Ruling Party Expected To Win Ethiopian Elections
By Heather Murdock
Ethiopians are voting in the first national election since 2005, when almost 200 people were killed in post-election violence. Voter turnout appears high despite opposition allegations of fraud and intimidation.
This man, wearing a paper yellow visor, points a stick at a ballot, blown up so a small group of voters can see it, while he issues instructions. He tells voters to mark symbols like a bee for the ruling party, and a "thumbs up" for one of the leading opposition parties before putting their ballots in the box.
The election for Ethiopia's 547 national parliament seats will determine which party gets to form a government and select the head of state. Nearly everyone believes that the country's ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, will have another landslide victory.
The governing EPRDF, lead by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, has ruled Ethiopia since ousting the former regime in 1991. Since then, the EPRDF has dominated three elections.
In 2005, after allegations that the ruling party had stolen the elections, almost 200 protesters were killed, and more than 100 opposition leaders, activists and journalists were arrested by the government. Two years later, almost all of the detainees were pardoned.
Today, 180 European Union observers and 60 from the African Union are visiting poling stations across the nation. Chief Observer Thijs Berman says it is too early to say if emerging reports of voter intimidation are accurate.
"There are, just like in the campaign period allegations, of course, but I do not know to which extent and how serious they are," Berman said. "I have no idea."
But opposition leader Hailu Shawel, who heads the All Ethiopian Unity Organization, calls the election "ridiculous." He accuses the ruling party of intimidating voters, scaring away election observers and preparing pre-marked ballots.
"They want to be there forever," Hailu said. "Why they held an election is what surprised me. I thought they wanted to make amends for the past. They want to do something more sensible, but they just want power, that is it - at any cost."
Outside the polls, voters, even those that openly support opposition parties, seemed more confident in the election process. Many say they believe their ballots are confidential, and that their votes will be counted. Others say the ruling party is in power because it is popular, not because it rigs elections.
Last night in the bustling Haya Hulet market, Zoudit Tesfae waited for her jacket to be tailored, and said she was planning to vote for the ruling party because she prefers stability to change.
Zoutit says before the EPRDF took over the country, Ethiopia was a dictatorship, and her parents had to hide her sons, lest they be forced to fight in one of many wars. She did not object to the other parties running in today's election, but said Ethiopia had developed a lot in the past 19 years, and she does not want a new government to have to "start from scratch."
Source: VOA
Ethiopians are voting in the first national election since 2005, when almost 200 people were killed in post-election violence. Voter turnout appears high despite opposition allegations of fraud and intimidation.
This man, wearing a paper yellow visor, points a stick at a ballot, blown up so a small group of voters can see it, while he issues instructions. He tells voters to mark symbols like a bee for the ruling party, and a "thumbs up" for one of the leading opposition parties before putting their ballots in the box.
The election for Ethiopia's 547 national parliament seats will determine which party gets to form a government and select the head of state. Nearly everyone believes that the country's ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, will have another landslide victory.
The governing EPRDF, lead by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, has ruled Ethiopia since ousting the former regime in 1991. Since then, the EPRDF has dominated three elections.
In 2005, after allegations that the ruling party had stolen the elections, almost 200 protesters were killed, and more than 100 opposition leaders, activists and journalists were arrested by the government. Two years later, almost all of the detainees were pardoned.
Today, 180 European Union observers and 60 from the African Union are visiting poling stations across the nation. Chief Observer Thijs Berman says it is too early to say if emerging reports of voter intimidation are accurate.
"There are, just like in the campaign period allegations, of course, but I do not know to which extent and how serious they are," Berman said. "I have no idea."
But opposition leader Hailu Shawel, who heads the All Ethiopian Unity Organization, calls the election "ridiculous." He accuses the ruling party of intimidating voters, scaring away election observers and preparing pre-marked ballots.
"They want to be there forever," Hailu said. "Why they held an election is what surprised me. I thought they wanted to make amends for the past. They want to do something more sensible, but they just want power, that is it - at any cost."
Outside the polls, voters, even those that openly support opposition parties, seemed more confident in the election process. Many say they believe their ballots are confidential, and that their votes will be counted. Others say the ruling party is in power because it is popular, not because it rigs elections.
Last night in the bustling Haya Hulet market, Zoudit Tesfae waited for her jacket to be tailored, and said she was planning to vote for the ruling party because she prefers stability to change.
Zoutit says before the EPRDF took over the country, Ethiopia was a dictatorship, and her parents had to hide her sons, lest they be forced to fight in one of many wars. She did not object to the other parties running in today's election, but said Ethiopia had developed a lot in the past 19 years, and she does not want a new government to have to "start from scratch."
Source: VOA
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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Nigeria: Debate On Pedophilia, Sharia Law And The ‘Two' Nigerias
By Eremipagamo Amabebe
The headline is tabloid-esque: Nigerian senator marries 13-year-old girl. Like so much of the recent news from Nigeria, it seems more worthy of a Nollywood script than the political landscape of Africa's most populous country. And, also like so much of the news from Nigeria, the lurid drama making the rounds of international headlines is only the tip of a complex political iceberg.
The details of the story are as follows: Ahmad Sani Yerima, senator and former governor of Zamfara State in Northern Nigeria, was accused several weeks ago of marrying a 13-year old Egyptian girl. More details quickly emerged – Yerima reportedly paid the girl's parents US$100,000 in dowry, the girl's father was Yerima's cab driver, the marriage had to be performed in Nigeria to avoid legal repercussions in Egypt. Bloggers, activists, lawyers and medical professionals protested vehemently as the story developed. Women's rights organizations feared for the girl's health, saying she would be exposed vesicovaginal fistula (VVF). Human rights groups pointed to the incident as a case of child trafficking.
In an era when the “clash of civilizations” has captured the public imagination and terrorism dominates the international agenda, it can be difficult to disentangle the personal from the political. Yerima has long been controversial for straddling this divide: he was among the leaders that re-introduced Sharia law in Northern Nigeria, and in 2006 came under fire for marrying a 15-year-old girl, whom he divorced two years later. Nigeria's population is roughly divided between a Muslim-majority North and a Christian-majority South, a balance which has been strained by several incidents in the past few months. Yerima's marriage has played into this divide, he justifies the union as being sanctioned by Islam. “I don't care about the issue of age since I have not violated any rule as far as Islam is concerned” he told the BBC – a provocative claim in Nigeria's already charged atmosphere.
Expressing the sentiments of many bloggers, Adeola wrote that religion should not be pulled into what is essentially a question of children's rights:
Writing in This Day, Funke Aboyade responded:
Eremipagamo Amabebe is a writer, researcher, and editor currently based in Germany and the United States. She is interested in topics where politics, culture, and media intersect – in the past she has received grants to research Nigeria's “Nollywood” film industry and Germany's contemporary political cinema. She received her bachelor's degree from Columbia University, after which she spent a year as a visiting scholar at Humboldt University in Berlin and completed her master's in International Relations. Follow her on twitter here. This article was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
The headline is tabloid-esque: Nigerian senator marries 13-year-old girl. Like so much of the recent news from Nigeria, it seems more worthy of a Nollywood script than the political landscape of Africa's most populous country. And, also like so much of the news from Nigeria, the lurid drama making the rounds of international headlines is only the tip of a complex political iceberg.
The details of the story are as follows: Ahmad Sani Yerima, senator and former governor of Zamfara State in Northern Nigeria, was accused several weeks ago of marrying a 13-year old Egyptian girl. More details quickly emerged – Yerima reportedly paid the girl's parents US$100,000 in dowry, the girl's father was Yerima's cab driver, the marriage had to be performed in Nigeria to avoid legal repercussions in Egypt. Bloggers, activists, lawyers and medical professionals protested vehemently as the story developed. Women's rights organizations feared for the girl's health, saying she would be exposed vesicovaginal fistula (VVF). Human rights groups pointed to the incident as a case of child trafficking.
In an era when the “clash of civilizations” has captured the public imagination and terrorism dominates the international agenda, it can be difficult to disentangle the personal from the political. Yerima has long been controversial for straddling this divide: he was among the leaders that re-introduced Sharia law in Northern Nigeria, and in 2006 came under fire for marrying a 15-year-old girl, whom he divorced two years later. Nigeria's population is roughly divided between a Muslim-majority North and a Christian-majority South, a balance which has been strained by several incidents in the past few months. Yerima's marriage has played into this divide, he justifies the union as being sanctioned by Islam. “I don't care about the issue of age since I have not violated any rule as far as Islam is concerned” he told the BBC – a provocative claim in Nigeria's already charged atmosphere.
Expressing the sentiments of many bloggers, Adeola wrote that religion should not be pulled into what is essentially a question of children's rights:
Let us not hide under any form or religion or culture to deprive children from living or leading their lives normally.Akin, too, saw religion as a distraction from the real issue:
Should Islam suffer a battering because one man had to satisfy his lust for young flesh [?]Yerima's actions function, albeit unintentionally, as a sort of activism for his particular interpretation of Islam. Many Nigerian politicians are unwilling to confront the cleavage between the northern and southern parts of the country, despite evidence of increasing tension. In what was widely seen as a gaffe, Ayogu Eze, spokesman for the Senate, initially said the Yerima affair was a private one. But the public thought otherwise and, whether Yerima intended it or no, the union has certainly gotten Nigerians discussing the implementation of Sharia law in Northern Nigeria.
Writing in This Day, Funke Aboyade responded:
Did you think you could, as you had done for eight years in your fiefdom in Zamfara imposing your peculiar brand of the Shari'a on your impoverished citizenry, transport same to the national arena without sanction? Well, here's some news for you, Senator: you've breached a law, a law you swore to uphold. And you will be sanctioned in accordance with that law.Sokari wrote:
Women Empowerment and Legal Aid [WELA] is demanding that the Federal Government arrest and prosecute Yerima for trafficking but not for forced marriage and rape. Why – because Yerima married the young girl under Sharia law and the age of consent in Northern Nigeria remains 13. This is so typical on all levels. No one has the guts to come out name the man and his crimes and challenge a law, religious or otherwise, which violates the rights of children as agreed by all international and African human rights legislation.A country with two major religions, three major ethnic groups and more than 500 indigenous languages, Nigeria presents an interesting case study in multiculturalism. But, as in other hybrid societies, integrating diverse cultures under one legal code is often a difficult task. Nine of Nigeria's 36 states, including the senator's own Zamfara state, follow Sharia law which puts the age of consent at 13. But in Abuja, where the marriage was carried out, 13 falls far below the age of consent. Adding to the confusion is the fact that the Federal Government has ratified the Child Rights Convention as well as other child protection treaties which would seemingly override state law and place the legal age of consent at 18. It is in this context that Yerima used Islam to justify the legality marriage. Speaking to the BBC, he said:
I consider God's law and that of His prophet above any other law. I will not respect any law that contradicts that and whoever wants to sanction me for that is free.Funke Aboyade had a caustic reply:
Really? Why then, Senator, are you in the Senate? Did you or did you not swear to uphold the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria?Sokari concluded:
The two issues are the rights of children and secondly the fact that at this moment there are two Nigeria’s – the northern Sharia states and the rest of the country and the former is increasingly removing itself from the Federal structure and picking and choosing which Federal and international laws it will uphold and those it will ignore.Since the news broke, an investigation into the matter has been launched by the Senate. But Boma Tai-Osagbemi was critical:
Nothing will ever come out of the ‘investigation'…. I suspect this man will still be untouched and unscathed!”Whether the investigation will yield any results remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome, the incident stands to set an important precedent, at the very least reigniting the the debate on federalism in Nigeria.
Eremipagamo Amabebe is a writer, researcher, and editor currently based in Germany and the United States. She is interested in topics where politics, culture, and media intersect – in the past she has received grants to research Nigeria's “Nollywood” film industry and Germany's contemporary political cinema. She received her bachelor's degree from Columbia University, after which she spent a year as a visiting scholar at Humboldt University in Berlin and completed her master's in International Relations. Follow her on twitter here. This article was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Nile Waters: Only A Partial Agreement
Only four countries – Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania – have signed, in Entebbe, Uganda, an agreement to share the management of the waters of the Nile, reports MISNA.
Egypt and Sudan have long opposed the project, of which little is known, seeing as both countries have benefited from the previous water sharing treaty going back to 1959.
Both countries have boycotted Friday’s meeting.
Other notable absentees at the meeting were representatives from the government of Burundi, of the DR Congo and Kenya, which could sign the agreement at a later date.
In recent years the countries of the Nile Basin have been discussing to review the water sharing arrangements and rights over the waters of the river, but Friday’s agreement marks a clear break.
According to Mufid Shehab, Egyptian minister of parliamentary and juridical affairs, without Sudan and Egypt’s signature, the Entebbe document cannot be adopted and enforced.
Source: Original reporting by MISNA
Egypt and Sudan have long opposed the project, of which little is known, seeing as both countries have benefited from the previous water sharing treaty going back to 1959.
Both countries have boycotted Friday’s meeting.
Other notable absentees at the meeting were representatives from the government of Burundi, of the DR Congo and Kenya, which could sign the agreement at a later date.
In recent years the countries of the Nile Basin have been discussing to review the water sharing arrangements and rights over the waters of the river, but Friday’s agreement marks a clear break.
According to Mufid Shehab, Egyptian minister of parliamentary and juridical affairs, without Sudan and Egypt’s signature, the Entebbe document cannot be adopted and enforced.
Source: Original reporting by MISNA
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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Yemen Prevents Ethiopians Entering Into Saudi Arabia
Yemeni Security forces in Haradh border district of the Hajjah province thwarted an attempt by a group of Ethiopians to pass into Saudi Arabia territory, the Yemen Interior Ministry said on Tuesday, according to the state media news agency SABA.
The ministry said that counting today's operation, security authorities in Haradh area now "frustrated 15 attempts of African citizens to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia since the beginning of 2010," reported SABA.
SABA said that around 200 Africans from Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia have been captured in the operations, as well as 10 Yemenis who were involved in human traficking.
SABA noted that "Yemen is considered to be a gateway for Somalis to the Middle East. It recognizes all Somalis as refugees on a 'prima facie basis,' meaning they are automatically granted the right to stay. But many of those who cross the Gulf of Aden move on to Yemen's neighbors Saudi Arabia and Oman in pursuit of jobs."
The escalating numbers of refugees is placing an increasing strain on Yemen's limited resources.
The ministry said that counting today's operation, security authorities in Haradh area now "frustrated 15 attempts of African citizens to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia since the beginning of 2010," reported SABA.
SABA said that around 200 Africans from Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia have been captured in the operations, as well as 10 Yemenis who were involved in human traficking.
SABA noted that "Yemen is considered to be a gateway for Somalis to the Middle East. It recognizes all Somalis as refugees on a 'prima facie basis,' meaning they are automatically granted the right to stay. But many of those who cross the Gulf of Aden move on to Yemen's neighbors Saudi Arabia and Oman in pursuit of jobs."
The escalating numbers of refugees is placing an increasing strain on Yemen's limited resources.
Tuesday, May 04, 2010 |
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Japanese Military Joins U.S. And NATO In Horn Of Africa
By Rick Rozoff
Japanese navy commander Keizo Kitagawa recently spoke with Agence France-Presse and disclosed that his nation was opening its first overseas military base - at any rate since the Second World War - in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.
Kitagawa is assigned to the Plans and Policy Section of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, as his nation's navy is called, and is in charge of the deployment.
AFP quoted the Japanese officer as stressing the unprecedented nature of the development: "This will be the only Japanese base outside our country and the first in Africa." [1]
The military installation is to cost $40 million and is expected to accommodate Japanese troops early next year.
Djibouti rests at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, across from strife-torn Yemen, and borders the northwest corner of equally conflict-ridden Somalia. The narrow span of water separating it from Yemen is the gateway for all maritime traffic passing between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.
Naval deployments to the Gulf of Aden by several major nations and alliances - the U.S., NATO, the European Union, China, Russia, India, Iran and others - are designed to insure the free passage of commercial vessels through the above route and to protect United Nations World Food Programme deliveries to Somalia. The second concern in particular led to the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1838 in 2008, which requests that nations with military vessels in the area suppress the capture of ships and their crews for ransom. An anti-piracy mission.
However, the above-mentioned Japanese naval officer was more direct in identifying his nation's interest in establishing a military base in Africa. Kitagawa also told AFP that "We are deploying here to fight piracy and for our self-defence. Japan is a maritime nation and the increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden through which 20,000 vessels sail every year is worrying."
The term self-defense is not fortuitous. Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution explicitly affirms that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
As such, in the post-World War Two period the nation's armed forces have been called the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).
The Constitution also expressly prohibits the deployment of military forces outside of Japan, stating that it is "not permissible constitutionally to dispatch armed troops to foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using military power, as a so-called overseas deployment of troops, since it generally exceeds the minimum level necessary for self-defense."
That notwithstanding, in the years following the Cold War all post-Second World War proscriptions against the use of military force by the former Axis nations have been disregarded, [2] and in February of 2004 Japan dispatched 600 troops, albeit in a non-combat role, to Iraq shortly after the U.S. and British invasion of the country. The nation's navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, supplied fuel and water in support of the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom campaign in Afghanistan from 2001-2007 and again from January of 2008 to the beginning of this year, thereby violating another basic tenet of its constitution, the ban on engaging in what the document refers to as collective self-defense, the relevant section of which reads:
"Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law. It is, however, not permissible to use the right, that is, to stop armed attack on another country with armed strength, although Japan is not under direct attack, since it exceeds the limit of use of armed strength as permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution."
However, a 2007 Defense White Paper left the door open to further military deployments with a provision on "international peace cooperation activities."
It is in the spirit of that elastic and evasive phrase that Japan resumed support for the war in Afghanistan in 2008 and has now secured a military base on the African continent.
The Japanese official presiding over the latter project also said that "A camp will be built to house our personnel and material. Currently we are stationed at the American base." Kitagawa added that "We sent military teams to Yemen, Oman, Kenya and Djibouti. In April 2009, we chose Djibouti."
A year earlier, the Kyodo News cited an official of the Foreign Ministry as confirming that "Japan and Djibouti reached a status of forces agreement" on April 3, 2009, "stipulating the terms of operations and legal status for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and related officials who will be based in the African nation during the current antipiracy mission in waters off Somalia." [3]
The agreement was signed on the same day by Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada and the foreign minister of Djibouti, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, in Tokyo. The month before Japan sent two destroyers to the Gulf of Aden.
Two months later Japan deployed two new destroyers, the 4,550-ton Harusame and the 3,500-ton Amagiri, off the Horn of Africa. Also last July the Japanese press disclosed that "The U.S....asked Japan to build its own facilities to carry out full-fledged operations," and that at the time "about 150 members of the Ground Self-Defense Force and MSDF [Maritime Self-Defense Force] stationed in Djibouti live in U.S. military lodgings near an airport." [4] The Japanese military announced plans to construct a runway for Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C surveillance planes and barracks for its troops.
Although Russian, Chinese, Indian and Iranian ships in the Horn of Africa are there to protect their own and other nations' vessels and their missions are understood to be limited to anti-piracy operations and to a prescribed duration, Japan and its American and NATO allies have established permanent land, naval and air bases in the region for use in armed conflicts on the African continent.
In early 2001 the U.S. started negotiations with the government of Djibouti for setting up its first major military base in Africa at the former French Foreign Legion base Camp Lemonnier. (Until recently spelled Lemonier by the Pentagon.)
This was several years before combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden became the rationale for U.S. and NATO deployments in the region.
Djibouti is the last territory on the African continent to achieve independence (excepting Western Sahara, seized by Morocco in 1975 with the connivance of Spain's General Franco), only being granted what independence it has by France in 1977. Its population is less than 900,000.
France still maintains its largest overseas military base in the world in the nation and has approximately 3,000 troops stationed there.
Since the Pentagon moved into and took over Camp Lemonnier in 2003, it established its Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) on the base and has an estimated 2,000 troops from all four branches of the U.S. military - Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps - stationed there.
The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa's area of operations incorporates Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen and increasingly the Indian Ocean island nations of Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius.
As the U.S. was transferring the CJTF-HOA command from the Marine Corps to the Navy in 2005 - to free up Marines for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - the then commander, Major Marine General Timothy Ghormley, acknowledged that "U.S. forces have been working with militaries in Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Comoros" [5] and "operate throughout Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia." [6]
France has used its base in Djibouti for deadly military interventions in Cote d'Ivoire and Chad and, because of the nation's topography, Djibouti has also been used for training French troops for the war in Afghanistan, where the nation's contingent is the fourth largest serving under NATO command.
Last December the commander of the French army in the country, Commandant Etienne du Fayet, said that "French officers are going to be training a contingent in Uganda next February and we are also going to Ethiopia." [7] During deadly border clashes between Djibouti and Eritrea in June of 2008 France deployed additional troops, warships and aircraft to the region.
The U.S. base has been used for military operations in Somalia and Uganda. In 2008 the deputy commander of U.S. forces in the country was cited as revealing that "the Djibouti base facilitates some other military activities he won't talk about.
"There have been reports of U.S. special operations forces working from the base on counter-terrorism missions in Somalia and elsewhere....[T]hat approach is the model for the new United States Africa Command...."
At the same time Rear Admiral Philip Greene took over as commander of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa and, speaking over nine months before the formal activation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), said "There is, I think, great synergy between what CJTF-Horn of Africa does now and what we're about and what AFRICOM will represent as a combatant command."
To indicate the range of the operations he envisioned, Greene also said he would "be watching some of the region's hot spots for potential seeds of instability," including "the situations in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan's Darfur region, as well as tension on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and piracy along the Indian Ocean coastline." [8]
In 2006 a Kenyan daily newspaper wrote that (as of four years ago) "direct US arms sales to East Africa and the Horn of Africa countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia – have shot up from under one million dollars in 2003 to over $25 million in 2006. Djibouti leads the list with nearly $20 million in direct arms purchases in 2005 and 2006." [9]
The same feature described broader U.S. plans for the Horn of Africa region and further afield being hatched from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti:
"Overall, direct US weapons sales [to Africa] increased from $39.2 million in 2005 to nearly $60 million in 2006. In both years, East Africa and the Horn accounted for nearly 40 percent of US weapons sales to Africa, and this demonstrates the US military’s strategic shift to the region.
"Access to strategic airfields and ports has also increased for the US military. Beyond Camp Lemonier in 2003, the US had an agreement with Kenya that allowed it access to the port of Mombasa and airfields at Embakasi and Nanyuki.
"Zambia and Uganda have joined Kenya in this unique arrangement. At Entebbe, the US has constructed two K-Span steel buildings to house troops and equipment. The so called 'Lily Pad' arrangement will allow the US
military to use the base when needed in times of conflict or as a staging area for a conflict within the region."
The article also stated, "Strategically, the US military has developed a
regional operations plan that centres on Djibouti to support the Horn countries. It anchors the southern flank with bases in Kenya, Zambia and Uganda to the west....[L]ike in Nigeria, it can be used to ensure an
uninterrupted flow of oil from the newly discovered fields of Uganda and Kenya, and it opens the door to the construction of a well-protected oil pipeline carrying oil from the interior of Central Africa to the port of Mombasa. It also provides a strategically located airbase to support future military operations to the north in Sudan or to the west." [10]
In 2006 the Pentagon expanded Camp Lemonnier by almost five times its original size, from 88 to 500 acres. Late last year it completed an airfield project in the country to provide parking spaces for C-130 Hercules and CV-22 Osprey aircraft and to support C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy military transport planes.
Four years ago the Reuters news agency reported "the United States is already providing Ethiopia and Kenya with logistical support and U.S. special forces had been observed on the Kenya-Somalia border," [11] and shortly afterward the U.S. Air Force divulged that U.S. airmen were operating out of Contingency Operating Location Bilate (also known as Camp Bilate) in Ethiopia in conjunction with the the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa headquarters at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. [12]
The U.S. military headquarters in Djibouti is in charge of three smaller downrange bases, known as Contingency Operating Locations, at Bilate and Hurso in Ethiopia and Manda Bay in Kenya.
An Ethiopian newspaper revealed at the time that "The United States would continue providing training and other assistance to the Ethiopian Defence Forces as per the Ethio-US bilateral cooperation" [13] during the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006.
Ethiopian troops were being trained in infantry tactics by soldiers with the U.S. Army's 1st Infantry Division’s 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment at the Training Academy in Hurso as jets from the country bombed the Somali capital and ground forces invaded their eastern neighbor. The U.S. Army conducted training at the base starting no later than 2003. "U.S. military personnel with the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa...have spent the last four years training the Ethiopian National Defense Forces in basic military tactics." [14] The effects of that preparation were seen in the 2006 invasion of Somalia.
The Pentagon's role in Somalia was not limited to training and arming Ethiopian invasion forces, as in early 2007 it was reported that "recent military operations in Somalia have been carried out by the Pentagon's Joint Special Operations Command, which directs the military's most secretive and elite units, like the Army's Delta Force.
"The Pentagon established a desolate outpost in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti in 2002 in part to serve as a hub for special missions...." [15]
As U.S. special forces were operating in Somalia and Washington's military client was launching air and ground attacks there, the U.S. deployed the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier, which "has an air wing of about 75 aircraft, including F/A-18 Hornet and SuperHornet strike fighters, E-2C Hawkeyes, EA-6B Prowlers, and SH-60 Seahawks," [16] to join the the guided-missile cruisers USS Bunker Hill and USS Anzio and the amphibious landing ship USS Ashland off the coast of Somalia.
An "AC-130 gunship, operated by the Special Operations Command, flew from its base in Djibouti to the southern tip of Somalia" [17] where it "rained gunfire on the desolate village of Hayo" on January 8. A local official was quoted as saying "There are so many dead bodies and animals in the village." [18]
"Officials with CJTF-HOA, based in Djibouti, declined...to comment on the reported AC-130 attacks; media reports said the plane was based at Camp Lemonier." [19]
Also in early January of 2007 a major Kenyan newspaper reported "The US counter-terrorism task force based in Djibouti acknowledges that American troops are on the ground in northern Kenya and in Lamu," the latter on the Indian Ocean. [20]
In March of the same year two U.S. soldiers were killed in Ethiopia in what was attributed to an accident. They were assigned to a unit that was "part of the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, headquartered at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti." [21]
Late last year U.S. Africa Command deployed lethal Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), 133 military personnel and three P-3 Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft to Seychelles in the Indian Ocean east of Kenya. The Pentagon now has its second major African military base.
In addition to the 5,000 U.S. and French troops stationed there, Djibouti also has been home to what in 2005 Agence France-Presse disclosed were "several hundred German, Dutch and Spanish soldiers." [22]
That is, the diminutive state is for all practical purposes not only the headquarters for U.S. Africa Command but also for NATO in Africa.
In late 2005 Britain announced that it was also deploying troops to Djibouti.
Starting in March of 2009 NATO started rotating its Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG 1) and Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2) warship fleets off the coast of Somalia, first with Operation Allied Provider until August of last year and since with Operation Ocean Shield, which continues to the present day and which in March was extended until the end of 2012. The current fleet consists of warships from the U.S., Britain, Greece, Italy and Turkey. Its area of operations includes one million square kilometers in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. (The current name of the naval groups are NATO Response Force Maritime Groups 1 and 2.)
NATO does not intend to leave the area soon if at all.
Even before the NATO Allied Provider and Ocean Shield operations began, the Italian destroyer MM Luigi Durand De La Penne, "a 5,000-ton multi-role warship capable of air defence, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare operations," [23] part of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, at the time comprised of warships from the U.S., Britain, Germany, Greece and Turkey, visited the Kenyan port city of Mombasa in October of 2008.
Of the current NATO deployment, last December then German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung said that it was "the most robust mandate we have ever had," adding, "There may be combat situations, and in this respect it would of course be a combat deployment." [24]
The NATO flotillas joined warships of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) with logistics facilities in Djibouti. Formerly the U.S. Navy's Task Force 150, starting in 2001 it became a multinational operation with the inclusion of NATO allies and those from an emerging Asian NATO. Full participating nations are the U.S., Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Pakistan, and others who have been involved are Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey. CTF-150 has 14-15 warships near Somalia at any given time and is coordinated with the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, under the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander/Commander US Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain.
In January of 2009 the U.S. Navy inaugurated Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), which will include warships from 20 nations, NATO and Asian NATO states.
European NATO nations are also "double-duty" participants in the European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, the first naval operation conducted by the EU and run under the auspices of the European Security and Defence Policy. It was launched in December of 2008 and is based at the Northwood Operation Headquarters in Britain, which also houses NATO's Allied Maritime Component Command Northwood. Current participants in Operation Atalanta are Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, and "a number of Cypriot, Irish, Finnish, Maltese and Sweden military personnel supplement the team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters." [25]
Starting no later than September of 2009 NATO commanders have visited and in essence established a headquarters in Somalia's autonomous Puntland state. Last autumn British Commodore Steve Chick, commander of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, met with Puntland authorities on board the HMS Cornwall. "The talks ended successfully with NATO and Puntland officials agreeing to cooperate in combating pirates operating along the Somali coast." [26]
This January Admiral Pereira da Cunha, commander of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, hosted Puntland officials on the Portuguese flagship Alvares Cabral, and the meeting "focused on human intelligence gathering, capacity building and counter piracy cooperation between NATO and Puntland authorities."
"NATO...has established a close working relationship with the Puntland Coastguard....This is just a start. With 60 years of experience and coalition building, NATO is well placed to make things happen." [27]
In March ministers of the Puntland government met with Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 commander Commodore Steve Chick on board the HMS Chatham, current flagship of the NATO naval group in the region. The talks "covered ways in which further cooperation between NATO and the Puntland authorities could be developed in the future." [28]
According to a Puntland news source, NATO's activities aren't limited to operations in the waters off Somalia: "NATO has a working relationship with Puntland authorities in a bid to enhance its fight against the piracy scourge along the lawless waters of the Horn of Africa. Puntland has offered its help in terms of dealing with the gangs in the mainland." [29]
The European Union will soon begin training 2,000 Ugandan troops for deployment to Somalia to aid the Transitional Federal Government, which is fighting for its life even in the nation's capital.
Last October a Kenyan newspaper announced that Kenyan troops sailed to Djibouti to receive military training along with the armed forces of other regional nations. At the same time military officers from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden were in Kenya to "assist the region in the ongoing establishment of a united military force to deal with conflicts on the continent."
"The experts from the European countries, which are part of the Nordic Bloc, are based at the EASBRIG headquarters, at the Defence Staff College in Karen, Nairobi." [30]
EASBRIG, the East African Standby Brigade, "will be deployed to trouble spots within 14 days after chaos erupts, to restore order....The brigade will have troops from 14 countries....The military unit will comprise 35,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers plus 1,000 civilian staff. Kenya is already training 2,000 soldiers to be seconded to the force once it is in place." [31]
....
Japan's destroyers off the coast of Somalia and the nation's first foreign military base in the post-World War Two era in Djibouti are in line with the geostrategic plans of Tokyo's allies in North America and Europe.
Plans which are embodied most fully in the creation of the first U.S. regional military command outside North America in a quarter of a century, Africa Command. Long after pirates, al-Qaeda affiliates and other threats have ceased to serve as their justification, the Pentagon, NATO and Japan will retain their military footholds in Africa.
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
NOTES:
1) Agence France-Presse, April 23, 2010
2) Former Axis Nations Abandon Post-World War II Military Restrictions Stop NATO, August 12, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/former-axis-nations-abandon-post-world-war-ii-military-restrictions
3) Kyodo News, April 3, 2009
4) Kyodo News, July 31, 2009
5) Stars And Stripes, September 23, 2005
6) US Department of Defense, September 22, 2005
7) Radio France Internationale, December 11, 2009
8) Voice of America News, January 25, 2008
9) The East African, November 6, 2006
10) Ibid
11) Reuters, November 21, 2006
12) Air Force Link, January 7, 2007
13) Ethiopian Herald, January 5, 2007
14) Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2007
15) Xinhua News Agency, January 13, 2007
16) Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2007
17) Voice of Russia, January 9, 2007
18) Reuters, January 10, 2007
19) Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2007
20) The Nation, January 3, 2007
21) Stars and Stripes, March 8, 2007
22) Agence France-Presse, December 22, 2005
23) The Standard (Kenya), October 29, 2008
24) Associated Press,December 23, 2009
25) European Union Naval Force Somalia
http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission
26) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood
September 11, 2009
27) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Command Operations January 27, 2010
28) Royal Navy, March 30, 2010
29) Garowe Online, April 8, 2010
30) The Nation, October 29, 2009
31) Ibid
Japanese navy commander Keizo Kitagawa recently spoke with Agence France-Presse and disclosed that his nation was opening its first overseas military base - at any rate since the Second World War - in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.
Kitagawa is assigned to the Plans and Policy Section of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, as his nation's navy is called, and is in charge of the deployment.
AFP quoted the Japanese officer as stressing the unprecedented nature of the development: "This will be the only Japanese base outside our country and the first in Africa." [1]
The military installation is to cost $40 million and is expected to accommodate Japanese troops early next year.
Djibouti rests at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, across from strife-torn Yemen, and borders the northwest corner of equally conflict-ridden Somalia. The narrow span of water separating it from Yemen is the gateway for all maritime traffic passing between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.
Naval deployments to the Gulf of Aden by several major nations and alliances - the U.S., NATO, the European Union, China, Russia, India, Iran and others - are designed to insure the free passage of commercial vessels through the above route and to protect United Nations World Food Programme deliveries to Somalia. The second concern in particular led to the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1838 in 2008, which requests that nations with military vessels in the area suppress the capture of ships and their crews for ransom. An anti-piracy mission.
However, the above-mentioned Japanese naval officer was more direct in identifying his nation's interest in establishing a military base in Africa. Kitagawa also told AFP that "We are deploying here to fight piracy and for our self-defence. Japan is a maritime nation and the increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden through which 20,000 vessels sail every year is worrying."
The term self-defense is not fortuitous. Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution explicitly affirms that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
As such, in the post-World War Two period the nation's armed forces have been called the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).
The Constitution also expressly prohibits the deployment of military forces outside of Japan, stating that it is "not permissible constitutionally to dispatch armed troops to foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using military power, as a so-called overseas deployment of troops, since it generally exceeds the minimum level necessary for self-defense."
That notwithstanding, in the years following the Cold War all post-Second World War proscriptions against the use of military force by the former Axis nations have been disregarded, [2] and in February of 2004 Japan dispatched 600 troops, albeit in a non-combat role, to Iraq shortly after the U.S. and British invasion of the country. The nation's navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, supplied fuel and water in support of the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom campaign in Afghanistan from 2001-2007 and again from January of 2008 to the beginning of this year, thereby violating another basic tenet of its constitution, the ban on engaging in what the document refers to as collective self-defense, the relevant section of which reads:
"Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law. It is, however, not permissible to use the right, that is, to stop armed attack on another country with armed strength, although Japan is not under direct attack, since it exceeds the limit of use of armed strength as permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution."
However, a 2007 Defense White Paper left the door open to further military deployments with a provision on "international peace cooperation activities."
It is in the spirit of that elastic and evasive phrase that Japan resumed support for the war in Afghanistan in 2008 and has now secured a military base on the African continent.
The Japanese official presiding over the latter project also said that "A camp will be built to house our personnel and material. Currently we are stationed at the American base." Kitagawa added that "We sent military teams to Yemen, Oman, Kenya and Djibouti. In April 2009, we chose Djibouti."
A year earlier, the Kyodo News cited an official of the Foreign Ministry as confirming that "Japan and Djibouti reached a status of forces agreement" on April 3, 2009, "stipulating the terms of operations and legal status for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and related officials who will be based in the African nation during the current antipiracy mission in waters off Somalia." [3]
The agreement was signed on the same day by Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada and the foreign minister of Djibouti, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, in Tokyo. The month before Japan sent two destroyers to the Gulf of Aden.
Two months later Japan deployed two new destroyers, the 4,550-ton Harusame and the 3,500-ton Amagiri, off the Horn of Africa. Also last July the Japanese press disclosed that "The U.S....asked Japan to build its own facilities to carry out full-fledged operations," and that at the time "about 150 members of the Ground Self-Defense Force and MSDF [Maritime Self-Defense Force] stationed in Djibouti live in U.S. military lodgings near an airport." [4] The Japanese military announced plans to construct a runway for Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C surveillance planes and barracks for its troops.
Although Russian, Chinese, Indian and Iranian ships in the Horn of Africa are there to protect their own and other nations' vessels and their missions are understood to be limited to anti-piracy operations and to a prescribed duration, Japan and its American and NATO allies have established permanent land, naval and air bases in the region for use in armed conflicts on the African continent.
In early 2001 the U.S. started negotiations with the government of Djibouti for setting up its first major military base in Africa at the former French Foreign Legion base Camp Lemonnier. (Until recently spelled Lemonier by the Pentagon.)
This was several years before combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden became the rationale for U.S. and NATO deployments in the region.
Djibouti is the last territory on the African continent to achieve independence (excepting Western Sahara, seized by Morocco in 1975 with the connivance of Spain's General Franco), only being granted what independence it has by France in 1977. Its population is less than 900,000.
France still maintains its largest overseas military base in the world in the nation and has approximately 3,000 troops stationed there.
Since the Pentagon moved into and took over Camp Lemonnier in 2003, it established its Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) on the base and has an estimated 2,000 troops from all four branches of the U.S. military - Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps - stationed there.
The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa's area of operations incorporates Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen and increasingly the Indian Ocean island nations of Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius.
As the U.S. was transferring the CJTF-HOA command from the Marine Corps to the Navy in 2005 - to free up Marines for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - the then commander, Major Marine General Timothy Ghormley, acknowledged that "U.S. forces have been working with militaries in Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Comoros" [5] and "operate throughout Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia." [6]
France has used its base in Djibouti for deadly military interventions in Cote d'Ivoire and Chad and, because of the nation's topography, Djibouti has also been used for training French troops for the war in Afghanistan, where the nation's contingent is the fourth largest serving under NATO command.
Last December the commander of the French army in the country, Commandant Etienne du Fayet, said that "French officers are going to be training a contingent in Uganda next February and we are also going to Ethiopia." [7] During deadly border clashes between Djibouti and Eritrea in June of 2008 France deployed additional troops, warships and aircraft to the region.
The U.S. base has been used for military operations in Somalia and Uganda. In 2008 the deputy commander of U.S. forces in the country was cited as revealing that "the Djibouti base facilitates some other military activities he won't talk about.
"There have been reports of U.S. special operations forces working from the base on counter-terrorism missions in Somalia and elsewhere....[T]hat approach is the model for the new United States Africa Command...."
At the same time Rear Admiral Philip Greene took over as commander of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa and, speaking over nine months before the formal activation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), said "There is, I think, great synergy between what CJTF-Horn of Africa does now and what we're about and what AFRICOM will represent as a combatant command."
To indicate the range of the operations he envisioned, Greene also said he would "be watching some of the region's hot spots for potential seeds of instability," including "the situations in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan's Darfur region, as well as tension on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and piracy along the Indian Ocean coastline." [8]
In 2006 a Kenyan daily newspaper wrote that (as of four years ago) "direct US arms sales to East Africa and the Horn of Africa countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia – have shot up from under one million dollars in 2003 to over $25 million in 2006. Djibouti leads the list with nearly $20 million in direct arms purchases in 2005 and 2006." [9]
The same feature described broader U.S. plans for the Horn of Africa region and further afield being hatched from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti:
"Overall, direct US weapons sales [to Africa] increased from $39.2 million in 2005 to nearly $60 million in 2006. In both years, East Africa and the Horn accounted for nearly 40 percent of US weapons sales to Africa, and this demonstrates the US military’s strategic shift to the region.
"Access to strategic airfields and ports has also increased for the US military. Beyond Camp Lemonier in 2003, the US had an agreement with Kenya that allowed it access to the port of Mombasa and airfields at Embakasi and Nanyuki.
"Zambia and Uganda have joined Kenya in this unique arrangement. At Entebbe, the US has constructed two K-Span steel buildings to house troops and equipment. The so called 'Lily Pad' arrangement will allow the US
military to use the base when needed in times of conflict or as a staging area for a conflict within the region."
The article also stated, "Strategically, the US military has developed a
regional operations plan that centres on Djibouti to support the Horn countries. It anchors the southern flank with bases in Kenya, Zambia and Uganda to the west....[L]ike in Nigeria, it can be used to ensure an
uninterrupted flow of oil from the newly discovered fields of Uganda and Kenya, and it opens the door to the construction of a well-protected oil pipeline carrying oil from the interior of Central Africa to the port of Mombasa. It also provides a strategically located airbase to support future military operations to the north in Sudan or to the west." [10]
In 2006 the Pentagon expanded Camp Lemonnier by almost five times its original size, from 88 to 500 acres. Late last year it completed an airfield project in the country to provide parking spaces for C-130 Hercules and CV-22 Osprey aircraft and to support C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy military transport planes.
Four years ago the Reuters news agency reported "the United States is already providing Ethiopia and Kenya with logistical support and U.S. special forces had been observed on the Kenya-Somalia border," [11] and shortly afterward the U.S. Air Force divulged that U.S. airmen were operating out of Contingency Operating Location Bilate (also known as Camp Bilate) in Ethiopia in conjunction with the the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa headquarters at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. [12]
The U.S. military headquarters in Djibouti is in charge of three smaller downrange bases, known as Contingency Operating Locations, at Bilate and Hurso in Ethiopia and Manda Bay in Kenya.
An Ethiopian newspaper revealed at the time that "The United States would continue providing training and other assistance to the Ethiopian Defence Forces as per the Ethio-US bilateral cooperation" [13] during the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006.
Ethiopian troops were being trained in infantry tactics by soldiers with the U.S. Army's 1st Infantry Division’s 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment at the Training Academy in Hurso as jets from the country bombed the Somali capital and ground forces invaded their eastern neighbor. The U.S. Army conducted training at the base starting no later than 2003. "U.S. military personnel with the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa...have spent the last four years training the Ethiopian National Defense Forces in basic military tactics." [14] The effects of that preparation were seen in the 2006 invasion of Somalia.
The Pentagon's role in Somalia was not limited to training and arming Ethiopian invasion forces, as in early 2007 it was reported that "recent military operations in Somalia have been carried out by the Pentagon's Joint Special Operations Command, which directs the military's most secretive and elite units, like the Army's Delta Force.
"The Pentagon established a desolate outpost in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti in 2002 in part to serve as a hub for special missions...." [15]
As U.S. special forces were operating in Somalia and Washington's military client was launching air and ground attacks there, the U.S. deployed the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier, which "has an air wing of about 75 aircraft, including F/A-18 Hornet and SuperHornet strike fighters, E-2C Hawkeyes, EA-6B Prowlers, and SH-60 Seahawks," [16] to join the the guided-missile cruisers USS Bunker Hill and USS Anzio and the amphibious landing ship USS Ashland off the coast of Somalia.
An "AC-130 gunship, operated by the Special Operations Command, flew from its base in Djibouti to the southern tip of Somalia" [17] where it "rained gunfire on the desolate village of Hayo" on January 8. A local official was quoted as saying "There are so many dead bodies and animals in the village." [18]
"Officials with CJTF-HOA, based in Djibouti, declined...to comment on the reported AC-130 attacks; media reports said the plane was based at Camp Lemonier." [19]
Also in early January of 2007 a major Kenyan newspaper reported "The US counter-terrorism task force based in Djibouti acknowledges that American troops are on the ground in northern Kenya and in Lamu," the latter on the Indian Ocean. [20]
In March of the same year two U.S. soldiers were killed in Ethiopia in what was attributed to an accident. They were assigned to a unit that was "part of the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, headquartered at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti." [21]
Late last year U.S. Africa Command deployed lethal Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), 133 military personnel and three P-3 Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft to Seychelles in the Indian Ocean east of Kenya. The Pentagon now has its second major African military base.
In addition to the 5,000 U.S. and French troops stationed there, Djibouti also has been home to what in 2005 Agence France-Presse disclosed were "several hundred German, Dutch and Spanish soldiers." [22]
That is, the diminutive state is for all practical purposes not only the headquarters for U.S. Africa Command but also for NATO in Africa.
In late 2005 Britain announced that it was also deploying troops to Djibouti.
Starting in March of 2009 NATO started rotating its Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG 1) and Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2) warship fleets off the coast of Somalia, first with Operation Allied Provider until August of last year and since with Operation Ocean Shield, which continues to the present day and which in March was extended until the end of 2012. The current fleet consists of warships from the U.S., Britain, Greece, Italy and Turkey. Its area of operations includes one million square kilometers in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. (The current name of the naval groups are NATO Response Force Maritime Groups 1 and 2.)
NATO does not intend to leave the area soon if at all.
Even before the NATO Allied Provider and Ocean Shield operations began, the Italian destroyer MM Luigi Durand De La Penne, "a 5,000-ton multi-role warship capable of air defence, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare operations," [23] part of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, at the time comprised of warships from the U.S., Britain, Germany, Greece and Turkey, visited the Kenyan port city of Mombasa in October of 2008.
Of the current NATO deployment, last December then German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung said that it was "the most robust mandate we have ever had," adding, "There may be combat situations, and in this respect it would of course be a combat deployment." [24]
The NATO flotillas joined warships of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) with logistics facilities in Djibouti. Formerly the U.S. Navy's Task Force 150, starting in 2001 it became a multinational operation with the inclusion of NATO allies and those from an emerging Asian NATO. Full participating nations are the U.S., Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Pakistan, and others who have been involved are Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey. CTF-150 has 14-15 warships near Somalia at any given time and is coordinated with the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, under the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander/Commander US Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain.
In January of 2009 the U.S. Navy inaugurated Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), which will include warships from 20 nations, NATO and Asian NATO states.
European NATO nations are also "double-duty" participants in the European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, the first naval operation conducted by the EU and run under the auspices of the European Security and Defence Policy. It was launched in December of 2008 and is based at the Northwood Operation Headquarters in Britain, which also houses NATO's Allied Maritime Component Command Northwood. Current participants in Operation Atalanta are Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, and "a number of Cypriot, Irish, Finnish, Maltese and Sweden military personnel supplement the team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters." [25]
Starting no later than September of 2009 NATO commanders have visited and in essence established a headquarters in Somalia's autonomous Puntland state. Last autumn British Commodore Steve Chick, commander of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, met with Puntland authorities on board the HMS Cornwall. "The talks ended successfully with NATO and Puntland officials agreeing to cooperate in combating pirates operating along the Somali coast." [26]
This January Admiral Pereira da Cunha, commander of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, hosted Puntland officials on the Portuguese flagship Alvares Cabral, and the meeting "focused on human intelligence gathering, capacity building and counter piracy cooperation between NATO and Puntland authorities."
"NATO...has established a close working relationship with the Puntland Coastguard....This is just a start. With 60 years of experience and coalition building, NATO is well placed to make things happen." [27]
In March ministers of the Puntland government met with Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 commander Commodore Steve Chick on board the HMS Chatham, current flagship of the NATO naval group in the region. The talks "covered ways in which further cooperation between NATO and the Puntland authorities could be developed in the future." [28]
According to a Puntland news source, NATO's activities aren't limited to operations in the waters off Somalia: "NATO has a working relationship with Puntland authorities in a bid to enhance its fight against the piracy scourge along the lawless waters of the Horn of Africa. Puntland has offered its help in terms of dealing with the gangs in the mainland." [29]
The European Union will soon begin training 2,000 Ugandan troops for deployment to Somalia to aid the Transitional Federal Government, which is fighting for its life even in the nation's capital.
Last October a Kenyan newspaper announced that Kenyan troops sailed to Djibouti to receive military training along with the armed forces of other regional nations. At the same time military officers from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden were in Kenya to "assist the region in the ongoing establishment of a united military force to deal with conflicts on the continent."
"The experts from the European countries, which are part of the Nordic Bloc, are based at the EASBRIG headquarters, at the Defence Staff College in Karen, Nairobi." [30]
EASBRIG, the East African Standby Brigade, "will be deployed to trouble spots within 14 days after chaos erupts, to restore order....The brigade will have troops from 14 countries....The military unit will comprise 35,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers plus 1,000 civilian staff. Kenya is already training 2,000 soldiers to be seconded to the force once it is in place." [31]
....
Japan's destroyers off the coast of Somalia and the nation's first foreign military base in the post-World War Two era in Djibouti are in line with the geostrategic plans of Tokyo's allies in North America and Europe.
Plans which are embodied most fully in the creation of the first U.S. regional military command outside North America in a quarter of a century, Africa Command. Long after pirates, al-Qaeda affiliates and other threats have ceased to serve as their justification, the Pentagon, NATO and Japan will retain their military footholds in Africa.
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
NOTES:
1) Agence France-Presse, April 23, 2010
2) Former Axis Nations Abandon Post-World War II Military Restrictions Stop NATO, August 12, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/former-axis-nations-abandon-post-world-war-ii-military-restrictions
3) Kyodo News, April 3, 2009
4) Kyodo News, July 31, 2009
5) Stars And Stripes, September 23, 2005
6) US Department of Defense, September 22, 2005
7) Radio France Internationale, December 11, 2009
8) Voice of America News, January 25, 2008
9) The East African, November 6, 2006
10) Ibid
11) Reuters, November 21, 2006
12) Air Force Link, January 7, 2007
13) Ethiopian Herald, January 5, 2007
14) Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2007
15) Xinhua News Agency, January 13, 2007
16) Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2007
17) Voice of Russia, January 9, 2007
18) Reuters, January 10, 2007
19) Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2007
20) The Nation, January 3, 2007
21) Stars and Stripes, March 8, 2007
22) Agence France-Presse, December 22, 2005
23) The Standard (Kenya), October 29, 2008
24) Associated Press,December 23, 2009
25) European Union Naval Force Somalia
http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission
26) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood
September 11, 2009
27) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Command Operations January 27, 2010
28) Royal Navy, March 30, 2010
29) Garowe Online, April 8, 2010
30) The Nation, October 29, 2009
31) Ibid
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Nearly A Quarter Of Addis Residents Lack Toilets
Almost a quarter of Addis Ababa residents have no access to toilets, says a new report by the Addis Ababa city authorities.
"We estimate that some three million people live in Addis Ababa. Out of this nearly 25 percent of the population have no access to toilets and defecate in rivers crossing the city" the report says.
"We cannot tolerate any more waste in rivers and roads. We should be ashamed. We want to make sure that the city is clean and a better place to live," said Mekuria Haile, a senior local government official, at the launch of the report entitled Cleaning and Beautifying Addis Ababa: Intensifying Environmental and Health Issues with Public Participation.
"Addis Ababa is one of the biggest cities in sub-Saharan Africa. but is still fighting against solid waste management and health problems posed by unsafe drinking water and inadequate sanitation," said Haile.
The outbreak of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) which hit most parts of the city in August 2009 "was the result of poor sanitation and hygiene, coupled with solid waste from the city" the report said.
"I cannot trust the water that comes through a pipeline since that outbreak. I boil my water every day before serving my family," said Senait Habte, a resident of the city's Kolfe Keraniyo slum.
"My relatives in rural Ethiopia live a better life than us in the city. They have good toilets and access to safe drinking water. Seems like the government has forgotten us," she told IRIN, adding: "There are continuous electricity blackouts. Sometimes we don't have water for five days. Life is becoming difficult in Addis nowadays."
Public relations chief at the Water Resources Ministry Bizuneh Tolcha told IRIN nearly 66 percent of the Ethiopian population has access to safe drinking water and 56 percent has access to a latrine.
"According to our water tests, the water in Addis is very clean but the problem is contamination due to its unsafe use," Tolcha told IRIN.
The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) says 60-80 percent of the current disease burden in Ethiopia is attributable to environmental health risks, which include poor hygiene and inadequate sanitation.
Eco-toilets
US-based NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and its partners have been promoting an ecological toilet called the ArborLoo, designed by Zimbabwean Peter Morgan specifically for African conditions. It serves both as a basic toilet and makes use of excreta for growing fruit trees.
The AborLoo is a single pit shallow compost toilet 1.0-1.5m deep comprising a ring beam, slab and structure.
"Each concrete toilet slab costs US$7-20 and anyone can use it. It best suits the elderly and disabled people. You can dig it in half a day and can also plant trees on it," says Bekele Abaire, programme manager at the CRS office in Ethiopia.
During use, fly and odour problems are reduced by regularly adding soil, wood ash and leaves to the excreta in the pit. Once full, the old toilet site is covered with soil and left to compost with the parts of the toilet being moved to another place, rebuilt and used in the same way again.
A tree is planted on the old site, preferably at the start of the rainy season, after the old pit contents have composted for a while.
"All of my family used to defecate at the back of our house or in an open field. This is the case everywhere in our `kebele' [district]; it is normal. We now understand that latrines are important for our hygiene and health. ArborLoo has helped us a lot. We plant fruits, vegetables, trees and above all we are safe from acute watery diarrhoea and other diseases," said Seid Abdo who is now using ArborLoo in Arsi Zone, Oromiya Regional State.
"Many communities achieved 100 percent sanitation coverage in areas that had 1 percent or less [coverage] before the project. And surprisingly none of these areas were affected by AWD, while others suffered from it," Bekele told IRIN.
"We are trying to implement more eco toilet projects in Addis Ababa. We want to scale it up in urban areas like Addis Ababa and Adama but we are challenged by lack of adequate policy and lack of funding," Bekele told IRIN.
Source: IRIN
"We estimate that some three million people live in Addis Ababa. Out of this nearly 25 percent of the population have no access to toilets and defecate in rivers crossing the city" the report says.
"We cannot tolerate any more waste in rivers and roads. We should be ashamed. We want to make sure that the city is clean and a better place to live," said Mekuria Haile, a senior local government official, at the launch of the report entitled Cleaning and Beautifying Addis Ababa: Intensifying Environmental and Health Issues with Public Participation.
"Addis Ababa is one of the biggest cities in sub-Saharan Africa. but is still fighting against solid waste management and health problems posed by unsafe drinking water and inadequate sanitation," said Haile.
The outbreak of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) which hit most parts of the city in August 2009 "was the result of poor sanitation and hygiene, coupled with solid waste from the city" the report said.
"I cannot trust the water that comes through a pipeline since that outbreak. I boil my water every day before serving my family," said Senait Habte, a resident of the city's Kolfe Keraniyo slum.
"My relatives in rural Ethiopia live a better life than us in the city. They have good toilets and access to safe drinking water. Seems like the government has forgotten us," she told IRIN, adding: "There are continuous electricity blackouts. Sometimes we don't have water for five days. Life is becoming difficult in Addis nowadays."
Public relations chief at the Water Resources Ministry Bizuneh Tolcha told IRIN nearly 66 percent of the Ethiopian population has access to safe drinking water and 56 percent has access to a latrine.
"According to our water tests, the water in Addis is very clean but the problem is contamination due to its unsafe use," Tolcha told IRIN.
The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) says 60-80 percent of the current disease burden in Ethiopia is attributable to environmental health risks, which include poor hygiene and inadequate sanitation.
Eco-toilets
US-based NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and its partners have been promoting an ecological toilet called the ArborLoo, designed by Zimbabwean Peter Morgan specifically for African conditions. It serves both as a basic toilet and makes use of excreta for growing fruit trees.
The AborLoo is a single pit shallow compost toilet 1.0-1.5m deep comprising a ring beam, slab and structure.
"Each concrete toilet slab costs US$7-20 and anyone can use it. It best suits the elderly and disabled people. You can dig it in half a day and can also plant trees on it," says Bekele Abaire, programme manager at the CRS office in Ethiopia.
During use, fly and odour problems are reduced by regularly adding soil, wood ash and leaves to the excreta in the pit. Once full, the old toilet site is covered with soil and left to compost with the parts of the toilet being moved to another place, rebuilt and used in the same way again.
A tree is planted on the old site, preferably at the start of the rainy season, after the old pit contents have composted for a while.
"All of my family used to defecate at the back of our house or in an open field. This is the case everywhere in our `kebele' [district]; it is normal. We now understand that latrines are important for our hygiene and health. ArborLoo has helped us a lot. We plant fruits, vegetables, trees and above all we are safe from acute watery diarrhoea and other diseases," said Seid Abdo who is now using ArborLoo in Arsi Zone, Oromiya Regional State.
"Many communities achieved 100 percent sanitation coverage in areas that had 1 percent or less [coverage] before the project. And surprisingly none of these areas were affected by AWD, while others suffered from it," Bekele told IRIN.
"We are trying to implement more eco toilet projects in Addis Ababa. We want to scale it up in urban areas like Addis Ababa and Adama but we are challenged by lack of adequate policy and lack of funding," Bekele told IRIN.
Source: IRIN
Tuesday, April 20, 2010 |
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Somali Refugee Flow Into Yemen Slows Despite Ongoing Violence
The number of people crossing the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in the mixed migration flow from the Horn of Africa has nearly halved during the first quarter of the year in comparison with the same period in 2009. Since the beginning of the year, some 9,400 people reached the shores of Yemen in contrast to nearly 17,000 between January and March 2009.
The largest drop is registered in the number of the new Somali arrivals. Some 3,200 Somali refugees arrived in Yemen this year which is approximately a third of their number during the first quarter of 2009. Today, Somali refugees represent every third new arrival to Yemen. During the same period of 2009, which was considered one of the relatively calmest periods in Somalia recently, Somali refugees were the overwhelming majority as they made more than half of all of the new arrivals by sea to Yemen. New arrivals from Somalia are automatically recognised as refugees in Yemen and the country presently hosts more than 170,000 Somali refugees.
However, the drop in the number of Somali arrivals is not driven by improvement of conditions inside Somalia. Many Somali civilians are daily forced to flee their homes.
This year began with some of the worst and deadliest fighting in Somalia since early 2009. The first three months of 2010 recorded some of highest displacement rates since January 2009 with an estimated 169,000 people being forced to leave their homes in south central Somalia, particularly from Mogadishu. However, the number of new Somali arrivals in the region remains relatively small. More than 20,000 Somali refugees fled the neighbouring countries - mostly to Kenya (over 12,000) and Ethiopia (over 6,500) since the beginning of the year.
Most of the displaced Somalis found shelter in the makeshift camps in the Afgooye corridor just outside Mogadishu or remain displaced in within the capital.
The new Somali refugees reaching Yemen claim that those fleeing the fighting face increasing difficulties in reaching the port town of Bossaso in northern Somalia, where they wait for their chance to board smugglers' boats sailing for Yemen. They cite general insecurity as the main reason deterring their movements towards the north. In addition, they say that more and more people simply have no means to pay for the trip to Puntland.
The refugees also reported that there are visible efforts by Puntland authorities to stem the human trafficking and mentioned that there is a large number of new arrivals in Bossaso waiting to be smuggled to Yemen. UNHCR teams in northern Somalia continue to assist the displaced population. In addition, intensive information campaigns warn those contemplating the risky passage to Yemen of the dangers involved.
According to same reports, many displaced Somalis avoid heading towards Kenya or Ethiopia through territories under militia control, fearing violence and forceful recruitment.
The civilian population in Somalia continues to suffer one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. There are an estimated 1.4 million IDPs in Somalia while nearly 570,000 Somalis live as refugees in the neighbouring countries.
Source: UNHCR
The largest drop is registered in the number of the new Somali arrivals. Some 3,200 Somali refugees arrived in Yemen this year which is approximately a third of their number during the first quarter of 2009. Today, Somali refugees represent every third new arrival to Yemen. During the same period of 2009, which was considered one of the relatively calmest periods in Somalia recently, Somali refugees were the overwhelming majority as they made more than half of all of the new arrivals by sea to Yemen. New arrivals from Somalia are automatically recognised as refugees in Yemen and the country presently hosts more than 170,000 Somali refugees.
However, the drop in the number of Somali arrivals is not driven by improvement of conditions inside Somalia. Many Somali civilians are daily forced to flee their homes.
This year began with some of the worst and deadliest fighting in Somalia since early 2009. The first three months of 2010 recorded some of highest displacement rates since January 2009 with an estimated 169,000 people being forced to leave their homes in south central Somalia, particularly from Mogadishu. However, the number of new Somali arrivals in the region remains relatively small. More than 20,000 Somali refugees fled the neighbouring countries - mostly to Kenya (over 12,000) and Ethiopia (over 6,500) since the beginning of the year.
Most of the displaced Somalis found shelter in the makeshift camps in the Afgooye corridor just outside Mogadishu or remain displaced in within the capital.
The new Somali refugees reaching Yemen claim that those fleeing the fighting face increasing difficulties in reaching the port town of Bossaso in northern Somalia, where they wait for their chance to board smugglers' boats sailing for Yemen. They cite general insecurity as the main reason deterring their movements towards the north. In addition, they say that more and more people simply have no means to pay for the trip to Puntland.
The refugees also reported that there are visible efforts by Puntland authorities to stem the human trafficking and mentioned that there is a large number of new arrivals in Bossaso waiting to be smuggled to Yemen. UNHCR teams in northern Somalia continue to assist the displaced population. In addition, intensive information campaigns warn those contemplating the risky passage to Yemen of the dangers involved.
According to same reports, many displaced Somalis avoid heading towards Kenya or Ethiopia through territories under militia control, fearing violence and forceful recruitment.
The civilian population in Somalia continues to suffer one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. There are an estimated 1.4 million IDPs in Somalia while nearly 570,000 Somalis live as refugees in the neighbouring countries.
Source: UNHCR
Friday, April 09, 2010 |
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Puntland Begins Repatriating Ethiopian Migrants
Authorities in Somalia's self-declared autonomous region of Puntland have begun repatriating hundreds of Ethiopian migrants, officials told IRIN.
"These are people who decided they wanted to return but could not afford to do so," said Mohamud Jama Muse, director of the Migration Response Centre (MRC) in Bosasso, Puntland's capital.
He said thousands of Ethiopians and Somalis were in Bosasso, with the intention of crossing into Yemen or to find work.
"We have so far repatriated 490 Ethiopian migrants," said Maher Ahmed, senior operations and programme manager with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Ahmed said that 12 flights had been chartered and IOM was providing airport assistance in Bosasso and Ethiopia.
He said: "We will provide them with US$30 for transport to their home areas and, once there, give them a reintegration package."
Individuals over 18 are given $260 and those younger $110 as part of the reintegration package, he said, adding that "90 percent of those repatriated were women and children".
The continued voluntary repatriation of Ethiopians depended on available funding, Ahmed said.
Joining the queue
Muse said MRC had registered another 1,200 Ethiopians who wanted to return home. He said many had been unable to cross to Yemen or find jobs in Bosasso. "There are no jobs here and they run out of money, so they cannot pay the smugglers."
Adam Nisha Dakabu, an Ethiopian who came to Bosasso to go to Yemen and then Saudi Arabia, said: "I wanted to go but could not because I could not raise the money. I could not find anything to do here, so when I heard about this I registered myself to return."
He said life in Bosasso was very difficult. "At least at home I will be with my family."
Muse said that in response to tough measures taken by the Puntland authorities against smugglers, "it was becoming more and more difficult and expensive for would-be migrants to find boats".
He added that because of the crackdown, smugglers were reportedly charging $200 or more for the trip to Yemen. In the past they charged $50-$75 for the one-to-three-day journey.
According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 74,000 people crossed the Red Sea from the Horn of Africa to Yemen in 2009 - up 50 percent on 2008.
The number of Somali migrants remained steady in 2008 and 2009, while the number of Ethiopians rose sharply to 42,000 in 2009, UNHCR said. So far in 2010, 5,032 migrants have crossed and four have died.
Source: IRIN
"These are people who decided they wanted to return but could not afford to do so," said Mohamud Jama Muse, director of the Migration Response Centre (MRC) in Bosasso, Puntland's capital.
He said thousands of Ethiopians and Somalis were in Bosasso, with the intention of crossing into Yemen or to find work.
"We have so far repatriated 490 Ethiopian migrants," said Maher Ahmed, senior operations and programme manager with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Ahmed said that 12 flights had been chartered and IOM was providing airport assistance in Bosasso and Ethiopia.
He said: "We will provide them with US$30 for transport to their home areas and, once there, give them a reintegration package."
Individuals over 18 are given $260 and those younger $110 as part of the reintegration package, he said, adding that "90 percent of those repatriated were women and children".
The continued voluntary repatriation of Ethiopians depended on available funding, Ahmed said.
Joining the queue
Muse said MRC had registered another 1,200 Ethiopians who wanted to return home. He said many had been unable to cross to Yemen or find jobs in Bosasso. "There are no jobs here and they run out of money, so they cannot pay the smugglers."
Adam Nisha Dakabu, an Ethiopian who came to Bosasso to go to Yemen and then Saudi Arabia, said: "I wanted to go but could not because I could not raise the money. I could not find anything to do here, so when I heard about this I registered myself to return."
He said life in Bosasso was very difficult. "At least at home I will be with my family."
Muse said that in response to tough measures taken by the Puntland authorities against smugglers, "it was becoming more and more difficult and expensive for would-be migrants to find boats".
He added that because of the crackdown, smugglers were reportedly charging $200 or more for the trip to Yemen. In the past they charged $50-$75 for the one-to-three-day journey.
According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 74,000 people crossed the Red Sea from the Horn of Africa to Yemen in 2009 - up 50 percent on 2008.
The number of Somali migrants remained steady in 2008 and 2009, while the number of Ethiopians rose sharply to 42,000 in 2009, UNHCR said. So far in 2010, 5,032 migrants have crossed and four have died.
Source: IRIN
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 |
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Ethiopia Accuses Rights Groups, VOA Of 'Smear Campaign'
By Peter Heinlein
Ethiopia has charged that recent human rights reports and Voice of America broadcasts are aimed at destabilizing the country ahead of the May 23 national elections. Jamming of VOA broadcasts to Ethiopia has been expanded in recent days.
Government spokesman Shimelis Kemal describes the latest reports on Ethiopia by Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department as part of a pre-election smear campaign.
"These reports are made under the guise of human rights concerns but primarily focused on defaming and unduly blemishing the good image of the country," said Shimelis Kemal.
The report by the New York-based Human Rights Watch accuses Ethiopia of creating a climate of fear ahead of the May elections with a 'coordinated and sustained attack' on political opponents and journalists. The State Department's annual report documents a number of violations, among them that Ethiopia is holding scores of political prisoners, including opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa.
Both reports were issued in the past few weeks.
Speaking to reporters, Shimelis called the reports a 'litany of condemnation' filled with false allegations designed to destabilize Ethiopia.
"It is a smear campaign intended to portray the forthcoming elections as unfair and the conditions surrounding the election as undemocratic," said Shimelis. "One can discern that the prime focus of this reporting is to create a kind of weak government in Ethiopia that would easily bend to pressures from foreign elements, foreign forces.
Shimelis also defended Ethiopia's decision to jam VOA language service broadcasts, alleging that the Amharic Service has a history of sowing seeds of hatred.
"VOA in the past has repeatedly broadcast programs and statements that tend to incite, foment hatred between different ethnic groups," he said. "Recently, it has transmitted a program alleging the government of Ethiopia had staged state sponsored genocide in Gambela."
Shimelis noted that several VOA Amharic Service staffers working in Washington had been charged in absentia with 'openly promoting violence' in the wake of the 2005 election. VOA rejected the accusations, and the charges were later dropped.
VOA broadcasts to Ethiopia were blocked around the 2005 election, and again before the 2008 local elections. Jamming of Amharic Service programs began again February 22. The jamming has been extended in the past few days to other Ethiopian language broadcasts, in Tigrinya and Afan Oromo.
Despite the jamming and the denunciation of human rights reporting, spokesman Shimelis described the overall Ethiopia/U.S. relationship as strong, and based on mutual interests. The United States views Ethiopia as a key ally in the volatile Horn of Africa region.
VOA Director Danforth W. Austin issued a statement Thursday calling the jamming "unfortunate," and strongly denying that the broadcasts are aimed at destabilizing or defaming the government of Ethiopia. The statement said VOA supports free, uncensored press, and recognizes the opportunity to serve the people of Ethiopia with unbiased news and information.
The Voice of America is a multi-media international broadcasting service funded by the U.S. Government. VOA broadcasts more than 1,500 hours of news and other programming every week in 45 languages to an audience of more than 125 million people.
Source: VOA
Ethiopia has charged that recent human rights reports and Voice of America broadcasts are aimed at destabilizing the country ahead of the May 23 national elections. Jamming of VOA broadcasts to Ethiopia has been expanded in recent days.
Government spokesman Shimelis Kemal describes the latest reports on Ethiopia by Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department as part of a pre-election smear campaign.
"These reports are made under the guise of human rights concerns but primarily focused on defaming and unduly blemishing the good image of the country," said Shimelis Kemal.
The report by the New York-based Human Rights Watch accuses Ethiopia of creating a climate of fear ahead of the May elections with a 'coordinated and sustained attack' on political opponents and journalists. The State Department's annual report documents a number of violations, among them that Ethiopia is holding scores of political prisoners, including opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa.
Both reports were issued in the past few weeks.
Speaking to reporters, Shimelis called the reports a 'litany of condemnation' filled with false allegations designed to destabilize Ethiopia.
"It is a smear campaign intended to portray the forthcoming elections as unfair and the conditions surrounding the election as undemocratic," said Shimelis. "One can discern that the prime focus of this reporting is to create a kind of weak government in Ethiopia that would easily bend to pressures from foreign elements, foreign forces.
Shimelis also defended Ethiopia's decision to jam VOA language service broadcasts, alleging that the Amharic Service has a history of sowing seeds of hatred.
"VOA in the past has repeatedly broadcast programs and statements that tend to incite, foment hatred between different ethnic groups," he said. "Recently, it has transmitted a program alleging the government of Ethiopia had staged state sponsored genocide in Gambela."
Shimelis noted that several VOA Amharic Service staffers working in Washington had been charged in absentia with 'openly promoting violence' in the wake of the 2005 election. VOA rejected the accusations, and the charges were later dropped.
VOA broadcasts to Ethiopia were blocked around the 2005 election, and again before the 2008 local elections. Jamming of Amharic Service programs began again February 22. The jamming has been extended in the past few days to other Ethiopian language broadcasts, in Tigrinya and Afan Oromo.
Despite the jamming and the denunciation of human rights reporting, spokesman Shimelis described the overall Ethiopia/U.S. relationship as strong, and based on mutual interests. The United States views Ethiopia as a key ally in the volatile Horn of Africa region.
VOA Director Danforth W. Austin issued a statement Thursday calling the jamming "unfortunate," and strongly denying that the broadcasts are aimed at destabilizing or defaming the government of Ethiopia. The statement said VOA supports free, uncensored press, and recognizes the opportunity to serve the people of Ethiopia with unbiased news and information.
The Voice of America is a multi-media international broadcasting service funded by the U.S. Government. VOA broadcasts more than 1,500 hours of news and other programming every week in 45 languages to an audience of more than 125 million people.
Source: VOA
Friday, April 02, 2010 |
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Bad Aid
By Vijay Prashad
In December 1984, I walked into the HMV store on London’s Oxford Street to spend a little discretionary money on an LP. Other albums drew me, but one had an advantage. It combined the talents of all the major “Top of the Pops” singers onto one song. Given the standards of British pop at the time (leaving aside Scritti Politti’s “Jacques Derrida” and perhaps the Bronski Beat’s “Smalltown Boy”), the diminishing marginal returns at the cash register were held in check with only one purchase. It had to be Bob Geldof’s Do They Know It’s Christmas? The “charity single” had all of Britain’s finest, from Paul McCartney to Boy George, from Siobhan Fahey (of Bananarama) to Sting. The song opens with African drums and Phil Collins’ drum kit, and then the flow of British vocalists, with a young Bono in full flight. Geldof named their charity super-group Band Aid, a name that morphed as the fever caught, into Live Aid, Sport Aid and so on. BBC ran the Band Aid song non-stop. It raised millions of pounds to buy relief for the survivors of the Ethiopian famine.
Not to be undone, Harry Belafonte and Ken Kragen hastened to bring their friends into the studio in Los Angeles to sing a song written by Michael Jackson and Lionel Richie, produced by Quincy Jones (they called their project USA for Africa). The superstars of the U. S. billboard charts represented themselves, from Paul Simon to Stevie Wonder, from Diana Ross to Bob Dylan. Bob Geldof specially traveled to sing in the chorus, and Ray Charles held it together at the end. The British had been silly, singing about snow (the only place that gets snow in Ethiopia is its highest mountain, Ras Dashen, in the Simien Range). But the Americans did what they do best, singing, “We are the World.” And, indeed, so it seems to be.
Geldof and the other artists turned their attention to Ethiopia in 1984 because of a famine that broke out in 1982 and lingered on till 1990. In fact, the Horn of Africa suffered a plague of famines from 1973 onward, when the desiccation of the Sahara put paid to both the livelihood of nomads and petty farmers, led to acute drought and further deforestation. When the Ethiopian regime of Haile Selassie failed to provide relief to the people whom the Ethiopians call the bekum mot, the living dead, young radicals in the armed forces moved in and seized control of the country. They constituted themselves as the Derg, the Committee, drew from their own version of Marxism, and set in motion some haphazard forms of agricultural regeneration. The Derg were always hampered by three factors: the inherited agricultural crisis which would be its undoing; an empire that was not a nation, with secessionist provinces (such as Eritrea, ceded to Ethiopia by the UN in 1950) unwilling to bow to the rule of Addis Ababa; a hostile Atlantic bloc, ready and able to bring whatever pressure was needed to bring the Derg to its knees (Jimmy Carter’s evangelical humanism came alongside a cynical policy of anti-communism, which in the Horn meant a strategy to encircle Ethiopia and, with a wink and a nod, embolden its irredentist neighbors and secessionist provinces).
The Derg had little capacity to deal with any of the problems that beset the new republic. Civilians who returned from exile when the Emperor was deposed found that the military Marxists had not the temperament to make room for them. One of the most difficult problems for the new regime was the land question. Imperial Ethiopia gave the land over to the aristocracy (the mesafint) and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, both of whom neglected that section of Acts 4:32-37 which enjoined the believers to share all that they had so “neither was there any among them that lacked.” In March 1975, the derg pushed forward a radical land reform law, whose immediate impact was in southern Ethiopia. Seven million households benefited from the reform. A flurry of activity around urban housing, literacy and relief for the destitute provided some dynamism to the otherwise devastated country.
Early in the derg’s tenure, it set-up a Minimum Package Program to increase the productivity of the new small-hold farms. Before these initiatives could bear any fruit, the derg began to conscript young farmers into its growing army (for the battles against a Somalian incursion into Ogaden, against Eritrean secessionists and against northern rebels, particularly in the province of Tigray). High fuel prices didn’t help, and nor did pressure from Washington and Moscow. Cuba tried to mediate. Castro met Somalia’s Siad Barre and Ethiopia’s Mengistu in Aden, along with the South Yemen Marxist leader Abdul Fattah Ismail. Nothing came of it. The Horn of Africa was rife with various strands of nationalism and Marxism, including Soviet-backed regimes and Albanianists. It was a mess, wide open for the machinations of the Cold War.
It did not help that the Derg faltered. It took refuge in the flotsam of policies that came north from Tanzania, including forced resettlement (the policy has its origins in an 1958 attempt by the Emperor’s government). As in Tanzania, the policy failed: people did not wish to leave their ancestral lands, nor were they convinced that their new homes would be the promised cornucopia. Drought, war, and now agricultural chaos: the famine of 1982-90 entered world history.
Like Haile Selassie, the Derg at first refused to admit to the famine. Visnews Kenyan bureau chief, Mohamed Amin finagled his camera into Ethiopia, and broadcast the first images of the growing disaster. It was this intrepid work that brought the attention of the BBC’s Michael Buerk. All the channels wanted in. Their initial interest, after a few years of disregard, was media competition. Mary Kay Magistad (now The World’s Beijing correspondent) wrote her master’s thesis on what she called the “Ethiopian bandwagon.” “Literally overnight,” she wrote, “it seemed that everyone wanted to cover Ethiopia. Reporters deluged Addis Ababa by the hundreds; many aid workers who had been trying for more than a year to pull the news media’s attention to the famine were now finding themselves too busy briefing journalists that they barely had time to do their normal relief work.” Mohamed Amin was largely forgotten (in 1996, Amin was on Ethiopian Airlines flight 961, which was hijacked by three men who wanted political asylum in Australia. Amin negotiated with the hijackers all the way till the plane crash that killed all passengers). The world media made Ethiopia the icon of misery in the post-colonial world. State failure in the former colonies would now be blamed on that toxic brew of nationalism and corruption. The picture of an Ethiopian child with a distended belly and a tear resting on his cheek beside an engorged fly was on the cover of many glossy magazines.
The BBC’s Martin Plaut, who reported from the famine regions of northern Ethiopia in the 1970s, went back this past year and investigated the famine and the relief. His radio documentary unsettled the aid industry, and Bob Geldof. Plaut found that most of the relief money did not go to alleviate hunger. Instead, it went to buy arms for the rebels of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) through its aid cut-out, Relief Society of Tigray (REST). The TPLF was in the midst of an armed campaign against the Derg, offering a second front to give relief to the Eritrean rebels. It now turns out, according to Plaut’s report, that while the TPLF was blindsiding the aid workers, it did not surprise the CIA. A CIA report from 1985 quite clearly pointed out, “Some funds that insurgent organizations are raising for relief operations, as a result of increased world publicity, are almost certainly being diverted for military purposes.” Robert Houdek, who was Washington’s chargé d’affaires in Addis, confirmed to Plaut that his government was aware of the redirection of funds. Indeed, this went along the grain of the overall Contra strategy pushed by the Reagan administration (National Security Directive 75, from January 1983, which pointed out that “US policy will seek to limit and destabilize activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients” as well the 1981 presidential finding to authorize the CIA to support “democratic resistance” to the derg). The Contra strategy was in play in Nicaragua, in Angola, in Afghanistan and in the Horn of Africa (all this explicitly put by Reagan in his February 1986 Message to the Congress on Foreign Policy). The TPLF and its various allies were the contras of the region.
As Mary Kay Magistad points out, the British and American governments were motivated less by humanitarian imperatives than by political ones. “This,” she writes, “was highlighted by the contradiction of the government’s rhetoric that it was committed to helping starving Africans, and the fact that it was at the same time cutting its aid budget by an average of 6 percent per annum.” Not only were aid budgets being cut, but the United States pressured 22 of the 34 low-income countries in Africa to succumb to structural adjustment policies (devaluation of currencies, cuts in social services, and so on); this was the price to be paid for short-term financial assistance from the IMF. The mighty dynamo of the newly formed Group of Seven (G7, formed in 1974) threw itself into the narrowing of spaces for independent action by the new states in Africa, Asia and Latin America: punitive policies came alongside modern forms of gunboat diplomacy, with the occasional Contra insurgency to hit recalcitrant regimes in the neck. Ethiopia never stood a chance. It was fated to be destroyed, as was its neighbor Somalia. The detritus that stands before us now is a consequence of this ghastly history.
And so we come to Haiti
What the G-7 wrought was a world of people who labor hard, but nevertheless suffer usurious debt rates and have little space to exercise their political desires. The New International Economic Order (NIEO, 1973), passed by the UN General Assembly, carried a reasonable platform for the transformation of the planet’s economic relations. Trade regimes would be altered, so would financial devices and restrictions on technology transfer. The dream was to shape the world not toward outrageous profits, but toward genuine development. The G7 was formed to smash the NIEO. Its interests were toward Wall Street not the Addis slum of Tekle Haymonot. The NIEO would have circumvented the debt crisis that wracked the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1980s. Absent the Contra strategy, there might have been the possibility for the creation of stable political structures in much of what would become the Global South. Debt and the absence of democracy was the gift of the G7, and of course with petrodollars, the massive expansion of the role of finance over the planet’s political economy. One major function of the expansion of neo-liberalism (not mentioned by David Harvey in his otherwise excellent short history) is the orchestrated destruction of the NIEO, the highest point of the Third World project.
The best of the North’s liberalism, however, was not in Band Aid, but on the Brandt Commission, a panel of eminences set up at the behest of a very guilty Robert McNamara (then of the World Bank) and led by Willy Brandt, the socialist leader from West Germany. The Brandt Commission offered several of the NIEO proposals without the politics, and in a much more moderated form. Brandt was as much a threat to the G7 as the NIEO, indeed more because it did not come from Algeria’s Houari Boumediène but from the Washington Post’s Katharine Graham (one of the Brandt Commissioners). Margaret Thatcher persuaded Reagan to go to the Cancun North-South Summit (1981) to smash the Brandt dynamic; “The whole concept of ‘North-South’ dialogue, which the Brandt Commission had made the fashionable talk of the international community,” she wrote later, “was in my view wrong-headed.” Reagan smiled, and the “quality press” went along with him and Maggie. This is all before Murdoch ran the news business.
Haiti never had a chance. It had been treated as a standing threat since its revolution in 1804. Democracy was never to be permitted to it. Since the 1980s, its leading democratic leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was twice removed from his democratic office by the United States. When he came back to power in 1994, it was under the most benighted conditions, these set by the Clinton White House and Wall Street. They wanted Haiti to become a maquiladora, not a country. Haiti’s debt has spiraled out of control. It took the January 12 earthquake to move the U. S. to consider joining Venezuela in debt cancellation. That is now on the agenda. But only for Haiti. Not for Ethiopia, and not for the Global South. According to the World Bank, for every $1 of aid sent South, $25 goes to the North in debt-servicing. It is a standing outrage. Furthermore, the attempt to democratize the United Nations, led by former General Assembly President Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua, has been thus far treated with contempt by the G7. What is the point of financial assistance if there is no accountable, political institution to make the best use of this money, this aid?
How is the aid that now goes to places like Haiti being spent? In the case of Ethiopia, the United States eschewed civilian agencies. The Inter-Agency Task Force on the African Famine was run by the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as AID and the Department of Agriculture. The leader was retired Lt. Gen. Julius Becton who would lead FEMA under Reagan’s second term (1985-89). Aid was always militarized. As well in the current Haiti case. And NGOs were already at the center, with an express purpose of displacing the State. Most of their work is “band aid,” in the pejorative sense (even the New York Times recognized this in an editorial on March 25, “The little country is swarming with well-intentioned organizations, each trying to do their little bit of help. One group is trying to distribute thousands of flashlights to women and girls. It’s a kind and practical gesture, but what they really need are shelters from sexual violence, and adequate policing. Haiti has neither, Amnesty International reports”). Paul Farmer, the UN Deputy Special Envoy for Haiti, also calls attention to the “flock of trauma vultures, consultants and carpetbaggers.” There is money to be made in a disaster. As my friend P. Sainath put it, “everybody loves a good drought.”
Raising money for Haiti is all well and good. But which Haiti is getting the money? That question was not asked of the Ethiopian aid effort, and it is not being asked now. Is the Haiti of structural adjustment, the raft on the Caribbean, fated to being reduced to a factory and a port for Royal Caribbean’s cruise ships? All the efforts thus far seem to suggest that this is the Haiti that is being promised. There is an alternative. If all that energy that goes toward raising money went toward a political campaign to erase the “odious debt” owned by the South to the North it would clear space for an alternative. That’s the first step. Another is the revival of a 21st Century New International Economic Order.
Vijay Prashad is the George and Martha Kellner Chair of South Asian History and Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT His most recent book, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World, won the Muzaffar Ahmad Book Prize for 2009. The Swedish and French editions are just out. He can be reached at: vijay.prashad@trincoll.edu . This article first appeared at Counterpunch and is reprinted with permission.
In December 1984, I walked into the HMV store on London’s Oxford Street to spend a little discretionary money on an LP. Other albums drew me, but one had an advantage. It combined the talents of all the major “Top of the Pops” singers onto one song. Given the standards of British pop at the time (leaving aside Scritti Politti’s “Jacques Derrida” and perhaps the Bronski Beat’s “Smalltown Boy”), the diminishing marginal returns at the cash register were held in check with only one purchase. It had to be Bob Geldof’s Do They Know It’s Christmas? The “charity single” had all of Britain’s finest, from Paul McCartney to Boy George, from Siobhan Fahey (of Bananarama) to Sting. The song opens with African drums and Phil Collins’ drum kit, and then the flow of British vocalists, with a young Bono in full flight. Geldof named their charity super-group Band Aid, a name that morphed as the fever caught, into Live Aid, Sport Aid and so on. BBC ran the Band Aid song non-stop. It raised millions of pounds to buy relief for the survivors of the Ethiopian famine.
Not to be undone, Harry Belafonte and Ken Kragen hastened to bring their friends into the studio in Los Angeles to sing a song written by Michael Jackson and Lionel Richie, produced by Quincy Jones (they called their project USA for Africa). The superstars of the U. S. billboard charts represented themselves, from Paul Simon to Stevie Wonder, from Diana Ross to Bob Dylan. Bob Geldof specially traveled to sing in the chorus, and Ray Charles held it together at the end. The British had been silly, singing about snow (the only place that gets snow in Ethiopia is its highest mountain, Ras Dashen, in the Simien Range). But the Americans did what they do best, singing, “We are the World.” And, indeed, so it seems to be.
Geldof and the other artists turned their attention to Ethiopia in 1984 because of a famine that broke out in 1982 and lingered on till 1990. In fact, the Horn of Africa suffered a plague of famines from 1973 onward, when the desiccation of the Sahara put paid to both the livelihood of nomads and petty farmers, led to acute drought and further deforestation. When the Ethiopian regime of Haile Selassie failed to provide relief to the people whom the Ethiopians call the bekum mot, the living dead, young radicals in the armed forces moved in and seized control of the country. They constituted themselves as the Derg, the Committee, drew from their own version of Marxism, and set in motion some haphazard forms of agricultural regeneration. The Derg were always hampered by three factors: the inherited agricultural crisis which would be its undoing; an empire that was not a nation, with secessionist provinces (such as Eritrea, ceded to Ethiopia by the UN in 1950) unwilling to bow to the rule of Addis Ababa; a hostile Atlantic bloc, ready and able to bring whatever pressure was needed to bring the Derg to its knees (Jimmy Carter’s evangelical humanism came alongside a cynical policy of anti-communism, which in the Horn meant a strategy to encircle Ethiopia and, with a wink and a nod, embolden its irredentist neighbors and secessionist provinces).
The Derg had little capacity to deal with any of the problems that beset the new republic. Civilians who returned from exile when the Emperor was deposed found that the military Marxists had not the temperament to make room for them. One of the most difficult problems for the new regime was the land question. Imperial Ethiopia gave the land over to the aristocracy (the mesafint) and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, both of whom neglected that section of Acts 4:32-37 which enjoined the believers to share all that they had so “neither was there any among them that lacked.” In March 1975, the derg pushed forward a radical land reform law, whose immediate impact was in southern Ethiopia. Seven million households benefited from the reform. A flurry of activity around urban housing, literacy and relief for the destitute provided some dynamism to the otherwise devastated country.
Early in the derg’s tenure, it set-up a Minimum Package Program to increase the productivity of the new small-hold farms. Before these initiatives could bear any fruit, the derg began to conscript young farmers into its growing army (for the battles against a Somalian incursion into Ogaden, against Eritrean secessionists and against northern rebels, particularly in the province of Tigray). High fuel prices didn’t help, and nor did pressure from Washington and Moscow. Cuba tried to mediate. Castro met Somalia’s Siad Barre and Ethiopia’s Mengistu in Aden, along with the South Yemen Marxist leader Abdul Fattah Ismail. Nothing came of it. The Horn of Africa was rife with various strands of nationalism and Marxism, including Soviet-backed regimes and Albanianists. It was a mess, wide open for the machinations of the Cold War.
It did not help that the Derg faltered. It took refuge in the flotsam of policies that came north from Tanzania, including forced resettlement (the policy has its origins in an 1958 attempt by the Emperor’s government). As in Tanzania, the policy failed: people did not wish to leave their ancestral lands, nor were they convinced that their new homes would be the promised cornucopia. Drought, war, and now agricultural chaos: the famine of 1982-90 entered world history.
Like Haile Selassie, the Derg at first refused to admit to the famine. Visnews Kenyan bureau chief, Mohamed Amin finagled his camera into Ethiopia, and broadcast the first images of the growing disaster. It was this intrepid work that brought the attention of the BBC’s Michael Buerk. All the channels wanted in. Their initial interest, after a few years of disregard, was media competition. Mary Kay Magistad (now The World’s Beijing correspondent) wrote her master’s thesis on what she called the “Ethiopian bandwagon.” “Literally overnight,” she wrote, “it seemed that everyone wanted to cover Ethiopia. Reporters deluged Addis Ababa by the hundreds; many aid workers who had been trying for more than a year to pull the news media’s attention to the famine were now finding themselves too busy briefing journalists that they barely had time to do their normal relief work.” Mohamed Amin was largely forgotten (in 1996, Amin was on Ethiopian Airlines flight 961, which was hijacked by three men who wanted political asylum in Australia. Amin negotiated with the hijackers all the way till the plane crash that killed all passengers). The world media made Ethiopia the icon of misery in the post-colonial world. State failure in the former colonies would now be blamed on that toxic brew of nationalism and corruption. The picture of an Ethiopian child with a distended belly and a tear resting on his cheek beside an engorged fly was on the cover of many glossy magazines.
The BBC’s Martin Plaut, who reported from the famine regions of northern Ethiopia in the 1970s, went back this past year and investigated the famine and the relief. His radio documentary unsettled the aid industry, and Bob Geldof. Plaut found that most of the relief money did not go to alleviate hunger. Instead, it went to buy arms for the rebels of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) through its aid cut-out, Relief Society of Tigray (REST). The TPLF was in the midst of an armed campaign against the Derg, offering a second front to give relief to the Eritrean rebels. It now turns out, according to Plaut’s report, that while the TPLF was blindsiding the aid workers, it did not surprise the CIA. A CIA report from 1985 quite clearly pointed out, “Some funds that insurgent organizations are raising for relief operations, as a result of increased world publicity, are almost certainly being diverted for military purposes.” Robert Houdek, who was Washington’s chargé d’affaires in Addis, confirmed to Plaut that his government was aware of the redirection of funds. Indeed, this went along the grain of the overall Contra strategy pushed by the Reagan administration (National Security Directive 75, from January 1983, which pointed out that “US policy will seek to limit and destabilize activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients” as well the 1981 presidential finding to authorize the CIA to support “democratic resistance” to the derg). The Contra strategy was in play in Nicaragua, in Angola, in Afghanistan and in the Horn of Africa (all this explicitly put by Reagan in his February 1986 Message to the Congress on Foreign Policy). The TPLF and its various allies were the contras of the region.
As Mary Kay Magistad points out, the British and American governments were motivated less by humanitarian imperatives than by political ones. “This,” she writes, “was highlighted by the contradiction of the government’s rhetoric that it was committed to helping starving Africans, and the fact that it was at the same time cutting its aid budget by an average of 6 percent per annum.” Not only were aid budgets being cut, but the United States pressured 22 of the 34 low-income countries in Africa to succumb to structural adjustment policies (devaluation of currencies, cuts in social services, and so on); this was the price to be paid for short-term financial assistance from the IMF. The mighty dynamo of the newly formed Group of Seven (G7, formed in 1974) threw itself into the narrowing of spaces for independent action by the new states in Africa, Asia and Latin America: punitive policies came alongside modern forms of gunboat diplomacy, with the occasional Contra insurgency to hit recalcitrant regimes in the neck. Ethiopia never stood a chance. It was fated to be destroyed, as was its neighbor Somalia. The detritus that stands before us now is a consequence of this ghastly history.
And so we come to Haiti
What the G-7 wrought was a world of people who labor hard, but nevertheless suffer usurious debt rates and have little space to exercise their political desires. The New International Economic Order (NIEO, 1973), passed by the UN General Assembly, carried a reasonable platform for the transformation of the planet’s economic relations. Trade regimes would be altered, so would financial devices and restrictions on technology transfer. The dream was to shape the world not toward outrageous profits, but toward genuine development. The G7 was formed to smash the NIEO. Its interests were toward Wall Street not the Addis slum of Tekle Haymonot. The NIEO would have circumvented the debt crisis that wracked the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1980s. Absent the Contra strategy, there might have been the possibility for the creation of stable political structures in much of what would become the Global South. Debt and the absence of democracy was the gift of the G7, and of course with petrodollars, the massive expansion of the role of finance over the planet’s political economy. One major function of the expansion of neo-liberalism (not mentioned by David Harvey in his otherwise excellent short history) is the orchestrated destruction of the NIEO, the highest point of the Third World project.
The best of the North’s liberalism, however, was not in Band Aid, but on the Brandt Commission, a panel of eminences set up at the behest of a very guilty Robert McNamara (then of the World Bank) and led by Willy Brandt, the socialist leader from West Germany. The Brandt Commission offered several of the NIEO proposals without the politics, and in a much more moderated form. Brandt was as much a threat to the G7 as the NIEO, indeed more because it did not come from Algeria’s Houari Boumediène but from the Washington Post’s Katharine Graham (one of the Brandt Commissioners). Margaret Thatcher persuaded Reagan to go to the Cancun North-South Summit (1981) to smash the Brandt dynamic; “The whole concept of ‘North-South’ dialogue, which the Brandt Commission had made the fashionable talk of the international community,” she wrote later, “was in my view wrong-headed.” Reagan smiled, and the “quality press” went along with him and Maggie. This is all before Murdoch ran the news business.
Haiti never had a chance. It had been treated as a standing threat since its revolution in 1804. Democracy was never to be permitted to it. Since the 1980s, its leading democratic leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was twice removed from his democratic office by the United States. When he came back to power in 1994, it was under the most benighted conditions, these set by the Clinton White House and Wall Street. They wanted Haiti to become a maquiladora, not a country. Haiti’s debt has spiraled out of control. It took the January 12 earthquake to move the U. S. to consider joining Venezuela in debt cancellation. That is now on the agenda. But only for Haiti. Not for Ethiopia, and not for the Global South. According to the World Bank, for every $1 of aid sent South, $25 goes to the North in debt-servicing. It is a standing outrage. Furthermore, the attempt to democratize the United Nations, led by former General Assembly President Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua, has been thus far treated with contempt by the G7. What is the point of financial assistance if there is no accountable, political institution to make the best use of this money, this aid?
How is the aid that now goes to places like Haiti being spent? In the case of Ethiopia, the United States eschewed civilian agencies. The Inter-Agency Task Force on the African Famine was run by the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as AID and the Department of Agriculture. The leader was retired Lt. Gen. Julius Becton who would lead FEMA under Reagan’s second term (1985-89). Aid was always militarized. As well in the current Haiti case. And NGOs were already at the center, with an express purpose of displacing the State. Most of their work is “band aid,” in the pejorative sense (even the New York Times recognized this in an editorial on March 25, “The little country is swarming with well-intentioned organizations, each trying to do their little bit of help. One group is trying to distribute thousands of flashlights to women and girls. It’s a kind and practical gesture, but what they really need are shelters from sexual violence, and adequate policing. Haiti has neither, Amnesty International reports”). Paul Farmer, the UN Deputy Special Envoy for Haiti, also calls attention to the “flock of trauma vultures, consultants and carpetbaggers.” There is money to be made in a disaster. As my friend P. Sainath put it, “everybody loves a good drought.”
Raising money for Haiti is all well and good. But which Haiti is getting the money? That question was not asked of the Ethiopian aid effort, and it is not being asked now. Is the Haiti of structural adjustment, the raft on the Caribbean, fated to being reduced to a factory and a port for Royal Caribbean’s cruise ships? All the efforts thus far seem to suggest that this is the Haiti that is being promised. There is an alternative. If all that energy that goes toward raising money went toward a political campaign to erase the “odious debt” owned by the South to the North it would clear space for an alternative. That’s the first step. Another is the revival of a 21st Century New International Economic Order.
Vijay Prashad is the George and Martha Kellner Chair of South Asian History and Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT His most recent book, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World, won the Muzaffar Ahmad Book Prize for 2009. The Swedish and French editions are just out. He can be reached at: vijay.prashad@trincoll.edu . This article first appeared at Counterpunch and is reprinted with permission.
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Analysis Of Al Qaeda And Al Shabaab In East Africa
The East Africa region has emerged over the past two decades as a region that is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and is considered a safe haven for international terrorist groups.
Africa’s porous borders and lax security at airports and seaports and weak law enforcement agencies are major concerns. Political, ethnic, and religious conflicts in the region create an environment conducive to terrorist groups. The inability of African security services to detect and intercept terrorist activities due to lack of technology and sufficient trained and motivated manpower is a major impediment in dealing with the terrorist threats in Africa. The takeover of power in Sudan by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989 led to a significant increase in the activities of international terror groups in Africa.
The NIF government provided safe haven for well known international terrorist organizations and individuals, and the government’s security services also were directly engaged in facilitating and assisting domestic and international terror groups. Sudan has also been a safe haven for major terrorist figures, including the founder and leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden used Sudan as a base of operations until he returned to Afghanistan in mid-1996, where he had previously been a major financier of Arab volunteers in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Many observers contend that it was during his five year stay in Sudan that Bin Laden laid down the foundation for Al Qaeda. The penetration by Al Qaeda into East Africa is directly tied to NIF’s early years of support to international terrorist organizations. The East Africa region is by far the most impacted by international terrorist activities in Africa.
The 1990s saw a dramatic and daring terrorist attacks against American interests in Africa. The U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by Al Qaeda killed 229 people, 12 of whom were American citizens, and injured over 5,000 people. In November, 2002, simultaneous terrorist attacks struck Mombasa, Kenya. Al Qaeda suicide bombers drove a four-wheel drive vehicle packed with explosives into the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 10 Kenyans and three Israelis. In June 1995, members of Gama’a Islamiya, an Egyptian extremist group, tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Somalia: Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups?
The United States, Somalia’s neighbors, and some Somali groups have expressed concern over the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. In the mid-1990s, Islamic courts began to emerge in parts of the country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. These courts functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by using their own militia.
Members of the Al Ittihad Al Islami63 militia reportedly provided the bulk of the security forces for these courts in the 1990s. The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country. Somali factions, including the so-called Islamic groups, often go through realignments or simply disappear from the scene. Very little is known about the leadership or organizational structure of these groups.
There have been three known radical Islamic groups in Somalia whose prominence alternately waxed and waned: Al Ittihad Al Islami (Islamic Union), Al Islah (Reform), and Al Tabligh (Conveyers of God’s Work). In 1995, a group called Jihad Al Islam, led by Sheikh Abbas bin Omar, emerged in Mogadishu, and gave the two main warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, an ultimatum to end their factional fighting. The group claimed at that time that it maintained offices in several countries, including Yemen, Pakistan, Kenya, and Sudan.
Not much was heard subsequently from Jihad Al Islam, although a group of Somalis later formed the Sharia (Islamic law) Implementation Club (SIC) in 1996. In late September 2001, the Bush Administration added Al Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related entities whose assets were frozen by an Executive Order. Bush Administration officials accused Al Ittihad Al Islami of links with Al Qaeda.
None of the groups mentioned above remain active, although some of their leaders are now leaders of groups engaged in terrorist activities in Somalia. The leader of Hizb Al Islam, Sheikh Hassan Aweys, who is on the U.S. terrorist list, was a leader in Al Ittihad Al Islami.
The Islamic Courts Union, Al Shabaab
Some observers have argued that the takeover of power in Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) may have ended the insecurity and use of the country as safe haven for international terrorists in Somalia if Ethiopian forces, with the support of the United States, had not intervened to oust the ICU.
The ouster of the ICU, in the view of these observers, created a security vacuum in south-central Somalia and enabled Al Qaeda-affiliated Somali commanders to take control of many of the ICU fighters. Many ICU fighters, who joined the resistance against the Ethiopian forces, soon became members of Al Shabaab (the youth), a fairly new group led by a small group of Somalis with ties to foreign terrorist groups. Many foreign fighters and Somali expatriates, including over a dozen Somali-Americans, who went to Somalia to join the fight against the Ethiopian forces at the beginning of the intervention later fought against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda, however, have not been able to win the hearts and
minds of the majority of Somalis.
The TFG and a number of formerly anti-government armed Islamic groups have formed alliances to fight Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda. A faction of Hizb al Islam has joined the TFG and Al Shabaab has not been able to forge a formal alliance with Hizb Al Islam and its leader Sheikh Aweys.
Another Islamic militia group, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah, has become an ally of the TFG and is currently fighting against Al Shabaab. On February 1, 2010, Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group, led by Hassan Al Turki, reportedly agreed to merge under one name: Al Shabaab Mujahidin Movement.
Both Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group have been coordinating their attacks against the TFG and working closely with foreign fighters over the past two years. Senior TFG officials consider the merger a reaffirmation of a pre-existing informal alliance between the two groups.64
U.S. targeted attacks against the leadership of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab have weakened the two organizations over the past two years. Two of the three wanted Al Qaeda terrorists in Somalia, Abu Taha al Sudani (a Sudanese national married to a Somali) and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan were reportedly killed in 2007 and 2009, respectively. A number of Al Shabaab senior commanders have also been killed in the past two years. The killing of Nabhan in a U.S. strike reportedly shook the leadership of Al Shabaab and is likely to weaken the link between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda, and it may take some time for Al Qaeda to replace Nabhan with someone familiar with that region.
Of the three most wanted Al Qaeda leaders in East Africa, the only one left is the leader of the group and the mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings: Harun Fazul (a Comoronian national).
The Leadership of Al Shabaab
The leaders of Al Shabaab are not well known, with few exceptions. Ahmed Abdi Godane (also known as Abu Zubayr), who is on the U.S. terrorism list and who trained and fought in Afghanistan, is a key commander from the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland.
In September 2009, Al Shabaab released a video, entitled “At your service Osama,” declaring its allegiance to Bin Laden. Godane appeared on the video tape offering his service to Bin Laden. Mukhtar Robow, who is on the U.S. terrorism list and is a native of southern Somalia, is considered one of the key leaders of Al Shabaab and a former spokesman, although in late 2009 he reportedly was marginalized.
Another key leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama (Al Afghani), who is on the U.S. terrorism list and also from Somaliland, and reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Hassan Al Turki is a member of the Ogaden clan from Ethiopia, who has openly called for Jihad, and works closely with foreign fighters. In 2004, he was placed on the U.S. terrorism list.
Another individual who was often referred to as the commander of Al Shabaab forces was Aden Ayro. Ayro’s importance and influence was highly exaggerated since he did not have a leadership position in the organization. Ayro was suspected of killing four aid workers in the breakaway region of Somaliland as well as a Somali scholar in Mogadishu named Abdulqadir Yahya. In May 2008, Ayro was killed in a U.S. air strike. Since the killing of Ayro, the insurgency has intensified its attacks and membership in the organization increased. One of the major mistakes that contributed to the emergence and strength of Al Shabaab was the labeling of the leadership of the Courts as extremist and jihadist, and the failure to identify and target the leadership of Al Shabaab, according to some observers.
In March 2008, the State Department designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Al Qaeda poses a direct threat against U.S. interests and allies in East Africa. Al Shabaab, on the other hand, appears more focused on carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and African Union peacekeeping forces (AMISOM). On February 2, 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing stated:
“We judge most Al Shabaab and East Africa-based Al Qaeda members will remain focused on regional objectives in the near-term. Nevertheless, East Africa-based Al Qaeda leaders or Al Shabaab may elect to redirect to the Homeland some of the Westerners, including North Americans, now training and fighting in Somalia.”65
Reportedly, over a dozen Somali youth from Minneapolis and other parts of the United States have left the U.S, and some community leaders believe they went to Somalia to join the insurgency. There is no clear evidence of how many and for what purpose these Somalis left Minneapolis, although some U.S. counterterrorism officials have expressed concern to Congress that some of these individuals could be recruited by Al Qaeda to perform attacks in Somalia or the United States.66
U.S. officials stressed in early 2009 that they did not possess “credible reporting” that suggested such an operation targeting the U.S. homeland was planned or imminent.67 The concerns appear based in part on the fact that one of the suicide bombers in the October 2008 attacks in Puntland and Somaliland was an American-Somali from Minneapolis, although broader concerns exist about the participation of U.S. citizens in Al Shabaab activities and potential U.S.-based financing for terrorist groups in Somalia.
The December 2009 Mogadishu suicide attack in which three TFG ministers and over a dozen civilians were killed was carried out by a Somali from Denmark. Over the past decade, many Somalis have returned to Somalia to work as journalists, humanitarian workers, and teachers. A number of these Somalis have been killed in the past two years by insurgents and security forces.
The Obama Administration has been engaged in support of the new leadership of the TFG, the same leaders that the Ethiopian government with the support of the United States ousted from power in late 2006. One option available to the Administration is engagement with the Islamic insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and security problems facing Somalia.
According to some observers, it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the Islamic movements discretely. Most observers believe that Al Shabaab can only be contained by another Islamic movement supported by clan elders. Some of the most influential leaders in Al Shabaab are on the U.N. and U.S. Terrorism Lists.
Some observers argue that removing some of these individuals from the Terrorism List in exchange for some concessions, including an end to the insurgency and acceptance of a negotiated settlement, should be considered as an option. One of the key facilitators of the Djibouti talks that formed the TFG was a Somali man on a U.N. Terrorism List. According to U.N. officials, he was subsequently removed from the list.
The top leaders of Al Shabaab are determined to continue their terrorist campaign and are not inclined to participate in negotiations. Targeted measures, including sanctions and assassination of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab, could pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge.
However, others believe that this option is likely to backfire in the short term and increase anti-Western violence. Another option is to refer some of these individuals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. The most effective way of containing the extremists, most observers contend, is to look for a Somali-led solution, both political and military. The TFG, Somaliland, Puntland, and other moderate Somali forces could form a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab politically and militarily. Such a coalition is likely to get the support of the Somali population rather than an external force.
The coalition can be assisted by neighboring countries. Many Somali observers contend that a Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most powerful justifications used by Al Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces.
This article is an edited selection of a larger February 2010 Congressional Research Service Report, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (PDF) or found here at Open CRS
NOTES:
62 Prepared by Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs.
63 The 2005 U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism described Al Ittihad Al Islami as “a Somali extremist group that was formed in the 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s, failed to obtain its objective of establishing a Salafist emirate in Somalia and steadily declined following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and Somalia’s subsequent collapse into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive, lacked central leadership, and suffered divisions between factions.”
64 Ted Dagne interviewed President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of Somalia and other senior officials, January 29 and February 1, 2010.
65 Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
66 See “Young Somali Men Missing from Minneapolis,” International Herald Tribune, November 27, 2008. In March 2009, an NCTC official expressed “concern… over the travel by some tens of Somali-American young men back to Somalia, some of whom have trained and fought with Al Shabaab.” Testimony of Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director, Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, March 11, 2009.
67 Testimony of Andrew Liepman, op cit. “Let me stress we don't have a body of reporting that indicates U.S. persons who have traveled to Somalia are planning to execute attacks in the United States. We don't have that credible reporting. But we do worry that there is the potential that these individuals could be indoctrinated by al Qaeda while they're in Somalia and then returned to the United States with the intention to conduct attacks.”
Africa’s porous borders and lax security at airports and seaports and weak law enforcement agencies are major concerns. Political, ethnic, and religious conflicts in the region create an environment conducive to terrorist groups. The inability of African security services to detect and intercept terrorist activities due to lack of technology and sufficient trained and motivated manpower is a major impediment in dealing with the terrorist threats in Africa. The takeover of power in Sudan by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989 led to a significant increase in the activities of international terror groups in Africa.
The NIF government provided safe haven for well known international terrorist organizations and individuals, and the government’s security services also were directly engaged in facilitating and assisting domestic and international terror groups. Sudan has also been a safe haven for major terrorist figures, including the founder and leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden used Sudan as a base of operations until he returned to Afghanistan in mid-1996, where he had previously been a major financier of Arab volunteers in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Many observers contend that it was during his five year stay in Sudan that Bin Laden laid down the foundation for Al Qaeda. The penetration by Al Qaeda into East Africa is directly tied to NIF’s early years of support to international terrorist organizations. The East Africa region is by far the most impacted by international terrorist activities in Africa.
The 1990s saw a dramatic and daring terrorist attacks against American interests in Africa. The U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by Al Qaeda killed 229 people, 12 of whom were American citizens, and injured over 5,000 people. In November, 2002, simultaneous terrorist attacks struck Mombasa, Kenya. Al Qaeda suicide bombers drove a four-wheel drive vehicle packed with explosives into the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 10 Kenyans and three Israelis. In June 1995, members of Gama’a Islamiya, an Egyptian extremist group, tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Somalia: Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups?
The United States, Somalia’s neighbors, and some Somali groups have expressed concern over the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. In the mid-1990s, Islamic courts began to emerge in parts of the country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. These courts functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by using their own militia.
Members of the Al Ittihad Al Islami63 militia reportedly provided the bulk of the security forces for these courts in the 1990s. The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country. Somali factions, including the so-called Islamic groups, often go through realignments or simply disappear from the scene. Very little is known about the leadership or organizational structure of these groups.
There have been three known radical Islamic groups in Somalia whose prominence alternately waxed and waned: Al Ittihad Al Islami (Islamic Union), Al Islah (Reform), and Al Tabligh (Conveyers of God’s Work). In 1995, a group called Jihad Al Islam, led by Sheikh Abbas bin Omar, emerged in Mogadishu, and gave the two main warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, an ultimatum to end their factional fighting. The group claimed at that time that it maintained offices in several countries, including Yemen, Pakistan, Kenya, and Sudan.
Not much was heard subsequently from Jihad Al Islam, although a group of Somalis later formed the Sharia (Islamic law) Implementation Club (SIC) in 1996. In late September 2001, the Bush Administration added Al Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related entities whose assets were frozen by an Executive Order. Bush Administration officials accused Al Ittihad Al Islami of links with Al Qaeda.
None of the groups mentioned above remain active, although some of their leaders are now leaders of groups engaged in terrorist activities in Somalia. The leader of Hizb Al Islam, Sheikh Hassan Aweys, who is on the U.S. terrorist list, was a leader in Al Ittihad Al Islami.
The Islamic Courts Union, Al Shabaab
Some observers have argued that the takeover of power in Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) may have ended the insecurity and use of the country as safe haven for international terrorists in Somalia if Ethiopian forces, with the support of the United States, had not intervened to oust the ICU.
The ouster of the ICU, in the view of these observers, created a security vacuum in south-central Somalia and enabled Al Qaeda-affiliated Somali commanders to take control of many of the ICU fighters. Many ICU fighters, who joined the resistance against the Ethiopian forces, soon became members of Al Shabaab (the youth), a fairly new group led by a small group of Somalis with ties to foreign terrorist groups. Many foreign fighters and Somali expatriates, including over a dozen Somali-Americans, who went to Somalia to join the fight against the Ethiopian forces at the beginning of the intervention later fought against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda, however, have not been able to win the hearts and
minds of the majority of Somalis.
The TFG and a number of formerly anti-government armed Islamic groups have formed alliances to fight Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda. A faction of Hizb al Islam has joined the TFG and Al Shabaab has not been able to forge a formal alliance with Hizb Al Islam and its leader Sheikh Aweys.
Another Islamic militia group, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah, has become an ally of the TFG and is currently fighting against Al Shabaab. On February 1, 2010, Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group, led by Hassan Al Turki, reportedly agreed to merge under one name: Al Shabaab Mujahidin Movement.
Both Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group have been coordinating their attacks against the TFG and working closely with foreign fighters over the past two years. Senior TFG officials consider the merger a reaffirmation of a pre-existing informal alliance between the two groups.64
U.S. targeted attacks against the leadership of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab have weakened the two organizations over the past two years. Two of the three wanted Al Qaeda terrorists in Somalia, Abu Taha al Sudani (a Sudanese national married to a Somali) and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan were reportedly killed in 2007 and 2009, respectively. A number of Al Shabaab senior commanders have also been killed in the past two years. The killing of Nabhan in a U.S. strike reportedly shook the leadership of Al Shabaab and is likely to weaken the link between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda, and it may take some time for Al Qaeda to replace Nabhan with someone familiar with that region.
Of the three most wanted Al Qaeda leaders in East Africa, the only one left is the leader of the group and the mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings: Harun Fazul (a Comoronian national).
The Leadership of Al Shabaab
The leaders of Al Shabaab are not well known, with few exceptions. Ahmed Abdi Godane (also known as Abu Zubayr), who is on the U.S. terrorism list and who trained and fought in Afghanistan, is a key commander from the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland.
In September 2009, Al Shabaab released a video, entitled “At your service Osama,” declaring its allegiance to Bin Laden. Godane appeared on the video tape offering his service to Bin Laden. Mukhtar Robow, who is on the U.S. terrorism list and is a native of southern Somalia, is considered one of the key leaders of Al Shabaab and a former spokesman, although in late 2009 he reportedly was marginalized.
Another key leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama (Al Afghani), who is on the U.S. terrorism list and also from Somaliland, and reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Hassan Al Turki is a member of the Ogaden clan from Ethiopia, who has openly called for Jihad, and works closely with foreign fighters. In 2004, he was placed on the U.S. terrorism list.
Another individual who was often referred to as the commander of Al Shabaab forces was Aden Ayro. Ayro’s importance and influence was highly exaggerated since he did not have a leadership position in the organization. Ayro was suspected of killing four aid workers in the breakaway region of Somaliland as well as a Somali scholar in Mogadishu named Abdulqadir Yahya. In May 2008, Ayro was killed in a U.S. air strike. Since the killing of Ayro, the insurgency has intensified its attacks and membership in the organization increased. One of the major mistakes that contributed to the emergence and strength of Al Shabaab was the labeling of the leadership of the Courts as extremist and jihadist, and the failure to identify and target the leadership of Al Shabaab, according to some observers.
In March 2008, the State Department designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Al Qaeda poses a direct threat against U.S. interests and allies in East Africa. Al Shabaab, on the other hand, appears more focused on carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and African Union peacekeeping forces (AMISOM). On February 2, 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing stated:
“We judge most Al Shabaab and East Africa-based Al Qaeda members will remain focused on regional objectives in the near-term. Nevertheless, East Africa-based Al Qaeda leaders or Al Shabaab may elect to redirect to the Homeland some of the Westerners, including North Americans, now training and fighting in Somalia.”65
Reportedly, over a dozen Somali youth from Minneapolis and other parts of the United States have left the U.S, and some community leaders believe they went to Somalia to join the insurgency. There is no clear evidence of how many and for what purpose these Somalis left Minneapolis, although some U.S. counterterrorism officials have expressed concern to Congress that some of these individuals could be recruited by Al Qaeda to perform attacks in Somalia or the United States.66
U.S. officials stressed in early 2009 that they did not possess “credible reporting” that suggested such an operation targeting the U.S. homeland was planned or imminent.67 The concerns appear based in part on the fact that one of the suicide bombers in the October 2008 attacks in Puntland and Somaliland was an American-Somali from Minneapolis, although broader concerns exist about the participation of U.S. citizens in Al Shabaab activities and potential U.S.-based financing for terrorist groups in Somalia.
The December 2009 Mogadishu suicide attack in which three TFG ministers and over a dozen civilians were killed was carried out by a Somali from Denmark. Over the past decade, many Somalis have returned to Somalia to work as journalists, humanitarian workers, and teachers. A number of these Somalis have been killed in the past two years by insurgents and security forces.
The Obama Administration has been engaged in support of the new leadership of the TFG, the same leaders that the Ethiopian government with the support of the United States ousted from power in late 2006. One option available to the Administration is engagement with the Islamic insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and security problems facing Somalia.
According to some observers, it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the Islamic movements discretely. Most observers believe that Al Shabaab can only be contained by another Islamic movement supported by clan elders. Some of the most influential leaders in Al Shabaab are on the U.N. and U.S. Terrorism Lists.
Some observers argue that removing some of these individuals from the Terrorism List in exchange for some concessions, including an end to the insurgency and acceptance of a negotiated settlement, should be considered as an option. One of the key facilitators of the Djibouti talks that formed the TFG was a Somali man on a U.N. Terrorism List. According to U.N. officials, he was subsequently removed from the list.
The top leaders of Al Shabaab are determined to continue their terrorist campaign and are not inclined to participate in negotiations. Targeted measures, including sanctions and assassination of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab, could pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge.
However, others believe that this option is likely to backfire in the short term and increase anti-Western violence. Another option is to refer some of these individuals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. The most effective way of containing the extremists, most observers contend, is to look for a Somali-led solution, both political and military. The TFG, Somaliland, Puntland, and other moderate Somali forces could form a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab politically and militarily. Such a coalition is likely to get the support of the Somali population rather than an external force.
The coalition can be assisted by neighboring countries. Many Somali observers contend that a Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most powerful justifications used by Al Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces.
This article is an edited selection of a larger February 2010 Congressional Research Service Report, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (PDF) or found here at Open CRS
NOTES:
62 Prepared by Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs.
63 The 2005 U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism described Al Ittihad Al Islami as “a Somali extremist group that was formed in the 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s, failed to obtain its objective of establishing a Salafist emirate in Somalia and steadily declined following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and Somalia’s subsequent collapse into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive, lacked central leadership, and suffered divisions between factions.”
64 Ted Dagne interviewed President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of Somalia and other senior officials, January 29 and February 1, 2010.
65 Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
66 See “Young Somali Men Missing from Minneapolis,” International Herald Tribune, November 27, 2008. In March 2009, an NCTC official expressed “concern… over the travel by some tens of Somali-American young men back to Somalia, some of whom have trained and fought with Al Shabaab.” Testimony of Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director, Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, March 11, 2009.
67 Testimony of Andrew Liepman, op cit. “Let me stress we don't have a body of reporting that indicates U.S. persons who have traveled to Somalia are planning to execute attacks in the United States. We don't have that credible reporting. But we do worry that there is the potential that these individuals could be indoctrinated by al Qaeda while they're in Somalia and then returned to the United States with the intention to conduct attacks.”
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