could jeopardise the independence of the monetary authority.
In general central bank risk management is considered conservative, so that overall it could be perceived that the development of an elaborate risk management framework is not really necessary. However, the central bank becomes an above average risk taker in a crisis situation – first of all by showing inertia in its risk management framework. There is thus some fundamental transformation taking place in the risk tolerance of the central as it continues operating in a financial crisis when other market participants have long adopted a very conservative approach. At a time when all risk measures (probabilities of default of collateral issuers and counterparties, correlations, expected loss, VaR-measures) have gone up dramatically and financial institutions are cutting credit lines and are increasing margin requirements in the interbank market, the central bank becomes the lender of last resort. In such a situation its risk taking increases considerably. This suggests that the management of the central bank’s risk exposures is even more important in a crisis and requires, at least then, a very carefully designed risk management framework.
Credit assessment in the Eurosystem
The experience of the financial crisis has led the Eurosystem to solidify the already elaborate credit risk assessment framework it uses in its credit operations. Let me now give you some more information on the way the Eurosystem handles credit risk assessment in the context of its own credit operations. As you are probably aware, Article 18.1 of the Statute of the ESCB requires that all credit operations conducted by the ECB and the National Central Banks (NCBs) should be based on adequate collateral. In particular all such collateral must meet high credit standards.
The Eurosystem has defined an elaborate framework of credit assessment (the European Credit Assessment Framework – ECAF) to ensure that such standards are met. In the assessment of the credit standard of eligible assets, the Eurosystem takes into account credit assessment information from credit assessment systems belonging to different sources. Some of them are private, namely external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs), counterparties’ internal ratings based (IRB) systems and third-party providers’ rating tools (RTs). Others are public, namely the national central banks’ in-house credit assessment systems (ICASs), Additionally, in the assessment of the credit standard, the Eurosystem takes into account institutional criteria and features guaranteeing similar protection for the instrument holder such as guarantees.
The performance of all credit assessment systems that are accepted by the Eurosystem is closely monitored. On an annual basis the observed default rate for the set of all eligible debtors assessed by a particular system is compared to the credit quality threshold set by the Eurosystem. This way, the results from credit assessments are comparable across systems and sources.
With regard to the ECAI source, the Eurosystem does not automatically follow the assessments provided by a rating agency. First, any such assessment must be based on a public rating. Even then, the Eurosystem reserves the right to request any clarification that it considers necessary. In particular when it comes to asset-backed securities, a number of transparency requirements are imposed. Ratings must be explained in a publicly available credit rating report, namely a detailed pre-sale or new issue report, including, inter alia, a comprehensive analysis of structural and legal aspects, a detailed collateral pool assessment, an analysis of the transaction participants, as well as an analysis of any other relevant particularities of a transaction. Moreover ECAIs must publish regular surveillance reports for asset-backed containing an update of the key transaction data (e.g. composition of the collateral pool, transaction participants, capital structure), as well as performance data.
The need for better understanding of the underlying assets in securitised transactions was emphasised by the ECB when it launched a public consultation on loan-by-loan information requirements for asset-backed securities (ABSs) in the Eurosystem collateral framework. With this initiative, the ECB strives to promote an improvement of disclosure standards in securitisation markets from current levels. Such higher standards would contribute to avoiding the inadequate assessment of risks in the underlying asset pools of ABSs by investors and the exclusive dependence on third-party assessments that was at the core of the current crisis.
Finally, I would like to emphasise one important element of our framework. Despite the fact that the Eurosystem uses ECAI ratings as one of its credit assessments it still reserves the right to determine whether an asset fulfils the requirement for high credit standards on the basis of any information it may consider relevant from a risk management perspective. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that on 3 May 2010 the ECB decided to suspend the application of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations in the case of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. This suspension was based on the positive assessment on the side of the Governing Council of the ECB, in liaison with the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund of the Greek government’s economic and financial adjustment programme. The measure acknowledged therefore the strong commitment of the Greek government to fully implement the programme and was an example of the ability and will of the ECB to make an independent credit assessment.
The connection between credit and liquidity risk
While I have emphasised so far credit risk management, I would also like to touch upon the more elusive concept of liquidity risk. The current financial crisis has been triggered by the inability of some financial institutions to fund some complex assets. It has been traditionally thought that while such a situation may put the institution at strain, it should be clearly distinguished from that of an insolvency. However, the experience of the last three years has showed that the distinction is far from simple. A prolonged period of liquidity difficulties may easily leave no other choice to the institution than an emergency sale of assets at significant losses and a subsequent depletion of its capital position. Therefore a liquidity problem, if it cannot be properly addressed – possibly by the intervention of the central bank- can easily lead to insolvency.
In recognising the importance of liquidity risk and the systemic implications of a liquidity crisis, the Basel Committee issued a consultative document on an international framework for liquidity risk management, standards and monitoring in December 2010. The document put forward two liquidity risk standards and a set of tools for ongoing monitoring of liquidity risk exposures and information exchange among supervisors. The two standards, namely (i) a global minimum ‘liquidity coverage ratio’ which aims at capturing liquidity risk in the short term by ensuring that banks hold sufficient high quality liquid assets to withstand an acute stress lasting one month; and (ii) the longer term ‘net stable funding ratio’ which aims at incentivising banks to fund themselves using more stable sources on a structural basis by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity characteristics of the financial institution’s assets and activities over a one year time horizon.
A discussion has been triggered and various concerns were voiced on the calibration of the standards, which in the view of some could generate significant negative repercussions for the real economy, for certain markets (such as the money market and interbank market) and for the business models of some banks. Central in this discussion is the question on the set of assets considered eligible for the short-term liquidity standard. It has been claimed that the proposal is not in line with the severe stress scenario that is assumed and that it could lead to concentration risk as well as higher cost for the assets that are not included. Furthermore, the design of the longer-term standard was questioned, as it was argued that a higher level of mismatch between assets and liabilities is necessary for banks to fulfil their intermediation role in the economy.
The ECB has a particular interest on the Basel Committee proposal on liquidity risk as it relates to the implementation of monetary policy, has an impact on the money market, as well as possible consequences on the financial integration in the Euro area. Clearly the proposed liquidity standards address the major shortcomings identified by the financial crisis in the area of liquidity risk by requiring banks to increase their holdings of liquid assets and to reduce their reliance on short-term volatile funding sources. Furthermore, enhancing the liquidity risk management of banks could have a positive impact on market confidence, reducing thus the volatility in money and capital markets.
Still the calibration of the proposed liquidity standards needs to be revisited to take into account the comments received during the public consultation and their impact on the banking sector, financial markets and the overall economy. Finally, the establishment of an appropriate phase-in period that will allow banks to adjust their balance sheets without an undue impact on their operations or an increase in their reliance on central bank funding is warranted.
Conclusions
I would like to close my remarks by the rather pessimistic conclusion that, unfortunately, it appears that periods of “irrational exuberance” can lead us to forget well established practices on how to prudently manage risks. Financial crises like the current one remind us of their importance. Also central banks have learned valuable lessons in their own risk management and have made steps in solidifying their defences, while remaining faithful to their objectives of ensuring price stability while also safeguarding financial stability.
Thank you very much for your attention.
[1]Counterparty Risk Management Group: “Improving Counterparty Risk Management Practices”, June 1999
[2]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The Joint Forum: Stocktaking on the use of credit ratings
Risk Europe 2010, Frankfurt am Main, 26 May 2010
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure for me to address again this year, for the second time in a row, the annual Risk Europe conference here in Frankfurt. I would have liked to say that this simply shows the great importance that the ECB places in the development of sound and effective risk management practices in the financial industry. However, I must admit that my eagerness to address this forum is also a result of the great challenges that we, central banks and private financial institutions alike, continue to face collectively in managing risk. These challenges seem to persist, although they have been changing face. The high levels of uncertainty manifested in unprecedented levels of asset volatility in the years 2007-2009 emanated originally from liquidity shortages in the off-balance sheet management of highly complex assets. In late 2009 and 2010 we have seen again high levels of volatility, this time associated with concerns about the large fiscal imbalances in some EU Member States.
In both phases of the crisis, financial markets have reacted to the increasing fear that some market participants may fail to honour their obligations; they have in other words experienced an increase in credit risk. Under the general concept of credit risk I would include both the risk of default of issuers of securities held in portfolios as well the counterparty risk faced in over-the-counter transactions. Today I would like to share with you some thoughts on the management of such risks in general and in central banks in particular.
General principles in the management of credit risk
It is widely accepted (but not appropriately emphasised) that one of the causes of the deep financial crisis witnessed since mid 2007 has been the deviation from well established principles in the management of risk (in particular credit risk) by financial institutions. Common sense risk management practices such as “know your counterparties”, “invest only in products you understand”, “do not outsource credit risk management by relying exclusively on external credit assessments”, “do not rely exclusively on quantitative models, however sophisticated” had been abandoned. It is interesting to recall at this stage the work of the original Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group [1] co-chaired by E. Gerald Corrigan and Stephen G. Thieke which already in 1999 stressed that “better knowledge of one’s counterparty represents the foundation upon which the other pillars of risk management rest”. Re-establishing these principles in risk management practice is essential for the resilience of the financial system.
I would like to highlight in particular the trend witnessed in recent years for many market participants to exclusively rely on external assessments for the management of their credit risk. These assessments have been often provided by only a small number of specialised institutions (rating agencies). The critique on the role of rating agencies has become a recurring theme in all analysis of the current crisis. In addition to potential conflicts of interest embedded in their business models, rating agencies have faced questions on their methodology, in particular in the area of structured finance, and the lack of transparency in their activities. The ex-post assessment of the performance of their ratings in the last two years has raised serious concerns. At the same time the use of credit rating in legislation, regulations, and other supervisory policies is so widespread [2] that I would agree with the Financial Stability Forum which has questioned whether it is not these policies that unintentionally give credit ratings an official seal of approval and discourage investors from performing their own due diligence. This should certainly be one of the main concerns of regulatory authorities in the immediate future.
How central banks address credit risk
Central banks are unique as market participants because they do not face liquidity risk in their own currency. However, they are not immune to credit risk. Losses occurred because of a default of one of their counterparties or an issuer of a security they hold in their portfolio can deplete their financial buffers. Although their financial survival does not depend in any vital way on such buffers, their perceived lack of financial resources could irrevocably damage their credibility in the market and thus their ability to implement monetary policy and safeguard financial stability. Furthermore, if a recapitalisation of the central bank by the government becomes ultimately necessary, it could jeopardise the independence of the monetary authority.
In general central bank risk management is considered conservative, so that overall it could be perceived that the development of an elaborate risk management framework is not really necessary. However, the central bank becomes an above average risk taker in a crisis situation – first of all by showing inertia in its risk management framework. There is thus some fundamental transformation taking place in the risk tolerance of the central as it continues operating in a financial crisis when other market participants have long adopted a very conservative approach. At a time when all risk measures (probabilities of default of collateral issuers and counterparties, correlations, expected loss, VaR-measures) have gone up dramatically and financial institutions are cutting credit lines and are increasing margin requirements in the interbank market, the central bank becomes the lender of last resort. In such a situation its risk taking increases considerably. This suggests that the management of the central bank’s risk exposures is even more important in a crisis and requires, at least then, a very carefully designed risk management framework.
Credit assessment in the Eurosystem
The experience of the financial crisis has led the Eurosystem to solidify the already elaborate credit risk assessment framework it uses in its credit operations. Let me now give you some more information on the way the Eurosystem handles credit risk assessment in the context of its own credit operations. As you are probably aware, Article 18.1 of the Statute of the ESCB requires that all credit operations conducted by the ECB and the National Central Banks (NCBs) should be based on adequate collateral. In particular all such collateral must meet high credit standards.
The Eurosystem has defined an elaborate framework of credit assessment (the European Credit Assessment Framework – ECAF) to ensure that such standards are met. In the assessment of the credit standard of eligible assets, the Eurosystem takes into account credit assessment information from credit assessment systems belonging to different sources. Some of them are private, namely external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs), counterparties’ internal ratings based (IRB) systems and third-party providers’ rating tools (RTs). Others are public, namely the national central banks’ in-house credit assessment systems (ICASs), Additionally, in the assessment of the credit standard, the Eurosystem takes into account institutional criteria and features guaranteeing similar protection for the instrument holder such as guarantees.
The performance of all credit assessment systems that are accepted by the Eurosystem is closely monitored. On an annual basis the observed default rate for the set of all eligible debtors assessed by a particular system is compared to the credit quality threshold set by the Eurosystem. This way, the results from credit assessments are comparable across systems and sources.
With regard to the ECAI source, the Eurosystem does not automatically follow the assessments provided by a rating agency. First, any such assessment must be based on a public rating. Even then, the Eurosystem reserves the right to request any clarification that it considers necessary. In particular when it comes to asset-backed securities, a number of transparency requirements are imposed. Ratings must be explained in a publicly available credit rating report, namely a detailed pre-sale or new issue report, including, inter alia, a comprehensive analysis of structural and legal aspects, a detailed collateral pool assessment, an analysis of the transaction participants, as well as an analysis of any other relevant particularities of a transaction. Moreover ECAIs must publish regular surveillance reports for asset-backed containing an update of the key transaction data (e.g. composition of the collateral pool, transaction participants, capital structure), as well as performance data.
The need for better understanding of the underlying assets in securitised transactions was emphasised by the ECB when it launched a public consultation on loan-by-loan information requirements for asset-backed securities (ABSs) in the Eurosystem collateral framework. With this initiative, the ECB strives to promote an improvement of disclosure standards in securitisation markets from current levels. Such higher standards would contribute to avoiding the inadequate assessment of risks in the underlying asset pools of ABSs by investors and the exclusive dependence on third-party assessments that was at the core of the current crisis.
Finally, I would like to emphasise one important element of our framework. Despite the fact that the Eurosystem uses ECAI ratings as one of its credit assessments it still reserves the right to determine whether an asset fulfils the requirement for high credit standards on the basis of any information it may consider relevant from a risk management perspective. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that on 3 May 2010 the ECB decided to suspend the application of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations in the case of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. This suspension was based on the positive assessment on the side of the Governing Council of the ECB, in liaison with the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund of the Greek government’s economic and financial adjustment programme. The measure acknowledged therefore the strong commitment of the Greek government to fully implement the programme and was an example of the ability and will of the ECB to make an independent credit assessment.
The connection between credit and liquidity risk
While I have emphasised so far credit risk management, I would also like to touch upon the more elusive concept of liquidity risk. The current financial crisis has been triggered by the inability of some financial institutions to fund some complex assets. It has been traditionally thought that while such a situation may put the institution at strain, it should be clearly distinguished from that of an insolvency. However, the experience of the last three years has showed that the distinction is far from simple. A prolonged period of liquidity difficulties may easily leave no other choice to the institution than an emergency sale of assets at significant losses and a subsequent depletion of its capital position. Therefore a liquidity problem, if it cannot be properly addressed – possibly by the intervention of the central bank- can easily lead to insolvency.
In recognising the importance of liquidity risk and the systemic implications of a liquidity crisis, the Basel Committee issued a consultative document on an international framework for liquidity risk management, standards and monitoring in December 2010. The document put forward two liquidity risk standards and a set of tools for ongoing monitoring of liquidity risk exposures and information exchange among supervisors. The two standards, namely (i) a global minimum ‘liquidity coverage ratio’ which aims at capturing liquidity risk in the short term by ensuring that banks hold sufficient high quality liquid assets to withstand an acute stress lasting one month; and (ii) the longer term ‘net stable funding ratio’ which aims at incentivising banks to fund themselves using more stable sources on a structural basis by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity characteristics of the financial institution’s assets and activities over a one year time horizon.
A discussion has been triggered and various concerns were voiced on the calibration of the standards, which in the view of some could generate significant negative repercussions for the real economy, for certain markets (such as the money market and interbank market) and for the business models of some banks. Central in this discussion is the question on the set of assets considered eligible for the short-term liquidity standard. It has been claimed that the proposal is not in line with the severe stress scenario that is assumed and that it could lead to concentration risk as well as higher cost for the assets that are not included. Furthermore, the design of the longer-term standard was questioned, as it was argued that a higher level of mismatch between assets and liabilities is necessary for banks to fulfil their intermediation role in the economy.
The ECB has a particular interest on the Basel Committee proposal on liquidity risk as it relates to the implementation of monetary policy, has an impact on the money market, as well as possible consequences on the financial integration in the Euro area. Clearly the proposed liquidity standards address the major shortcomings identified by the financial crisis in the area of liquidity risk by requiring banks to increase their holdings of liquid assets and to reduce their reliance on short-term volatile funding sources. Furthermore, enhancing the liquidity risk management of banks could have a positive impact on market confidence, reducing thus the volatility in money and capital markets.
Still the calibration of the proposed liquidity standards needs to be revisited to take into account the comments received during the public consultation and their impact on the banking sector, financial markets and the overall economy. Finally, the establishment of an appropriate phase-in period that will allow banks to adjust their balance sheets without an undue impact on their operations or an increase in their reliance on central bank funding is warranted.
Conclusions
I would like to close my remarks by the rather pessimistic conclusion that, unfortunately, it appears that periods of “irrational exuberance” can lead us to forget well established practices on how to prudently manage risks. Financial crises like the current one remind us of their importance. Also central banks have learned valuable lessons in their own risk management and have made steps in solidifying their defences, while remaining faithful to their objectives of ensuring price stability while also safeguarding financial stability.
Thank you very much for your attention.
[1]Counterparty Risk Management Group: “Improving Counterparty Risk Management Practices”, June 1999
[2]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The Joint Forum: Stocktaking on the use of credit ratings
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 |
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European Mobile Working Solutions Held Back By Cost Control Concerns
A new research study on mobile working has revealed that nearly 60 % of European multinationals currently have limited or no mobile working capabilities in place, with managers concerned about pricing predictability and the impact on corporate culture as two of the key barriers to adoption.
According to a pan-European study undertaken by Vodafone Global Enterprise - the Vodafone business that manages the telecoms needs of multinational enterprise customers - only two fifths (41%) of the 500 multinationals surveyed said they had a comprehensive mobile working solution in place. A further 44% said it was an important priority, while one sixth (15%) said they did not have a plan to initiate mobile working.
The study asked respondents what they thought were the main reasons behind companies not embracing mobile working solutions. 70% of respondents highlighted fears that differing tariff structures across many different markets would prove complex to manage. Other fears included a deterioration of productivity and the security implications of corporate applications being widely used on mobile devices.
However, large businesses are becoming more mobile and the study identified a strong desire amongst European enterprise employees for mobile working capabilities. Almost three quarters of firms (70%) said their employees wanted the option of flexible working.
This survey reinforces the considerable opportunity for providers of managed mobile solutions such as Vodafone Global Enterprise, which has recently expanded its client base to around 575 multi-national corporations and reported revenues of £1.1bn in the year to 31 March 2010.
According to a pan-European study undertaken by Vodafone Global Enterprise - the Vodafone business that manages the telecoms needs of multinational enterprise customers - only two fifths (41%) of the 500 multinationals surveyed said they had a comprehensive mobile working solution in place. A further 44% said it was an important priority, while one sixth (15%) said they did not have a plan to initiate mobile working.
The study asked respondents what they thought were the main reasons behind companies not embracing mobile working solutions. 70% of respondents highlighted fears that differing tariff structures across many different markets would prove complex to manage. Other fears included a deterioration of productivity and the security implications of corporate applications being widely used on mobile devices.
However, large businesses are becoming more mobile and the study identified a strong desire amongst European enterprise employees for mobile working capabilities. Almost three quarters of firms (70%) said their employees wanted the option of flexible working.
This survey reinforces the considerable opportunity for providers of managed mobile solutions such as Vodafone Global Enterprise, which has recently expanded its client base to around 575 multi-national corporations and reported revenues of £1.1bn in the year to 31 March 2010.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 |
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Stock, Oil Prices Hammered By Korean Tensions, European Debt
Prices fell sharply on Asian and European stock markets Tuesday, as investors worried that the European debt crisis and tensions between North and South Korea could hurt the economy. U.S. stock indexes were down for a while, losing as much as three percent before recovering to end the day with little change.
Worried investors sold euros and sought the perceived safety of dollars, which had the effect of cutting world oil prices more than $2 a barrel at one point in New York trading.
The downturn was partly triggered by reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had put his military on higher alert after South Korea accused the North of sinking a South Korean ship.
The Korean tensions add to worries about Europe's debt problems affecting Greece and other nations. Those concerns grew Monday as the International Monetary Fund urged Spain to make urgent reforms to its labor market and banking sector. Spanish officials had just finished taking over a failing bank.
Europe's problems were discussed by top Chinese and U.S. officials in talks on economic issues in Beijing Tuesday. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Washington and Beijing support Europe's policy reforms and other efforts to cope with the crisis.
Source: VOA
Worried investors sold euros and sought the perceived safety of dollars, which had the effect of cutting world oil prices more than $2 a barrel at one point in New York trading.
The downturn was partly triggered by reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had put his military on higher alert after South Korea accused the North of sinking a South Korean ship.
The Korean tensions add to worries about Europe's debt problems affecting Greece and other nations. Those concerns grew Monday as the International Monetary Fund urged Spain to make urgent reforms to its labor market and banking sector. Spanish officials had just finished taking over a failing bank.
Europe's problems were discussed by top Chinese and U.S. officials in talks on economic issues in Beijing Tuesday. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Washington and Beijing support Europe's policy reforms and other efforts to cope with the crisis.
Source: VOA
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Bulgarian Extradited From Poland To US For Money Laundering Scheme
A Bulgarian man appeared in federal court in the District of Columbia today to face charges related to his alleged role in managing a money laundering network for a transnational criminal group based in Eastern Europe, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division.
According to court documents, in less than one year, the criminal conspiracy allegedly netted nearly $1 million from U.S. victims.
Georgi Vasilev Pletnyov, 49, of Svishtov, Bulgaria, was extradited from Poland to the United States on Friday, May 21, 2010. U.S. Magistrate Judge Alan Kay today ordered Pletnyov detained pending a hearing scheduled for May 28, 2010. Pletnyov is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
According to the indictment, Pletnyov allegedly participated in a scheme that operated from July 2005 through May 2006, which involved the posting of advertisements on eBay and other websites, fraudulently offering expensive vehicles and boats for sale that the conspirators did not possess. The indictment alleges that when the U.S. victims expressed interest in the merchandise, they were contacted directly by an e-mail from a purported seller. According to the indictment, the victims allegedly were then instructed to wire transfer payments through “eBay Secure Traders”—an entity which has no actual affiliation to eBay but was used as a ruse to persuade the victims that they were sending money into a secure escrow account pending delivery and inspection of their purchases. Instead, the victims’ funds allegedly were wired directly into bank accounts in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland that were controlled by co-conspirators.
Pletnyov was originally charged on Jan. 9, 2008, along with five additional defendants: Roman Teodor, Ivaylo Vasilev Pletnyov, Nikolay Georgiev Minchev, Georgi Boychev Georgiev and Antoaneta Angelova Getova. On Dec. 2, 2009, Ivaylo Vasilev Pletnyov and Nikolay Georgiev Minchev were sentenced to four years and 30 months in prison, respectively, for their roles in the money laundering conspiracy. Georgiev pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering on May 13, 2010, and is scheduled to be sentenced on July 23, 2010. The United States continues to work with foreign counterparts regarding the remaining defendants.
An indictment is merely an accusation and the defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
This investigation was conducted by the FBI – Hungarian National Bureau of Investigation Organized Crime Task Force located in Budapest, Hungary (Budapest Task Force). The Budapest Task Force was established by the FBI in April 2000 to address the increasing threat of Eurasian organized crime groups to the United States.
According to court documents, in less than one year, the criminal conspiracy allegedly netted nearly $1 million from U.S. victims.
Georgi Vasilev Pletnyov, 49, of Svishtov, Bulgaria, was extradited from Poland to the United States on Friday, May 21, 2010. U.S. Magistrate Judge Alan Kay today ordered Pletnyov detained pending a hearing scheduled for May 28, 2010. Pletnyov is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
According to the indictment, Pletnyov allegedly participated in a scheme that operated from July 2005 through May 2006, which involved the posting of advertisements on eBay and other websites, fraudulently offering expensive vehicles and boats for sale that the conspirators did not possess. The indictment alleges that when the U.S. victims expressed interest in the merchandise, they were contacted directly by an e-mail from a purported seller. According to the indictment, the victims allegedly were then instructed to wire transfer payments through “eBay Secure Traders”—an entity which has no actual affiliation to eBay but was used as a ruse to persuade the victims that they were sending money into a secure escrow account pending delivery and inspection of their purchases. Instead, the victims’ funds allegedly were wired directly into bank accounts in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland that were controlled by co-conspirators.
Pletnyov was originally charged on Jan. 9, 2008, along with five additional defendants: Roman Teodor, Ivaylo Vasilev Pletnyov, Nikolay Georgiev Minchev, Georgi Boychev Georgiev and Antoaneta Angelova Getova. On Dec. 2, 2009, Ivaylo Vasilev Pletnyov and Nikolay Georgiev Minchev were sentenced to four years and 30 months in prison, respectively, for their roles in the money laundering conspiracy. Georgiev pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering on May 13, 2010, and is scheduled to be sentenced on July 23, 2010. The United States continues to work with foreign counterparts regarding the remaining defendants.
An indictment is merely an accusation and the defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
This investigation was conducted by the FBI – Hungarian National Bureau of Investigation Organized Crime Task Force located in Budapest, Hungary (Budapest Task Force). The Budapest Task Force was established by the FBI in April 2000 to address the increasing threat of Eurasian organized crime groups to the United States.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Turkey's 'Ghandi' Takes The Reins, Promising To March To Power
By Robert Tait
(RFE/RL) -- His tranquil demeanor has earned him the moniker "Ghandi." But Kemal Kilicdaroglu will need to show an altogether more pugnacious face if he is to meet the rising tide of optimism unleashed by his election as leader of Turkey's main opposition party.
In just a few days, this unprepossessing mustachioed former civil servant has been transformed from obscurity into a potent symbol of hope that the long-dormant Republic People's Party (CHP) can complete the long march from opposition to the corridors of power that were its intended destiny when it was established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey's founder, nearly 90 years ago.
Kilicdaroglu, 62, assumed the burden of expectation from the country's secularist center-left after being elected party leader last weekend to replace the disgraced Deniz Baykal, who stepped down this month over the release of a video that appeared to show him having a sexual liaison with his former secretary.
His elevation defied efforts by Baykal supporters to engineer his return to the leadership and confounded expectations that the post would go to one of the former leader's loyal lieutenants.
Now commentators are lauding Kilicdaroglu as the man who can transform the CHP from the bedraggled time-warped outfit over which Baykal presided -- when the party, belying its supposed social-democratic identity, became identified with chauvinistic nationalism, intolerance of minorities, and elitism. Baykal, 71, was widely perceived to have become a barrier to reform -- and to winning power -- by adopting intransigent attitudes.
In a barnstorming acceptance speech, Kilicdaroglu fed hopes that change was at hand by vowing to take the party back to government and launching a vitriolic attack on Turkey's imperious prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom he belittled by calling "Mr. Recep." He also promised to target the corruption he said Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had ushered in and to focus on helping the poor.
Taking On The AKP...And CHP
The euphoria surrounding Kilicdaroglu has caught the Islamist-rooted AKP, in power since 2002, off-guard. From concentrating on a constitutional reform package designed to weaken the twin secularist bastions of the judiciary and the military, the party now appears suddenly worried about losing office at the next election, which must take place no later than next year. Seemingly rattled, Erdogan has warned of dispossessed establishment "oligarchs" seeking to regain their former power.
Soli Ozel, a political scientist at Istanbul Bilgi University, says Kilicdaroglu now has the opportunity to restore the CHP to a governing status it has not enjoyed for decades.
"It's quite obvious that the government is feeling very uncomfortable about this new development and there is no doubt in my mind that there is demand for change in the country," Ozel says, "partially because of AKP fatigue, partially because there are so many problems that have not been solved and partially because the arrogance of the AKP, after so many years in power, is finally getting to people."
Yet the optimism over Kilicdaroglu's could turn out to be a false dawn. "There is no question that there is an incredible, almost storm of hope, but how prepared he is we don't know," Ozel says.
For example, Ozel says that "on foreign policy his speech was rather miserable." While he says Kilicdaroglu represents "a hope for change," the CHP "is a very difficult body to change. I personally wish him well, but I think he is going to have a very hard time to do whatever it is he wants to do."
Baykal Looms In The Background
One cause for concern is the continuing influence of Baykal and his cohorts over the party's direction. After his election, Kilicdaroglu cemented his leadership by purging Baykal loyalists from senior office-holding positions -- from which they were running the CHP "like members of the politburo," in the words of one reformer, Bedri Baykam -- and replacing them with modernizers.
However, he heavily owes his position to the machinations of the CHP secretary-general, Onder Sav, who swung behind Kilicdaroglu's candidacy and thereby ruled out the return of Baykal. In owing Sav, Kilicdaroglu is indebted to one of the party's most powerful old-guard figures who is also one of Baykal's oldest friends and allies.
Nor has Baykal himself left the stage. Even Kilicdaroglu's supporters acknowledge that he will need to tap the vast experience Baykal gained in 19 years as party leader to get a grip on the CHP apparatus.
Baykal's looming shadow might be bad news for those like reformist Baykam, who blames the former leader for driving away party supporters who are now being tempted back by Kilicdaroglu.
"He did not care about people who had resigned, people who had left politics because they felt they were left aside, people who had gone to other parties, people that were even fired from the CHP," Baykam says. "Kilicdaroglu has brought such a wave that all these persons are coming back."
In a series of interviews on Turkish television, Baykal has pledged to continue influencing events. "Making politics doesn't just mean engaging in politics as a party leader. Only my room has changed. I will continue to make politics," he told CNN Turk.
His TV appearances have reinforced fears that the conservative forces some modernizers have dubbed as "Baykalism" will remain predominant, even under Kilicdaroglu. Baykam accuses the former leader of misleadingly claiming that the CHP's sudden revival is unconnected with his resignation.
"He tries to present it to the general public that we were on our way up anyway," Baykam says. "But the reality is, of course that his resigning did boost the CHP."
The "Ghandi" show may be the only one in town for the moment. But the performance lines of his predecessor have not been forgotten.
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
(RFE/RL) -- His tranquil demeanor has earned him the moniker "Ghandi." But Kemal Kilicdaroglu will need to show an altogether more pugnacious face if he is to meet the rising tide of optimism unleashed by his election as leader of Turkey's main opposition party.
In just a few days, this unprepossessing mustachioed former civil servant has been transformed from obscurity into a potent symbol of hope that the long-dormant Republic People's Party (CHP) can complete the long march from opposition to the corridors of power that were its intended destiny when it was established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey's founder, nearly 90 years ago.
Kilicdaroglu, 62, assumed the burden of expectation from the country's secularist center-left after being elected party leader last weekend to replace the disgraced Deniz Baykal, who stepped down this month over the release of a video that appeared to show him having a sexual liaison with his former secretary.
His elevation defied efforts by Baykal supporters to engineer his return to the leadership and confounded expectations that the post would go to one of the former leader's loyal lieutenants.
Now commentators are lauding Kilicdaroglu as the man who can transform the CHP from the bedraggled time-warped outfit over which Baykal presided -- when the party, belying its supposed social-democratic identity, became identified with chauvinistic nationalism, intolerance of minorities, and elitism. Baykal, 71, was widely perceived to have become a barrier to reform -- and to winning power -- by adopting intransigent attitudes.
In a barnstorming acceptance speech, Kilicdaroglu fed hopes that change was at hand by vowing to take the party back to government and launching a vitriolic attack on Turkey's imperious prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom he belittled by calling "Mr. Recep." He also promised to target the corruption he said Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had ushered in and to focus on helping the poor.
Taking On The AKP...And CHP
The euphoria surrounding Kilicdaroglu has caught the Islamist-rooted AKP, in power since 2002, off-guard. From concentrating on a constitutional reform package designed to weaken the twin secularist bastions of the judiciary and the military, the party now appears suddenly worried about losing office at the next election, which must take place no later than next year. Seemingly rattled, Erdogan has warned of dispossessed establishment "oligarchs" seeking to regain their former power.
Soli Ozel, a political scientist at Istanbul Bilgi University, says Kilicdaroglu now has the opportunity to restore the CHP to a governing status it has not enjoyed for decades.
"It's quite obvious that the government is feeling very uncomfortable about this new development and there is no doubt in my mind that there is demand for change in the country," Ozel says, "partially because of AKP fatigue, partially because there are so many problems that have not been solved and partially because the arrogance of the AKP, after so many years in power, is finally getting to people."
Yet the optimism over Kilicdaroglu's could turn out to be a false dawn. "There is no question that there is an incredible, almost storm of hope, but how prepared he is we don't know," Ozel says.
For example, Ozel says that "on foreign policy his speech was rather miserable." While he says Kilicdaroglu represents "a hope for change," the CHP "is a very difficult body to change. I personally wish him well, but I think he is going to have a very hard time to do whatever it is he wants to do."
Baykal Looms In The Background
One cause for concern is the continuing influence of Baykal and his cohorts over the party's direction. After his election, Kilicdaroglu cemented his leadership by purging Baykal loyalists from senior office-holding positions -- from which they were running the CHP "like members of the politburo," in the words of one reformer, Bedri Baykam -- and replacing them with modernizers.
However, he heavily owes his position to the machinations of the CHP secretary-general, Onder Sav, who swung behind Kilicdaroglu's candidacy and thereby ruled out the return of Baykal. In owing Sav, Kilicdaroglu is indebted to one of the party's most powerful old-guard figures who is also one of Baykal's oldest friends and allies.
Nor has Baykal himself left the stage. Even Kilicdaroglu's supporters acknowledge that he will need to tap the vast experience Baykal gained in 19 years as party leader to get a grip on the CHP apparatus.
Baykal's looming shadow might be bad news for those like reformist Baykam, who blames the former leader for driving away party supporters who are now being tempted back by Kilicdaroglu.
"He did not care about people who had resigned, people who had left politics because they felt they were left aside, people who had gone to other parties, people that were even fired from the CHP," Baykam says. "Kilicdaroglu has brought such a wave that all these persons are coming back."
In a series of interviews on Turkish television, Baykal has pledged to continue influencing events. "Making politics doesn't just mean engaging in politics as a party leader. Only my room has changed. I will continue to make politics," he told CNN Turk.
His TV appearances have reinforced fears that the conservative forces some modernizers have dubbed as "Baykalism" will remain predominant, even under Kilicdaroglu. Baykam accuses the former leader of misleadingly claiming that the CHP's sudden revival is unconnected with his resignation.
"He tries to present it to the general public that we were on our way up anyway," Baykam says. "But the reality is, of course that his resigning did boost the CHP."
The "Ghandi" show may be the only one in town for the moment. But the performance lines of his predecessor have not been forgotten.
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Lafarge And Strabag To Create Cement JV In Central Europe
Lafarge, a leader in building materials, and Strabag, Central and Eastern Europe's largest construction company, are combining their cement activities in several countries of Central Europe.
The two companies signed an agreement on May 25, 2010 creating the holding company Lafarge Cement CE Holding GmbH. The new company will have its headquarters in Austria.
Lafarge will bring its cement plants at Mannersdorf and Retznei in Austria, Cížkovice in Czech Republic and Trbovlje in Slovenia into the holding, while STRABAG will contribute the plant it is currently building in Pécs in Hungary. Lafarge then will hold a 70% interest in the new company, while Strabag will hold 30%. As a result of this transaction, Lafarge debt will be reduced by 77.5 million euros.
Lafarge Cement CE Holding GmbH will have a total annual production capacity of 4.8 million tonnes of cement. These construction materials will be sold under the Lafarge brand name in all countries.
By joining their activities on the Austrian, Czech, Slovak, Slovenian and Hungarian markets, the two companies expect significant synergies in terms of investment and cost.
"The deal helps us to secure exactly the amount of cement we need in a year, namely 1.5 million tonnes, in just those countries in which we need it. It also allows us to achieve economies of scale in procurement and administration and to profit from the know-how of the global cement market leader," Strabag CEO Dr. Hans Peter Haselsteiner says in explanation of the strategy.
Bruno Lafont, Chairman and CEO of Lafarge commented "with this common company, we are really combining the strengths of two leaders on their respective markets. This strategic move will allow both companies to better cross their respective understanding and knowledge of customers' needs and producer capabilities; as a consequence, we believe it will contribute to product and services development in the near future and will be a benefit to our customers. Thanks to the larger industrial network created, we will also have value creation opportunities, notably through logistics optimization."
Pending the approval by the relevant competition authorities, the company would become operational January 1st, 2011. It will be fully consolidated by Lafarge and at equity by Strabag.
The two companies signed an agreement on May 25, 2010 creating the holding company Lafarge Cement CE Holding GmbH. The new company will have its headquarters in Austria.
Lafarge will bring its cement plants at Mannersdorf and Retznei in Austria, Cížkovice in Czech Republic and Trbovlje in Slovenia into the holding, while STRABAG will contribute the plant it is currently building in Pécs in Hungary. Lafarge then will hold a 70% interest in the new company, while Strabag will hold 30%. As a result of this transaction, Lafarge debt will be reduced by 77.5 million euros.
Lafarge Cement CE Holding GmbH will have a total annual production capacity of 4.8 million tonnes of cement. These construction materials will be sold under the Lafarge brand name in all countries.
By joining their activities on the Austrian, Czech, Slovak, Slovenian and Hungarian markets, the two companies expect significant synergies in terms of investment and cost.
"The deal helps us to secure exactly the amount of cement we need in a year, namely 1.5 million tonnes, in just those countries in which we need it. It also allows us to achieve economies of scale in procurement and administration and to profit from the know-how of the global cement market leader," Strabag CEO Dr. Hans Peter Haselsteiner says in explanation of the strategy.
Bruno Lafont, Chairman and CEO of Lafarge commented "with this common company, we are really combining the strengths of two leaders on their respective markets. This strategic move will allow both companies to better cross their respective understanding and knowledge of customers' needs and producer capabilities; as a consequence, we believe it will contribute to product and services development in the near future and will be a benefit to our customers. Thanks to the larger industrial network created, we will also have value creation opportunities, notably through logistics optimization."
Pending the approval by the relevant competition authorities, the company would become operational January 1st, 2011. It will be fully consolidated by Lafarge and at equity by Strabag.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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EU Digital Agenda And The Need For Better Infrastructures
The Spanish Secretary of State for Telecommunications and Information Society, Francisco Ros, has taken part at the opening of the World Congress on Information Technology in Amsterdam, with a speech on the Granada Strategy.
Ros highlighted the main points of the declaration approved in Granada last month by the EU Telecommunications and Information Society ministers vis-a-vis the implementation of the new European Digital Agenda, which should be adopted prior to the conclusion of the six month term of the Spanish Presidency.
The strategy aims to overcome the digital divide and achieve 100% broad band coverage for all citizens in 2013. It also includes the adoption of high-speed communications by 2020, the rollout of efficient, new-generation networks, together with the implementation of a predictable regulatory framework.The strategy also involves the development of data protection measures.
Furthermore, the strategy also includes the drafting and dissemination of the Digital Rights Charter, the creation of a single market for content and e-Commerce, the development of interoperable digital public services and innovation in ICTs in areas in which Europe has greatest market potential.
In short, the Spanish Secretary of State advocated more and better infrastructures, capable of hosting multiple and higher quality online services in a unified and trusted market.These services are required to attract the necessary combined demand and to encourage the wide-ranging introduction of these technologies.
This process will generate more revenues, necessary for investment in upgrading the existing infrastructures and to develop new-generation networks: the so-called ’virtuous circle of the Digital Agenda’.
The Secretary of State also made reference to sustainability. It is calculated that by 2020, the intelligent use of ICTs in industrial sectors may help reduce CO2 emissions in Europe by 15%, which, in financial terms equates to a saving of over 600 million Euros.
The WCIT, considered the most important world event in the field of ICTs, is organised by the World Information Technologies and Services Alliance with support from the European Commission, under the auspices of the ICT Office, and co-organised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands and Amsterdam City Council.
Ros highlighted the main points of the declaration approved in Granada last month by the EU Telecommunications and Information Society ministers vis-a-vis the implementation of the new European Digital Agenda, which should be adopted prior to the conclusion of the six month term of the Spanish Presidency.
The strategy aims to overcome the digital divide and achieve 100% broad band coverage for all citizens in 2013. It also includes the adoption of high-speed communications by 2020, the rollout of efficient, new-generation networks, together with the implementation of a predictable regulatory framework.The strategy also involves the development of data protection measures.
Furthermore, the strategy also includes the drafting and dissemination of the Digital Rights Charter, the creation of a single market for content and e-Commerce, the development of interoperable digital public services and innovation in ICTs in areas in which Europe has greatest market potential.
In short, the Spanish Secretary of State advocated more and better infrastructures, capable of hosting multiple and higher quality online services in a unified and trusted market.These services are required to attract the necessary combined demand and to encourage the wide-ranging introduction of these technologies.
This process will generate more revenues, necessary for investment in upgrading the existing infrastructures and to develop new-generation networks: the so-called ’virtuous circle of the Digital Agenda’.
The Secretary of State also made reference to sustainability. It is calculated that by 2020, the intelligent use of ICTs in industrial sectors may help reduce CO2 emissions in Europe by 15%, which, in financial terms equates to a saving of over 600 million Euros.
The WCIT, considered the most important world event in the field of ICTs, is organised by the World Information Technologies and Services Alliance with support from the European Commission, under the auspices of the ICT Office, and co-organised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands and Amsterdam City Council.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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