Intelligence: No More Co-Ordination Czar?
By B. Raman
The Times of India has reported (May 28,2010) that the Government of India is contemplating the setting up under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) of a coordination committee on all matters concerning security and intelligence. This committee will initially comprise the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Cabinet Secretary and the Union Home Secretary.
If this proposal is approved and comes into being, it could mean the retention of the co-ordination responsibility in the PMO, but with the NSA, who is part of the PMO, sharing that responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary,instead of exercising that responsibility exclusively as has been the practice till now.
The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, had recommended a two-tier mechanism for co-ordination---- the first consisting of all intelligence agencies and the second in respect of technical intelligence. It recommended that the Principal Secretary to the PM, in his concurrent capacity as the NSA, should head both. Shri Brajesh Mishra thus became the Co-ordination Czar of the then Government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Shri J.N.Dixit, who succeeded Shri Mishra as the NSA in 2004, and Shri M.K. Narayanan, who succeeded Shri Dixit after his death in January 2005, continued to exercise exclusively the responsibility for co-ordination with the Principal Secretary to the PM having no responsibility in the matter. While the intelligence agencies were not quite comfortable with Shri Dixit inheriting this role, they were quite happy with Shri Narayanan, a former head of the Intelligence Bureau and a former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, exercising this responsibility.
Ever since Shri P.Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there were indications that he was not happy over the marginalization of the role of his Ministry in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence community. It was apparent from his 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture at New Delhi on December 23, 2009, that he wanted his role and that of his Ministry in matters relating to internal security management to be strengthened. His desire for a more participatory and active role for the MHA in the co-ordination of the functioning of the TECHINT agencies became clear during his intervention in the Lok Sabha at the time of the recent debate over allegations of phone-tapping by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
If Shri Chidambaram has his way it would dilute the role of the PMO in general and the new NSA, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, in particular in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence and security agencies. If the TOI report is correct, the PMO is trying to find a new mechanism under which the PMO will continue to exercise the co-ordination responsibilities through the NSA, while at the same time partly satisfying the desire of Shri Chidambaram by making the NSA share this responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary.
Before 2000, the responsibility for co-ordination was being exercised by the Secretaries' Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Home, Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Principal Secretary to the PM. This collective responsibility for co-ordination, which was replaced in 2000 by the exclusive responsibility of the NSA, is now sought to be revived in a modified form under which the NSA will still be responsible for co-ordination but with his powers shared with the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. Shri Menon will not be an intelligence and security Czar as his predecessors were.
Nor will Shri Chidambaram be the Co-ordination Czar. He will have a more important role than his predecessors since 2000, but not as important as he would have liked it to be.
This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 24, 2009, titled the Internal Security Czar at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3564.html.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The Times of India has reported (May 28,2010) that the Government of India is contemplating the setting up under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) of a coordination committee on all matters concerning security and intelligence. This committee will initially comprise the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Cabinet Secretary and the Union Home Secretary.
If this proposal is approved and comes into being, it could mean the retention of the co-ordination responsibility in the PMO, but with the NSA, who is part of the PMO, sharing that responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary,instead of exercising that responsibility exclusively as has been the practice till now.
The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, had recommended a two-tier mechanism for co-ordination---- the first consisting of all intelligence agencies and the second in respect of technical intelligence. It recommended that the Principal Secretary to the PM, in his concurrent capacity as the NSA, should head both. Shri Brajesh Mishra thus became the Co-ordination Czar of the then Government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Shri J.N.Dixit, who succeeded Shri Mishra as the NSA in 2004, and Shri M.K. Narayanan, who succeeded Shri Dixit after his death in January 2005, continued to exercise exclusively the responsibility for co-ordination with the Principal Secretary to the PM having no responsibility in the matter. While the intelligence agencies were not quite comfortable with Shri Dixit inheriting this role, they were quite happy with Shri Narayanan, a former head of the Intelligence Bureau and a former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, exercising this responsibility.
Ever since Shri P.Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there were indications that he was not happy over the marginalization of the role of his Ministry in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence community. It was apparent from his 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture at New Delhi on December 23, 2009, that he wanted his role and that of his Ministry in matters relating to internal security management to be strengthened. His desire for a more participatory and active role for the MHA in the co-ordination of the functioning of the TECHINT agencies became clear during his intervention in the Lok Sabha at the time of the recent debate over allegations of phone-tapping by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
If Shri Chidambaram has his way it would dilute the role of the PMO in general and the new NSA, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, in particular in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence and security agencies. If the TOI report is correct, the PMO is trying to find a new mechanism under which the PMO will continue to exercise the co-ordination responsibilities through the NSA, while at the same time partly satisfying the desire of Shri Chidambaram by making the NSA share this responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary.
Before 2000, the responsibility for co-ordination was being exercised by the Secretaries' Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Home, Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Principal Secretary to the PM. This collective responsibility for co-ordination, which was replaced in 2000 by the exclusive responsibility of the NSA, is now sought to be revived in a modified form under which the NSA will still be responsible for co-ordination but with his powers shared with the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. Shri Menon will not be an intelligence and security Czar as his predecessors were.
Nor will Shri Chidambaram be the Co-ordination Czar. He will have a more important role than his predecessors since 2000, but not as important as he would have liked it to be.
This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 24, 2009, titled the Internal Security Czar at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3564.html.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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65 Killed In India Train Blast
Authorities in eastern India say a passenger train was derailed by an explosion and hit an oncoming train early Friday, killing at least 65 people and wounding more than 100 in a suspected attack by Maoist rebels.
Officials warned the death toll could rise as rescuers struggled to reach a large number of passengers still trapped inside the mangled wreckage.
The Mumbai-bound express train, traveling from the northeastern city of Kolkata in West Bengal state, derailed as it was traveling through an area known to be a stronghold of Maoist rebels.
Thirteen cars careened off the track and collided with a cargo train traveling in the opposite direction.
Sabotage is suspected, but officials cautioned it is too early to say whether the Maoists, who have stepped up their attacks in recent months, are responsible.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called the Maoist insurgency, which has spread to 20 of the country's 28 states, India's most serious domestic security issue. The rebels, also known as Naxalites, are demanding land and jobs for the poor.
Source: VOA
Officials warned the death toll could rise as rescuers struggled to reach a large number of passengers still trapped inside the mangled wreckage.
The Mumbai-bound express train, traveling from the northeastern city of Kolkata in West Bengal state, derailed as it was traveling through an area known to be a stronghold of Maoist rebels.
Thirteen cars careened off the track and collided with a cargo train traveling in the opposite direction.
Sabotage is suspected, but officials cautioned it is too early to say whether the Maoists, who have stepped up their attacks in recent months, are responsible.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called the Maoist insurgency, which has spread to 20 of the country's 28 states, India's most serious domestic security issue. The rebels, also known as Naxalites, are demanding land and jobs for the poor.
Source: VOA
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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ASEAN And SAARC: Intra Regional Trade Forums
By Tuli Sinha for IPCS
This article evaluates ASEAN and SAARC as two pivotal regional platforms for actuating economic cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. A comparative study reveals that despite asymmetrical sizes AFTA has surpassed SAFTA in terms of trade benefits and value addition to the overall regional economic growth. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine AFTA and SAFTA relatively and ascertain reasons for the failure of SAARC and SAFTA in relation to ASEAN’s initiatives. Why has SAARC failed to forge conditions of cooperation on the economic and political fronts? What have been the probable impediments in the growth of SAFTA as compared to AFTA? What can be done to restructure and revive the SAFTA to propel the South Asian economy towards greater economic integration and regional consolidation? What was decided in the 16th SAARC Summit in terms of regional trade cooperation?
The European Union (EU) is spearheading the process of developing inter-regional economic networks among other regional organizations of the world. However, many factors are responsible for the success of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which realized the logic of an apropos economic group consciousness which completely lacked in SAARC. It is a collective effort by ASEAN member countries to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade in the goods sector. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN’s position as a competitive production base producing for both regional and global markets. An analysis reveals that the formation of AFTA has led to a remarkable expansion of intra-ASEAN trade since its inception. The statistics so far substantiates the fact that Intra-ASEAN trade has been consistently increasing over the years from US$81.98 billion in 1993. Today, the intra-ASEAN trade incorporates approximately 25 per cent of the total external trade in comparison to merely 2 per cent of the intra-SAARC trade.
Among the countries, Singapore continues to be a major contributor in the intra-regional trade, accounting for 39.5 per cent of the total intra-ASEAN trade, followed by Malaysia (24.2 per cent), Thailand (15.6 per cent), Indonesia (9.5 per cent) and the Philippines (5.7 per cent). Also, the role of great power interventions especially of the US has been vital in determining the fate of AFTA. ASEAN has been an important economic partner for the United States; shared convergent commercial interests are a major driving force for ASEAN and the success of its forums. For the last two years, the cumulative American investment in ASEAN has been greater than the total investments in China, Japan and Korea. ASEAN receives the fifth largest share of US foreign investment and this is rendering a subtle counter to the China block in Asia. Such an external pressure in terms of performance is completely missing in SAARC.
Moreover, despite initial gains, SAFTA has not really achieved much in terms of internal or external trade. It is interesting to observe incessant efforts by the SAARC members, especially India, being the most prosperous, to ameliorate conditions of intra regional trade in South Asia. The robust rise in India’s total imports from SAARC has been underpinned by the sharp increase in imports from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. India generally maintains a positive trade balance with the other SAARC member countries, and the trade surplus has risen from US$2.3 billion to US$5.0 billion until recently. Sri Lanka is again the leading partner, accounting for 31 per cent of India’s total imports from the region, followed by Pakistan (21 per cent), Nepal (20 per cent), Bangladesh (15 per cent) and Bhutan (9 per cent). The region also lacks the impetus to incur the unforeseen costs and investments to initiate any new agenda for economic prosperity unlike ASEAN.
Although SAARC has been working towards enhancing its regional trade, it certainly requires a structural revival. There are several steps that should be incorporated in the working process of SAFTA and SAARC on the whole to improve the conditions of trade. First, SAFTA experiences high trade deficit in terms of its global trade, thus more emphasis could be given to boost exports from the region. Second, SAARC countries are mainly exporting agricultural commodities and agro-based products. With trade being competitive and identical, more diversification of goods is extremely essential. Third, while SAARC countries have effected reduction in tariff levels, it can be reduced even further to increase the benefits of the trade bloc in future. Adequate steps could also be implemented to attract more FDI into the region from other sources. Fourth, the direct relationship between bilateral exports and GDP in the SAARC region reveals the potential for export-led growth in the region. With further opening of the economy, the bilateral exports will also increase. As there is a positive relation between the bilateral trade agreement and bilateral export flows in the SAARC region, the creation of bilateral agreements in the region must be encouraged. Finally, strengthening of economic relations can be used to reinforce improving political relations in the region, for instance, the relationship between India and Pakistan, as economic ties could help improve political relations to a great extent.
Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at tuli_sn@yahoo.com. This article was published by IPCS.
This article evaluates ASEAN and SAARC as two pivotal regional platforms for actuating economic cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. A comparative study reveals that despite asymmetrical sizes AFTA has surpassed SAFTA in terms of trade benefits and value addition to the overall regional economic growth. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine AFTA and SAFTA relatively and ascertain reasons for the failure of SAARC and SAFTA in relation to ASEAN’s initiatives. Why has SAARC failed to forge conditions of cooperation on the economic and political fronts? What have been the probable impediments in the growth of SAFTA as compared to AFTA? What can be done to restructure and revive the SAFTA to propel the South Asian economy towards greater economic integration and regional consolidation? What was decided in the 16th SAARC Summit in terms of regional trade cooperation?
The European Union (EU) is spearheading the process of developing inter-regional economic networks among other regional organizations of the world. However, many factors are responsible for the success of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which realized the logic of an apropos economic group consciousness which completely lacked in SAARC. It is a collective effort by ASEAN member countries to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade in the goods sector. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN’s position as a competitive production base producing for both regional and global markets. An analysis reveals that the formation of AFTA has led to a remarkable expansion of intra-ASEAN trade since its inception. The statistics so far substantiates the fact that Intra-ASEAN trade has been consistently increasing over the years from US$81.98 billion in 1993. Today, the intra-ASEAN trade incorporates approximately 25 per cent of the total external trade in comparison to merely 2 per cent of the intra-SAARC trade.
Among the countries, Singapore continues to be a major contributor in the intra-regional trade, accounting for 39.5 per cent of the total intra-ASEAN trade, followed by Malaysia (24.2 per cent), Thailand (15.6 per cent), Indonesia (9.5 per cent) and the Philippines (5.7 per cent). Also, the role of great power interventions especially of the US has been vital in determining the fate of AFTA. ASEAN has been an important economic partner for the United States; shared convergent commercial interests are a major driving force for ASEAN and the success of its forums. For the last two years, the cumulative American investment in ASEAN has been greater than the total investments in China, Japan and Korea. ASEAN receives the fifth largest share of US foreign investment and this is rendering a subtle counter to the China block in Asia. Such an external pressure in terms of performance is completely missing in SAARC.
Moreover, despite initial gains, SAFTA has not really achieved much in terms of internal or external trade. It is interesting to observe incessant efforts by the SAARC members, especially India, being the most prosperous, to ameliorate conditions of intra regional trade in South Asia. The robust rise in India’s total imports from SAARC has been underpinned by the sharp increase in imports from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. India generally maintains a positive trade balance with the other SAARC member countries, and the trade surplus has risen from US$2.3 billion to US$5.0 billion until recently. Sri Lanka is again the leading partner, accounting for 31 per cent of India’s total imports from the region, followed by Pakistan (21 per cent), Nepal (20 per cent), Bangladesh (15 per cent) and Bhutan (9 per cent). The region also lacks the impetus to incur the unforeseen costs and investments to initiate any new agenda for economic prosperity unlike ASEAN.
Although SAARC has been working towards enhancing its regional trade, it certainly requires a structural revival. There are several steps that should be incorporated in the working process of SAFTA and SAARC on the whole to improve the conditions of trade. First, SAFTA experiences high trade deficit in terms of its global trade, thus more emphasis could be given to boost exports from the region. Second, SAARC countries are mainly exporting agricultural commodities and agro-based products. With trade being competitive and identical, more diversification of goods is extremely essential. Third, while SAARC countries have effected reduction in tariff levels, it can be reduced even further to increase the benefits of the trade bloc in future. Adequate steps could also be implemented to attract more FDI into the region from other sources. Fourth, the direct relationship between bilateral exports and GDP in the SAARC region reveals the potential for export-led growth in the region. With further opening of the economy, the bilateral exports will also increase. As there is a positive relation between the bilateral trade agreement and bilateral export flows in the SAARC region, the creation of bilateral agreements in the region must be encouraged. Finally, strengthening of economic relations can be used to reinforce improving political relations in the region, for instance, the relationship between India and Pakistan, as economic ties could help improve political relations to a great extent.
Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at tuli_sn@yahoo.com. This article was published by IPCS.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Black Box Recovered From Indian Jet Crash
Searchers in southern India have found the flight data recorder of the Air India Express plane that crashed last week killing 158 people.
An aviation official said Tuesday the data recorder, commonly referred to as the black box, was recovered at the crash site in the city of Mangalore in southern Karnataka state.
The cockpit voice recorder was found on Sunday.
The Air India Express plane Boeing 737 passenger jet carrying 166 people crashed early Saturday while landing at Mangalore's airport.
Eight people survived the crash when the plane overshot the runway and plunged down a ravine before bursting into flames.
Officials say 146 of the 158 bodies recovered from the wreckage have been identified. A U.S. forensics team is in India to assist in the investigation.
Indian Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel told CNN-IBN television that human error may have caused the crash, as weather and visibility were good during the landing.
But Air India chairman Arvind Jadhav has said the pilot who landed the ill-fated aircraft was highly experienced.
The crash is one of the deadliest in India's history. A 1996 midair collision of two planes over New Delhi killed 349 people.
Source: VOA
An aviation official said Tuesday the data recorder, commonly referred to as the black box, was recovered at the crash site in the city of Mangalore in southern Karnataka state.
The cockpit voice recorder was found on Sunday.
The Air India Express plane Boeing 737 passenger jet carrying 166 people crashed early Saturday while landing at Mangalore's airport.
Eight people survived the crash when the plane overshot the runway and plunged down a ravine before bursting into flames.
Officials say 146 of the 158 bodies recovered from the wreckage have been identified. A U.S. forensics team is in India to assist in the investigation.
Indian Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel told CNN-IBN television that human error may have caused the crash, as weather and visibility were good during the landing.
But Air India chairman Arvind Jadhav has said the pilot who landed the ill-fated aircraft was highly experienced.
The crash is one of the deadliest in India's history. A 1996 midair collision of two planes over New Delhi killed 349 people.
Source: VOA
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Black Box From Air India Plane Crash Recovered
(KUNA) -- The black box of the ill-fated Air India flight "IX 812", which crashed in southern city of Mangalore on Saturday (May 22) killing 158 passengers, was recovered from the accident site on Tuesday, said media reports.
The Black Box, also called the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR), is mounted in the aircrafts tail and stores key information which could give vital clues on what caused the plane crash.
The instrument, which will have data on a range of parameters and information on the pilots response, was damaged on one side, but the reports quoted Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) officials as saying that it was intact with the "main memory".
Following the recovery of the Black Box, the DGCA officials officially called off the search operations. On Saturday, (Indian Standard Time) the plane landed safely but around 2000 feet ahead of the touch-down point at the Mangalore Airport, which is located on a hill top and surrounded with dense forests.
Not having left with enough runway after landing, the pilot swerved the plane to stop it, but it hit a concrete structure and caught fire killing 158 persons out of the total 166. Eight passengers jumped out of the cracks developed in the plane body, to safety.
The Black Box, also called the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR), is mounted in the aircrafts tail and stores key information which could give vital clues on what caused the plane crash.
The instrument, which will have data on a range of parameters and information on the pilots response, was damaged on one side, but the reports quoted Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) officials as saying that it was intact with the "main memory".
Following the recovery of the Black Box, the DGCA officials officially called off the search operations. On Saturday, (Indian Standard Time) the plane landed safely but around 2000 feet ahead of the touch-down point at the Mangalore Airport, which is located on a hill top and surrounded with dense forests.
Not having left with enough runway after landing, the pilot swerved the plane to stop it, but it hit a concrete structure and caught fire killing 158 persons out of the total 166. Eight passengers jumped out of the cracks developed in the plane body, to safety.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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ASEAN and SAARC: Intra Regional Connectivity
By Tanvi Pate for IPCS
During the recent 16th SAARC Summit at Thimpu, the enthusiasm to firm up the agreements on developing intra-regional connectivity was dampened as Pakistan refused endorsement of the Motor Vehicles Agreement meant to provide connectivity between Kabul and Dhaka criss-crossing the South Asian region. It is imperative to examine that after twenty-five years of existence, to what extent has SAARC achieved one of its main ambitions of intra-state connectivity? How has SAARC fared as compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in terms of Cross Border Infrastructure (CBI)? And if SAARC is woefully inadequate, why is that so? What should SAARC do to address this problem?
Cross border connectivity is an important aspect that automatically comes to fore when gauging the success of any regional organization. Connectivity brings countries together and acts as a dispensable force for harmonizing cross-border legislations. It also facilitates intra regional trade and bestows an opportunity upon the ‘land locked’ countries to eventually become ‘land linked’.
ASEAN, in this sense has come a far way since its inception in 1967. With intra-state and regional connectivity growing fourfold over the past two decades, a complex maze of road and air networks now connects the major cities. For instance, Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore are connected by the North South expressway where extending from Bukit Kayu Hitam in Kedah near the Malaysia-Thai border connects Phetkasem road in Thailand to Johor Bahru in southern Malaysia and finally joins Singapore. The Myanmar-Thailand-Cambodia link road starts from Myawaddy-Mae Sot-Tak-Bangkok-Aranyaprathet to Khlong Luek on Thailand-Cambodia border through Siem Reap and Phnom Penh. Similarly, all the major airports in the region operate direct flights between most of the capitals. The number of direct flights each week range almost from seventy between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to twenty-one between Yangon and Bangkok, respectively. Even Phnom Penh and Vientiane operate on an average seven direct flights a week.
SAARC, on the other hand displays grossly inefficient CBI as there are no direct land routes in operation between India and Pakistan or India and Sri-Lanka. Single transit routes connect Petrapole (India) to Benapole (Bangladesh). Bhutan and Bangladesh are connected via India through Phuentsholing (Bhutan)-Jaigaon (India)-Changrabandha (India)-Burimari (Bangladesh). Likewise Nepal and India are linked by border towns of Birgunj and Raxaul, on western front the Kabul-Pakistan highway connects Pakistan and Kabul. Direct flight connectivity in SAARC is also minimal. For instance, the busiest hub is New Delhi-Kathmandu, with an average of forty-two flights to and fro every week. Apart from only three flights weekly between New Delhi and Paro, there are no direct flight connections from New Delhi to either Dhaka or Male or between Kabul and Karachi.
The above comparison clearly displays the wide disparity between CBI of these two regional organizations. One of the reasons as to why ASEAN has succeeded in connecting itself is due to its massive intra regional trade, which has forced the countries to soothe out their trade barriers as displayed by the zero tariff regimes already in place between the original five members and Brunei. Goods being dumped in individual markets is a prevalent concern in ASEAN, however it is recognized that complex production links and joint ventures would remedy these short term adjustment losses. Measures like ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010, have also encouraged the countries to upgrade or establish new road and air networks. On the whole, the group has realized that their trade potential will remain under- exploited in absence of proper connectivity and will put in jeopardy their ambition of forming an Economic Community by 2015.
The scenario in SAARC is in complete contradiction. The successive summits have stressed the importance of CBI and the regional multimodal transport study has given important suggestions on linking the region through various corridors, however SAARC countries have not really gathered pace in addressing these shortcomings cooperatively. Connectivity has been hampered by inadequate rules and regulations across the borders, as evident from the lack of formal transit agreement at regional level or bilateral level. Due to lack of political trust and the fear of their markets being swamped by goods, small countries like Bangladesh still refuse to allow transit rights to India. Moreover, SAARC corridors do fall under the Asian Highway Network project and Asian Development Bank has forwarded loans for roads like AH2 in Nepal, but the pace of up-gradation is incredibly slow. Low intraregional trade along with sluggish attitude towards regionalism are definitely the main causes of low intra regional connectivity in SAARC.
ASEAN is able to enhance its connectivity, as for its members, ASEAN is a number one priority, whereas this does not stand true for SAARC. For establishing greater connectivity, the member countries will have to overcome their bilateral issues, promote intra-regional trade and make efficient use of private resources available. A proper time frame for completion of CBI is also needed whereby a stipulated action plan could speed up the process further. Unless SAARC member countries peer into the abyss of opportunities that lie ahead and focus on the benefits of intense regionalisation, connecting SAARC will remain a distant possibility.
Tanvi Pate is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at tanvi@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
During the recent 16th SAARC Summit at Thimpu, the enthusiasm to firm up the agreements on developing intra-regional connectivity was dampened as Pakistan refused endorsement of the Motor Vehicles Agreement meant to provide connectivity between Kabul and Dhaka criss-crossing the South Asian region. It is imperative to examine that after twenty-five years of existence, to what extent has SAARC achieved one of its main ambitions of intra-state connectivity? How has SAARC fared as compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in terms of Cross Border Infrastructure (CBI)? And if SAARC is woefully inadequate, why is that so? What should SAARC do to address this problem?
Cross border connectivity is an important aspect that automatically comes to fore when gauging the success of any regional organization. Connectivity brings countries together and acts as a dispensable force for harmonizing cross-border legislations. It also facilitates intra regional trade and bestows an opportunity upon the ‘land locked’ countries to eventually become ‘land linked’.
ASEAN, in this sense has come a far way since its inception in 1967. With intra-state and regional connectivity growing fourfold over the past two decades, a complex maze of road and air networks now connects the major cities. For instance, Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore are connected by the North South expressway where extending from Bukit Kayu Hitam in Kedah near the Malaysia-Thai border connects Phetkasem road in Thailand to Johor Bahru in southern Malaysia and finally joins Singapore. The Myanmar-Thailand-Cambodia link road starts from Myawaddy-Mae Sot-Tak-Bangkok-Aranyaprathet to Khlong Luek on Thailand-Cambodia border through Siem Reap and Phnom Penh. Similarly, all the major airports in the region operate direct flights between most of the capitals. The number of direct flights each week range almost from seventy between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to twenty-one between Yangon and Bangkok, respectively. Even Phnom Penh and Vientiane operate on an average seven direct flights a week.
SAARC, on the other hand displays grossly inefficient CBI as there are no direct land routes in operation between India and Pakistan or India and Sri-Lanka. Single transit routes connect Petrapole (India) to Benapole (Bangladesh). Bhutan and Bangladesh are connected via India through Phuentsholing (Bhutan)-Jaigaon (India)-Changrabandha (India)-Burimari (Bangladesh). Likewise Nepal and India are linked by border towns of Birgunj and Raxaul, on western front the Kabul-Pakistan highway connects Pakistan and Kabul. Direct flight connectivity in SAARC is also minimal. For instance, the busiest hub is New Delhi-Kathmandu, with an average of forty-two flights to and fro every week. Apart from only three flights weekly between New Delhi and Paro, there are no direct flight connections from New Delhi to either Dhaka or Male or between Kabul and Karachi.
The above comparison clearly displays the wide disparity between CBI of these two regional organizations. One of the reasons as to why ASEAN has succeeded in connecting itself is due to its massive intra regional trade, which has forced the countries to soothe out their trade barriers as displayed by the zero tariff regimes already in place between the original five members and Brunei. Goods being dumped in individual markets is a prevalent concern in ASEAN, however it is recognized that complex production links and joint ventures would remedy these short term adjustment losses. Measures like ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010, have also encouraged the countries to upgrade or establish new road and air networks. On the whole, the group has realized that their trade potential will remain under- exploited in absence of proper connectivity and will put in jeopardy their ambition of forming an Economic Community by 2015.
The scenario in SAARC is in complete contradiction. The successive summits have stressed the importance of CBI and the regional multimodal transport study has given important suggestions on linking the region through various corridors, however SAARC countries have not really gathered pace in addressing these shortcomings cooperatively. Connectivity has been hampered by inadequate rules and regulations across the borders, as evident from the lack of formal transit agreement at regional level or bilateral level. Due to lack of political trust and the fear of their markets being swamped by goods, small countries like Bangladesh still refuse to allow transit rights to India. Moreover, SAARC corridors do fall under the Asian Highway Network project and Asian Development Bank has forwarded loans for roads like AH2 in Nepal, but the pace of up-gradation is incredibly slow. Low intraregional trade along with sluggish attitude towards regionalism are definitely the main causes of low intra regional connectivity in SAARC.
ASEAN is able to enhance its connectivity, as for its members, ASEAN is a number one priority, whereas this does not stand true for SAARC. For establishing greater connectivity, the member countries will have to overcome their bilateral issues, promote intra-regional trade and make efficient use of private resources available. A proper time frame for completion of CBI is also needed whereby a stipulated action plan could speed up the process further. Unless SAARC member countries peer into the abyss of opportunities that lie ahead and focus on the benefits of intense regionalisation, connecting SAARC will remain a distant possibility.
Tanvi Pate is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at tanvi@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Dr. Manmohan Singh: Illusions Towards Pakistan And Excuses for Non-Action Against Maoists
By B. Raman
The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, addressed a press conference on May 24, 2010, to mark the completion of one year of his second tenure as the Prime Minister. Hopes that he will be more forthcoming than he usually is on matters of concern to the people such as the internal security situation and India's relations with Pakistan were belied. He was evasive and avoided going into specifics. This has led to considerable criticism.
It would be unfair to say that Dr. Manmohan Singh has not had achievements to his credit during the six years he has been in office. He has had. The economy has been in good shape without being affected seriously by the global melt-down. Greater attention has been paid to the problems of the common man. India's relations with the US have improved without affecting its relations with Russia. It has maintained its interest in Afghanistan without being deterred by terrorist attacks on the Indian mission in Kabul and without letting itself be forced by the US pressure to reduce its presence in that country to address Pakistani concerns. Frictions over border and security-related issues have not been allowed to come in the way of the developing economic relations with China. Following the Copenhagen summit, the comfort level between India and China has increased. Relations with Sri Lanka have improved and India has played a quiet role in ensuring the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan Government without losing sight of the interests of the Tamils. Relations with Bangladesh are in a better shape than before with greater attention to India's security concerns by the Government in Dhaka. Despite misunderstanding with the Maoists of Nepal, India has not lost the goodwill of the political class in Nepal. The low-profile relations with Myanmar have served India's security interests. Relations with Bhutan, the Maldives, the ASEAN countries and Japan continue to improve. While maintaining its interest in the countries to the East of India, India has been paying more attention to the countries to the West of India. The Look East policy has been supplemented by a much-needed Look West policy. India has been playing an important role in multilateral institutions and mechanisms -- whether in matters relating to the economy or regional security. India is accepted as a benign regional power though there is continuing skepticism over its capability to play the role of a global power on par with China.
Lack of public enthusiasm over his policies have been confined to his handling of Pakistan's use of terrorism against India and the increase in the activities of the Maoists, who pose a challenge to the political stability and internal security of India. His desire for better relations with Pakistan in spite of its continuing use of terrorism against India to achieve a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir and to keep India weak came out clearly at the press conference. No one can question his interest in keeping the dialogue going with Pakistan in the hope of one day persuading the Pakistani leadership to realise the folly of using terrorism to serve its national agenda. What one finds disturbing is his tendency to romanticise India's relation with Pakistan and his ill-conceived assertion that India's emergence as a major power depended on better relations with Pakistan.
His remarks linking India's future as a major power with an improvement in its relations with Pakistan are likely to be misinterpreted in Islamabad as indicating that its use of terrorism against India has started paying dividends. There will be more and not less terrorism as a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's penchant for softness towards Pakistan. Ever since he took over as the Prime Minister in 2004, one has not come across a single statement of his indicating in clear terms what India can do and what it will not do to improve relations with Pakistan.
There has been an unfortunate impression in Pakistan that Dr. Manmohan Singh does not attach the same seriousness to Pakistan's use of terrorism against India as large sections of our public and political class do. As a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's perceived softness towards Pakistan and his disinclination to use the stick against Pakistan, there is an impression in Pakistan's military and intelligence circles that Dr. Manmohan Singh lacks the will and the desire to be tough with Pakistan and , hence, they can do anything against India and get away with it so long as he is the Prime Minister.
Unless this impression is corrected through a clear enunciation of our policy, we are not going to have any respite from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. India has suffered two acts of mass casualty terrorism emanating from Pakistan during the tenure of Dr. Manmohan Singh---- the July 2006 attack on suburban trains in Mumbai and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai--- and more are likely so long as our Prime Minister does not act to remove this impression of Pakistan.
Unwilling to strike and hesitant to wound Pakistan. Repeated expressions of goodwill towards Pakistan seem to be more important to him than assurances to his own people that he will not tolerate any more act of mass casualty terrorism against his people from Pakistan.
This is not an argument against talks with Pakistan. This is an argument to hold our feet firmly to the ground while talking to Pakistan and to avoid talks based on illusions. This is an argument to underline that Dr. Manmohan Singh, as the Prime Minister, has an important responsibility to protect the lives and property of his people from acts of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. The exercise of this responsibility should have greater priority over any goodwill for Pakistan.
His conviction that India's rise as a major power depends on better relations with Pakistan is not totally correct. Better relations with Pakistan will definitely help, but the absence of it will not mean the end of the world for India. We have reached where we are today despite our bad relations with Pakistan and we can continue to keep moving forward even if there is no significant improvement in the bilateral relations. Talk to Pakistan, but avoid the defeatist impression that talking to Pakistan is the only salvation for India. It is not.
His remarks on the Maoist challenge brought out clearly the bureaucrat-turned-politician in him and not the statesman. The realisation that the Maoist problem is no longer a localised regional problem was missing in his remarks. It has become a political and humanitarian challenge and a security problem with pan-Indian dimensions that has to be dealt with at a pan-Indian level. A pan-Indian response to this challenge has to come from New Delhi and the Prime Minister has to play the leadership role in the search for such a response.
Instead of admitting his responsibility and expressing his determination to exercise that responsibility, he sought to pass the buck on to the States by projecting it as still in the stage of a localised, regional problem which has to be handled by the affected States to the best of their ability with the required assistance from the Govt. of India.
His remarks on relations with Pakistan and on the Maoist issue do not bode well for our success in dealing with these two challenges to our national security in an effective manner.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, addressed a press conference on May 24, 2010, to mark the completion of one year of his second tenure as the Prime Minister. Hopes that he will be more forthcoming than he usually is on matters of concern to the people such as the internal security situation and India's relations with Pakistan were belied. He was evasive and avoided going into specifics. This has led to considerable criticism.
It would be unfair to say that Dr. Manmohan Singh has not had achievements to his credit during the six years he has been in office. He has had. The economy has been in good shape without being affected seriously by the global melt-down. Greater attention has been paid to the problems of the common man. India's relations with the US have improved without affecting its relations with Russia. It has maintained its interest in Afghanistan without being deterred by terrorist attacks on the Indian mission in Kabul and without letting itself be forced by the US pressure to reduce its presence in that country to address Pakistani concerns. Frictions over border and security-related issues have not been allowed to come in the way of the developing economic relations with China. Following the Copenhagen summit, the comfort level between India and China has increased. Relations with Sri Lanka have improved and India has played a quiet role in ensuring the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan Government without losing sight of the interests of the Tamils. Relations with Bangladesh are in a better shape than before with greater attention to India's security concerns by the Government in Dhaka. Despite misunderstanding with the Maoists of Nepal, India has not lost the goodwill of the political class in Nepal. The low-profile relations with Myanmar have served India's security interests. Relations with Bhutan, the Maldives, the ASEAN countries and Japan continue to improve. While maintaining its interest in the countries to the East of India, India has been paying more attention to the countries to the West of India. The Look East policy has been supplemented by a much-needed Look West policy. India has been playing an important role in multilateral institutions and mechanisms -- whether in matters relating to the economy or regional security. India is accepted as a benign regional power though there is continuing skepticism over its capability to play the role of a global power on par with China.
Lack of public enthusiasm over his policies have been confined to his handling of Pakistan's use of terrorism against India and the increase in the activities of the Maoists, who pose a challenge to the political stability and internal security of India. His desire for better relations with Pakistan in spite of its continuing use of terrorism against India to achieve a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir and to keep India weak came out clearly at the press conference. No one can question his interest in keeping the dialogue going with Pakistan in the hope of one day persuading the Pakistani leadership to realise the folly of using terrorism to serve its national agenda. What one finds disturbing is his tendency to romanticise India's relation with Pakistan and his ill-conceived assertion that India's emergence as a major power depended on better relations with Pakistan.
His remarks linking India's future as a major power with an improvement in its relations with Pakistan are likely to be misinterpreted in Islamabad as indicating that its use of terrorism against India has started paying dividends. There will be more and not less terrorism as a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's penchant for softness towards Pakistan. Ever since he took over as the Prime Minister in 2004, one has not come across a single statement of his indicating in clear terms what India can do and what it will not do to improve relations with Pakistan.
There has been an unfortunate impression in Pakistan that Dr. Manmohan Singh does not attach the same seriousness to Pakistan's use of terrorism against India as large sections of our public and political class do. As a result of Dr. Manmohan Singh's perceived softness towards Pakistan and his disinclination to use the stick against Pakistan, there is an impression in Pakistan's military and intelligence circles that Dr. Manmohan Singh lacks the will and the desire to be tough with Pakistan and , hence, they can do anything against India and get away with it so long as he is the Prime Minister.
Unless this impression is corrected through a clear enunciation of our policy, we are not going to have any respite from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. India has suffered two acts of mass casualty terrorism emanating from Pakistan during the tenure of Dr. Manmohan Singh---- the July 2006 attack on suburban trains in Mumbai and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai--- and more are likely so long as our Prime Minister does not act to remove this impression of Pakistan.
Unwilling to strike and hesitant to wound Pakistan. Repeated expressions of goodwill towards Pakistan seem to be more important to him than assurances to his own people that he will not tolerate any more act of mass casualty terrorism against his people from Pakistan.
This is not an argument against talks with Pakistan. This is an argument to hold our feet firmly to the ground while talking to Pakistan and to avoid talks based on illusions. This is an argument to underline that Dr. Manmohan Singh, as the Prime Minister, has an important responsibility to protect the lives and property of his people from acts of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. The exercise of this responsibility should have greater priority over any goodwill for Pakistan.
His conviction that India's rise as a major power depends on better relations with Pakistan is not totally correct. Better relations with Pakistan will definitely help, but the absence of it will not mean the end of the world for India. We have reached where we are today despite our bad relations with Pakistan and we can continue to keep moving forward even if there is no significant improvement in the bilateral relations. Talk to Pakistan, but avoid the defeatist impression that talking to Pakistan is the only salvation for India. It is not.
His remarks on the Maoist challenge brought out clearly the bureaucrat-turned-politician in him and not the statesman. The realisation that the Maoist problem is no longer a localised regional problem was missing in his remarks. It has become a political and humanitarian challenge and a security problem with pan-Indian dimensions that has to be dealt with at a pan-Indian level. A pan-Indian response to this challenge has to come from New Delhi and the Prime Minister has to play the leadership role in the search for such a response.
Instead of admitting his responsibility and expressing his determination to exercise that responsibility, he sought to pass the buck on to the States by projecting it as still in the stage of a localised, regional problem which has to be handled by the affected States to the best of their ability with the required assistance from the Govt. of India.
His remarks on relations with Pakistan and on the Maoist issue do not bode well for our success in dealing with these two challenges to our national security in an effective manner.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Indian PM Says "Trust Deficit" With Pakistan Is Biggest Problem
(KUNA) -- Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh said on Monday that the "trust deficit" between India and Pakistan was the "biggest problem" standing in the way of improving bilateral relations.
The premier was addressing a press conference in New Delhi on completion of one year of his government.
Singh also said India is willing to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, provided that it ensures that its soil is not used for terrorism against India.
About the forthcoming dialogue between the foreign ministers of the two countries in July, Singh said India is going to make a beginning in improving the bilateral relations, which have been sour after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
"It has been my effort to try to reduce the gap between our two countries without surrendering or affecting our vital national interest," Singh added, while speaking about ties with Pakistan.
He also said, "Pakistan is our neighbour. It is my belief that India cannot realise its full development potential unless we have the best possible relations with our neighbours and Pakistan is our largest neighbour."
During his more-than-one-hour press conference, the Indian premier expressed hope that the rate of food inflation would come down to 5-6 percent by the year-end.
He also talked about various other concurrent issues facing the country like Naxals (group of armed rebels in some states) and coordination between his office and other ministries.
The premier was addressing a press conference in New Delhi on completion of one year of his government.
Singh also said India is willing to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, provided that it ensures that its soil is not used for terrorism against India.
About the forthcoming dialogue between the foreign ministers of the two countries in July, Singh said India is going to make a beginning in improving the bilateral relations, which have been sour after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
"It has been my effort to try to reduce the gap between our two countries without surrendering or affecting our vital national interest," Singh added, while speaking about ties with Pakistan.
He also said, "Pakistan is our neighbour. It is my belief that India cannot realise its full development potential unless we have the best possible relations with our neighbours and Pakistan is our largest neighbour."
During his more-than-one-hour press conference, the Indian premier expressed hope that the rate of food inflation would come down to 5-6 percent by the year-end.
He also talked about various other concurrent issues facing the country like Naxals (group of armed rebels in some states) and coordination between his office and other ministries.
Monday, May 24, 2010 |
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ASEAN And SAARC: Resolving Intra Regional Disputes
By Chloe Choquier for IPCS
Prior to the SAARC 16th Summit held in Bhutan’s capital Thimphu in April 2010, Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed had affirmed his hopes about the bilateral meeting between Indian PM Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani. Since bilateral issues cannot officially be tackled in the multilateral forum of SAARC, this comment reflected the common feeling among SAARC member States that the Indo-Pak relations overshadow SAARC meetings. The incapacity of its member States to discuss political issues restrains SAARC’s credibility as a regional organization, but isn’t that the only way for such a discordant association to overcome its divisions? Can the Association learn anything from the ASEAN experience? Does 16th Summit offer any hope for a stronger political dialogue within SAARC in the future?
One of the reasons for creating a regional organization is the shared conviction among neighbours that the stronger the regional links, the lower the incentive to use force to resolve conflicts. In this sense, ASEAN Nations signed in 1975, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopting the principles of renunciation to the threat or the use of force, and settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner. Disputes have not been necessarily absent in Southeast Asia since then, but their common conviction that getting on with each other is an economically win-win situation forced the respect of agreed principles – mainly because, unlike SAARC’s members, ASEAN States are economically interdependent. Because of their complex and confrontational history, SAARC member States have not reached such a level of regional commitment. They agreed to contribute to mutual trust in the region through non-use of force and non-interference, but the absence of political dialogue on bilateral issues made these promises meaningless. Consequently, the threat or use of force between member States of SAARC has remained possible.
The main difference between ASEAN and SAARC lies in the existence of practical diplomatic tools to address these issues. ASEAN member States and other regional and international stakeholders created in 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote confidence-building and develop preventive diplomacy in the region. Often criticized for its lack of efficiency in tackling long-standing issues like Myanmar’s democratization, the ARF has nevertheless established a diplomatic forum to address these specific concerns. A SAARC Regional Forum to discuss disputes would be a proper way to take political pressure away from SAARC Summits but the creation of such a mechanism seems unlikely as long as SAARC lacks a common vision of regionalism. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are in favor of amending the SAARC charter to enable discussion on bilateral issues: they both believe that economic cooperation can’t be achieved without a resolution of political issues first. India, on the contrary, prefers economic cooperation to be the main driving force of regionalism, for fear that the smaller countries might form a united front to overrule Delhi and with the idea that political gains will follow. Unanimity being the one and only decision procedure, a stronger regional political dialogue is not in all likelihood a potential perspective.
It seems SAARC could learn a lesson from the success of informal diplomacy within ASEAN. Informal negotiations over the Spratly Islands dispute have been efficient in creating confidence-building between the actors and peaceful cooperation while official consultations, subjected to media pressure, focused merely on nationalist demands. Since SAARC’s official track is blocked, member States have also used bilateral meetings outside the summits to discuss their security issues. The meeting between Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the 16th Summit also proves the relative success of informal sideline diplomacy. Officially discussing political disagreements during the SAARC Summits would probably threaten dialogue on any other subject and even the very existence of SAARC. Keeping the discussions informal and bilateral allows SAARC to slowly but surely move forward on less controversial issues such as poverty reduction. In a nutshell, proponents of a Charter reform should resign themselves to the idea that bilateral diplomacy is probably the only solution to create a stronger SAARC.
Another explanation for ASEAN’s comparative success in conflict management is the use of alternative dispute resolution, through justice or mediation. If ASEAN countries favor bilateral conflict resolution, the principle of non-intervention pushed them to use the International Court of Justice to resolve territorial disputes like the sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan in 2002 and over Pedra Branca, Middle Rock and South Ledge in 2008. If the recourse to third-party mediation did not determine maritime boundaries, it was often the only way to break impasses and initiate bilateral negotiations. But the lack of confidence in international bodies and the Indian satisfaction with status quo in Kashmir make the use of international justice less likely within SAARC. To conclude, if international and regional ways to deal with disputes are efficient for ASEAN States, it seems bilateral discussions are the only foreseeable solution to make SAARC work in the fields of economic and social development. In this sense, India, as a leading member of SAARC, has a responsibility in convening informal bilateral negotiations with its neighbors to deal with regional disputes.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr. This article was published by IPCS.
Prior to the SAARC 16th Summit held in Bhutan’s capital Thimphu in April 2010, Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed had affirmed his hopes about the bilateral meeting between Indian PM Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani. Since bilateral issues cannot officially be tackled in the multilateral forum of SAARC, this comment reflected the common feeling among SAARC member States that the Indo-Pak relations overshadow SAARC meetings. The incapacity of its member States to discuss political issues restrains SAARC’s credibility as a regional organization, but isn’t that the only way for such a discordant association to overcome its divisions? Can the Association learn anything from the ASEAN experience? Does 16th Summit offer any hope for a stronger political dialogue within SAARC in the future?
One of the reasons for creating a regional organization is the shared conviction among neighbours that the stronger the regional links, the lower the incentive to use force to resolve conflicts. In this sense, ASEAN Nations signed in 1975, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopting the principles of renunciation to the threat or the use of force, and settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner. Disputes have not been necessarily absent in Southeast Asia since then, but their common conviction that getting on with each other is an economically win-win situation forced the respect of agreed principles – mainly because, unlike SAARC’s members, ASEAN States are economically interdependent. Because of their complex and confrontational history, SAARC member States have not reached such a level of regional commitment. They agreed to contribute to mutual trust in the region through non-use of force and non-interference, but the absence of political dialogue on bilateral issues made these promises meaningless. Consequently, the threat or use of force between member States of SAARC has remained possible.
The main difference between ASEAN and SAARC lies in the existence of practical diplomatic tools to address these issues. ASEAN member States and other regional and international stakeholders created in 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote confidence-building and develop preventive diplomacy in the region. Often criticized for its lack of efficiency in tackling long-standing issues like Myanmar’s democratization, the ARF has nevertheless established a diplomatic forum to address these specific concerns. A SAARC Regional Forum to discuss disputes would be a proper way to take political pressure away from SAARC Summits but the creation of such a mechanism seems unlikely as long as SAARC lacks a common vision of regionalism. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are in favor of amending the SAARC charter to enable discussion on bilateral issues: they both believe that economic cooperation can’t be achieved without a resolution of political issues first. India, on the contrary, prefers economic cooperation to be the main driving force of regionalism, for fear that the smaller countries might form a united front to overrule Delhi and with the idea that political gains will follow. Unanimity being the one and only decision procedure, a stronger regional political dialogue is not in all likelihood a potential perspective.
It seems SAARC could learn a lesson from the success of informal diplomacy within ASEAN. Informal negotiations over the Spratly Islands dispute have been efficient in creating confidence-building between the actors and peaceful cooperation while official consultations, subjected to media pressure, focused merely on nationalist demands. Since SAARC’s official track is blocked, member States have also used bilateral meetings outside the summits to discuss their security issues. The meeting between Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the 16th Summit also proves the relative success of informal sideline diplomacy. Officially discussing political disagreements during the SAARC Summits would probably threaten dialogue on any other subject and even the very existence of SAARC. Keeping the discussions informal and bilateral allows SAARC to slowly but surely move forward on less controversial issues such as poverty reduction. In a nutshell, proponents of a Charter reform should resign themselves to the idea that bilateral diplomacy is probably the only solution to create a stronger SAARC.
Another explanation for ASEAN’s comparative success in conflict management is the use of alternative dispute resolution, through justice or mediation. If ASEAN countries favor bilateral conflict resolution, the principle of non-intervention pushed them to use the International Court of Justice to resolve territorial disputes like the sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan in 2002 and over Pedra Branca, Middle Rock and South Ledge in 2008. If the recourse to third-party mediation did not determine maritime boundaries, it was often the only way to break impasses and initiate bilateral negotiations. But the lack of confidence in international bodies and the Indian satisfaction with status quo in Kashmir make the use of international justice less likely within SAARC. To conclude, if international and regional ways to deal with disputes are efficient for ASEAN States, it seems bilateral discussions are the only foreseeable solution to make SAARC work in the fields of economic and social development. In this sense, India, as a leading member of SAARC, has a responsibility in convening informal bilateral negotiations with its neighbors to deal with regional disputes.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr. This article was published by IPCS.
Monday, May 24, 2010 |
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Trade Dependence, Economic-Political Vulnerability Vary Among BRIC
By Markus Jaeger, analyst for Deutsche Bank Research
Trade openness benefits economies in terms of medium-term economic growth and wealth generation, even if, admittedly, the empirical evidence on this score is somewhat mixed; it also benefits less advanced economies relatively more than advanced ones. On the flipside, greater trade openness exposes economies to greater economic volatility and potentially resulting social instability. More open, less advanced economies are typically more sensitive than less open, more advanced economies. Due to the greater opportunity costs of trade closure and protectionism, it also renders the former more vulnerable to protectionist threats, especially by the latter.
In terms of trade openness, China and Russia are more exposed to international trade than Brazil and India. In terms of social stability, China and India are, ceteris paribus, more exposed than Brazil and Russia. Lower per capita incomes and the relatively greater labour intensity of their exports tend to magnify the impact of trade shocks on social stability. In this very simple framework, China would be the most, and Brazil the least vulnerable BRIC economy – the latter’s non-negligible dependence on volatile commodity exports notwithstanding. This may appear somewhat counter-intuitive given China’s recent economic performance, but one must not forget that economic growth did slow down dramatically in the last quarter of 2008 before the authorities launched a massive stimulus programme.
Greater openness in China and Russia also translates into higher “opportunity costs” of trade closure, and thus a higher susceptibility to protectionist threats, especially from large, less open, developed countries. This susceptibility, however, is mitigated or enhanced by a country’s trade structure. For instance, Russia is less susceptible due to the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports, while China’s significant dependence on commodity imports increases its susceptibility. While both China and Russia are significant net importers of agro-products, China’s dependence on fuel and mining imports is very substantial. More arguably, China’s export profile does not give it a great deal of leverage vis-a-vis other countries, while the geo-graphic concentration – almost 40% of exports go to the US and the EU alone – render it more vulnerable, not least because the EU and the US are significantly less dependent on Chinese imports than China is on exports to the EU and the US. Export processing trade notwithstanding, China is the country most vulnerable among the BRIC countries to trade disruptions (or the threat thereof) on account of trade openness, its labour-intensive export sector and its trade structure.
China’s potential vulnerability is further enhanced by the fact that it, like Russia but unlike Brazil and India, has a more “complicated” relationship with its main trading partners (esp. the US). For now, Beijing and Washington are neither “strategic partners” nor “strategic competitors”. Beijing is therefore mindful as regards the potential risks stemming from foreign trade protectionism and commodity dependence. The sense of potential vulnerability is compounded by China’s pursuit of a commodity- and energy-intensive investment- and export-led growth strategy that is highly dependent on commodity imports. Manifest concerns about potential social instability in the event of a trade (disruption) induced economic slowdown will further exacerbate this vulnerability in the eyes of the Chinese government.
aBeijing’s significant financial resources may help mitigate somewhat its concerns about economic security, including vis-Ã -vis Washington. Not surprisingly, however, Beijing is seeking to mitigate commodity supply risk by establishing long-term supply relationships (e.g. loan-oil deals with Brazil and Russia), by supporting the acquisition of natural resource assets by domestic companies (e.g. “going global”) and, more generally, by fostering friendly diplomatic relations with commodity-rich countries (e.g. Africa, Asia). The recent wrangling over iron ore prices and foreign opposition to the acquisition of natural resource assets by Chinese companies will have done nothing to alleviate Beijing’s concerns about economic security. Beijing is fully aware that if push ever came to shove (e.g. Taiwan), China’s trade dependence would be an important source of economic, political and strategic vulnerability, especially vis-Ã -vis advanced, relatively closed economies (read: the US).
All said, China is the BRIC economy that benefits the most from international trade; but it is also the one most vulnerable in terms of trade protectionism and access to strategically important commodities, its strong international financial position notwithstanding. More so than any other BRIC country, China has an interest in fostering free trade and opposing protectionism. At the same time, Beijing also faces far greater incentives to mitigate and pro-actively manage its trade dependence, especially as regards access to strategically vital natural resources. Maintaining an open trading system and creating a level playing field as regards foreign direct investment will remain a central plank of Chinese economic diplomacy.
Trade openness benefits economies in terms of medium-term economic growth and wealth generation, even if, admittedly, the empirical evidence on this score is somewhat mixed; it also benefits less advanced economies relatively more than advanced ones. On the flipside, greater trade openness exposes economies to greater economic volatility and potentially resulting social instability. More open, less advanced economies are typically more sensitive than less open, more advanced economies. Due to the greater opportunity costs of trade closure and protectionism, it also renders the former more vulnerable to protectionist threats, especially by the latter.
In terms of trade openness, China and Russia are more exposed to international trade than Brazil and India. In terms of social stability, China and India are, ceteris paribus, more exposed than Brazil and Russia. Lower per capita incomes and the relatively greater labour intensity of their exports tend to magnify the impact of trade shocks on social stability. In this very simple framework, China would be the most, and Brazil the least vulnerable BRIC economy – the latter’s non-negligible dependence on volatile commodity exports notwithstanding. This may appear somewhat counter-intuitive given China’s recent economic performance, but one must not forget that economic growth did slow down dramatically in the last quarter of 2008 before the authorities launched a massive stimulus programme.
Greater openness in China and Russia also translates into higher “opportunity costs” of trade closure, and thus a higher susceptibility to protectionist threats, especially from large, less open, developed countries. This susceptibility, however, is mitigated or enhanced by a country’s trade structure. For instance, Russia is less susceptible due to the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports, while China’s significant dependence on commodity imports increases its susceptibility. While both China and Russia are significant net importers of agro-products, China’s dependence on fuel and mining imports is very substantial. More arguably, China’s export profile does not give it a great deal of leverage vis-a-vis other countries, while the geo-graphic concentration – almost 40% of exports go to the US and the EU alone – render it more vulnerable, not least because the EU and the US are significantly less dependent on Chinese imports than China is on exports to the EU and the US. Export processing trade notwithstanding, China is the country most vulnerable among the BRIC countries to trade disruptions (or the threat thereof) on account of trade openness, its labour-intensive export sector and its trade structure.
China’s potential vulnerability is further enhanced by the fact that it, like Russia but unlike Brazil and India, has a more “complicated” relationship with its main trading partners (esp. the US). For now, Beijing and Washington are neither “strategic partners” nor “strategic competitors”. Beijing is therefore mindful as regards the potential risks stemming from foreign trade protectionism and commodity dependence. The sense of potential vulnerability is compounded by China’s pursuit of a commodity- and energy-intensive investment- and export-led growth strategy that is highly dependent on commodity imports. Manifest concerns about potential social instability in the event of a trade (disruption) induced economic slowdown will further exacerbate this vulnerability in the eyes of the Chinese government.
aBeijing’s significant financial resources may help mitigate somewhat its concerns about economic security, including vis-Ã -vis Washington. Not surprisingly, however, Beijing is seeking to mitigate commodity supply risk by establishing long-term supply relationships (e.g. loan-oil deals with Brazil and Russia), by supporting the acquisition of natural resource assets by domestic companies (e.g. “going global”) and, more generally, by fostering friendly diplomatic relations with commodity-rich countries (e.g. Africa, Asia). The recent wrangling over iron ore prices and foreign opposition to the acquisition of natural resource assets by Chinese companies will have done nothing to alleviate Beijing’s concerns about economic security. Beijing is fully aware that if push ever came to shove (e.g. Taiwan), China’s trade dependence would be an important source of economic, political and strategic vulnerability, especially vis-Ã -vis advanced, relatively closed economies (read: the US).
All said, China is the BRIC economy that benefits the most from international trade; but it is also the one most vulnerable in terms of trade protectionism and access to strategically important commodities, its strong international financial position notwithstanding. More so than any other BRIC country, China has an interest in fostering free trade and opposing protectionism. At the same time, Beijing also faces far greater incentives to mitigate and pro-actively manage its trade dependence, especially as regards access to strategically vital natural resources. Maintaining an open trading system and creating a level playing field as regards foreign direct investment will remain a central plank of Chinese economic diplomacy.
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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The Financial Crisis And Leviathan
By Robert Higgs
Since the early twentieth century, periods of real or perceived national emergency have been “critical episodes” in the growth of government’s size, scope, and power in the United States and in many other countries. Hence, the concise conceptualization: Crisis and Leviathan (the main title of my 1987 book on the growth of government in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century).
In the past century, the first five such critical episodes in the United States were: World War I; the Great Depression; World War II; a multi-faceted set of crises associated with the civil-rights revolution and the Vietnam War, roughly coincident with the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon; and the post 9/11 events associated with the so-called War on Terror and the U.S. attacks on and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We are now amid another such critical episode, which springs from the housing bust that began in 2006, the economic recession that began late in 2007, and the financial debacle that reached its climax in September 2008.
The current troubles are complex and raise a multitude of questions. Many books and articles no doubt will be written to analyze these various issues in scholarly depth and detail, and certainly anything we might say today must be regarded as preliminary, at best. I focus here on a few aspects of the present episode that relate closely to my own research on the growth of government, a field of study to which I have returned again and again over the past thirty years.
I
The current recession has elicited many comparisons with earlier business downturns, especially with the Great Depression. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke is often described as an expert on the Great Depression who takes its lessons, as he understands them, deeply into account as he formulates and implements Fed policies. Likewise, many other economists have revisited the Great Depression recently in search of lessons applicable to current policy-making. In all of these reflections, the mainstream economics profession in general has distinguished itself by an astonishing superficiality of historical knowledge and lack of theoretical prowess.
The swiftness with which a great many mainstream economists have reverted to the simplistic “vulgar Keynesianism” that had its heyday from the late 1940s to the late 1960s has been nothing short of shocking, given that by the end of the 1970s such old-fashioned Keynesianism seemed to have been completely discredited and superseded in the leading echelons of the mainstream economics profession. Now it has come roaring back. Of course, the general public, whose understanding of such matters is always primitive, and the politicians, who are always looking for plausible intellectual rationales to excuse their insatiable spending, borrowing, and power-grabbing, had never abandoned vulgar Keynesianism, so they were elated to find that the economic “experts” were again confirming their own self-interested inclinations.
From such vulgar Keynesian thinking flowed the succession of “stimulus” spending measures, beginning with the Bush administration’s, carried out in the spring of 2008. Other governments have gone down the same foolish path. Of course, as any competent economist could have testified even fifty years ago, such temporary government-spending surges give people money that, for the most part, they save or use to pay off debts, rather than spending it along the lines envisioned by Keynesian “multiplier” analysis to set in motion an upward spiral of income, expenditure, real output, and employment. Much of the so-called stimulus spending in the United States has served only to bulk up the pay and benefits of government employees (federal, state, and local), effectively transferring income from the private sector to the government sector, and to reward other groups, such as the United Auto Workers and low-income home buyers, for their support of the Obama administration—past, present, or future.
Bernanke and his colleagues in other central banks are taking credit for saving the financial system and even for saving the world from a repetition of the Great Depression—claims that must be treated with extreme skepticism. In any event, however, they have certainly created the potential for rapidly accelerating consumer-price inflation, should the banks become less apprehensive about their balance sheets and employ their vast excess-reserve balances to resume their lending and investing on a more normal basis.
Bernanke expresses confidence that he has the “tools” to rein in such potentially inflationary bank action, mainly by raising the interest rate the Fed pays banks on their deposits at the Fed, but one may well doubt whether he will be able to use those tools effectively. When interest rates begin to rise substantially, as they must sooner or later, great political pressure will be brought against tighter-money actions by the Fed and other central banks; the politicians will protest increases in interest rates at a time when unemployment remains at an elevated rate and other aspects of the recession linger, as well. So, even if Bernanke has the effective tools he claims to have, the question remains as to whether he will have the personal courage and the political support required to use those tools effectively.
II
One aspect of the current crisis that has come as anything but a surprise is that the politicians and their supporting coalition of crony capitalists and other backers have certainly not (in the immortal words of Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel) allowed “a crisis to go to waste.” The past two years have witnessed one power-grab or institutional takeover after another, most notably of AIG, Fannie, Freddie, General Motors, and Chrysler. Under the TARP scheme, the Treasury has taken ownership positions in hundreds of large banks by acquiring preferred shares and warrants. Virtually all residential mortgage lending now ultimately springs from the secondary market and guarantees provided by Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie Mae, FHA, and VA. This aspect of the government’s power-grab has been especially important because by continuing to pump funds into dodgy mortgages, the government is preventing the necessary restructuring of the housing-construction industry and the mortgage-credit sector, propping up unqualified and underwater borrowers and ill-managed and even insolvent lenders, and thereby creating great potential for a second round of the housing/housing-finance bust in the near-term future.
As the huge recent expansion of the government’s size and scope has proceeded, the Treasury’s fiscal condition has deteriorated badly. The federal deficit jumped from an amount equal to about 3 percent of GDP in fiscal 2008 to an amount equal to about 10 percent of GDP in fiscal 2009, and even the government’s forecasts now project deficits in the neighborhood of $1 trillion per year for the next decade. Thus, the U.S. government’s debt has exploded, and will continue to rise relentlessly—or, it will do so as long as willing buyers can be found for bonds promising only modest nominal yields, a market that Uncle Sam can no longer assume will persist indefinitely. (The Chinese and other major buyers are already grousing and insisting that the U.S. Treasury act more prudently.)
While the government proper was expanding its size, scope, and power, the Fed was greatly expanding the magnitude and scope of its own balance sheet and, in effect, engaging in “industrial policy” by singling out particular firms and industries for assistance, while steering clear of others in equally dire condition. If the Fed is not “picking winners,” it is certainly deciding who will be spared a market-determined fate as a loser. Fed officials insist that they intend to withdraw from many of the new areas they have recently entered, once the crisis has passed, but it will be surprising if the recent “emergency” policies do not remain in the Fed’s arsenal, bulking up its power, and equally surprising if it sloughs off all of the unusual types of “securities” it has acquired in the past two years.
At the moment, the Fed is seeking—and it, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity may well be given—wide-ranging statutory authority to reorganize preemptively any seemingly failing firm (not only banks) whose failure would pose, in the Fed’s estimation, a “systemic risk.” Such authority would greatly expand the Fed’s current power as a monetary central planner by adding a role as risk-management central planner. Regardless of whether the Fed, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity ends up the winner of the current power scramble, the possible repercussions of this expanded power on the operation of the capital markets is frightful to contemplate.
III
As the current troubles have led many economists and others to revisit the government’s policies during the 1930s, some have concluded that even though the New Deal’s hodgepodge of policies never brought about full recovery, the action that most economists believe did effect a full recovery—in Paul Krugman’s words, “the large public works program, otherwise known as World War II, that ended the Great Depression”—suggests a remedy for today’s recession along similar lines. In retrospect, it is clear that this belief in the creation of “wartime prosperity” by massive government spending and deficit financing did more than anything else to bring about acceptance of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s. Even today, not only the general public but most professional economists remain firmly convinced that, as the familiar saying maintains, “the war got the economy out of the Great Depression,” and hence a serious recession such as the present one naturally causes them to recall this supposed “lesson” of economic history. Among many lesser lights, Martin Feldstein, one of the country’s most eminent and influential economists, has recently proposed what amounts to an exercise in military Keynesianism as a stimulus measure.
The fly in this ointment, however, is that the lesson almost everyone has drawn from the events of the 1940s is false; the common belief is a myth. When we take apart the simplistic Keynesian analysis of the war’s effect on the economy and look carefully at what actually happened to the various components of the labor force, the capital stock, and the gross domestic product, we see that the economic events of the war years represent a classic case of a command economy’s sacrificing butter—not to mention life, liberty, and property—for the sake of producing and deploying more guns.
A single graph suffices to give us a more accurate portrayal of the economy’s performance in the 1930s and 1940s (for a complete analysis, see the first five chapters of my 2006 book Depression, War, and Cold War).
As the graph shows, real GDP dropped sharply in the early 1930s, then recovered rapidly after 1933, but it did not reach its high-employment growth trend until 1941, when the nature of the economy’s output (shifting rapidly into war production) was beginning to obscure the meaning of data that purport to measure “real output.” If we accept the standard data, a huge war boom appears to have occurred during the war years, followed by a sharp downturn, concentrated in 1946, after which the economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend (shown in the figure by the straight line connecting the [logarithms of the] values for 1929 and 1948).
Looking at the private part of GDP—the part with a much clearer meaning, owing to its derivation from freely-made consumer and investor choices about the use of privately owned funds—we see a similar pattern during the 1930s, but a completely different pattern during the 1940s. After 1941, private output of both consumer and investor goods fell to much lower levels and remained submerged far below the high-employment growth trend throughout the war years. Private real output did not exceed its 1941 rate until 1946, when it shot up by about 30 percent in a single year. Afterward, the private economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend. Real prosperity had been achieved at last, for the first time since 1929.
But wait, the critics protest: didn’t the war wipe out mass unemployment? Of course, it did. However, this elimination of mass unemployment had nothing to do with Keynesian fiscal policy (or, for that matter, with the concurrent, highly expansive monetary policy) and everything to do with the military draft, which pulled the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar labor force into the armed forces. If the economy has 5–7 million persons unemployed, then drafting 10 million prime-age workers (and thereby inducing millions of others to enlist “voluntarily”) will “solve” the unemployment problem every time. To use the same policy today, the U.S. authorities need only to conscript about 30 million men—not, I daresay, a political idea whose time has come.
Indeed, the idea is preposterous, and so, more generally, is looking to the government’s alleged “large public works program, otherwise known as World War II” as a model of how to deal with today’s economic crisis. Rather than allow ourselves to be mesmerized by a statistically spurious bulge of real GDP during World War II, we are better advised to recall the wartime rationing of many ordinary consumer goods, the shortages or complete production closures of many consumer goods (e.g., automobiles, most consumer durables), the preemption of public transport by the military authorities, and the wage, price, and rent controls that caused, among many other undesirable consequences, drastic deterioration in the quality of many goods and services. Whatever else the war might have accomplished, it certainly did not produce conditions that we may properly describe as genuine prosperity.
IV
Even if policy makers decline to adopt World War II-type policies as remedies for the current recession, the immense magnitude of the present-day military-industrial complex certainly complicates all efforts to effect a recovery, by draining more than $1 trillion a year from the economy’s potential to produce private consumer and producer goods. The current long-running wars and military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will probably never end, although eventually they may be scaled back somewhat, only add to the economic drain on U.S. resources. So far, more than $1 trillion has been expended for these ill-fated adventures, and their total cost may eventually cumulate to several times this amount, not simply because they, like the U.S. military presence in Japan, Korea, and various European countries, will continue indefinitely, but also because of the need to care for a multitude of physically and psychologically disabled veterans over a span of several decades.
Even if the wars in the Middle East were concluded overnight, however, a huge distortion would continue to affect the U.S. economy, owing to the normal operation of the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of the current armed forces and their far-flung empire of more than 800 large overseas bases. This military hypertrophy reflects not an attempt to pump up the macroeconomy, as military Keynesians would have it, but rather the devotion of U.S. ruling elites to the maintenance of global military hegemony, ultimately capped by the attainment of “full-spectrum dominance”—“control of land, sea, air and space and all attendant resources” over the entire world.
Why do U.S. policy makers seek such god-like control of the planet? To the extent that the military leadership itself contributes to shaping national-security policies, this o’erleaping ambition merely expresses the latest phase of the military’s longstanding maniacal quest for total power—the undoubted ability to win any and all conceivable wars. Among the civilian leadership, the motives range more widely. An important impulse, though it is never mentioned frankly in polite company, is to maintain a foreign military presence configured so as to make the state of Israel as secure as possible. Another abiding interest is to control the worldwide distribution of petroleum, if necessary by bribing, intimidating, or taking military action against the governments of important oil-producing countries, especially in the Persian Gulf region.
Related to this wholly unnecessary quest to control the world’s oil-distribution channels—after all, it does not serve the interests of the oil producers to withhold their product from the world market—is the ambition to play the Great Game by throwing up barriers to the expanding influence of China and India and the residual potential of Russia in southwest Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea region, where vast stores of oil and gas remain to be tapped and brought to market. For more than half a century, U.S. leaders have been obsessed with projecting their country’s power into petro-military adventures of all sorts. However senseless this fixation might seem in a purely economic perspective, we can scarcely deny that the coziest crony capitalists in the oil and related industries have reaped a great deal of income along the way, and owing to their extraordinary political clout, they have every expectation of continuing to reap such income in the future, with the vital assistance of U.S. diplomats and armed forces to grease the skids.
Although the military-industrial-congressional complex is one of the most powerful interest groups in U.S. politics, and we may certainly expect it to struggle forcefully to retain or even to increase the flow of wealth placed at its disposal, the U.S. government’s increasingly precarious financial condition may compel even this powerful coalition to settle for a smaller space at the trough, especially if stagflation sets in as the U.S. economy’s normal condition during the next decade (as I suspect it will). If America’s economic future turns out to be even worse than I now foresee—for example, with rapid inflation, price and capital controls, and a flight from the dollar—then even greater retrenchment of the U.S. military presence abroad will be unavoidable. Such economic ruin would be a heavy price to pay for reining in America’s global hegemony, but, nevertheless, the military retrenchment itself would be a consequence that most of the world’s people would celebrate.
Acknowledgment: This commentary was originally prepared for presentation at a meeting convened by Diapason Commodities Management S.A. in Venice, Italy, April 30, 2010. I am grateful to Sean Corrigan and his colleagues at Diapason for inviting me to speak at this meeting.
Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institute’s quarterly journal The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague. He has been a visiting scholar at Oxford University and Stanford University, and a fellow for the Hoover Institution and the National Science Foundation. He is the author of many books, including Depression, War, and Cold War. This article was published by The Independent Institute and reprinted with permission.
Since the early twentieth century, periods of real or perceived national emergency have been “critical episodes” in the growth of government’s size, scope, and power in the United States and in many other countries. Hence, the concise conceptualization: Crisis and Leviathan (the main title of my 1987 book on the growth of government in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century).
In the past century, the first five such critical episodes in the United States were: World War I; the Great Depression; World War II; a multi-faceted set of crises associated with the civil-rights revolution and the Vietnam War, roughly coincident with the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon; and the post 9/11 events associated with the so-called War on Terror and the U.S. attacks on and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We are now amid another such critical episode, which springs from the housing bust that began in 2006, the economic recession that began late in 2007, and the financial debacle that reached its climax in September 2008.
The current troubles are complex and raise a multitude of questions. Many books and articles no doubt will be written to analyze these various issues in scholarly depth and detail, and certainly anything we might say today must be regarded as preliminary, at best. I focus here on a few aspects of the present episode that relate closely to my own research on the growth of government, a field of study to which I have returned again and again over the past thirty years.
I
The current recession has elicited many comparisons with earlier business downturns, especially with the Great Depression. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke is often described as an expert on the Great Depression who takes its lessons, as he understands them, deeply into account as he formulates and implements Fed policies. Likewise, many other economists have revisited the Great Depression recently in search of lessons applicable to current policy-making. In all of these reflections, the mainstream economics profession in general has distinguished itself by an astonishing superficiality of historical knowledge and lack of theoretical prowess.
The swiftness with which a great many mainstream economists have reverted to the simplistic “vulgar Keynesianism” that had its heyday from the late 1940s to the late 1960s has been nothing short of shocking, given that by the end of the 1970s such old-fashioned Keynesianism seemed to have been completely discredited and superseded in the leading echelons of the mainstream economics profession. Now it has come roaring back. Of course, the general public, whose understanding of such matters is always primitive, and the politicians, who are always looking for plausible intellectual rationales to excuse their insatiable spending, borrowing, and power-grabbing, had never abandoned vulgar Keynesianism, so they were elated to find that the economic “experts” were again confirming their own self-interested inclinations.
From such vulgar Keynesian thinking flowed the succession of “stimulus” spending measures, beginning with the Bush administration’s, carried out in the spring of 2008. Other governments have gone down the same foolish path. Of course, as any competent economist could have testified even fifty years ago, such temporary government-spending surges give people money that, for the most part, they save or use to pay off debts, rather than spending it along the lines envisioned by Keynesian “multiplier” analysis to set in motion an upward spiral of income, expenditure, real output, and employment. Much of the so-called stimulus spending in the United States has served only to bulk up the pay and benefits of government employees (federal, state, and local), effectively transferring income from the private sector to the government sector, and to reward other groups, such as the United Auto Workers and low-income home buyers, for their support of the Obama administration—past, present, or future.
At the same time, Bernanke and other central bankers, obsessed by an irrational fear of deflation, set in motion liquidity-enhancing measures so vast that no one could reasonably have anticipated them. Excess reserves of depository institutions in the United States now substantially exceed $1 trillion, as the banks have simply absorbed the effusions of dollars the Fed has spent to acquire an unprecedented variety of “securities,” including various “toxic” assets that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other ill-managed firms had acquired during the housing boom and later.
Bernanke expresses confidence that he has the “tools” to rein in such potentially inflationary bank action, mainly by raising the interest rate the Fed pays banks on their deposits at the Fed, but one may well doubt whether he will be able to use those tools effectively. When interest rates begin to rise substantially, as they must sooner or later, great political pressure will be brought against tighter-money actions by the Fed and other central banks; the politicians will protest increases in interest rates at a time when unemployment remains at an elevated rate and other aspects of the recession linger, as well. So, even if Bernanke has the effective tools he claims to have, the question remains as to whether he will have the personal courage and the political support required to use those tools effectively.
II
One aspect of the current crisis that has come as anything but a surprise is that the politicians and their supporting coalition of crony capitalists and other backers have certainly not (in the immortal words of Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel) allowed “a crisis to go to waste.” The past two years have witnessed one power-grab or institutional takeover after another, most notably of AIG, Fannie, Freddie, General Motors, and Chrysler. Under the TARP scheme, the Treasury has taken ownership positions in hundreds of large banks by acquiring preferred shares and warrants. Virtually all residential mortgage lending now ultimately springs from the secondary market and guarantees provided by Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie Mae, FHA, and VA. This aspect of the government’s power-grab has been especially important because by continuing to pump funds into dodgy mortgages, the government is preventing the necessary restructuring of the housing-construction industry and the mortgage-credit sector, propping up unqualified and underwater borrowers and ill-managed and even insolvent lenders, and thereby creating great potential for a second round of the housing/housing-finance bust in the near-term future.
As the huge recent expansion of the government’s size and scope has proceeded, the Treasury’s fiscal condition has deteriorated badly. The federal deficit jumped from an amount equal to about 3 percent of GDP in fiscal 2008 to an amount equal to about 10 percent of GDP in fiscal 2009, and even the government’s forecasts now project deficits in the neighborhood of $1 trillion per year for the next decade. Thus, the U.S. government’s debt has exploded, and will continue to rise relentlessly—or, it will do so as long as willing buyers can be found for bonds promising only modest nominal yields, a market that Uncle Sam can no longer assume will persist indefinitely. (The Chinese and other major buyers are already grousing and insisting that the U.S. Treasury act more prudently.)
While the government proper was expanding its size, scope, and power, the Fed was greatly expanding the magnitude and scope of its own balance sheet and, in effect, engaging in “industrial policy” by singling out particular firms and industries for assistance, while steering clear of others in equally dire condition. If the Fed is not “picking winners,” it is certainly deciding who will be spared a market-determined fate as a loser. Fed officials insist that they intend to withdraw from many of the new areas they have recently entered, once the crisis has passed, but it will be surprising if the recent “emergency” policies do not remain in the Fed’s arsenal, bulking up its power, and equally surprising if it sloughs off all of the unusual types of “securities” it has acquired in the past two years.
At the moment, the Fed is seeking—and it, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity may well be given—wide-ranging statutory authority to reorganize preemptively any seemingly failing firm (not only banks) whose failure would pose, in the Fed’s estimation, a “systemic risk.” Such authority would greatly expand the Fed’s current power as a monetary central planner by adding a role as risk-management central planner. Regardless of whether the Fed, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity ends up the winner of the current power scramble, the possible repercussions of this expanded power on the operation of the capital markets is frightful to contemplate.
III
As the current troubles have led many economists and others to revisit the government’s policies during the 1930s, some have concluded that even though the New Deal’s hodgepodge of policies never brought about full recovery, the action that most economists believe did effect a full recovery—in Paul Krugman’s words, “the large public works program, otherwise known as World War II, that ended the Great Depression”—suggests a remedy for today’s recession along similar lines. In retrospect, it is clear that this belief in the creation of “wartime prosperity” by massive government spending and deficit financing did more than anything else to bring about acceptance of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s. Even today, not only the general public but most professional economists remain firmly convinced that, as the familiar saying maintains, “the war got the economy out of the Great Depression,” and hence a serious recession such as the present one naturally causes them to recall this supposed “lesson” of economic history. Among many lesser lights, Martin Feldstein, one of the country’s most eminent and influential economists, has recently proposed what amounts to an exercise in military Keynesianism as a stimulus measure.
The fly in this ointment, however, is that the lesson almost everyone has drawn from the events of the 1940s is false; the common belief is a myth. When we take apart the simplistic Keynesian analysis of the war’s effect on the economy and look carefully at what actually happened to the various components of the labor force, the capital stock, and the gross domestic product, we see that the economic events of the war years represent a classic case of a command economy’s sacrificing butter—not to mention life, liberty, and property—for the sake of producing and deploying more guns.
A single graph suffices to give us a more accurate portrayal of the economy’s performance in the 1930s and 1940s (for a complete analysis, see the first five chapters of my 2006 book Depression, War, and Cold War).
Looking at the private part of GDP—the part with a much clearer meaning, owing to its derivation from freely-made consumer and investor choices about the use of privately owned funds—we see a similar pattern during the 1930s, but a completely different pattern during the 1940s. After 1941, private output of both consumer and investor goods fell to much lower levels and remained submerged far below the high-employment growth trend throughout the war years. Private real output did not exceed its 1941 rate until 1946, when it shot up by about 30 percent in a single year. Afterward, the private economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend. Real prosperity had been achieved at last, for the first time since 1929.
But wait, the critics protest: didn’t the war wipe out mass unemployment? Of course, it did. However, this elimination of mass unemployment had nothing to do with Keynesian fiscal policy (or, for that matter, with the concurrent, highly expansive monetary policy) and everything to do with the military draft, which pulled the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar labor force into the armed forces. If the economy has 5–7 million persons unemployed, then drafting 10 million prime-age workers (and thereby inducing millions of others to enlist “voluntarily”) will “solve” the unemployment problem every time. To use the same policy today, the U.S. authorities need only to conscript about 30 million men—not, I daresay, a political idea whose time has come.
Indeed, the idea is preposterous, and so, more generally, is looking to the government’s alleged “large public works program, otherwise known as World War II” as a model of how to deal with today’s economic crisis. Rather than allow ourselves to be mesmerized by a statistically spurious bulge of real GDP during World War II, we are better advised to recall the wartime rationing of many ordinary consumer goods, the shortages or complete production closures of many consumer goods (e.g., automobiles, most consumer durables), the preemption of public transport by the military authorities, and the wage, price, and rent controls that caused, among many other undesirable consequences, drastic deterioration in the quality of many goods and services. Whatever else the war might have accomplished, it certainly did not produce conditions that we may properly describe as genuine prosperity.
IV
Even if policy makers decline to adopt World War II-type policies as remedies for the current recession, the immense magnitude of the present-day military-industrial complex certainly complicates all efforts to effect a recovery, by draining more than $1 trillion a year from the economy’s potential to produce private consumer and producer goods. The current long-running wars and military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will probably never end, although eventually they may be scaled back somewhat, only add to the economic drain on U.S. resources. So far, more than $1 trillion has been expended for these ill-fated adventures, and their total cost may eventually cumulate to several times this amount, not simply because they, like the U.S. military presence in Japan, Korea, and various European countries, will continue indefinitely, but also because of the need to care for a multitude of physically and psychologically disabled veterans over a span of several decades.
Even if the wars in the Middle East were concluded overnight, however, a huge distortion would continue to affect the U.S. economy, owing to the normal operation of the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of the current armed forces and their far-flung empire of more than 800 large overseas bases. This military hypertrophy reflects not an attempt to pump up the macroeconomy, as military Keynesians would have it, but rather the devotion of U.S. ruling elites to the maintenance of global military hegemony, ultimately capped by the attainment of “full-spectrum dominance”—“control of land, sea, air and space and all attendant resources” over the entire world.
Why do U.S. policy makers seek such god-like control of the planet? To the extent that the military leadership itself contributes to shaping national-security policies, this o’erleaping ambition merely expresses the latest phase of the military’s longstanding maniacal quest for total power—the undoubted ability to win any and all conceivable wars. Among the civilian leadership, the motives range more widely. An important impulse, though it is never mentioned frankly in polite company, is to maintain a foreign military presence configured so as to make the state of Israel as secure as possible. Another abiding interest is to control the worldwide distribution of petroleum, if necessary by bribing, intimidating, or taking military action against the governments of important oil-producing countries, especially in the Persian Gulf region.
Related to this wholly unnecessary quest to control the world’s oil-distribution channels—after all, it does not serve the interests of the oil producers to withhold their product from the world market—is the ambition to play the Great Game by throwing up barriers to the expanding influence of China and India and the residual potential of Russia in southwest Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea region, where vast stores of oil and gas remain to be tapped and brought to market. For more than half a century, U.S. leaders have been obsessed with projecting their country’s power into petro-military adventures of all sorts. However senseless this fixation might seem in a purely economic perspective, we can scarcely deny that the coziest crony capitalists in the oil and related industries have reaped a great deal of income along the way, and owing to their extraordinary political clout, they have every expectation of continuing to reap such income in the future, with the vital assistance of U.S. diplomats and armed forces to grease the skids.
Although the military-industrial-congressional complex is one of the most powerful interest groups in U.S. politics, and we may certainly expect it to struggle forcefully to retain or even to increase the flow of wealth placed at its disposal, the U.S. government’s increasingly precarious financial condition may compel even this powerful coalition to settle for a smaller space at the trough, especially if stagflation sets in as the U.S. economy’s normal condition during the next decade (as I suspect it will). If America’s economic future turns out to be even worse than I now foresee—for example, with rapid inflation, price and capital controls, and a flight from the dollar—then even greater retrenchment of the U.S. military presence abroad will be unavoidable. Such economic ruin would be a heavy price to pay for reining in America’s global hegemony, but, nevertheless, the military retrenchment itself would be a consequence that most of the world’s people would celebrate.
Acknowledgment: This commentary was originally prepared for presentation at a meeting convened by Diapason Commodities Management S.A. in Venice, Italy, April 30, 2010. I am grateful to Sean Corrigan and his colleagues at Diapason for inviting me to speak at this meeting.
Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institute’s quarterly journal The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague. He has been a visiting scholar at Oxford University and Stanford University, and a fellow for the Hoover Institution and the National Science Foundation. He is the author of many books, including Depression, War, and Cold War. This article was published by The Independent Institute and reprinted with permission.
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Calls To Protect India Children In Maoist Conflict
India should take immediate steps to protect children caught up in its conflict with Maoist rebels, in light of a report today by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Human Rights Watch said. This is the first time that the long-running Maoist conflict in India has appeared in the secretary-general's report to the UN Security Council about the use of children in armed conflict around the world.
India should immediately review state government policies of occupying and using school buildings as part of operations against Maoist armed groups, known as Naxalites, and give schools better protection from Maoist attacks, Human Rights Watch said. Human Rights Watch also called upon the Maoists to immediately cease their recruitment and use of children, and stop attacking schools.
"Both the security forces and the Maoists in India are exploiting and harming children, destroying their chances at an education and causing damage that will affect their entire lives," said Bede Sheppard, Asia researcher on children's rights at Human Rights Watch. "The new UN report will focus international attention on this tragic situation."
The UN Security Council has stated repeatedly that it will consider targeted sanctions, including arms embargoes, against parties to armed conflict that do not end their use of child soldiers.
The secretary-general's report describes how the Maoists, particularly in Chhattisgarh state, are recruiting and using boys and girls in their ranks, and that they have carried out systematic attacks on schools to damage and destroy government structures and to instill fear among local residents.
The report also noted that government security forces have been occupying school buildings in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. In 2009, security forces similarly occupied school buildings in Bihar and West Bengal states.
"Having security forces occupy school grounds puts children and their education at unnecessary risk," Sheppard said. "Now this practice is putting India's reputation on the world stage at risk."
In a 2009 report, "Sabotaged Schooling," Human Rights Watch documented how government security forces – both police and paramilitary police – occupy school buildings as bases for anti-Maoist operations, sometimes only for a few days, but often for periods lasting several months and even years. Sometimes the security forces take over entire buildings, while in other places they occupy parts of school buildings, with students trying to carry on their studies in the remaining space, often under distracting and even frightening circumstances.
Human Rights Watch has also documented that at least 34 schools in Jharkhand and 16 schools in Bihar were attacked by the Maoists during 2009. These do not include schools that were occupied by security forces at the time of attack. Most of the attacks occurred at night when students and teachers were not there.
Maoist attacks and school occupations by security forces unnecessarily place students at risk of harm, and lead many to drop out or to interrupt their studies. Girls are especially likely to drop out following a partial occupation of a school because of harassment, or perceived harassment, by the security forces. Often, schools are closed altogether and students may not be able to attend at all or are forced to move into inferior sites, to study outdoors, or, for those able to reach them, to travel to schools farther away. Students also reported to Human Rights Watch that it was traumatic to witness security forces beating suspects on school grounds.
In a 2008 report, "'Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime,'" Human Rights Watch also documented the use of children in the conflict in Chhattisgarh state. The Maoists deploy children to gather intelligence, for sentry duty, to make and plant landmines and bombs, and to engage in hostilities against government forces. They organize children ages 6 to 12 into children's associations (bal sangams), indoctrinating, training, and using them as informers. Typically, children over the age of 12 are recruited into other Maoist ranks and trained in the use of rifles, landmines, and improvised explosive devices. Children in Maoist armed guerrilla squads (dalams) are involved in fighting with government security forces.
The secretary-general's report, which covers all of 2009, was submitted in response to Security Council Resolution 1882 of August 4, 2009, in which the council requested a briefing on the issue of children and armed conflict around the world. India was one of 22 countries highlighted in the report, which will be debated by the Security Council in June.
"Secretary-General Ban has brought international attention to the mistreatment of children in India's Maoist conflict," Sheppard said. "The Security Council should be prepared to take action if the Indian government and the Maoists do not act to better protect children."
India should immediately review state government policies of occupying and using school buildings as part of operations against Maoist armed groups, known as Naxalites, and give schools better protection from Maoist attacks, Human Rights Watch said. Human Rights Watch also called upon the Maoists to immediately cease their recruitment and use of children, and stop attacking schools.
"Both the security forces and the Maoists in India are exploiting and harming children, destroying their chances at an education and causing damage that will affect their entire lives," said Bede Sheppard, Asia researcher on children's rights at Human Rights Watch. "The new UN report will focus international attention on this tragic situation."
The UN Security Council has stated repeatedly that it will consider targeted sanctions, including arms embargoes, against parties to armed conflict that do not end their use of child soldiers.
The secretary-general's report describes how the Maoists, particularly in Chhattisgarh state, are recruiting and using boys and girls in their ranks, and that they have carried out systematic attacks on schools to damage and destroy government structures and to instill fear among local residents.
The report also noted that government security forces have been occupying school buildings in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. In 2009, security forces similarly occupied school buildings in Bihar and West Bengal states.
"Having security forces occupy school grounds puts children and their education at unnecessary risk," Sheppard said. "Now this practice is putting India's reputation on the world stage at risk."
In a 2009 report, "Sabotaged Schooling," Human Rights Watch documented how government security forces – both police and paramilitary police – occupy school buildings as bases for anti-Maoist operations, sometimes only for a few days, but often for periods lasting several months and even years. Sometimes the security forces take over entire buildings, while in other places they occupy parts of school buildings, with students trying to carry on their studies in the remaining space, often under distracting and even frightening circumstances.
Human Rights Watch has also documented that at least 34 schools in Jharkhand and 16 schools in Bihar were attacked by the Maoists during 2009. These do not include schools that were occupied by security forces at the time of attack. Most of the attacks occurred at night when students and teachers were not there.
Maoist attacks and school occupations by security forces unnecessarily place students at risk of harm, and lead many to drop out or to interrupt their studies. Girls are especially likely to drop out following a partial occupation of a school because of harassment, or perceived harassment, by the security forces. Often, schools are closed altogether and students may not be able to attend at all or are forced to move into inferior sites, to study outdoors, or, for those able to reach them, to travel to schools farther away. Students also reported to Human Rights Watch that it was traumatic to witness security forces beating suspects on school grounds.
In a 2008 report, "'Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime,'" Human Rights Watch also documented the use of children in the conflict in Chhattisgarh state. The Maoists deploy children to gather intelligence, for sentry duty, to make and plant landmines and bombs, and to engage in hostilities against government forces. They organize children ages 6 to 12 into children's associations (bal sangams), indoctrinating, training, and using them as informers. Typically, children over the age of 12 are recruited into other Maoist ranks and trained in the use of rifles, landmines, and improvised explosive devices. Children in Maoist armed guerrilla squads (dalams) are involved in fighting with government security forces.
The secretary-general's report, which covers all of 2009, was submitted in response to Security Council Resolution 1882 of August 4, 2009, in which the council requested a briefing on the issue of children and armed conflict around the world. India was one of 22 countries highlighted in the report, which will be debated by the Security Council in June.
"Secretary-General Ban has brought international attention to the mistreatment of children in India's Maoist conflict," Sheppard said. "The Security Council should be prepared to take action if the Indian government and the Maoists do not act to better protect children."
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Why Are Youth Angry? Perspectives From Kashmir
By Arjimand Hussain Talib for IPCS
It has been around eight decades since the youth of Kashmir first expressed their anger on the streets of Srinagar in 1931. Then the expression of their anger was seen as a sign of political catharsis. Long years of foreign rule and subjugation had brewed up a fury which was looking for a vent. The expression of anger on the streets also sought to re-assert the quest for Kashmiri identity and political emancipation. Today, some eight decades down the line, the expression and the quantum of that youth anger can still be seen in identical forms on Kashmir’s streets.
The subcontinent’s famous poet Sir Muhammad Iqbal’s philosophical and famous ‘Khaak-i-Arjimand’ couplet has long remained central to political philosophers’ understanding of the political volatility and spiritual restlessness in Kashmir. So what is it that sparks this anger even today?
When normal outlets of human expression remain choked, catharsis finds its likely way - either through slogans or rocks or other means of violent expression. There are reasons why despite the establishment of a ‘democratic’ political order in Jammu & Kashmir, the anger on its streets remains. The fundamental reason is political. There is a feeling of political and economic disempowerment. Kashmiri youth, faced with a strong state and its security apparatus, also nurse feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Dissent, peaceful or otherwise, has almost always meant persecution. Some youth also tend to see their religious identity under attack. The cumulative result is accumulated anger.
The fourth generation of Kashmiris is today doing what the first generation did some 60-70 years ago; they are venting their anger and frustration with the political system through street resistance. Having no platform for expressing their political opinion, they resort to hurling stones.
As the gun has taken the back seat, slogans, street protests and hurling stones are the order of the day. It is easy to attribute this street resistance to acts of ‘miscreants’ or ‘anti-social elements’, but ignoring the underlying factors constitutes a grave folly. It would be wiser to acknowledge that in an environment of political and economic suffocation, this street resistance means psychological catharsis. There is a clear action and reaction pattern involved.
In the autumn of 2009, security agencies in Kashmir sought to pick up boys who were engaged in street resistance. Over 400 youth were picked up during one single night in Srinagar and other towns. After the arrest, the charges being slapped on the arrested youth ranged from ‘attempted murder’ to ‘waging war against the state’. Public Safety Act came in handy. But did this crackdown result in silencing Kashmir’s streets? And what was done to address the issues that triggered this rage in the first place?
From conventional law and order and security points of view, a state crackdown is a natural reaction. But have the last six decades of this street rage management through a security approach worked in Kashmir? Has it silenced the streets? Has it won the Kashmiri heart and mind? Once in jail, another generation of political prisoners who had chosen peaceful means of expressing their political dissent takes birth. And what is the outcome? ‘Reformed’ youth after release, or a new brand of radicalized political activists with no faith in peaceful means of resistance?
Understanding the psychology of those who are detained and tortured is critical. These youngsters engage in means of peaceful resistance – sometimes even stone pelting – because the soldier on the street to them represents a political and military occupation. Undignified treatment to an angry young man during detention hurts his self respect. A slap or a punch on his face creates a deeper disillusionment in his mind. It reinforces his belief that no political system would work for him except the one of Azadi. It even rekindles emotions of revenge. Most importantly, it radicalizes his thoughts and visions of resistance. Suppression often leads to greater disquiet. And then angry young men don’t remain averse to violence.
India’s Home Minister, P Chidambaram in 2009 exhorted the Omar Abdullah government to seek a political course rather than a law and order one to manage the street anger in Kashmir. Such a statement from someone in India’s establishment signaled a welcome understanding and appreciation of Kashmir’s ground realities.
Kashmir has witnessed generations of its youth, espousing secular nationalist ideals for achieving Kashmir’s political goals, eventually embracing a radical religious worldview. Failure of secular, peaceful and democratic means in achieving political goals often leads to an embrace of a religious political ideology. And then the consequences prove disastrous. It is time to break away from the law-and-order approach in dealing with the Kashmiri youth anger. The new approach has to be political, and humane. There is no other short cut.
Arjimand Hussain Talib is a Columnist, Srinagar and may be reached at arjimand@gmail.com. This article was published by IPCS.
It has been around eight decades since the youth of Kashmir first expressed their anger on the streets of Srinagar in 1931. Then the expression of their anger was seen as a sign of political catharsis. Long years of foreign rule and subjugation had brewed up a fury which was looking for a vent. The expression of anger on the streets also sought to re-assert the quest for Kashmiri identity and political emancipation. Today, some eight decades down the line, the expression and the quantum of that youth anger can still be seen in identical forms on Kashmir’s streets.
The subcontinent’s famous poet Sir Muhammad Iqbal’s philosophical and famous ‘Khaak-i-Arjimand’ couplet has long remained central to political philosophers’ understanding of the political volatility and spiritual restlessness in Kashmir. So what is it that sparks this anger even today?
When normal outlets of human expression remain choked, catharsis finds its likely way - either through slogans or rocks or other means of violent expression. There are reasons why despite the establishment of a ‘democratic’ political order in Jammu & Kashmir, the anger on its streets remains. The fundamental reason is political. There is a feeling of political and economic disempowerment. Kashmiri youth, faced with a strong state and its security apparatus, also nurse feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Dissent, peaceful or otherwise, has almost always meant persecution. Some youth also tend to see their religious identity under attack. The cumulative result is accumulated anger.
The fourth generation of Kashmiris is today doing what the first generation did some 60-70 years ago; they are venting their anger and frustration with the political system through street resistance. Having no platform for expressing their political opinion, they resort to hurling stones.
As the gun has taken the back seat, slogans, street protests and hurling stones are the order of the day. It is easy to attribute this street resistance to acts of ‘miscreants’ or ‘anti-social elements’, but ignoring the underlying factors constitutes a grave folly. It would be wiser to acknowledge that in an environment of political and economic suffocation, this street resistance means psychological catharsis. There is a clear action and reaction pattern involved.
In the autumn of 2009, security agencies in Kashmir sought to pick up boys who were engaged in street resistance. Over 400 youth were picked up during one single night in Srinagar and other towns. After the arrest, the charges being slapped on the arrested youth ranged from ‘attempted murder’ to ‘waging war against the state’. Public Safety Act came in handy. But did this crackdown result in silencing Kashmir’s streets? And what was done to address the issues that triggered this rage in the first place?
From conventional law and order and security points of view, a state crackdown is a natural reaction. But have the last six decades of this street rage management through a security approach worked in Kashmir? Has it silenced the streets? Has it won the Kashmiri heart and mind? Once in jail, another generation of political prisoners who had chosen peaceful means of expressing their political dissent takes birth. And what is the outcome? ‘Reformed’ youth after release, or a new brand of radicalized political activists with no faith in peaceful means of resistance?
Understanding the psychology of those who are detained and tortured is critical. These youngsters engage in means of peaceful resistance – sometimes even stone pelting – because the soldier on the street to them represents a political and military occupation. Undignified treatment to an angry young man during detention hurts his self respect. A slap or a punch on his face creates a deeper disillusionment in his mind. It reinforces his belief that no political system would work for him except the one of Azadi. It even rekindles emotions of revenge. Most importantly, it radicalizes his thoughts and visions of resistance. Suppression often leads to greater disquiet. And then angry young men don’t remain averse to violence.
India’s Home Minister, P Chidambaram in 2009 exhorted the Omar Abdullah government to seek a political course rather than a law and order one to manage the street anger in Kashmir. Such a statement from someone in India’s establishment signaled a welcome understanding and appreciation of Kashmir’s ground realities.
Kashmir has witnessed generations of its youth, espousing secular nationalist ideals for achieving Kashmir’s political goals, eventually embracing a radical religious worldview. Failure of secular, peaceful and democratic means in achieving political goals often leads to an embrace of a religious political ideology. And then the consequences prove disastrous. It is time to break away from the law-and-order approach in dealing with the Kashmiri youth anger. The new approach has to be political, and humane. There is no other short cut.
Arjimand Hussain Talib is a Columnist, Srinagar and may be reached at arjimand@gmail.com. This article was published by IPCS.
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Locating Singapore In India’s Strategic Radar
By Rahul Mishra for IDSA
The week ending 28 March 2010 was dominated by Singapore in terms of India’s politico-military and cultural diplomacy moves. It started with Minister for External Affairs S.M. Krishna’s visit to Singapore and ended with the armies of the two countries conducting a joint military exercise codenamed ‘Bold Kurukshetra’ in Madhya Pradesh. Krishna’s two-day visit was to “discuss ways of enhancing bilateral relationship in all spheres to a higher level.” During this visit, his first since appointment as Minister for External Affairs, Krishna met Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew as well as other leaders. He also visited the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and applauded the faculty there for its outstanding academic contribution to strengthening cultural linkages between India and Southeast Asia. He also updated the media on developments regarding the proposed Nalanda University in India. The visit underscores the cultural linkages India shares with Singapore.
Krishna’s visit was complimented in the politico-military sphere by the holding of the two-day annual joint armour exercise at the Babina Field Firing Range in Madhya Pradesh. The exercise was aimed at ‘validating inter-operability between the two forces’. This was the sixth in the ‘Bold Kurukshetra Series’ between the two armed forces. Among other things, the exercise involved the Singapore Armed Forces’ BIONIX Infantry Fighting Vehicle and BRONCO All-Terrain Tracked Carrier as well as BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and T-72 Main Battle Tank of the Indian Army. The exercise also included professional exchange between the two armies in the form of getting used to each other’s equipment and sand-model exercises.
These events indicate the deep seated relationship between India and Singapore as well as the strategic significance Singapore commands in India’s Look East Policy. The events of the last week have just added to half a century old cordial relations between the two countries. For instance, Singapore was the first country to support India in the 1965 War with Pakistan. Moreover, when Britain shut its bases in Singapore, “Lee Kuan Yew visited India to persuade New Delhi to evince greater interest in Southeast Asia. He wanted India to make use of the naval and dockyard facilities for building and repairing ships.”
When in 1992, under the visionary leadership of P.V. Narsimha Rao, India heralded its ‘Look East Policy’, the place where the first such meeting was held was Singapore. Since then, the policy has formed the cornerstone of India’s Southeast Asian foreign (economic) policy, with Singapore occupying a central position.1 In 1992, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Singapore became a key role player in bringing India and ASEAN member countries together at the institutional level. It was also the country-coordinator for India when India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. It was Singapore again that paved the way for India joining the ASEAN Regional Forum. India and Singapore also inked a defence co-operation agreement in 2003 which is the founding stone of regular joint military exercises the two countries carry out. Additionally, Singapore is the first country in the world with which India signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement in June 2005, which served to open new avenues for business and trading communities of the two countries.
Taking cue from the recent India-Singapore success story, it could be argued that India’s ‘natural Southeast Asian partner’ still holds the potential to serve as the ‘window to the East Asian region’. Singapore has, for a long time, been considered best for playing such a role. Sadly, not much has been done to make the best use of Singapore’s good offices in boosting ties with other friendly Southeast Asian countries. For instance, India is yet to find a mechanism to institute a tri-lateral dialogue involving India, Singapore and possibly Vietnam on defence and security issues, to begin with. India has robust defence relations with Vietnam and Singapore, individually. India has concluded a long term training arrangement with Singapore, while Singapore has been searching for Defence R&D prospects in India. Vietnam too has been a beneficiary of India’s defence assistance. At the same time, Singapore and Vietnam also have evolved strong defence relations after shedding the baggage of the Cold War. In 2009, they signed an Agreement on National Defence Cooperation (DCA). The DCA serves as a framework for both countries to formalise existing interactions and promote new areas of cooperation. Current interactions include exchange of visits, cross-attendance of training courses, as well as an annual policy dialogue which aims to bring together key officials from the two defence establishments to exchange views on defence and security issues of mutual interest.2
China’s rise in Asia will have a significant impact on countries in the continent and one cannot deny the possibility of China becoming hegemonic in future. This, in the long run, could become a uniting factor for India and Southeast Asian countries. While India and Vietnam had fought wars with China in the past, Singapore remains wary of Chinese intentions on territorial matters and on the Taiwan issue.
India at present seems content with what it has got from the ‘Look East Policy’, which no doubt is India’s most successful policy move so far in the post-Cold War era. This, however, should have prompted India to reach out to the East Asian region more vigorously. Unfortunately, apart from engaging the region through institutional arrangements such as ARF, ASEAN+3 and FTA, India has sought to engage the countries of the region only through bilateral arrangements. India’s arrangements such as those with Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore do not constitute a complete picture of its long term strategic vision in East Asia and at best look like mutually exclusive, isolated components.
It is imperative that India engages Singapore in a more robust manner so as to enable the forging of deeper and more broad-based friendships in the Southeast Asian region through Singapore’s good offices. This is something India has to work towards to enable a key role for itself as a rising power in the twenty-first century.
1. 1. Amitendu Palit, India’s Economic Engagement with Southeast Asia: Progress and Challenges, ISAS Working Paper No. 60, Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009, p. 1. Quoted in The Next Stage of Singapore-India Relations: Possibilities and Prospects, Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Sana Rahman, ISAS Working Paper No. 91, 24 September 2009
2. 2. For details, see “Fact Sheet: Singapore - Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement,”
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/sep/07sep09_nr/...
Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/LocatingSingaporeinIndiasStrategicRadar_rmishra_010410
The week ending 28 March 2010 was dominated by Singapore in terms of India’s politico-military and cultural diplomacy moves. It started with Minister for External Affairs S.M. Krishna’s visit to Singapore and ended with the armies of the two countries conducting a joint military exercise codenamed ‘Bold Kurukshetra’ in Madhya Pradesh. Krishna’s two-day visit was to “discuss ways of enhancing bilateral relationship in all spheres to a higher level.” During this visit, his first since appointment as Minister for External Affairs, Krishna met Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew as well as other leaders. He also visited the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and applauded the faculty there for its outstanding academic contribution to strengthening cultural linkages between India and Southeast Asia. He also updated the media on developments regarding the proposed Nalanda University in India. The visit underscores the cultural linkages India shares with Singapore.
Krishna’s visit was complimented in the politico-military sphere by the holding of the two-day annual joint armour exercise at the Babina Field Firing Range in Madhya Pradesh. The exercise was aimed at ‘validating inter-operability between the two forces’. This was the sixth in the ‘Bold Kurukshetra Series’ between the two armed forces. Among other things, the exercise involved the Singapore Armed Forces’ BIONIX Infantry Fighting Vehicle and BRONCO All-Terrain Tracked Carrier as well as BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and T-72 Main Battle Tank of the Indian Army. The exercise also included professional exchange between the two armies in the form of getting used to each other’s equipment and sand-model exercises.
These events indicate the deep seated relationship between India and Singapore as well as the strategic significance Singapore commands in India’s Look East Policy. The events of the last week have just added to half a century old cordial relations between the two countries. For instance, Singapore was the first country to support India in the 1965 War with Pakistan. Moreover, when Britain shut its bases in Singapore, “Lee Kuan Yew visited India to persuade New Delhi to evince greater interest in Southeast Asia. He wanted India to make use of the naval and dockyard facilities for building and repairing ships.”
When in 1992, under the visionary leadership of P.V. Narsimha Rao, India heralded its ‘Look East Policy’, the place where the first such meeting was held was Singapore. Since then, the policy has formed the cornerstone of India’s Southeast Asian foreign (economic) policy, with Singapore occupying a central position.1 In 1992, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Singapore became a key role player in bringing India and ASEAN member countries together at the institutional level. It was also the country-coordinator for India when India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. It was Singapore again that paved the way for India joining the ASEAN Regional Forum. India and Singapore also inked a defence co-operation agreement in 2003 which is the founding stone of regular joint military exercises the two countries carry out. Additionally, Singapore is the first country in the world with which India signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement in June 2005, which served to open new avenues for business and trading communities of the two countries.
Taking cue from the recent India-Singapore success story, it could be argued that India’s ‘natural Southeast Asian partner’ still holds the potential to serve as the ‘window to the East Asian region’. Singapore has, for a long time, been considered best for playing such a role. Sadly, not much has been done to make the best use of Singapore’s good offices in boosting ties with other friendly Southeast Asian countries. For instance, India is yet to find a mechanism to institute a tri-lateral dialogue involving India, Singapore and possibly Vietnam on defence and security issues, to begin with. India has robust defence relations with Vietnam and Singapore, individually. India has concluded a long term training arrangement with Singapore, while Singapore has been searching for Defence R&D prospects in India. Vietnam too has been a beneficiary of India’s defence assistance. At the same time, Singapore and Vietnam also have evolved strong defence relations after shedding the baggage of the Cold War. In 2009, they signed an Agreement on National Defence Cooperation (DCA). The DCA serves as a framework for both countries to formalise existing interactions and promote new areas of cooperation. Current interactions include exchange of visits, cross-attendance of training courses, as well as an annual policy dialogue which aims to bring together key officials from the two defence establishments to exchange views on defence and security issues of mutual interest.2
China’s rise in Asia will have a significant impact on countries in the continent and one cannot deny the possibility of China becoming hegemonic in future. This, in the long run, could become a uniting factor for India and Southeast Asian countries. While India and Vietnam had fought wars with China in the past, Singapore remains wary of Chinese intentions on territorial matters and on the Taiwan issue.
India at present seems content with what it has got from the ‘Look East Policy’, which no doubt is India’s most successful policy move so far in the post-Cold War era. This, however, should have prompted India to reach out to the East Asian region more vigorously. Unfortunately, apart from engaging the region through institutional arrangements such as ARF, ASEAN+3 and FTA, India has sought to engage the countries of the region only through bilateral arrangements. India’s arrangements such as those with Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore do not constitute a complete picture of its long term strategic vision in East Asia and at best look like mutually exclusive, isolated components.
It is imperative that India engages Singapore in a more robust manner so as to enable the forging of deeper and more broad-based friendships in the Southeast Asian region through Singapore’s good offices. This is something India has to work towards to enable a key role for itself as a rising power in the twenty-first century.
1. 1. Amitendu Palit, India’s Economic Engagement with Southeast Asia: Progress and Challenges, ISAS Working Paper No. 60, Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009, p. 1. Quoted in The Next Stage of Singapore-India Relations: Possibilities and Prospects, Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Sana Rahman, ISAS Working Paper No. 91, 24 September 2009
2. 2. For details, see “Fact Sheet: Singapore - Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement,”
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/sep/07sep09_nr/...
Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/LocatingSingaporeinIndiasStrategicRadar_rmishra_010410
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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LET Exploits Anger Against Facebook: Need For Caution In India
By B.Raman
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and other Pakistani jihadi organizations associated with Al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been organizing protest demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan to condemn an attempt by an user of "Facebook" to organise an "Everyone Draw Mohammed Day" competition to promote "freedom of expression". His attempt was allegedly inspired by an American woman cartoonist.
According to the Agence France Presse (AFP), Molly Norris, the American cartoonist whose work inspired the controversial page, condemned the Facebook spin-off and apologised to Muslims. She allegedly drew a cartoon in April to protest against the cancellation of an episode of popular show "South Park". Norris satirically proposed May 20 as an "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day." An "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" page quickly turned up on Facebook, but Norris, writing on her website, said she had nothing to do with it. "The vitriol this 'day' has brought out of people who only want to draw obscene images, is offensive to Muslims who did nothing to endanger our right to expression in the first place," she said. "I apologise to people of Muslim faith and ask that this 'day' be called off," she said
The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) has banned access to Facebook, YouTube and more than 450 links to "derogatory" Internet material in view of what it called "growing sacrilegious content". Sweden said it has closed its embassy in Islamabad for more than two weeks due to the security situation. An Al Qaeda front organisation has reportedly offered US $ 100,000 to anyone who kills Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who has angered many Muslims by drawing what they regard a highly blasphemous caricature of the Prophet.
In view of the interest taken by the LET and other Al Qaeda associates to exploit this issue to whip up anger in Pakistan, one has to be watchful to the possibility of LET elements in India including members of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) indulging in similar provocative acts in India. It is an emotional issue which can be easily exploited to create similar anger in sections of the Indian Muislim community.
In this connection, reference is invited to my earlier article of April 3,2010, titled "Was Jihad Jane A Recruit of LET?" annexed below for easy reference.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
WAS JIHAD JANE A RECRUIT OF LASHKAR-E-TOIBA? International Terrorism Monitor- Paper N0. 638 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3745.html
By B.Raman
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was "desperate to do something somehow to help" suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission "till I achieve it or die trying," according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and other Pakistani jihadi organizations associated with Al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been organizing protest demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan to condemn an attempt by an user of "Facebook" to organise an "Everyone Draw Mohammed Day" competition to promote "freedom of expression". His attempt was allegedly inspired by an American woman cartoonist.
According to the Agence France Presse (AFP), Molly Norris, the American cartoonist whose work inspired the controversial page, condemned the Facebook spin-off and apologised to Muslims. She allegedly drew a cartoon in April to protest against the cancellation of an episode of popular show "South Park". Norris satirically proposed May 20 as an "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day." An "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" page quickly turned up on Facebook, but Norris, writing on her website, said she had nothing to do with it. "The vitriol this 'day' has brought out of people who only want to draw obscene images, is offensive to Muslims who did nothing to endanger our right to expression in the first place," she said. "I apologise to people of Muslim faith and ask that this 'day' be called off," she said
The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) has banned access to Facebook, YouTube and more than 450 links to "derogatory" Internet material in view of what it called "growing sacrilegious content". Sweden said it has closed its embassy in Islamabad for more than two weeks due to the security situation. An Al Qaeda front organisation has reportedly offered US $ 100,000 to anyone who kills Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who has angered many Muslims by drawing what they regard a highly blasphemous caricature of the Prophet.
In view of the interest taken by the LET and other Al Qaeda associates to exploit this issue to whip up anger in Pakistan, one has to be watchful to the possibility of LET elements in India including members of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) indulging in similar provocative acts in India. It is an emotional issue which can be easily exploited to create similar anger in sections of the Indian Muislim community.
In this connection, reference is invited to my earlier article of April 3,2010, titled "Was Jihad Jane A Recruit of LET?" annexed below for easy reference.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
WAS JIHAD JANE A RECRUIT OF LASHKAR-E-TOIBA? International Terrorism Monitor- Paper N0. 638 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3745.html
By B.Raman
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was "desperate to do something somehow to help" suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission "till I achieve it or die trying," according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Obama Drops Intelligence Czar
By B.Raman
The decision of President Barack Obama to drop retired Admiral Dennis Blair, his Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has led to his resignation from the post with effect from May 28,2010. He has chosen to resign instead of waiting for the President to name his successor after being informed by Mr.Obama of his decision to replace him. His announcement that he was quitting came on May 21, 2010, three days after the Senate Intelligence Committee had come out with a report specifying 14 intelligence failures relating to the unsuccessful attempt by a Nigerian student trained by Al Qaeda in Yemen to blow up a US flight from Amsterdam as it was about to land in Detroit on December 25,2009. The list of 14 failures named by the Committee is annexed.
Ever since the Christmas Day incident, there were indications that Admiral Blair had lost the confidence of Mr.Obama. His role as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community of 16 agencies, as the supervisor of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and as the driving force behind efforts to improve the collection of human and technical intelligence relating to terrorism came under a cloud. There were reports that Mr.Obama had started dealing directly with other officials like the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mr.Leon Panetta, and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser Mr.John Brennan. Media reports had alleged that Mr.Obama had sidelined Admiral Blair without removing him from his post.
The exit of Admiral Blair was, therefore, not a surprise, but it was interesting that Mr.Obama took five months to decide to replace him even though it became evident after the Christmas Day incident that the DNI had not been able to perform effectively the tasks of co-ordination and joint action for which he was handpicked by Mr.Obama in January 2009.
Mr.Obama’s decision to replace Admiral Blair has come at a time when Mr.Obama has failed to make headway with his policies in Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea and has been unable to make Pakistan act vigorously against Al Qaeda and the Talibans, which continue to target the US homeland. While the ground situation in Afghanistan continues to be bad, that in Iraq has started deteriorating with renewed Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. He has been unable to make Iran and North Korea reverse their nuclear policy. North Korea’s action in sinking a South Korean naval ship killing many South Korean naval personnel is a challenge not only to South Korea, but also to the US presence and leadership in the Pacific area. There has been an erosion of US leadership in the East as well as the West Asian regions and the problem states of the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan no longer have a fear of the US.
The replacement of Admiral Blair in the wake of the nervousness caused in the US by the failed attempt of Faisal Shahzad, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, to cause an incendiary explosion in the Times Square, New York, on May 1 would help in diverting public attention away from the gaps in Mr.Obama’s own leadership by focusing on the gaps in the leadership qualities of Admiral Blair, which have enabled foreign-based terrorists-- whether Al Qaeda or the Tehrik-a-Taliban Pakistan -- to revive their attacks against the US, whether in the Khost area of Afghanistan where they killed seven CIA officers in the last week of December last or in the US homeland where two surprise attacks planned in stealth failed not because of the capabilities of the US intelligence, but thanks to the alertness of the public.
The post of DNI was created in 2004 to coordinate the work of the US intelligence community and to supervise that of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This was one of the recommendations of the National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. Admiral Blair was the third incumbent of the post. The previous two under Mr.George Bush were Mr. John Negroponte and Mr. John McConell. One had expected that the fact that the DNI works directly under the President and draws his status and authority from him would enable him to perform the role of intelligence co-ordinator effectively. But the expectations were belied.
Admiral Blair, like his two predecessors, was able to co-ordinate effectively only the budgetary part of the work -- that is, having the total intelligence budget approved by the Congress and deciding on the allocations of individual agencies. He was unable to co-ordinate effectively the operational part of his work -- that is, setting the intelligence collection tasks for different agencies and getting the intelligence collected by different agencies integrated in a single stream, analysed, assessed and followed up. A DNI can perform the operational co-ordination effectively only if the heads of the agencies keep him in the picture regarding their important operations and share with him all important intelligence at every stage of their processing.
None of the three DNIs since the post was created in 2004 was able to make the chiefs of individual agencies share with him all that needed to be shared. There was no common understanding of what needed to be shared. The chief of every agency decided this according to his own whims and fancies. Neither Mr.Bush nor Mr.Obama was able to call the heads of individual agencies to order. The US intelligence community lacked the culture of joint action similar to what one finds in the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism in the Armed Forces. Instead of creating and heading an integrated intelligence staff, the DNIs were functioning in an ad hoc non-integrated manner.
The National Commission wanted the creation of the NCTC under the leadership of the DNI to ensure the integration of the entire intelligence process relating to terrorism-----collection, collation, analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The terrorist attempts on Christmas Day and on May 1 showed weaknesses in the integration process six years after the post of DNI and the NCTC were created.
The exit of Admiral Blair will not remove the deficiencies unless and until the entire counter-terrorism mechanism is overhauled and made to function in an integrated manner. There are lessons for India too because one has the impression that after his visit to the US earlier this year, Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seems to have come back with some admiration for the NCTC and has been trying to create a similar set-up in India. It is necessary to study what went wrong with it in the US so that we can ensure that similar weaknesses do not creep into our system.
What makes the difference between a good intelligence community and a bad one is not the number of its staff, its gadgetry and budgets alone, but its culture of joint action. If this culture is missing, thousands of intelligence personnel and billions of dollars alone will not win the fight against terrorism. None of the three DNIs who have held office since 2004 has succeeded in creating this culture.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
LIST OF 14 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES CITED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE DOTS
The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14 intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit on Christmas Day :
— The State Department should have revoked Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa based on information available to the department.
— Abdulmutallab wasn't placed on any of the terrorist watchlists because the standards were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats.
— Key intelligence reports weren't reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.
— A CIA division at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.
— The CIA didn't disseminate key reports until after the attempted attack.
— A name search by the CIA Counterterrorism Center was too limited and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts at the CIA Counterterrorism Center didn't connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab, focusing instead on Yemen -based threats from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .
— Because her computer was wrongly configured, an FBI counterterrorism analyst couldn't access all the relevant reports even though they were in the FBI's system.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence wasn't properly organized to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.
— The National Security Agency didn't take all available actions that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab and didn't disseminate all relevant reporting.
— The NSA didn't select Abdulmutallab for watchlists based on information that only partly identified him.
— Intelligence analysts were focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula rather than on potential threats to the U.S.
The decision of President Barack Obama to drop retired Admiral Dennis Blair, his Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has led to his resignation from the post with effect from May 28,2010. He has chosen to resign instead of waiting for the President to name his successor after being informed by Mr.Obama of his decision to replace him. His announcement that he was quitting came on May 21, 2010, three days after the Senate Intelligence Committee had come out with a report specifying 14 intelligence failures relating to the unsuccessful attempt by a Nigerian student trained by Al Qaeda in Yemen to blow up a US flight from Amsterdam as it was about to land in Detroit on December 25,2009. The list of 14 failures named by the Committee is annexed.
Ever since the Christmas Day incident, there were indications that Admiral Blair had lost the confidence of Mr.Obama. His role as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community of 16 agencies, as the supervisor of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and as the driving force behind efforts to improve the collection of human and technical intelligence relating to terrorism came under a cloud. There were reports that Mr.Obama had started dealing directly with other officials like the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mr.Leon Panetta, and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser Mr.John Brennan. Media reports had alleged that Mr.Obama had sidelined Admiral Blair without removing him from his post.
The exit of Admiral Blair was, therefore, not a surprise, but it was interesting that Mr.Obama took five months to decide to replace him even though it became evident after the Christmas Day incident that the DNI had not been able to perform effectively the tasks of co-ordination and joint action for which he was handpicked by Mr.Obama in January 2009.
Mr.Obama’s decision to replace Admiral Blair has come at a time when Mr.Obama has failed to make headway with his policies in Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea and has been unable to make Pakistan act vigorously against Al Qaeda and the Talibans, which continue to target the US homeland. While the ground situation in Afghanistan continues to be bad, that in Iraq has started deteriorating with renewed Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. He has been unable to make Iran and North Korea reverse their nuclear policy. North Korea’s action in sinking a South Korean naval ship killing many South Korean naval personnel is a challenge not only to South Korea, but also to the US presence and leadership in the Pacific area. There has been an erosion of US leadership in the East as well as the West Asian regions and the problem states of the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan no longer have a fear of the US.
The replacement of Admiral Blair in the wake of the nervousness caused in the US by the failed attempt of Faisal Shahzad, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, to cause an incendiary explosion in the Times Square, New York, on May 1 would help in diverting public attention away from the gaps in Mr.Obama’s own leadership by focusing on the gaps in the leadership qualities of Admiral Blair, which have enabled foreign-based terrorists-- whether Al Qaeda or the Tehrik-a-Taliban Pakistan -- to revive their attacks against the US, whether in the Khost area of Afghanistan where they killed seven CIA officers in the last week of December last or in the US homeland where two surprise attacks planned in stealth failed not because of the capabilities of the US intelligence, but thanks to the alertness of the public.
The post of DNI was created in 2004 to coordinate the work of the US intelligence community and to supervise that of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This was one of the recommendations of the National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. Admiral Blair was the third incumbent of the post. The previous two under Mr.George Bush were Mr. John Negroponte and Mr. John McConell. One had expected that the fact that the DNI works directly under the President and draws his status and authority from him would enable him to perform the role of intelligence co-ordinator effectively. But the expectations were belied.
Admiral Blair, like his two predecessors, was able to co-ordinate effectively only the budgetary part of the work -- that is, having the total intelligence budget approved by the Congress and deciding on the allocations of individual agencies. He was unable to co-ordinate effectively the operational part of his work -- that is, setting the intelligence collection tasks for different agencies and getting the intelligence collected by different agencies integrated in a single stream, analysed, assessed and followed up. A DNI can perform the operational co-ordination effectively only if the heads of the agencies keep him in the picture regarding their important operations and share with him all important intelligence at every stage of their processing.
None of the three DNIs since the post was created in 2004 was able to make the chiefs of individual agencies share with him all that needed to be shared. There was no common understanding of what needed to be shared. The chief of every agency decided this according to his own whims and fancies. Neither Mr.Bush nor Mr.Obama was able to call the heads of individual agencies to order. The US intelligence community lacked the culture of joint action similar to what one finds in the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism in the Armed Forces. Instead of creating and heading an integrated intelligence staff, the DNIs were functioning in an ad hoc non-integrated manner.
The National Commission wanted the creation of the NCTC under the leadership of the DNI to ensure the integration of the entire intelligence process relating to terrorism-----collection, collation, analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The terrorist attempts on Christmas Day and on May 1 showed weaknesses in the integration process six years after the post of DNI and the NCTC were created.
The exit of Admiral Blair will not remove the deficiencies unless and until the entire counter-terrorism mechanism is overhauled and made to function in an integrated manner. There are lessons for India too because one has the impression that after his visit to the US earlier this year, Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seems to have come back with some admiration for the NCTC and has been trying to create a similar set-up in India. It is necessary to study what went wrong with it in the US so that we can ensure that similar weaknesses do not creep into our system.
What makes the difference between a good intelligence community and a bad one is not the number of its staff, its gadgetry and budgets alone, but its culture of joint action. If this culture is missing, thousands of intelligence personnel and billions of dollars alone will not win the fight against terrorism. None of the three DNIs who have held office since 2004 has succeeded in creating this culture.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
LIST OF 14 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES CITED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE DOTS
The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14 intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit on Christmas Day :
— The State Department should have revoked Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa based on information available to the department.
— Abdulmutallab wasn't placed on any of the terrorist watchlists because the standards were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats.
— Key intelligence reports weren't reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.
— A CIA division at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.
— The CIA didn't disseminate key reports until after the attempted attack.
— A name search by the CIA Counterterrorism Center was too limited and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts at the CIA Counterterrorism Center didn't connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab, focusing instead on Yemen -based threats from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .
— Because her computer was wrongly configured, an FBI counterterrorism analyst couldn't access all the relevant reports even though they were in the FBI's system.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence wasn't properly organized to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.
— The National Security Agency didn't take all available actions that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab and didn't disseminate all relevant reporting.
— The NSA didn't select Abdulmutallab for watchlists based on information that only partly identified him.
— Intelligence analysts were focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula rather than on potential threats to the U.S.
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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