New US National Security Strategy
By Ali Younes
The Obama administration released its National Security Strategy Thursday (May 27) which is consistent with president Obama's approach on issues of international cooperation, terrorism, and nuclear policy. The document is largely an internationalist approach by an internationalist president who seeks cooperation with the world’s economic powers and international institutions in order to ensure continuity of American economic prosperity and its position as the world’s only superpower.
On the issue of terrorism the document did not make any significant changes from those of the Bush administration. Terrorism is still dealt with as an issue of “war” as oppose to “criminal” matter. Obama’s terrorism policies are a continuation of the same policies under Bush; that said, however, the new strategy no longer uses the words “Islam” or “Jihad” in the same sentences as “terrorism, so as to deny terrorist groups the claim that the United States is at war with all Muslims or with Islam. This is also meant to prevent the flourishing of smaller local extremist groups anywhere in the world from joining Al Qaida in its global “Jihad” by re-defining the US battle against one specific organization and not its conceptual underpinnings.
From the outset, this is significant; the document reads: “the United States is not at war with Islam” and mentioned that the US is battling Al Qaida specifically “the US is waging a global campaign against Al Qaida and its terrorist affiliates”.
The change in terminology is important but it is largely symbolic because the Obama administration terrorism policies are largely a continuation of Bush terrorism policies minus words like “jihadists” extremist Islam” that, according to this administration were empowering groups like Al Qaida by making the United States look like a country at war “or waging a crusade” against Islam itself.
Despite using the term “global campaign” in the document to refer to the war against Al Qaida in one place, and using “we are at war with a specific network, Al Qaida, and its terrorist affiliates” in another, this is only a minor change from the Bush approach.
The term “War” is a legal term; the Bush administration declared that the United States is at “war with Al Qaida” same as this administration; in so doing, this declaratory policy gives the president extraordinary “war powers” as a wartime president. Wartime powers enable the president to override the Congress and the Constitution of the United States as practiced from Abraham Lincoln until George .W. Bush, who, as a “wartime president” invaded both Iraq and Afghanistan under the nose of a terrified congress.
Also, as a wartime president, Bush was able to cow congress into silence and complacency when kidnapping foreign persons in foreign countries, surveillance against American citizens without court warrants, imprisoning American citizens without legal charges, the Rendition program (also practiced under Clinton) and establishing secret prisons in foreign countries to extract confessions through torture. (Several Arab countries were shamelessly participating in this program).
International law was also violated by President Bush when dealing with US-held detainees as enemy combatants depriving them, therefore, of Geneva Conventions protocols protections.
Under Obama these practices continued to be practiced with only minor cosmetic changes if any at all such as authorizing the CIA to kill or assassinate Anwar Al Awlaki, an American citizen of Yemeni origins who is affiliated with Al Qaida in Yemen.
Despite Obama’s promises to close Guantanamo Bay prison, it is still holds its inmates, some indefinitely and the administration is expanding the Bagram prison, in Afghanistan, which will be outside the jurisdiction of US laws and international laws as well.
Overall, the document, emphasized a “soft power “approach to international relations and broke with Bush’s neoconic grand designs to change the world in the US image.
Ali Younes is a writer and political analyst based in Washington D.C. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. He can be reached at: ali.younes@charter.net.
The Obama administration released its National Security Strategy Thursday (May 27) which is consistent with president Obama's approach on issues of international cooperation, terrorism, and nuclear policy. The document is largely an internationalist approach by an internationalist president who seeks cooperation with the world’s economic powers and international institutions in order to ensure continuity of American economic prosperity and its position as the world’s only superpower.
On the issue of terrorism the document did not make any significant changes from those of the Bush administration. Terrorism is still dealt with as an issue of “war” as oppose to “criminal” matter. Obama’s terrorism policies are a continuation of the same policies under Bush; that said, however, the new strategy no longer uses the words “Islam” or “Jihad” in the same sentences as “terrorism, so as to deny terrorist groups the claim that the United States is at war with all Muslims or with Islam. This is also meant to prevent the flourishing of smaller local extremist groups anywhere in the world from joining Al Qaida in its global “Jihad” by re-defining the US battle against one specific organization and not its conceptual underpinnings.
From the outset, this is significant; the document reads: “the United States is not at war with Islam” and mentioned that the US is battling Al Qaida specifically “the US is waging a global campaign against Al Qaida and its terrorist affiliates”.
The change in terminology is important but it is largely symbolic because the Obama administration terrorism policies are largely a continuation of Bush terrorism policies minus words like “jihadists” extremist Islam” that, according to this administration were empowering groups like Al Qaida by making the United States look like a country at war “or waging a crusade” against Islam itself.
Despite using the term “global campaign” in the document to refer to the war against Al Qaida in one place, and using “we are at war with a specific network, Al Qaida, and its terrorist affiliates” in another, this is only a minor change from the Bush approach.
The term “War” is a legal term; the Bush administration declared that the United States is at “war with Al Qaida” same as this administration; in so doing, this declaratory policy gives the president extraordinary “war powers” as a wartime president. Wartime powers enable the president to override the Congress and the Constitution of the United States as practiced from Abraham Lincoln until George .W. Bush, who, as a “wartime president” invaded both Iraq and Afghanistan under the nose of a terrified congress.
Also, as a wartime president, Bush was able to cow congress into silence and complacency when kidnapping foreign persons in foreign countries, surveillance against American citizens without court warrants, imprisoning American citizens without legal charges, the Rendition program (also practiced under Clinton) and establishing secret prisons in foreign countries to extract confessions through torture. (Several Arab countries were shamelessly participating in this program).
International law was also violated by President Bush when dealing with US-held detainees as enemy combatants depriving them, therefore, of Geneva Conventions protocols protections.
Under Obama these practices continued to be practiced with only minor cosmetic changes if any at all such as authorizing the CIA to kill or assassinate Anwar Al Awlaki, an American citizen of Yemeni origins who is affiliated with Al Qaida in Yemen.
Despite Obama’s promises to close Guantanamo Bay prison, it is still holds its inmates, some indefinitely and the administration is expanding the Bagram prison, in Afghanistan, which will be outside the jurisdiction of US laws and international laws as well.
Overall, the document, emphasized a “soft power “approach to international relations and broke with Bush’s neoconic grand designs to change the world in the US image.
Ali Younes is a writer and political analyst based in Washington D.C. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. He can be reached at: ali.younes@charter.net.
Sunday, May 30, 2010 |
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Statement On Wartime Contracting In Iraq And Afghanistan
Statement Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Good morning, Co-chair Thibault, Co-Chair Shays, and members of the commission. I am pleased to be here with you today to discuss the FBI’s efforts to combat international contract corruption.
Since the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002, the United States government has privatized hundreds of functions that were conducted by military personnel in previous contingency operations and, in the process, has spent over $770 billion on private contractors. These contractors provide services and supplies as well as logistical and tactical support to the U.S. military in both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the reconstruction efforts of these two countries. While the vast majority of these contractors are legitimate, the FBI and its partners have also seen the emergence of complex and wide-ranging contractor fraud schemes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.
Specifically, the majority of International Contract Corruption Task Force investigations involve two principal characters: U.S. contracting officers (both uniform and civilian) and government contractors. As is the case in most white-collar crimes, the primary motivating force is greed. The illegal conduct predominantly involves the illegal payment of bribes/kickbacks in exchange for government contracts and theft of government property such as diesel fuel.
To combat these and other fraud schemes, the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI established the International Contract Corruption Initiative (ICCI) in November 2005. The mission of ICCI was to evaluate the extent of the crime problem, engage with other law enforcement agencies designated with oversight, develop a strategy to address the problem, and provide support to field offices conducting related corruption and fraud investigations.
The ICCI quickly revealed that the crime problem was immense and that it would take a coordinated approach to tackle the issue effectively. In 2006, after consulting with U.S. Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies tasked with investigating fraud related to the war, reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts, we joined our partners in standing up the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF). Participants initially included: Department of Defense Inspector General - Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Department of State, Office of Inspector General (DOS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Agency for International Development - Office of Inspector General (USAID), and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division - Major Procurement Fraud Unit (Army CID/MPFU).
In early 2009, three additional agencies joined the ICCTF—Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS). The ICCTF works closely with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force.
Joint Operations Center
To further interagency cooperation and coordination, we worked together once again to establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in 2007. The JOC, staffed by representatives from all nine ICCTF agencies and co-located in FBI space, goes along way in ensuring de-confliction of cases. The FBI’s International Corruption Unit (ICU) unit chief manages the daily administration of the JOC. The Board of Governors (BOGs), comprised of executive managers from each of the task force agencies, oversee both the ICCTF and JOC, to ensure standardization of operation and real-time sharing of information. Agency representatives work shoulder to shoulder, de-conflicting investigations, sharing intelligence, and supporting operations overseas. Task force agents are currently investigating nearly 300 joint cases in the U.S. and overseas which are directly supported by the JOC.
The FBI has also committed seven supervisory special agents, four intelligence analysts, two management and program analysts, and two administrative support personnel to the JOC in support of the ICCTF mission. Other ICCTF agencies have committed a total of eight intelligence analysts to the JOC, as well as a special agent from each agency to serve as that agencies’ JOC representative. JOC personnel collect and disseminate intelligence to ICCTF agencies, FBI field offices, and the intelligence community at large in furtherance of the intelligence cycle and in support of ICCTF field operations. To date, JOC analysts have responded to more than 300 requests for assistance (RFAs), provided direct support to top priority ICCTF cases, and initiated proactive intelligence assessments to identify trends and patterns.
Coordination with DOJ and the National Procurement Fraud Task Force
DOJ has established a coordinated and unified approach to combating procurement fraud, including fraud relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and reconstruction efforts in those countries. DOJ has devoted an array of resources and expertise to this important mission. The Antitrust Division, the Civil Division, and numerous U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have devoted substantial resources and coordinated their efforts with the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Public Integrity Section, Office of International Affairs Section, and the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.
DOJ has been working closely with the ICCTF and the JOC to investigate and prosecute procurement fraud relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rebuilding of those countries.
In an arrangement that ensures the maximum degree of coordination, the Director of the National Procurement Fraud Task Force serves as a primary point of contact for both the JOC and the ICCTF. He provides guidance to law enforcement agents during the early stages of their investigations, and assists the agents in identifying the best venue to prosecute cases. In addition, the Director tracks all prosecutions of contract fraud cases associated with the wars and rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to the efforts undertaken by the Department’s Criminal, Civil, and Antitrust Divisions, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country also have brought numerous warzone cases. Among them are many high-profile and sophisticated procurement fraud cases, such as those handled by the LOGCAP Working Group in the Central District of Illinois, and the United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York, among others.
As of May 2010, the Department had brought criminal charges against approximately 100 individuals and six companies for public corruption and government fraud relating to wars and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to civil claims brought or settled against a number of contractors.
FBI TDY Program in Support of ICCTF
Since June 2007, FBI agents have been deployed on 120-day temporary duty (TDY) rotations to conduct investigations in support of the ICCTF mission. The FBI currently deploys 35-40 agents per year to locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. These agents work with other ICCTF partners to initiate and conduct investigations. FBI agents in theater report to the FBI legat and coordinate operations with the FBI’s International Operations Division (IOD). In cooperation with IOD, an assistant legal attaché (ALAT) position was created to oversee the ICCTF mission in Iraq and recently, a similar ALAT position was created to oversee the ICCTF mission in Kuwait. In June of this year, the FBI will deploy a senior-level agent to Afghanistan for a one-year assignment; the FBI anticipates that this position will eventually be converted into a third ICCTF ALAT slot.
International Corruption Unit
The International Corruption Unit (ICU) was created in 2008 to oversee the increasing number of corruption and fraud investigations with an international nexus requiring extensive coordination with FBI field offices, legal attaché offices, U.S. federal agencies, and the law enforcement agencies of host countries. Specifically, the ICU oversees ICCTF matters, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigations, and antitrust investigations. These violations all have an international nexus and are therefore housed within the ICU, which has developed strong liaison relationships with law enforcement entities around the world. The ICU, which also initiates exchange programs with overseas law enforcement partners, is contemplating expansion of its mission into other theaters of operation, such as Pakistan and the continent of Africa.
Since its formation, the ICU has overseen all fraud and corruption cases related to the OCO. This includes all fraud against the U.S. government where the illegal conduct occurred outside the United States and involves United States persons or funds. Since 2004, the ICCTF has initiated nearly 700 investigations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. To date for FY 2010, the ICCTF has 273 pending cases. Only seven months into the fiscal year (FY), the ICCTF has already generated 80 percent of the prior year’s case load. In FY 2009 alone, the ICCTF obtained over $3.3 million in forfeitures/seizures, over $1 million in fines/penalties, and over $1.1 million in restitution. To date in FY 2010, the ICCTF has obtained over $47 million in restitution, and $1 million in forfeitures/seizures.
Successes
Working closely with our partners, sharing information and leveraging all available resources and expertise, the FBI has made significant strides in the area of international corruption. Clearly, there is more work to be done but through a coordinated approach we have become more nimble in our efforts and more able to combat the most egregious offenders.
In December 2009, a former U.S. Army contracting officer was sentenced to over 17 years for his participation in a bribery and money laundering scheme related to bribes paid for contracts awarded in support of the Iraq war. Major John Lee Cockerham, Jr. (U.S. Army) was a former contracting officer responsible for soliciting and reviewing bids for Department of Defense contracts in support of operations in the Middle East, including Operation Iraqi Freedom. The contracts were for the purchase of various products and services, including bottled water destined for soldiers serving in Kuwait and Iraq. The investigation determined Cockerham received favors, cash, and items of value from contractors in exchange for favorable treatment and consideration on contracts awarded in Iraq and Kuwait. Once he agreed to take money in exchange for awarding contracts, John Cockerham directed the contractors to pay his wife, her sister, and others to hide the fact that contractors were paying bribes. His wife has since been sentenced to 41 months in prison. Her sister received 70 months for her role in the scheme. The total restitution orders included more than $14 million.
In January 2010, Michael Wheeler, a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves, was sentenced to 42 months in prison for his participation in a wide-ranging bribery conspiracy involving the U.S. government, the Republic of Iraq and the Coalition Provisional Authority - South Central Region (CPA-SC) in Al-Hillah, Iraq.
Specifically, Wheeler conspired from December 2003 to December 2005 with at least three others to rig bids on contracts being awarded by the CPA-SC so that more than 20 contracts—worth approximately $8 million—were awarded to a co-conspirator. That individual, in turn, provided Wheeler and several other co-conspirators with more than $1 million in cash, SUVs, sports cars, a motorcycle, jewelry, computers, business class airline tickets, liquor, and promises of future employment.
In March of this year, Michel Jamil was sentenced to 40 months in prison for his participation in a scheme to steal approximately 10 million gallons of fuel from the U.S. Army in Iraq. In his guilty plea, Jamil admitted that he and two of his co-conspirators arranged for the creation of a false memorandum for record (MFR) authorizing individuals, purportedly on behalf of a company serving as a contractor to the U.S. government, to draw fuel from the Victory Bulk Fuel Point (VBFP), Camp Liberty, Iraq, which was owned and operated by the United States. The VBFP supplies aviation and diesel fuel to both military units and U.S. government contractors operating in and around the Victory Base Complex. Jamil admitted that he and his co-conspirators used false MFRs to steal large quantities of fuel from the U.S. Army for subsequent sale on the black market. Jamil admitted that he escorted the trucks to retrieve fuel from the VBFP using false MFRs on approximately 10 to 15 occasions. As a result of the scheme, Jamil received between $75,000 and $87,500 in personal profits.
Unfortunately, these cases represent a small sample of the cases our ICCTF team investigates each and every day. Together, though, we will continue root out the most egregious offenders.
Co-chair Thibault, Co-Chair Shays, and members of the commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you on this important issue. I am now happy to answer any questions.
By Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Good morning, Co-chair Thibault, Co-Chair Shays, and members of the commission. I am pleased to be here with you today to discuss the FBI’s efforts to combat international contract corruption.
Since the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002, the United States government has privatized hundreds of functions that were conducted by military personnel in previous contingency operations and, in the process, has spent over $770 billion on private contractors. These contractors provide services and supplies as well as logistical and tactical support to the U.S. military in both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the reconstruction efforts of these two countries. While the vast majority of these contractors are legitimate, the FBI and its partners have also seen the emergence of complex and wide-ranging contractor fraud schemes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.
Specifically, the majority of International Contract Corruption Task Force investigations involve two principal characters: U.S. contracting officers (both uniform and civilian) and government contractors. As is the case in most white-collar crimes, the primary motivating force is greed. The illegal conduct predominantly involves the illegal payment of bribes/kickbacks in exchange for government contracts and theft of government property such as diesel fuel.
To combat these and other fraud schemes, the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI established the International Contract Corruption Initiative (ICCI) in November 2005. The mission of ICCI was to evaluate the extent of the crime problem, engage with other law enforcement agencies designated with oversight, develop a strategy to address the problem, and provide support to field offices conducting related corruption and fraud investigations.
The ICCI quickly revealed that the crime problem was immense and that it would take a coordinated approach to tackle the issue effectively. In 2006, after consulting with U.S. Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies tasked with investigating fraud related to the war, reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts, we joined our partners in standing up the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF). Participants initially included: Department of Defense Inspector General - Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Department of State, Office of Inspector General (DOS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Agency for International Development - Office of Inspector General (USAID), and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division - Major Procurement Fraud Unit (Army CID/MPFU).
In early 2009, three additional agencies joined the ICCTF—Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS). The ICCTF works closely with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force.
Joint Operations Center
To further interagency cooperation and coordination, we worked together once again to establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in 2007. The JOC, staffed by representatives from all nine ICCTF agencies and co-located in FBI space, goes along way in ensuring de-confliction of cases. The FBI’s International Corruption Unit (ICU) unit chief manages the daily administration of the JOC. The Board of Governors (BOGs), comprised of executive managers from each of the task force agencies, oversee both the ICCTF and JOC, to ensure standardization of operation and real-time sharing of information. Agency representatives work shoulder to shoulder, de-conflicting investigations, sharing intelligence, and supporting operations overseas. Task force agents are currently investigating nearly 300 joint cases in the U.S. and overseas which are directly supported by the JOC.
The FBI has also committed seven supervisory special agents, four intelligence analysts, two management and program analysts, and two administrative support personnel to the JOC in support of the ICCTF mission. Other ICCTF agencies have committed a total of eight intelligence analysts to the JOC, as well as a special agent from each agency to serve as that agencies’ JOC representative. JOC personnel collect and disseminate intelligence to ICCTF agencies, FBI field offices, and the intelligence community at large in furtherance of the intelligence cycle and in support of ICCTF field operations. To date, JOC analysts have responded to more than 300 requests for assistance (RFAs), provided direct support to top priority ICCTF cases, and initiated proactive intelligence assessments to identify trends and patterns.
Coordination with DOJ and the National Procurement Fraud Task Force
DOJ has established a coordinated and unified approach to combating procurement fraud, including fraud relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and reconstruction efforts in those countries. DOJ has devoted an array of resources and expertise to this important mission. The Antitrust Division, the Civil Division, and numerous U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have devoted substantial resources and coordinated their efforts with the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Public Integrity Section, Office of International Affairs Section, and the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.
DOJ has been working closely with the ICCTF and the JOC to investigate and prosecute procurement fraud relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rebuilding of those countries.
In an arrangement that ensures the maximum degree of coordination, the Director of the National Procurement Fraud Task Force serves as a primary point of contact for both the JOC and the ICCTF. He provides guidance to law enforcement agents during the early stages of their investigations, and assists the agents in identifying the best venue to prosecute cases. In addition, the Director tracks all prosecutions of contract fraud cases associated with the wars and rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to the efforts undertaken by the Department’s Criminal, Civil, and Antitrust Divisions, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country also have brought numerous warzone cases. Among them are many high-profile and sophisticated procurement fraud cases, such as those handled by the LOGCAP Working Group in the Central District of Illinois, and the United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York, among others.
As of May 2010, the Department had brought criminal charges against approximately 100 individuals and six companies for public corruption and government fraud relating to wars and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to civil claims brought or settled against a number of contractors.
FBI TDY Program in Support of ICCTF
Since June 2007, FBI agents have been deployed on 120-day temporary duty (TDY) rotations to conduct investigations in support of the ICCTF mission. The FBI currently deploys 35-40 agents per year to locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. These agents work with other ICCTF partners to initiate and conduct investigations. FBI agents in theater report to the FBI legat and coordinate operations with the FBI’s International Operations Division (IOD). In cooperation with IOD, an assistant legal attaché (ALAT) position was created to oversee the ICCTF mission in Iraq and recently, a similar ALAT position was created to oversee the ICCTF mission in Kuwait. In June of this year, the FBI will deploy a senior-level agent to Afghanistan for a one-year assignment; the FBI anticipates that this position will eventually be converted into a third ICCTF ALAT slot.
International Corruption Unit
The International Corruption Unit (ICU) was created in 2008 to oversee the increasing number of corruption and fraud investigations with an international nexus requiring extensive coordination with FBI field offices, legal attaché offices, U.S. federal agencies, and the law enforcement agencies of host countries. Specifically, the ICU oversees ICCTF matters, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigations, and antitrust investigations. These violations all have an international nexus and are therefore housed within the ICU, which has developed strong liaison relationships with law enforcement entities around the world. The ICU, which also initiates exchange programs with overseas law enforcement partners, is contemplating expansion of its mission into other theaters of operation, such as Pakistan and the continent of Africa.
Since its formation, the ICU has overseen all fraud and corruption cases related to the OCO. This includes all fraud against the U.S. government where the illegal conduct occurred outside the United States and involves United States persons or funds. Since 2004, the ICCTF has initiated nearly 700 investigations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. To date for FY 2010, the ICCTF has 273 pending cases. Only seven months into the fiscal year (FY), the ICCTF has already generated 80 percent of the prior year’s case load. In FY 2009 alone, the ICCTF obtained over $3.3 million in forfeitures/seizures, over $1 million in fines/penalties, and over $1.1 million in restitution. To date in FY 2010, the ICCTF has obtained over $47 million in restitution, and $1 million in forfeitures/seizures.
Successes
Working closely with our partners, sharing information and leveraging all available resources and expertise, the FBI has made significant strides in the area of international corruption. Clearly, there is more work to be done but through a coordinated approach we have become more nimble in our efforts and more able to combat the most egregious offenders.
In December 2009, a former U.S. Army contracting officer was sentenced to over 17 years for his participation in a bribery and money laundering scheme related to bribes paid for contracts awarded in support of the Iraq war. Major John Lee Cockerham, Jr. (U.S. Army) was a former contracting officer responsible for soliciting and reviewing bids for Department of Defense contracts in support of operations in the Middle East, including Operation Iraqi Freedom. The contracts were for the purchase of various products and services, including bottled water destined for soldiers serving in Kuwait and Iraq. The investigation determined Cockerham received favors, cash, and items of value from contractors in exchange for favorable treatment and consideration on contracts awarded in Iraq and Kuwait. Once he agreed to take money in exchange for awarding contracts, John Cockerham directed the contractors to pay his wife, her sister, and others to hide the fact that contractors were paying bribes. His wife has since been sentenced to 41 months in prison. Her sister received 70 months for her role in the scheme. The total restitution orders included more than $14 million.
In January 2010, Michael Wheeler, a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves, was sentenced to 42 months in prison for his participation in a wide-ranging bribery conspiracy involving the U.S. government, the Republic of Iraq and the Coalition Provisional Authority - South Central Region (CPA-SC) in Al-Hillah, Iraq.
Specifically, Wheeler conspired from December 2003 to December 2005 with at least three others to rig bids on contracts being awarded by the CPA-SC so that more than 20 contracts—worth approximately $8 million—were awarded to a co-conspirator. That individual, in turn, provided Wheeler and several other co-conspirators with more than $1 million in cash, SUVs, sports cars, a motorcycle, jewelry, computers, business class airline tickets, liquor, and promises of future employment.
In March of this year, Michel Jamil was sentenced to 40 months in prison for his participation in a scheme to steal approximately 10 million gallons of fuel from the U.S. Army in Iraq. In his guilty plea, Jamil admitted that he and two of his co-conspirators arranged for the creation of a false memorandum for record (MFR) authorizing individuals, purportedly on behalf of a company serving as a contractor to the U.S. government, to draw fuel from the Victory Bulk Fuel Point (VBFP), Camp Liberty, Iraq, which was owned and operated by the United States. The VBFP supplies aviation and diesel fuel to both military units and U.S. government contractors operating in and around the Victory Base Complex. Jamil admitted that he and his co-conspirators used false MFRs to steal large quantities of fuel from the U.S. Army for subsequent sale on the black market. Jamil admitted that he escorted the trucks to retrieve fuel from the VBFP using false MFRs on approximately 10 to 15 occasions. As a result of the scheme, Jamil received between $75,000 and $87,500 in personal profits.
Unfortunately, these cases represent a small sample of the cases our ICCTF team investigates each and every day. Together, though, we will continue root out the most egregious offenders.
Co-chair Thibault, Co-Chair Shays, and members of the commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you on this important issue. I am now happy to answer any questions.
Monday, May 24, 2010 |
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Iraq Court Hands Down Death Sentence For Al Qaeda Member
An Iraqi court has sentenced to death an Al Qaeda operative who took part in the kidnapping and killing of five Russian citizens in Baghdad back in 2006.
A legal expert told French media in Baghdad that the sentence is based on the anti-terrorism law as well as the charge of abducting and killing five employees of the Russian embassy in Baghdad, Itar-Tass news agency reported.
“That was a malicious crime perpetrated against diplomats, which aimed to force certain countries to close down their embassies in Baghdad – the goal sought by Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations,” the source noted.
According to the agency, Russian Ambassador to Baghdad Valeryan Shuvayev has welcomed the sentence.
"This is the first militant convicted on these charges, and there may be more,” he said.
Shuvayev pointed out that the embassy has asked Iraqi and US authorities to help in the investigation of the crime and in the search for the bodies of the dead.
The kidnapping occurred on June 3, 2006 when several armed men attacked a car carrying Russian embassy employees. Four of the employees were kidnapped and one was killed on the spot.
The Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced the kidnapped embassy workers’ death on June 27, 2006.
Source: RT
A legal expert told French media in Baghdad that the sentence is based on the anti-terrorism law as well as the charge of abducting and killing five employees of the Russian embassy in Baghdad, Itar-Tass news agency reported.
“That was a malicious crime perpetrated against diplomats, which aimed to force certain countries to close down their embassies in Baghdad – the goal sought by Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations,” the source noted.
According to the agency, Russian Ambassador to Baghdad Valeryan Shuvayev has welcomed the sentence.
"This is the first militant convicted on these charges, and there may be more,” he said.
Shuvayev pointed out that the embassy has asked Iraqi and US authorities to help in the investigation of the crime and in the search for the bodies of the dead.
The kidnapping occurred on June 3, 2006 when several armed men attacked a car carrying Russian embassy employees. Four of the employees were kidnapped and one was killed on the spot.
The Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced the kidnapped embassy workers’ death on June 27, 2006.
Source: RT
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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Yemeni-American Muslim Cleric Urges Muslims To Kill US Soldiers
A radical U.S.-born Muslim cleric is urging Muslims serving in the U.S. Army to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In a video posted Sunday on Islamist militant websites, Anwar al-Awlaki said he justifies the deaths of U.S. soldiers because Americans have intentionally killed what he said were millions of Muslim civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq.
He also praised U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people last year at Fort Hood, a U.S. military base in the southern state of Texas. He said in the video that Hasan performed a "heroic act."
Last month, U.S. officials said the Obama administration had authorized the CIA to capture or kill Awlaki, an al-Qaida operative born in the U.S. to Yemeni parents.
Awlaki is believed to be hiding in a mountainous region in southeastern Yemen's Shabwa province.
Yemen intensified its campaign against al-Qaida militants after the group's local branch, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, claimed responsibility for the failed bombing of a U.S.-bound passenger jet last December.
Source: VOA
In a video posted Sunday on Islamist militant websites, Anwar al-Awlaki said he justifies the deaths of U.S. soldiers because Americans have intentionally killed what he said were millions of Muslim civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq.
He also praised U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people last year at Fort Hood, a U.S. military base in the southern state of Texas. He said in the video that Hasan performed a "heroic act."
Last month, U.S. officials said the Obama administration had authorized the CIA to capture or kill Awlaki, an al-Qaida operative born in the U.S. to Yemeni parents.
Awlaki is believed to be hiding in a mountainous region in southeastern Yemen's Shabwa province.
Yemen intensified its campaign against al-Qaida militants after the group's local branch, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, claimed responsibility for the failed bombing of a U.S.-bound passenger jet last December.
Source: VOA
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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The Financial Crisis And Leviathan
By Robert Higgs
Since the early twentieth century, periods of real or perceived national emergency have been “critical episodes” in the growth of government’s size, scope, and power in the United States and in many other countries. Hence, the concise conceptualization: Crisis and Leviathan (the main title of my 1987 book on the growth of government in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century).
In the past century, the first five such critical episodes in the United States were: World War I; the Great Depression; World War II; a multi-faceted set of crises associated with the civil-rights revolution and the Vietnam War, roughly coincident with the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon; and the post 9/11 events associated with the so-called War on Terror and the U.S. attacks on and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We are now amid another such critical episode, which springs from the housing bust that began in 2006, the economic recession that began late in 2007, and the financial debacle that reached its climax in September 2008.
The current troubles are complex and raise a multitude of questions. Many books and articles no doubt will be written to analyze these various issues in scholarly depth and detail, and certainly anything we might say today must be regarded as preliminary, at best. I focus here on a few aspects of the present episode that relate closely to my own research on the growth of government, a field of study to which I have returned again and again over the past thirty years.
I
The current recession has elicited many comparisons with earlier business downturns, especially with the Great Depression. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke is often described as an expert on the Great Depression who takes its lessons, as he understands them, deeply into account as he formulates and implements Fed policies. Likewise, many other economists have revisited the Great Depression recently in search of lessons applicable to current policy-making. In all of these reflections, the mainstream economics profession in general has distinguished itself by an astonishing superficiality of historical knowledge and lack of theoretical prowess.
The swiftness with which a great many mainstream economists have reverted to the simplistic “vulgar Keynesianism” that had its heyday from the late 1940s to the late 1960s has been nothing short of shocking, given that by the end of the 1970s such old-fashioned Keynesianism seemed to have been completely discredited and superseded in the leading echelons of the mainstream economics profession. Now it has come roaring back. Of course, the general public, whose understanding of such matters is always primitive, and the politicians, who are always looking for plausible intellectual rationales to excuse their insatiable spending, borrowing, and power-grabbing, had never abandoned vulgar Keynesianism, so they were elated to find that the economic “experts” were again confirming their own self-interested inclinations.
From such vulgar Keynesian thinking flowed the succession of “stimulus” spending measures, beginning with the Bush administration’s, carried out in the spring of 2008. Other governments have gone down the same foolish path. Of course, as any competent economist could have testified even fifty years ago, such temporary government-spending surges give people money that, for the most part, they save or use to pay off debts, rather than spending it along the lines envisioned by Keynesian “multiplier” analysis to set in motion an upward spiral of income, expenditure, real output, and employment. Much of the so-called stimulus spending in the United States has served only to bulk up the pay and benefits of government employees (federal, state, and local), effectively transferring income from the private sector to the government sector, and to reward other groups, such as the United Auto Workers and low-income home buyers, for their support of the Obama administration—past, present, or future.
Bernanke and his colleagues in other central banks are taking credit for saving the financial system and even for saving the world from a repetition of the Great Depression—claims that must be treated with extreme skepticism. In any event, however, they have certainly created the potential for rapidly accelerating consumer-price inflation, should the banks become less apprehensive about their balance sheets and employ their vast excess-reserve balances to resume their lending and investing on a more normal basis.
Bernanke expresses confidence that he has the “tools” to rein in such potentially inflationary bank action, mainly by raising the interest rate the Fed pays banks on their deposits at the Fed, but one may well doubt whether he will be able to use those tools effectively. When interest rates begin to rise substantially, as they must sooner or later, great political pressure will be brought against tighter-money actions by the Fed and other central banks; the politicians will protest increases in interest rates at a time when unemployment remains at an elevated rate and other aspects of the recession linger, as well. So, even if Bernanke has the effective tools he claims to have, the question remains as to whether he will have the personal courage and the political support required to use those tools effectively.
II
One aspect of the current crisis that has come as anything but a surprise is that the politicians and their supporting coalition of crony capitalists and other backers have certainly not (in the immortal words of Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel) allowed “a crisis to go to waste.” The past two years have witnessed one power-grab or institutional takeover after another, most notably of AIG, Fannie, Freddie, General Motors, and Chrysler. Under the TARP scheme, the Treasury has taken ownership positions in hundreds of large banks by acquiring preferred shares and warrants. Virtually all residential mortgage lending now ultimately springs from the secondary market and guarantees provided by Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie Mae, FHA, and VA. This aspect of the government’s power-grab has been especially important because by continuing to pump funds into dodgy mortgages, the government is preventing the necessary restructuring of the housing-construction industry and the mortgage-credit sector, propping up unqualified and underwater borrowers and ill-managed and even insolvent lenders, and thereby creating great potential for a second round of the housing/housing-finance bust in the near-term future.
As the huge recent expansion of the government’s size and scope has proceeded, the Treasury’s fiscal condition has deteriorated badly. The federal deficit jumped from an amount equal to about 3 percent of GDP in fiscal 2008 to an amount equal to about 10 percent of GDP in fiscal 2009, and even the government’s forecasts now project deficits in the neighborhood of $1 trillion per year for the next decade. Thus, the U.S. government’s debt has exploded, and will continue to rise relentlessly—or, it will do so as long as willing buyers can be found for bonds promising only modest nominal yields, a market that Uncle Sam can no longer assume will persist indefinitely. (The Chinese and other major buyers are already grousing and insisting that the U.S. Treasury act more prudently.)
While the government proper was expanding its size, scope, and power, the Fed was greatly expanding the magnitude and scope of its own balance sheet and, in effect, engaging in “industrial policy” by singling out particular firms and industries for assistance, while steering clear of others in equally dire condition. If the Fed is not “picking winners,” it is certainly deciding who will be spared a market-determined fate as a loser. Fed officials insist that they intend to withdraw from many of the new areas they have recently entered, once the crisis has passed, but it will be surprising if the recent “emergency” policies do not remain in the Fed’s arsenal, bulking up its power, and equally surprising if it sloughs off all of the unusual types of “securities” it has acquired in the past two years.
At the moment, the Fed is seeking—and it, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity may well be given—wide-ranging statutory authority to reorganize preemptively any seemingly failing firm (not only banks) whose failure would pose, in the Fed’s estimation, a “systemic risk.” Such authority would greatly expand the Fed’s current power as a monetary central planner by adding a role as risk-management central planner. Regardless of whether the Fed, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity ends up the winner of the current power scramble, the possible repercussions of this expanded power on the operation of the capital markets is frightful to contemplate.
III
As the current troubles have led many economists and others to revisit the government’s policies during the 1930s, some have concluded that even though the New Deal’s hodgepodge of policies never brought about full recovery, the action that most economists believe did effect a full recovery—in Paul Krugman’s words, “the large public works program, otherwise known as World War II, that ended the Great Depression”—suggests a remedy for today’s recession along similar lines. In retrospect, it is clear that this belief in the creation of “wartime prosperity” by massive government spending and deficit financing did more than anything else to bring about acceptance of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s. Even today, not only the general public but most professional economists remain firmly convinced that, as the familiar saying maintains, “the war got the economy out of the Great Depression,” and hence a serious recession such as the present one naturally causes them to recall this supposed “lesson” of economic history. Among many lesser lights, Martin Feldstein, one of the country’s most eminent and influential economists, has recently proposed what amounts to an exercise in military Keynesianism as a stimulus measure.
The fly in this ointment, however, is that the lesson almost everyone has drawn from the events of the 1940s is false; the common belief is a myth. When we take apart the simplistic Keynesian analysis of the war’s effect on the economy and look carefully at what actually happened to the various components of the labor force, the capital stock, and the gross domestic product, we see that the economic events of the war years represent a classic case of a command economy’s sacrificing butter—not to mention life, liberty, and property—for the sake of producing and deploying more guns.
A single graph suffices to give us a more accurate portrayal of the economy’s performance in the 1930s and 1940s (for a complete analysis, see the first five chapters of my 2006 book Depression, War, and Cold War).
As the graph shows, real GDP dropped sharply in the early 1930s, then recovered rapidly after 1933, but it did not reach its high-employment growth trend until 1941, when the nature of the economy’s output (shifting rapidly into war production) was beginning to obscure the meaning of data that purport to measure “real output.” If we accept the standard data, a huge war boom appears to have occurred during the war years, followed by a sharp downturn, concentrated in 1946, after which the economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend (shown in the figure by the straight line connecting the [logarithms of the] values for 1929 and 1948).
Looking at the private part of GDP—the part with a much clearer meaning, owing to its derivation from freely-made consumer and investor choices about the use of privately owned funds—we see a similar pattern during the 1930s, but a completely different pattern during the 1940s. After 1941, private output of both consumer and investor goods fell to much lower levels and remained submerged far below the high-employment growth trend throughout the war years. Private real output did not exceed its 1941 rate until 1946, when it shot up by about 30 percent in a single year. Afterward, the private economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend. Real prosperity had been achieved at last, for the first time since 1929.
But wait, the critics protest: didn’t the war wipe out mass unemployment? Of course, it did. However, this elimination of mass unemployment had nothing to do with Keynesian fiscal policy (or, for that matter, with the concurrent, highly expansive monetary policy) and everything to do with the military draft, which pulled the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar labor force into the armed forces. If the economy has 5–7 million persons unemployed, then drafting 10 million prime-age workers (and thereby inducing millions of others to enlist “voluntarily”) will “solve” the unemployment problem every time. To use the same policy today, the U.S. authorities need only to conscript about 30 million men—not, I daresay, a political idea whose time has come.
Indeed, the idea is preposterous, and so, more generally, is looking to the government’s alleged “large public works program, otherwise known as World War II” as a model of how to deal with today’s economic crisis. Rather than allow ourselves to be mesmerized by a statistically spurious bulge of real GDP during World War II, we are better advised to recall the wartime rationing of many ordinary consumer goods, the shortages or complete production closures of many consumer goods (e.g., automobiles, most consumer durables), the preemption of public transport by the military authorities, and the wage, price, and rent controls that caused, among many other undesirable consequences, drastic deterioration in the quality of many goods and services. Whatever else the war might have accomplished, it certainly did not produce conditions that we may properly describe as genuine prosperity.
IV
Even if policy makers decline to adopt World War II-type policies as remedies for the current recession, the immense magnitude of the present-day military-industrial complex certainly complicates all efforts to effect a recovery, by draining more than $1 trillion a year from the economy’s potential to produce private consumer and producer goods. The current long-running wars and military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will probably never end, although eventually they may be scaled back somewhat, only add to the economic drain on U.S. resources. So far, more than $1 trillion has been expended for these ill-fated adventures, and their total cost may eventually cumulate to several times this amount, not simply because they, like the U.S. military presence in Japan, Korea, and various European countries, will continue indefinitely, but also because of the need to care for a multitude of physically and psychologically disabled veterans over a span of several decades.
Even if the wars in the Middle East were concluded overnight, however, a huge distortion would continue to affect the U.S. economy, owing to the normal operation of the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of the current armed forces and their far-flung empire of more than 800 large overseas bases. This military hypertrophy reflects not an attempt to pump up the macroeconomy, as military Keynesians would have it, but rather the devotion of U.S. ruling elites to the maintenance of global military hegemony, ultimately capped by the attainment of “full-spectrum dominance”—“control of land, sea, air and space and all attendant resources” over the entire world.
Why do U.S. policy makers seek such god-like control of the planet? To the extent that the military leadership itself contributes to shaping national-security policies, this o’erleaping ambition merely expresses the latest phase of the military’s longstanding maniacal quest for total power—the undoubted ability to win any and all conceivable wars. Among the civilian leadership, the motives range more widely. An important impulse, though it is never mentioned frankly in polite company, is to maintain a foreign military presence configured so as to make the state of Israel as secure as possible. Another abiding interest is to control the worldwide distribution of petroleum, if necessary by bribing, intimidating, or taking military action against the governments of important oil-producing countries, especially in the Persian Gulf region.
Related to this wholly unnecessary quest to control the world’s oil-distribution channels—after all, it does not serve the interests of the oil producers to withhold their product from the world market—is the ambition to play the Great Game by throwing up barriers to the expanding influence of China and India and the residual potential of Russia in southwest Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea region, where vast stores of oil and gas remain to be tapped and brought to market. For more than half a century, U.S. leaders have been obsessed with projecting their country’s power into petro-military adventures of all sorts. However senseless this fixation might seem in a purely economic perspective, we can scarcely deny that the coziest crony capitalists in the oil and related industries have reaped a great deal of income along the way, and owing to their extraordinary political clout, they have every expectation of continuing to reap such income in the future, with the vital assistance of U.S. diplomats and armed forces to grease the skids.
Although the military-industrial-congressional complex is one of the most powerful interest groups in U.S. politics, and we may certainly expect it to struggle forcefully to retain or even to increase the flow of wealth placed at its disposal, the U.S. government’s increasingly precarious financial condition may compel even this powerful coalition to settle for a smaller space at the trough, especially if stagflation sets in as the U.S. economy’s normal condition during the next decade (as I suspect it will). If America’s economic future turns out to be even worse than I now foresee—for example, with rapid inflation, price and capital controls, and a flight from the dollar—then even greater retrenchment of the U.S. military presence abroad will be unavoidable. Such economic ruin would be a heavy price to pay for reining in America’s global hegemony, but, nevertheless, the military retrenchment itself would be a consequence that most of the world’s people would celebrate.
Acknowledgment: This commentary was originally prepared for presentation at a meeting convened by Diapason Commodities Management S.A. in Venice, Italy, April 30, 2010. I am grateful to Sean Corrigan and his colleagues at Diapason for inviting me to speak at this meeting.
Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institute’s quarterly journal The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague. He has been a visiting scholar at Oxford University and Stanford University, and a fellow for the Hoover Institution and the National Science Foundation. He is the author of many books, including Depression, War, and Cold War. This article was published by The Independent Institute and reprinted with permission.
Since the early twentieth century, periods of real or perceived national emergency have been “critical episodes” in the growth of government’s size, scope, and power in the United States and in many other countries. Hence, the concise conceptualization: Crisis and Leviathan (the main title of my 1987 book on the growth of government in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century).
In the past century, the first five such critical episodes in the United States were: World War I; the Great Depression; World War II; a multi-faceted set of crises associated with the civil-rights revolution and the Vietnam War, roughly coincident with the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon; and the post 9/11 events associated with the so-called War on Terror and the U.S. attacks on and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We are now amid another such critical episode, which springs from the housing bust that began in 2006, the economic recession that began late in 2007, and the financial debacle that reached its climax in September 2008.
The current troubles are complex and raise a multitude of questions. Many books and articles no doubt will be written to analyze these various issues in scholarly depth and detail, and certainly anything we might say today must be regarded as preliminary, at best. I focus here on a few aspects of the present episode that relate closely to my own research on the growth of government, a field of study to which I have returned again and again over the past thirty years.
I
The current recession has elicited many comparisons with earlier business downturns, especially with the Great Depression. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke is often described as an expert on the Great Depression who takes its lessons, as he understands them, deeply into account as he formulates and implements Fed policies. Likewise, many other economists have revisited the Great Depression recently in search of lessons applicable to current policy-making. In all of these reflections, the mainstream economics profession in general has distinguished itself by an astonishing superficiality of historical knowledge and lack of theoretical prowess.
The swiftness with which a great many mainstream economists have reverted to the simplistic “vulgar Keynesianism” that had its heyday from the late 1940s to the late 1960s has been nothing short of shocking, given that by the end of the 1970s such old-fashioned Keynesianism seemed to have been completely discredited and superseded in the leading echelons of the mainstream economics profession. Now it has come roaring back. Of course, the general public, whose understanding of such matters is always primitive, and the politicians, who are always looking for plausible intellectual rationales to excuse their insatiable spending, borrowing, and power-grabbing, had never abandoned vulgar Keynesianism, so they were elated to find that the economic “experts” were again confirming their own self-interested inclinations.
From such vulgar Keynesian thinking flowed the succession of “stimulus” spending measures, beginning with the Bush administration’s, carried out in the spring of 2008. Other governments have gone down the same foolish path. Of course, as any competent economist could have testified even fifty years ago, such temporary government-spending surges give people money that, for the most part, they save or use to pay off debts, rather than spending it along the lines envisioned by Keynesian “multiplier” analysis to set in motion an upward spiral of income, expenditure, real output, and employment. Much of the so-called stimulus spending in the United States has served only to bulk up the pay and benefits of government employees (federal, state, and local), effectively transferring income from the private sector to the government sector, and to reward other groups, such as the United Auto Workers and low-income home buyers, for their support of the Obama administration—past, present, or future.
At the same time, Bernanke and other central bankers, obsessed by an irrational fear of deflation, set in motion liquidity-enhancing measures so vast that no one could reasonably have anticipated them. Excess reserves of depository institutions in the United States now substantially exceed $1 trillion, as the banks have simply absorbed the effusions of dollars the Fed has spent to acquire an unprecedented variety of “securities,” including various “toxic” assets that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other ill-managed firms had acquired during the housing boom and later.
Bernanke expresses confidence that he has the “tools” to rein in such potentially inflationary bank action, mainly by raising the interest rate the Fed pays banks on their deposits at the Fed, but one may well doubt whether he will be able to use those tools effectively. When interest rates begin to rise substantially, as they must sooner or later, great political pressure will be brought against tighter-money actions by the Fed and other central banks; the politicians will protest increases in interest rates at a time when unemployment remains at an elevated rate and other aspects of the recession linger, as well. So, even if Bernanke has the effective tools he claims to have, the question remains as to whether he will have the personal courage and the political support required to use those tools effectively.
II
One aspect of the current crisis that has come as anything but a surprise is that the politicians and their supporting coalition of crony capitalists and other backers have certainly not (in the immortal words of Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel) allowed “a crisis to go to waste.” The past two years have witnessed one power-grab or institutional takeover after another, most notably of AIG, Fannie, Freddie, General Motors, and Chrysler. Under the TARP scheme, the Treasury has taken ownership positions in hundreds of large banks by acquiring preferred shares and warrants. Virtually all residential mortgage lending now ultimately springs from the secondary market and guarantees provided by Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie Mae, FHA, and VA. This aspect of the government’s power-grab has been especially important because by continuing to pump funds into dodgy mortgages, the government is preventing the necessary restructuring of the housing-construction industry and the mortgage-credit sector, propping up unqualified and underwater borrowers and ill-managed and even insolvent lenders, and thereby creating great potential for a second round of the housing/housing-finance bust in the near-term future.
As the huge recent expansion of the government’s size and scope has proceeded, the Treasury’s fiscal condition has deteriorated badly. The federal deficit jumped from an amount equal to about 3 percent of GDP in fiscal 2008 to an amount equal to about 10 percent of GDP in fiscal 2009, and even the government’s forecasts now project deficits in the neighborhood of $1 trillion per year for the next decade. Thus, the U.S. government’s debt has exploded, and will continue to rise relentlessly—or, it will do so as long as willing buyers can be found for bonds promising only modest nominal yields, a market that Uncle Sam can no longer assume will persist indefinitely. (The Chinese and other major buyers are already grousing and insisting that the U.S. Treasury act more prudently.)
While the government proper was expanding its size, scope, and power, the Fed was greatly expanding the magnitude and scope of its own balance sheet and, in effect, engaging in “industrial policy” by singling out particular firms and industries for assistance, while steering clear of others in equally dire condition. If the Fed is not “picking winners,” it is certainly deciding who will be spared a market-determined fate as a loser. Fed officials insist that they intend to withdraw from many of the new areas they have recently entered, once the crisis has passed, but it will be surprising if the recent “emergency” policies do not remain in the Fed’s arsenal, bulking up its power, and equally surprising if it sloughs off all of the unusual types of “securities” it has acquired in the past two years.
At the moment, the Fed is seeking—and it, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity may well be given—wide-ranging statutory authority to reorganize preemptively any seemingly failing firm (not only banks) whose failure would pose, in the Fed’s estimation, a “systemic risk.” Such authority would greatly expand the Fed’s current power as a monetary central planner by adding a role as risk-management central planner. Regardless of whether the Fed, the FDIC, or another government regulatory entity ends up the winner of the current power scramble, the possible repercussions of this expanded power on the operation of the capital markets is frightful to contemplate.
III
As the current troubles have led many economists and others to revisit the government’s policies during the 1930s, some have concluded that even though the New Deal’s hodgepodge of policies never brought about full recovery, the action that most economists believe did effect a full recovery—in Paul Krugman’s words, “the large public works program, otherwise known as World War II, that ended the Great Depression”—suggests a remedy for today’s recession along similar lines. In retrospect, it is clear that this belief in the creation of “wartime prosperity” by massive government spending and deficit financing did more than anything else to bring about acceptance of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s. Even today, not only the general public but most professional economists remain firmly convinced that, as the familiar saying maintains, “the war got the economy out of the Great Depression,” and hence a serious recession such as the present one naturally causes them to recall this supposed “lesson” of economic history. Among many lesser lights, Martin Feldstein, one of the country’s most eminent and influential economists, has recently proposed what amounts to an exercise in military Keynesianism as a stimulus measure.
The fly in this ointment, however, is that the lesson almost everyone has drawn from the events of the 1940s is false; the common belief is a myth. When we take apart the simplistic Keynesian analysis of the war’s effect on the economy and look carefully at what actually happened to the various components of the labor force, the capital stock, and the gross domestic product, we see that the economic events of the war years represent a classic case of a command economy’s sacrificing butter—not to mention life, liberty, and property—for the sake of producing and deploying more guns.
A single graph suffices to give us a more accurate portrayal of the economy’s performance in the 1930s and 1940s (for a complete analysis, see the first five chapters of my 2006 book Depression, War, and Cold War).
Looking at the private part of GDP—the part with a much clearer meaning, owing to its derivation from freely-made consumer and investor choices about the use of privately owned funds—we see a similar pattern during the 1930s, but a completely different pattern during the 1940s. After 1941, private output of both consumer and investor goods fell to much lower levels and remained submerged far below the high-employment growth trend throughout the war years. Private real output did not exceed its 1941 rate until 1946, when it shot up by about 30 percent in a single year. Afterward, the private economy moved closely along its high-employment growth trend. Real prosperity had been achieved at last, for the first time since 1929.
But wait, the critics protest: didn’t the war wipe out mass unemployment? Of course, it did. However, this elimination of mass unemployment had nothing to do with Keynesian fiscal policy (or, for that matter, with the concurrent, highly expansive monetary policy) and everything to do with the military draft, which pulled the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar labor force into the armed forces. If the economy has 5–7 million persons unemployed, then drafting 10 million prime-age workers (and thereby inducing millions of others to enlist “voluntarily”) will “solve” the unemployment problem every time. To use the same policy today, the U.S. authorities need only to conscript about 30 million men—not, I daresay, a political idea whose time has come.
Indeed, the idea is preposterous, and so, more generally, is looking to the government’s alleged “large public works program, otherwise known as World War II” as a model of how to deal with today’s economic crisis. Rather than allow ourselves to be mesmerized by a statistically spurious bulge of real GDP during World War II, we are better advised to recall the wartime rationing of many ordinary consumer goods, the shortages or complete production closures of many consumer goods (e.g., automobiles, most consumer durables), the preemption of public transport by the military authorities, and the wage, price, and rent controls that caused, among many other undesirable consequences, drastic deterioration in the quality of many goods and services. Whatever else the war might have accomplished, it certainly did not produce conditions that we may properly describe as genuine prosperity.
IV
Even if policy makers decline to adopt World War II-type policies as remedies for the current recession, the immense magnitude of the present-day military-industrial complex certainly complicates all efforts to effect a recovery, by draining more than $1 trillion a year from the economy’s potential to produce private consumer and producer goods. The current long-running wars and military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will probably never end, although eventually they may be scaled back somewhat, only add to the economic drain on U.S. resources. So far, more than $1 trillion has been expended for these ill-fated adventures, and their total cost may eventually cumulate to several times this amount, not simply because they, like the U.S. military presence in Japan, Korea, and various European countries, will continue indefinitely, but also because of the need to care for a multitude of physically and psychologically disabled veterans over a span of several decades.
Even if the wars in the Middle East were concluded overnight, however, a huge distortion would continue to affect the U.S. economy, owing to the normal operation of the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of the current armed forces and their far-flung empire of more than 800 large overseas bases. This military hypertrophy reflects not an attempt to pump up the macroeconomy, as military Keynesians would have it, but rather the devotion of U.S. ruling elites to the maintenance of global military hegemony, ultimately capped by the attainment of “full-spectrum dominance”—“control of land, sea, air and space and all attendant resources” over the entire world.
Why do U.S. policy makers seek such god-like control of the planet? To the extent that the military leadership itself contributes to shaping national-security policies, this o’erleaping ambition merely expresses the latest phase of the military’s longstanding maniacal quest for total power—the undoubted ability to win any and all conceivable wars. Among the civilian leadership, the motives range more widely. An important impulse, though it is never mentioned frankly in polite company, is to maintain a foreign military presence configured so as to make the state of Israel as secure as possible. Another abiding interest is to control the worldwide distribution of petroleum, if necessary by bribing, intimidating, or taking military action against the governments of important oil-producing countries, especially in the Persian Gulf region.
Related to this wholly unnecessary quest to control the world’s oil-distribution channels—after all, it does not serve the interests of the oil producers to withhold their product from the world market—is the ambition to play the Great Game by throwing up barriers to the expanding influence of China and India and the residual potential of Russia in southwest Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea region, where vast stores of oil and gas remain to be tapped and brought to market. For more than half a century, U.S. leaders have been obsessed with projecting their country’s power into petro-military adventures of all sorts. However senseless this fixation might seem in a purely economic perspective, we can scarcely deny that the coziest crony capitalists in the oil and related industries have reaped a great deal of income along the way, and owing to their extraordinary political clout, they have every expectation of continuing to reap such income in the future, with the vital assistance of U.S. diplomats and armed forces to grease the skids.
Although the military-industrial-congressional complex is one of the most powerful interest groups in U.S. politics, and we may certainly expect it to struggle forcefully to retain or even to increase the flow of wealth placed at its disposal, the U.S. government’s increasingly precarious financial condition may compel even this powerful coalition to settle for a smaller space at the trough, especially if stagflation sets in as the U.S. economy’s normal condition during the next decade (as I suspect it will). If America’s economic future turns out to be even worse than I now foresee—for example, with rapid inflation, price and capital controls, and a flight from the dollar—then even greater retrenchment of the U.S. military presence abroad will be unavoidable. Such economic ruin would be a heavy price to pay for reining in America’s global hegemony, but, nevertheless, the military retrenchment itself would be a consequence that most of the world’s people would celebrate.
Acknowledgment: This commentary was originally prepared for presentation at a meeting convened by Diapason Commodities Management S.A. in Venice, Italy, April 30, 2010. I am grateful to Sean Corrigan and his colleagues at Diapason for inviting me to speak at this meeting.
Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institute’s quarterly journal The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague. He has been a visiting scholar at Oxford University and Stanford University, and a fellow for the Hoover Institution and the National Science Foundation. He is the author of many books, including Depression, War, and Cold War. This article was published by The Independent Institute and reprinted with permission.
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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You, I, They And Rima Fakih Are All The Same
By Qais Nawwaf
It is no exaggeration to state that Rima Fakih's Miss USA victory is widely perceived as a defining moment in Arab American history. Ululations could be heard from Las Vegas to Dearborn to Lebanon. "We are elated by her success," stated Sarah Najjar-Wilson, president of the American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee. Fakih's promoter Rami Haddad credited her with breaking stereotypes of Arabs. Amer Zahr, an Arab-American comedian, wrote in an open letter to Fakih "In this age where we are fighting for an identity, trying to get a box on the census form, attempting to withstand the impending theft of hummus, and having to prove our patriotism over and over, you are now a symbol." Maytha of Kabobfest perceived Fakih's win as validation of Levantine beauty and a means of limiting racist stereotypes and social stigma towards Arabs.
This event was even compared to Barack Obama's winning the presidency.
The excitement expressed by Arab-Americans conveys the perception of achieving a milestone on the long, treacherous road towards what appears to be Arab America's grand dream: acceptance into mainstream American society. This is confirmed by Fakih's own statement "It would show the world that yes, there are Arabs that are beautiful not only in looks, but also on the inside. There are Arabs that are caring, that are good people, and who love the country they live in. I think it would make the Arab image a more positive one."
As an Arab living in the US, nothing could be further from my mind. In light of the US occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe the main political objective of Arabs living in the west generally and the US specifically ought to be disruption of, and eventually putting a halt to, the war machine that has devastated and exhausted the lives of innocent millions. Arab-Americans are in an ideal position to demand this. They live in the belly of the beast, and they are in no need to be educated on the fundamentals of the realities of war and occupation, at least in comparison to the general American public the majority of which is frequently found unable to find Afghanistan and Iraq on a map. Arab and Muslim-Americans' perpetual quest for acceptance, pursued with disregard for the responsibility of seriously opposing the wars and occupations, brings to mind Malcolm X's statement addressing African-American involvement in opposing war on Congolese: "they're able to take these hired killers, put them in American planes, with American bombs, and drop them on African villages, blowing to bits Black men, Black women, Black children, Black babies, and you Black people sitting over here cool like it doesn't even involve you. You're a fool. They'll do it to them today, and do it to you tomorrow. Because you and I and they are all the same."
To seek approval and acceptance by American (read: white) society by an Arab or Muslim in America at a time like this is as ludicrous as a Vietnamese seeking acceptance from American society in the 60s and 70s instead of focusing their energies on putting an end to the carpet bombing and use of napalm on fellow Vietnamese. It's as ridiculous as an Algerian's seeking acceptance into French society during the zenith of Algeria's colonization or a Black slave presenting his best appearance to his master during the Transatlantic slave trade. It is even more ridiculous when such validation arrives in the sexist, degrading vehicle of a beauty pageant, which we're willing to dismiss in return for 15 minutes of fame. Blogger Will Youmans had no qualms with commenting that he was "happy for her even if the pageant is wack and debases women."
Contrary to common understanding among Arab-Americans, an Arab's winning of a beauty pageant does not challenge stereotypes of Arab women. In fact, it confirms them. Subservience to males from underneath the hijab isn't the only stereotype regarding Arab women. The image of the bellydancing, exotic harem girl also permeates western imagination of the Arab world. The physical requirements of winning a beauty pageant do not differ significantly. The image of a bikini-wearing Arab is not exactly a radical shift from the characters of Arabian Nights.
In this vein, Rima Fakih’s accomplishment alleviates some of the pressure sensed by Arab-Americans, generally speaking; the responsibility to prove their humanity to the west. I strongly reject this burden. I believe the burden is on the west to prove its humanity to Arabs and Muslims simply because the US, the "greatest purveyor of violence in the world today" according to Martin Luther King Jr., is occupying Afghanistan and Iraq. I would have understood Arab-Americans' need to give themselves a human face if Afghanistan and Iraq were occupying the US. To date, the Afghani and Iraqi peoples have not shock and awed Washington, used depleted uranium on the American people, attacked people at weddings, imposed crippling sanctions or destroyed American culture. Neither have there been any recorded sightings of Afghani tanks roaming the streets of Chicago or of Iraqi fighter jets disrupting the peace of San Francisco.
I have heard my Arab and Muslim brethren argue that this is a "strategic" move. That is, if we want to gain political clout and influence US foreign policy, we must first challenge the negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims. I see at least two flaws in this argument:
First, humanizing the victim in the perspective of the aggressor is not a prerequisite to liberation. If anything, it's a stalling technique to postpone venturing outside one's comfort zone in order to stand up for justice. I am not aware of any successful liberation campaign that suspended its demand for justice pending successful humanization of the victim in the oppressors' eyes. This "strategy" certainly did not preclude MLK Jr. from condemning his government's policies towards Vietnam while simultaneously working to end Jim Crow and desegregate the south. In any case, an Arab winning the beauty pageant does not threaten the status quo, as the US does not categorically reject Arabs occupying high-profile and even powerful establishments positions. Need I say more than "John Abizaid"? The US cannot genuinely claim that it respects Rima Fakih while it continues to imprison, torture, rape and bomb our sisters in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not the case that the US may consider respecting its Afghani and Iraqi female hostages after an Arab Muslim wins a beauty pageant. The opposite is more likely true; true respect for an Arab beauty pageant and her entire ethnicity and religion may stand a chance only after Afghanistan and Iraq are fully decolonized.
Second, even if we were to assume there is merit in the strategy of humanizing Arabs and Muslims first as a step towards eventually achieving Arab and Muslim political influence, what greater agent for humanization is there than opposing the inhumane occupations? If we want to give ourselves a human face before the American public, what better way to accomplish that than to express genuine concern for the lives and self-determination of those under brutal military occupation? In the words of the late Rachel Corrie, "I think it is a good idea for us all to drop everything and devote our lives to making this [occupation] stop."
I can't blame Arab-Americans for feeling happy about Fakih's new title despite its glaring problems. A community deserves a break when it endures ethnic profiling at workplaces, schools and airports, harsh immigration policies, hate crimes and overall political marginalization. But the yearning for the elusive carrot of acceptance by a society that overwhelmingly continues to acquiesce, if not support, colonization of two Muslim countries is an exercise in futility.
Qais Nawwaf is one of millions of displaced Iraqis. He resides on a colonized part of Indigenous territory commonly referred to as the "United States." He has a degree in a discipline invented by his ancestors: writing. He may be reached at: qnawwaf@gmail.com. This article was published by The Palestine Think Tank and is reprinted with permission.
It is no exaggeration to state that Rima Fakih's Miss USA victory is widely perceived as a defining moment in Arab American history. Ululations could be heard from Las Vegas to Dearborn to Lebanon. "We are elated by her success," stated Sarah Najjar-Wilson, president of the American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee. Fakih's promoter Rami Haddad credited her with breaking stereotypes of Arabs. Amer Zahr, an Arab-American comedian, wrote in an open letter to Fakih "In this age where we are fighting for an identity, trying to get a box on the census form, attempting to withstand the impending theft of hummus, and having to prove our patriotism over and over, you are now a symbol." Maytha of Kabobfest perceived Fakih's win as validation of Levantine beauty and a means of limiting racist stereotypes and social stigma towards Arabs.
This event was even compared to Barack Obama's winning the presidency.
The excitement expressed by Arab-Americans conveys the perception of achieving a milestone on the long, treacherous road towards what appears to be Arab America's grand dream: acceptance into mainstream American society. This is confirmed by Fakih's own statement "It would show the world that yes, there are Arabs that are beautiful not only in looks, but also on the inside. There are Arabs that are caring, that are good people, and who love the country they live in. I think it would make the Arab image a more positive one."
As an Arab living in the US, nothing could be further from my mind. In light of the US occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe the main political objective of Arabs living in the west generally and the US specifically ought to be disruption of, and eventually putting a halt to, the war machine that has devastated and exhausted the lives of innocent millions. Arab-Americans are in an ideal position to demand this. They live in the belly of the beast, and they are in no need to be educated on the fundamentals of the realities of war and occupation, at least in comparison to the general American public the majority of which is frequently found unable to find Afghanistan and Iraq on a map. Arab and Muslim-Americans' perpetual quest for acceptance, pursued with disregard for the responsibility of seriously opposing the wars and occupations, brings to mind Malcolm X's statement addressing African-American involvement in opposing war on Congolese: "they're able to take these hired killers, put them in American planes, with American bombs, and drop them on African villages, blowing to bits Black men, Black women, Black children, Black babies, and you Black people sitting over here cool like it doesn't even involve you. You're a fool. They'll do it to them today, and do it to you tomorrow. Because you and I and they are all the same."
To seek approval and acceptance by American (read: white) society by an Arab or Muslim in America at a time like this is as ludicrous as a Vietnamese seeking acceptance from American society in the 60s and 70s instead of focusing their energies on putting an end to the carpet bombing and use of napalm on fellow Vietnamese. It's as ridiculous as an Algerian's seeking acceptance into French society during the zenith of Algeria's colonization or a Black slave presenting his best appearance to his master during the Transatlantic slave trade. It is even more ridiculous when such validation arrives in the sexist, degrading vehicle of a beauty pageant, which we're willing to dismiss in return for 15 minutes of fame. Blogger Will Youmans had no qualms with commenting that he was "happy for her even if the pageant is wack and debases women."
Contrary to common understanding among Arab-Americans, an Arab's winning of a beauty pageant does not challenge stereotypes of Arab women. In fact, it confirms them. Subservience to males from underneath the hijab isn't the only stereotype regarding Arab women. The image of the bellydancing, exotic harem girl also permeates western imagination of the Arab world. The physical requirements of winning a beauty pageant do not differ significantly. The image of a bikini-wearing Arab is not exactly a radical shift from the characters of Arabian Nights.
In this vein, Rima Fakih’s accomplishment alleviates some of the pressure sensed by Arab-Americans, generally speaking; the responsibility to prove their humanity to the west. I strongly reject this burden. I believe the burden is on the west to prove its humanity to Arabs and Muslims simply because the US, the "greatest purveyor of violence in the world today" according to Martin Luther King Jr., is occupying Afghanistan and Iraq. I would have understood Arab-Americans' need to give themselves a human face if Afghanistan and Iraq were occupying the US. To date, the Afghani and Iraqi peoples have not shock and awed Washington, used depleted uranium on the American people, attacked people at weddings, imposed crippling sanctions or destroyed American culture. Neither have there been any recorded sightings of Afghani tanks roaming the streets of Chicago or of Iraqi fighter jets disrupting the peace of San Francisco.
I have heard my Arab and Muslim brethren argue that this is a "strategic" move. That is, if we want to gain political clout and influence US foreign policy, we must first challenge the negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims. I see at least two flaws in this argument:
First, humanizing the victim in the perspective of the aggressor is not a prerequisite to liberation. If anything, it's a stalling technique to postpone venturing outside one's comfort zone in order to stand up for justice. I am not aware of any successful liberation campaign that suspended its demand for justice pending successful humanization of the victim in the oppressors' eyes. This "strategy" certainly did not preclude MLK Jr. from condemning his government's policies towards Vietnam while simultaneously working to end Jim Crow and desegregate the south. In any case, an Arab winning the beauty pageant does not threaten the status quo, as the US does not categorically reject Arabs occupying high-profile and even powerful establishments positions. Need I say more than "John Abizaid"? The US cannot genuinely claim that it respects Rima Fakih while it continues to imprison, torture, rape and bomb our sisters in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not the case that the US may consider respecting its Afghani and Iraqi female hostages after an Arab Muslim wins a beauty pageant. The opposite is more likely true; true respect for an Arab beauty pageant and her entire ethnicity and religion may stand a chance only after Afghanistan and Iraq are fully decolonized.
Second, even if we were to assume there is merit in the strategy of humanizing Arabs and Muslims first as a step towards eventually achieving Arab and Muslim political influence, what greater agent for humanization is there than opposing the inhumane occupations? If we want to give ourselves a human face before the American public, what better way to accomplish that than to express genuine concern for the lives and self-determination of those under brutal military occupation? In the words of the late Rachel Corrie, "I think it is a good idea for us all to drop everything and devote our lives to making this [occupation] stop."
I can't blame Arab-Americans for feeling happy about Fakih's new title despite its glaring problems. A community deserves a break when it endures ethnic profiling at workplaces, schools and airports, harsh immigration policies, hate crimes and overall political marginalization. But the yearning for the elusive carrot of acceptance by a society that overwhelmingly continues to acquiesce, if not support, colonization of two Muslim countries is an exercise in futility.
Qais Nawwaf is one of millions of displaced Iraqis. He resides on a colonized part of Indigenous territory commonly referred to as the "United States." He has a degree in a discipline invented by his ancestors: writing. He may be reached at: qnawwaf@gmail.com. This article was published by The Palestine Think Tank and is reprinted with permission.
Thursday, May 20, 2010 |
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Saudi Colonel Arrested For Alleged World Cup Terror Plot
(BuaNews) -- Officials in Iraq on Monday arrested a Saudi army official on allegations he was planning to participate in Al-Qaeda attacks on the World Cup.
Colonel Azzam al-Qahtani was accused of conspiring with the terrorist organisations in Baghdad.
Officials behind the arrest were not giving any details of what alleged World Cup attack plans they uncovered.
South African police commissioner Bheki Cele told the South African Parliament two weeks ago that South African police had investigated a threat by Al Shabaab, an al-Qaeda offshoot, and decided it was not credible.
Cele insisted South Africa was more than prepared for any terror threat to the World Cup.
Colonel Azzam al-Qahtani was accused of conspiring with the terrorist organisations in Baghdad.
Officials behind the arrest were not giving any details of what alleged World Cup attack plans they uncovered.
South African police commissioner Bheki Cele told the South African Parliament two weeks ago that South African police had investigated a threat by Al Shabaab, an al-Qaeda offshoot, and decided it was not credible.
Cele insisted South Africa was more than prepared for any terror threat to the World Cup.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Report: Al-Qaida In Iraq Names New 'War Minister'
A U.S.-based intelligence organization says an al-Qaida-linked militant group in Iraq has picked a new "war minister."
The SITE group says the group, known as the Islamic State of Iraq, named al-Nasser Lideen Allah Abu Suleiman on jihadist internet forums Friday.
He was quoted as saying "dark days soaked with blood" are ahead for Iraqi Shi'ites.
The statement comes after U.S. and Iraqi forces killed two al-Qaida in Iraq leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in a raid last month.
Since then, militants have carried out waves of attacks in apparent retaliation for the raid.
Iraqi officials say at least 10 people were injured Friday when a bomb exploded as worshippers were leaving a mosque in a predominantly Shi'ite area south of Baghdad.
Bombings and shootings across Iraq killed at least 119 people Monday - the country's worst day of violence this year. Iraqi officials blamed al-Qaida-linked militants for the violence, but there was no immediate claim of responsibility.
Source: VOA
The SITE group says the group, known as the Islamic State of Iraq, named al-Nasser Lideen Allah Abu Suleiman on jihadist internet forums Friday.
He was quoted as saying "dark days soaked with blood" are ahead for Iraqi Shi'ites.
The statement comes after U.S. and Iraqi forces killed two al-Qaida in Iraq leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in a raid last month.
Since then, militants have carried out waves of attacks in apparent retaliation for the raid.
Iraqi officials say at least 10 people were injured Friday when a bomb exploded as worshippers were leaving a mosque in a predominantly Shi'ite area south of Baghdad.
Bombings and shootings across Iraq killed at least 119 people Monday - the country's worst day of violence this year. Iraqi officials blamed al-Qaida-linked militants for the violence, but there was no immediate claim of responsibility.
Source: VOA
Friday, May 14, 2010 |
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Bombers Exploit Iraq's Political Uncertainty
By Abeer Mohammed
(IWPR) -- A wave of bomb and gun attacks across Iraq this week exploited a leadership vacuum and the emergence of a powerful Shia coalition, with the aim of re-igniting sectarian bloodshed, analysts and politicians said.
Shootings, suicide attacks and car bombs in at least ten countrywide locations killed 119 people on May 10, with the deadliest incidents coming in the predominantly Shia cities of Basra and Hillah. Two bombings a day later killed five more Iraqis in Baghdad.
A popular tea shop in the capital's Sadr City area, near the headquarters of radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, was bombed on May 12 leaving at least nine customers dead and dozens injured. The string of attacks, against mostly Shia targets, has been seen by some as a brutal sectarian backlash against political developments and many fear more violence ahead.
"Attacking a well-known Sadrist stronghold is retaliation for how well the Shia did in the election," said Amir al-Kenani, a parliamentarian from the Sadrist bloc, after the May 12 bombing.
"Terrorists will continue to commit more attacks, particularly on poor people. Their main goal is to stoke sectarian tension at a time when the government and security forces are not able to protect their people. People here expect a bomb at any time. Sooner or later they will have to protect themselves, if others cannot protect them."
The perpetrators of the most recent bombings are as yet unknown, but officials blamed the May 10 strikes on al-Qaeda, saying the extremist group was striking back after a series of successful government campaigns that included the killing of two top militant leaders in a raid last month.
Analysts believe the current political climate has given attackers a chance to trigger sectarian warfare, and the days and weeks ahead will determine if they will be successful.
POLITICAL DEADLOCK
The attacks occurred as politicians continue months of wrangling over the formation of the next government. The tightly coordinated strikes also followed the merger last week of Iraq's two main Shia political blocs, a move certain to cement a leading role in the next administration.
The alliance of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law, SOL, with the Iraqi National Alliance, INA, dominated by hard-line anti-American Sadr, has been seen as marginalising Iraq's Sunni minority which has been largely discontent with the Shia-led governments in power since 2003.
The new coalition, which United States ambassador Christopher Hill called a "Shia mega party", has brought concern that Sunni will again abandon the political process and return to militias and tribal networks for protection.
"The formation of the new alliance will fuel violence in Iraq for two reasons. First, it tells terrorists that Iraqi politicians are arguing and busy with their own business, so this is the best time to attack. Second, it enables al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations to induce Sunni to insurgency again by telling them they have no position in Iraq's government even though they went to the polls and did well in the election," said Kadim al-Muqdadia, a political analyst and professor of media and journalism at Baghdad University.
The merger of the Shia blocs was a political blow to Ayad Allawi, a secular Shia former prime minister whose Iraqiya coalition was widely supported by Sunni. Iraqiya got the most votes in March 7 parliamentary elections that yielded no outright winner. According to unofficial results, the bloc won 91 seats in parliament, followed by SOL and INA, which acquired 89 and 70 seats respectively.
Although a manual recount, expected to be finalised this week in Baghdad, may slightly alter the results, this will matter little after the merger of SOL and INA. The new coalition now needs only four more votes to reach the required majority in the 325-seat parliament to form a government. This process of negotiation with other potential allies will begin once results are declared official by the Supreme Court.
Allawi has blasted the new alliance as a brazen attempt to rob Iraqiya of its right to form the next government, and has spent several weeks canvassing in the Middle East for support. He has also repeatedly warned of sectarian violence in response to the merger, a possibility that Shia leaders continued to deny strongly in the aftermath of the latest bloodshed.
"The style of the attacks shows that they are not sectarian. They are not related to the formation of the Shia alliance, or a reaction to it. The new alliance is a step toward speeding up the political process in Iraq, not stoking sectarian strife," said Ammar Touma, a senior INA leader and a member of the parliamentary committee on security and defence.
"Attacks such as these should push politicians to step forward and form the next government. They should set aside all their political disputes in order to defeat al-Qaeda and the followers of the Baath party. "
In the run-up to the elections, Maliki launched a strident anti-Baathist campaign that led to the banning of at least one prominent Iraqiya candidate for alleged links to the Baath party. After the election, votes for several other Iraqiya politicians were thrown out on similar grounds.
Iraqiya officials have criticised the charges, as well as the controversial recount ordered by Maliki, as illegal delays to the election process. Iraqiya leaders were quick to point a finger at the Shia coalition after this week's attacks.
"Terrorists are exploiting the atmosphere that has resulted from illegal and unconstitutional attempts to force Iraqiya out of its right to form the government," Alya Nesaeif, a senior Iraqiya official, said.
Nesaeif said that even if the recent violence does not return Iraq to sectarian fighting, the current trend in politics is dangerously divisive.
"Sectarianism is not a something that is carried out only in bomb blasts; it is a practice adopted by politicians too," she said.
SUNNI DISTRUST
Political analyst Abdullah Jaafar, a retired political science professor at Baghdad University, believes many Sunni feel alienated from politics and are looking to their leaders to decide their next move.
"Of course, Sunni are worried. They had a bad experience with such a Shia alliance in the last government. If Sunni politicians choose to oppose or boycott the political process, Sunni will join the insurgency. But this time it won't be like 2006, it will be worse," said Jaafar, referring to the period between 2006 and 2007 when sectarian fighting was at its worst.
At that time, Sunni formed so-called Awakening Councils and fought al-Qaeda alongside United States and Iraqi forces. Since that time, many former Awakening Council leaders have felt left out by the government they took up arms for.
"Sectarian violence is highly possible in this atmosphere. But if Sunni politicians choose to join a Shia government, the situation could take a turn for the better. It all depends on the choice Iraqiya makes. The Shia parties have come together again and there is no turning back. We should hope that all politicians act wisely at this time," Jaafar said.
Shia officials have defended the new coalition as the fastest route to a new government, and have said they would be open to negotiations with any party interested in joining them.
"Our goals and programmes are similar, and with no outright winner. Unity between us is the best way to form a big bloc and speed up the process of forming the government to avoid any turmoil that will probably cause violence," SOL spokesman Hajim al-Hasani said.
Analysts believe the pre-election split between the Shia blocs was due to a disagreement over the position of prime minister – a dispute that remains unresolved. Jaafar said elements of the INA, including the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Ammar al-Hakim, did not agree to another term for Maliki. In response, the incumbent prime minister broke away and formed the SOL coalition. After Allawi's surprise victory, the blocs agreed to unite and to settle on who should be the premier once the formation of the government was under way.
"The prime minister post is an issue which will take a long time to resolve, but it was not the only obstacle that delayed our merger. Now we will establish a government from all the winning lists; this is our principle. Even if this alliance is formed of a specific sect, it does not mean its programmes and strategies will be sectarian. They will be for the whole nation," INA deputy Ammar Toama said.
Some members of Iraqiya are not so sure, and many are waiting to see how the bloc and its allies respond.
"We do not give our blessing to this new alliance. It is their right to build an alliance, but we have to draw the line on this specific alliance because it clearly formed along sectarian lines," Iraqiya spokesman Maysoun al-Damlouji said.
"Iraqiya has not decided its next step yet. We have not decided what we will do: join or oppose a new government. We will wait and see what happens in the next few days."
Abeer Mohammed is IWPR's senior local editor in Baghdad. This article originally appeared in Iraq Crisis Report, produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net
(IWPR) -- A wave of bomb and gun attacks across Iraq this week exploited a leadership vacuum and the emergence of a powerful Shia coalition, with the aim of re-igniting sectarian bloodshed, analysts and politicians said.
Shootings, suicide attacks and car bombs in at least ten countrywide locations killed 119 people on May 10, with the deadliest incidents coming in the predominantly Shia cities of Basra and Hillah. Two bombings a day later killed five more Iraqis in Baghdad.
A popular tea shop in the capital's Sadr City area, near the headquarters of radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, was bombed on May 12 leaving at least nine customers dead and dozens injured. The string of attacks, against mostly Shia targets, has been seen by some as a brutal sectarian backlash against political developments and many fear more violence ahead.
"Attacking a well-known Sadrist stronghold is retaliation for how well the Shia did in the election," said Amir al-Kenani, a parliamentarian from the Sadrist bloc, after the May 12 bombing.
"Terrorists will continue to commit more attacks, particularly on poor people. Their main goal is to stoke sectarian tension at a time when the government and security forces are not able to protect their people. People here expect a bomb at any time. Sooner or later they will have to protect themselves, if others cannot protect them."
The perpetrators of the most recent bombings are as yet unknown, but officials blamed the May 10 strikes on al-Qaeda, saying the extremist group was striking back after a series of successful government campaigns that included the killing of two top militant leaders in a raid last month.
Analysts believe the current political climate has given attackers a chance to trigger sectarian warfare, and the days and weeks ahead will determine if they will be successful.
POLITICAL DEADLOCK
The attacks occurred as politicians continue months of wrangling over the formation of the next government. The tightly coordinated strikes also followed the merger last week of Iraq's two main Shia political blocs, a move certain to cement a leading role in the next administration.
The alliance of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law, SOL, with the Iraqi National Alliance, INA, dominated by hard-line anti-American Sadr, has been seen as marginalising Iraq's Sunni minority which has been largely discontent with the Shia-led governments in power since 2003.
The new coalition, which United States ambassador Christopher Hill called a "Shia mega party", has brought concern that Sunni will again abandon the political process and return to militias and tribal networks for protection.
"The formation of the new alliance will fuel violence in Iraq for two reasons. First, it tells terrorists that Iraqi politicians are arguing and busy with their own business, so this is the best time to attack. Second, it enables al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations to induce Sunni to insurgency again by telling them they have no position in Iraq's government even though they went to the polls and did well in the election," said Kadim al-Muqdadia, a political analyst and professor of media and journalism at Baghdad University.
The merger of the Shia blocs was a political blow to Ayad Allawi, a secular Shia former prime minister whose Iraqiya coalition was widely supported by Sunni. Iraqiya got the most votes in March 7 parliamentary elections that yielded no outright winner. According to unofficial results, the bloc won 91 seats in parliament, followed by SOL and INA, which acquired 89 and 70 seats respectively.
Although a manual recount, expected to be finalised this week in Baghdad, may slightly alter the results, this will matter little after the merger of SOL and INA. The new coalition now needs only four more votes to reach the required majority in the 325-seat parliament to form a government. This process of negotiation with other potential allies will begin once results are declared official by the Supreme Court.
Allawi has blasted the new alliance as a brazen attempt to rob Iraqiya of its right to form the next government, and has spent several weeks canvassing in the Middle East for support. He has also repeatedly warned of sectarian violence in response to the merger, a possibility that Shia leaders continued to deny strongly in the aftermath of the latest bloodshed.
"The style of the attacks shows that they are not sectarian. They are not related to the formation of the Shia alliance, or a reaction to it. The new alliance is a step toward speeding up the political process in Iraq, not stoking sectarian strife," said Ammar Touma, a senior INA leader and a member of the parliamentary committee on security and defence.
"Attacks such as these should push politicians to step forward and form the next government. They should set aside all their political disputes in order to defeat al-Qaeda and the followers of the Baath party. "
In the run-up to the elections, Maliki launched a strident anti-Baathist campaign that led to the banning of at least one prominent Iraqiya candidate for alleged links to the Baath party. After the election, votes for several other Iraqiya politicians were thrown out on similar grounds.
Iraqiya officials have criticised the charges, as well as the controversial recount ordered by Maliki, as illegal delays to the election process. Iraqiya leaders were quick to point a finger at the Shia coalition after this week's attacks.
"Terrorists are exploiting the atmosphere that has resulted from illegal and unconstitutional attempts to force Iraqiya out of its right to form the government," Alya Nesaeif, a senior Iraqiya official, said.
Nesaeif said that even if the recent violence does not return Iraq to sectarian fighting, the current trend in politics is dangerously divisive.
"Sectarianism is not a something that is carried out only in bomb blasts; it is a practice adopted by politicians too," she said.
SUNNI DISTRUST
Political analyst Abdullah Jaafar, a retired political science professor at Baghdad University, believes many Sunni feel alienated from politics and are looking to their leaders to decide their next move.
"Of course, Sunni are worried. They had a bad experience with such a Shia alliance in the last government. If Sunni politicians choose to oppose or boycott the political process, Sunni will join the insurgency. But this time it won't be like 2006, it will be worse," said Jaafar, referring to the period between 2006 and 2007 when sectarian fighting was at its worst.
At that time, Sunni formed so-called Awakening Councils and fought al-Qaeda alongside United States and Iraqi forces. Since that time, many former Awakening Council leaders have felt left out by the government they took up arms for.
"Sectarian violence is highly possible in this atmosphere. But if Sunni politicians choose to join a Shia government, the situation could take a turn for the better. It all depends on the choice Iraqiya makes. The Shia parties have come together again and there is no turning back. We should hope that all politicians act wisely at this time," Jaafar said.
Shia officials have defended the new coalition as the fastest route to a new government, and have said they would be open to negotiations with any party interested in joining them.
"Our goals and programmes are similar, and with no outright winner. Unity between us is the best way to form a big bloc and speed up the process of forming the government to avoid any turmoil that will probably cause violence," SOL spokesman Hajim al-Hasani said.
Analysts believe the pre-election split between the Shia blocs was due to a disagreement over the position of prime minister – a dispute that remains unresolved. Jaafar said elements of the INA, including the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Ammar al-Hakim, did not agree to another term for Maliki. In response, the incumbent prime minister broke away and formed the SOL coalition. After Allawi's surprise victory, the blocs agreed to unite and to settle on who should be the premier once the formation of the government was under way.
"The prime minister post is an issue which will take a long time to resolve, but it was not the only obstacle that delayed our merger. Now we will establish a government from all the winning lists; this is our principle. Even if this alliance is formed of a specific sect, it does not mean its programmes and strategies will be sectarian. They will be for the whole nation," INA deputy Ammar Toama said.
Some members of Iraqiya are not so sure, and many are waiting to see how the bloc and its allies respond.
"We do not give our blessing to this new alliance. It is their right to build an alliance, but we have to draw the line on this specific alliance because it clearly formed along sectarian lines," Iraqiya spokesman Maysoun al-Damlouji said.
"Iraqiya has not decided its next step yet. We have not decided what we will do: join or oppose a new government. We will wait and see what happens in the next few days."
Abeer Mohammed is IWPR's senior local editor in Baghdad. This article originally appeared in Iraq Crisis Report, produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Kuwait Energy Profile - Still Heavily Dependent On Oil Export Revenue
(EIA) -- Kuwait is one of the world’s top exporters of oil, with about 2.4 million barrels per day exported in 2008. Kuwait's economy is heavily dependent on oil export revenues which account for roughly 90 percent of total export earnings. Kuwait channels around 10 percent of its oil revenues into the "Future Generations Fund" for the day when oil income runs out.
The Kuwaiti constitution forbids foreign ownership of Kuwait's mineral resources. The Kuwaiti Parliament passed the “Foreign Direct Investment Act” in 2001, aimed at promoting foreign investment in Kuwait’s oil and gas sectors, which facilitated some development in those sectors.
However, major projects such as Project Kuwait remain at a standstill due to disagreements between Parliament and the ruling Al-Sabah family.
Oil
According to Oil and Gas Journal, as of January 2010 Kuwait’s territorial boundaries contained an estimated 101.5 billion barrels (bbl) of proven oil reserves, roughly 8 percent of the world total.
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (a.k.a. Divided Zone, Neutral Zone), which Kuwait shares 50-50 with Saudi Arabia, holds an additional 5 billion bbl of reserves, bringing Kuwait's total oil reserves to 104 billion bbl.
Overview
The Supreme Petroleum Council oversees Kuwait’s oil sector and sets oil policy. The Kuwait Petroleum Council (KPC) manages domestic and foreign oil investments.
KOC, nationalized in 1979, is KPC’s upstream arm in Kuwait. The Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC), set up in 2002, oversees the bulk of Kuwait’s interests in the Neutral Zone. Most Kuwaiti crude oil is sold on term contracts, with the price of Kuwaiti crude oil tied to Saudi Arabian Medium (for western customers) and a monthly average of Dubai and Oman crudes (for Asian buyers).
Most of Kuwait's oil reserves are located south of Kuwait City. The 70-billion bbl Greater Burgan area, which comprises the Burgan, Magwa and Ahmadi fields, is widely considered the world's second largest oil field, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field. Producing oil since the 1950’s, Greater Burgan generally produces lighter crudes with API’s in the 28°-36° range, and has a production capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d. The South Magwa field (discovered in 1984) is estimated to hold at least 25 billion bbl of light crude.
Other fields surrounding the Greater Burgan area include Umm Gudair, Minagish, and Abdaliya. Umm Gudair and Minagish produce heavier crude oil, with gravities in the 22°-26° API range, and have a combined production capacity of 200,000 bbl per day. In January 2003, water injection began at Minagish to enhance oil recovery and offset natural declines in production.
Northern Kuwait holds the majority of Kuwait’s larger fields after Greater Burgan. Kuwait’s second largest field, Raudhatain, was discovered in 1955 by KOC, and has 9.55 billion bbl of proven and probable recoverable oil. Raudhatain has the capacity to produce 450,000 bbl of oil per day.
Partitioned Neutral Zone
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) was established in 1922 to settle a territorial dispute between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The PNZ encompasses a 6,200 square-mile area and contains an estimated 5 billion bbl of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. A Joint Operations Committee, with representatives from both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, manages the resources in the PNZ. Kuwait is represented by the Wafra Joint Operations Group, and Saudi Arabia is represented by Chevron. Oil production capacity in the PNZ is currently about 600,000 barrels per day, all of which is divided equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Onshore production in the PNZ centers on Wafra. On stream since 1954, Wafra is the largest of the PNZ’s onshore fields with approximately 3.4 billion in proven and probable reserves. Wafra has related production facilities and gathering centers with South Umm Gudair and South Fuwaris. Onshore production in the PNZ has a capacity of around 274,000 bbl/d.
The production capacity of offshore fields in the PNZ is 300,000 bbl/d, with almost 90 percent coming from Khafji. Offshore production is about four times as expensive in the PNZ as in the rest of Kuwait. Khafji, an extension of Saudi Arabia’s Safaniyah (the world’s largest offshore field), Hout, also an extension of Safaniyah, and Dorra, an extension of Iran’s Arash, are the largest fields. Dorra is not currently under production pending resolution of boundary demarcation negotiations between Kuwait and Iran.
Production & Consumption
In 2009, Kuwait’s total oil production approximated 2.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), including approximately 300,000 bbl/d production from the PNZ; 2008 total oil production was roughly 2.7 million bbl/d (PNZ production roughly the same). Of 2009 production, 2.3 million bbl/d was crude and approximately 200,000 bbl/d was non-crude liquids. Overall, around two-thirds of Kuwaiti oil production comes from the southeast of the country. Kuwait’s total oil consumption equaled roughly 350,000 bbl/d in 2008.
OPEC Crude Oil Production 2009
Most of Kuwait’s major producing fields are over sixty years old, and therefore field maturity is becoming a concern. In 2005, KOC, citing field exhaustion, lowered its production plateau estimates for the Greater Burgan area from 2 million bbl/d to 1.7 million bbl/d over a 20-30 year period. This issue places added significance on development of other Kuwaiti reserves going forward.
Developments
Kuwait plans to increase crude oil production capacity from its current 2.6 million bbl/d to 4 million bbl/d by 2020, largely via Project Kuwait (PK). Progress towards enacting PK, however, remains caught in the disagreement between Parliament and the ruling family on how best to proceed.
Kuwait's constitution - and longtime policy - bars foreign investment in the country's natural resources, except as provided for by law. In order to allow IOC involvement, "incentivized buy-back contract" (IBBC) arrangements, which do not involve production sharing, concessions, or the "booking" of reserves by foreign companies, have been created. The structure of the IBBC agreements allows the Kuwaiti government to retain full ownership of oil reserves, control over oil production levels, and strategic management of the ventures. Foreign firms are to be paid a "per barrel" fee, along with allowances for capital recovery and incentive fees for increasing reserves, in their role as service provider/contractor. In May 2007, the Kuwaiti ruling family conceded the responsibility to approve each related IBBC for Project Kuwait to Parliament.
PK aims to increase the country's oil production capacity from four northern oil fields – Raudhatain, Sabriya, Ratqa, and Abdali - to 3.5 million bbl/d by 2015, and then 4 million bbl/d by 2020 with the help of international oil companies (IOC). Heavy oil is a major component of Kuwait’s increased production capacity plans. Estimated heavy oil reserves of approximately 13 billion bbl are located primarily in the north of Kuwait.
KOC also plans to drill for oil in South East Kuwait and West Kuwait. In South East Kuwait, which holds the vast Burgan field, production is to increase by 200,000 b/d to a total of 1.7 million bbl/d; KOC hopes to maintain capacity in West Kuwait at 500,000 b/d.
Kuwait is expected to increase its crude oil production capacity by approximately 170,000 bbl/d in 2011 with Gathering Center (GC) 24 in the Sabriya oil field. Western Kuwait’s GC-16 is expected to add another 100,000 bbl/d in production capacity, but its startup date is uncertain.
Exports
Kuwait exports the majority of its crude and refined products to the Asia-Pacific region.
In 2008, Kuwait’s total exports of crude oil and refined products reached nearly 2.4 million bbl/d. The Asia-Pacific region received approximately 1.5 million bbl/d, the United States received approximately 210,000 bbl/d, and Western Europe received 180,000 bbl/d. Kuwait's single export blend ("Kuwait Export") has a specific gravity of 31.4°API (a typical medium Mideast crude), and is considered sour with 2.52 percent sulfur content.
Mina al-Ahmadi is the country's main port for the export of crude oil. Kuwait also has operational oil export terminals at Mina Abdullah, Shuaiba, and at Mina Saud. To handle increased production generated by Project Kuwait, a new terminal is planned for construction on Bubiyan Island.
Downstream
Kuwait's three domestic refineries have a combined capacity of roughly 936,000 bbl/d. The country's largest refinery is Mina al-Ahmadi, with capacity of 466,000 bbl/d, followed by Mina Abdullah (270,000 bbl/d) and Shuaiba (200,000 bbl/d).
Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI; a.k.a. “Q8”) manages KPC's refining and marketing operations internationally, with approximately 4,000 retail stations across Western Europe (Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Italy). KPI owns an 80,000 bbl/d refinery in Rotterdam, Netherlands and has a 50:50 joint venture with AGIP in the 240,000 bbl/d capacity refinery in Milazzo, Italy.
With the growth of downstream markets in Asia, Kuwait is interested in acquiring downstream assets in large emerging markets such as China. In China’s Guangdong Province, KPC is negotiating a partnership with China’s Sinopec and Dow Chemical Company. The plant will feature a 300,000 bbl/d capacity refinery and a 1 million tons per year ethylene steam cracker.
Clean Fuels Project
The Clean Fuels Project (CFP) is the umbrella under which Kuwait’s existing refineries will be upgraded. With a 2008 price tag of $18 billion, the CFP is split into three packages. In Package 1, Mina Abdullah’s distillation capacity will be increased to 420,000 bbl/d. Package 2 will consist of revamping Mina Abdullah’s utilities both on and offsite. Package 3 will restore and repair necessary elements of Mina Al-Ahmadi.
Natural Gas
According to Oil and Gas Journal, in January 2010 Kuwait’s estimated natural gas reserves stood at nearly 63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Kuwait produces a relatively modest volume of dry natural gas, approximately 449 billion cf (Bcf) in 2008, the vast majority of which is "associated gas" (i.e., found and produced in conjunction with oil).
Production
Kuwait seeks to significantly increase its use of natural gas in electricity generation, water desalination, and petrochemicals to free up as much as 100,000 barrels per day of oil for export. Kuwait hopes to accomplish this through increased drilling for natural gas, and tying together gathering centers to create the infrastructure necessary to reduce associated gas flaring.
In 2005, an estimated 35 Tcf of non-associated gas was discovered in several fields near Sabriya and Umm Niga in northern Kuwait. In the summer of 2008, Kuwait began production of approximately 175 million cf per day, planned to rise to nearly 1 Bcf per day by 2015. The new production is not expected to offset Kuwait’s rising demand.
As with oil, negotiations continue between Kuwait and Iran regarding the disputed Dorra offshore natural gas field and any development requires resolution of demarcation issues. The Dorra field has been claimed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, and may contain up to 11 Tcf of recoverable natural gas reserves. It is not currently in production.
Consumption & Imports
In 2008, Kuwait consumed approximately 449 Bcf of natural gas. Although on an annual basis natural gas consumption matches production, in recent years, Kuwait’s electricity demand, the generation of which is fueled by natural gas, has outpaced natural gas production during the summer months, resulting in the shutdown of refinery and petrochemical operations to meet the increased demand in electricity.
To mitigate the demand shortage, in June 2009 Kuwait signed a deal with Shell to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), receiving the first cargo in August 2009. Kuwait took delivery of the LNG at the Persian Gulf’s first regasification terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi GasPort. Mina al-Ahmadi’s regasification capacity is approximately 10,300 tonnes of LNG per day (500 million cubic feet per day). In addition to the contract with Shell, Kuwait takes on spot cargoes as needed.
Kuwait and Qatar continue to explore options by which Qatar might supply Kuwait with LNG cargoes. Besides Qatar, Kuwait seeks to import natural gas from Iran, most likely from its huge South Pars gas field. Iran and Kuwait signed a preliminary memorandum of understanding for natural gas sales in March 2005, but commerce requires the resolution of maritime border issues in the region, specifically with regards to Dorra.
The Kuwaiti constitution forbids foreign ownership of Kuwait's mineral resources. The Kuwaiti Parliament passed the “Foreign Direct Investment Act” in 2001, aimed at promoting foreign investment in Kuwait’s oil and gas sectors, which facilitated some development in those sectors.
However, major projects such as Project Kuwait remain at a standstill due to disagreements between Parliament and the ruling Al-Sabah family.
Oil
According to Oil and Gas Journal, as of January 2010 Kuwait’s territorial boundaries contained an estimated 101.5 billion barrels (bbl) of proven oil reserves, roughly 8 percent of the world total.
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (a.k.a. Divided Zone, Neutral Zone), which Kuwait shares 50-50 with Saudi Arabia, holds an additional 5 billion bbl of reserves, bringing Kuwait's total oil reserves to 104 billion bbl.
Overview
The Supreme Petroleum Council oversees Kuwait’s oil sector and sets oil policy. The Kuwait Petroleum Council (KPC) manages domestic and foreign oil investments.
KOC, nationalized in 1979, is KPC’s upstream arm in Kuwait. The Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC), set up in 2002, oversees the bulk of Kuwait’s interests in the Neutral Zone. Most Kuwaiti crude oil is sold on term contracts, with the price of Kuwaiti crude oil tied to Saudi Arabian Medium (for western customers) and a monthly average of Dubai and Oman crudes (for Asian buyers).
Most of Kuwait's oil reserves are located south of Kuwait City. The 70-billion bbl Greater Burgan area, which comprises the Burgan, Magwa and Ahmadi fields, is widely considered the world's second largest oil field, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field. Producing oil since the 1950’s, Greater Burgan generally produces lighter crudes with API’s in the 28°-36° range, and has a production capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d. The South Magwa field (discovered in 1984) is estimated to hold at least 25 billion bbl of light crude.
Other fields surrounding the Greater Burgan area include Umm Gudair, Minagish, and Abdaliya. Umm Gudair and Minagish produce heavier crude oil, with gravities in the 22°-26° API range, and have a combined production capacity of 200,000 bbl per day. In January 2003, water injection began at Minagish to enhance oil recovery and offset natural declines in production.
Northern Kuwait holds the majority of Kuwait’s larger fields after Greater Burgan. Kuwait’s second largest field, Raudhatain, was discovered in 1955 by KOC, and has 9.55 billion bbl of proven and probable recoverable oil. Raudhatain has the capacity to produce 450,000 bbl of oil per day.
Partitioned Neutral Zone
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) was established in 1922 to settle a territorial dispute between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The PNZ encompasses a 6,200 square-mile area and contains an estimated 5 billion bbl of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. A Joint Operations Committee, with representatives from both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, manages the resources in the PNZ. Kuwait is represented by the Wafra Joint Operations Group, and Saudi Arabia is represented by Chevron. Oil production capacity in the PNZ is currently about 600,000 barrels per day, all of which is divided equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Onshore production in the PNZ centers on Wafra. On stream since 1954, Wafra is the largest of the PNZ’s onshore fields with approximately 3.4 billion in proven and probable reserves. Wafra has related production facilities and gathering centers with South Umm Gudair and South Fuwaris. Onshore production in the PNZ has a capacity of around 274,000 bbl/d.
The production capacity of offshore fields in the PNZ is 300,000 bbl/d, with almost 90 percent coming from Khafji. Offshore production is about four times as expensive in the PNZ as in the rest of Kuwait. Khafji, an extension of Saudi Arabia’s Safaniyah (the world’s largest offshore field), Hout, also an extension of Safaniyah, and Dorra, an extension of Iran’s Arash, are the largest fields. Dorra is not currently under production pending resolution of boundary demarcation negotiations between Kuwait and Iran.
Production & Consumption
In 2009, Kuwait’s total oil production approximated 2.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), including approximately 300,000 bbl/d production from the PNZ; 2008 total oil production was roughly 2.7 million bbl/d (PNZ production roughly the same). Of 2009 production, 2.3 million bbl/d was crude and approximately 200,000 bbl/d was non-crude liquids. Overall, around two-thirds of Kuwaiti oil production comes from the southeast of the country. Kuwait’s total oil consumption equaled roughly 350,000 bbl/d in 2008.
OPEC Crude Oil Production 2009
Most of Kuwait’s major producing fields are over sixty years old, and therefore field maturity is becoming a concern. In 2005, KOC, citing field exhaustion, lowered its production plateau estimates for the Greater Burgan area from 2 million bbl/d to 1.7 million bbl/d over a 20-30 year period. This issue places added significance on development of other Kuwaiti reserves going forward.
Developments
Kuwait plans to increase crude oil production capacity from its current 2.6 million bbl/d to 4 million bbl/d by 2020, largely via Project Kuwait (PK). Progress towards enacting PK, however, remains caught in the disagreement between Parliament and the ruling family on how best to proceed.
Kuwait's constitution - and longtime policy - bars foreign investment in the country's natural resources, except as provided for by law. In order to allow IOC involvement, "incentivized buy-back contract" (IBBC) arrangements, which do not involve production sharing, concessions, or the "booking" of reserves by foreign companies, have been created. The structure of the IBBC agreements allows the Kuwaiti government to retain full ownership of oil reserves, control over oil production levels, and strategic management of the ventures. Foreign firms are to be paid a "per barrel" fee, along with allowances for capital recovery and incentive fees for increasing reserves, in their role as service provider/contractor. In May 2007, the Kuwaiti ruling family conceded the responsibility to approve each related IBBC for Project Kuwait to Parliament.
PK aims to increase the country's oil production capacity from four northern oil fields – Raudhatain, Sabriya, Ratqa, and Abdali - to 3.5 million bbl/d by 2015, and then 4 million bbl/d by 2020 with the help of international oil companies (IOC). Heavy oil is a major component of Kuwait’s increased production capacity plans. Estimated heavy oil reserves of approximately 13 billion bbl are located primarily in the north of Kuwait.
KOC also plans to drill for oil in South East Kuwait and West Kuwait. In South East Kuwait, which holds the vast Burgan field, production is to increase by 200,000 b/d to a total of 1.7 million bbl/d; KOC hopes to maintain capacity in West Kuwait at 500,000 b/d.
Kuwait is expected to increase its crude oil production capacity by approximately 170,000 bbl/d in 2011 with Gathering Center (GC) 24 in the Sabriya oil field. Western Kuwait’s GC-16 is expected to add another 100,000 bbl/d in production capacity, but its startup date is uncertain.
Exports
Kuwait exports the majority of its crude and refined products to the Asia-Pacific region.
In 2008, Kuwait’s total exports of crude oil and refined products reached nearly 2.4 million bbl/d. The Asia-Pacific region received approximately 1.5 million bbl/d, the United States received approximately 210,000 bbl/d, and Western Europe received 180,000 bbl/d. Kuwait's single export blend ("Kuwait Export") has a specific gravity of 31.4°API (a typical medium Mideast crude), and is considered sour with 2.52 percent sulfur content.
Mina al-Ahmadi is the country's main port for the export of crude oil. Kuwait also has operational oil export terminals at Mina Abdullah, Shuaiba, and at Mina Saud. To handle increased production generated by Project Kuwait, a new terminal is planned for construction on Bubiyan Island.
Downstream
Kuwait's three domestic refineries have a combined capacity of roughly 936,000 bbl/d. The country's largest refinery is Mina al-Ahmadi, with capacity of 466,000 bbl/d, followed by Mina Abdullah (270,000 bbl/d) and Shuaiba (200,000 bbl/d).
Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI; a.k.a. “Q8”) manages KPC's refining and marketing operations internationally, with approximately 4,000 retail stations across Western Europe (Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Italy). KPI owns an 80,000 bbl/d refinery in Rotterdam, Netherlands and has a 50:50 joint venture with AGIP in the 240,000 bbl/d capacity refinery in Milazzo, Italy.
With the growth of downstream markets in Asia, Kuwait is interested in acquiring downstream assets in large emerging markets such as China. In China’s Guangdong Province, KPC is negotiating a partnership with China’s Sinopec and Dow Chemical Company. The plant will feature a 300,000 bbl/d capacity refinery and a 1 million tons per year ethylene steam cracker.
Clean Fuels Project
The Clean Fuels Project (CFP) is the umbrella under which Kuwait’s existing refineries will be upgraded. With a 2008 price tag of $18 billion, the CFP is split into three packages. In Package 1, Mina Abdullah’s distillation capacity will be increased to 420,000 bbl/d. Package 2 will consist of revamping Mina Abdullah’s utilities both on and offsite. Package 3 will restore and repair necessary elements of Mina Al-Ahmadi.
Natural Gas
According to Oil and Gas Journal, in January 2010 Kuwait’s estimated natural gas reserves stood at nearly 63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Kuwait produces a relatively modest volume of dry natural gas, approximately 449 billion cf (Bcf) in 2008, the vast majority of which is "associated gas" (i.e., found and produced in conjunction with oil).
Production
Kuwait seeks to significantly increase its use of natural gas in electricity generation, water desalination, and petrochemicals to free up as much as 100,000 barrels per day of oil for export. Kuwait hopes to accomplish this through increased drilling for natural gas, and tying together gathering centers to create the infrastructure necessary to reduce associated gas flaring.
In 2005, an estimated 35 Tcf of non-associated gas was discovered in several fields near Sabriya and Umm Niga in northern Kuwait. In the summer of 2008, Kuwait began production of approximately 175 million cf per day, planned to rise to nearly 1 Bcf per day by 2015. The new production is not expected to offset Kuwait’s rising demand.
As with oil, negotiations continue between Kuwait and Iran regarding the disputed Dorra offshore natural gas field and any development requires resolution of demarcation issues. The Dorra field has been claimed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, and may contain up to 11 Tcf of recoverable natural gas reserves. It is not currently in production.
Consumption & Imports
In 2008, Kuwait consumed approximately 449 Bcf of natural gas. Although on an annual basis natural gas consumption matches production, in recent years, Kuwait’s electricity demand, the generation of which is fueled by natural gas, has outpaced natural gas production during the summer months, resulting in the shutdown of refinery and petrochemical operations to meet the increased demand in electricity.
To mitigate the demand shortage, in June 2009 Kuwait signed a deal with Shell to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), receiving the first cargo in August 2009. Kuwait took delivery of the LNG at the Persian Gulf’s first regasification terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi GasPort. Mina al-Ahmadi’s regasification capacity is approximately 10,300 tonnes of LNG per day (500 million cubic feet per day). In addition to the contract with Shell, Kuwait takes on spot cargoes as needed.
Kuwait and Qatar continue to explore options by which Qatar might supply Kuwait with LNG cargoes. Besides Qatar, Kuwait seeks to import natural gas from Iran, most likely from its huge South Pars gas field. Iran and Kuwait signed a preliminary memorandum of understanding for natural gas sales in March 2005, but commerce requires the resolution of maritime border issues in the region, specifically with regards to Dorra.
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Airline Dispute Raises Iraqi-Kuwaiti Tensions
By Ali Kareem, Mohammad Furat
(IWPR) -- A fierce legal dogfight between the national airlines of Iraq and Kuwait has revived deep resentments over the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and sparked a protest at Baghdad airport.
The dispute has raged in British courts since shortly after the first Gulf War, with Kuwait Airways claiming it is owed 1.2 billion US dollars by Iraqi Airways for ten planes and tonnes of parts that were looted during the occupation by Saddam Hussein's forces.
Officials in Baghdad say the case is unjustified and diplomatically dangerous. Attorneys from both sides have traded verbal salvoes for years, each charging their counterparts with displaying no real commitment to resolve the case.
The case has been marked by charges of perjury, forgery and perversion of justice against Iraq. In turn, Kuwait has been accused of exploiting Iraq's instability and insulting the suffering of Iraqis under the Saddam regime.
Hundreds of protesters rallied at Baghdad International Airport on May 5 to denounce Kuwait's restitution demands. According to local media, a banner at the protest read, "Stop sucking the blood of Iraqis with your so-called compensation".
Despite its designation as a business dispute, the case is increasing tensions between the two countries to their highest point since last year when Kuwait insisted that Iraq continue paying war compensation, despite a steep drop in oil prices and the global downturn.
"The issue has become seriously dangerous,” Hassan Shaban, a Baghdad-based legal analyst, said. “If there is no agreement between Iraqis and Kuwaitis, it must come through intervention by the Arab League or United Nations. This case can’t go on like this, or it will deeply damage the future of aviation in Iraq just as it is beginning to recover."
The dispute resurfaced April 25 when the first Iraqi Airways flight from Baghdad to London was met at Gatwick airport by lawyers for Kuwait Airways. Armed with a 2004 British High Court injunction, the authorities froze the airline’s assets and confiscated the passport of Iraqi Airways director Kifah Hassan Jabbar. Attempts to seize the aircraft were unsuccessful, as it had been leased from a Swedish company.
A statement from the Iraqi ministry of transport after the incident said, "We are surprised by this escalation and provocation by the Kuwaiti authorities and their insistence on pursuing and harassing Iraqis when they tried to open a new window to the world and [a way] out of the suffering that they have lived through for several decades."
Jabbar's passport was returned following a May 5 hearing in which he promised to provide the court with a statement of Iraqi Airways’s global assets.
"Iraqi Airways has agreed to make available an official statement of global assets. They want to freeze all Iraqi Airways assets, but Iraqi Airways has no assets. It is very simple. So there is no case, inshallah (God willing)," said Saad al-Khafaji, a senior official with Iraqi Airways in Britain and Ireland, by phone from London after the hearing.
Khafaji said he was speaking on behalf of Jabbar, who was advised not to speak to the press.
He said the case would not affect the airline’s current twice weekly flights between Baghdad and London via Sweden using a leased plane. Its other flights to places like Dubai and Istanbul are also unaffected.
Khafaji said the action also would not stop the airline receiving new Bombardier regional jets from Canada, despite legal action by the Kuwaiti side in Canada. He said four of the planes had already been delivered.
The sum of 1.2 billion dollars had grown over the years of legal action partly through court penalties and interest and partly through the Iraqi side’s own incompetence, he said.
"Whenever the Kuwaitis made a claim in court, and we didn’t respond, the court ruled in favour of the Kuwaitis. The reparation demand didn’t exceed 200 million dollars in 2000, but it has doubled and doubled until it has now reached 1.2 billion dollars. That was a big mistake on our part, otherwise we wouldn’t be talking about this large amount," Khafaji said.
As it stands, all Iraqi Airways assets will remain frozen in British banks until either party applies to the court. Kuwait Airways lawyer Chris Gooding said the information submitted, along with Khafaji's claim of Iraqi Airways's lack of assets, will be the subject of cross examination in the next hearing. No date for the hearing has been set.
"Frankly, where I'm sitting the claim of having no assets just doesn't ring true,” said Gooding of Fasken Martineau, which has represented Kuwait Airways in the case since 1990.
“They are operating flights to England and Sweden and other places on a regular basis and they are presently re-fleeting to the tune of billions of dollars," he said, referring to Iraqi Airways's pending purchase of 47 new aircraft from the United States and Canada.
Iraqi officials have repeatedly claimed they have made restitution offers and pledges of friendship only to be rebuked. Some have said it was unfair that Iraq be held accountable for the actions of the former regime and questioned why Kuwait Airways chose to work outside a UN-established reparations fund that has so far accumulated more than 27 billion dollars from Baghdad.
"The Kuwait Airways issue has been exaggerated by the Kuwaitis who have attached political dimensions to the case. Kuwait has to respect the will of the Iraqi people and stop taking advantage of the circumstances in Iraq for the purpose of retribution," Adnan Bilaibl, director of Iraq's civil aviation authority, said.
"What Kuwait is doing is unjustified and this needs to be stopped because things are getting dangerous," he added.
Khafaji blames the current crisis on mismanagement by former Iraqi Airways officials and the intractable nature of Saddam's government. He said Kuwait had offered to settle the dispute for 150 million dollars in 2000, but the Baghdad government declined.
"Iraqi Airways has always been unlucky in this matter. We have been a victim of the criminality of the former regime and the negligence of the successive cabinets since 2003," he said.
"But because the minister of transport has officially invited the Kuwaiti side to sit at the table and settle the case and they have refused, Iraq is not going to pay 1.2 billion dollars. It is impossible. No Iraqi official will agree to sign a payment of such an exaggerated sum."
According to a court document obtained by IWPR, British judge David Steel wrote in 2006, "In my judgement, the evidence is overwhelming that IAC [Iraqi Airways] has throughout this litigation pursued a deliberate and sophisticated policy of non-disclosure, suppression and concealment of relevant documents."
Gooding maintained that "patience has run out" for Kuwait Airways after 20 years of litigation. He said the case is being handled in a British civil court as a matter between two commercial entities, and does not involve the actions of past governments.
"In the past, there have been discussions towards a negotiated settlement,” Gooding said. “The position of Kuwait is they will listen to any sensible offer that's backed by cash, but they won't respond to hopes and dreams.”
Ali Kareem is an IWPR-trained journalist in Sulaimaniyah. Mohammad Furat is an IWPR local editor in Erbil. IWPR. Iraq editor Charles McDermid contributed to this report from Sulaimaniyah. This article originally appeared in Iraq Crisis Report, produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net
(IWPR) -- A fierce legal dogfight between the national airlines of Iraq and Kuwait has revived deep resentments over the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and sparked a protest at Baghdad airport.
The dispute has raged in British courts since shortly after the first Gulf War, with Kuwait Airways claiming it is owed 1.2 billion US dollars by Iraqi Airways for ten planes and tonnes of parts that were looted during the occupation by Saddam Hussein's forces.
Officials in Baghdad say the case is unjustified and diplomatically dangerous. Attorneys from both sides have traded verbal salvoes for years, each charging their counterparts with displaying no real commitment to resolve the case.
The case has been marked by charges of perjury, forgery and perversion of justice against Iraq. In turn, Kuwait has been accused of exploiting Iraq's instability and insulting the suffering of Iraqis under the Saddam regime.
Hundreds of protesters rallied at Baghdad International Airport on May 5 to denounce Kuwait's restitution demands. According to local media, a banner at the protest read, "Stop sucking the blood of Iraqis with your so-called compensation".
Despite its designation as a business dispute, the case is increasing tensions between the two countries to their highest point since last year when Kuwait insisted that Iraq continue paying war compensation, despite a steep drop in oil prices and the global downturn.
"The issue has become seriously dangerous,” Hassan Shaban, a Baghdad-based legal analyst, said. “If there is no agreement between Iraqis and Kuwaitis, it must come through intervention by the Arab League or United Nations. This case can’t go on like this, or it will deeply damage the future of aviation in Iraq just as it is beginning to recover."
The dispute resurfaced April 25 when the first Iraqi Airways flight from Baghdad to London was met at Gatwick airport by lawyers for Kuwait Airways. Armed with a 2004 British High Court injunction, the authorities froze the airline’s assets and confiscated the passport of Iraqi Airways director Kifah Hassan Jabbar. Attempts to seize the aircraft were unsuccessful, as it had been leased from a Swedish company.
A statement from the Iraqi ministry of transport after the incident said, "We are surprised by this escalation and provocation by the Kuwaiti authorities and their insistence on pursuing and harassing Iraqis when they tried to open a new window to the world and [a way] out of the suffering that they have lived through for several decades."
Jabbar's passport was returned following a May 5 hearing in which he promised to provide the court with a statement of Iraqi Airways’s global assets.
"Iraqi Airways has agreed to make available an official statement of global assets. They want to freeze all Iraqi Airways assets, but Iraqi Airways has no assets. It is very simple. So there is no case, inshallah (God willing)," said Saad al-Khafaji, a senior official with Iraqi Airways in Britain and Ireland, by phone from London after the hearing.
Khafaji said he was speaking on behalf of Jabbar, who was advised not to speak to the press.
He said the case would not affect the airline’s current twice weekly flights between Baghdad and London via Sweden using a leased plane. Its other flights to places like Dubai and Istanbul are also unaffected.
Khafaji said the action also would not stop the airline receiving new Bombardier regional jets from Canada, despite legal action by the Kuwaiti side in Canada. He said four of the planes had already been delivered.
The sum of 1.2 billion dollars had grown over the years of legal action partly through court penalties and interest and partly through the Iraqi side’s own incompetence, he said.
"Whenever the Kuwaitis made a claim in court, and we didn’t respond, the court ruled in favour of the Kuwaitis. The reparation demand didn’t exceed 200 million dollars in 2000, but it has doubled and doubled until it has now reached 1.2 billion dollars. That was a big mistake on our part, otherwise we wouldn’t be talking about this large amount," Khafaji said.
As it stands, all Iraqi Airways assets will remain frozen in British banks until either party applies to the court. Kuwait Airways lawyer Chris Gooding said the information submitted, along with Khafaji's claim of Iraqi Airways's lack of assets, will be the subject of cross examination in the next hearing. No date for the hearing has been set.
"Frankly, where I'm sitting the claim of having no assets just doesn't ring true,” said Gooding of Fasken Martineau, which has represented Kuwait Airways in the case since 1990.
“They are operating flights to England and Sweden and other places on a regular basis and they are presently re-fleeting to the tune of billions of dollars," he said, referring to Iraqi Airways's pending purchase of 47 new aircraft from the United States and Canada.
Iraqi officials have repeatedly claimed they have made restitution offers and pledges of friendship only to be rebuked. Some have said it was unfair that Iraq be held accountable for the actions of the former regime and questioned why Kuwait Airways chose to work outside a UN-established reparations fund that has so far accumulated more than 27 billion dollars from Baghdad.
"The Kuwait Airways issue has been exaggerated by the Kuwaitis who have attached political dimensions to the case. Kuwait has to respect the will of the Iraqi people and stop taking advantage of the circumstances in Iraq for the purpose of retribution," Adnan Bilaibl, director of Iraq's civil aviation authority, said.
"What Kuwait is doing is unjustified and this needs to be stopped because things are getting dangerous," he added.
Khafaji blames the current crisis on mismanagement by former Iraqi Airways officials and the intractable nature of Saddam's government. He said Kuwait had offered to settle the dispute for 150 million dollars in 2000, but the Baghdad government declined.
"Iraqi Airways has always been unlucky in this matter. We have been a victim of the criminality of the former regime and the negligence of the successive cabinets since 2003," he said.
"But because the minister of transport has officially invited the Kuwaiti side to sit at the table and settle the case and they have refused, Iraq is not going to pay 1.2 billion dollars. It is impossible. No Iraqi official will agree to sign a payment of such an exaggerated sum."
According to a court document obtained by IWPR, British judge David Steel wrote in 2006, "In my judgement, the evidence is overwhelming that IAC [Iraqi Airways] has throughout this litigation pursued a deliberate and sophisticated policy of non-disclosure, suppression and concealment of relevant documents."
Gooding maintained that "patience has run out" for Kuwait Airways after 20 years of litigation. He said the case is being handled in a British civil court as a matter between two commercial entities, and does not involve the actions of past governments.
"In the past, there have been discussions towards a negotiated settlement,” Gooding said. “The position of Kuwait is they will listen to any sensible offer that's backed by cash, but they won't respond to hopes and dreams.”
Ali Kareem is an IWPR-trained journalist in Sulaimaniyah. Mohammad Furat is an IWPR local editor in Erbil. IWPR. Iraq editor Charles McDermid contributed to this report from Sulaimaniyah. This article originally appeared in Iraq Crisis Report, produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net
Saturday, May 08, 2010 |
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Iraq Completes First-Ever National Immunization Week
By Rob Sixsmith
Against a difficult backdrop of conflict and insecurity, important gains have been made by Iraq's first-ever National Immunization Week. The campaign targeted nearly 15 million children under the age of five – many for the first time – and led to greater health awareness and education.
Partners supporting the campaign – including UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health – are now looking toward the future.
Investing in health
In collaboration with the Health Directorate in Iraq's Kirkuk Governorate, UNICEF held a two-day policy workshop to kick-start the vaccination drive in Kirkuk. Partners discussed future coordination between ministries and non-governmental organizations, as well as an intensified media campaign designed to spread the central messages of National Immunization Week.
"Immunization is not merely a need, but a child's basic right," said Kirkuk Governor Abdul Rahman Mostafa. "I invite everyone in the government and the community to invest in our children."
For some at UNICEF, National Immunization Week demonstrated that the central messages of their work were gradually beginning to crystallize into policy.
"It was really exciting to hear the governor talking about children's rights and investing in their health and development," said UNICEF Iraq Health and Nutrition Specialist Dr. Taha Al Mulla. "The advocacy efforts of our previous visit to Kirkuk have obviously started to bear fruit."
Crucial gains
The importance of Iraq's National Immunization Week was felt most clearly by those mothers and children who have suffered at the sharp end of Iraq's challenging conditions.
"Even in the worst periods of conflict and insecurity, I didn't forget the vaccination times of my three kids," said Um Zaid, a mother from Baghdad.
UNICEF and partners made crucial gains for mothers like Ms. Zaid across all 18 Iraqi governorates. In particular, they have made strides in pushing the immunization programme out to remote, low-coverage areas.
By training health workers and mobilizing the support of Iraq's community leaders – including clerics and the heads of women's and youth groups – UNICEF is helping to lay essential building blocks for achieving 100 per cent vaccination coverage in the years ahead.
Source: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Against a difficult backdrop of conflict and insecurity, important gains have been made by Iraq's first-ever National Immunization Week. The campaign targeted nearly 15 million children under the age of five – many for the first time – and led to greater health awareness and education.
Partners supporting the campaign – including UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health – are now looking toward the future.
Investing in health
In collaboration with the Health Directorate in Iraq's Kirkuk Governorate, UNICEF held a two-day policy workshop to kick-start the vaccination drive in Kirkuk. Partners discussed future coordination between ministries and non-governmental organizations, as well as an intensified media campaign designed to spread the central messages of National Immunization Week.
"Immunization is not merely a need, but a child's basic right," said Kirkuk Governor Abdul Rahman Mostafa. "I invite everyone in the government and the community to invest in our children."
For some at UNICEF, National Immunization Week demonstrated that the central messages of their work were gradually beginning to crystallize into policy.
"It was really exciting to hear the governor talking about children's rights and investing in their health and development," said UNICEF Iraq Health and Nutrition Specialist Dr. Taha Al Mulla. "The advocacy efforts of our previous visit to Kirkuk have obviously started to bear fruit."
Crucial gains
The importance of Iraq's National Immunization Week was felt most clearly by those mothers and children who have suffered at the sharp end of Iraq's challenging conditions.
"Even in the worst periods of conflict and insecurity, I didn't forget the vaccination times of my three kids," said Um Zaid, a mother from Baghdad.
UNICEF and partners made crucial gains for mothers like Ms. Zaid across all 18 Iraqi governorates. In particular, they have made strides in pushing the immunization programme out to remote, low-coverage areas.
By training health workers and mobilizing the support of Iraq's community leaders – including clerics and the heads of women's and youth groups – UNICEF is helping to lay essential building blocks for achieving 100 per cent vaccination coverage in the years ahead.
Source: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Saturday, May 08, 2010 |
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Nabucco Pipeline 'Needs Patience And Public Support'
Although the EU's proposed Nabucco gas pipeline is suffering from a lack of finance, demand and suppliers and could be delayed further, the EU and its member states should still back the project politically and financially, argues a European policy think-tank.
In a new policy brief, Centre for European Reform (CER) deputy director Katinka Barysch argues that despite the problems and postponements, the project ''still makes sense'' and should remain the flagship of the EU's energy policy.
Yet the paper, published on 5 May, also warns that the EU must recognise that its power to secure gas supplies from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq is fairly limited.
The Nabucco pipeline is designed to provide the EU with gas from suppliers in the Caspian and possibly the Middle East, yet faces competition from the South Stream project, backed by Russia.
In March, EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger said that a decision on the construction of the Nabucco pipeline should be made in 2010, but that its completion may be delayed by four years – from 2014 to 2018.
Despite the current lack of demand for Nabucco and the EU's ambitious climate change goals, many energy experts still foresee a slow but steady increase in European demand for gas in the future, the CER paper states.
''If such forecasts turn out to be correct, the EU will need Nord Stream, South Stream and all the southern corridor pipelines to satisfy its additional demand,'' says Barysch.
Nabucco, which is at the centre of the EU's southern corridor strategy, would reduce Europe's reliance on gas imports from Russia and provide a link to the gas-rich Caspian region – and possibly the Middle East in future.
Barysch believes that the EU and its governments should give Nabucco stronger public support if they believe it can achieve objectives ''beyond enabling some energy companies to make a profit by shipping additional gas to Europe''.
Challenges for guaranteeing supply
Currently, the only readily available gas field for Nabucco is Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan and a bilateral dispute between Baku and Ankara over gas prices is holding up progress on the second stage of the pipeline.
Turkmenistan – which exports most of its gas to Russia – is keen to get connected to the Nabucco pipeline, yet contractual and transit issues cast doubts on its readiness to sign up, Barysch states.
Iraq is another potential supplier for the project, but a number of obstacles exist – particularly how to share the revenues between Baghdad and the gas-rich Kurdish region in the north.
Though the pipeline could help the EU to develop stronger ties with these countries and help relations with Turkey as its membership bid stagnates, the EU ultimately ''has limited influence over many of the make-or-break issues for Nabucco,'' the paper concludes.
Source: EurActiv
In a new policy brief, Centre for European Reform (CER) deputy director Katinka Barysch argues that despite the problems and postponements, the project ''still makes sense'' and should remain the flagship of the EU's energy policy.
Yet the paper, published on 5 May, also warns that the EU must recognise that its power to secure gas supplies from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq is fairly limited.
The Nabucco pipeline is designed to provide the EU with gas from suppliers in the Caspian and possibly the Middle East, yet faces competition from the South Stream project, backed by Russia.
In March, EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger said that a decision on the construction of the Nabucco pipeline should be made in 2010, but that its completion may be delayed by four years – from 2014 to 2018.
Despite the current lack of demand for Nabucco and the EU's ambitious climate change goals, many energy experts still foresee a slow but steady increase in European demand for gas in the future, the CER paper states.
''If such forecasts turn out to be correct, the EU will need Nord Stream, South Stream and all the southern corridor pipelines to satisfy its additional demand,'' says Barysch.
Nabucco, which is at the centre of the EU's southern corridor strategy, would reduce Europe's reliance on gas imports from Russia and provide a link to the gas-rich Caspian region – and possibly the Middle East in future.
Barysch believes that the EU and its governments should give Nabucco stronger public support if they believe it can achieve objectives ''beyond enabling some energy companies to make a profit by shipping additional gas to Europe''.
Challenges for guaranteeing supply
Currently, the only readily available gas field for Nabucco is Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan and a bilateral dispute between Baku and Ankara over gas prices is holding up progress on the second stage of the pipeline.
Turkmenistan – which exports most of its gas to Russia – is keen to get connected to the Nabucco pipeline, yet contractual and transit issues cast doubts on its readiness to sign up, Barysch states.
Iraq is another potential supplier for the project, but a number of obstacles exist – particularly how to share the revenues between Baghdad and the gas-rich Kurdish region in the north.
Though the pipeline could help the EU to develop stronger ties with these countries and help relations with Turkey as its membership bid stagnates, the EU ultimately ''has limited influence over many of the make-or-break issues for Nabucco,'' the paper concludes.
Source: EurActiv
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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Iraq: Controlled Devolution Or Uncontrolled Disintegration
By Ivan Eland
Recently, Massoud Barzani, president of the northern Kurdish region in Iraq, bluntly declared that the American visions of a strongly unified Iraq were “bird dreams and wishes.” Barzani then proceeded to heighten pressure for greater decentralization of the country and expanded Kurdish control over oil.
At the same time, Arab Sunnis, previously more inclined to keep Iraq together because their section of the country has few proven oil reserves, could very well resume their guerrilla war against the Shi’ite-led government. If the plurality the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc earned in the recent election is stolen from it by recount or disqualification of candidates, or if any new coalition government is established that leaves out the bloc, Sunnis could resume the insurgency. Already the Sunni Awakening movement, former guerillas the Americans paid off, is disillusioned by its electoral marginalization and broken promises by the Shi’ite-led regime to give its former fighters government jobs.
Meanwhile, most Shi’ite groups have also been receptive to creating a more decentralized country.
Although the Iraqi constitution creates a fairly decentralized state, the most worrisome development for Iraqi unity is Barzani’s increasing demands. Barzani’s electoral gains—and because of Iraq’s post-election political stalemate, his ability to be a king-maker in selecting Iraq’s next prime minister—make him and the Kurds more strident in their quest for autonomy, or maybe even independence, and to grab the ethnically-mixed but oil-rich city of Kirkuk. If civil war breaks out, which is entirely possible as, or after, American forces leave the country, it will probably start over this oil-saturated boundary line between Kurdistan and the Sunni Arab portion of Iraq.
Although the United States should have sponsored a conclave of all Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups to discuss decentralization before America lost much influence as a result of its projected troop withdrawal, this attempt to avert a likely civil war nevertheless still needs to be undertaken. The Kurds are demanding action under Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, which lays out steps for a plebiscite to determine the trajectory of the northern portion of Iraq, including Kirkuk. If this referendum is conducted without such a conclave in advance, the result could be explosive.
Iraq always has been an artificial country ever since its creation in the early part of the 20th century by the British, who pushed together three unrelated provinces of the old Ottoman Empire so they could get control of Iraq’s oil. Only the iron fist of Sunni Arab dictators, the last of which was Saddam Hussein, held the country together—that is, until the U.S. invasion in 2003 ended the Sunni reign. The Kurds have never really wanted to be part of Iraq, and most of the Shi’a want, at minimum, some autonomy from the central government. Even the Sunnis are fearful of paybacks from any majority-led Shi’ite central government, some of which have already been delivered.
Some analysts have claimed—and rightfully so—that the United States has already meddled enough in Iraq and made a mess of things. But that’s not what’s being proposed here. The United States should use any remaining influence to avoid the impending train wreck, but only by sponsoring and mediating—not meddling in—the Iraqi conclave. The Iraqis must reach their own settlement; but the impending U.S. troop withdrawal, current political stalemate, Sunni disillusionment with the electoral process, and increased Kurdish demands may very well make all groups much more receptive to a decentralized solution—provided the U.S. acts merely as a neutral facilitator.
Here are some things that Iraqis might want to consider in any such devolution arrangement. Any agreement to ensure post-U.S. stability would probably need to allow both Kurds and Shi’a the autonomy to manage and keep the earnings from oil production out of reserves in their territories. Also needed would be some sort of gerrymandering or territorial swap, which would give Kurdish-populated lands now outside Kurdistan to the Kurds in exchange for the Sunni region getting access to more oil reserves.
Overall, the Iraqi central government needs to be weakened or the three groups will fight over control of this historically and potentially oppressive body. Thus, security and judicial functions probably need to be devolved to Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a regions. The central government could be converted into an economic confederation, thus maintaining economies of scale in any common market, a common currency, and free trade and investment areas.
Most important, such a negotiated settlement should not be forced on Iraqis. But if they are unable to reach such a decentralization to self-government, ethno-sectarian fissures are likely to pull a post-U.S. Iraq apart violently.
Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Recently, Massoud Barzani, president of the northern Kurdish region in Iraq, bluntly declared that the American visions of a strongly unified Iraq were “bird dreams and wishes.” Barzani then proceeded to heighten pressure for greater decentralization of the country and expanded Kurdish control over oil.
At the same time, Arab Sunnis, previously more inclined to keep Iraq together because their section of the country has few proven oil reserves, could very well resume their guerrilla war against the Shi’ite-led government. If the plurality the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc earned in the recent election is stolen from it by recount or disqualification of candidates, or if any new coalition government is established that leaves out the bloc, Sunnis could resume the insurgency. Already the Sunni Awakening movement, former guerillas the Americans paid off, is disillusioned by its electoral marginalization and broken promises by the Shi’ite-led regime to give its former fighters government jobs.
Meanwhile, most Shi’ite groups have also been receptive to creating a more decentralized country.
Although the Iraqi constitution creates a fairly decentralized state, the most worrisome development for Iraqi unity is Barzani’s increasing demands. Barzani’s electoral gains—and because of Iraq’s post-election political stalemate, his ability to be a king-maker in selecting Iraq’s next prime minister—make him and the Kurds more strident in their quest for autonomy, or maybe even independence, and to grab the ethnically-mixed but oil-rich city of Kirkuk. If civil war breaks out, which is entirely possible as, or after, American forces leave the country, it will probably start over this oil-saturated boundary line between Kurdistan and the Sunni Arab portion of Iraq.
Although the United States should have sponsored a conclave of all Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups to discuss decentralization before America lost much influence as a result of its projected troop withdrawal, this attempt to avert a likely civil war nevertheless still needs to be undertaken. The Kurds are demanding action under Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, which lays out steps for a plebiscite to determine the trajectory of the northern portion of Iraq, including Kirkuk. If this referendum is conducted without such a conclave in advance, the result could be explosive.
Iraq always has been an artificial country ever since its creation in the early part of the 20th century by the British, who pushed together three unrelated provinces of the old Ottoman Empire so they could get control of Iraq’s oil. Only the iron fist of Sunni Arab dictators, the last of which was Saddam Hussein, held the country together—that is, until the U.S. invasion in 2003 ended the Sunni reign. The Kurds have never really wanted to be part of Iraq, and most of the Shi’a want, at minimum, some autonomy from the central government. Even the Sunnis are fearful of paybacks from any majority-led Shi’ite central government, some of which have already been delivered.
Some analysts have claimed—and rightfully so—that the United States has already meddled enough in Iraq and made a mess of things. But that’s not what’s being proposed here. The United States should use any remaining influence to avoid the impending train wreck, but only by sponsoring and mediating—not meddling in—the Iraqi conclave. The Iraqis must reach their own settlement; but the impending U.S. troop withdrawal, current political stalemate, Sunni disillusionment with the electoral process, and increased Kurdish demands may very well make all groups much more receptive to a decentralized solution—provided the U.S. acts merely as a neutral facilitator.
Here are some things that Iraqis might want to consider in any such devolution arrangement. Any agreement to ensure post-U.S. stability would probably need to allow both Kurds and Shi’a the autonomy to manage and keep the earnings from oil production out of reserves in their territories. Also needed would be some sort of gerrymandering or territorial swap, which would give Kurdish-populated lands now outside Kurdistan to the Kurds in exchange for the Sunni region getting access to more oil reserves.
Overall, the Iraqi central government needs to be weakened or the three groups will fight over control of this historically and potentially oppressive body. Thus, security and judicial functions probably need to be devolved to Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a regions. The central government could be converted into an economic confederation, thus maintaining economies of scale in any common market, a common currency, and free trade and investment areas.
Most important, such a negotiated settlement should not be forced on Iraqis. But if they are unable to reach such a decentralization to self-government, ethno-sectarian fissures are likely to pull a post-U.S. Iraq apart violently.
Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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