Defending Everything Is Defending Nothing

By Ivan Eland

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently led a panel of experts in coming up with a report, “NATO 2020,” which will be used to draft a replacement for NATO’s current strategic concept, adopted in 1999. The report [.pdf] essentially advocates a continuation and expansion of NATO’s quest to be all things to all people. Unfortunately, this effort resembles the “expand or die” mantra that was applied to NATO as its primary mission—countering the Soviet Union—was tossed into the dustbin of history. Instead of expanding in territory and mission after the Cold War ended, NATO probably should have died back then and may die—or be severely crippled—by its likely loss in Afghanistan.

Although the Cold War is long over, the report advocates recommitting the alliance to its original collective security mission—so that member countries will feel more confident committing to do missions in far-flung areas outside the NATO area to counter the new threats of terrorism, piracy, cyberattacks, and nuclear and missile proliferation. Even though NATO has never been an organization designed or suited to counter these types of threats, the report is essentially saying that the U.S. should recommit to defending NATO nations—especially nations close to Russia, such as Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Such an American effort would then allow the allies to feel comfortable diverting resources from defending themselves to buying rudimentary power-projection forces to help provide a NATO fig leaf for U.S. interventions in remote lands outside NATO territory—such as Afghanistan. Such interventions would ostensibly be done to fix failed states, respond to humanitarian disasters, and stop genocide and violations of human rights but would often further underlying U.S. perceived geo-strategic goals. This “I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine” is good for the American empire because it makes the allies dependent on the United States for their defense—thus increasing American influence in Europe—and allows the U.S. to get a stamp of NATO respectability on some of its meddling around the globe.

These are advantages for the interventionist U.S. foreign policy elite, but actually defending all of these added NATO countries hardly benefits the already strapped American taxpayer or enhances his or her security. The alliance has not done much planning about how it would defend such far-forward nations against any Russian attack. That’s because defending them is costly and because the United States is also pursuing the contradictory goal of improving relations with Russia. In fact, Albright’s report encourages cooperation with Moscow on counterterrorism, maritime security, the drug war, and missile defense against Iran. But more generally, improvement in relations with Russia will always be limited as long as the potentially hostile NATO alliance is near and right on its borders.

Getting into a war with a nuclear-armed Russia over countries that were not regarded as vital to U.S. interests after World War II—when the United States wisely let the Soviet Union, which had just been devastated by a Nazi invasion, have a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as a buffer—does not make the U.S. taxpayer more secure, especially when Russia is a mere shadow of the Soviet Union.

But proximity does matter, as U.S. impotence during the recent Russo-Georgian War in 2008 showed. Similarly, an effective American conventional defense of allied countries like the Baltics against locally superior Russian forces would be difficult. Defense of the Baltics, non-strategic for U.S. security, could quickly escalate to a nuclear exchange, which might very well threaten the U.S. homeland. How all of this makes the American taxpayer more secure is doubtful.

Albright’s report again illustrates how irresponsible it has been to induct into NATO so many new countries so close to Russia. She and her panel seem to be backhandedly opening a vast sinkhole of new spending on actually defending these nations—at a time when budget deficits are out of control in many NATO countries (including the U.S.) and could bankrupt some of them (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy).

Yet, even in the unlikely event that more American and allied money is spent to defend all of these added countries, Frederick the Great’s maxim still holds: To defend everything is to defend nothing.


Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Feting A Fetid War

By Ivan Eland

To smooth over the stormy relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, President Barack Obama is throwing out the red carpet in Washington, D.C., for Karzai and his entourage. Vice President Joe Biden, who in the past has erupted in open hostility toward Karzai, is holding a “kiss-and-make-up” dinner for the Afghan leader.

All of this hoopla is the belated recognition by the Obama administration that Karzai is weak and corrupt but is the only game in town in Afghanistan. Of course, if the Vietnam War is any indication, being chained to a local leader with no legitimacy at home is usually the death knell of the entire war effort. Many historians think the U.S. lost that war even before the escalation when President John F. Kennedy tacitly endorsed a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. After that, corrupt South Vietnamese leaders ruled South Vietnam, giving the communists the opportunity to win the hearts and minds of the people and eventual victory.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, who escalated the war after Kennedy’s death, has been criticized ever since by the U.S. military for not letting it do all needed to win. But LBJ’s martial limitations made a little more sense when it is realized that he was trying to avoid an all-out war with a large communist power, as had disastrously occurred during the Korean War, and never intended to win the Vietnam War. LBJ was worried, even before he escalated the war, that the conflict would turn into a quagmire and was merely trying to tilt combat in U.S. favor to force the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong into a negotiated settlement. But the zealous communists never intended to compromise.

Obama is trying the same gambit in Afghanistan. His stated goal is to eradicate al-Qaeda and degrade, by the escalation of the U.S. military presence, the Afghan Taliban on the battlefield to such an extent that the United States can negotiate a better deal with them. The major problem with this strategy is that, unlike in Vietnam, Obama has signaled his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of next year. So the zealous Taliban has every incentive to merely hang on and outwait Obama, who is already facing an unpopular war at home, much like LBJ and Richard Nixon did in Vietnam.

Moreover, even in the hapless Vietnam War, the U.S. government’s ultimate objective was clear—prevent the communists from overrunning South Vietnam. The purpose of this war is the president’s vague notion that Afghanistan, not Iraq, should be the central front in the war on terror. Why this is so is unclear. After all, the Afghan Taliban seems to have learned its lesson and is not allowing the training on territory it controls of al-Qaeda, the leadership of which has likely long moved to Pakistan. Furthermore, the hated U.S. presence in Afghanistan and U.S. drone strikes against the Pakistani Taliban—whose enemy is instead the government of Pakistan—have destabilized Pakistan and made real the possibility that Islamist militants could eventually take over the nuclear-armed Pakistani government.

Maybe equally as bad, the Pakistani Taliban, which had been confining its efforts to destabilizing the Pakistani government, is now assisting attempted terrorist attacks in the United States. As in Yemen and Somalia, the United States has made new Islamist enemies of groups that concerned themselves primarily with local issues. In the case of Yemen, the United States had just ramped up its assistance to the Yemeni government against local militants when they commissioned the underwear bomber to blow up a U.S. flight.

President Obama, like his predecessor George W. Bush, has dismissed the obvious link between U.S. occupations of Muslim countries in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased terrorism against U.S. targets, saying that there were no such occupations on 9/11. Of course, Osama bin Laden has repeatedly declared that his primary reason for attacking on 9/11, before, and since has been U.S. military intervention in and occupation of Islamic countries.

John O. Brennan, Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser at the White House, has gone further and said that the administration’s drone attacks in Pakistan have thrown “these terrorist groups” off balance, hindering their attacks against U.S. targets. “Because of our success in degrading the capabilities of these terrorist groups overseas, preventing them from carrying out these attacks, they are now relegated to trying to do these unsophisticated attacks, showing that they have inept capabilities in training.” It failed to dawn on Brennan that the terrorist attacks wouldn’t be occurring in the first place without aggressive U.S. behavior in Islamic lands—for example, the motivation for the Pakistani Taliban-assisted Times Square bombing was clearly Obama’s escalation of the Bush administration’s drone attacks on Pakistani Taliban targets.

The original purpose of the war in Afghanistan was to eradicate al-Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda is now probably instead in Pakistan. The United States, with its nation-building wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, seems to be fighting everyone instead of focusing on those who attacked the U.S. on 9/11. The U.S. government’s inability to distinguish between al-Qaeda, with global ambitions, and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, with their local goals, has merely made more enemies, including those who would begin attacking the United States. How are Americans being made safer by this war?


Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, May 13, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Iraq: Controlled Devolution Or Uncontrolled Disintegration

By Ivan Eland

Recently, Massoud Barzani, president of the northern Kurdish region in Iraq, bluntly declared that the American visions of a strongly unified Iraq were “bird dreams and wishes.” Barzani then proceeded to heighten pressure for greater decentralization of the country and expanded Kurdish control over oil.

At the same time, Arab Sunnis, previously more inclined to keep Iraq together because their section of the country has few proven oil reserves, could very well resume their guerrilla war against the Shi’ite-led government. If the plurality the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc earned in the recent election is stolen from it by recount or disqualification of candidates, or if any new coalition government is established that leaves out the bloc, Sunnis could resume the insurgency. Already the Sunni Awakening movement, former guerillas the Americans paid off, is disillusioned by its electoral marginalization and broken promises by the Shi’ite-led regime to give its former fighters government jobs.

Meanwhile, most Shi’ite groups have also been receptive to creating a more decentralized country.

Although the Iraqi constitution creates a fairly decentralized state, the most worrisome development for Iraqi unity is Barzani’s increasing demands. Barzani’s electoral gains—and because of Iraq’s post-election political stalemate, his ability to be a king-maker in selecting Iraq’s next prime minister—make him and the Kurds more strident in their quest for autonomy, or maybe even independence, and to grab the ethnically-mixed but oil-rich city of Kirkuk. If civil war breaks out, which is entirely possible as, or after, American forces leave the country, it will probably start over this oil-saturated boundary line between Kurdistan and the Sunni Arab portion of Iraq.

Although the United States should have sponsored a conclave of all Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups to discuss decentralization before America lost much influence as a result of its projected troop withdrawal, this attempt to avert a likely civil war nevertheless still needs to be undertaken. The Kurds are demanding action under Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, which lays out steps for a plebiscite to determine the trajectory of the northern portion of Iraq, including Kirkuk. If this referendum is conducted without such a conclave in advance, the result could be explosive.

Iraq always has been an artificial country ever since its creation in the early part of the 20th century by the British, who pushed together three unrelated provinces of the old Ottoman Empire so they could get control of Iraq’s oil. Only the iron fist of Sunni Arab dictators, the last of which was Saddam Hussein, held the country together—that is, until the U.S. invasion in 2003 ended the Sunni reign. The Kurds have never really wanted to be part of Iraq, and most of the Shi’a want, at minimum, some autonomy from the central government. Even the Sunnis are fearful of paybacks from any majority-led Shi’ite central government, some of which have already been delivered.

Some analysts have claimed—and rightfully so—that the United States has already meddled enough in Iraq and made a mess of things. But that’s not what’s being proposed here. The United States should use any remaining influence to avoid the impending train wreck, but only by sponsoring and mediating—not meddling in—the Iraqi conclave. The Iraqis must reach their own settlement; but the impending U.S. troop withdrawal, current political stalemate, Sunni disillusionment with the electoral process, and increased Kurdish demands may very well make all groups much more receptive to a decentralized solution—provided the U.S. acts merely as a neutral facilitator.

Here are some things that Iraqis might want to consider in any such devolution arrangement. Any agreement to ensure post-U.S. stability would probably need to allow both Kurds and Shi’a the autonomy to manage and keep the earnings from oil production out of reserves in their territories. Also needed would be some sort of gerrymandering or territorial swap, which would give Kurdish-populated lands now outside Kurdistan to the Kurds in exchange for the Sunni region getting access to more oil reserves.

Overall, the Iraqi central government needs to be weakened or the three groups will fight over control of this historically and potentially oppressive body. Thus, security and judicial functions probably need to be devolved to Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a regions. The central government could be converted into an economic confederation, thus maintaining economies of scale in any common market, a common currency, and free trade and investment areas.

Most important, such a negotiated settlement should not be forced on Iraqis. But if they are unable to reach such a decentralization to self-government, ethno-sectarian fissures are likely to pull a post-U.S. Iraq apart violently.


Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

To the Tea Party: War And Liberty Aren't Fellow Travelers

By Ivan Eland

In an astute op-ed piece in the Christian Science Monitor, James Bovard points out that the love of liberty by the Tea Party crowd usually takes a backseat to a hatred of President Obama and the Left. After attending a tax day Tea Party event in Rockville, Md., a suburb of the nation’s capital, Bovard reported that the Tea Partiers oppose big government from the Left but not from the Right. Big government from the Right usually involves warfare and its accompanying enhanced police powers at home, which usually severely erode the liberty Tea Partiers claim to stand for. For example, the tea sippers extended their pinkies in a salute to torture, harsh policies toward Iran, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. They didn’t seem to mind the National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping and vacuuming up of ordinary Americans’ phone calls either, according to Bovard.

Yet of all the causes of big government in human history, warfare is the most important. The nation-state originally came into being because wars had become too expensive for mere kingdoms to handle.

And then the welfare state followed the warfare state. In fact, a militaristic conservative, Otto von Bismarck, created the first modern welfare state in Germany in the latter part of the 19th century.

In American history too, welfare has followed warfare. The roots of the Social Security system were planted with pensions for Civil War veterans. The progressive movement—with its counterproductive regulations on business that hurt the consumers it was trying to help—followed the Spanish-American colonial war.

But World War I was what allowed big government a vast and permanent foothold in American society. War had become so expensive and large scale that the U.S. government took over the entire economy to fight it—historically, the first time that had happened. Equally important, the government crushed dissent with the worst violations of civil liberties in American history. The war’s only rivals in stifling free political discourse were the Alien and Sedition Acts passed in the late 1700s—ostensibly needed by the government to fight off the French in the Quasi War but really aimed at political opponents. After World War I, resulting anti-foreign sentiments led to a red scare and the Palmer raids by law enforcement on innocent people.

During the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt brought back many of the World War I wartime agencies designed to “manage” the economy and simply renamed them. The war had set the bad precedent that no sector of the American economy was immune from government meddling.

World War II, the most horrific war in world history, also gave us the most government. During the war, government again took over regulation of the economy and even accounted for more than 40 percent of the American economy’s output, an all-time high. Although for the general population, civil liberties erosion was not as great as during World War I, that was little comfort to Japanese-Americans, who had not a single instance of disloyalty but were thrown into unconstitutional internment camps anyway.

The Cold War, although spawning only periodic hot wars, corroded civil liberties because it lasted so long. The McCarthyite witch hunts for communists in the 1950s and presidential wiretapping during the Vietnam War era that led to Watergate both began over fears of compromising information to unfriendly ears during those periods.

And of course, we have George W. Bush, a big-government conservative, who curiously wins, as Bovard notes, a 57 percent approval rating from the “small government” Tea Partiers. Yet in parallel with his war on terror, domestic spending increased more than any president since Lyndon Johnson, and he dramatically increased executive power to near tyrannical proportions by illegally using torture, wiretapping, and indefinite detentions without trial.

As Bovard notes, Tea Partiers are right-wing Obama-haters rather than liberty-lovers. And like their icon Sarah Palin, they seem proudly ignorant of history. Even the Boston Tea Party, from which the supposedly anti-tax Tea Party movement gets its name, hardly promoted liberty. The original Tea Party was caused by the British reducing taxes, not increasing them. The British had reduced the tariff on tea, thereby ruining the smuggling business in which many of the Bostonian vandals were engaged. After the violent and unnecessary destruction of private property by a mob—which other American cities had avoided and no true proponent of liberty should celebrate—the British cracked down on Boston. This crackdown thus eventually triggered the American Revolution, which likely decreased liberty in America. Wars almost always do.



Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Friday, April 30, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Should U.S. Be More Involved In Israeli-Palestinian ‘Peace Process’?

By Ivan Eland

The Obama administration is eager to solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem—both to make the president seem less naïve for having believed he could broker the chronic dispute quickly and to lessen the motivation for radical Islamists that attack the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. The administration is even debating internally whether to field its own Middle East peace proposal. However, although U.S. support for Israel is a cause of anti-U.S. violent jihadism, it is part of a broader motivation, and an active U.S. attempt to solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute might actually make Islamist terrorism worse.

The administration’s line of reasoning apparently emanates from David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, who has alluded to the link between lack of resolution of the Palestine issue and the ardor of anti-U.S. militant Islamists. The aggressive Israeli lobby has pounced on even Petraeus’ subtle conclusion and criticized him as saying that U.S. support for Israel fuels militant Islamism. Of course, Petraeus dared not go that far to such a politically incorrect conclusion, but everyone, including the lobby, knew what he was thinking.

The problem is that he is only half right—at least in the case of al-Qaeda, which should be America’s primary concern (rather than worrying about Islamist militants who are focused on local issues, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Iraq). Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, started out attacking the United States for what he believes is its “infidel” occupation of Muslim lands, or its support for corrupt rulers in those countries. Of course, by extension, he regards Israel and the occupied territories as Muslim lands having been stolen by infidels. And he regards Israel as the Americans’ neo-colonial proxy.

Thus, reality is wider than Petraeus’ line of reasoning, and it undermines his implicit argument that solving the Palestine problem is the key to reducing the lure of Islamist radicalism. Although his line of reasoning is risky—indirectly taking on the powerful Israeli lobby—it serves to divert attention from a wider conclusion that could adversely affect the U.S. military bureaucracy. If Americans finally realized, almost a decade after the Islamists’ motivations for the 9/11 strikes should have been discussed, that the primary motivation of the diabolical attacks was revenge for the U.S. occupation of Muslim countries—either directly or through perceived proxies—or intervention in them, the U.S. military might very well face the prospect of being withdrawn from its extensive presence overseas and losing a significant portion of its funding. Instead, Petraeus is attempting to channel the administration’s efforts into yet more interventionism—which motivates the anti-U.S. attacks in the first place—to make his life easier, without examining the larger issue, which could cause his institution major convulsions.

But wouldn’t it be nice for the United States to solve the Palestine problem to either safeguard other U.S. security interests or to act as a Good Samaritan to help the Israelis and Palestinians achieve peace and resultant prosperity?

First, there are no other U.S. security interests that slavish support for Israel satisfies. The Cold War is over, and so is the need for the need for an isolated pro-U.S. outpost in the Middle East. In fact, the same U.S. government that usually faithfully backs Israel worries itself silly over the flow of oil, which is located mainly in Arab or Islamic countries hostile to Israel. The close U.S.-Israeli relationship is counterproductive to this stated U.S. interest. So the perennial U.S. push to solve the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate is borne of domestic politics rather than of any compelling impetus based on U.S. security.

Second, U.S. involvement in trying to solve the intractable problem in Palestine—violence has been occurring there since the 1920s—merely convinces Islamist radicals that the United States is trying to help Israel legitimize the stealing of even more Arab land in the occupied territories. And it is difficult for the U.S. to be an honest broker in the dispute because of domestic pressure to be on Israel’s side.

Finally, Petraeus’ line of reasoning assumes that the Palestine issue can be resolved. Experts have clearly delineated possible compromises on paper, but mutual hatred and distrust between the Israelis and Palestinians prevent obvious solutions (to everyone else) from being agreed to and implemented. Heavy U.S. involvement and then likely failure is liable to highlight for Islamist radicals the belief that the impossibility of the U.S. being an honest broker in the conflict makes America complicit in one more continuing occupation by infidels of a Muslim land. Therefore, Islamist radicals’ stoked anger could lead to even more anti-U.S. attacks.


Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, April 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Obama’s Nuclear Achievements: Less Than Meets The Eye

By Ivan Eland

Despite all the hoopla about President Barack Obama’s summit on nuclear security and a new arms control deal, the eventual results of his laudable efforts will probably be modest and will likely be dwarfed by the damage to nuclear security done by George W. Bush’s prior administration.

Although the possibility of nuclear terrorism probably has been overstated—terrorists would have trouble getting fissionable material already under controls—it is not out of the question and can be made even more improbable by nations taking added measures to secure such dangerous substances. Obama wants—as the Ukraine has done—all countries to pledge to lock down their nuclear material by 2012. But pledges aside, many countries are not that serious about doing so or simply can’t afford it.

Obama’s task is made more difficult by his own and his predecessor’s actions in Southwest and South Asia, respectively. The George W. Bush administration, in order to contain China, sidled up to India and disastrously pledged to sell it nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors, thus freeing up Indian nuclear facilities to make material for more atomic weapons. India’s archrival, Pakistan, already destabilized by the Bush-initiated nation-building bog in neighboring Afghanistan (that instability is being exacerbated by Obama’s ill-advised escalation of the Afghan conflict), is now shifting into overdrive to produce more nuclear material to keep up with the Singhs. Pakistan, fighting an insurgency of Islamist militants, is the last country on earth in which involvement in a "bake-off" to create more nuclear material is desirable. In setting a horrible precedent by completing the Indian nuclear deal with a nation that has spurned the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bush administration chose largesse for the already heavily subsidized American nuclear industry over good sense.

As for Obama’s strategic arms control deal with the Russians, it cuts deployed warheads by only 30 percent, and even that is helped out by new ways of counting them. However, the agreement and his slight tightening of U.S. declaratory doctrine on when nuclear weapons would be used may have marginal positive effects by making nuclear weapons less legitimate in the eyes of most non-nuclear nations. Of course, such countries know that the new U.S. doctrine might likely be thrown out the window in a crisis. Furthermore, the policy already seems to have had the opposite effect on Iran, which, along with other nations that have eschewed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been excluded from the narrowing doctrine. Iran bitterly complained that the new U.S. policy implicitly targeted it with nuclear weapons. The doctrinal shift may very well make Iran more, rather than less, likely to continue its probable quest to get a countering nuclear deterrent.

Nevertheless, the modest arms control agreement with Russia on deployed strategic long-range weapons does start repairing an unnecessarily tattered relationship with Russia. This improvement in relations will be needed for the harder task of reducing or eliminating shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons and atomic devices in storage. To reach such a needed agreement, the United States likely would have to either get rid of missile defense or adopt a joint U.S.-Russian system, some of which would be on Russia’s territory; the U.S. would also either need to scrap the NATO alliance or admit Russia and eliminate the Article V U.S. security guarantee for European nations.

Thus, Obama’s achievements in nuclear security and arms control are, so far, more modest than all the publicity implies, but at least Obama has refocused world attention on what is still the only existential threat in U.S. history—nuclear war—and the improbable, but potentially disastrous, threat of nuclear terrorism. In its pursuit of nation-building and military social work in overseas quagmires, the Bush administration had neglected both.


Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Friday, April 16, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Let’s Get Our Own Foreign Policy House In Order Before Criticizing Others

By Ivan Eland

On March 31, 2010, the New York Times wrote an editorial that briefly expressed horror in response to the Moscow subway terror bombings, then warned that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin might yet again use terrorist attacks to further consolidate his power, and finally lectured Russia that the only way to defeat such extremism was to deal with the underlying causes. Such a sermonizing editorial by any Russian publication after the 9/11 attacks would have engendered outrage in America. Yet the same conclusions and advice that the Times gave to Russia in the wake of its tragedy could equally be applied to post-9/11 U.S. policy.

In the wake of the Moscow subway attacks, the Times opined,
“We are concerned . . . that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will use Monday’s horror as another excuse to further consolidate his authoritarian control of the country.”

“After extremists from Chechnya executed a series of bloody attacks in 2004, then-President Putin pushed through ‘reforms’ supposedly intended to improve Russians’ security. Their effect was to hand the Kremlin, Mr. Putin, and the state security services, from which he came, far too much power to silence a free press and undercut nearly all political challengers.”

Yet similarly, in the aftermath of 9/11, the George W. Bush administration moved swiftly to expand American executive power past the already potent capabilities of the imperial presidency into the realm of a “presidency on steroids.” For example, Bush claimed that during wartime, the president could disregard congressionally passed laws, especially statutes requiring court-approved warrants for surveillance of Americans. Such rule by executive fiat is usually what petty dictators do. Bush also unconstitutionally detained terrorism suspects, including U.S. citizens, indefinitely without trial and then approved torture, which was prohibited by U.S. and international law, on them. So politicians in the United States can also use terrorist attacks to grab more power in the name of enhancing security.

Even more blindly, the Times condescendingly preached to Putin that,
“If Russia is to have any hope of defeating extremism, Mr. Putin is going to have to focus less on promoting his own power and more on the root causes of the conflicts in the Caucuses. He can start by heeding his protégé, Dmitri Medvedev, the current president who has urged that the Kremlin address the underlying inequities that feed militancy, including poverty, joblessness, and official corruption. Brute force alone will not work this time either.”

And this from the flagship newspaper in a country that for many years has refused to examine the root causes of the 9/11 attacks and, in fact, has allowed its politicians to do more of the same. Had the American media and members of Congress actually examined Osama bin Laden’s writings to attempt to honestly determine his motives for attacking the United States, the unnecessary long-term occupation of Afghanistan and the feckless invasion and occupation of Iraq might have been prevented before they made the problem of blowback anti-U.S. terrorism worse. Bin Laden has been clear that he attacks the United States because of its intervention in and military occupation of Islamic lands.

Although it is easy to pick on the Times, the newspaper’s view merely reflects the lack of introspection by the U.S. political elite and American society about the ill effects of a U.S. foreign policy of overseas interventionism and hostile foreign reactions to it. But then the pot should not call the kettle black, but rather try to clean up its own act first.

 Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, April 08, 2010 | 1 comments | Read more...

Does U.S. Government Understand The Terrorist Threat?

By Ivan Eland

Most Americans just assume that the U.S. government’s actions to protect them from terrorism, if not perfect, are rational, based on sound information and analysis, and undertaken with the intention to protect the most people possible. But the government’s response here to the tragic bombings on the Russian subway should raise questions about such assumptions.

In response to the subway bombings in Russia, the metro subway system in Washington, D.C., increased its security—with transit police and bomb-sniffing canines conducting sweeps through subway stations and railroad yards. Yet the subway bombers in Russia are likely Chechens or other peoples in the North Caucuses seeking independence from Russia. Although the Chechen rebels have relied on funding from al-Qaeda and Doku Umarov, the Chechen insurgent leader, has several al-Qaeda emissaries on his staff, the Chechens are attacking Russia because the Russians continue a brutal suppression of Chechen aspirations for independence.

As with most local groups affiliated with al-Qaeda—for example, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (North Africa)—the Chechens focus on local issues, rather than attacking U.S. territory. So the Chechens are unlikely to want to attack—and probably don’t have the ability to bomb—the Washington subway system. So why did Washington subway security ramp up after the Moscow bombings? It was either reflexive irrationality that a similar attack might occur here or the government demonstrating that it’s “doing something” to illogically nervous American commuters.

Probably both of these factors had something to do with it. Remember the hysteria after 9/11, when young National Guardsmen were deployed in some U.S. airports with assault rifles? One could only hope they weren’t given any ammunition and that it was all for show. Or how about the short-lived banning of electronic tickets and prohibition on getting out of your seat during the last 30 minutes of every flight into the nation’s capital?

Government action often seems to be reactive, whether rational or not, after a major incident, especially in the very publicly visible realm of air travel. After the shoe-bomber incident, the government required us to take off our shoes and have them X-rayed. After the terrorist plot to mix chemicals for a bomb once on the plane, liquids were limited to three-ounce containers. The Christmas underwear bomber will eventually give us all full-body scanners. Yet one can walk onto an Amtrak train with no security at all and a cruise ship with much less intensive scrutiny than air travel. An easily sinkable cruise ship going down could kill over a thousand people, and a train bombing could kill hundreds, as it did in Spain. In part, airline security gets more government effort because more people fly than take trains or cruise ships, thus resulting in more pubic awareness of security in that sector. Regardless of the threat, politics directs that lots of government attention be paid to air security.

More important, the government also guards things that are unlikely to be attacked, which should lead the average citizen to wonder if it even understands the threat from al-Qaeda central, which is trying to attack U.S. targets. For example, ironically and tragically in Washington, D.C., concrete barriers and a beefed-up police presence have “bunkerized” the Jefferson Memorial, which is supposed to be a tribute to the rhetorical champion of American liberty. Yet al-Qaeda usually attacks symbolic economic (the World Trade Center in New York) or political (the U.S. national military command at the Pentagon) targets. Despite the propaganda of George W. Bush, al-Qaeda does not attack the United States because of its freedom.

When Bush kept repeating this nonsense, Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s heinous leader, put out an angry message denying it and reiterating that he attacks the United States because of its “infidel” occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern dictators.

Silence concerning or the deliberate muddling of al-Qaeda’s motives for attacking the U.S. by American politicians and media allows the American government to avoid being held accountable for its contributory negligence in causing horrific terrorist blowback, such as the 9/11 attacks. The excessive security at the Jefferson Memorial shows the lengths that the government will go to maintain the charade.

If terrorism is to be stopped, the underlying causes have to be eliminated. In the case of Russia, it has to somehow recognize Chechen self-determination. In the case of the United States, an honest debate has to finally occur about the blowback effects from an unnecessarily interventionist and militarized U.S. foreign policy abroad. A nation’s foreign and defense policies are supposed to make its people and territory safer, not less secure.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, April 01, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Not Out Of The Woods Yet In Iraq

By Ivan Eland

Despite Newsweek’s astonishing cover story announcing “Victory at Last,” the results of the Iraqi election could destabilize the country, as they did five years ago.

In 2005, the disaffected Sunnis boycotted the vote and resorted to violence during and after the long interregnum in which Iraqi factions bickered and bargained to form a government. Burned by under-representation in the Iraqi parliament as a result of their boycott, the Sunnis participated this time around. So everything should turn out better, right? Not likely.

Despite the veneer of multi-ethno-sectarian election groupings, Iraqis still vote mostly along ethno-sectarian lines. A foreign power imposing a foreign system of democracy at gunpoint will always have several major problems in a country such as Iraq. All of these have to do with underlying societal forces that undermine the superstructure of democracy, rendering it artificial.

The first is that history shows that democracy is most likely to survive in countries that have reached a certain economic level and have thus developed a powerful middle class. Iraq--the victim of the most grinding economic sanctions in world history, three devastating wars since 1980, and ethno-sectarian rebellion as far back as the eye can see—has seen its economy plummet past the point where democracy is likely to prove sustainable.

Second, Iraq, since becoming independent of British rule, has largely been ruled by a series of dictators, the latest of which was Saddam Hussein. As demonstrated by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s invocation of his title as Commander-in-Chief of Iraqi security forces and his demand for an electoral recount (even before the official results were announced), Iraq’s political culture is still one of threats, intimidation, and accusation. This is a fact that can’t be changed just by holding a few elections.

Third and most important, the underlying ethno-sectarian fissures in the country render a successful federal system of government almost impossible. Such a system requires close cooperation between the national, provincial, and local levels, which is very difficult when groups fight for power at all levels on an ethno-sectarian basis. A very loose and more decentralized confederation might be a better form of government for a fractured Iraq.

The results of the recent election indicate a very close race between Prime Minister al-Maliki’s faction, which was supported mainly by Shi’a, and Ayad Allawi’s group, which was primarily backed by Sunnis. Since the majority Shi’i vote has been split, it is possible that Allawi could try to form the next government. If that happens, the Shi’a and the Kurds—long oppressed by the minority Sunnis—might anticipate that recurring, and they could react violently.

If instead al-Maliki ends up trying to form a government, then the Sunnis could again feel politically marginalized, reigniting their insurgency. Also, returns indicate a strong showing by the anti-American radical Shi’i Muqtada al-Sadr, which could also cause a major problem for al-Maliki since he helped repress al-Sadr’s militias in Basra and elsewhere. The Kurds—now less unified—are a wild card.

Lastly, no matter what final coalition ends up controlling the Iraqi government, the close election could mean another protracted interregnum before that negotiated grouping gels. The gap could be filled with more ethno-sectarian strife.

Thus, it is too early for the U.S. elite’s self-congratulation that democracy has finally been solidified in Iraq. Defeat could yet be snatched from the jaws of victory after U.S. forces leave, and even before that if the latest election is as destabilizing as was the one in 2005.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Friday, March 26, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

More Sanctions Against Iran Are Not The Answer

By Ivan Eland

Because President Barack Obama’s attempt to entice Iran to give up its nuclear program has ended in unsurprising failure, he is now trying to ratchet up the pressure on the regime by leading the drive to increase international economic sanctions. However, even if he were to succeed in getting Russia and China to go along in the United Nations Security Council, the measures would probably be unsuccessful in achieving their stated goal.

The history of economic sanctions illustrates that they can be simultaneously successful and yet not very effective. Sanctions are usually successful in the country or countries that impose them. They are used to demonstrate more resolve to a recalcitrant country than a diplomatic slap on the wrist, but don’t go as far as covert action or a military attack. Sanctions are the middle ground of protest when diplomacy is perceived as too weak and covert action and military action are perceived as too dangerous or excessive. They also satisfy domestic political constituencies who are demanding action.

Unfortunately, however, the economic and political effects of economic sanctions on the target country rarely achieve their often-lofty goals. Sanctions, if severe enough, can bite economically by cutting off trade and financial transactions—for example, the most multilateral and comprehensive sanctions in world history against Saddam Hussein’s regime before the first Gulf War to attempt to dislodge the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait. Yet over time, history shows that cheating on sanctions increases dramatically as it becomes profitable for companies and countries to get top dollar for evading the restrictions on commerce. Thus, in the long term, the real economic effect is to merely raise the cost of trade and financial transactions to the target country.

These increased costs do punish the target nation, but do sanctions usually achieve their intended political goal? Again, the Iraqi case is illustrative. Even in the extreme case of grinding (at least in the short and medium term) worldwide and comprehensive sanctions, Saddam Hussein refused to leave Kuwait until he was evicted by military force. Furthermore, this goal of sanctions was more modest than demanding that the target country abandon a nuclear program, which is perceived as vital to its security, or even trying to achieve regime change.

And in the case of Iran, it is unclear which of these two more ambitious goals the multilateral, but incremental and selective, sanctions are intended to achieve. The three prior selective rounds of multilateral sanctions were directed toward the objective of getting Iran to halt the enrichment of nuclear fuel. Yet restricting more and more Iranian scientists from traveling abroad and exhorting countries to cut off trade with Iran will hardly achieve this ambitious goal. Lately, however, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has accused the Iranian Revolutionary Guard military force of turning Iran into a military dictatorship and talked about an even more grandiose goal for any incremental increase in multilateral sanctions—undermining this heart of the regime.

The history of sanctions indicates, however, that surgically targeting the regime, while avoiding harm to innocent people, is almost impossible. The regime usually redirects the pain of sanctions away from the security forces and onto the backs of ordinary citizens (as Saddam Hussein did), causing a “rally around the flag” effect against the sanctioning nations. At a time when the autocratic rule in Iran is weakening because of election protests, the United States and the international community should be careful about giving the Iranian government an external threat against which to rally domestic support.

Because Russia and China, with substantial commercial connections to Iran, always drag their feet on further sanctions against Iran, it is increasingly likely that the next incremental round of sanctions will have to be watered down—as was the last round in 2008. Even if new sanctions are eventually imposed, Iran can continue to enrich uranium during the months that it will take the United States to convince Russia and China to go along.

Thus, since Iran lives in a rough neighborhood, mere incremental sanctions will be unlikely to end its quest for the ultimate deterrent against attack. The only other option would be a U.S. military attack on Iran, but this wouldn’t likely take out all of Iran’s nuclear facilities (because the U.S. doesn’t know where all of them are located) and could spur potent Iranian retaliation in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and worldwide via terrorist attacks. The only way to assure an end to Iran’s nuclear program would be a full-bore invasion of that inhospitable nation, which would make the invasion and occupation of Iraq look like a picnic.

Thus, the bad news is that, even if stronger sanctions are imposed, Iran will probably get nuclear weapons eventually. The good news is that this threat is less severe than the hysteria indicates. As it did with radical and nuclear-armed Maoist China, the United States could likely deter any attack by Iran’s few warheads—provided the Iranians could eventually develop a missile with long enough range to hit the United States—through the mere presence of the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal.


Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, March 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

On Guantánamo, Symbolism Trumps Substance

By Ivan Eland

President Obama has been so chastened by his failure to meet the pledge of closing Guantánamo prison within a year that Rahm Emanuel, his chief of staff, is trying to negotiate with Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) to gain Republican support for doing so. In exchange, Graham wants Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other alleged 9/11 attackers tried using a military tribunal instead of a civilian court and also wants unconstitutional legislation allowing the indefinite detainment of terrorism suspects without trial. Closing Gitmo is designed to revive a tarnished U.S. image abroad rather than being a substantive change in policy, and it now apparently may come at the expense of using unconstitutional and discredited means of holding and trying terrorism suspects.

Although closing Guantánamo would be important symbolically, the law-free sanctuary that the Bush administration had achieved there has already been eroded by the Supreme Court’s demand that detainees have some legal rights. And even if the Obama administration closes Gitmo, some of Bush’s unconstitutional policies would continue in prisons around the United States—for example, the use of military tribunals for some detainees and the detention of some former Guantánamo detainees indefinitely without trial. Thus, the world should, and probably will, focus on the U.S. government’s continued violation of detainees’ rights rather than where they are violated—thus negating any positive public relations benefits from closing Gitmo.

But why should suspected diabolical terrorists have rights? Because these are our rights that are being trampled on too. The key word here is “suspected.” No matter how horrendous the crime—and slaughtering innocents for political reasons is about as heinous as it gets—the alleged culprit deserves a fair trial because he or she could actually be not guilty. Governments, including U.S. federal, state, and local governments, routinely make mistakes and jail the wrong people for crimes. According to Anthony Gregory, author of a forthcoming book on legally challenging incarcerations, an academic study of Guantánamo prisoners found that more than half had never committed a hostile act against the United States. And all but a few percent had not been picked up by American authorities, but had been turned over to U.S. forces in Afghanistan by Afghans to claim handsome rewards. In other words, innocent people had been turned in to get cash. Only 8 percent of Gitmo detainees were al-Qaeda members.

And why are military tribunals so bad? Although they have been slightly improved since the Bush administration originally set up its kangaroo military courts, they still lack the procedural safeguards of detainee rights found even in military courts-martial. Even more important, they are unconstitutional. The 6th Amendment in the U.S. Bill of Rights requires a jury trial for all criminal offenses, with no exception for national security cases. Proponents of military tribunals cite their use to try would-be German spies and saboteurs during World War II, but they were no more constitutional then than now. Furthermore, the killing of almost 3,000 people on 9/11 was a shameful crime, and those that allegedly perpetrated it should not be elevated to “warrior” status by trying them in a military tribunal.

Obama is only contemplating abandoning civilian trials for the alleged 9/11 attackers because of political pressure against holding such trials where the attacks occurred—southern New York, eastern Virginia, and western Pennsylvania. It is disheartening that the public in these attacked areas would not leap at the chance to uphold justice and the American legal system in their own communities.

Overseas, people will merely see any use of kangaroo military tribunals for what they are: attempts to shop jurisdictionally to get convictions more easily. Already the Obama administration selected the cases easiest to prove—those against the 9/11 attackers—for pursuit in civilian courts and relegated the more difficult ones to remain in military tribunals. This policy then created the anomaly that the most heinous defendants got the most rights. Of course, throwing the alleged 9/11 attackers’ case back to into military tribunals will correct this anomaly, but at the expense of violating the 6th Amendment. Thus, all defendants in terrorism cases should be tried in civilian courts as potential criminals.

Lastly, the civilian courts—just as they have in other cases with sensitive information, such as espionage and Mafia cases—have an excellent record of obtaining convictions. Civilian trials have resulted in hundreds of successful terrorism prosecutions, whereas the flawed military tribunals have resulted in only a few convictions—and most of those were overturned.

So if a deal is cut with Sen. Graham to close Guantánamo in exchange for tossing the alleged 9/11 attackers’ case back into military tribunals, the Constitution again will have been trampled under foot and the positive symbolism of closing Gitmo will have been offset by the use of kangaroo military commissions, which have been justly reviled around the world.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Friday, March 12, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Learning From History: Can U.S. Win Afghan War?

Photo: OCHA/VMU - A map of Afghanistan highlighting the restive southern province of Hilmand (also spelt Helmand)
By Ivan Eland

The United States military is attempting to transfer its recipe for “success” in the conflict in Iraq to the war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, after many years of stumbling to relearn the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare gleaned from many years of staggering in Vietnam, the United States happened upon a technique that attenuated the Sunni insurgency. That gambit was dividing the Sunni opposition by paying former Saddamists to fight the recalcitrant al-Qaeda.

In the short term, this strategy has dampened the violence in Iraq. In the long term, it may aggravate the still likely civil war between the Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis by training, arming, and paying the Sunnis, as well as the Kurds and Shia. But Afghanistan’s war is really between a recalcitrant Taliban and U.S.-supported warlords (the Afghan government is weak and corrupt), the U.S. military, and NATO allied forces. So to divide the opposition, couldn’t the United States just pay off some of the Taliban? Afghan’s president, Hamid Karzai, has proposed just that and has gotten some U.S. support.

Although throughout history, counterinsurgency “wins” have been few, dividing the opposition has been a major factor in prominent episodes that have proved successful. For example, in the 1950s, the classic British win in Malaya has helped write the military doctrine on counterinsurgency warfare ever since. After initially stumbling with a scorched-earth policy, the British implemented the same “hearts and minds” approach, aimed at winning the support of the indigenous population, that the U.S. has adopted in Afghanistan. This more benign method succeeded in winning over the Malayan population, thereby eliminating support for guerrillas among the people—the key to any counterinsurgency success. But the British were helped by one significant factor. Malays were already divided about rebelling against their colonial overlord. The Malayan Communist Party insurgents had the support of only a small part of the population.

A similar situation existed during the Greek government’s successful counterinsurgency against Marxist guerillas from 1946 until 1949. The guerrillas became divided when the Soviet Union demanded that they adhere to the values of the international Communist movement, which prevented them from taking advantage of strong feelings of Greek nationalism among the population.

So from these two cases and the at least short-term success in Iraq, isn’t Karzai’s effort to divide the opposition by bribing the Taliban with jobs and money a good idea? Given that the U.S. seems to be unwisely sinking deeper into the Afghan quicksand, trying to bribe your enemies, instead of fighting them, may again have at least short-term merits and is worth a try. But one other crucial issue has not been mentioned in the Malayan, Greek, and Iraqi success stories: the overwhelming factor of foreign occupation.

The primary reason that counterinsurgency warfare has not been very successful over time is that although counterinsurgents are usually much stronger than insurgents, they are also often foreign occupiers. This is one huge strike against them. People naturally get really annoyed when foreigners invade their country, as our own experience with British forces in the American Revolution attests. Even if the foreign troops are fairly benevolent—building schools, roads, and health clinics and handing out candy to children—they are still foreigners who are killing civilians by accident and arrogantly telling locals what to do at gunpoint, thus creating a nationalist backlash.

In the aforementioned three episodes, hatred of foreign involvement was either mitigated (in the Malayan and Iraqi cases) or went against the insurgents (in the Greek case). In the Malayan case, the Communist Party was overwhelmingly Chinese in ethnic origin. The Chinese, a minority in Malaya, were regarded as hated foreigners—even more so than the British. So the insurgents were the minority of a minority, and ethnic Malayans helped the British get rid of them.

In the Iraqi case, the Sunni insurgency was originally directed against the Americans but then became preoccupied with a civil war against the Shia majority and the excessively bloodthirsty and foreign-led al-Qaeda. Eventually, the mainstream Sunni rebels believed that receiving money, training, and arms from the foreigners would help them in their future fight against these perceived alien groups. So the mainstream Sunni insurgents flipped and began helping the Americans.

In Greece, the people have always been nationalistic, and the Greek government, backed by only indirect U.S. aid, used such nationalism to battle an insurgency of internationally oriented communists, which were getting aid from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greeks outside Greece.

Unfortunately for the United States in Afghanistan, however, the label of “foreign occupier” is an albatross the U.S. will likely never be able to shake or mitigate. Although the Taliban is often brutal (but may now be toning this down in its own realization that it must win greater public support) and unpopular, so is the U.S. occupation and the corrupt client government of Hamid Karzai. After the fraudulent election, the U.S. stewed about putting distance between the United States and Karzai, but more important—and something Americans don’t want to face—is that to survive, Karzai must stiff-arm the foreign occupier. In the all-important quest for the hearts and minds of the Afghan public, the Taliban is at least perceived by those people as being Afghans acting independently. In addition, the Taliban guerrillas are fighting to get back their home turf, and that means they, like the North Vietnamese, will likely have much more patience than the foreign occupier. One must go back in history to centuries before Christ—to Cyrus the Great of Persia—to find a conqueror of Afghanistan who actually was able to maintain control of it. So the U.S. escalation in Afghanistan is likely to face insurmountable long-term obstacles.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, February 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Liberty Versus ‘Patriotism’

By Ivan Eland

Dozens of people have been arrested under the Stolen Valor Act, which punishes, by up to a year in jail, the wearing of any unearned military medal. It is still a crime even if no effort was made to profit from the adornment or dissembling about earning it. This law is now being challenged in the courts as a violation of the First Amendment’s free speech right. Let’s hope that the judicial system acknowledges the clear violation of this amendment. But, of course, many times the courts choose the wrong answer, especially when questions of “patriotism” and the military arise.

The ancient Greeks and the men of the 18th-century Enlightenment, which included the American founders, differentiated between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism to both of these groups meant a responsibility to fellow citizens and devotion to humanity and the common good. Fealty to the nation-state and its government—nationalism—was an entirely different concept. In fact, the original U.S. patriots fought the American Revolution against the British nation-state and its government to preserve the traditional Englishmen’s rights in the colonies, which were under attack from the British crown.

Unfortunately, in the 19th century, the concepts of patriotism and nationalism blended. On top of that, after World War II, U.S. foreign policy became permanently militarized and public guilt about some mistreatment of returning Vietnam conscripts has led to excessive post-Vietnam adulation of the U.S. military. The public also feels sheepish about its lack of sacrifice—for example, sitting in lazy boy recliners watching the Super Bowl—while young men and women fight the government’s wars.

Such excessive admiration of things military is quite the opposite of what the founders believed. They, almost to a man, were suspicious that large standing armies, such as those of 18th-century European monarchs, would be a major threat to liberty. Given this American history, the adoption by the House, unanimous passage by the Senate, and signing by the president in 2006 of the clearly unconstitutional Stolen Valor Act indicates that demagogic nationalism by politicians knows no bounds.

Wearing an unearned military medal falls under none of the traditional judicial limits imposed on First Amendment free speech—that is, obscenity, libel, or imminent danger to others. That is, the courts have ruled that the First Amendment protects almost all speech that doesn’t harm another person. Also, as Jonathan Turley, a law professor at George Washington University, told the Washington Post about the act, “Half the pickup lines in bars across the country could be criminalized under that concept.” Taking the absurdity even farther, a kid could be arrested for wearing old military medals as part of a Halloween costume.

Of course, if anyone attempts to profit from saying that they won an unearned medal, or by actually wearing one, he or she could still be charged with fraud.

Liberty, for which our military men and women are supposed to be fighting, should trump nationalism, faux patriotism, and militarism. In fact, all of these things probably harm the U.S. military more than a wannabe hero making false claims about earning a martial medal. All of these maladies, usually promoted by guilt-ridden expedient civilians, usually get military people killed in unnecessary wars—certainly more disrespect to the nation’s armed forces than faking a few medals.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, February 11, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The U.S. Can No Longer Afford Its Empire

By Ivan Eland

President Obama has presented Congress with a spending request of $3.8 trillion for the next fiscal year in 2011, but with a third of it not paid for with taxes, thus resulting in a $1.3 trillion deficit (a whopping 8.3 percent of GDP). The small piece of good news is that this deficit is smaller as a portion of the nation’s economic output than this year’s gargantuan 10.6 percent for FY 2010 (that $1.6 trillion deficit is a post-World War II record). Budget deficits of this magnitude have occurred before, but only during cataclysmic wars—the Civil War and World Wars I and II.

Contrary to the rhetoric of congressional Republicans, who are stridently criticizing Obama for his excessive spending, these budget deficits are largely the result of George W. Bush’s new entitlement program (Medicare prescription drug coverage), the usual Republican fake tax cuts (tax cuts without concomitant reductions in government spending), bank and insurance bailouts, and the conduct of two disastrous U.S. occupations of foreign countries. Of course, Obama is far from blameless.

Using the key statistic of deficits as a portion of GDP, when Obama took office during FY 2009, the budget deficit was more than 9 percent of GDP. Obama’s $787 billion stimulus package and bailout of car companies increased an already gaping deficit into the 10.6 percent post-World War II record. The 8.3 percent figure for FY 2001 starts a downward projection but is still much too high. In fact, all budget projections for years out past the current and requested years (in this case, FY 2010 and FY 2011) are usually malarkey, because policy changes are unpredictable in the “out years.”

However, if history is any guide, Obama, a Democrat, over the long term will probably be better on deficits than George W. Bush, a Republican (he couldn’t be much worse). That’s because, according to conservative economist John H. Wood of Wake Forest University, historically, U.S. budget deficits have been closed after a crisis has passed.

Democrat Bill Clinton, with tax increases, cuts in military spending, and robust economic growth, managed to defy predictions for indefinite deficits from the Republican Reagan/Bush Sr. years and turned them into budget surpluses ending with FY 2001, the year he left office. Obama now faces a similar task of cleaning up the fiscal mess from the junior Bush’s eight years.

Obama made his task harder by buying into the flawed Keynesian argument that increased government spending is good for the economy. His stimulus package and car company bailouts just dug the fiscal hole deeper. But now the good news is that he seems to have quit digging and may have turned the corner to smaller deficits as a percentage of GDP. Only time will tell, but the wake-up call of the loss of Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat in liberal Massachusetts (in addition to dramatically lowering the probability that Obama’s stealth budget-busting health care program will be enacted) may cause Obama to become a “deficit-reduction Democrat,” much like his forebear Clinton.

After the Cold War, Clinton cut the defense budget despite the prosecution of many frivolous small wars that were unneeded for U.S. security. So far, Obama continues to increase military spending while freezing only a small part of non-security spending. Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House, has prudently said the avoidance of cutting security spending is unacceptable.

And security spending is massive. According to Winslow Wheeler of the Center on Defense Information, the annual U.S. security budget—including spending on the wars, the Defense Department, the Department of Energy nuclear weapons programs, homeland security, veterans compensation, international affairs, non-DoD military retirement payments, and interest on the national debt accounted for by defense programs—is well over $1 trillion per year.

Cuts to such spending should not entail just slashing a few weapon systems—as was done in FY 2010 but not in FY 2011—but need to result from a total reassessment of the non-traditional post-World War II U.S. foreign policy of U.S. militarized interventionism. Such a policy should have been pronounced a failure when it caused the horrendous retaliatory terrorist attacks on 9/11. Instead, the tragedy triggered the initiation of a neoconservative hyper-version of this same foreign policy, the War on Terror (which includes two unneeded and counterproductive occupations of two Muslim countries), which statistics show made the problem of terrorism worse.

The Cold War is long over, and the concomitant rationale (dubious even then) for using an interventionist U.S. foreign policy to attempt to run the world is now obsolete and even dangerous in an era of blowback terrorism. Many empires throughout history have collapsed or withered away because their aspirations were too big for their wallets; the U.S. is in that perilous position now. Therefore, the United States should dramatically retract its defense perimeter, thus cutting the U.S. security budget by half and saving more than $500 billion a year. Of course, doing this will not cut even half the annual $1.3 trillion deficit. But it is a start on throwing dirt back in the cavernous budget hole.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Wednesday, February 03, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Why Freeze Spending On Only Part Of The Budget?

By Ivan Eland

The results of the special election for the Massachusetts Senate seat once held by Ted Kennedy reverberated like a “shot heard ’round the world”—or at least one heard ’round Washington. All the spending lately in Washington has apparently alienated the political independents that Barack Obama won in November 2008. And the president gets the message—or at least he is making a good show of it.

His new proposal is a severely qualified three-year spending freeze, covering only about an eighth of the federal budget. The proposal covers only “discretionary spending,” programs that Congress appropriates money for each year, and leaves out the faster growing entitlement programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, which are ballooning on automatic pilot. Admittedly, entitlement programs are hard to cut, because . . . well . . . people feel entitled to their government handouts.

Yet Obama’s proposed spending freeze, which in fiscal year 2010 will save only a measly $10-$15 billion in a $3.5 trillion annual federal budget, doesn’t even cover all discretionary spending. Exempt are the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and foreign aid. Yet DoD spending alone, with the Cold War long over, is the greatest in inflation-adjusted terms since World War II and has doubled since George W. Bush took office in 2001.

President Obama’s rationale for not including these security expenditures in his discretionary spending freeze is that he is prosecuting two wars. Aside from the obvious solution of ending the two conflicts—which are part of the “war on terror” but have had the counterproductive effect of increasing retaliatory terrorism—and cutting back the defense budget, defense spending could be reduced even if the two war efforts are sustained.

Just as Obama used the economic crisis to try to pass an unrelated and expensive health care bill, George W. Bush used the 9/11 attacks to conduct an unrelated invasion of Iraq, which he then used as an excuse to pump up the defense and non-defense budgets. Although Obama has deepened the national debt and budget deficit, most of the two are still mostly Bush’s, because his reckless spending lasted eight years and Obama’s has only been going for a year so far. Still, despite different political rhetoric, some things never change in Washington.

So why doesn’t Obama at least freeze security spending? Could it be that the “war on terror” requires Cold War-like resources to be successful? No, the intelligence, drones, and CIA and Special Forces operations to conduct a real, covert, and more effective war on terror are reasonably cheap. The real answer as to why there is no defense spending freeze: Because Democrats are always scared of being called “wimps” on national security issues—likely the same reason Obama had to support at least one overseas war and thus reluctantly escalated the Afghanistan conflict.

Even if the Afghan war is considered necessary, however, it has nothing to do with most of the defense budget. A large part of that budget is doled out to special interests, including defense industries and even uniformed service members.

So here are some suggestions of items that could be cut from the defense budget without harming national security. The Navy could cancel the CVN-79 aircraft carrier, terminate the building of littoral combat ships and LPD-26-class amphibious vessels, stop production of exorbitantly expensive DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers, and terminate production of SSN-774 Virginia-class submarines. The Navy has little relevance to the war on terror and, with existing equipment, has crushing dominance over any other fleet in the world. The Air Force should stop production of C-17 aircraft, which are expensive compared to sealift, and delay production of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter until flight tests have been satisfactory. The Marines should cancel the MV-22 Osprey aircraft; the range and speed advantages over existing helicopters are not worth the much higher cost.

The Army and Marines should end expansion of their forces. Adding more soldiers is very expensive because of added salaries, benefits, equipment, and support. If any presidential administration feels it needs to use military force against terrorists, it should be employed only sparingly after law enforcement methods have failed, and with a lighter footprint so that it does fuel the Islamist fire that it seeks to dampen. Thus, if the United States is not conducting counterproductive occupations of Muslim lands to ostensibly quell terrorism, the ground forces need not be augmented, and even can be reduced. This reduction should allow cutting the weapons and equipment that are purchased for such forces.

Finally, there are loads of pork in the foreign aid and homeland security budgets that could be extracted. At most (and even this is a stretch), Obama’s proposed limited spending freeze will result in a savings of only 3 percent of the ballooning budget deficits in the next 10 years. To avoid his predecessor’s reputation of “spending like a drunken sailor,” Obama must include massive entitlements and discretionary security spending in his budget cutting for it to be serious.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Friday, January 29, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The Next Crisis For Obama?

By Ivan Eland

Since taking office, Barack Obama has had to deal with an economy in free fall, a self-generated health care “crisis” and his attempt at “reform,” and a rising Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. So far, Iraq has been quiet enough that many in the media and public have redirected their attention to the wars du jour of Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The relative peace (punctuated by an occasional violent attack) in Iraq may be about to evaporate and cause yet another crisis for the president.

The Iraqi Accountability and Justice Commission dispenses neither, operates in secret, and is headed by Ahmed Chalabi, a suspected Iranian agent who duped the overly receptive Bush administration into invading Iraq, and Ali Faisal al-Lami, who was detained for terrorism. The commission has disqualified more than 500 candidates for the upcoming parliamentary elections in March. The candidates were mostly Sunni, and the disbarment could very well re-ignite a Sunni insurgency or Shi’ite-Sunni civil war.

The ban, endorsed by Shi’ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, conveniently helps his electoral mixed Shi’ite-Sunni alliance, ironically named State of the Law Coalition, by undermining his chief rival, the similarly mixed coalition of Iraqiya, which features a vice president, former prime minister, and a prominent Sunni politician who has been banned from running. Of course, in a conflict of interest so typical in Iraq, the Shi’ite coalition of Chalabi and al-Lami also benefits from the disbarment of Sunni candidates.

In 2005, the Sunnis also felt disenfranchised, which led to the rising insurgency and civil war with the Shi’ites in 2006 and 2007. So this kangaroo commission’s decision could have dramatic consequences.

The ruling seemed to shock American and foreign diplomats, who believe that the reduced violence in Iraq has occurred because U.S.-led “institution-building,” artificially imposed at gunpoint, has been working. But in most societies, laws and institutions usually follow a societal consensus and informal compact among factions. Little of that exists in Iraq, so the constitution, the laws, and the institutions adopted under pressure from an occupying power are just a veneer. The bald disqualification of candidates, more typical of autocracies such as Iran, is merely a symptom of the continued fractured nature of Iraqi society.

Until those underlying fissures are dealt with, the reduction in violence will only be temporary—caused primarily by American paying off of Sunni insurgents, prior ethnic cleansing that separated warring factions, and sheer exhaustion from war rather than the forming of a societal consensus in an artificial country. Historically, in other similar ethno-sectarian conflicts, violence has ebbed and flowed over time. As baseball great Yogi Berra quipped, “It ain’t over till it’s over.” And it won’t be over soon.

In addition to the barring of candidates from the election, other symptoms of the continuing factionalism have been the difficulties in passing laws governing the March election and control over oil resources, the internal infighting in the much touted mixed electoral coalitions (especially in the newly announced Iraqiya), the Shi’ite-dominated army imposing de facto martial law in Sunni areas of Baghdad, and, most ominously, the seeming loyalty of certain units in the Iraqi security forces to their Kurdish, Shi’ite, or Sunni ethno-sectarian factions rather than the Iraqi state.

Because a repeat of Sunni disenfranchisement and hostile reaction is possible, pressure is building for a strong U.S. intervention to motivate Iraqi coalitions to reach a compromise on the disbarred candidates, thus avoiding violence and ensuring a smoother electoral process. Yet even if a compromise is reached, it doesn’t deal with the underlying artificiality of the U.S. project to hold Iraq together.

The disbarment of candidates for the election is a canary in the coal mine and dramatically highlights the threat that renewed violence poses to Obama’s laudable plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of next year.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Thursday, January 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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