BHP Billiton Finalises Joint Venture Arrangements For Indonesian Coal Project
BHP Billiton has confirmed the formation of the new joint venture for its Indonesian Coal Project (ICP) with a subsidiary of PT Adaro Energy TBK (Adaro) following the completion of Government approvals.
Adaro has acquired a 25 per cent interest in the ICP joint venture, with BHP Billiton holding the remaining 75 per cent.
BHP Billiton President Metallurgical Coal, Hubie van Dalsen, said, "We are very pleased that the Indonesian Government has approved the formation of the joint venture with Adaro, a strong Indonesian partner who shares our values and our commitment to the protection of the region's outstanding biodiversity."
"We are progressing study work to identify development options across the seven Coal Contracts of Work (CCOWs). In future, the project will be known as the IndoMet Coal project," he added.
Adaro has acquired a 25 per cent interest in the ICP joint venture, with BHP Billiton holding the remaining 75 per cent.
BHP Billiton President Metallurgical Coal, Hubie van Dalsen, said, "We are very pleased that the Indonesian Government has approved the formation of the joint venture with Adaro, a strong Indonesian partner who shares our values and our commitment to the protection of the region's outstanding biodiversity."
"We are progressing study work to identify development options across the seven Coal Contracts of Work (CCOWs). In future, the project will be known as the IndoMet Coal project," he added.
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Timor-Leste: Oecusse And The Indonesian Border
The security threat at Indonesia and Timor-Leste’s shared border has decreased sharply since the latter’s 2002 independence, but failure to finalise agreement on the border and normalise cross-border traffic could allow limited but long-standing local disputes to escalate.
Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border, the latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the relationship between the two countries, which have done much to normalise relations and to leave their violent past behind.
Yet, Crisis Group also notes that growing goodwill between the capitals is not yet matched by full cooperation on the border. The costs are greatest in Oecusse, Timor-Leste’s isolated enclave of 67,000 inhabitants inside Indonesian West Timor. The two countries have so far failed to agree on two segments of its border, and there is a risk that this unfinished business could threaten fresh conflict.
“The governments must work with renewed urgency to resolve the remaining disputed segments”, said Cillian Nolan, Crisis Group Analyst. “At the same time, they need to make greater efforts to promote local arrangements for cross-border activities. Otherwise, local disputes will fester and could escalate. The lack of a cheap and legal way for trade and cultural exchange promotes crime and corruption”.
Beyond security threats, there are border management challenges over the movement of people and goods. Though the enclave has been politically distinct for several hundred years, links remain strong between families divided by the border. Isolated from the rest of Timor-Leste, residents depend on cheap goods from Indonesia. Informal arrangements have served to facilitate these relations in the absence of a sustainable system that would promote rather than criminalise local traffic. But these are often put on hold when border tensions rise, increasing difficulties in Oecusse.
As Indonesia and Timor-Leste work on being good neighbours, they should focus on concrete actions that improve life for the people and lessen the risk of conflict on both sides. Final border demarcation would be a key step, so would formalising arrangements for increased communication and problem-solving between local officials and security forces.
The sides should move quickly to implement an agreed border-pass system and border markets to promote commercial and social exchange, which would immediately benefit both. Steps for civilian coordination of border matters should continue, with priority on local arrangements to manage resource conflicts. Maintaining good ties should not be left to casual encounters at border posts by frequently rotated security forces. Peaceful border management requires cultivating better contacts between civilian officials and elected governments.
“Boosting normal ties for Oecusse depends more on bureaucrats and politicians than soldiers and police”, said Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “A less militarised soft border may be unlikely in the near term, but it should remain on the agenda as a long-term goal that both sides should actively work toward”.
Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border, the latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the relationship between the two countries, which have done much to normalise relations and to leave their violent past behind.
Yet, Crisis Group also notes that growing goodwill between the capitals is not yet matched by full cooperation on the border. The costs are greatest in Oecusse, Timor-Leste’s isolated enclave of 67,000 inhabitants inside Indonesian West Timor. The two countries have so far failed to agree on two segments of its border, and there is a risk that this unfinished business could threaten fresh conflict.
“The governments must work with renewed urgency to resolve the remaining disputed segments”, said Cillian Nolan, Crisis Group Analyst. “At the same time, they need to make greater efforts to promote local arrangements for cross-border activities. Otherwise, local disputes will fester and could escalate. The lack of a cheap and legal way for trade and cultural exchange promotes crime and corruption”.
Beyond security threats, there are border management challenges over the movement of people and goods. Though the enclave has been politically distinct for several hundred years, links remain strong between families divided by the border. Isolated from the rest of Timor-Leste, residents depend on cheap goods from Indonesia. Informal arrangements have served to facilitate these relations in the absence of a sustainable system that would promote rather than criminalise local traffic. But these are often put on hold when border tensions rise, increasing difficulties in Oecusse.
As Indonesia and Timor-Leste work on being good neighbours, they should focus on concrete actions that improve life for the people and lessen the risk of conflict on both sides. Final border demarcation would be a key step, so would formalising arrangements for increased communication and problem-solving between local officials and security forces.
The sides should move quickly to implement an agreed border-pass system and border markets to promote commercial and social exchange, which would immediately benefit both. Steps for civilian coordination of border matters should continue, with priority on local arrangements to manage resource conflicts. Maintaining good ties should not be left to casual encounters at border posts by frequently rotated security forces. Peaceful border management requires cultivating better contacts between civilian officials and elected governments.
“Boosting normal ties for Oecusse depends more on bureaucrats and politicians than soldiers and police”, said Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “A less militarised soft border may be unlikely in the near term, but it should remain on the agenda as a long-term goal that both sides should actively work toward”.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Is Copy-Cat Of Mumbai 26/11 Possible In Indonesia?
By B.Raman
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August, 2010.
This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August, 2010.
This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Indonesia: Blasphemous Blog Post Leads To School Attack
(UCAN) -- An anonymous blogger’s blasphemous website posting has led to an attack by Muslims on the Catholic-run School of St. Bellarminus located in Bekasi district, West Java.
The angry mob wearing black and claiming to be members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) broke down the gate on the evening of May 6 and smashed the school’s windows, Marsel Jawa, the school’s security guard, said.
The unknown blogger published offensive statements about Islam in late April on a website purporting to belong to the school.
“Our school has become the victim of a false accusation written on a blog by an unknown person,” Sister Ignatio Nudek, who heads the Educational Foundation of St. Bellarminus, told UCA News on May 7.
The offending article was accompanied by a photograph of the Qur’an in a toilet. The website was later blocked by authorities.
“This school does not have such blog. We never disgraced other religions. In fact we have Muslim students too,” the Follower of Jesus nun maintained.
The school reported the attacks to the police.
“Even though the blog has been blocked we want the police to soon investigate the case,” Sister Nudek said.
Three staffs of the school met with representatives of 40 Islamic organizations on April 26, after discovering the blog posting.
“During the meeting, they all understood that we are the victim of the false accusation,” the nun said.
Sister Nudek said the school had also sent official letters containing a clarification of the false accusation to Islamic organizations including FPI and the Forum of Muslims (FUI) as well as local religious leaders.
The school has also reported the attacks to the archdiocese of Jakarta and its commission for ecumenical and interreligious affairs.
“We want this case to be solved as soon as possible. We do not want to make other religious followers, especially Muslims, feel uneasy,” she said.
About 30 policemen remain on guard.
St. Bellarminus school was established in 1992 and has 883 students from kindergarten to senior high school – 514 Protestants, 324 Catholics, 23 Buddhists and 22 Muslims. Most staff are Muslims.
The angry mob wearing black and claiming to be members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) broke down the gate on the evening of May 6 and smashed the school’s windows, Marsel Jawa, the school’s security guard, said.
The unknown blogger published offensive statements about Islam in late April on a website purporting to belong to the school.
“Our school has become the victim of a false accusation written on a blog by an unknown person,” Sister Ignatio Nudek, who heads the Educational Foundation of St. Bellarminus, told UCA News on May 7.
The offending article was accompanied by a photograph of the Qur’an in a toilet. The website was later blocked by authorities.
“This school does not have such blog. We never disgraced other religions. In fact we have Muslim students too,” the Follower of Jesus nun maintained.
The school reported the attacks to the police.
“Even though the blog has been blocked we want the police to soon investigate the case,” Sister Nudek said.
Three staffs of the school met with representatives of 40 Islamic organizations on April 26, after discovering the blog posting.
“During the meeting, they all understood that we are the victim of the false accusation,” the nun said.
Sister Nudek said the school had also sent official letters containing a clarification of the false accusation to Islamic organizations including FPI and the Forum of Muslims (FUI) as well as local religious leaders.
The school has also reported the attacks to the archdiocese of Jakarta and its commission for ecumenical and interreligious affairs.
“We want this case to be solved as soon as possible. We do not want to make other religious followers, especially Muslims, feel uneasy,” she said.
About 30 policemen remain on guard.
St. Bellarminus school was established in 1992 and has 883 students from kindergarten to senior high school – 514 Protestants, 324 Catholics, 23 Buddhists and 22 Muslims. Most staff are Muslims.
Saturday, May 08, 2010 |
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Asia Markets Tumble On Greece Debt Woes
By Ron Corben
Asia markets fell sharply Friday, reacting to Wall Street's plunge over Greek debt crisis worries. But analysts and the UN regional economic arm remain upbeat on Asia's economic prospects despite the financial jitters.
Stock markets across Asia fell, including those in China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand and New Zealand, by up to four per cent. Gold climbed to just over $1200.00 an ounce - a gain of $20.00 from the previous day.
The wave of selling of stock came as investors feared that Greece's debt problems could spread to other countries within the eurozone such as Spain and Portugal.
Asia's economies have largely shown sound recovery from the global financial crisis of 2009, due largely to government stimulus packages that led to increased domestic spending.
But the market uncertainties could still rattle economic confidence.
Noeleen Heyzer, executive secretary of the U.N.'s regional economic and social arm (UNESCAP), said economic recovery remains fragile and problems faced in the eurozone could lead to more uncertainty.
"This rebound is actually fragile and it is uneven," said Heyzer. "It is a 'v' shape rebound that can become a double dip. We're very concerned about several of the risk factors that would have to be managed and this included inflation, the building up of asset bubbles because of excess liquidity, appreciation of the exchange rates in many of the Asian countries."
In Japan the Nikkei average fell over four per cent to a two month low as shares fell as a result of concerns over Europe's debt crisis.
Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hotayama in public comments expressed his concerns over what he called "the Greek problem".
The Bank of Japan Friday said it was willing to offer $22 billion in short term loans to commercial banks to boost liquidity in the world's second largest
economy.
In China markets dropped almost two per cent over concerns the central government's moves to curb bank lending with the European Union - China's largest trading partner.
While the uncertainty swept across the markets, analysts said they were still confident in the Asian economies.
Heyzer said the problems faced in the eurozone highlighted Asia's need to focus its economic development by boosting intra-regional trade and investment.
"Just look at what is happening to the eurozone today; what is happening to the U.S. debt levels today and the global imbalances. So what Asia will have to do is to look to new drivers of growth that takes into account … globalization, side by side with regionalization," said Heyzer.
UNESCAP in its latest regional survey says strong support from expansion policies has helped Asian and Pacific economies to reverse the declines of the latter half of 2009. But the outlook remained dependent on the world economy stabilizing.
Analysts Friday say they expect Asia's markets to recover as most companies in the region are not directly exposed to Europe's hardest hit economies.
Source: VOA
Asia markets fell sharply Friday, reacting to Wall Street's plunge over Greek debt crisis worries. But analysts and the UN regional economic arm remain upbeat on Asia's economic prospects despite the financial jitters.
Stock markets across Asia fell, including those in China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand and New Zealand, by up to four per cent. Gold climbed to just over $1200.00 an ounce - a gain of $20.00 from the previous day.
The wave of selling of stock came as investors feared that Greece's debt problems could spread to other countries within the eurozone such as Spain and Portugal.
Asia's economies have largely shown sound recovery from the global financial crisis of 2009, due largely to government stimulus packages that led to increased domestic spending.
But the market uncertainties could still rattle economic confidence.
Noeleen Heyzer, executive secretary of the U.N.'s regional economic and social arm (UNESCAP), said economic recovery remains fragile and problems faced in the eurozone could lead to more uncertainty.
"This rebound is actually fragile and it is uneven," said Heyzer. "It is a 'v' shape rebound that can become a double dip. We're very concerned about several of the risk factors that would have to be managed and this included inflation, the building up of asset bubbles because of excess liquidity, appreciation of the exchange rates in many of the Asian countries."
In Japan the Nikkei average fell over four per cent to a two month low as shares fell as a result of concerns over Europe's debt crisis.
Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hotayama in public comments expressed his concerns over what he called "the Greek problem".
The Bank of Japan Friday said it was willing to offer $22 billion in short term loans to commercial banks to boost liquidity in the world's second largest
economy.
In China markets dropped almost two per cent over concerns the central government's moves to curb bank lending with the European Union - China's largest trading partner.
While the uncertainty swept across the markets, analysts said they were still confident in the Asian economies.
Heyzer said the problems faced in the eurozone highlighted Asia's need to focus its economic development by boosting intra-regional trade and investment.
"Just look at what is happening to the eurozone today; what is happening to the U.S. debt levels today and the global imbalances. So what Asia will have to do is to look to new drivers of growth that takes into account … globalization, side by side with regionalization," said Heyzer.
UNESCAP in its latest regional survey says strong support from expansion policies has helped Asian and Pacific economies to reverse the declines of the latter half of 2009. But the outlook remained dependent on the world economy stabilizing.
Analysts Friday say they expect Asia's markets to recover as most companies in the region are not directly exposed to Europe's hardest hit economies.
Source: VOA
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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The ASEM Dialogue: Opportunities For Southeast Asia?
Tuli Sinha for IPCS
Indonesia’s participation in the sixth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) interfaith dialog held in Madrid, Spain from 7-9 April, themed as "Consolidation of Religious Freedom and of Mutual Knowledge of Societies through Inter-religious and Intercultural Dialogue" sent across the message of a gradually strengthening Europe-Southeast Asia bilateral relations. The three-day meeting brought together 200 delegates from ASEM partners, and was co-hosted by Spain and Pakistan and sponsored by 14 ASEM partners, including Austria, The Netherlands, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Britain, Germany, Italy, China, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. It becomes imperative to analyse this dialogue for political and economic connotations, specifically for Indonesia which is the largest Muslim, pluralistic country among the initiators of the dialogue.
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal get-together that addresses political, economic, and cultural issues with the objective of strengthening the relationship between the two regions in a spirit of informality and equal partnership. Recently, these issues have been further broadened to include human rights, rule of law, global health threats, sustainable development, and intercultural and interfaith dialogues. Apolitical and cultural dialogues become important as they hold the prospect of improving bilateral relations between countries.
To begin with, there is a need to explore the various facets of this dialogue and its working. The key characteristics of ASEM include four main pillars. First is the ‘informality’ which provides an open forum for policy makers and officials to discuss any political, economic, and social issue of common interest rather than duplicate the work already being carried out in the bilateral and multilateral forums. Second is the ‘multi-dimensionality’ which covers the full spectrum of relations between the two regions and devotes equal weight to political, economic, and cultural issues. Third is the ‘emphasis on equal partnership’ which eschews any aid-based relationship. Last, is the ‘Dual focus’ on high-level and people-to-people contact which provides a platform for a meeting of the heads of the states, and an increasing focus on fostering contacts between societies in all sectors of the two regions.
Although it creates a multilateral forum for a much encompassing cooperation in terms of issues among the members, a critical assessment of the ASEM Dialogue exhibits a rather dismal picture of its role and existence. First, the only permanent physical institution of ASEM, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) established in the year 1997 has never been in the limelight or used as a concrete platform for discussions on serious issues.
Second, Interfaith Dialogue is a tricky and consequently rarely tackled subject in Europe. European countries are diversely populated and some of them – like France, Germany, Denmark or Belgium – currently question their relation with their Muslim populations and its links with immigration, unemployment, and extremism issues. Therefore, it becomes imperative for Europe to develop some kind of an intra-European dialogue simultaneously to provide a platform for the religious, ethnic, and cultural issues of people within the region rather than imparting all the attention to a multilateral dialogue with Asian nations. Could the ASEM Interfaith Dialogue, if taken seriously by all participants, be a first step towards a better understanding within Europe? Does Asia serve as a role model on that matter? And what can Indonesia specifically bring to the Dialogue?
The inter-religious organization, ASEM fails to shed any light on this. The dialogue does discuss issue of economic cooperation and transaction of meagre grants from Europe to Asian nations. This is very nominal taking into account the lump sum deals among European Union and Indonesia or with any other Asian member. Therefore, ASEM needs to prioritize and choose issues of relevance rather than expanding the list with human rights, rule of law as they are purely political in character.
It is important to remember that ASEM is not a substitute for existing bilateral or multilateral forums between Asia and Europe. However, through the ASEM dialogue, Indonesia can garner collaborative synergies and optimally utilize them as a catalyst for enhancing overall Southeast Asia-Europe relations. It is evident from the past ASEM dialogues that this level of informal engagement with Europe holds great significance for the Indonesian Foreign Policy. It acts as a bridge to reduce the existing economic gap between the two regions. ASEM can also be utilized by Indonesia as a medium to strengthen its position among the Asian countries.
ASEM has definitely helped Europe and Asia in having a more global vision and promoted the overall Asia-Europe relations on international and inter-regional issues of common interest. By bringing together different cultures and civilizations, ASEM fosters common understanding and dialogue and this should be encouraged.
Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at tuli@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
Indonesia’s participation in the sixth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) interfaith dialog held in Madrid, Spain from 7-9 April, themed as "Consolidation of Religious Freedom and of Mutual Knowledge of Societies through Inter-religious and Intercultural Dialogue" sent across the message of a gradually strengthening Europe-Southeast Asia bilateral relations. The three-day meeting brought together 200 delegates from ASEM partners, and was co-hosted by Spain and Pakistan and sponsored by 14 ASEM partners, including Austria, The Netherlands, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Britain, Germany, Italy, China, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. It becomes imperative to analyse this dialogue for political and economic connotations, specifically for Indonesia which is the largest Muslim, pluralistic country among the initiators of the dialogue.
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal get-together that addresses political, economic, and cultural issues with the objective of strengthening the relationship between the two regions in a spirit of informality and equal partnership. Recently, these issues have been further broadened to include human rights, rule of law, global health threats, sustainable development, and intercultural and interfaith dialogues. Apolitical and cultural dialogues become important as they hold the prospect of improving bilateral relations between countries.
To begin with, there is a need to explore the various facets of this dialogue and its working. The key characteristics of ASEM include four main pillars. First is the ‘informality’ which provides an open forum for policy makers and officials to discuss any political, economic, and social issue of common interest rather than duplicate the work already being carried out in the bilateral and multilateral forums. Second is the ‘multi-dimensionality’ which covers the full spectrum of relations between the two regions and devotes equal weight to political, economic, and cultural issues. Third is the ‘emphasis on equal partnership’ which eschews any aid-based relationship. Last, is the ‘Dual focus’ on high-level and people-to-people contact which provides a platform for a meeting of the heads of the states, and an increasing focus on fostering contacts between societies in all sectors of the two regions.
Although it creates a multilateral forum for a much encompassing cooperation in terms of issues among the members, a critical assessment of the ASEM Dialogue exhibits a rather dismal picture of its role and existence. First, the only permanent physical institution of ASEM, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) established in the year 1997 has never been in the limelight or used as a concrete platform for discussions on serious issues.
Second, Interfaith Dialogue is a tricky and consequently rarely tackled subject in Europe. European countries are diversely populated and some of them – like France, Germany, Denmark or Belgium – currently question their relation with their Muslim populations and its links with immigration, unemployment, and extremism issues. Therefore, it becomes imperative for Europe to develop some kind of an intra-European dialogue simultaneously to provide a platform for the religious, ethnic, and cultural issues of people within the region rather than imparting all the attention to a multilateral dialogue with Asian nations. Could the ASEM Interfaith Dialogue, if taken seriously by all participants, be a first step towards a better understanding within Europe? Does Asia serve as a role model on that matter? And what can Indonesia specifically bring to the Dialogue?
The inter-religious organization, ASEM fails to shed any light on this. The dialogue does discuss issue of economic cooperation and transaction of meagre grants from Europe to Asian nations. This is very nominal taking into account the lump sum deals among European Union and Indonesia or with any other Asian member. Therefore, ASEM needs to prioritize and choose issues of relevance rather than expanding the list with human rights, rule of law as they are purely political in character.
It is important to remember that ASEM is not a substitute for existing bilateral or multilateral forums between Asia and Europe. However, through the ASEM dialogue, Indonesia can garner collaborative synergies and optimally utilize them as a catalyst for enhancing overall Southeast Asia-Europe relations. It is evident from the past ASEM dialogues that this level of informal engagement with Europe holds great significance for the Indonesian Foreign Policy. It acts as a bridge to reduce the existing economic gap between the two regions. ASEM can also be utilized by Indonesia as a medium to strengthen its position among the Asian countries.
ASEM has definitely helped Europe and Asia in having a more global vision and promoted the overall Asia-Europe relations on international and inter-regional issues of common interest. By bringing together different cultures and civilizations, ASEM fosters common understanding and dialogue and this should be encouraged.
Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at tuli@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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US and Kopassus Training: Strategic And Legal Aspects
Chloe Choquier for IPCS
Kopassus commander Major General Lodewijk Paulus and several high-ranking Indonesian officers recently visited Washington DC to discuss lifting the ban on US training for the elite army special forces – the Komando Pasukan Khusus, known as Kopassus. Since the 1970s, Kopassus has been notorious for its brutal tactics in East Timor, Aceh, Papua and Java and is accused of murder, torture and kidnapping, among other humanitarian law violations. As international and Indonesian human rights advocacy groups argue that the unit continues to commit abuses in Papua and persecute former Aceh rebels, Indonesia sees the training as a foundation of the US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership to be signed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President Barack Obama during his visit to Jakarta, rescheduled in June 2010. What would this re-engagement mean for US external policy? Can Washington push for an improvement of the state of human rights in the archipelago?
During the Cold War, Washington largely supported the Suharto regime’s military policies and the Ford administration fully backed Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975. But the US cut off International Military Education and Training assistance to Indonesia after the November 1991 Dili massacre in which 273 people were murdered by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) – Indonesian military. The 1997 Leahy Law then banned the provision of training to any foreign military unit in case of 'credible evidence' that it has committed 'gross violations of human rights'. This influence of humanitarian ideals on US foreign policy was later surrendered with the 2005 State Department’s waiver of the Congress Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 2006 restricting military assistance to Indonesia. Three years later, the Bush Administration proposed restarting U.S. training of Kopassus. The growing terrorist threat and the importance of regional stability for US trade were the cornerstone of this policy turnaround. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings, Washington had released funds for training a limited number of TNI officers but the ban on Kopassus remained effective. The recklessness of Australia, which resumed counter-terrorism training with Kopassus in 2006, offered a new argument in favor of US re-engagement.
Proponents of this new cooperation promote the opportunity to teach Indonesian military a lesson about respect for human rights. But the 2005 national security waiver had unsurprisingly resulted in a pause in the reforms within TNI. The contact with rights-respecting foreign forces has actually never proved relevant to improve Kopassus behavior. “Many of these crimes occurred while the US was most deeply engaged with the Indonesian military, providing the bulk of its weapons and training,” said John M Miller, national coordinator of the East Timor Action Network to the Asia Times in March. Moreover, the US’ questionable human rights record gives Indonesians the bitter feeling of a double standard being applied in US foreign policy.
What can Washington ask from Jakarta at this point? Since none of the previous requirements have been achieved, a re-engagement would mark the official comeback of Realpolitik to the detriment of human rights promotion in US foreign policy. Until now, US preconditions were firstly based on accountability for past abuses. According to Human Rights Watch’s recommendations, any military personnel previously convicted for human-rights violations should be discharged. First, a tribunal to investigate the disappearance of two dozen student activists in 1997 and 1998 should also be established, as Indonesia's House of Representatives recommended to the Ministry of Defence in September 2009. The absence of such mechanisms allows the existence of ambiguous situations, such as the nomination of Kopassus-trained Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, who was the Military Commander at the time of the 1997/98 disappearances, as deputy Minister of Defence. Second, Washington had required from Indonesia the implementation of structural reforms to enhance civilian control of the military. As of now, Indonesia's military justice system has exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel implicated in criminal offenses against civilians. Third, the re-engagement of the US would also be limited to nonlethal counter-terrorism training through Kopassus’ counter-terror force, known as Unit 81, and only include younger officers who were not part of the unit at the time of major human rights abuses. But the much-praised counter-terrorism efforts of Indonesia in recent years were almost entirely the work of the police forces, especially the already US-funded counter-terrorism police unit, Detachment 88. If US funding to the military would improve this already successful police initiative, remains an unanswered question.
Washington does not have much leeway anyway, as the Chinese non-interference policy represents a severe competitor on the subject. The likelihood of 'playing the Chinese card' is more and more plausible since Sino-Indonesia military-security ties were initiated in 2005, as the US limitation on arms sales already pushed Indonesia towards Beijing. Indonesia’s “behavior in the coming months and years will function as an indicator of the relative strength of the United States and China in the region,” recently affirmed Matthew Omolesky in the American Spectator. In a nutshell, as Indonesians are not eager to compromise and Washington still pushes for reforms, an agreement, if reached in June, would be for Indonesians, East Timorese and Americans, a no-win situation.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern for IPCS and may be reached at: chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr. This article was published by IPCS.
Kopassus commander Major General Lodewijk Paulus and several high-ranking Indonesian officers recently visited Washington DC to discuss lifting the ban on US training for the elite army special forces – the Komando Pasukan Khusus, known as Kopassus. Since the 1970s, Kopassus has been notorious for its brutal tactics in East Timor, Aceh, Papua and Java and is accused of murder, torture and kidnapping, among other humanitarian law violations. As international and Indonesian human rights advocacy groups argue that the unit continues to commit abuses in Papua and persecute former Aceh rebels, Indonesia sees the training as a foundation of the US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership to be signed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President Barack Obama during his visit to Jakarta, rescheduled in June 2010. What would this re-engagement mean for US external policy? Can Washington push for an improvement of the state of human rights in the archipelago?
During the Cold War, Washington largely supported the Suharto regime’s military policies and the Ford administration fully backed Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975. But the US cut off International Military Education and Training assistance to Indonesia after the November 1991 Dili massacre in which 273 people were murdered by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) – Indonesian military. The 1997 Leahy Law then banned the provision of training to any foreign military unit in case of 'credible evidence' that it has committed 'gross violations of human rights'. This influence of humanitarian ideals on US foreign policy was later surrendered with the 2005 State Department’s waiver of the Congress Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 2006 restricting military assistance to Indonesia. Three years later, the Bush Administration proposed restarting U.S. training of Kopassus. The growing terrorist threat and the importance of regional stability for US trade were the cornerstone of this policy turnaround. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings, Washington had released funds for training a limited number of TNI officers but the ban on Kopassus remained effective. The recklessness of Australia, which resumed counter-terrorism training with Kopassus in 2006, offered a new argument in favor of US re-engagement.
Proponents of this new cooperation promote the opportunity to teach Indonesian military a lesson about respect for human rights. But the 2005 national security waiver had unsurprisingly resulted in a pause in the reforms within TNI. The contact with rights-respecting foreign forces has actually never proved relevant to improve Kopassus behavior. “Many of these crimes occurred while the US was most deeply engaged with the Indonesian military, providing the bulk of its weapons and training,” said John M Miller, national coordinator of the East Timor Action Network to the Asia Times in March. Moreover, the US’ questionable human rights record gives Indonesians the bitter feeling of a double standard being applied in US foreign policy.
What can Washington ask from Jakarta at this point? Since none of the previous requirements have been achieved, a re-engagement would mark the official comeback of Realpolitik to the detriment of human rights promotion in US foreign policy. Until now, US preconditions were firstly based on accountability for past abuses. According to Human Rights Watch’s recommendations, any military personnel previously convicted for human-rights violations should be discharged. First, a tribunal to investigate the disappearance of two dozen student activists in 1997 and 1998 should also be established, as Indonesia's House of Representatives recommended to the Ministry of Defence in September 2009. The absence of such mechanisms allows the existence of ambiguous situations, such as the nomination of Kopassus-trained Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, who was the Military Commander at the time of the 1997/98 disappearances, as deputy Minister of Defence. Second, Washington had required from Indonesia the implementation of structural reforms to enhance civilian control of the military. As of now, Indonesia's military justice system has exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel implicated in criminal offenses against civilians. Third, the re-engagement of the US would also be limited to nonlethal counter-terrorism training through Kopassus’ counter-terror force, known as Unit 81, and only include younger officers who were not part of the unit at the time of major human rights abuses. But the much-praised counter-terrorism efforts of Indonesia in recent years were almost entirely the work of the police forces, especially the already US-funded counter-terrorism police unit, Detachment 88. If US funding to the military would improve this already successful police initiative, remains an unanswered question.
Washington does not have much leeway anyway, as the Chinese non-interference policy represents a severe competitor on the subject. The likelihood of 'playing the Chinese card' is more and more plausible since Sino-Indonesia military-security ties were initiated in 2005, as the US limitation on arms sales already pushed Indonesia towards Beijing. Indonesia’s “behavior in the coming months and years will function as an indicator of the relative strength of the United States and China in the region,” recently affirmed Matthew Omolesky in the American Spectator. In a nutshell, as Indonesians are not eager to compromise and Washington still pushes for reforms, an agreement, if reached in June, would be for Indonesians, East Timorese and Americans, a no-win situation.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern for IPCS and may be reached at: chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr. This article was published by IPCS.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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Calls To Repeal Indonesian Laws That Criminalize Criticism
Indonesia's legislature should repeal a number of laws that allow powerful persons, including public officials, to bring criminal charges against activists, journalists, consumers, and others who criticize them, Human Rights Watch said in a report.
The report, "Turning Critics into Criminals: The Human Rights Consequences of Criminal Defamation Law in Indonesia," documents recent cases in which criminal libel, slander, and "insult" laws have been used to silence public criticism. Criminal defamation charges have been filed against individuals after they held public demonstrations protesting corruption, wrote letters to the editor complaining about fraud, registered formal complaints with the authorities, and published news reports about sensitive subjects.
"Criminal defamation is a potent weapon for those who want to silence critics in Indonesia," said Elaine Pearson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The government ought to be encouraging whistle-blowers and people who express their concerns peacefully to speak out freely, instead of punishing them."
In a majority of the criminal defamation cases examined in the report, the complaints appear to have been used to retaliate against people who had made allegations of corruption, fraud, or misconduct against powerful interests or government officials. The authorities were alleged to have used improper or intimidating conduct in some of the criminal defamation investigations.
In one case, the Office of the Attorney General filed criminal charges against anti-corruption activists who had identified possible discrepancies in its accounting of funds recovered from graft cases. The police initially did not investigate the claim, but nine months later, shortly after the activists called for the resignation of the head of the police in a separate anti-corruption campaign, the activists were summoned for questioning on the defamation complaint.
Prita Mulyasari was jailed for three weeks away from her very young children and spent over 12 months in the criminal justice process simply for sending an email to friends complaining about medical treatment she received. Bersihar Lubis, a veteran journalist, was convicted of defamation and given a suspended jail sentence for writing an opinion column criticizing the attorney general's decision to ban a high school history textbook.
Criminal defamation investigations and prosecutions can have a dramatic impact on the lives of those accused, Human Rights Watch found. Some of those charged with defamation lost their jobs and found it difficult or impossible to find new work. Others suffered professional setbacks while they endured lengthy prosecutions, some of which lasted for years. Some reported that their personal and professional relationships were strained by the stigma of prosecution or conviction. Some, like the journalist Risang Bima Wijaya, ended up behind bars.
Human Rights Watch found that criminal defamation laws have a chilling effect on people's willingness to express critical thoughts or opinions. As Risang Bima Wijaya told Human Rights Watch, "It was like an infection with other journalists when they found out [about his conviction]."
In 2008, Indonesia's legislature enacted a new internet law that sets forth the harshest penalties to date for defamation that appears online. The increased prison terms and fines pose an increasingly powerful threat to private citizens who express their thoughts or opinions online, as Prita Mulyasari discovered when authorities placed her in detention on the mere suspicion that she had sent a defamatory email.
"Investigations and prosecutions under criminal defamation laws can have a disastrous effect on those accused," Pearson said. "The threat of imprisonment makes people think twice before speaking out against corruption and misconduct."
Indonesian law contains a number of vaguely drafted criminal defamation provisions. The criminal code prohibits individuals from intentionally publicizing statements that harm another person's reputation, in many cases even if those statements are true. It imposes harsher penalties for defaming public officials than other people and includes an additional charge for deliberately "insulting" a public official, even if the statements are true. The new internet law punishes defamation sent over the internet with up to six years imprisonment and fines of up to Rp1 billion (approximately US$106,000).
International human rights law allows states to restrict freedom of expression to protect the reputations of others, but such restrictions must be necessary and narrowly drawn. Human Rights Watch believes that criminal penalties are always disproportionate remedies for harm caused to reputations.
Human Rights Watch called on Indonesia to repeal its defamation laws, replacing them with civil defamation provisions that contain adequate safeguards to protect freedom of expression from unnecessary limitations. In the meantime, public officials in particular should refrain from filing criminal defamation claims when the criticism against them relates to things they have done or are alleged to have done in their official capacity, Human Rights Watch said.
"Criminal defamation laws undermine democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of expression in Indonesia," Pearson said. "The government should not send those brave enough to speak their minds to prison."
The report, "Turning Critics into Criminals: The Human Rights Consequences of Criminal Defamation Law in Indonesia," documents recent cases in which criminal libel, slander, and "insult" laws have been used to silence public criticism. Criminal defamation charges have been filed against individuals after they held public demonstrations protesting corruption, wrote letters to the editor complaining about fraud, registered formal complaints with the authorities, and published news reports about sensitive subjects.
"Criminal defamation is a potent weapon for those who want to silence critics in Indonesia," said Elaine Pearson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The government ought to be encouraging whistle-blowers and people who express their concerns peacefully to speak out freely, instead of punishing them."
In a majority of the criminal defamation cases examined in the report, the complaints appear to have been used to retaliate against people who had made allegations of corruption, fraud, or misconduct against powerful interests or government officials. The authorities were alleged to have used improper or intimidating conduct in some of the criminal defamation investigations.
In one case, the Office of the Attorney General filed criminal charges against anti-corruption activists who had identified possible discrepancies in its accounting of funds recovered from graft cases. The police initially did not investigate the claim, but nine months later, shortly after the activists called for the resignation of the head of the police in a separate anti-corruption campaign, the activists were summoned for questioning on the defamation complaint.
Prita Mulyasari was jailed for three weeks away from her very young children and spent over 12 months in the criminal justice process simply for sending an email to friends complaining about medical treatment she received. Bersihar Lubis, a veteran journalist, was convicted of defamation and given a suspended jail sentence for writing an opinion column criticizing the attorney general's decision to ban a high school history textbook.
Criminal defamation investigations and prosecutions can have a dramatic impact on the lives of those accused, Human Rights Watch found. Some of those charged with defamation lost their jobs and found it difficult or impossible to find new work. Others suffered professional setbacks while they endured lengthy prosecutions, some of which lasted for years. Some reported that their personal and professional relationships were strained by the stigma of prosecution or conviction. Some, like the journalist Risang Bima Wijaya, ended up behind bars.
Human Rights Watch found that criminal defamation laws have a chilling effect on people's willingness to express critical thoughts or opinions. As Risang Bima Wijaya told Human Rights Watch, "It was like an infection with other journalists when they found out [about his conviction]."
In 2008, Indonesia's legislature enacted a new internet law that sets forth the harshest penalties to date for defamation that appears online. The increased prison terms and fines pose an increasingly powerful threat to private citizens who express their thoughts or opinions online, as Prita Mulyasari discovered when authorities placed her in detention on the mere suspicion that she had sent a defamatory email.
"Investigations and prosecutions under criminal defamation laws can have a disastrous effect on those accused," Pearson said. "The threat of imprisonment makes people think twice before speaking out against corruption and misconduct."
Indonesian law contains a number of vaguely drafted criminal defamation provisions. The criminal code prohibits individuals from intentionally publicizing statements that harm another person's reputation, in many cases even if those statements are true. It imposes harsher penalties for defaming public officials than other people and includes an additional charge for deliberately "insulting" a public official, even if the statements are true. The new internet law punishes defamation sent over the internet with up to six years imprisonment and fines of up to Rp1 billion (approximately US$106,000).
International human rights law allows states to restrict freedom of expression to protect the reputations of others, but such restrictions must be necessary and narrowly drawn. Human Rights Watch believes that criminal penalties are always disproportionate remedies for harm caused to reputations.
Human Rights Watch called on Indonesia to repeal its defamation laws, replacing them with civil defamation provisions that contain adequate safeguards to protect freedom of expression from unnecessary limitations. In the meantime, public officials in particular should refrain from filing criminal defamation claims when the criticism against them relates to things they have done or are alleged to have done in their official capacity, Human Rights Watch said.
"Criminal defamation laws undermine democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of expression in Indonesia," Pearson said. "The government should not send those brave enough to speak their minds to prison."
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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Counter-Terrorism In Indonesia: The Price Of Success
By Chloe Choquier for IPCS
On 22 February 2010, a series of Indonesian police operations led to the discovery of an alleged militant training camp in the Jalin Forest of the province of Aceh. The operations revealed the existence of a previously unknown group calling itself al Qaeda in Aceh, whose supposed leader, top-ranked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) militant Dulmatin was killed in a shootout with Indonesian police on 9 March 2010. One of the most wanted terrorist in Southeast Asia, he was suspected of being the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings. Much-praised by Washington and Canberra, this success is nevertheless challenged by the continued presence of al Qaeda in Aceh, which shows “the strengthening of the terrorist network in Indonesia, not it’s weakening” said Andi Widjajanto, a military analyst at the University of Indonesia. A new unity among extremist groups questions the degree to which offensive counterterrorism measures actually damage the terrorists’ ability to perpetrate attacks. Does the number of arrests and police raids actually reduce the terrorist threat in the country?
Supposedly resulting from a split within JI, the composite group seems to have gathered together terrorists from several militant factions that had never been allied before. “They didn’t necessarily agree to carry out Bali-style bombings, but they did agree on military training and the need to establish an Islamic state, by force if necessary,” said Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group’s expert on Indonesia, to the Canadian Globe and Mail. The head of the counter-terrorism division at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai told The Jakarta Post that terrorists are also believed to be receiving assistance from several former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) combatants dissatisfied with the 2005 peace accord in the region. Mr Dulmatin and his presumed successor, Umar Patek, also created a direct link between the new organization and the Filipino terrorist group ‘Abu Sayyaf’, which had both joined after the Bali bombings. The ability of these groups to maintain regional contacts and create alliances might draw a reassessment of Jakarta’s glorified counter-terrorism achievements.
Indonesia has greatly improved its capacities and efforts over the last few years, with a wake-up call provoked by the July 2009 Jakarta bombing. The archipelagic State officially adopts a ‘soft approach’ based on the prosecution of most of the 450 extremists arrested since 2002. By not declaring a War on Terror and by treating terrorists as criminals rather than enemies, Indonesia managed to gain public support among moderate Muslims. The de-radicalization programs established from 2004 in Indonesian prisons succeeded to persuade dozens of jihadists to renounce violence and cooperate with the police.
But what is the effectiveness of these soft measures? According to Noor Huda Ismail, former extremist Dar-ul Islam member, too many released terror suspects are still prone to becoming recidivists. On 12 April, six alleged terrorists suspected of participating in military training activities in Aceh were arrested on Sumatra Island. Two of them, identified as Ibrahim and Lutfi, had earlier served time in prison for their roles in the 2004 Australian embassy bombing in Jakarta. Indonesian prisons actually remain a hot spot for recruitment, due to massive corruption and a lack of supervision. Radicalization within jails is still a major concern for the government, which needs to allow more funding for de-radicalization programs and more energy to monitoring activities of former prisoners.
Indonesia’s anti-terrorism policy has left aside two major causes of terrorists’ strength. First, it does not damage the fundraising process, mainly based on a system of Zakat, Infaq and Sadaqah collected through Mosques owned by radical Islamic groups. A 2008 evaluation report by the Asia-Pacific Group on money laundering, notes that there has been a very limited use of the terrorist financing offence in Indonesia, since it can only be used when linked to a specific terrorist act. Second, in the case of al Qaeda in Aceh, the arming of terrorists was facilitated by indirect factors – the massive availability of weapons in Aceh despite the provisions of the 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement and the proximity of the Malacca Straits easing the procurement of firearms through drug trafficking in Thailand and Myanmar.
With the expected ‘pulang kampong’ (homecoming) of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia's US-funded special counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88, had stepped up its hunt for wanted terrorists over the past few weeks. But the extensive number of shootouts of top operatives by Detachment 88 in the last few months does not stop these networks from constantly evolving, recruiting, and becoming less dependent upon high profile figures. By killing terror suspects, the police lose the opportunity of obtaining crucial intelligence, and run the risk of converting sympathizers into combatants. Consequently, neither a soft approach nor a military approach can succeed in countering terrorism in Indonesia as long as it does not tackle recruitment processes.
In conclusion, Indonesia’s counter-terrorism policy won’t gain long-term efficiency unless it addresses larger security issues and tackles the root causes of radicalism by adopting a preventive approach. Even though this soft approach drastically reduced its potential to jeopardize the state, the terrorist threat will remain a challenge for Indonesia in the near future.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr This article was published by IPCS.
On 22 February 2010, a series of Indonesian police operations led to the discovery of an alleged militant training camp in the Jalin Forest of the province of Aceh. The operations revealed the existence of a previously unknown group calling itself al Qaeda in Aceh, whose supposed leader, top-ranked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) militant Dulmatin was killed in a shootout with Indonesian police on 9 March 2010. One of the most wanted terrorist in Southeast Asia, he was suspected of being the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings. Much-praised by Washington and Canberra, this success is nevertheless challenged by the continued presence of al Qaeda in Aceh, which shows “the strengthening of the terrorist network in Indonesia, not it’s weakening” said Andi Widjajanto, a military analyst at the University of Indonesia. A new unity among extremist groups questions the degree to which offensive counterterrorism measures actually damage the terrorists’ ability to perpetrate attacks. Does the number of arrests and police raids actually reduce the terrorist threat in the country?
Supposedly resulting from a split within JI, the composite group seems to have gathered together terrorists from several militant factions that had never been allied before. “They didn’t necessarily agree to carry out Bali-style bombings, but they did agree on military training and the need to establish an Islamic state, by force if necessary,” said Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group’s expert on Indonesia, to the Canadian Globe and Mail. The head of the counter-terrorism division at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai told The Jakarta Post that terrorists are also believed to be receiving assistance from several former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) combatants dissatisfied with the 2005 peace accord in the region. Mr Dulmatin and his presumed successor, Umar Patek, also created a direct link between the new organization and the Filipino terrorist group ‘Abu Sayyaf’, which had both joined after the Bali bombings. The ability of these groups to maintain regional contacts and create alliances might draw a reassessment of Jakarta’s glorified counter-terrorism achievements.
Indonesia has greatly improved its capacities and efforts over the last few years, with a wake-up call provoked by the July 2009 Jakarta bombing. The archipelagic State officially adopts a ‘soft approach’ based on the prosecution of most of the 450 extremists arrested since 2002. By not declaring a War on Terror and by treating terrorists as criminals rather than enemies, Indonesia managed to gain public support among moderate Muslims. The de-radicalization programs established from 2004 in Indonesian prisons succeeded to persuade dozens of jihadists to renounce violence and cooperate with the police.
But what is the effectiveness of these soft measures? According to Noor Huda Ismail, former extremist Dar-ul Islam member, too many released terror suspects are still prone to becoming recidivists. On 12 April, six alleged terrorists suspected of participating in military training activities in Aceh were arrested on Sumatra Island. Two of them, identified as Ibrahim and Lutfi, had earlier served time in prison for their roles in the 2004 Australian embassy bombing in Jakarta. Indonesian prisons actually remain a hot spot for recruitment, due to massive corruption and a lack of supervision. Radicalization within jails is still a major concern for the government, which needs to allow more funding for de-radicalization programs and more energy to monitoring activities of former prisoners.
Indonesia’s anti-terrorism policy has left aside two major causes of terrorists’ strength. First, it does not damage the fundraising process, mainly based on a system of Zakat, Infaq and Sadaqah collected through Mosques owned by radical Islamic groups. A 2008 evaluation report by the Asia-Pacific Group on money laundering, notes that there has been a very limited use of the terrorist financing offence in Indonesia, since it can only be used when linked to a specific terrorist act. Second, in the case of al Qaeda in Aceh, the arming of terrorists was facilitated by indirect factors – the massive availability of weapons in Aceh despite the provisions of the 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement and the proximity of the Malacca Straits easing the procurement of firearms through drug trafficking in Thailand and Myanmar.
With the expected ‘pulang kampong’ (homecoming) of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia's US-funded special counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88, had stepped up its hunt for wanted terrorists over the past few weeks. But the extensive number of shootouts of top operatives by Detachment 88 in the last few months does not stop these networks from constantly evolving, recruiting, and becoming less dependent upon high profile figures. By killing terror suspects, the police lose the opportunity of obtaining crucial intelligence, and run the risk of converting sympathizers into combatants. Consequently, neither a soft approach nor a military approach can succeed in countering terrorism in Indonesia as long as it does not tackle recruitment processes.
In conclusion, Indonesia’s counter-terrorism policy won’t gain long-term efficiency unless it addresses larger security issues and tackles the root causes of radicalism by adopting a preventive approach. Even though this soft approach drastically reduced its potential to jeopardize the state, the terrorist threat will remain a challenge for Indonesia in the near future.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr This article was published by IPCS.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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Middle East Tipped For Important Role In Globalization Of Retail
According to a new report titled "Emerging from the downturn: Global Powers of Retailing 2010" for Deloitte and Planet Retail, retailers in Africa and the Middle East have expanded well outside their home countries, but the vast majority of their sales, 91.8 percent, still come from domestic operations.
As it looks at the future of the globalized retail industry, the report identifies the 250 largest retailers around the world based on publicly available data for the companies, and provides an outlook for the global economy; a discussion of the major challenges facing retailers; and an analysis of market capitalization in the retail industry.
"The Deloitte report highlights that many emerging-market retailers are rapidly becoming world-class players in their own right," said Omar Fahoum, chairman and chief executive of Deloitte in the Middle East. "This indicates that not only are they well equipped to compete with the global giants in their home markets, some are even becoming competitive in other markets. Several emerging-market retailers have already experienced success in neighboring markets, and this is happening whether in the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, or South America."
As per the Deloitte report, in the coming years, large emerging markets are set to play a far more significant role in the global economy. However, most discussions to date about the consumer markets of emerging nations have focused on the opportunity for global retailers that are based in developed countries.
In contrast, Deloitte's Global Powers of Retailing report states that it is the retailers based in emerging markets which are the ones most likely to reap the benefits of this greater role in the global economy rather than the relative handful of global retailers that have the gumption to invest in emerging markets.
When it comes to the promise of a rising middle class in emerging markets, the lion's share of attention has for good reason been visited upon China. Yet several other big, emerging markets offer great promise, and not only the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, and India). The report finds that Egypt joins Turkey, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam as one of eight specific countries considered likely to play an important role in the further globalization of retailing.
The report suggests that this phenomenon is likely to become more established in the future as such retailers become regional powerhouses. The next step in the evolution of these players, however, will be investments into developed markets. Some of this is starting to take place with retailers based in emerging markets spotting growth opportunities in much more affluent markets.
As it looks at the future of the globalized retail industry, the report identifies the 250 largest retailers around the world based on publicly available data for the companies, and provides an outlook for the global economy; a discussion of the major challenges facing retailers; and an analysis of market capitalization in the retail industry.
"The Deloitte report highlights that many emerging-market retailers are rapidly becoming world-class players in their own right," said Omar Fahoum, chairman and chief executive of Deloitte in the Middle East. "This indicates that not only are they well equipped to compete with the global giants in their home markets, some are even becoming competitive in other markets. Several emerging-market retailers have already experienced success in neighboring markets, and this is happening whether in the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, or South America."
As per the Deloitte report, in the coming years, large emerging markets are set to play a far more significant role in the global economy. However, most discussions to date about the consumer markets of emerging nations have focused on the opportunity for global retailers that are based in developed countries.
In contrast, Deloitte's Global Powers of Retailing report states that it is the retailers based in emerging markets which are the ones most likely to reap the benefits of this greater role in the global economy rather than the relative handful of global retailers that have the gumption to invest in emerging markets.
When it comes to the promise of a rising middle class in emerging markets, the lion's share of attention has for good reason been visited upon China. Yet several other big, emerging markets offer great promise, and not only the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, and India). The report finds that Egypt joins Turkey, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam as one of eight specific countries considered likely to play an important role in the further globalization of retailing.
The report suggests that this phenomenon is likely to become more established in the future as such retailers become regional powerhouses. The next step in the evolution of these players, however, will be investments into developed markets. Some of this is starting to take place with retailers based in emerging markets spotting growth opportunities in much more affluent markets.
Friday, April 30, 2010 |
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U.S. Consolidates Military Network In Asia-Pacific Region
By Rick Rozoff
The United States has six naval fleets and eleven aircraft carrier strike groups patrolling the world's oceans and seas. The U.S. Navy is as large as the world's next thirteen biggest navies combined [1].
Washington has as many aircraft carriers as all other nations together. Russia has one; China has none. The U.S. and its NATO allies - Britain (2), Italy (2), France (1) and Spain (1) - account for 17 of 22 in service in the world. Ten of the eleven American carriers are Nimitz class nuclear-powered supercarriers, substantially larger than most all non-U.S. ones. The U.S. Navy has all ten supercarriers in the world at the moment. [2]
U.S. aircraft carriers contain 70-80 planes and are available for deployment in all the world's oceans and most of its seas. They are escorted in their carrier groups by anti-air and anti-submarine warfare guided missile destroyers, anti-submarine warfare frigates, missile cruisers with long-range Tomahawks, and nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines. The U.S. also maintains between ten and twelve naval expeditionary strike groups which include amphibious assault ships and AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters in addition to destroyers, cruisers, frigates, attack submarines and P-3C Orion long-range anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft.
With the reestablishing of the Navy's Fourth Fleet - its area of responsibility includes Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea - two years ago after a 58-year hiatus, the U.S. has six fleets that can be dispatched to all five oceans.
The Seventh Fleet (there is no First Fleet), based in Japan, is the largest of U.S. forward-deployed fleets and consists of as many as 40–60 ships, 200-350 aircraft and 20,000-60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Its area of responsibility takes in more than 50 million square miles of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, from Russia's Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south, from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea, South Africa to the Korean Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait.
When on the occasion of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize last December President Barack Obama referred to himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the world's sole military superpower he was not guilty of hyperbole if he was of hubris. His defense budget for next year is almost half as large as world military spending for 2008, the last year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has compiled figures.
The U.S. has mutual defense treaties with six nations in the Asia-Pacific area: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The Pentagon has bases in Japan and South Korea, troops and base camps in the Philippines, satellite surveillance sites in Australia and the use of air bases in Thailand.
Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are included in the American global missile interceptor network with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and ship-based Standard Missile-3 deployments in those four nations. Last December it was announced that the U.S. will supply Taiwan with 200 Patriot anti-ballistic missiles and the following month it was revealed that Washington will also provide Taiwan with eight frigates capable of being upgraded to fire Standard Missile-3 interceptors. [3]
Last week the head of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, told the U.S. Congress that, as Reuters summarized it, "Japan remains fully committed to building a linchpin multibillion-dollar missile interceptor with the United States," despite hopes to the contrary entertained after the Democratic Party of Japan's Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister last September.
Referring to the current Standard Missile-3 enhancement program, O'Reilly said that Japanese government officials "have indicated that they are in full support and their commitments are solid."
In regards to the upgraded interceptor missile, the SM-3 Block IIA, he added, "Within the next year, we will begin our discussions on production arrangements between the United States and Japan." [4]
On April 27 the U.S. renewed a military logistics agreement with Australia "allowing deployed Australian forces to exploit the vast logistics capability of the American military" and permitting "U.S. forces on operations to make use of Australian logistics."
"Since its inception, the agreement had ensured supply support and services to Australian and U.S. forces deployed to all parts of the world wherever they were operating together....That included mutual support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [5]
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General James Cartwright, is visiting New Zealand this week to consult with the country's top military commanders and defense minister.
Cartwright is "the first vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit New Zealand since the position was established" in 1986. [6] His visit comes two weeks after NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, made similar trips to New Zealand and Australia.
Last month New Zealand's Defence Minister Wayne Mapp announced that joint military exercises with the U.S. would resume after 23 years, since the nation's 1987 ban on the docking of nuclear-powered warships and submarines.
New Zealand has been brought back into the fold in part by providing NATO with over 200 troops for the war in Afghanistan. Australia, with over 1,500 soldiers assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in the nation, is the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the war. Last year it unveiled plans for the most extensive military buildup in its post-World War Two history. [7]
On April 23 the U.S. and India launched the ten-day Malabar 2010 military exercises after "Ships, submarines and aircraft from the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet arrived in Goa" to engage in maneuvers which include training for "surface and anti-submarine warfare, coordinated gunnery exercises [and] air defense...." [8] The U.S. contribution consists of two guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate, a guided missile cruiser, a nuclear fast-attack submarine, P-3 Orion anti-submarine and surveillance aircraft, SH-60B Seahawk helicopters and Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) special forces.
The Malabar war games have been conducted jointly by the U.S. and India since 1992 (except for 1998-2001 after India carried out nuclear tests), but last year included Japan, and Malabar 2007 was a five-nation operation held in the Bay of Bengal with the U.S. and India joined by Australia, Japan and Singapore, leading to suspicions of U.S. designs for an Asia-Pacific analogue of NATO.
As Malabar 2010 was underway, "warships, combat aircraft and soldiers" from Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore (all Commonwealth nations) began Exercise Bersama Shield 2010 "on the Malaysian peninsula and in the South China Sea." [9]
Malaysia is among a minority of maritime states not to have joined the U.S.-launched Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) whose architect was then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. Established in 2003 as "a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors," [10], it has grown to incorporate over 90 of the world's 148 coastal nations. [11]
China, Indonesia and Malaysia have refused to join, though South Korea did in May of last year, and the first three countries along with Iran and North Korea - the states used as justification for the PSI - view the U.S.-led global surveillance, interdiction and boarding operation with deep concern and doubts about its legality, as it operates without a United Nations mandate, can be argued to circumvent and violate international maritime law, and in effect grants the U.S. and its allies the self-arrogated right to conduct piracy on the high seas.
"Launched on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. President Obama strongly supports the PSI. On April 5, 2009 in Prague, the President called on the international community to make PSI a 'durable international institution.'" [12]
The PSI has been effectively if not formally extended into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa with the U.S.-run Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 warship deployments. Recently the South Korean navy assumed command of Combined Task Force 151 from Singapore. Combined Task Force 150 contributing navies include those of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey.
Last week it was announced that NATO welcomed South Korea as the 46th nation supplying it with troops for the war in Afghanistan. On March 29 Mongolia became the 45th. [13] Singapore also has troops serving under NATO in the country and until this year Japan was providing naval support to the U.S. war effort there.
On April 26 the China Daily reported that Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly in charge of strategic studies at the Chinese army's National Defense University, said "The United States is the greatest perceived threat to the People's Liberation Army" and that "the US was the only country capable of threatening China's national security interests in an all-round way." [14]
Another Chinese news source on the same day wrote of U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) plans to be able to strike any target on earth within sixty minutes and the Pentagon's recent test flights of the X-37B orbital space plane and the Falcon hypersonic spy plane, reporting that "Chinese space technology expert Pang Zhihao said the spaceship...aids the PGS program, which he said could be a potential threat to world peace." [15]
The previous day London's Sunday Times acknowledged that "Obama's interest in Prompt Global Strike (PGS)...has alarmed China and Russia...." [16]
U.S. fast strike and first strike global missile and space strategy and its expansion of military alliances and networks in the Asia-Pacific area are rightly seen as threats to China and Russia. And to international security and peace.
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
NOTES:
1) Measured by battle fleet tonnage.
2) A supercarrier is currently defined as an aircraft carrier displacing 70,000 or more tons.
3) U.S.-China Military Tensions Grow
Stop NATO, January 19, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/u-s-china-military-tensions-grow
4) Reuters, April 21, 2010
5) Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010
6) Ibid
7) Australian Military Buildup And The Rise Of Asian NATO
Stop NATO, May 6, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/australian-military-buildup-and-the-rise-of-asian-nato
8) Navy Newsstand, April 23, 2010
9) Agence France-Presse, April 26, 2010
10) U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm
11) Proliferation Security Initiative And U.S. 1,000-Ship Navy: Control Of
World’s Oceans, Prelude To War
Stop NATO, January 29, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/proliferation-security-initiative-and-us-1000-ship-navy-control-of-worlds-oceans-prelude-to-war
12) U.S. Department of State, Ibid
13) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
14) China Daily, April 26, 2010
15) Global Times, April 26, 2010
16) Sunday Times, April 25, 2010
The United States has six naval fleets and eleven aircraft carrier strike groups patrolling the world's oceans and seas. The U.S. Navy is as large as the world's next thirteen biggest navies combined [1].
Washington has as many aircraft carriers as all other nations together. Russia has one; China has none. The U.S. and its NATO allies - Britain (2), Italy (2), France (1) and Spain (1) - account for 17 of 22 in service in the world. Ten of the eleven American carriers are Nimitz class nuclear-powered supercarriers, substantially larger than most all non-U.S. ones. The U.S. Navy has all ten supercarriers in the world at the moment. [2]
U.S. aircraft carriers contain 70-80 planes and are available for deployment in all the world's oceans and most of its seas. They are escorted in their carrier groups by anti-air and anti-submarine warfare guided missile destroyers, anti-submarine warfare frigates, missile cruisers with long-range Tomahawks, and nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines. The U.S. also maintains between ten and twelve naval expeditionary strike groups which include amphibious assault ships and AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters in addition to destroyers, cruisers, frigates, attack submarines and P-3C Orion long-range anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft.
With the reestablishing of the Navy's Fourth Fleet - its area of responsibility includes Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea - two years ago after a 58-year hiatus, the U.S. has six fleets that can be dispatched to all five oceans.
The Seventh Fleet (there is no First Fleet), based in Japan, is the largest of U.S. forward-deployed fleets and consists of as many as 40–60 ships, 200-350 aircraft and 20,000-60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Its area of responsibility takes in more than 50 million square miles of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, from Russia's Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south, from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea, South Africa to the Korean Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait.
When on the occasion of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize last December President Barack Obama referred to himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the world's sole military superpower he was not guilty of hyperbole if he was of hubris. His defense budget for next year is almost half as large as world military spending for 2008, the last year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has compiled figures.
The U.S. has mutual defense treaties with six nations in the Asia-Pacific area: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The Pentagon has bases in Japan and South Korea, troops and base camps in the Philippines, satellite surveillance sites in Australia and the use of air bases in Thailand.
Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are included in the American global missile interceptor network with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and ship-based Standard Missile-3 deployments in those four nations. Last December it was announced that the U.S. will supply Taiwan with 200 Patriot anti-ballistic missiles and the following month it was revealed that Washington will also provide Taiwan with eight frigates capable of being upgraded to fire Standard Missile-3 interceptors. [3]
Last week the head of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, told the U.S. Congress that, as Reuters summarized it, "Japan remains fully committed to building a linchpin multibillion-dollar missile interceptor with the United States," despite hopes to the contrary entertained after the Democratic Party of Japan's Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister last September.
Referring to the current Standard Missile-3 enhancement program, O'Reilly said that Japanese government officials "have indicated that they are in full support and their commitments are solid."
In regards to the upgraded interceptor missile, the SM-3 Block IIA, he added, "Within the next year, we will begin our discussions on production arrangements between the United States and Japan." [4]
On April 27 the U.S. renewed a military logistics agreement with Australia "allowing deployed Australian forces to exploit the vast logistics capability of the American military" and permitting "U.S. forces on operations to make use of Australian logistics."
"Since its inception, the agreement had ensured supply support and services to Australian and U.S. forces deployed to all parts of the world wherever they were operating together....That included mutual support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [5]
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General James Cartwright, is visiting New Zealand this week to consult with the country's top military commanders and defense minister.
Cartwright is "the first vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit New Zealand since the position was established" in 1986. [6] His visit comes two weeks after NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, made similar trips to New Zealand and Australia.
Last month New Zealand's Defence Minister Wayne Mapp announced that joint military exercises with the U.S. would resume after 23 years, since the nation's 1987 ban on the docking of nuclear-powered warships and submarines.
New Zealand has been brought back into the fold in part by providing NATO with over 200 troops for the war in Afghanistan. Australia, with over 1,500 soldiers assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in the nation, is the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the war. Last year it unveiled plans for the most extensive military buildup in its post-World War Two history. [7]
On April 23 the U.S. and India launched the ten-day Malabar 2010 military exercises after "Ships, submarines and aircraft from the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet arrived in Goa" to engage in maneuvers which include training for "surface and anti-submarine warfare, coordinated gunnery exercises [and] air defense...." [8] The U.S. contribution consists of two guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate, a guided missile cruiser, a nuclear fast-attack submarine, P-3 Orion anti-submarine and surveillance aircraft, SH-60B Seahawk helicopters and Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) special forces.
The Malabar war games have been conducted jointly by the U.S. and India since 1992 (except for 1998-2001 after India carried out nuclear tests), but last year included Japan, and Malabar 2007 was a five-nation operation held in the Bay of Bengal with the U.S. and India joined by Australia, Japan and Singapore, leading to suspicions of U.S. designs for an Asia-Pacific analogue of NATO.
As Malabar 2010 was underway, "warships, combat aircraft and soldiers" from Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore (all Commonwealth nations) began Exercise Bersama Shield 2010 "on the Malaysian peninsula and in the South China Sea." [9]
Malaysia is among a minority of maritime states not to have joined the U.S.-launched Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) whose architect was then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. Established in 2003 as "a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors," [10], it has grown to incorporate over 90 of the world's 148 coastal nations. [11]
China, Indonesia and Malaysia have refused to join, though South Korea did in May of last year, and the first three countries along with Iran and North Korea - the states used as justification for the PSI - view the U.S.-led global surveillance, interdiction and boarding operation with deep concern and doubts about its legality, as it operates without a United Nations mandate, can be argued to circumvent and violate international maritime law, and in effect grants the U.S. and its allies the self-arrogated right to conduct piracy on the high seas.
"Launched on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. President Obama strongly supports the PSI. On April 5, 2009 in Prague, the President called on the international community to make PSI a 'durable international institution.'" [12]
The PSI has been effectively if not formally extended into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa with the U.S.-run Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 warship deployments. Recently the South Korean navy assumed command of Combined Task Force 151 from Singapore. Combined Task Force 150 contributing navies include those of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey.
Last week it was announced that NATO welcomed South Korea as the 46th nation supplying it with troops for the war in Afghanistan. On March 29 Mongolia became the 45th. [13] Singapore also has troops serving under NATO in the country and until this year Japan was providing naval support to the U.S. war effort there.
On April 26 the China Daily reported that Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly in charge of strategic studies at the Chinese army's National Defense University, said "The United States is the greatest perceived threat to the People's Liberation Army" and that "the US was the only country capable of threatening China's national security interests in an all-round way." [14]
Another Chinese news source on the same day wrote of U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) plans to be able to strike any target on earth within sixty minutes and the Pentagon's recent test flights of the X-37B orbital space plane and the Falcon hypersonic spy plane, reporting that "Chinese space technology expert Pang Zhihao said the spaceship...aids the PGS program, which he said could be a potential threat to world peace." [15]
The previous day London's Sunday Times acknowledged that "Obama's interest in Prompt Global Strike (PGS)...has alarmed China and Russia...." [16]
U.S. fast strike and first strike global missile and space strategy and its expansion of military alliances and networks in the Asia-Pacific area are rightly seen as threats to China and Russia. And to international security and peace.
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
NOTES:
1) Measured by battle fleet tonnage.
2) A supercarrier is currently defined as an aircraft carrier displacing 70,000 or more tons.
3) U.S.-China Military Tensions Grow
Stop NATO, January 19, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/u-s-china-military-tensions-grow
4) Reuters, April 21, 2010
5) Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010
6) Ibid
7) Australian Military Buildup And The Rise Of Asian NATO
Stop NATO, May 6, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/australian-military-buildup-and-the-rise-of-asian-nato
8) Navy Newsstand, April 23, 2010
9) Agence France-Presse, April 26, 2010
10) U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm
11) Proliferation Security Initiative And U.S. 1,000-Ship Navy: Control Of
World’s Oceans, Prelude To War
Stop NATO, January 29, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/proliferation-security-initiative-and-us-1000-ship-navy-control-of-worlds-oceans-prelude-to-war
12) U.S. Department of State, Ibid
13) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
14) China Daily, April 26, 2010
15) Global Times, April 26, 2010
16) Sunday Times, April 25, 2010
Thursday, April 29, 2010 |
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SE Asia Worries Thailand's Unrest Could Spread
By Brian Padden
Thailand's neighbors are watching the political unrest in Bangkok with growing concern. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has said the protests there could spread economic and political instability throughout the region.
ASEAN has called on the Thai government and the anti-government demonstrators to exercise restraint and to seek a settlement through dialogue and reconciliation. The foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia have made similar statements.
Since March, 26 people have been killed and almost 1,000 injured in bomb blasts and confrontations between police and anti-government protesters in Bangkok known as red shirts. The red shirts, made up mostly of rural and urban poor, demand new elections. The demonstrations have disrupted businesses and tourism in the country.
Protests Could Affect Investments
Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah says he is concerned that instability in Thailand could lead to a repeat of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Then, the collapse of the Thai baht hurt investor confidence in the region.
"Well its rather too early to assess what would be the direct impact of the development in Thailand on the economy, but we did hope actually that it would not create similar situations [like] in the '90's when the contagion effect of the economic meltdown was felt in our region," said Faizasyah. "But hopefully this is a very isolated case but we are also very hopeful that with our efforts together then we can resolve the situation in a peaceful way."
Michael Montesano with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs says right now most foreign investors see the crisis as specific to Thailand only. But, he says, as the protests continue investment in the region could be affected.
"The only effect that we need to be afraid of is those people on the outside of the region who see the region as a whole, and who have their antenna up to instability and political crisis in Southeast Asia, and who, when they see crisis in one country become skittish about how to deal with investment and the economy and other activities in the region as a whole," said Montesano.
Neighbors Offer Assistance
Thailand's political divisions have built steadily over the past several years, since a military coup ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006.
Although Thailand's urban middle class and elite consider him corrupt, he remains very popular among farmers and the poor, because of his anti-poverty programs. His supporters consider the current government to be illegitimate because it came to power in a parliamentary deal after courts ousted two pro-Thaksin elected governments in 2008.
Singapore and Indonesia have offered help to resolve the crisis in Thailand but Faizasyah says it would only be useful if both sides request it.
"We are not interfering in our neighboring issues actually," said Faizasyah. "It must be very clear if there is anyway we can assist in the dialogue, at the request of the government or other parties in this situation then certainly we will be, we are there to provide any assistance available at our disposal."
Montesano says ASEAN's tradition of non-interference in members' affairs and the Thai government's unwillingness to ask for help, will stifle any regional mediation effort. What Thailand's neighbors can do to prevent similar protest movements from spreading, he says, is to address the concerns of the poor and disenfranchised in their own countries.
"I think that other countries in the region would do well to look at the deep roots of Thailand's crisis, and to ask themselves whether their economies and their societies aren't also subject to similar crises," said Montesano.
Apart from that, he says, Thailand's neighbors and the rest of the world can only watch to see how the crisis plays out.
Source: VOA
Thailand's neighbors are watching the political unrest in Bangkok with growing concern. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has said the protests there could spread economic and political instability throughout the region.
ASEAN has called on the Thai government and the anti-government demonstrators to exercise restraint and to seek a settlement through dialogue and reconciliation. The foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia have made similar statements.
Since March, 26 people have been killed and almost 1,000 injured in bomb blasts and confrontations between police and anti-government protesters in Bangkok known as red shirts. The red shirts, made up mostly of rural and urban poor, demand new elections. The demonstrations have disrupted businesses and tourism in the country.
Protests Could Affect Investments
Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah says he is concerned that instability in Thailand could lead to a repeat of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Then, the collapse of the Thai baht hurt investor confidence in the region.
"Well its rather too early to assess what would be the direct impact of the development in Thailand on the economy, but we did hope actually that it would not create similar situations [like] in the '90's when the contagion effect of the economic meltdown was felt in our region," said Faizasyah. "But hopefully this is a very isolated case but we are also very hopeful that with our efforts together then we can resolve the situation in a peaceful way."
Michael Montesano with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs says right now most foreign investors see the crisis as specific to Thailand only. But, he says, as the protests continue investment in the region could be affected.
"The only effect that we need to be afraid of is those people on the outside of the region who see the region as a whole, and who have their antenna up to instability and political crisis in Southeast Asia, and who, when they see crisis in one country become skittish about how to deal with investment and the economy and other activities in the region as a whole," said Montesano.
Neighbors Offer Assistance
Thailand's political divisions have built steadily over the past several years, since a military coup ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006.
Although Thailand's urban middle class and elite consider him corrupt, he remains very popular among farmers and the poor, because of his anti-poverty programs. His supporters consider the current government to be illegitimate because it came to power in a parliamentary deal after courts ousted two pro-Thaksin elected governments in 2008.
Singapore and Indonesia have offered help to resolve the crisis in Thailand but Faizasyah says it would only be useful if both sides request it.
"We are not interfering in our neighboring issues actually," said Faizasyah. "It must be very clear if there is anyway we can assist in the dialogue, at the request of the government or other parties in this situation then certainly we will be, we are there to provide any assistance available at our disposal."
Montesano says ASEAN's tradition of non-interference in members' affairs and the Thai government's unwillingness to ask for help, will stifle any regional mediation effort. What Thailand's neighbors can do to prevent similar protest movements from spreading, he says, is to address the concerns of the poor and disenfranchised in their own countries.
"I think that other countries in the region would do well to look at the deep roots of Thailand's crisis, and to ask themselves whether their economies and their societies aren't also subject to similar crises," said Montesano.
Apart from that, he says, Thailand's neighbors and the rest of the world can only watch to see how the crisis plays out.
Source: VOA
Tuesday, April 27, 2010 |
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Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise In Aceh
As revelations about a jihadi coalition calling itself “Al Qaeda Indonesia in Aceh” continue to emerge, the Indonesian government should take steps to tighten control over prisons, provide more training for police in confronting armed suspects and consider banning paramilitary training by non-state actors.
Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines a new stream of jihadism in Indonesia that the coalition represents and its significance for the future of terrorism in the region.
“This group defined itself in opposition to the other two main streams of Indonesian jihadism”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Asia Program Senior Adviser. “It was angry with Jemaah Islamiyah for abandoning jihad and critical of the late Noordin Top for having no long-term strategy”.
With 48 men arrested since late February, eight killed in police raids, and about fifteen others identified and being sought, the new group seems to have been crushed for now, but the groups that formed the coalition still exist, and new alignments or mutations are likely.
The report examines how and why the group made the colossal blunder of choosing Aceh as its “secure base”, where an Islamic community would be established through a combination of religious outreach and jihad against anyone who stood in the way.
Its leaders, including the fugitive Bali bomber Dulmatin, killed in a 9 March raid, were persuaded that many of Aceh’s religious leaders would be supportive, but their ultra-puritan, anti-Western rhetoric of violence drew little sympathy in an area recovering from three decades of conflict.
The Indonesian government can learn several lessons from the discovery of the group:
“Rolling up this network is no mean feat and the Indonesian police, at both local and national levels, deserve credit for their fast work”, said Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “But no one should be complacent that the job is over”.
Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines a new stream of jihadism in Indonesia that the coalition represents and its significance for the future of terrorism in the region.
“This group defined itself in opposition to the other two main streams of Indonesian jihadism”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Asia Program Senior Adviser. “It was angry with Jemaah Islamiyah for abandoning jihad and critical of the late Noordin Top for having no long-term strategy”.
With 48 men arrested since late February, eight killed in police raids, and about fifteen others identified and being sought, the new group seems to have been crushed for now, but the groups that formed the coalition still exist, and new alignments or mutations are likely.
The report examines how and why the group made the colossal blunder of choosing Aceh as its “secure base”, where an Islamic community would be established through a combination of religious outreach and jihad against anyone who stood in the way.
Its leaders, including the fugitive Bali bomber Dulmatin, killed in a 9 March raid, were persuaded that many of Aceh’s religious leaders would be supportive, but their ultra-puritan, anti-Western rhetoric of violence drew little sympathy in an area recovering from three decades of conflict.
The Indonesian government can learn several lessons from the discovery of the group:
- intelligence on extremist groups remains weak ;
- monitoring of prisons, prisoners and ex-prisoners needs improvement (at least twelve of those arrested, killed or wanted are ex-prisoners) ;
- police need more training in use of non-lethal methods of capturing “active shooters”; and
- corruption remains the lubricant for terrorist activities, with forged documents easily available for a price.
“Rolling up this network is no mean feat and the Indonesian police, at both local and national levels, deserve credit for their fast work”, said Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “But no one should be complacent that the job is over”.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010 |
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Jakarta's Slums Struggle With Sanitation
In Jakarta's northern Muara Angke coastal area, a lack of access to piped water has forced people to bathe and wash clothes using murky grey water from fish ponds.
“I don't feel disgusted at all. I’ve gotten used to it,” Ibu Nunung, who shells mussels for a living, told IRIN outside her house in Muara Angke Blok Empang, a slum in the area.
Nunung said residents, many of whom live on less than US$2 a day, had to fork out the equivalent of up to $1 daily to buy clean water for drinking and cooking from vendors transporting water in jugs.
She admitted that itchy skin was a common problem among locals.
Jakarta, a city of 10 million people, is dotted with slums like the one in Muara Angke.
Many people live without running water in shanty towns built in the shadow of gleaming skyscrapers, and gutters are clogged with rubbish, causing foul smells.
“Poor sanitation, lack of access to clean water, overcrowding and poor nutrition are among [the] major problems in Jakarta, and the government's commitment is needed to address these problems,” said Erlyn Sulistyaningsih, a project manager with Mercy Corps Indonesia.
Less than 50 percent of Jakarta's residents have access to piped water, according to the NGO, which runs water, sanitation and health programmes in the city.
More than 75 percent of the city's residents rely on shallow groundwater, but an official study found that 90 percent of shallow wells are contaminated with coliform bacteria or heavy metals, Mercy Corps said in a 2008 publication entitled Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy.
Jakarta produces 6,000 tons of waste each day, but can only manage 50 percent of it, it said.
Sulistyaningsih heads a project aimed at increasing access to sanitary facilities, including toilets, providing access to clean water, and educating child caregivers about nutrition in several villages in Jakarta and neighbouring Bekasi District.
“Our programme seeks to prevent diseases which are spread by the faeces-to-mouth route, and we hope it can be replicated by other communities,” she told IRIN.
Premature deaths
A study released by the World Bank's Water and Sanitation Programme in 2008 revealed that only 57 percent of Indonesian households had easy access to a private and safe place to urinate and defecate in 2004.
Poor sanitation, including poor hygiene, causes at least 120 million disease episodes and 50,000 premature deaths annually, the report said.
The study also found that poor sanitation costs the Indonesian economy $6.3 billion per year, or equal to 2.3 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
Nugroho Tri Utomo, head of the subdirectorate of drinking water and waste water at the National Development Planning Agency, said part of the problem was a lack of funding, with spending on sanitation accounting for only 1 percent of the city's budget.
“Both the general public and authorities have yet to realize the importance of sanitation, not only to health but also to the economy,” he said.
Improvement plans under way
The government last month launched a programme to provide access to adequate sanitation to 80 percent of urban households by 2014.
The Settlement Sanitation Development Programme, estimated to cost $5.5 billion, aims to develop waste water services in 226 cities, build sanitary landfills serving 240 urban areas, and stop inundations in strategic urban locations covering 22,500 hectares.
Under a separate programme called the National Strategy for Community-Based Total Sanitation, launched in 2008, the government aims to provide access to sanitation and introduce more effective water treatment methods in 10,000 villages by 2012.
Source: IRIN
“I don't feel disgusted at all. I’ve gotten used to it,” Ibu Nunung, who shells mussels for a living, told IRIN outside her house in Muara Angke Blok Empang, a slum in the area.
Nunung said residents, many of whom live on less than US$2 a day, had to fork out the equivalent of up to $1 daily to buy clean water for drinking and cooking from vendors transporting water in jugs.
She admitted that itchy skin was a common problem among locals.
Jakarta, a city of 10 million people, is dotted with slums like the one in Muara Angke.
Many people live without running water in shanty towns built in the shadow of gleaming skyscrapers, and gutters are clogged with rubbish, causing foul smells.
“Poor sanitation, lack of access to clean water, overcrowding and poor nutrition are among [the] major problems in Jakarta, and the government's commitment is needed to address these problems,” said Erlyn Sulistyaningsih, a project manager with Mercy Corps Indonesia.
Less than 50 percent of Jakarta's residents have access to piped water, according to the NGO, which runs water, sanitation and health programmes in the city.
More than 75 percent of the city's residents rely on shallow groundwater, but an official study found that 90 percent of shallow wells are contaminated with coliform bacteria or heavy metals, Mercy Corps said in a 2008 publication entitled Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy.
Jakarta produces 6,000 tons of waste each day, but can only manage 50 percent of it, it said.
Sulistyaningsih heads a project aimed at increasing access to sanitary facilities, including toilets, providing access to clean water, and educating child caregivers about nutrition in several villages in Jakarta and neighbouring Bekasi District.
“Our programme seeks to prevent diseases which are spread by the faeces-to-mouth route, and we hope it can be replicated by other communities,” she told IRIN.
Premature deaths
A study released by the World Bank's Water and Sanitation Programme in 2008 revealed that only 57 percent of Indonesian households had easy access to a private and safe place to urinate and defecate in 2004.
Poor sanitation, including poor hygiene, causes at least 120 million disease episodes and 50,000 premature deaths annually, the report said.
The study also found that poor sanitation costs the Indonesian economy $6.3 billion per year, or equal to 2.3 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
Nugroho Tri Utomo, head of the subdirectorate of drinking water and waste water at the National Development Planning Agency, said part of the problem was a lack of funding, with spending on sanitation accounting for only 1 percent of the city's budget.
“Both the general public and authorities have yet to realize the importance of sanitation, not only to health but also to the economy,” he said.
Improvement plans under way
The government last month launched a programme to provide access to adequate sanitation to 80 percent of urban households by 2014.
The Settlement Sanitation Development Programme, estimated to cost $5.5 billion, aims to develop waste water services in 226 cities, build sanitary landfills serving 240 urban areas, and stop inundations in strategic urban locations covering 22,500 hectares.
Under a separate programme called the National Strategy for Community-Based Total Sanitation, launched in 2008, the government aims to provide access to sanitation and introduce more effective water treatment methods in 10,000 villages by 2012.
Source: IRIN
Sunday, April 18, 2010 |
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Islam, Democracy, Modernization Can Develop Together - Indonesian President
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said Islam, democracy, and modernization can develop side by side to form a modern and democratic nation without abandoning religious values.
According to the Indonesian New Agency Antara, the President said, "We in Indonesia have seen that Islam, democracy and modernization can grow together. There is no conflict between religious, spiritual and political obligations as citizens in pluralism and the capability to participate in the modern world."
The President's statement came during the opening speech at the Sixth Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy.
Islam-based political parties in Indonesia are among the strong supporters of democracy, he said.
"This moderate view of openness and tolerance in Indonesia and other communities in the world, is a seed of harmonious life among civilizations in the 21st century," he said.
At present, democracy in Indonesia continues to grow and the country enjoys the third best economic growth among G-20 member states, after China and India, according to the head of state.
It showed that democracy and economic growth can happen at the same time, he said.
The three-day meeting is being participated in by 625 people, including democracy activists, practitioners, and academics from 110 countries.
The agenda will focus on ways to expand democracy movements within all cultures, as well as on ways to develop mutually supporting cross-cultural relationships to advance democracy in all global regions, to advance the World Movement's ongoing Defending Civil Society and Assessing Democracy Assistance projects.
Source: KUNA
According to the Indonesian New Agency Antara, the President said, "We in Indonesia have seen that Islam, democracy and modernization can grow together. There is no conflict between religious, spiritual and political obligations as citizens in pluralism and the capability to participate in the modern world."
The President's statement came during the opening speech at the Sixth Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy.
Islam-based political parties in Indonesia are among the strong supporters of democracy, he said.
"This moderate view of openness and tolerance in Indonesia and other communities in the world, is a seed of harmonious life among civilizations in the 21st century," he said.
At present, democracy in Indonesia continues to grow and the country enjoys the third best economic growth among G-20 member states, after China and India, according to the head of state.
It showed that democracy and economic growth can happen at the same time, he said.
The three-day meeting is being participated in by 625 people, including democracy activists, practitioners, and academics from 110 countries.
The agenda will focus on ways to expand democracy movements within all cultures, as well as on ways to develop mutually supporting cross-cultural relationships to advance democracy in all global regions, to advance the World Movement's ongoing Defending Civil Society and Assessing Democracy Assistance projects.
Source: KUNA
Monday, April 12, 2010 |
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Spain Hosts 6th Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue
Coinciding with the Spanish Presidency of the EU, the cities of Madrid and Toledo hosted the 6th Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue, the aim of which is to promote relations and mutual respect between cultures and creeds from both regions.
The working sessions, which were held at the IFEMA exhibition centre in Madrid, dealt with three main issues: religious freedom and human rights; respect and mutual understanding; and dialogue between cultures and religions as a bridge between societies.
Delegates from 27 of around 50 countries which make up the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) attended the meeting, titled 'Consolidating religious freedom and mutual understanding through interfaith and intercultural dialogue'; the meeting, which was set up in 1996, is a high-level forum between the governments of both regions.
The Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue has taken place every year since 2005, either in Asia or in Europe, and brings together diplomats, senior officials connected with interfaith matters, leading academics and religious leaders from different faiths.
This year's dialogue was jointly organised by Spain and Pakistan, and was sponsored by 15 European and Asian countries: Germany, Austria, China, South Korea, Denmark, the Philippines, Finland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore and Thailand.
The eventwas held in Spain in response to the announcement made in this regard by the President of the Government, José Luis RodrÃguez Zapatero, at the ASEM Summit in Beijing in 2008. The city councils of Madrid and Toledo and the regional government of Castilla La Mancha helped the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to organise this 6th ASEM Interfaith Dialogue.
The closing ceremony took place Friday in the city of Toledo.
The working sessions, which were held at the IFEMA exhibition centre in Madrid, dealt with three main issues: religious freedom and human rights; respect and mutual understanding; and dialogue between cultures and religions as a bridge between societies.
Delegates from 27 of around 50 countries which make up the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) attended the meeting, titled 'Consolidating religious freedom and mutual understanding through interfaith and intercultural dialogue'; the meeting, which was set up in 1996, is a high-level forum between the governments of both regions.
The Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue has taken place every year since 2005, either in Asia or in Europe, and brings together diplomats, senior officials connected with interfaith matters, leading academics and religious leaders from different faiths.
This year's dialogue was jointly organised by Spain and Pakistan, and was sponsored by 15 European and Asian countries: Germany, Austria, China, South Korea, Denmark, the Philippines, Finland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore and Thailand.
The eventwas held in Spain in response to the announcement made in this regard by the President of the Government, José Luis RodrÃguez Zapatero, at the ASEM Summit in Beijing in 2008. The city councils of Madrid and Toledo and the regional government of Castilla La Mancha helped the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to organise this 6th ASEM Interfaith Dialogue.
The closing ceremony took place Friday in the city of Toledo.
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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Strong Earthquake Injures 12 In Indonesia
A strong earthquake jolted Indonesia's Aceh province at the northern end of Sumatra, damaging buildings and injuring 12 people so far, officials said.
"Four of the victims suffered from serious injuries, all of the 12 injured persons were being treated at a hospital in Simeuleu island," the provincial disaster management agency named only Iskandar told the Indonesian News Agency.
"Most of the victims are hit by some parts of building falling during the quake," said Iskandar, adding that the quake cracked a road in Singkil regency of Aceh and caused light damages to dozens of houses in the regency and Simeuleu island.
The quake intensity was also felt at 4 to 5 MMI in Meulaboh town of Aceh and Sibolga of North Sumatra province, the meteorology and geophysics agency said, but there were no report of damages or injuries.
A magnitude-9.2 quake struck in December 2004 off Aceh and caused a tsunami that spread death and destruction across the Indian Ocean. More than 170,000 people died or went missing in Aceh alone.
Source: KUNA
"Four of the victims suffered from serious injuries, all of the 12 injured persons were being treated at a hospital in Simeuleu island," the provincial disaster management agency named only Iskandar told the Indonesian News Agency.
"Most of the victims are hit by some parts of building falling during the quake," said Iskandar, adding that the quake cracked a road in Singkil regency of Aceh and caused light damages to dozens of houses in the regency and Simeuleu island.
The quake intensity was also felt at 4 to 5 MMI in Meulaboh town of Aceh and Sibolga of North Sumatra province, the meteorology and geophysics agency said, but there were no report of damages or injuries.
A magnitude-9.2 quake struck in December 2004 off Aceh and caused a tsunami that spread death and destruction across the Indian Ocean. More than 170,000 people died or went missing in Aceh alone.
Source: KUNA
Wednesday, April 07, 2010 |
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Radicalization In Indonesia, Dialogue Needed
A substantive dialogue between the Indonesian government and Papuan leaders could help stem political radicalisation in the country’s easternmost province.
Indonesia: Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, charts the radicalisation of activists from the central highlands, the province’s mountainous spine, and links a small group of them, the pro-independence National Committee for West Papua (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), to some of the violence that erupted in Papua in 2009. The KNPB is not broadly representative and its tactics are decried by other activists, but its message – that peaceful methods have failed to produce results – resonates more widely.
“A dialogue, if carefully prepared, offers the possibility of addressing longstanding grievances, without calling Indonesian sovereignty into question”, said Sidney Jones, senior adviser to Crisis Group’s Asia program. “But it will only succeed if all issues -- political and historical, not just economic -- are on the table, and President Yudhoyono gives it visible, public backing”.
The urgency of dialogue is underscored by the upsurge of violence in the second half of 2009 and early 2010. The report examines several incidents where members of the KNPB either claimed responsibility for the violence, although in one case playing no direct role, or appeared to be working in co-ordination with local guerrilla commanders of the Free Papua Movement’s National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/Organisasi Papua Merdeka, TPN/OPM). It also looks in detail at the shooting attacks near the giant Freeport copper and gold mine. In all cases, actions by security forces contributed to the problem, sometimes through poorly targeted arrests that angered the community or through demands for money that made the presence of troops a burden.
Violence and radicalisation in Papua could increase unless political frustrations are addressed. The path to talks will not be easy, however. Some in the central government believe that any discussion of non-economic issues will only fuel support for independence. Some Papuan activists believe that dialogue should only take place with international mediation and with the political endgame left open. Even some of those who accept Indonesian sovereignty as a given believe that Jakarta has a history of promising but not delivering. But the radicalisation of the KNPB is proof of the dangers of leaving political grievances to fester.
Papua is not the land of horrors that some activists would like to portray. It has huge problems, but there also have been huge changes over the last decade. The Indonesian government repeatedly shoots itself in the foot by restricting access and preventing a full picture of Papua from emerging.
“The best way to marginalise the radicals is not to lock them up”, said Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group South East Asia project director. “It is to throw the doors wide open to the central highlands and elsewhere in Papua, and let NGOs and journalists report back”.
Indonesia: Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, charts the radicalisation of activists from the central highlands, the province’s mountainous spine, and links a small group of them, the pro-independence National Committee for West Papua (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), to some of the violence that erupted in Papua in 2009. The KNPB is not broadly representative and its tactics are decried by other activists, but its message – that peaceful methods have failed to produce results – resonates more widely.
“A dialogue, if carefully prepared, offers the possibility of addressing longstanding grievances, without calling Indonesian sovereignty into question”, said Sidney Jones, senior adviser to Crisis Group’s Asia program. “But it will only succeed if all issues -- political and historical, not just economic -- are on the table, and President Yudhoyono gives it visible, public backing”.
The urgency of dialogue is underscored by the upsurge of violence in the second half of 2009 and early 2010. The report examines several incidents where members of the KNPB either claimed responsibility for the violence, although in one case playing no direct role, or appeared to be working in co-ordination with local guerrilla commanders of the Free Papua Movement’s National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/Organisasi Papua Merdeka, TPN/OPM). It also looks in detail at the shooting attacks near the giant Freeport copper and gold mine. In all cases, actions by security forces contributed to the problem, sometimes through poorly targeted arrests that angered the community or through demands for money that made the presence of troops a burden.
Violence and radicalisation in Papua could increase unless political frustrations are addressed. The path to talks will not be easy, however. Some in the central government believe that any discussion of non-economic issues will only fuel support for independence. Some Papuan activists believe that dialogue should only take place with international mediation and with the political endgame left open. Even some of those who accept Indonesian sovereignty as a given believe that Jakarta has a history of promising but not delivering. But the radicalisation of the KNPB is proof of the dangers of leaving political grievances to fester.
Papua is not the land of horrors that some activists would like to portray. It has huge problems, but there also have been huge changes over the last decade. The Indonesian government repeatedly shoots itself in the foot by restricting access and preventing a full picture of Papua from emerging.
“The best way to marginalise the radicals is not to lock them up”, said Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group South East Asia project director. “It is to throw the doors wide open to the central highlands and elsewhere in Papua, and let NGOs and journalists report back”.
Friday, March 12, 2010 |
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Sri Lankan Migration To The Gulf: Female Breadwinners — Domestic Workers
By Michele Ruth Gamburd for MEI
Several waves of Sri Lankan migration have taken place since the country gained independence in 1948. Beginning in the mid-1950s, wealthy, educated, English-speaking elites have migrated to Commonwealth countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom. In addition, since the upsurge in ethnic hostilities in the early 1980s, Tamil speaking Hindu migrants have left the country, with many settling in Canada. In contrast with these permanent migrants, since 1976 a growing number of Sri Lankans have become migrant workers. The leading destination for this migrant labor force — the majority of whom are women — has been the Gulf.
The Scale and Composition of Sri Lankan Labor Migrants
In 2003, the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), the main administrative body regulating labor migration, estimated that 1,003,600 Sri Lankans worked abroad.1 By 2008, this number had increased to 1,792,368, or 9% of the island’s 20 million people. From the late 1980s until as recently as 2007, women made up the majority of these labor migrants. They accounted for 75% of the migrant flow in the mid-1990s, and by 2008 declined to a little under 50%. Of the migrant women, 88% went to work as housemaids.2 In much of the global North, such migrant transnational domestic workers meet the needs of the global “care deficit,” reflecting a global trend in outsourcing domestic labor to women from less developed countries. In contrast, transnational domestic servants in the Middle East free their sponsors for leisure, supporting a socially significant lifestyle.
In recent years, Sri Lankan officials have actively encouraged male migration. The male guest workers fill more diverse roles, with skilled and unskilled laborers making up roughly equal percentages of the male migrants (42% and 41% respectively in 2008).
Main Destination Countries
Most Sri Lankan migrants (92%), both male and female, journey to the Gulf, with four countries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar) absorbing over 80% of Sri Lanka’s workers. In the Gulf, Sri Lankan women share the market for migrant domestic workers with women from Indonesia, the Philippines, and several other countries. Racial, ethnic, religious, and national stereotypes predetermine wages. For example, in the UAE in 2004, housemaids from the Philippines were paid more than those from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh, in that order.3
Most Sri Lankan housemaids go abroad on two-year contracts and live in their employers’ residences. Live-in housemaids have less autonomy and lower salaries than women with part-time or live-out arrangements. The isolation of the work situation can lead to abuse and exploitation.
Domestic workers’ legal protections vary from country to country. In many Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, labor laws cover male laborers but do not protect household workers.4 Labor regulations do apply to foreign domestic servants working in other areas in Asia, the European Union, and the United States, but may not be enforced against middle- and upper-class employers.5
Sri Lankan Sojourners as Temporary Migrants in the Gulf
Guest workers form a crucial aspect of local economies in the Gulf. Overall, foreigners make up an estimated 37-43% of the population of the GCC countries and constitute 70% of the workforce, with workforce numbers rising significantly higher in the UAE (90%), Kuwait (82%), and Qatar (90%).6 Most GCC countries have a de facto dual economy, with well paid, non-strenuous public-sector jobs created for “nationals” and poorly paid, difficult, low-status, private sector jobs performed by foreigners.
The high percentage of guest workers worries government officials. Accordingly, governments have legislated to minimize the perceived threat. Restrictions on length of stay, strict regulations about changing jobs, hurdles imposed by the sponsorship system, difficult-to-meet criteria for bringing in family members, the inability to own land and businesses, the near-impossibility of obtaining citizenship, and the absence of legal rights all work to keep guest workers’ stays short, temporary, or informal.7 Although Sri Lankans migrate to Australia, Canada, and the UK with plans to settle there, most sojourners in the Gulf do not hope to assimilate permanently into the host country.
Incentives for Sri Lankan Transnational Domestic Migrants
There are both national-level and family-level incentives for Sri Lankans to migrate. On the national level, migrant laborers’ remittances contribute significantly to Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange earnings. In 2008, total remittances stood at SLR 316,118 million, or roughly $2.87 billion (converted at $1 = SLR 110). Nearly 60% of this total, SLR 189,039 million or $1.72 billion, came from the Gulf. In generating foreign earnings, private remittances (36%) come second after Sri Lanka’s large garment industry (40%). Clearly the country has a great financial stake in the remittances generated by migrant laborers, particularly those working in the Gulf.
Migration alleviates unemployment among the poorer segments of Sri Lanka’s population. Locally available jobs are mostly poorly paid and temporary, particularly for women. Although transnational domestic workers earn only an average of $100 a month while abroad, this is between two and five times what women could earn working in Sri Lanka, and equals or exceeds the wages earned by most village men. Migrant women consistently assert that families cannot make ends meet on their husbands’ salaries, and say that migration to the Middle East is their only available economic alternative. Family motives for migration usually include getting out of debt, buying land, and building a house. Women also state that they would like to support their family’s daily consumption needs, educate their children, and provide dowries for themselves or their daughters. Participants in the decision-making process (undergone repeatedly for migrants who return several times to the Gulf) weigh financial necessity and household improvements against separation, incursion of loans, and alternate arrangements for childcare.
Migrant women often become the sole or most significant breadwinners for their families. Several studies suggest that each migrant woman supports four to five members of her family; figures for migrant men are likely similar.8 In 2003, the SLBFE estimated that migrant laborers made up 14% of the total number of employed Sri Lankans. By 2008, this figure had jumped to 25%. A significant and growing percentage of Sri Lankan families are thus directly dependent on Gulf remittances.
Conclusion
Labor migration to the Gulf has become a core feature of Sri Lankans’ economic strategies at the family and national levels. Migration is likely to continue in the future. Trends will depend upon several factors: Sri Lanka’s success in diversifying its migrants’ destination countries; its economic growth and the local availability of desirable jobs; and its continued capacity to send care workers abroad while tending to an aging population at home.
Michele Ruth Gamburd is Professor of Anthropology at Portland State University. She is the author of The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaids (Cornell University Press, 2000) and Breaking the Ashes: The Culture of Illicit Liquor in Sri Lanka (Cornell University Press, 2008).
This article was first published in Viewpoints: Migration and the Gulf, February 2010 (PDF) published by the Middle East Institute (MEI), pages 13-15, and is reprinted here with permission.
NOTES:
1. Statistical information in this article comes from the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment’s Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment 2008, which can be found online at http://slbfe.lk/downloads/Annual Statistical Report 2008 - SLBFE.pdf.
2. In Sri Lanka, domestic servants are often referred to as “housemaids” in both English and Sinhala. These migrant women’s duties often exceed the narrow technical limits of the term.
3. Michele Gamburd, “Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers: Obstacles and Challenges,” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2009), p. 70.
4. Regarding Saudi Arabia, see Graeme Hugo, “Indonesian International Domestic Workers: Contemporary Developments and Issues,” in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds., Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 83; regarding the UAE, see Gamburd, “Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers,” p. 66; regarding the UAE and Kuwait, see Karen Leonard, “South Asian Workers in the Gulf: Jockeying for Places,” in Richard Warren Perry and Bill Maurer, eds., Globalization under Construction: Governmentality, Law, and Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 134, 153.
5. Pei-Chia Lan, “Surrogate Family, Disposable Labour and Stratified Others: Transnational Domestic Workers in Taiwan,” in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds., Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 227; Vivienne Wee and Amy Sim, “Hong Kong as a Destination for Migrant Domestic Workers,” in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds., Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 193.
6. Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” Paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, United Nations Secretariat, Beirut, Lebanon, May 15-17, 2006, p. 4; Sulayman Khalaf and Saad Alkobaisiet, “Migrants’ Strategies of Coping and Patterns of Accommodation in the Oil-Rich Gulf Societies: Evidence from the UAE,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1999), p. 272; Leonard, “South Asian Workers in the Gulf,” p. 133.
7. Sulayman Khalaf, “Gulf Societies and the Image of Unlimited Good,” Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 17 (1992), p. 72; Khalaf and Alkobaisi, “Migrants’ Strategies of Coping,” p. 294; Ahn Nga Longva, Walls Build on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
8. Swarna Jayaweera, Malsiri Dias, and Leelangi Wanasundera, Returnee Migrant Women in Two Locations in Sri Lanka: (Colombo, Sri Lanka: CENWOR, 2002), p. 1; Nedra Weerakoon, “Sri Lanka: A Caste Study of International Female Labour Migration,” in S. Sta. M. Amparita, J.J. Balisnono, R. Plaetevoet, and R. Selwyn, eds., Legal Protection for Asian Women Migrant Workers: Strategies for Action, (Makati City, Philippines: Ateneo Human Rights Center, 1998), p. 109.
Several waves of Sri Lankan migration have taken place since the country gained independence in 1948. Beginning in the mid-1950s, wealthy, educated, English-speaking elites have migrated to Commonwealth countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom. In addition, since the upsurge in ethnic hostilities in the early 1980s, Tamil speaking Hindu migrants have left the country, with many settling in Canada. In contrast with these permanent migrants, since 1976 a growing number of Sri Lankans have become migrant workers. The leading destination for this migrant labor force — the majority of whom are women — has been the Gulf.
The Scale and Composition of Sri Lankan Labor Migrants
In 2003, the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), the main administrative body regulating labor migration, estimated that 1,003,600 Sri Lankans worked abroad.1 By 2008, this number had increased to 1,792,368, or 9% of the island’s 20 million people. From the late 1980s until as recently as 2007, women made up the majority of these labor migrants. They accounted for 75% of the migrant flow in the mid-1990s, and by 2008 declined to a little under 50%. Of the migrant women, 88% went to work as housemaids.2 In much of the global North, such migrant transnational domestic workers meet the needs of the global “care deficit,” reflecting a global trend in outsourcing domestic labor to women from less developed countries. In contrast, transnational domestic servants in the Middle East free their sponsors for leisure, supporting a socially significant lifestyle.
In recent years, Sri Lankan officials have actively encouraged male migration. The male guest workers fill more diverse roles, with skilled and unskilled laborers making up roughly equal percentages of the male migrants (42% and 41% respectively in 2008).
Main Destination Countries
Most Sri Lankan migrants (92%), both male and female, journey to the Gulf, with four countries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar) absorbing over 80% of Sri Lanka’s workers. In the Gulf, Sri Lankan women share the market for migrant domestic workers with women from Indonesia, the Philippines, and several other countries. Racial, ethnic, religious, and national stereotypes predetermine wages. For example, in the UAE in 2004, housemaids from the Philippines were paid more than those from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh, in that order.3
Most Sri Lankan housemaids go abroad on two-year contracts and live in their employers’ residences. Live-in housemaids have less autonomy and lower salaries than women with part-time or live-out arrangements. The isolation of the work situation can lead to abuse and exploitation.
Domestic workers’ legal protections vary from country to country. In many Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, labor laws cover male laborers but do not protect household workers.4 Labor regulations do apply to foreign domestic servants working in other areas in Asia, the European Union, and the United States, but may not be enforced against middle- and upper-class employers.5
Sri Lankan Sojourners as Temporary Migrants in the Gulf
Guest workers form a crucial aspect of local economies in the Gulf. Overall, foreigners make up an estimated 37-43% of the population of the GCC countries and constitute 70% of the workforce, with workforce numbers rising significantly higher in the UAE (90%), Kuwait (82%), and Qatar (90%).6 Most GCC countries have a de facto dual economy, with well paid, non-strenuous public-sector jobs created for “nationals” and poorly paid, difficult, low-status, private sector jobs performed by foreigners.
The high percentage of guest workers worries government officials. Accordingly, governments have legislated to minimize the perceived threat. Restrictions on length of stay, strict regulations about changing jobs, hurdles imposed by the sponsorship system, difficult-to-meet criteria for bringing in family members, the inability to own land and businesses, the near-impossibility of obtaining citizenship, and the absence of legal rights all work to keep guest workers’ stays short, temporary, or informal.7 Although Sri Lankans migrate to Australia, Canada, and the UK with plans to settle there, most sojourners in the Gulf do not hope to assimilate permanently into the host country.
Incentives for Sri Lankan Transnational Domestic Migrants
There are both national-level and family-level incentives for Sri Lankans to migrate. On the national level, migrant laborers’ remittances contribute significantly to Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange earnings. In 2008, total remittances stood at SLR 316,118 million, or roughly $2.87 billion (converted at $1 = SLR 110). Nearly 60% of this total, SLR 189,039 million or $1.72 billion, came from the Gulf. In generating foreign earnings, private remittances (36%) come second after Sri Lanka’s large garment industry (40%). Clearly the country has a great financial stake in the remittances generated by migrant laborers, particularly those working in the Gulf.
Migration alleviates unemployment among the poorer segments of Sri Lanka’s population. Locally available jobs are mostly poorly paid and temporary, particularly for women. Although transnational domestic workers earn only an average of $100 a month while abroad, this is between two and five times what women could earn working in Sri Lanka, and equals or exceeds the wages earned by most village men. Migrant women consistently assert that families cannot make ends meet on their husbands’ salaries, and say that migration to the Middle East is their only available economic alternative. Family motives for migration usually include getting out of debt, buying land, and building a house. Women also state that they would like to support their family’s daily consumption needs, educate their children, and provide dowries for themselves or their daughters. Participants in the decision-making process (undergone repeatedly for migrants who return several times to the Gulf) weigh financial necessity and household improvements against separation, incursion of loans, and alternate arrangements for childcare.
Migrant women often become the sole or most significant breadwinners for their families. Several studies suggest that each migrant woman supports four to five members of her family; figures for migrant men are likely similar.8 In 2003, the SLBFE estimated that migrant laborers made up 14% of the total number of employed Sri Lankans. By 2008, this figure had jumped to 25%. A significant and growing percentage of Sri Lankan families are thus directly dependent on Gulf remittances.
Conclusion
Labor migration to the Gulf has become a core feature of Sri Lankans’ economic strategies at the family and national levels. Migration is likely to continue in the future. Trends will depend upon several factors: Sri Lanka’s success in diversifying its migrants’ destination countries; its economic growth and the local availability of desirable jobs; and its continued capacity to send care workers abroad while tending to an aging population at home.
Michele Ruth Gamburd is Professor of Anthropology at Portland State University. She is the author of The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaids (Cornell University Press, 2000) and Breaking the Ashes: The Culture of Illicit Liquor in Sri Lanka (Cornell University Press, 2008).
This article was first published in Viewpoints: Migration and the Gulf, February 2010 (PDF) published by the Middle East Institute (MEI), pages 13-15, and is reprinted here with permission.
NOTES:
1. Statistical information in this article comes from the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment’s Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment 2008, which can be found online at http://slbfe.lk/downloads/Annual Statistical Report 2008 - SLBFE.pdf.
2. In Sri Lanka, domestic servants are often referred to as “housemaids” in both English and Sinhala. These migrant women’s duties often exceed the narrow technical limits of the term.
3. Michele Gamburd, “Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers: Obstacles and Challenges,” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2009), p. 70.
4. Regarding Saudi Arabia, see Graeme Hugo, “Indonesian International Domestic Workers: Contemporary Developments and Issues,” in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds., Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 83; regarding the UAE, see Gamburd, “Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers,” p. 66; regarding the UAE and Kuwait, see Karen Leonard, “South Asian Workers in the Gulf: Jockeying for Places,” in Richard Warren Perry and Bill Maurer, eds., Globalization under Construction: Governmentality, Law, and Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 134, 153.
5. Pei-Chia Lan, “Surrogate Family, Disposable Labour and Stratified Others: Transnational Domestic Workers in Taiwan,” in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds., Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 227; Vivienne Wee and Amy Sim, “Hong Kong as a Destination for Migrant Domestic Workers,” in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds., Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 193.
6. Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” Paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, United Nations Secretariat, Beirut, Lebanon, May 15-17, 2006, p. 4; Sulayman Khalaf and Saad Alkobaisiet, “Migrants’ Strategies of Coping and Patterns of Accommodation in the Oil-Rich Gulf Societies: Evidence from the UAE,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1999), p. 272; Leonard, “South Asian Workers in the Gulf,” p. 133.
7. Sulayman Khalaf, “Gulf Societies and the Image of Unlimited Good,” Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 17 (1992), p. 72; Khalaf and Alkobaisi, “Migrants’ Strategies of Coping,” p. 294; Ahn Nga Longva, Walls Build on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
8. Swarna Jayaweera, Malsiri Dias, and Leelangi Wanasundera, Returnee Migrant Women in Two Locations in Sri Lanka: (Colombo, Sri Lanka: CENWOR, 2002), p. 1; Nedra Weerakoon, “Sri Lanka: A Caste Study of International Female Labour Migration,” in S. Sta. M. Amparita, J.J. Balisnono, R. Plaetevoet, and R. Selwyn, eds., Legal Protection for Asian Women Migrant Workers: Strategies for Action, (Makati City, Philippines: Ateneo Human Rights Center, 1998), p. 109.
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Bali Bombing Suspect Killed - Indonesian President
Yudhoyono has confirmed that a leading Southeast Asian militant, wanted for the 2002 Bali bombings, was killed during a raid on the main island of Java Tuesday.
Mr. Yudhoyono made the announcement Wednesday in a speech in the Australian capital Canberra.
Dulmatin, a high-ranking member of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group, is believed to have planned the 2002 bombings on the Indonesian resort island of Bali that killed 202 people, many of them Australian tourists.
He was one of three people killed in separate raids Tuesday in the city of Panulang, south of the Indonesian capital of Jakarta
The United States had offered a $10 million reward for Dulmatin.
Since February, police have conducted a series of raids on a suspected Jemaah Islamiyah cell in Aceh that was operating a militant training facility.
Source: VOA
Mr. Yudhoyono made the announcement Wednesday in a speech in the Australian capital Canberra.
Dulmatin, a high-ranking member of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group, is believed to have planned the 2002 bombings on the Indonesian resort island of Bali that killed 202 people, many of them Australian tourists.
He was one of three people killed in separate raids Tuesday in the city of Panulang, south of the Indonesian capital of Jakarta
The United States had offered a $10 million reward for Dulmatin.
Since February, police have conducted a series of raids on a suspected Jemaah Islamiyah cell in Aceh that was operating a militant training facility.
Source: VOA
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