Bernanke Underlines Central Bank Independence
(KUNA) -- Visiting US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke on Wednesday said central banks must meet their responsibilities for transparency and accountability in exchange for this independence.
"It is crucial that we maintain the ability of central banks to make monetary policy independently of short-term political influence," the Fed chief said in a speech at an international conference in Tokyo hosted by the Bank of Japan.
"As an agent of the government, a central bank must be accountable in the pursuit of its mandated goals, responsive to the public and its elected representatives, and transparent in its policies." The central bank should enjoy a degree of independence and there should be no spillover from monetary policy independence to independence in other spheres of activity," he said.
"Transparency regarding monetary policy in particular not only helps make central banks more accountable, it also increases the effectiveness of policy, " he said, warning that political interference in monetary policy can generate undesirable boom-bust cycles that ultimately lead to both a less stable economy and higher inflation.
Bernanke went on to say, "The public will expect high inflation and demand more-rapid increases in nominal wages and in prices if the central bank is not credible."
The Fed chairman also noted central banks around the world are working with their governments to prevent future crises by strengthening frameworks for financial regulation and supervision.
"It is crucial that we maintain the ability of central banks to make monetary policy independently of short-term political influence," the Fed chief said in a speech at an international conference in Tokyo hosted by the Bank of Japan.
"As an agent of the government, a central bank must be accountable in the pursuit of its mandated goals, responsive to the public and its elected representatives, and transparent in its policies." The central bank should enjoy a degree of independence and there should be no spillover from monetary policy independence to independence in other spheres of activity," he said.
"Transparency regarding monetary policy in particular not only helps make central banks more accountable, it also increases the effectiveness of policy, " he said, warning that political interference in monetary policy can generate undesirable boom-bust cycles that ultimately lead to both a less stable economy and higher inflation.
Bernanke went on to say, "The public will expect high inflation and demand more-rapid increases in nominal wages and in prices if the central bank is not credible."
The Fed chairman also noted central banks around the world are working with their governments to prevent future crises by strengthening frameworks for financial regulation and supervision.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 |
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ASEAN And SAARC: Intra Regional Trade Forums
By Tuli Sinha for IPCS
This article evaluates ASEAN and SAARC as two pivotal regional platforms for actuating economic cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. A comparative study reveals that despite asymmetrical sizes AFTA has surpassed SAFTA in terms of trade benefits and value addition to the overall regional economic growth. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine AFTA and SAFTA relatively and ascertain reasons for the failure of SAARC and SAFTA in relation to ASEAN’s initiatives. Why has SAARC failed to forge conditions of cooperation on the economic and political fronts? What have been the probable impediments in the growth of SAFTA as compared to AFTA? What can be done to restructure and revive the SAFTA to propel the South Asian economy towards greater economic integration and regional consolidation? What was decided in the 16th SAARC Summit in terms of regional trade cooperation?
The European Union (EU) is spearheading the process of developing inter-regional economic networks among other regional organizations of the world. However, many factors are responsible for the success of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which realized the logic of an apropos economic group consciousness which completely lacked in SAARC. It is a collective effort by ASEAN member countries to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade in the goods sector. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN’s position as a competitive production base producing for both regional and global markets. An analysis reveals that the formation of AFTA has led to a remarkable expansion of intra-ASEAN trade since its inception. The statistics so far substantiates the fact that Intra-ASEAN trade has been consistently increasing over the years from US$81.98 billion in 1993. Today, the intra-ASEAN trade incorporates approximately 25 per cent of the total external trade in comparison to merely 2 per cent of the intra-SAARC trade.
Among the countries, Singapore continues to be a major contributor in the intra-regional trade, accounting for 39.5 per cent of the total intra-ASEAN trade, followed by Malaysia (24.2 per cent), Thailand (15.6 per cent), Indonesia (9.5 per cent) and the Philippines (5.7 per cent). Also, the role of great power interventions especially of the US has been vital in determining the fate of AFTA. ASEAN has been an important economic partner for the United States; shared convergent commercial interests are a major driving force for ASEAN and the success of its forums. For the last two years, the cumulative American investment in ASEAN has been greater than the total investments in China, Japan and Korea. ASEAN receives the fifth largest share of US foreign investment and this is rendering a subtle counter to the China block in Asia. Such an external pressure in terms of performance is completely missing in SAARC.
Moreover, despite initial gains, SAFTA has not really achieved much in terms of internal or external trade. It is interesting to observe incessant efforts by the SAARC members, especially India, being the most prosperous, to ameliorate conditions of intra regional trade in South Asia. The robust rise in India’s total imports from SAARC has been underpinned by the sharp increase in imports from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. India generally maintains a positive trade balance with the other SAARC member countries, and the trade surplus has risen from US$2.3 billion to US$5.0 billion until recently. Sri Lanka is again the leading partner, accounting for 31 per cent of India’s total imports from the region, followed by Pakistan (21 per cent), Nepal (20 per cent), Bangladesh (15 per cent) and Bhutan (9 per cent). The region also lacks the impetus to incur the unforeseen costs and investments to initiate any new agenda for economic prosperity unlike ASEAN.
Although SAARC has been working towards enhancing its regional trade, it certainly requires a structural revival. There are several steps that should be incorporated in the working process of SAFTA and SAARC on the whole to improve the conditions of trade. First, SAFTA experiences high trade deficit in terms of its global trade, thus more emphasis could be given to boost exports from the region. Second, SAARC countries are mainly exporting agricultural commodities and agro-based products. With trade being competitive and identical, more diversification of goods is extremely essential. Third, while SAARC countries have effected reduction in tariff levels, it can be reduced even further to increase the benefits of the trade bloc in future. Adequate steps could also be implemented to attract more FDI into the region from other sources. Fourth, the direct relationship between bilateral exports and GDP in the SAARC region reveals the potential for export-led growth in the region. With further opening of the economy, the bilateral exports will also increase. As there is a positive relation between the bilateral trade agreement and bilateral export flows in the SAARC region, the creation of bilateral agreements in the region must be encouraged. Finally, strengthening of economic relations can be used to reinforce improving political relations in the region, for instance, the relationship between India and Pakistan, as economic ties could help improve political relations to a great extent.
Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at tuli_sn@yahoo.com. This article was published by IPCS.
This article evaluates ASEAN and SAARC as two pivotal regional platforms for actuating economic cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. A comparative study reveals that despite asymmetrical sizes AFTA has surpassed SAFTA in terms of trade benefits and value addition to the overall regional economic growth. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine AFTA and SAFTA relatively and ascertain reasons for the failure of SAARC and SAFTA in relation to ASEAN’s initiatives. Why has SAARC failed to forge conditions of cooperation on the economic and political fronts? What have been the probable impediments in the growth of SAFTA as compared to AFTA? What can be done to restructure and revive the SAFTA to propel the South Asian economy towards greater economic integration and regional consolidation? What was decided in the 16th SAARC Summit in terms of regional trade cooperation?
The European Union (EU) is spearheading the process of developing inter-regional economic networks among other regional organizations of the world. However, many factors are responsible for the success of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which realized the logic of an apropos economic group consciousness which completely lacked in SAARC. It is a collective effort by ASEAN member countries to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade in the goods sector. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN’s position as a competitive production base producing for both regional and global markets. An analysis reveals that the formation of AFTA has led to a remarkable expansion of intra-ASEAN trade since its inception. The statistics so far substantiates the fact that Intra-ASEAN trade has been consistently increasing over the years from US$81.98 billion in 1993. Today, the intra-ASEAN trade incorporates approximately 25 per cent of the total external trade in comparison to merely 2 per cent of the intra-SAARC trade.
Among the countries, Singapore continues to be a major contributor in the intra-regional trade, accounting for 39.5 per cent of the total intra-ASEAN trade, followed by Malaysia (24.2 per cent), Thailand (15.6 per cent), Indonesia (9.5 per cent) and the Philippines (5.7 per cent). Also, the role of great power interventions especially of the US has been vital in determining the fate of AFTA. ASEAN has been an important economic partner for the United States; shared convergent commercial interests are a major driving force for ASEAN and the success of its forums. For the last two years, the cumulative American investment in ASEAN has been greater than the total investments in China, Japan and Korea. ASEAN receives the fifth largest share of US foreign investment and this is rendering a subtle counter to the China block in Asia. Such an external pressure in terms of performance is completely missing in SAARC.
Moreover, despite initial gains, SAFTA has not really achieved much in terms of internal or external trade. It is interesting to observe incessant efforts by the SAARC members, especially India, being the most prosperous, to ameliorate conditions of intra regional trade in South Asia. The robust rise in India’s total imports from SAARC has been underpinned by the sharp increase in imports from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. India generally maintains a positive trade balance with the other SAARC member countries, and the trade surplus has risen from US$2.3 billion to US$5.0 billion until recently. Sri Lanka is again the leading partner, accounting for 31 per cent of India’s total imports from the region, followed by Pakistan (21 per cent), Nepal (20 per cent), Bangladesh (15 per cent) and Bhutan (9 per cent). The region also lacks the impetus to incur the unforeseen costs and investments to initiate any new agenda for economic prosperity unlike ASEAN.
Although SAARC has been working towards enhancing its regional trade, it certainly requires a structural revival. There are several steps that should be incorporated in the working process of SAFTA and SAARC on the whole to improve the conditions of trade. First, SAFTA experiences high trade deficit in terms of its global trade, thus more emphasis could be given to boost exports from the region. Second, SAARC countries are mainly exporting agricultural commodities and agro-based products. With trade being competitive and identical, more diversification of goods is extremely essential. Third, while SAARC countries have effected reduction in tariff levels, it can be reduced even further to increase the benefits of the trade bloc in future. Adequate steps could also be implemented to attract more FDI into the region from other sources. Fourth, the direct relationship between bilateral exports and GDP in the SAARC region reveals the potential for export-led growth in the region. With further opening of the economy, the bilateral exports will also increase. As there is a positive relation between the bilateral trade agreement and bilateral export flows in the SAARC region, the creation of bilateral agreements in the region must be encouraged. Finally, strengthening of economic relations can be used to reinforce improving political relations in the region, for instance, the relationship between India and Pakistan, as economic ties could help improve political relations to a great extent.
Tuli Sinha is a Research Officer for SEARP, IPCS and may be reached at tuli_sn@yahoo.com. This article was published by IPCS.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Tokyo Stocks End On 6-Month Low On Eurozone Woes, N.Korea
(KUNA) -- Tokyo stocks plunged on Tuesday, with a key index falling to a six-month closing low amid growing concerns over Europe's debt worries and diplomatic tension on the Korean peninsula.
The 225-issue Nikkei Stock Average on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) lost 298.51 points, or 3.06 percent, from Monday to 9,459.89, breaking below the 9, 500 threshold for the first time since Nov. 30.
The broader Tokyo Stock Price Index, which includes all shares on the TSE's first section, was down 20.19 points, or 2.29 percent, to 859.82, the lowest level since December 2.
Almost all 33 sectors on the TSE declined, led by textile and sea transport issues. The index was also dampened by the yen's appreciation against the US dollar and Euro, as investors sold export-oriented issues.
Weak performance in other Asian markets also contributed to the decline.
In the currency markets, at 5:15 p.m. (0815 GMT), the US dollar traded at JPY 89.70-75 compared with JPY 90.23-33 in New York and JPY 90.22-24 in Tokyo at 5 p.m. Monday
The 225-issue Nikkei Stock Average on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) lost 298.51 points, or 3.06 percent, from Monday to 9,459.89, breaking below the 9, 500 threshold for the first time since Nov. 30.
The broader Tokyo Stock Price Index, which includes all shares on the TSE's first section, was down 20.19 points, or 2.29 percent, to 859.82, the lowest level since December 2.
Almost all 33 sectors on the TSE declined, led by textile and sea transport issues. The index was also dampened by the yen's appreciation against the US dollar and Euro, as investors sold export-oriented issues.
Weak performance in other Asian markets also contributed to the decline.
In the currency markets, at 5:15 p.m. (0815 GMT), the US dollar traded at JPY 89.70-75 compared with JPY 90.23-33 in New York and JPY 90.22-24 in Tokyo at 5 p.m. Monday
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Meiji Seika Kaisha And BASF Sign Insecticide Agreement
BASF said Tuesday it has signed an agreement with Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd. for the co-development of a new insecticide for the control of piercing and sucking insects, code named ME5343.
Under the terms of the agreement, Meiji Seika granted a worldwide, exclusive license (except Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, where Meiji Seika will hold the exclusive license) to BASF to develop and commercialize the new insecticide.
Further details of the agreement were not disclosed.
According to BASF, representing both a new class of chemistry and a new mode of action, the insecticide was discovered in a research collaboration between Meiji Seika and The Kitasato Institute. The compound shows significant efficacy for the control of aphids, whiteflies and certain scales, mealy bugs and leaf hoppers, including those that have developed resistance to other insecticides.
This new insecticide is expected to be launched in the Japanese market in 2014 and other markets in 2015. It has potential use applications in vegetables, fruit, vine, row crops, and ornamentals, and has shown to be effective as a foliar, seed, and soil applied treatment.
“This agreement combines BASF’s global market strength with Meiji Seika’s innovation skills, delivering an important and exciting new insecticide innovation to growers around the world,” said Markus Heldt, President of BASF Crop Protection division.
This new compound has been evaluated in research trials and is considered a high performance insecticide that ranks low in toxicity to beneficial arthropods, including pollinators, and is an ideal candidate for use in insect resistance management programs, according to researchers at both companies.
While significant research on the development of this compound is planned, early results have been promising, BASF said.
According to BASF, other features of the compound include low toxicity to the environment, non-target organisms, including other arthropods, and mammals. With global regulatory requirements increasing, the compound is expected to meet evolving regulatory standards that may further restrict or force existing compounds off the market. Meiji Seika will submit the new compound for regulatory approval in Japan in 2012. BASF will submit for regulatory approval in the U.S., Brazil, and EU in 2013, with commercial launch planned for 2015.
Under the terms of the agreement, Meiji Seika granted a worldwide, exclusive license (except Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, where Meiji Seika will hold the exclusive license) to BASF to develop and commercialize the new insecticide.
Further details of the agreement were not disclosed.
According to BASF, representing both a new class of chemistry and a new mode of action, the insecticide was discovered in a research collaboration between Meiji Seika and The Kitasato Institute. The compound shows significant efficacy for the control of aphids, whiteflies and certain scales, mealy bugs and leaf hoppers, including those that have developed resistance to other insecticides.
This new insecticide is expected to be launched in the Japanese market in 2014 and other markets in 2015. It has potential use applications in vegetables, fruit, vine, row crops, and ornamentals, and has shown to be effective as a foliar, seed, and soil applied treatment.
“This agreement combines BASF’s global market strength with Meiji Seika’s innovation skills, delivering an important and exciting new insecticide innovation to growers around the world,” said Markus Heldt, President of BASF Crop Protection division.
This new compound has been evaluated in research trials and is considered a high performance insecticide that ranks low in toxicity to beneficial arthropods, including pollinators, and is an ideal candidate for use in insect resistance management programs, according to researchers at both companies.
While significant research on the development of this compound is planned, early results have been promising, BASF said.
According to BASF, other features of the compound include low toxicity to the environment, non-target organisms, including other arthropods, and mammals. With global regulatory requirements increasing, the compound is expected to meet evolving regulatory standards that may further restrict or force existing compounds off the market. Meiji Seika will submit the new compound for regulatory approval in Japan in 2012. BASF will submit for regulatory approval in the U.S., Brazil, and EU in 2013, with commercial launch planned for 2015.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Clinton Press Tokyo Press Conference: N Korea Agression, Iran
Hillary Rodham Clinton, US Secretary of State
Ikura Guesthouse
Tokyo, Japan
May 21, 2010
MODERATOR: (Via translator) I would like to begin (inaudible) press conference with Foreign Minister Okada and Secretary Clinton. Minister Okada and then Secretary Clinton will speak, and then questions and answers. Mr. Okada, please.
FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA: (Via translator) Thank you. This is my fifth meeting with Secretary Clinton since last September. We had a very candid exchange of views. In today's meeting we had discussions centering on the regional situations in Asia, and the response to the Iranian nuclear issue -- but of course, other themes as well.
Instabilities and uncertainties as represented by the sinking of the ROK Navy corvette are becoming visible. And the Japan-U.S. alliance is, therefore, all the more important. Against this backdrop, this meeting, I believe, was important and timely for the purpose of addressing these situations through mutual cooperation, with common awareness of them between Japan and the United States. And, as such, it is gratifying that Secretary Clinton has visited Japan.
With regard to the sinking of the Korean corvette, we discussed the response we should take following the announcement yesterday of the results of the investigations. Setting aside details, we confirmed that coordination among Japan, U.S., and ROK, including our future response, is important, and that we shall maintain close communication with each other in addressing the matter.
As the Secretary is on her way to attend the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, I explained to her the results of the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers meeting, as well as the Japan-China Bilateral meeting held in its margins, and exchanged the views on Japan-China and U.S.-China relations, as well.
On the Iranian nuclear issue, while we will need to watch how the recent agreement between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil will play out, we see eye to eye that the cause for concern remains unchanged as Iran has publicly stated that it will continue the enrichment of uranium to approximately the 20 percent level.
I told Secretary Clinton that Japan will actively play a role in the discussions for a new UN Security Council resolution in order to enable the international community to put out a unified message. We confirmed that our two countries will continue to work closely together. We confirmed afresh the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance, including the above-mentioned exchange of views, and we shall carry on our consultations to further deepen the alliance.
On the question of relocating the Futenma air station, working-level officials of our two countries were having a meeting today, as well. And I also explained Japan's position on this. Talks are proceeding intensively between Japan and the United States. Both Japan and the United States will make further efforts towards a settlement by the end of May. That's all for me. Thank you very much.
Secretary Clinton, please.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, it's a pleasure to be back in Tokyo, and to reaffirm the enduring alliance between our two nations. I thank Minister Okada for his warm welcome and the substantive discussions that we’ve had, and I look forward to seeing the prime minister.
Japan was the first nation I visited as Secretary of State, because we recognize that this relationship continues to be a cornerstone of security, stability, and progress in a region that is so crucial to the future of our entire world.
This year, as the United States and Japan mark the 50th anniversary of our alliance, we can be very proud of all we have accomplished together; the peace we have kept, the prosperity we have built, and the bonds we have forged. This partnership is essential for meeting the challenges not only of today, but also of tomorrow. And it is a rock solid foundation for our shared future.
As the foreign minister said, we had a productive meeting on a number of critical issues and common concerns. We had a detailed discussion on the results of the international investigation into the sinking of the Korean military vessel. This was a thorough and comprehensive scientific examination, and the United States and other international observers were deeply engaged. The evidence is overwhelming and condemning. The torpedo that sunk the Cheonan and took the lives of 46 South Korean sailors was fired by a North Korean submarine. And the United States strongly condemns this act of aggression. As Minister Okada and I discussed, we will be in deep and constant consultations, not only between the United States and Japan, but also with South Korea, China, and others to determine our response.
We appreciate Japan's support of South Korea and this investigation, because we recognize the threat that North Korea's aggression poses is also to the people of Japan. Last year I met with families of the abducted, and expressed my personal sympathy and concern. The United States and Japan continue to work side by side to meet the challenges posed by North Korea. We agree that North Korea must stop its provocative behavior, halt its policy of threats and belligerence toward its neighbors, and take irreversible steps to fulfill its denuclearization commitments, and comply with international law.
I will be discussing these issues with my counterparts in Beijing next week, and then I will travel to Seoul, to consult with our South Korean partners about the way forward. But let me be clear. This will not be and cannot be business as usual. There must be an international -- not just a regional, but an international -- response.
The Minister and I also conferred about our efforts at the United Nations to secure a strong resolution on Iran. The draft resolution agreed to by the P-5+1 and circulated at the Security Council this week sends an unmistakable message to the Iranian leadership: Comply with your obligations or face growing isolation and consequences. The burden is on Iran to demonstrate through its actions, not its words, that it will live up to its responsibilities. The international non-proliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity. And the United States appreciates Japan's support on this issue, and its leadership on the broader non-proliferation agenda.
Today we also discussed issues relating to the continued successful operation of U.S. bases in Japan. These are the front line of our alliance, and an anchor of stability in the region. The United States continues to work closely with Japan on basing issues to find a way forward that serves the interest of both our countries, and an arrangement that is operationally viable and politically sustainable. Our shared goal remains unchanged: to maintain Japanese security and regional stability, while minimizing the impact on base-hosting communities.
We salute Japan's commitment to regional and global engagement, and I particularly applaud Japan's generous contribution of $5 billion over 5 years to support the people of Afghanistan, as they combat violent extremism, and work to build a secure and stable nation. From reconstruction efforts in Iraq, to combating piracy off the horn of Africa, to fighting climate change, Japan is providing crucial contributions and leadership on a wide range of global challenges. Japan is making a real difference, and is an essential partner for the United States in pursuit of our common goals and values.
Last year, during my town hall discussion at the University of Tokyo, a student asked me how we can continue developing the U.S.-Japan relationship from a regional alliance to a global partnership. This is exactly the right question. And it is the question that animates our discussion and drives our collective action. And today we look to the future full of confidence in our friendship and our ability to work together.
And so, let me thank Minister Okada once again for his hospitality and leadership, and let me state how much the United States looks forward to continuing our work together to ensure that the next 50 years are as fruitful as the last.
MODERATOR: (Via translator) Thank you very much. Since time is pressing, I would like to accept two questions. One from Japanese media, please. Mr. Mishoma.
QUESTION: (Via translator) Mishoma with JJ Press. Question for both Minister Okada and Secretary Clinton, and the same question on Futenma. While the end of May is approaching, any settlement that can win the understanding of Okinawans remains elusive. How do the two countries intend to overcome the situation? And do the two countries plan to issue some kind of a joint statement towards the end of May? Thank you.
FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA: As I said earlier, between Japan and the United States we would like to come up with a clear direction. And with regard to that general direction, we would like to ask (inaudible) make firm efforts to gain the understanding of Okinawans. Coming Sunday, Prime Minister plans to visit Okinawa. So we will -- the entire cabinet will continue to engage in efforts to explain the government's position and gain the understanding of the people.
At the same time, to the Japanese people, we would like to have their understanding that in the current security environment the presence of U.S. forces is indispensible for the security and stability of Japan. But not only just that, but the region's stability.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I agree completely with Minister Okada's statement about the importance of our alliance, and the United States's commitment to the defense of Japan. It has always been important. It is good to be reminded, as we recently were with the unprovoked attack on the Korean vessel, that there are still dangers and challenges that confront us together.
We are working closely to resolve the outstanding issues concerning our basing. We both seek an arrangement that is operationally viable and politically sustainable. The goal of our governments remains unchanged. We want to maintain the security of Japan and the stability of the region. And I am confident we will resolve this matter in a way that reflects the very best of our alliance, the strength of that alliance, for the next 50 years, and provides the security guarantees that the Japanese people are looking for. So we have committed to redoubling our efforts to meet the deadline that has been announced by the Japanese Government, and we look forward to a resolution of this matter.
MODERATOR: Thank you. One last question from the U.S. media corps. Mr. Schmidt?
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, you just said that there should be -- the sinking the Cheonan -- you just said that there should be a strong international response. Can you tell us what your options are? And are you worried that North Korea might retaliate to its condemnation?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I'm sorry, what was the last part of that question?
QUESTION: Are you worried that North Korea might retaliate after its condemnation?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, one of the reasons that I wanted to stop here first was to consult with the Japanese Government, and to reaffirm our commitment to working together to resolve this matter. We look forward to intensive consultations in China. And then, as you know, I will be going to Seoul. It is premature for me, at this moment, to announce options or actions without that level of consultation among the regional nations that are most directly affected by North Korea's behavior.
I think it is important to send a clear message to North Korea that provocative actions have consequences. We cannot allow this attack on South Korea to go unanswered by the international community. So we will determine our best options, moving forward, and send a clear, unmistakable message to North Korea regarding the international communities, and most particularly, its neighbors' concerns about its behavior. And I look forward to being able to work out the details over the next week.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much. With this, we conclude the joint press conference. Thank you very much. The two ministers will have to immediately leave. Would the members of the press kindly wait in your seats? Thank you.
Ikura Guesthouse
Tokyo, Japan
May 21, 2010
MODERATOR: (Via translator) I would like to begin (inaudible) press conference with Foreign Minister Okada and Secretary Clinton. Minister Okada and then Secretary Clinton will speak, and then questions and answers. Mr. Okada, please.
FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA: (Via translator) Thank you. This is my fifth meeting with Secretary Clinton since last September. We had a very candid exchange of views. In today's meeting we had discussions centering on the regional situations in Asia, and the response to the Iranian nuclear issue -- but of course, other themes as well.
Instabilities and uncertainties as represented by the sinking of the ROK Navy corvette are becoming visible. And the Japan-U.S. alliance is, therefore, all the more important. Against this backdrop, this meeting, I believe, was important and timely for the purpose of addressing these situations through mutual cooperation, with common awareness of them between Japan and the United States. And, as such, it is gratifying that Secretary Clinton has visited Japan.
With regard to the sinking of the Korean corvette, we discussed the response we should take following the announcement yesterday of the results of the investigations. Setting aside details, we confirmed that coordination among Japan, U.S., and ROK, including our future response, is important, and that we shall maintain close communication with each other in addressing the matter.
As the Secretary is on her way to attend the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, I explained to her the results of the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers meeting, as well as the Japan-China Bilateral meeting held in its margins, and exchanged the views on Japan-China and U.S.-China relations, as well.
On the Iranian nuclear issue, while we will need to watch how the recent agreement between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil will play out, we see eye to eye that the cause for concern remains unchanged as Iran has publicly stated that it will continue the enrichment of uranium to approximately the 20 percent level.
I told Secretary Clinton that Japan will actively play a role in the discussions for a new UN Security Council resolution in order to enable the international community to put out a unified message. We confirmed that our two countries will continue to work closely together. We confirmed afresh the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance, including the above-mentioned exchange of views, and we shall carry on our consultations to further deepen the alliance.
On the question of relocating the Futenma air station, working-level officials of our two countries were having a meeting today, as well. And I also explained Japan's position on this. Talks are proceeding intensively between Japan and the United States. Both Japan and the United States will make further efforts towards a settlement by the end of May. That's all for me. Thank you very much.
Secretary Clinton, please.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, it's a pleasure to be back in Tokyo, and to reaffirm the enduring alliance between our two nations. I thank Minister Okada for his warm welcome and the substantive discussions that we’ve had, and I look forward to seeing the prime minister.
Japan was the first nation I visited as Secretary of State, because we recognize that this relationship continues to be a cornerstone of security, stability, and progress in a region that is so crucial to the future of our entire world.
This year, as the United States and Japan mark the 50th anniversary of our alliance, we can be very proud of all we have accomplished together; the peace we have kept, the prosperity we have built, and the bonds we have forged. This partnership is essential for meeting the challenges not only of today, but also of tomorrow. And it is a rock solid foundation for our shared future.
As the foreign minister said, we had a productive meeting on a number of critical issues and common concerns. We had a detailed discussion on the results of the international investigation into the sinking of the Korean military vessel. This was a thorough and comprehensive scientific examination, and the United States and other international observers were deeply engaged. The evidence is overwhelming and condemning. The torpedo that sunk the Cheonan and took the lives of 46 South Korean sailors was fired by a North Korean submarine. And the United States strongly condemns this act of aggression. As Minister Okada and I discussed, we will be in deep and constant consultations, not only between the United States and Japan, but also with South Korea, China, and others to determine our response.
We appreciate Japan's support of South Korea and this investigation, because we recognize the threat that North Korea's aggression poses is also to the people of Japan. Last year I met with families of the abducted, and expressed my personal sympathy and concern. The United States and Japan continue to work side by side to meet the challenges posed by North Korea. We agree that North Korea must stop its provocative behavior, halt its policy of threats and belligerence toward its neighbors, and take irreversible steps to fulfill its denuclearization commitments, and comply with international law.
I will be discussing these issues with my counterparts in Beijing next week, and then I will travel to Seoul, to consult with our South Korean partners about the way forward. But let me be clear. This will not be and cannot be business as usual. There must be an international -- not just a regional, but an international -- response.
The Minister and I also conferred about our efforts at the United Nations to secure a strong resolution on Iran. The draft resolution agreed to by the P-5+1 and circulated at the Security Council this week sends an unmistakable message to the Iranian leadership: Comply with your obligations or face growing isolation and consequences. The burden is on Iran to demonstrate through its actions, not its words, that it will live up to its responsibilities. The international non-proliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity. And the United States appreciates Japan's support on this issue, and its leadership on the broader non-proliferation agenda.
Today we also discussed issues relating to the continued successful operation of U.S. bases in Japan. These are the front line of our alliance, and an anchor of stability in the region. The United States continues to work closely with Japan on basing issues to find a way forward that serves the interest of both our countries, and an arrangement that is operationally viable and politically sustainable. Our shared goal remains unchanged: to maintain Japanese security and regional stability, while minimizing the impact on base-hosting communities.
We salute Japan's commitment to regional and global engagement, and I particularly applaud Japan's generous contribution of $5 billion over 5 years to support the people of Afghanistan, as they combat violent extremism, and work to build a secure and stable nation. From reconstruction efforts in Iraq, to combating piracy off the horn of Africa, to fighting climate change, Japan is providing crucial contributions and leadership on a wide range of global challenges. Japan is making a real difference, and is an essential partner for the United States in pursuit of our common goals and values.
Last year, during my town hall discussion at the University of Tokyo, a student asked me how we can continue developing the U.S.-Japan relationship from a regional alliance to a global partnership. This is exactly the right question. And it is the question that animates our discussion and drives our collective action. And today we look to the future full of confidence in our friendship and our ability to work together.
And so, let me thank Minister Okada once again for his hospitality and leadership, and let me state how much the United States looks forward to continuing our work together to ensure that the next 50 years are as fruitful as the last.
MODERATOR: (Via translator) Thank you very much. Since time is pressing, I would like to accept two questions. One from Japanese media, please. Mr. Mishoma.
QUESTION: (Via translator) Mishoma with JJ Press. Question for both Minister Okada and Secretary Clinton, and the same question on Futenma. While the end of May is approaching, any settlement that can win the understanding of Okinawans remains elusive. How do the two countries intend to overcome the situation? And do the two countries plan to issue some kind of a joint statement towards the end of May? Thank you.
FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA: As I said earlier, between Japan and the United States we would like to come up with a clear direction. And with regard to that general direction, we would like to ask (inaudible) make firm efforts to gain the understanding of Okinawans. Coming Sunday, Prime Minister plans to visit Okinawa. So we will -- the entire cabinet will continue to engage in efforts to explain the government's position and gain the understanding of the people.
At the same time, to the Japanese people, we would like to have their understanding that in the current security environment the presence of U.S. forces is indispensible for the security and stability of Japan. But not only just that, but the region's stability.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I agree completely with Minister Okada's statement about the importance of our alliance, and the United States's commitment to the defense of Japan. It has always been important. It is good to be reminded, as we recently were with the unprovoked attack on the Korean vessel, that there are still dangers and challenges that confront us together.
We are working closely to resolve the outstanding issues concerning our basing. We both seek an arrangement that is operationally viable and politically sustainable. The goal of our governments remains unchanged. We want to maintain the security of Japan and the stability of the region. And I am confident we will resolve this matter in a way that reflects the very best of our alliance, the strength of that alliance, for the next 50 years, and provides the security guarantees that the Japanese people are looking for. So we have committed to redoubling our efforts to meet the deadline that has been announced by the Japanese Government, and we look forward to a resolution of this matter.
MODERATOR: Thank you. One last question from the U.S. media corps. Mr. Schmidt?
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, you just said that there should be -- the sinking the Cheonan -- you just said that there should be a strong international response. Can you tell us what your options are? And are you worried that North Korea might retaliate to its condemnation?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I'm sorry, what was the last part of that question?
QUESTION: Are you worried that North Korea might retaliate after its condemnation?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, one of the reasons that I wanted to stop here first was to consult with the Japanese Government, and to reaffirm our commitment to working together to resolve this matter. We look forward to intensive consultations in China. And then, as you know, I will be going to Seoul. It is premature for me, at this moment, to announce options or actions without that level of consultation among the regional nations that are most directly affected by North Korea's behavior.
I think it is important to send a clear message to North Korea that provocative actions have consequences. We cannot allow this attack on South Korea to go unanswered by the international community. So we will determine our best options, moving forward, and send a clear, unmistakable message to North Korea regarding the international communities, and most particularly, its neighbors' concerns about its behavior. And I look forward to being able to work out the details over the next week.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much. With this, we conclude the joint press conference. Thank you very much. The two ministers will have to immediately leave. Would the members of the press kindly wait in your seats? Thank you.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Euro Fallout: Asia Markets Tumble, US Economy Hit, China Starts To Feel Pinch
By Peter Simpson
Asian markets slipped following Thursday's big falls in the United States and Europe. The normally insulated Chinese markets also dived before recovering, as nerves remain on edge over the worsening debt crisis in some European Union nations and the euro's big slide.
Asian stock markets fell sharply in early trading Friday as they reacted to continuing declines in Europe and on Wall Street.
The Nikkei 225 index in Japan lost 2.5 percent, and Singapore's Straits Times Index shed two percent.
In China, Shanghai's Composite index dropped nearly three percent early in the day but rallied and ended up just over one percent.
Chinese markets generally have been insulated from the affects of the European debt crisis and the struggling U.S. economy. Instead, over the past few months, they have been more affected by concerns that the government will clamp down on the high-flying property market.
But Michael Pettis, a finance professor at Peking University, says the jittery Chinese markets are starting to react to the weakening euro and concerns that Europe's problems will hurt the vulnerable U.S. economy.
As a result, he says, increased trade conflict is inevitable as Washington and Beijing respond differently to the European debt crisis and euro slide.
"What I don't think the Chinese fully appreciate yet is that in a world of contracting global demand, it's the deficit countries like those in the euro zone and the U.S that hold most of the cards. But I do think that because the U.S. and China require completely opposite responses to the crisis in Europe, and [that] these are going to make trade tensions much, much worse," said Pettis.
Many investors and economists worry that Greece and other economically vulnerable nations like Spain or Portugal will be unable to pay their debts despite an unprecedented and costly rescue effort by the European Union.
Financial reform legislation in the U.S. also has hurt the markets, because investors are concerned about how the reforms will affect earnings for banks and investment companies.
Markets in Hong Kong and South Korea were closed on Friday for a holiday, while trading in Thailand has been suspended because of the political violence in Bangkok.
Source: VOA
Asian markets slipped following Thursday's big falls in the United States and Europe. The normally insulated Chinese markets also dived before recovering, as nerves remain on edge over the worsening debt crisis in some European Union nations and the euro's big slide.
Asian stock markets fell sharply in early trading Friday as they reacted to continuing declines in Europe and on Wall Street.
The Nikkei 225 index in Japan lost 2.5 percent, and Singapore's Straits Times Index shed two percent.
In China, Shanghai's Composite index dropped nearly three percent early in the day but rallied and ended up just over one percent.
Chinese markets generally have been insulated from the affects of the European debt crisis and the struggling U.S. economy. Instead, over the past few months, they have been more affected by concerns that the government will clamp down on the high-flying property market.
But Michael Pettis, a finance professor at Peking University, says the jittery Chinese markets are starting to react to the weakening euro and concerns that Europe's problems will hurt the vulnerable U.S. economy.
As a result, he says, increased trade conflict is inevitable as Washington and Beijing respond differently to the European debt crisis and euro slide.
"What I don't think the Chinese fully appreciate yet is that in a world of contracting global demand, it's the deficit countries like those in the euro zone and the U.S that hold most of the cards. But I do think that because the U.S. and China require completely opposite responses to the crisis in Europe, and [that] these are going to make trade tensions much, much worse," said Pettis.
Many investors and economists worry that Greece and other economically vulnerable nations like Spain or Portugal will be unable to pay their debts despite an unprecedented and costly rescue effort by the European Union.
Financial reform legislation in the U.S. also has hurt the markets, because investors are concerned about how the reforms will affect earnings for banks and investment companies.
Markets in Hong Kong and South Korea were closed on Friday for a holiday, while trading in Thailand has been suspended because of the political violence in Bangkok.
Source: VOA
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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The Role Of China In Russia’s Military Thinking
By Simon Saradzhyan for RES
The continuing rise of China requires the Russian military to prepare a plan that allows it to counter Beijing’s
potential supremacy. However, military preparations alone will not suffice. Russia needs to reverse the negative socio-economic and demographic trends in the Far East and Siberia before they create conditions facilitating an armed conflict.
The East-2010 War-Game: Who Are Russia’s Potential Foes?
In June 2010 the Russian armed forces will stage an operational-strategic exercise dubbed Vostok-2010 (East-2010) that will become “the main combat-training event” of 2010, according to a recent Defense Ministry press release. Thousands of soldiers from the Army (including the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection Forces) Navy, Air Force, Airborne Troops and other elements of the Russian armed forces will participate in the joint exercise staged by the Far Eastern and Siberian Military Districts. While these two eastern districts and the fleet will play the lead role in the game, Vostok-2010 will also involve forces and assets from other military districts and all of Russia’s four fleets, including submarines, according to senior commanders. Russia’s long-range aviation and the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ Interior Troops will also participate in the war game.
The importance given to Vostok-2010 marks a significant change from the recent past. More often than not, it is the Zapad (West) exercise, which simulates a Russian war with NATO, that concludes the Russian armed forces’ combat training season. That was the case last year when tens of thousands of troops participated in Zapad-2009, which featured large-scale operations in western Russia and Belarus, including beach landings and a simulated nuclear strike. But this year Vostok will mark the apogee of Russian military training, according to commander of the Ground Forces Col. General Alexander Postnikov.
President Dmitry Medvedev has already promised to attend the war-game, during which troops will test the new chain of command (military district-operational command-brigade) and practice re-deployment from one region to another, chief of the General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov told RIA Novosti on January 15.
While commenting extensively on the West wargames, top Russian commanders would not publicly identify either potential foes or the overall scenario for East-2010. One unnamed, but obvious foe to prepare for is Japan. In an April 7 interview Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin openly stated that one reason why Moscow wants to buy Mistral helicopter-carrying warships from France is because Russia has an unresolved territorial dispute with Japan.
The Russian leadership is also concerned about the unpredictability of the nuclear-armed North Korean regime and has even decided to deploy its newest air defense system – the S-400 – in the Far East, even though this system is not designed to shoot down ballistic missiles during the ascending or mid-course phases of their flight.
However, there is one more potential foe in the East whose growing military might requires Russia to prepare a counter-action strategy on the scale of Vostok-2010. And that potential foe is China.
Acknowledging the Potential Threat
Until recently, Russia’s military-political leadership had been extremely careful not to mention China as a potential foe while taking pains to stress how much relations with its powerful eastern neighbor have improved.
Indeed, the two countries have settled their border disputes, signed a friendship treaty in 2001 and became partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They also agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target their nuclear weapons at each other in a deal signed in 1992.
However, China is already challenging Russia’s dominance in oil- and gas-rich Central Asia. In the future, fast-growing China could come to pose a security threat to Russia’s resource-rich Siberia and Far East, especially given the growing disparity in population density, economic output and continuing labor immigration across the Russian-Chinese border.
But while Russian officials had avoided referring to China as a potential foe, perhaps, in order to avoid angering the eastern neighbor and buy time to prepare for its further rise, former officials and experts do point to the potential threat posed by China’s conventional supremacy. “After the end of the Cold War…Moscow lost its superiority in conventional forces over NATO, China and the far eastern alliance led by the U.S,” Alexei Arbatov, one of Russia’s most authoritative arms control experts and the co-author of Russia’s new national security doctrine, observed in 2004. Now Russia sees its non-strategic nuclear weapons as the “nuclear equalizer,” compensating for the conventional forces lead held by the West and China.
More recently, the Defense Ministry top brass have begun to edge closer towards acknowledging the obvious.
In July 2009 a reporter for the Defense Ministry’s newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda pointed out to Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov that one of the slides in the commander’s own presentation “show that it is, after all, NATO and China that are the most dangerous of our geopolitical rivals.” He then asked the general whether the brigades, which Makarov said are replacing Cold War era divisions to better prepare the armed forces to fight local conflicts as opposed to the all-out wars of the 20th century, will be ready to “conduct defensive operations in massive warfare.” Makarov did not mention China in his answer.
However, earlier at the same conference he did point out that “in terms of China, we are conducting a very balanced, well-thought out policy.” However, based on my experience working as a defense and security journalist in Russia for 15 years, Krasnaya Zvezda reporters typically seek pre-approval for the questions they ask top commanders, so the reference to China as “strongest geopolitical rival” is no accident.
Two months later chief of the Ground Forces Staff Lt. General Sergei Skokov made what leading Russian military expert Alexander Khramchikhin described as an “epochal statement.” When describing what kind of warfare the national armed forces should prepare for, Skokov said the following in September 2009: “If we talk about the east, then it could be a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to conducting combat operations: straightforward, with large concentrations of personnel and firepower along individual operational directions.” Writing in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, Khramchikhin noted that “for the first time since the early days of Gorbachev, a high-ranking national commander has de facto acknowledged officially that the People’s Republic of China is our potential enemy.”
Should a conflict between Russia and China eventually break out, Russia should not hope that the conventional component of its one million strong armed forces will be able to stop the 2.8 million man People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, whose military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, according to G. John Ikenberry.
Russia has repeatedly gamed out a limited nuclear strike by air-launched cruise missiles to prevent a conventionally-superior foe from overwhelming its forces in a conventional conflict in the West and one may deduce from that that Russian generals have developed similar plans for conflicts in the East too.
However, while they serve as a powerful deterrent, nuclear weapons cannot be viewed as a panacea. Most importantly, even selected limited use of nuclear weapons, which Russian generals hope will demonstrate resolve and deescalate the conflict, can actually increase the risk that the foe will also choose to retaliate with nuclear weapons rather than sue for peace. Even the selective first use of nuclear weapons by Russia may prompt Beijing to respond by launching its ICBMs out of concern that Russia’s nuclear strike may destroy most of its nuclear arsenal. And, as a 2003 Defense Ministry report, entitled “Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Russian Armed Forces,” rightly notes: “When we speak about the nuclear deterrent, especially when this notion is applied to the deterrence of threats associated with the use of conventional forces by the enemy, we should also take into account that under contemporary conditions such deterrence can be effectively carried out only if well-equipped and combat-ready general- purpose forces are available.”
“It’s the Economy, Stupid.”
However, neither nuclear weapons nor conventional weapons will be effective in reducing the risk factors that increase the likelihood of conflict between China and Russia. Among these is the growing demographic and economic disparity between the two countries. This gap is increasingly evident in light of the macroeconomic and social data describing Russia’s Siberia and Far East. China’s economy has quadrupled in size since the late 1970s and may double again over the next decade.
China already has a population of 1.32 billion and its GDP totaled $4,326 billion in 2008, ranking third in terms of GDP in the world, according to the World Bank. Russia’s population totals some 141 million and its GDP totaled $1,601 billion in 2008, ranking ninth in the world, according to the same source. China is most likely to continue growing at rates unattainable for Russia while the latter can count only on migration to prevent further depopulation.
As of the early 2000s Russia’s Far Eastern and Siberian Districts had a total population of 27 million and their combined gross regional products totaled $110 billion per year, according to then-governor of Krasnoyarskii Krai Alexander Khoponin’s 2006 speech at the Baikal Economic Forum in 2006. The rapid growth of countries in the Asian Pacific region, which includes China, is the main challenge for Russia, Khloponin told a conference in September 2006, according to Russia’s Ekonomika i Biznes.
Nevertheless, given the current pace of development, Russia is still decades away from a serious conflict with China, if one ever erupts. As Singapore’s first premier Lee Kuan Yew, an astute observer of Asia, pointed out: “China wants time to grow. If there is going to be any conflict, they’ll postpone it for 50 years.” And before thinking of any conflict with Russia, China will of course want to re-gain Taiwan and establish its dominance in South -East Asia.
Russia should use the next several decades to pursue military reform until it produces a conventional force capable of deterring military threats along Russia’s perimeter and on par with China’s PLA, while also maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. Russian authorities should also allocate resources and introduce incentives to reverse depopulation in the Far East and Siberia and facilitate the region’s socio-economic growth to prevent the further deepening of the non-military disparities that increase the likelihood of a crisis in relations with China that may ultimately escalate into an armed conflict.
Simon Saradzhyan is a fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School Belfer Center where he researches terrorism and arms control. This article is partially based on his January 2010 paper “Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?” This article was published the Russian and Eurasia Security Network (RES), in its May 3, 2010 publication, No. 78: Russian Military Thinking Today (PDF) on pages 5-7, and is reprinted with permisison.
Recommended Reading
• G. John Ikenberry, “The Role of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.
• Lee Kuan Yew, Former Prime Minister of Singapore, Interview with Charlie Rose, October 22, 2009. Available at http://www.charlierose.com/download/transcript/10681.
The continuing rise of China requires the Russian military to prepare a plan that allows it to counter Beijing’s
potential supremacy. However, military preparations alone will not suffice. Russia needs to reverse the negative socio-economic and demographic trends in the Far East and Siberia before they create conditions facilitating an armed conflict.
The East-2010 War-Game: Who Are Russia’s Potential Foes?
In June 2010 the Russian armed forces will stage an operational-strategic exercise dubbed Vostok-2010 (East-2010) that will become “the main combat-training event” of 2010, according to a recent Defense Ministry press release. Thousands of soldiers from the Army (including the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection Forces) Navy, Air Force, Airborne Troops and other elements of the Russian armed forces will participate in the joint exercise staged by the Far Eastern and Siberian Military Districts. While these two eastern districts and the fleet will play the lead role in the game, Vostok-2010 will also involve forces and assets from other military districts and all of Russia’s four fleets, including submarines, according to senior commanders. Russia’s long-range aviation and the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ Interior Troops will also participate in the war game.
The importance given to Vostok-2010 marks a significant change from the recent past. More often than not, it is the Zapad (West) exercise, which simulates a Russian war with NATO, that concludes the Russian armed forces’ combat training season. That was the case last year when tens of thousands of troops participated in Zapad-2009, which featured large-scale operations in western Russia and Belarus, including beach landings and a simulated nuclear strike. But this year Vostok will mark the apogee of Russian military training, according to commander of the Ground Forces Col. General Alexander Postnikov.
President Dmitry Medvedev has already promised to attend the war-game, during which troops will test the new chain of command (military district-operational command-brigade) and practice re-deployment from one region to another, chief of the General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov told RIA Novosti on January 15.
While commenting extensively on the West wargames, top Russian commanders would not publicly identify either potential foes or the overall scenario for East-2010. One unnamed, but obvious foe to prepare for is Japan. In an April 7 interview Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin openly stated that one reason why Moscow wants to buy Mistral helicopter-carrying warships from France is because Russia has an unresolved territorial dispute with Japan.
The Russian leadership is also concerned about the unpredictability of the nuclear-armed North Korean regime and has even decided to deploy its newest air defense system – the S-400 – in the Far East, even though this system is not designed to shoot down ballistic missiles during the ascending or mid-course phases of their flight.
However, there is one more potential foe in the East whose growing military might requires Russia to prepare a counter-action strategy on the scale of Vostok-2010. And that potential foe is China.
Acknowledging the Potential Threat
Until recently, Russia’s military-political leadership had been extremely careful not to mention China as a potential foe while taking pains to stress how much relations with its powerful eastern neighbor have improved.
Indeed, the two countries have settled their border disputes, signed a friendship treaty in 2001 and became partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They also agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target their nuclear weapons at each other in a deal signed in 1992.
However, China is already challenging Russia’s dominance in oil- and gas-rich Central Asia. In the future, fast-growing China could come to pose a security threat to Russia’s resource-rich Siberia and Far East, especially given the growing disparity in population density, economic output and continuing labor immigration across the Russian-Chinese border.
But while Russian officials had avoided referring to China as a potential foe, perhaps, in order to avoid angering the eastern neighbor and buy time to prepare for its further rise, former officials and experts do point to the potential threat posed by China’s conventional supremacy. “After the end of the Cold War…Moscow lost its superiority in conventional forces over NATO, China and the far eastern alliance led by the U.S,” Alexei Arbatov, one of Russia’s most authoritative arms control experts and the co-author of Russia’s new national security doctrine, observed in 2004. Now Russia sees its non-strategic nuclear weapons as the “nuclear equalizer,” compensating for the conventional forces lead held by the West and China.
More recently, the Defense Ministry top brass have begun to edge closer towards acknowledging the obvious.
In July 2009 a reporter for the Defense Ministry’s newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda pointed out to Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov that one of the slides in the commander’s own presentation “show that it is, after all, NATO and China that are the most dangerous of our geopolitical rivals.” He then asked the general whether the brigades, which Makarov said are replacing Cold War era divisions to better prepare the armed forces to fight local conflicts as opposed to the all-out wars of the 20th century, will be ready to “conduct defensive operations in massive warfare.” Makarov did not mention China in his answer.
However, earlier at the same conference he did point out that “in terms of China, we are conducting a very balanced, well-thought out policy.” However, based on my experience working as a defense and security journalist in Russia for 15 years, Krasnaya Zvezda reporters typically seek pre-approval for the questions they ask top commanders, so the reference to China as “strongest geopolitical rival” is no accident.
Two months later chief of the Ground Forces Staff Lt. General Sergei Skokov made what leading Russian military expert Alexander Khramchikhin described as an “epochal statement.” When describing what kind of warfare the national armed forces should prepare for, Skokov said the following in September 2009: “If we talk about the east, then it could be a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to conducting combat operations: straightforward, with large concentrations of personnel and firepower along individual operational directions.” Writing in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, Khramchikhin noted that “for the first time since the early days of Gorbachev, a high-ranking national commander has de facto acknowledged officially that the People’s Republic of China is our potential enemy.”
Should a conflict between Russia and China eventually break out, Russia should not hope that the conventional component of its one million strong armed forces will be able to stop the 2.8 million man People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, whose military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, according to G. John Ikenberry.
Russia has repeatedly gamed out a limited nuclear strike by air-launched cruise missiles to prevent a conventionally-superior foe from overwhelming its forces in a conventional conflict in the West and one may deduce from that that Russian generals have developed similar plans for conflicts in the East too.
However, while they serve as a powerful deterrent, nuclear weapons cannot be viewed as a panacea. Most importantly, even selected limited use of nuclear weapons, which Russian generals hope will demonstrate resolve and deescalate the conflict, can actually increase the risk that the foe will also choose to retaliate with nuclear weapons rather than sue for peace. Even the selective first use of nuclear weapons by Russia may prompt Beijing to respond by launching its ICBMs out of concern that Russia’s nuclear strike may destroy most of its nuclear arsenal. And, as a 2003 Defense Ministry report, entitled “Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Russian Armed Forces,” rightly notes: “When we speak about the nuclear deterrent, especially when this notion is applied to the deterrence of threats associated with the use of conventional forces by the enemy, we should also take into account that under contemporary conditions such deterrence can be effectively carried out only if well-equipped and combat-ready general- purpose forces are available.”
“It’s the Economy, Stupid.”
However, neither nuclear weapons nor conventional weapons will be effective in reducing the risk factors that increase the likelihood of conflict between China and Russia. Among these is the growing demographic and economic disparity between the two countries. This gap is increasingly evident in light of the macroeconomic and social data describing Russia’s Siberia and Far East. China’s economy has quadrupled in size since the late 1970s and may double again over the next decade.
China already has a population of 1.32 billion and its GDP totaled $4,326 billion in 2008, ranking third in terms of GDP in the world, according to the World Bank. Russia’s population totals some 141 million and its GDP totaled $1,601 billion in 2008, ranking ninth in the world, according to the same source. China is most likely to continue growing at rates unattainable for Russia while the latter can count only on migration to prevent further depopulation.
As of the early 2000s Russia’s Far Eastern and Siberian Districts had a total population of 27 million and their combined gross regional products totaled $110 billion per year, according to then-governor of Krasnoyarskii Krai Alexander Khoponin’s 2006 speech at the Baikal Economic Forum in 2006. The rapid growth of countries in the Asian Pacific region, which includes China, is the main challenge for Russia, Khloponin told a conference in September 2006, according to Russia’s Ekonomika i Biznes.
Nevertheless, given the current pace of development, Russia is still decades away from a serious conflict with China, if one ever erupts. As Singapore’s first premier Lee Kuan Yew, an astute observer of Asia, pointed out: “China wants time to grow. If there is going to be any conflict, they’ll postpone it for 50 years.” And before thinking of any conflict with Russia, China will of course want to re-gain Taiwan and establish its dominance in South -East Asia.
Russia should use the next several decades to pursue military reform until it produces a conventional force capable of deterring military threats along Russia’s perimeter and on par with China’s PLA, while also maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. Russian authorities should also allocate resources and introduce incentives to reverse depopulation in the Far East and Siberia and facilitate the region’s socio-economic growth to prevent the further deepening of the non-military disparities that increase the likelihood of a crisis in relations with China that may ultimately escalate into an armed conflict.
Simon Saradzhyan is a fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School Belfer Center where he researches terrorism and arms control. This article is partially based on his January 2010 paper “Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?” This article was published the Russian and Eurasia Security Network (RES), in its May 3, 2010 publication, No. 78: Russian Military Thinking Today (PDF) on pages 5-7, and is reprinted with permisison.
Recommended Reading
• G. John Ikenberry, “The Role of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.
• Lee Kuan Yew, Former Prime Minister of Singapore, Interview with Charlie Rose, October 22, 2009. Available at http://www.charlierose.com/download/transcript/10681.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Excessive Rise Of Yen Undesirable -- Minister
(KUNA) -- Japanese Finance Minister Naoto Kan said Friday an excessive rise of the yen was not desirable, noting that he will be closely watching currency movement.
"In general, it is desirable for exchange rates to stay at an appropriate level in terms of international trade, and it is undesirable if the currency moves far off that level," Kan told a press conference.
"I think we must closely watch developments in the currency market and ensure that the yen will not become excessive," said Kan, who is also deputy prime minister and economic and fiscal policy minister.
However, he said the government has no immediate plan to take specific measures, and declined to say what an appropriate level for the yen. Monetary authorities have not intervened in the market since mid-March of 2004.
His remarks came after the yen sharply rose against both the dollar and the euro, while Tokyo stocks closed at its lowest level this year. A stronger yen hurts Japanese exporters by making their products more expensive abroad.
At 5:15 p.m. (0815 GMT), the US dollar traded at JPY 89.91-94 compared with JPY 89.63-73 in New York and JPY 91.37-40 in Tokyo at 5:00 p.m. Thursday. At one point, the dollar fell to a two-week low in the 88 yen range in New York Thursday.
Later in the day, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama instructed Kan to watch closely the financial situation at home and abroad and to deal with it appropriately, Kan told reporters after the meeting.
Hatoyama and Kan agreed there is no need for intervention at the moment to stabilize the financial markets, he added.
"In general, it is desirable for exchange rates to stay at an appropriate level in terms of international trade, and it is undesirable if the currency moves far off that level," Kan told a press conference.
"I think we must closely watch developments in the currency market and ensure that the yen will not become excessive," said Kan, who is also deputy prime minister and economic and fiscal policy minister.
However, he said the government has no immediate plan to take specific measures, and declined to say what an appropriate level for the yen. Monetary authorities have not intervened in the market since mid-March of 2004.
His remarks came after the yen sharply rose against both the dollar and the euro, while Tokyo stocks closed at its lowest level this year. A stronger yen hurts Japanese exporters by making their products more expensive abroad.
At 5:15 p.m. (0815 GMT), the US dollar traded at JPY 89.91-94 compared with JPY 89.63-73 in New York and JPY 91.37-40 in Tokyo at 5:00 p.m. Thursday. At one point, the dollar fell to a two-week low in the 88 yen range in New York Thursday.
Later in the day, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama instructed Kan to watch closely the financial situation at home and abroad and to deal with it appropriately, Kan told reporters after the meeting.
Hatoyama and Kan agreed there is no need for intervention at the moment to stabilize the financial markets, he added.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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The ‘Cheonan’ Investigation: Results And Aftermath
By Rukmani Gupta for IPCS
The South Korean government has made public the findings of an international probe into the sinking of the South Korean navy corvette ‘Cheonan’ on 26 March, that killed 46 sailors. President Lee Myung-bak has categorically stated that it was a North Korean torpedo that struck the Cheonan and led to its sinking.
While it had long been speculated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was directly involved in the sinking of the navy corvette, North Korea has consistently denied any involvement in the incident. The findings of the multi-national investigation team now provide conclusive evidence of North Korean complicity in the sinking of the Cheonan, irrevocably refuting DPRK’s tenuous claims to innocence.
The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) collected propulsion parts, including propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section from the site of the sinking. This evidence matched the specifications of a North Korean torpedo, “CHT-02D,” drawing for which were obtained from a booklet advertising North Korean weapons for export. Also, the marking in Hangul found inside the propulsion section was found to be consistent with the marking on a North Korean training torpedo retrieved in 2003.
In addition, the findings of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, that included the United States (US), Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, found that a few small submarines and a supporting mother ship left a North Korean naval base in the Yellow Sea 2-3 days prior to the attack and returned to port 2-3 days after the attack. Since it was confirmed that all submarines from neighboring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident, it is quite likely that one of the North Korean small submarines was responsible for the torpedo strike.
In the wake of these revelations, a spokesman from the National Defense Commission of the DPRK has called the conclusion reached by the investigators a "fabrication" and announced that North Korea will dispatch inspectors to verify the claim. Despite this rhetoric, North Korea knows well that the investigation and its conclusion will have credibility in the eyes of the world. Painting itself as a self-righteous victim, the DPRK has warned that any retaliation could lead to an "all-out" war and it will strongly react with "the total freeze of the inter-Korean relations, the complete abrogation of the north-south agreement on non-aggression and a total halt to the inter-Korean cooperation undertakings."
Japan and the United States have already announced support for whatever action the South Korean government deems appropriate. In a muted statement, China called the sinking of the Cheonan “unfortunate”, asking all parties to remain “cool-headed and self-restrained” and “avoid an escalation of the situation.” Beijing also stated that it was ‘reviewing’ the findings of the international investigation. Some indications of Beijing’s views on the matter could be found during Kim Jong-Il’s recent visit to China. Although Kim indicated a willingness to restart the six-party talks, Beijing maintained uncharacteristic silence on the issue, eventually accepting the South Korean and American condition that a resumption of talks would await the resolution of the Cheonan incident.
It is imperative that North Korea be made to understand that aggression at will is unacceptable. However, the question of what method should be employed to clearly communicate this to the DPRK remains problematic. It can be expected that the US and South Korea will conduct military exercises in order to review security arrangements and reassure the South Korean populace. That there will be a move for further sanctions against North Korea is also a distinct possibility. Towards this end, Chinese cooperation will be necessary. Although the Global Times has quoted Zhang Liangui, an expert on North Korea at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as saying that “sanctions should be imposed if North Korea is proved to be behind the attack,” he also suggests that China “should not take a stance on either side or express views on the incident." Such a position accurately reflects the Chinese dilemma in the current scenario. As a sponsor of the six-party talks, it has invested much in the peace process on the Korean peninsula. It has also projected the image of a law abiding international player. A categorical condemnation by China could well alienate DPRK and China would stand to lose whatever limited influence it has over its problematic neighbour. This would not only be a blow to Chinese aspirations to greater global prominence but seriously impede a resumption of dialogue with DPRK in the future. A North Korea bereft of its only ally is likely to engage a policy of brinkmanship even more vigorously. Perhaps all that China can do is support some strengthening of sanctions and offer to mediate once again.
It is reasonable to assume that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will discuss the Cheonan issue with Chinese leaders during her current visit, a coordination of policy between the US and China may be arrived at. We will have to wait to till Clinton’s visit to Seoul on 26 May to find out in what direction the parties concerned will move.
Rukmani Gupta is a Research Fellow at IPCS and may be reached at rukmani@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
The South Korean government has made public the findings of an international probe into the sinking of the South Korean navy corvette ‘Cheonan’ on 26 March, that killed 46 sailors. President Lee Myung-bak has categorically stated that it was a North Korean torpedo that struck the Cheonan and led to its sinking.
While it had long been speculated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was directly involved in the sinking of the navy corvette, North Korea has consistently denied any involvement in the incident. The findings of the multi-national investigation team now provide conclusive evidence of North Korean complicity in the sinking of the Cheonan, irrevocably refuting DPRK’s tenuous claims to innocence.
The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) collected propulsion parts, including propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section from the site of the sinking. This evidence matched the specifications of a North Korean torpedo, “CHT-02D,” drawing for which were obtained from a booklet advertising North Korean weapons for export. Also, the marking in Hangul found inside the propulsion section was found to be consistent with the marking on a North Korean training torpedo retrieved in 2003.
In addition, the findings of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, that included the United States (US), Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, found that a few small submarines and a supporting mother ship left a North Korean naval base in the Yellow Sea 2-3 days prior to the attack and returned to port 2-3 days after the attack. Since it was confirmed that all submarines from neighboring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident, it is quite likely that one of the North Korean small submarines was responsible for the torpedo strike.
In the wake of these revelations, a spokesman from the National Defense Commission of the DPRK has called the conclusion reached by the investigators a "fabrication" and announced that North Korea will dispatch inspectors to verify the claim. Despite this rhetoric, North Korea knows well that the investigation and its conclusion will have credibility in the eyes of the world. Painting itself as a self-righteous victim, the DPRK has warned that any retaliation could lead to an "all-out" war and it will strongly react with "the total freeze of the inter-Korean relations, the complete abrogation of the north-south agreement on non-aggression and a total halt to the inter-Korean cooperation undertakings."
Japan and the United States have already announced support for whatever action the South Korean government deems appropriate. In a muted statement, China called the sinking of the Cheonan “unfortunate”, asking all parties to remain “cool-headed and self-restrained” and “avoid an escalation of the situation.” Beijing also stated that it was ‘reviewing’ the findings of the international investigation. Some indications of Beijing’s views on the matter could be found during Kim Jong-Il’s recent visit to China. Although Kim indicated a willingness to restart the six-party talks, Beijing maintained uncharacteristic silence on the issue, eventually accepting the South Korean and American condition that a resumption of talks would await the resolution of the Cheonan incident.
It is imperative that North Korea be made to understand that aggression at will is unacceptable. However, the question of what method should be employed to clearly communicate this to the DPRK remains problematic. It can be expected that the US and South Korea will conduct military exercises in order to review security arrangements and reassure the South Korean populace. That there will be a move for further sanctions against North Korea is also a distinct possibility. Towards this end, Chinese cooperation will be necessary. Although the Global Times has quoted Zhang Liangui, an expert on North Korea at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as saying that “sanctions should be imposed if North Korea is proved to be behind the attack,” he also suggests that China “should not take a stance on either side or express views on the incident." Such a position accurately reflects the Chinese dilemma in the current scenario. As a sponsor of the six-party talks, it has invested much in the peace process on the Korean peninsula. It has also projected the image of a law abiding international player. A categorical condemnation by China could well alienate DPRK and China would stand to lose whatever limited influence it has over its problematic neighbour. This would not only be a blow to Chinese aspirations to greater global prominence but seriously impede a resumption of dialogue with DPRK in the future. A North Korea bereft of its only ally is likely to engage a policy of brinkmanship even more vigorously. Perhaps all that China can do is support some strengthening of sanctions and offer to mediate once again.
It is reasonable to assume that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will discuss the Cheonan issue with Chinese leaders during her current visit, a coordination of policy between the US and China may be arrived at. We will have to wait to till Clinton’s visit to Seoul on 26 May to find out in what direction the parties concerned will move.
Rukmani Gupta is a Research Fellow at IPCS and may be reached at rukmani@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Toyota To Recall 11,500 Lexus Vehicles Worldwide
(KUNA) -- Toyota Motor Corp. said Wednesday it will recall about 11,500 Lexus vehicles worldwide for problems related to steering, putting a fresh dent in its reputation.
Of the total, around 4,500 units were sold in Japan and 7,000 units in 50 overseas markets including the Middle East, the US, and China, the world's biggest carmaker said, adding that the four models subject to the recall are the LS460 and LS460L, and the LS600h and LS600hL hybrids.
Since March, Japan's Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Ministry has received 12 reports of electrical problems causing steering wheels to move out of sync with tires for a few seconds in the four models, but there were no reports of accidents linked to this problem.
Toyota has already issued recalls for 8.5 million vehicles worldwide since last October, including for its top-selling models, in connection with loose floor mats, faulty gas pedals, and brake problems.
Of the total, around 4,500 units were sold in Japan and 7,000 units in 50 overseas markets including the Middle East, the US, and China, the world's biggest carmaker said, adding that the four models subject to the recall are the LS460 and LS460L, and the LS600h and LS600hL hybrids.
Since March, Japan's Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Ministry has received 12 reports of electrical problems causing steering wheels to move out of sync with tires for a few seconds in the four models, but there were no reports of accidents linked to this problem.
Toyota has already issued recalls for 8.5 million vehicles worldwide since last October, including for its top-selling models, in connection with loose floor mats, faulty gas pedals, and brake problems.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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Allied To Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance And Arms Race
By J.J. Suh for FPIF
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has increased its defense budget fourfold in less than twenty years, from 6.6 trillion won in 1990 to 26.6 trillion won in 2008. Last year’s spending represents a twofold increase from ten years ago; and now the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Defense Reform 2020 projects an annual average increase of 7.6 percent to 53.3 trillion won by 2020, another doubling over the next decade. Is Seoul engaged in defense-budget doubling projects every ten years? Why has South Korea’s military spending increased so much in recent years, and especially under the liberal governments of the past ten years? Why does it keep growing? Is there any pattern that we can discern in South Korea’s military spending?
South Korea has continuously increased its military spending since 2000 at a rate higher than conventional explanations would expect. Its spending grew 200 percent for the past ten years, higher than would be warranted by the growth of its economy or government budget over the same period. South Korea also, notably, raised its defense spending at a higher rate than North Korea did at a time when Seoul was taking a more conciliatory policy of engagement, commonly dubbed the “sunshine policy.” Its defense spending increased ostensibly in response to its policy goal to build a more autonomous military under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. But closer examination shows that the U.S.-Korea alliance in fact strengthened during this period and served as driver of South Korea’s military transformation. Furthermore, Roh’s predecessor and successor have, despite their opposite political orientations, strengthened the military in a way that dovetails with changes in American strategy and military. This article examines how the South’s military transformation, in quantity and form, is attributable at least partly to the pressure that its alliance with the United States keeps on Seoul to maintain military readiness and interoperability.
This article critically examines three main groups of factors that affect Seoul’s military expenditure, showing their contributions and shortcomings. First, it shows that the conventional North Korea threat explanation is more effective in dealing with the past than with more recent periods. Second, it argues that internal factors go far toward explaining some cases of weapons acquisitions. Finally, it suggests that the quantitative growth and qualitative change of South Korea’s military are closely correlated with the requirements of alliance readiness, although the alliance produces countervailing effects on Seoul’s military spending.
This in fact has been the primary explanation of South Korea’s military spending: that Seoul must defend against the North Korean threat. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), for example, acquired tanks, M48s, mainly because it feared another blitzkrieg spearheaded by the North’s tank forces, as in the early stage of the Korean War. Traumatized by the experience of the war, the ROKA has continued to upgrade its tanks and has acquired new ones even while building all manner of defenses against the North’s tanks. The earlier history of Seoul’s spending growth can be readily explained in terms of its strategic need to catch up with North Korea, its main threat, which was enjoying an edge until the early 1970s. Seoul still identifies the North as a “direct and serious threat” and justifies its military spending in the same terms: “a country in conflict, such as ours that constantly faces North Korean threat, must analyze ‘security threats’ first to determine the military requirement and use the requirement to calculate the size of the defense expenditure.”
Such a realist perspective, however, fails to explain recent patterns of military spending by South Korea. Most economic and military indicators show that South Korea has an edge over North Korea in almost all measures of power. The size of the military according to a “bean count” is probably the only indicator in which the North has an advantage. But North Korea’s quantitative advantage quickly fades when one takes account of the qualitative disadvantages of operating its 1950s-vintage weapons systems against the state-of-the-art systems of the South. Most serious analysts conclude that “North Korea never had a lead over South Korea, and after the 1960s quickly began falling behind.”
If the North’s threat is the main driver of the South’s military spending, why didn’t Seoul slow down its budget increase in the 1990s when its defense budget was seven times that of the North? Why did it feel compelled to keep increasing its defense budget to widen the gap to a 10:1 ratio by 2002? In the 1990s North Korea was having serious difficulties, which turned into a massive starvation and an economic crisis in the latter half. Its military spending too showed a marginal increase in the early 1990s, only to fall precipitously in the latter half. But Seoul continued increasing its military spending as if it were indifferent to the relative and absolute decline of the North’s power. The increase is all the more puzzling because it was maintained even as the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments pursued rapprochement with the North. The two liberal governments, in fact, tripled South Korea’s defense budget from 9.9 billion won in 1998 to 28.6 billion won in 2008, just when Pyongyang was struggling to survive. The South’s continuous increases in the 1990s and early 21st century defies the external threat explanation.
Although the overall pattern of the South does not fit the expectation of the external threat theory, its recent acquisition of some weapons systems is directly related to the North’s asymmetric capabilities. Seoul has purchased Patriot missiles (PAC-2) and built the Aegis ships. Also it has produced Hyunmu 1 and 2, cruise missiles that can hit targets anywhere in North Korea. The Defense Reform 2020 plans to “greatly expand the capabilities of surveillance, reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception so that the North’s asymmetric (nuclear and missile) threats may be intercepted and eliminated within North Korea.” The Korean Defense Daily (Kukpang ilbo) projects that once these systems are in place, South Korea’s military “will acquire the first-strike capability.” The South’s pursuit of the first-strike capability is at least partially responsible for the continued increase in its military spending.
Writing about Korea’s defense industry in the mid-1980s, Chung-in Moon noted "a potential for the gradual formation of a military-industrial complex," and by 1990, Kim Yong-nam talked of a "military-industrial complex of developing-country-type" being formed in Korea. Whether or not it constitutes a military-industrial complex, a dense network has developed between the Korean government, the military, and the defense industry. This network certainly benefits from the alliance relationship.
The military-industry sector was not to be slighted. In 1991 there were eighty-four defense contractors designated as “defense industry” by the Ministry of National Defense, and hundreds of subcontractors, with total sales of 1.7 trillion won. By 2008, the number of defense contractors grew only slightly to eighty-nine, and they produced 1,442 defense products, with total sales of 5.5 trillion won. From the mid-1970s to 1991, military industries had invested a total of 1.2 trillion won in facilities and equipment; if dual-use facilities are included, the total is 3.3 trillion won. As of 1991, defense contractors employed 53,000 personnel. Even if the dual industries are excluded, the number is still about 28,000.
The MND typically allocates one third of its budget for armaments. In 1991 alone, the ministry, through the Defense Logistics Agency, spent 2.9 trillion won on local purchases, of which contracts with Korean defense firms represented "a substantial proportion." Foreign purchases amounted to 590 billion won, of which over 60 percent were FMS (foreign military sales) purchases from the United States. The government was not just the sole consumer of military goods, it was also the major source of funding for defense contractors. In 1996, for example, the MND set up the "Defense Industry Promotion Fund," through which it disbursed 52.3 billion won to thirty defense contractors as research and development (R&D) assistance. In the same year, it also provided defense contractors with loans worth 30.3 billion won.
A special group of go-betweens has emerged between the defense contractors and the government to facilitate the exchange of money and goods. According to a ministry document, 326 retired officers were employed in defense industries as of 1996. The number, substantial as it is, does not reveal the full extent of government-industry connections. Often the connections are quite personal. An officer who had worked on a particular weapons system would no sooner retire than get hired by the company that manufactured the very same weapons system. For example, a retired brigadier general who as chief of the Tank Project Task Force had overseen the army’s K-1 tank development project was hired upon his retirement as executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Defense Systems Division of the Hyundai Precision Industry, manufacturer of the tanks. Daewoo Heavy Industry, which produces warships, had as its vice president a retired brigadier general from the navy headquarters. Samsung Aviation, the primary contractor of the Korean fighter project, employed a retired major general (former commander of air force education) as advisor, a retired major general (former air force logistics commander) as vice president, and a retired colonel (former air force technology school president) as factory president.
The practice of “parachuting” retired officers into private sector positions is not limited to defense contractors. Retired military officers are also employed en masse by trading companies that import military equipment and software. As of 1997, there were 339 arms-import agencies, and practically all of them were owned and staffed by former officers. Although the exact amount of the commissions they received from imports in recent years is not known, their total commissions in 1990 alone ran to over $9 million. The amount is likely to have jumped significantly since 1993 when the Ministry of National Defense abolished the ceiling on commissions. The increase in weapons imports later in the 1990s also helped boost the sum of the commissions reaped by these weapons traders.
It is a reality that many former officials, who had worked in [acquisition] related offices of the Ministry of National Defense or in a branch of the armed services, are employed by arms import agencies and exercise their direct or indirect influence over ROC, planning, and implementation.
Defense industries’ interests, under some circumstances, override pure security considerations in arms procurement decisions, as the following example of the K-1 upgrading project illustrates. After successfully developing the K-1 tank by 1988, the South Korean military began to upgrade it in the early 1990s. The “up-gunning” project, which included replacing the K-1’s 105 mm. gun with a 120 mm. gun, was initiated to deal with the T-72 tanks that North Korea was thought to be poised to acquire from Russia. The upgrading project was imperative, the MND argued, since the K-1 tank’s 105 mm. gun did not have enough firepower to penetrate the T-72’s thicker and stronger armor.
But by the mid-1990s, it became increasingly clear that Pyongyang was not acquiring T-72s and would be unable to purchase them. The country’s worsening economic situation was causing massive starvation, and Moscow was reluctant to sell the tanks to the North because it wanted to expand ties with the South. Ironically it was the South, not the North, that received Russia’s most sophisticated tanks, the T-80Us, in the mid-1990s. By the end of the decade, North Korea had not received a single T-72, and certainly no T-80s, and its tank stock consisted largely of 1950s models that the K-1’s 105 mm. guns could easily destroy. Nonetheless, the up-gunning project proceeded as if the absence of T-72s in the North’s arsenal did not matter. The up-gunning and upgrading of a K-1 to a K-1 A-1 was not driven so much by military need as by Hyundai Precision Industry, which faced the problem of idling its tank production facilities after completing its order of K-1 tanks. Building on this momentum, the army is slated to roll out an even newer model, K-2, in 2016 and round out the armor modernization with 950 K-2 PIP’s by 2020.
Another example of industry interests overriding security considerations was provided by Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil’s call in May 1999 for more funding to keep the F-16 fighter production lines "warm." The Korean Fighter Program (KFP) was scheduled to terminate at the end of 1999 when all of the planned 120 F-16s were to have been assembled, which would close down production lines. Defense contractors involved in the KFP, therefore, had an interest in getting more orders. The Aerospace Industry Development Policy Board, established in 1990 to guide policy for Korea's nascent aircraft industry, held its second meeting in April 1999 to discuss the Basic Development Plan for Aerospace Industry. The Ministry of National Defense was at loggerheads with the Ministry of Industry and Resources (MIR) over the plan. The MND, reflecting the air force's view, argued for termination of the KFP and an early start of the KTX project (a supersonic trainer production program), whereas the MIR, representing the interests of the aircraft consortium led by Samsung Avionics, advocated an extension of the KFP. In the end, the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Board sided with the MIR, reflecting the degree to which economic interests, born out of military considerations, were now overshadowing national-security concerns in weapons procurement decisions. As one anonymous air force officer told the Associated Press, "some cabinet ministers were mixing national defense with business interests."
The above cases illustrate the gray area between national security and economic interest. But there is an even less transparent sector of this military-industrial network that mixes weapons deals with side payments. William Hartung graphically details an aspect of this sector in his description of Northrop Grumman's failed attempt to sell F-20 Tigersharks to South Korea. Featuring a host of colorful characters—mob leader "Wheelchair" Kang, who was wheelchair-bound after a gang feud; "Pistol" Park, who was known for his "pistolmanship" and close friendship with Korea’s President Chun Doo-hwan; and Northrop's chairman and CEO, Tom Jones—the fiasco involved elaborate and illegal schemes to exchange millions of dollars for a contract. It is impossible to ascertain the extent of this dark sector, which spanned the Pacific and involved government officials, military officers, and businessmen. Suffice it to note that every major weapon purchase or production contract to date has been accompanied by charges of corruption. The magnitude of this corruption was reflected in the fact that Korea's force modernization effort begun in 1974 was so tainted with massive scandals that the Ministry of National Defense felt compelled to change the name from the Yulgok Program to the Force Improvement Program (FIP).
The usefulness of these explanations, however, is limited. The military and defense contractors in South Korea undoubtedly have a selfish interest to protect, if not promote, their own welfare, and they have taken advantage of the democratic opening to pursue their self-interest. But those with interests in keeping the defense budget as high as possible represent a small segment of the state and society involved in national security policy making. As of 2008, the eighty-nine companies designated as the “defense industry” registered total sales of 5.5 trillion won, only 7 percent of the total sales of the companies and less than 1 percent of Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP). Also, though the Ministry of National Defense is one of the largest bureaucratic bodies in the Korean government, only a small number of its officials handle acquisitions, and their narrow self-interest is counterbalanced by institutional monitoring and audit. Hence, while internal drivers may account for, or contribute to, individual cases, they fall short of explaining the overall size of the defense budget. Furthermore, democratization serves as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it creates an opening for private interests to influence government decision-making. But on the other hand, it makes the government more subject to competing demands and increasing oversight.
There are two ways to assess the contribution that a country makes to its ally’s defense, although neither is an easy or perfect measure. One can either calculate the resources allocated for the ally’s defense or, counterfactually, estimate the marginal increase in the resources that the ally would have to spend if it lost the country’s support. The former is better at counting tangibles such as the number of soldiers and weapons systems deployed in or for the ally, and aggregate them to calculate the total support the country gives to its ally. While it may be easier to count the tangibles, the intangible contributions that a country makes to its ally’s defense may be more important and expensive in some cases. Either way, the total defense contribution is seen as reducing the ally’s security burden by that amount.
Using the first yardstick, we may estimate the total sum that the United States expends to support South Korea’s defense. One rudimentary estimate would take the number of American soldiers stationed in Korea as an indicator of the proportional slice of the U.S. defense budget if indirect costs, such as expenses on strategic forces and R&D, can be assumed to proportionately support each soldier. According to one estimate, the combined U.S.-South Korea expenditure totaled about $12 billion in 1986. Since South Korea alone spent approximately $5 billion that year, Washington contributed about $7 billion worth of force. Others estimate that one third of the U.S. defense budget goes to its forces in Asia-Pacific and therefore, by extension, to what the United States would deploy in case of a contingency in Korea. If the cost is limited to the in-country expenses incurred by U.S. forces deployed in South Korea, however, the amount is a more limited $1.2 billion (as of 2004), the figure used by the allied governments to figure out Seoul’s “host nation support.”
Using the second, more indirect measure is more complicated for it involves counterfactual estimates. One needs to estimate the marginal increase in Seoul’s defense expenditure if the alliance were terminated. This in turn involves assessing two kinds of costs. First, if the alliance were terminated and the American military withdrawn, Korea would first have to fill the void with its own forces at its own cost. Some 40,000 American soldiers would have to be replaced with Koreans, and all the facilities manned by Americans would have to be managed by Koreans. These extra personnel would have to be paid, and the operating costs of the facilities would have to be borne by Seoul. This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance:
The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.
Second, if the alliance were terminated, it could potentially disrupt the flow of parts and materials, causing an incalculable disaster in equipment maintenance and production that might even compromise the ROK army's readiness. The work of many of Korea's defense contractors would grind to a halt as Korea failed to obtain necessary parts. Many U.S. contractors would lose customers. These secondary costs are difficult to estimate but are frequently used as a reason for maintaining the alliance. Typifying such justifications, Hwang Tong-Jun, Director of the Weapons Systems Research Center, has argued that, despite the need to diversify the sources of weapons imports, "we need to focus on our cooperation with the U.S., which has developed over the past 20 years and which has sustained weapons interoperability."
While there is no dispute about the contributions that the United States has made to Korea’s defense, it is analytically difficult to show that its contributions have produced a replacement effect, not only because its contributions serve U.S. strategic needs but also because Korea’s military spending grew even when Washington’s security commitment remained constant or grew. In the 1950s and 1960s, Washington provided economic and military assistance—especially so-called counterpart funding—not just as a supplement but also as an inducement for Seoul to raise the size of the military and defense budget. Even as President Richard Nixon withdrew one division from South Korea, he increased other types of defense assistance to compensate for the decrease in Korea’s defense readiness that might result from the force reduction. President Jimmy Carter threatened to cut U.S. aid if Seoul did not go along with his policy, but he ended up giving aid without any troop withdrawal. Through the 1970s, President Park Chung-hee, fearing American withdrawal, launched an ambitious program to build Korea’s independent military capability. But in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan made unqualified commitment to South Korea’s defense, President Chun Doo-hwan still went ahead with the military modernization program. In other words, South Korea kept beefing up its military regardless of the level of American support.
This, in turn, raises the question about the degree to which U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) needs to be replaced in order to maintain a strategic balance against the North Korean military. The Roh Moo-hyun government justified some of its new weapons development programs in terms of the need to substitute for the U.S. capabilities that would be withdrawn by 2012 when wartime operational control will be transferred to the ROKA, but it is at least questionable whether all of those capabilities need to be acquired by South Korea. For example, the Kumgang and Paektu Projects would, upon their completion, give the ROKA the ability to monitor North Korea’s military activities almost anywhere in the country. Given that the North Korean military has only rudimentary reconnaissance and surveillance capability, any additional high-tech surveillance systems to replace what the United States currently provides could potentially be overkill. The ROKA maintains such a high force-to-space ratio that even without the benefits of the high-tech systems, it could block any blitzkrieg attempt by the North. Thus, while the U.S. military adds to the South’s capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliance’s supplementary effect, therefore, will be smaller than it seems at first.
It is not easy or cheap to keep modern allied militaries interoperable, for interoperability requirements lead to three types of durable and expensive investments. First, allies need, at a minimum, to be able to identify each other, so as to minimize friendly fire and to coordinate their exercises and operations. Their weapons systems and platforms must be designed and produced to ensure interoperability between the allies’ assets. With further military integration, they need to ensure that both can rely on each other’s ammunition and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants). Airports, ports, roads, and railroads may need be configured and maintained in order to enable an ally’s operation.
Second, the allied militaries need to customize the way allied militaries use equipment and manpower to achieve their joint objectives. The processes that require investment include consultation and coordination mechanisms, military planning, command structure, and the operation of combined forces and combined exercises. Alliance military practices are guided and governed by a host of rules, ranging from treaties and agreements to domestic laws and regulations, in addition to the standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement that apply to most military activities. This software infrastructure represents another set of expenditures that allies make to carry out alliance obligations.
Third, costs are incurred by the need to move human assets in teams or train them to work together. Allies make a durable investment in alliance personnel so that they “learn by doing” or “learn on the job” about their allied partners, as well as about the alliance-specific hardware and software infrastructure. Alliance practices typically involve training about allies, combined exercises, and exchange of officers. Allies also invest resources to educate soldiers about the history, culture, and politics of the ally as well as to teach at least some of them the ally’s language.
If the interoperability requirements lead to these three kinds of investment, which add to a country’s defense spending, allies also have political needs to meet. On the one hand, the wealthier ally bears the burden of helping out its ally by providing military or economic assistance that will enhance the ally’s strength. The more powerful ally may come under pressure to transfer weapons systems to an ally free of charge or at a “friendly” rate. These pressures were particularly strong during the cold war when the two superpowers competed with each other for allies. But even afterward, the strategic circumstances of, for instance, the global war on terrorism, have generated a need to invest in reconstructing the ally’s economy or military. On the other hand, the weaker of the two may purchase its ally’s weapons systems or other goods as a way to signal its commitment to the alliance or buy the ally’s interest. The powerful give what they can, and the weaker buy what they must, to paraphrase Thucydides.
Abandonment fear, which dampens one’s expectation of allied contributions, serves as a constant reminder that one must maintain at least a minimal ability to provide for one’s own security no matter how trustworthy the ally might currently be. Changes in domestic politics or international circumstances may alter the ally’s calculation tomorrow, and the ally will betray the alliance if the benefits of doing so outweigh those of honoring the commitment. A state’s predilection to shift its defense burden to an ally, therefore, is counterbalanced by its fear of abandonment.
Abandonment fear may do more than merely dampen the supplementary effect of an alliance. The more strongly a state fears abandonment, the more likely it is to explore ways to reduce the likelihood of abandonment. Such “chain-ganging” can take various forms. It can provide services that its ally desires, as for example when President Park dispatched two divisions of the Korean military to Vietnam to help out the United States. It may seek to influence the opinion of decision makers with economic assistance or purchase orders. It may even try lobbying as a last resort, as the Koreagate scandal revealed.
Entrapment fear itself may not directly increase defense spending unless an alliance is already so entrenched with a high level of interoperability that loosening the alliance involves undoing at least some of the interoperable features. But entrapment fear can lead to side payments if one’s “buck passing” deepens the other’s abandonment fear so much that the abandonment fear must be addressed, as, for example, when the Eisenhower administration agreed to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with President Syngman Rhee as a way to end its entrapment in the Korean War. President Nixon tried to reduce the U.S. defense burden and entrapment in Asia by withdrawing some forces from the region, but he ended up agreeing to increase military assistance to allay Seoul’s security concerns.
Entrapment itself can be highly costly, as Jefferson said when he warned the neophyte republic against “entanglement” in costly European wars. Despite the warning, the United States has been entrapped in its allies’ or friends’ wars at a great cost to itself. While President Park voluntarily dispatched the Korean military to Vietnam out of political and economic considerations, President Roh Moo-hyun came under pressure from the George W. Bush administration to contribute to the U.S. war in Iraq and later Afghanistan. In 1994, President Kim Young-sam found himself caught in the uncomfortable position of having to deal with the likelihood that the United States might use its military against North Korea’s nuclear facilities in Yongbyun.
States have used various measures to address the contradictory fears associated with alliances but have found no satisfactory solution that can allay both fears at the same time. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) pursued by the Bush administration is perhaps unique in simultaneously exacerbating both of these fears inherent in an alliance relationship, even though part of its goal was to allay them. The military transformation has sought to leverage new technological developments to maximize the mobility as well as the accuracy and lethality of the U.S. military. Its emphasis on mobility frees the forces from a fixed battle position and enables them to be rapidly deployed to distant places, making it possible to move U.S. bases out of inhospitable or potentially dangerous areas. While this may reduce American fears of entrapment, it increases their allies’ concerns about abandonment. At the same time, the newly acquired U.S. mobility, which may reduce American fears of abandonment, makes it potentially more likely that American allies can be involuntarily drawn into a conflict in which the United States is engaged, either because the U.S. military is deployed from allied bases or because U.S. forces are brought in from afar, dragging the ally into the conflict.
Not only does the military transformation shift the burden of the twin fears to allies, it also adds a new challenge to keep up with America’s transformation so that allied militaries might operate seamlessly together. As the U.S. military leapfrogs into a 21st-century high-tech force equipped with state-of-the-art weapons systems, its allied militaries come under pressure to follow suit or modernize their forces enough to maintain interoperability with the U.S. military. The U.S. military’s adoption of network-centric warfare and its emphasis on jointness drive allied militaries to train their forces about the new ways of fighting lest they have difficulties working with the new U.S. forces.
The MND’s Defense Reform 2020 Basic Plan notes that “the Korean military faces the requirement to transform into a futuristic force structure because of revolutionary changes in the war-fighting paradigm triggered by the development of information-science technology.” To effectively prepare for the future warfare, the MND is emphasizing the concepts of “jointness” and Network Centric Warfare, the very core concepts highlighted by the U.S. military transformation. A majority of force improvements envisioned by the Defense Reform 2020 are driven by these concepts. The Korean military is, for example, slated to acquire the following: satellites, airborne early warning control system, C4I, K series battle tanks, Aegis ships, F-15K/F-X fighters, aerial refueling aircraft, and precision guided missiles. These changes are driven by the agreement that Seoul’s and Washington’s militaries made in 2003: “the ROK will develop and transform its own military capabilities in reference to US military transformation.”
South Korea had a high level of entrapment fear when the Bush administration asked Seoul to contribute to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its fear was brought home when a Korean man, Kim Sŏnil, was kidnapped and executed in Iraq in 2004. But it was the military transformation and its attendant alliance transformation that created a serious debate about entrapment. As the U.S. military was being transformed into rapid deployment forces, some feared that the “strategic flexibility” adopted by the U.S.-ROK alliance could allow U.S. forces deployed in Korea to be deployed to other places, such as China, dragging South Korea into a conflict it did not desire.
At the same time, South Korea’s abandonment fear is increasing as the alliance goes through a transformation. Wartime operational control is scheduled to be returned to the ROKA by 2012, and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to be disbanded by the same time, according to the agreement signed in February 2007. The USFK is being moved away from frontline positions to rear areas—Osan and Daegu—while its overall size is shrinking. These changes are creating a fear among some Koreans, particularly conservatives, that Washington might abandon Korea at a time of crisis.
The twin fears of entrapment and abandonment are visible in the defense reform plan for 2020. On the one hand, in order to reduce entrapment fears, the MND emphasizes the need to develop an independent defense capability: “it is now more urgent than anytime before that we must develop our own capability to defend ourselves in order to ensure our survival.” To develop the capability, it is restructuring the ROKA’s command control system and acquiring the weapons systems necessary for the ROKA’s independent command control.
On the other hand, in order to address the abandonment fears, the ministry is working with the Pentagon to develop new coordinating mechanisms. It is also highlighting the need to make concentrated investments early on. Its urgent call for an “early harvest” in reality translates into acquiring existing U.S. weapons systems such as C4I systems, AWACS (airborne warning and control system), and theater operation command control systems, because of the interoperability built into the Korean military.
Also, the alliance produced pressure on Korea to emulate the trend in the ally’s weapons R&D, since the Korean army needed to ensure that its weapons systems and doctrines remained interoperable with those of its ally in the future. Korean weapons researchers and officers, therefore, constantly looked to their American counterparts to keep up with their research. Just as the RMA was driving military R&D in the United States in the 1990s, it was also starting to affect Korea's debate on the future of its arms industry. Specifically exploring Korea's possible response to the American debate on the RMA, No Hun and I Chae-Uk argued that "it is natural that the Korean military follows American trends in the RMA and uses them as a base to explore Korea’s own way of RMA." Weapons research was developing a life of its own, being driven more by its own needs or by developments in the ally’s weapons research than by the actual security environment.
Furthermore, it is notable that the alliance’s effects are expansionary in recent years. First, Seoul bears some of the direct and indirect cost of keeping U.S. forces in Korea, and its share of the burden has gone up in recent years. It has provided land, facilities, and services, as well as tax breaks, an indirect cost that amounted to $773 million in 2000 alone. Beginning in 1991 when it signed the Special Measures Agreement, South Korea has increased its share of the direct cost from 107.3 billion won to 741.5 billion won in 2008. If one adds the cost to relocate the USFK headquarters at Yongsan and consolidate other U.S. bases in Osan, Seoul’s total burden quickly increases. As Seoul’s capability grows, so does its contribution to the alliance cost. Furthermore, Washington’s expenses go up even as Seoul’s share of in-country costs increases because the U.S. military is going through an expensive transformation. Because the size of the alliance pie grows as a result, neither ally’s increased contribution replaces or reduces the other’s burden.
Second, not only is the size of the alliance pie expanding; the alliance’s area of operation is growing. As early as 2000, the two allies agreed that “the alliance will serve to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the Korean peninsula.” They have since extended their bilateral logistical support to a global level so that South Korea’s military might provide logistical support to U.S. forces operating, for example, in Central Asia. They have also agreed to the “strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces based in South Korea,” opening the door to the possibility that American forces could be projected from South Korea to anywhere outside the peninsula. The expansion has furthermore gotten the Korean military involved in such far-flung conflicts as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
Finally, Seoul’s military spending expands at least partly to acquire capabilities necessary for out-of-area operations. The Force Improvement Plan (FIP), originally conceived to expand South Korean military capability in response to the perceived superiority of the North, in recent years has reflected a "strategic vision" that looks beyond the North-South rivalry to plan for an eventually unified Korea's regional role. Reflecting such a vision, the Ministry of National Defense is making efforts to develop a more “balanced” force, with increased emphasis on maritime and air capabilities that would find limited application in an intra-Korean conflict. The navy is acquiring a blue sea capability, while the air force is being equipped with longer-range aircraft and aerial refueling planes. While it is at least debatable that Korea has an immediate need to prepare for an eventual conflict with Japan or China, it is notable that Seoul's strategic vision requires mostly U.S. weapons systems. The MND favors American missiles, the air force is purchasing American F-15Ks, the army is repeating the U.S. argument about the “military transformation,” and the navy is operating American-style Aegis-class destroyers. The ROKA is forging ahead toward “network-centric warfare.” So the alliance looms large even as South Korea busily prepares for strategic uncertainty in the region.
This essay was originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer and in FPIF
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has increased its defense budget fourfold in less than twenty years, from 6.6 trillion won in 1990 to 26.6 trillion won in 2008. Last year’s spending represents a twofold increase from ten years ago; and now the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Defense Reform 2020 projects an annual average increase of 7.6 percent to 53.3 trillion won by 2020, another doubling over the next decade. Is Seoul engaged in defense-budget doubling projects every ten years? Why has South Korea’s military spending increased so much in recent years, and especially under the liberal governments of the past ten years? Why does it keep growing? Is there any pattern that we can discern in South Korea’s military spending?
South Korea has continuously increased its military spending since 2000 at a rate higher than conventional explanations would expect. Its spending grew 200 percent for the past ten years, higher than would be warranted by the growth of its economy or government budget over the same period. South Korea also, notably, raised its defense spending at a higher rate than North Korea did at a time when Seoul was taking a more conciliatory policy of engagement, commonly dubbed the “sunshine policy.” Its defense spending increased ostensibly in response to its policy goal to build a more autonomous military under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. But closer examination shows that the U.S.-Korea alliance in fact strengthened during this period and served as driver of South Korea’s military transformation. Furthermore, Roh’s predecessor and successor have, despite their opposite political orientations, strengthened the military in a way that dovetails with changes in American strategy and military. This article examines how the South’s military transformation, in quantity and form, is attributable at least partly to the pressure that its alliance with the United States keeps on Seoul to maintain military readiness and interoperability.
This article critically examines three main groups of factors that affect Seoul’s military expenditure, showing their contributions and shortcomings. First, it shows that the conventional North Korea threat explanation is more effective in dealing with the past than with more recent periods. Second, it argues that internal factors go far toward explaining some cases of weapons acquisitions. Finally, it suggests that the quantitative growth and qualitative change of South Korea’s military are closely correlated with the requirements of alliance readiness, although the alliance produces countervailing effects on Seoul’s military spending.
External Threats
According to realist conventional wisdom, a state allocates resources to the military as a means to provide for survival. Since the minimal goal of a state is its survival against potential threats, the amount of its military spending is proportional to the level of threat it faces. A state in a benign strategic environment may keep its security expenditure to a minimum so it may allocate more resources to internal welfare, even if it may not be able to completely eliminate the military for fear that today’s friends should become tomorrow’s enemies. But a state facing a clear and present danger is forced to spend whatever is necessary to defend against an external threat even at a great cost to internal welfare. While scholars note a dilemma a state faces in striking an optimal balance between guns and butter, they tend to agree that the higher the level of threat, ceteris paribus, the higher the defense spending. Richardson’s classic arms-race model uses external threat as a driver of arms race because one’s increase in military capability increases the threat perceived by a potential adversary, who then increases its own military strength.This in fact has been the primary explanation of South Korea’s military spending: that Seoul must defend against the North Korean threat. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), for example, acquired tanks, M48s, mainly because it feared another blitzkrieg spearheaded by the North’s tank forces, as in the early stage of the Korean War. Traumatized by the experience of the war, the ROKA has continued to upgrade its tanks and has acquired new ones even while building all manner of defenses against the North’s tanks. The earlier history of Seoul’s spending growth can be readily explained in terms of its strategic need to catch up with North Korea, its main threat, which was enjoying an edge until the early 1970s. Seoul still identifies the North as a “direct and serious threat” and justifies its military spending in the same terms: “a country in conflict, such as ours that constantly faces North Korean threat, must analyze ‘security threats’ first to determine the military requirement and use the requirement to calculate the size of the defense expenditure.”
Such a realist perspective, however, fails to explain recent patterns of military spending by South Korea. Most economic and military indicators show that South Korea has an edge over North Korea in almost all measures of power. The size of the military according to a “bean count” is probably the only indicator in which the North has an advantage. But North Korea’s quantitative advantage quickly fades when one takes account of the qualitative disadvantages of operating its 1950s-vintage weapons systems against the state-of-the-art systems of the South. Most serious analysts conclude that “North Korea never had a lead over South Korea, and after the 1960s quickly began falling behind.”
If the North’s threat is the main driver of the South’s military spending, why didn’t Seoul slow down its budget increase in the 1990s when its defense budget was seven times that of the North? Why did it feel compelled to keep increasing its defense budget to widen the gap to a 10:1 ratio by 2002? In the 1990s North Korea was having serious difficulties, which turned into a massive starvation and an economic crisis in the latter half. Its military spending too showed a marginal increase in the early 1990s, only to fall precipitously in the latter half. But Seoul continued increasing its military spending as if it were indifferent to the relative and absolute decline of the North’s power. The increase is all the more puzzling because it was maintained even as the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments pursued rapprochement with the North. The two liberal governments, in fact, tripled South Korea’s defense budget from 9.9 billion won in 1998 to 28.6 billion won in 2008, just when Pyongyang was struggling to survive. The South’s continuous increases in the 1990s and early 21st century defies the external threat explanation.
Although the overall pattern of the South does not fit the expectation of the external threat theory, its recent acquisition of some weapons systems is directly related to the North’s asymmetric capabilities. Seoul has purchased Patriot missiles (PAC-2) and built the Aegis ships. Also it has produced Hyunmu 1 and 2, cruise missiles that can hit targets anywhere in North Korea. The Defense Reform 2020 plans to “greatly expand the capabilities of surveillance, reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception so that the North’s asymmetric (nuclear and missile) threats may be intercepted and eliminated within North Korea.” The Korean Defense Daily (Kukpang ilbo) projects that once these systems are in place, South Korea’s military “will acquire the first-strike capability.” The South’s pursuit of the first-strike capability is at least partially responsible for the continued increase in its military spending.
Internal Drivers
Korea’s Military-Industrial Complex
The above realist accounts of military spending have had difficulties in explaining not only the Korean case but also the experiences of the United States and other countries. Pointing to the failure of realist theories to explain the pattern of U.S. military expenditures, scholars have turned to domestic factors as a driver of defense spending. Ever since President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the possibility that a military-industrial complex might wield too great an influence on military policies, defense contractors and the military have been seen as behaving according to narrow self-interest to protect their jobs and businesses. Liberals, who see politics as competition and cooperation among self-interested individuals and groups, have refined this basic insight into interest-group theories, sometimes merging them with theories of political institutions. Many empirical studies have been done to make sense of the growth of military spending by the United States or the Soviet Union during the cold war even if they differ on what specific internal factors caused the growth. While they lack the ability to account for the overall level and pattern of military spending, they usually do a good job of delineating a specific arms purchase or military policy.Writing about Korea’s defense industry in the mid-1980s, Chung-in Moon noted "a potential for the gradual formation of a military-industrial complex," and by 1990, Kim Yong-nam talked of a "military-industrial complex of developing-country-type" being formed in Korea. Whether or not it constitutes a military-industrial complex, a dense network has developed between the Korean government, the military, and the defense industry. This network certainly benefits from the alliance relationship.
The military-industry sector was not to be slighted. In 1991 there were eighty-four defense contractors designated as “defense industry” by the Ministry of National Defense, and hundreds of subcontractors, with total sales of 1.7 trillion won. By 2008, the number of defense contractors grew only slightly to eighty-nine, and they produced 1,442 defense products, with total sales of 5.5 trillion won. From the mid-1970s to 1991, military industries had invested a total of 1.2 trillion won in facilities and equipment; if dual-use facilities are included, the total is 3.3 trillion won. As of 1991, defense contractors employed 53,000 personnel. Even if the dual industries are excluded, the number is still about 28,000.
The MND typically allocates one third of its budget for armaments. In 1991 alone, the ministry, through the Defense Logistics Agency, spent 2.9 trillion won on local purchases, of which contracts with Korean defense firms represented "a substantial proportion." Foreign purchases amounted to 590 billion won, of which over 60 percent were FMS (foreign military sales) purchases from the United States. The government was not just the sole consumer of military goods, it was also the major source of funding for defense contractors. In 1996, for example, the MND set up the "Defense Industry Promotion Fund," through which it disbursed 52.3 billion won to thirty defense contractors as research and development (R&D) assistance. In the same year, it also provided defense contractors with loans worth 30.3 billion won.
A special group of go-betweens has emerged between the defense contractors and the government to facilitate the exchange of money and goods. According to a ministry document, 326 retired officers were employed in defense industries as of 1996. The number, substantial as it is, does not reveal the full extent of government-industry connections. Often the connections are quite personal. An officer who had worked on a particular weapons system would no sooner retire than get hired by the company that manufactured the very same weapons system. For example, a retired brigadier general who as chief of the Tank Project Task Force had overseen the army’s K-1 tank development project was hired upon his retirement as executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Defense Systems Division of the Hyundai Precision Industry, manufacturer of the tanks. Daewoo Heavy Industry, which produces warships, had as its vice president a retired brigadier general from the navy headquarters. Samsung Aviation, the primary contractor of the Korean fighter project, employed a retired major general (former commander of air force education) as advisor, a retired major general (former air force logistics commander) as vice president, and a retired colonel (former air force technology school president) as factory president.
The practice of “parachuting” retired officers into private sector positions is not limited to defense contractors. Retired military officers are also employed en masse by trading companies that import military equipment and software. As of 1997, there were 339 arms-import agencies, and practically all of them were owned and staffed by former officers. Although the exact amount of the commissions they received from imports in recent years is not known, their total commissions in 1990 alone ran to over $9 million. The amount is likely to have jumped significantly since 1993 when the Ministry of National Defense abolished the ceiling on commissions. The increase in weapons imports later in the 1990s also helped boost the sum of the commissions reaped by these weapons traders.
The Politics of Choosing Weapons
All in all, under the best of circumstances, these employment patterns constitute a channel that helps smooth weapons purchase process. Under shadier circumstances, they degenerate into conduits for officers and arms dealers to exchange favors. Under the worst circumstances, they become a “free-for-all,” putting the cart before the horse: Defense contractors’ business interests take precedence over defense needs, a not uncommon practice in the military’s weapons purchase process. Before a service decides on a weapons system, it prepares an ROC (Required Operating Capabilities) that details capabilities that the service desires. Only after it completes the ROC does it begin to examine available weapons systems in order to choose the one that best satisfies the ROC. That is the process in theory. In reality, however, when a service of the army sets out to prepare its ROCs, the first thing it does, more often than not, is to acquire information on an overseas weapons system. Using that information, the service then makes up its ROC and ends up selecting the weapons system on which the ROC was based. And when the military obtains information from weapons importers, who monopolize technical data on foreign weapons systems, "there exists a possibility that weapons system selection is done not by analysis but by the arms agency's PR activities."It is a reality that many former officials, who had worked in [acquisition] related offices of the Ministry of National Defense or in a branch of the armed services, are employed by arms import agencies and exercise their direct or indirect influence over ROC, planning, and implementation.
Defense industries’ interests, under some circumstances, override pure security considerations in arms procurement decisions, as the following example of the K-1 upgrading project illustrates. After successfully developing the K-1 tank by 1988, the South Korean military began to upgrade it in the early 1990s. The “up-gunning” project, which included replacing the K-1’s 105 mm. gun with a 120 mm. gun, was initiated to deal with the T-72 tanks that North Korea was thought to be poised to acquire from Russia. The upgrading project was imperative, the MND argued, since the K-1 tank’s 105 mm. gun did not have enough firepower to penetrate the T-72’s thicker and stronger armor.
But by the mid-1990s, it became increasingly clear that Pyongyang was not acquiring T-72s and would be unable to purchase them. The country’s worsening economic situation was causing massive starvation, and Moscow was reluctant to sell the tanks to the North because it wanted to expand ties with the South. Ironically it was the South, not the North, that received Russia’s most sophisticated tanks, the T-80Us, in the mid-1990s. By the end of the decade, North Korea had not received a single T-72, and certainly no T-80s, and its tank stock consisted largely of 1950s models that the K-1’s 105 mm. guns could easily destroy. Nonetheless, the up-gunning project proceeded as if the absence of T-72s in the North’s arsenal did not matter. The up-gunning and upgrading of a K-1 to a K-1 A-1 was not driven so much by military need as by Hyundai Precision Industry, which faced the problem of idling its tank production facilities after completing its order of K-1 tanks. Building on this momentum, the army is slated to roll out an even newer model, K-2, in 2016 and round out the armor modernization with 950 K-2 PIP’s by 2020.
Another example of industry interests overriding security considerations was provided by Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil’s call in May 1999 for more funding to keep the F-16 fighter production lines "warm." The Korean Fighter Program (KFP) was scheduled to terminate at the end of 1999 when all of the planned 120 F-16s were to have been assembled, which would close down production lines. Defense contractors involved in the KFP, therefore, had an interest in getting more orders. The Aerospace Industry Development Policy Board, established in 1990 to guide policy for Korea's nascent aircraft industry, held its second meeting in April 1999 to discuss the Basic Development Plan for Aerospace Industry. The Ministry of National Defense was at loggerheads with the Ministry of Industry and Resources (MIR) over the plan. The MND, reflecting the air force's view, argued for termination of the KFP and an early start of the KTX project (a supersonic trainer production program), whereas the MIR, representing the interests of the aircraft consortium led by Samsung Avionics, advocated an extension of the KFP. In the end, the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Board sided with the MIR, reflecting the degree to which economic interests, born out of military considerations, were now overshadowing national-security concerns in weapons procurement decisions. As one anonymous air force officer told the Associated Press, "some cabinet ministers were mixing national defense with business interests."
The above cases illustrate the gray area between national security and economic interest. But there is an even less transparent sector of this military-industrial network that mixes weapons deals with side payments. William Hartung graphically details an aspect of this sector in his description of Northrop Grumman's failed attempt to sell F-20 Tigersharks to South Korea. Featuring a host of colorful characters—mob leader "Wheelchair" Kang, who was wheelchair-bound after a gang feud; "Pistol" Park, who was known for his "pistolmanship" and close friendship with Korea’s President Chun Doo-hwan; and Northrop's chairman and CEO, Tom Jones—the fiasco involved elaborate and illegal schemes to exchange millions of dollars for a contract. It is impossible to ascertain the extent of this dark sector, which spanned the Pacific and involved government officials, military officers, and businessmen. Suffice it to note that every major weapon purchase or production contract to date has been accompanied by charges of corruption. The magnitude of this corruption was reflected in the fact that Korea's force modernization effort begun in 1974 was so tainted with massive scandals that the Ministry of National Defense felt compelled to change the name from the Yulgok Program to the Force Improvement Program (FIP).
The usefulness of these explanations, however, is limited. The military and defense contractors in South Korea undoubtedly have a selfish interest to protect, if not promote, their own welfare, and they have taken advantage of the democratic opening to pursue their self-interest. But those with interests in keeping the defense budget as high as possible represent a small segment of the state and society involved in national security policy making. As of 2008, the eighty-nine companies designated as the “defense industry” registered total sales of 5.5 trillion won, only 7 percent of the total sales of the companies and less than 1 percent of Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP). Also, though the Ministry of National Defense is one of the largest bureaucratic bodies in the Korean government, only a small number of its officials handle acquisitions, and their narrow self-interest is counterbalanced by institutional monitoring and audit. Hence, while internal drivers may account for, or contribute to, individual cases, they fall short of explaining the overall size of the defense budget. Furthermore, democratization serves as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it creates an opening for private interests to influence government decision-making. But on the other hand, it makes the government more subject to competing demands and increasing oversight.
Alliance as a Supplement
Other scholars have elaborated on the baseline realist account to take into consideration the effect that a military alliance has on a country’s defense budget. Their studies usually note that an alliance has a dampening effect because it aggregates resources. Several scholars explain alliance formation in terms of the lowest cost choice between arms and alliance on the basis of the assumption that an alliance reduces one’s military cost by replacing at least some of one’s own defense expenditures.There are two ways to assess the contribution that a country makes to its ally’s defense, although neither is an easy or perfect measure. One can either calculate the resources allocated for the ally’s defense or, counterfactually, estimate the marginal increase in the resources that the ally would have to spend if it lost the country’s support. The former is better at counting tangibles such as the number of soldiers and weapons systems deployed in or for the ally, and aggregate them to calculate the total support the country gives to its ally. While it may be easier to count the tangibles, the intangible contributions that a country makes to its ally’s defense may be more important and expensive in some cases. Either way, the total defense contribution is seen as reducing the ally’s security burden by that amount.
Using the first yardstick, we may estimate the total sum that the United States expends to support South Korea’s defense. One rudimentary estimate would take the number of American soldiers stationed in Korea as an indicator of the proportional slice of the U.S. defense budget if indirect costs, such as expenses on strategic forces and R&D, can be assumed to proportionately support each soldier. According to one estimate, the combined U.S.-South Korea expenditure totaled about $12 billion in 1986. Since South Korea alone spent approximately $5 billion that year, Washington contributed about $7 billion worth of force. Others estimate that one third of the U.S. defense budget goes to its forces in Asia-Pacific and therefore, by extension, to what the United States would deploy in case of a contingency in Korea. If the cost is limited to the in-country expenses incurred by U.S. forces deployed in South Korea, however, the amount is a more limited $1.2 billion (as of 2004), the figure used by the allied governments to figure out Seoul’s “host nation support.”
Using the second, more indirect measure is more complicated for it involves counterfactual estimates. One needs to estimate the marginal increase in Seoul’s defense expenditure if the alliance were terminated. This in turn involves assessing two kinds of costs. First, if the alliance were terminated and the American military withdrawn, Korea would first have to fill the void with its own forces at its own cost. Some 40,000 American soldiers would have to be replaced with Koreans, and all the facilities manned by Americans would have to be managed by Koreans. These extra personnel would have to be paid, and the operating costs of the facilities would have to be borne by Seoul. This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance:
The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.
Second, if the alliance were terminated, it could potentially disrupt the flow of parts and materials, causing an incalculable disaster in equipment maintenance and production that might even compromise the ROK army's readiness. The work of many of Korea's defense contractors would grind to a halt as Korea failed to obtain necessary parts. Many U.S. contractors would lose customers. These secondary costs are difficult to estimate but are frequently used as a reason for maintaining the alliance. Typifying such justifications, Hwang Tong-Jun, Director of the Weapons Systems Research Center, has argued that, despite the need to diversify the sources of weapons imports, "we need to focus on our cooperation with the U.S., which has developed over the past 20 years and which has sustained weapons interoperability."
While there is no dispute about the contributions that the United States has made to Korea’s defense, it is analytically difficult to show that its contributions have produced a replacement effect, not only because its contributions serve U.S. strategic needs but also because Korea’s military spending grew even when Washington’s security commitment remained constant or grew. In the 1950s and 1960s, Washington provided economic and military assistance—especially so-called counterpart funding—not just as a supplement but also as an inducement for Seoul to raise the size of the military and defense budget. Even as President Richard Nixon withdrew one division from South Korea, he increased other types of defense assistance to compensate for the decrease in Korea’s defense readiness that might result from the force reduction. President Jimmy Carter threatened to cut U.S. aid if Seoul did not go along with his policy, but he ended up giving aid without any troop withdrawal. Through the 1970s, President Park Chung-hee, fearing American withdrawal, launched an ambitious program to build Korea’s independent military capability. But in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan made unqualified commitment to South Korea’s defense, President Chun Doo-hwan still went ahead with the military modernization program. In other words, South Korea kept beefing up its military regardless of the level of American support.
This, in turn, raises the question about the degree to which U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) needs to be replaced in order to maintain a strategic balance against the North Korean military. The Roh Moo-hyun government justified some of its new weapons development programs in terms of the need to substitute for the U.S. capabilities that would be withdrawn by 2012 when wartime operational control will be transferred to the ROKA, but it is at least questionable whether all of those capabilities need to be acquired by South Korea. For example, the Kumgang and Paektu Projects would, upon their completion, give the ROKA the ability to monitor North Korea’s military activities almost anywhere in the country. Given that the North Korean military has only rudimentary reconnaissance and surveillance capability, any additional high-tech surveillance systems to replace what the United States currently provides could potentially be overkill. The ROKA maintains such a high force-to-space ratio that even without the benefits of the high-tech systems, it could block any blitzkrieg attempt by the North. Thus, while the U.S. military adds to the South’s capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliance’s supplementary effect, therefore, will be smaller than it seems at first.
Alliance as a Driver
The Costs of Interoperability
While a military alliance as a tool of pulling security resources together reduces the defense burden for each ally, there are at least four reasons why an alliance may increase each member’s defense spending. First, the need to keep allied militaries interoperable generates pressure to allocate resources to meet the need for hardware, software, and human resources. Second, the political need to keep an ally happy can lead to a provision of military aid or to the sale or purchase of weapons or commercial goods. Third, a country may be persuaded to maintain a level of force by its fear of abandonment by its ally at a time of crisis. “Abandonment fears” lead the allies to invest in making their links as unbreakable as possible. Finally, a country may be dragged into a conflict in which its ally is involved. “Entrapment fears” reduce, if not counterbalance, the supplementary effect of the alliance to the extent that allies develop their capabilities independent of the alliance. Entrapment, of course, incurs direct costs of fighting as well as indirect costs of supporting the ally.It is not easy or cheap to keep modern allied militaries interoperable, for interoperability requirements lead to three types of durable and expensive investments. First, allies need, at a minimum, to be able to identify each other, so as to minimize friendly fire and to coordinate their exercises and operations. Their weapons systems and platforms must be designed and produced to ensure interoperability between the allies’ assets. With further military integration, they need to ensure that both can rely on each other’s ammunition and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants). Airports, ports, roads, and railroads may need be configured and maintained in order to enable an ally’s operation.
Second, the allied militaries need to customize the way allied militaries use equipment and manpower to achieve their joint objectives. The processes that require investment include consultation and coordination mechanisms, military planning, command structure, and the operation of combined forces and combined exercises. Alliance military practices are guided and governed by a host of rules, ranging from treaties and agreements to domestic laws and regulations, in addition to the standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement that apply to most military activities. This software infrastructure represents another set of expenditures that allies make to carry out alliance obligations.
Third, costs are incurred by the need to move human assets in teams or train them to work together. Allies make a durable investment in alliance personnel so that they “learn by doing” or “learn on the job” about their allied partners, as well as about the alliance-specific hardware and software infrastructure. Alliance practices typically involve training about allies, combined exercises, and exchange of officers. Allies also invest resources to educate soldiers about the history, culture, and politics of the ally as well as to teach at least some of them the ally’s language.
If the interoperability requirements lead to these three kinds of investment, which add to a country’s defense spending, allies also have political needs to meet. On the one hand, the wealthier ally bears the burden of helping out its ally by providing military or economic assistance that will enhance the ally’s strength. The more powerful ally may come under pressure to transfer weapons systems to an ally free of charge or at a “friendly” rate. These pressures were particularly strong during the cold war when the two superpowers competed with each other for allies. But even afterward, the strategic circumstances of, for instance, the global war on terrorism, have generated a need to invest in reconstructing the ally’s economy or military. On the other hand, the weaker of the two may purchase its ally’s weapons systems or other goods as a way to signal its commitment to the alliance or buy the ally’s interest. The powerful give what they can, and the weaker buy what they must, to paraphrase Thucydides.
Operating from Fear
These political needs are, in turn, grounded in the contradictory fears that plague alliances, and they diminish the supplementary effect on allies’ defense burden. The literature on military alliances notes that while alliances are designed to help the allies meet their partner’s security needs by sharing defense burdens, they face two kinds of fears that cannot be completely removed. On the one hand, a country fears that it might be abandoned by its allies precisely when its security is threatened, because its allies may judge it too costly to save it from the threat. On the other hand, a country worries that it might get dragged, by its alliance commitment, into a conflict in which its allies are embroiled, even if it does not want to get involved. The twin fears of abandonment and entrapment lead allies to take remedial action, adding to their military spending, although an action taken to allay one fear is bound to exacerbate the other: Tightening the alliance, or “chain-ganging,” reduces the abandonment fear at the risk of raising the entrapment fear, whereas loosening alliance commitments diminishes the danger of entrapment at the cost of a higher possibility of abandonment. These contradictory fears constitute a dilemma that leads allied partners to spend on security one way or another.Abandonment fear, which dampens one’s expectation of allied contributions, serves as a constant reminder that one must maintain at least a minimal ability to provide for one’s own security no matter how trustworthy the ally might currently be. Changes in domestic politics or international circumstances may alter the ally’s calculation tomorrow, and the ally will betray the alliance if the benefits of doing so outweigh those of honoring the commitment. A state’s predilection to shift its defense burden to an ally, therefore, is counterbalanced by its fear of abandonment.
Abandonment fear may do more than merely dampen the supplementary effect of an alliance. The more strongly a state fears abandonment, the more likely it is to explore ways to reduce the likelihood of abandonment. Such “chain-ganging” can take various forms. It can provide services that its ally desires, as for example when President Park dispatched two divisions of the Korean military to Vietnam to help out the United States. It may seek to influence the opinion of decision makers with economic assistance or purchase orders. It may even try lobbying as a last resort, as the Koreagate scandal revealed.
Entrapment fear itself may not directly increase defense spending unless an alliance is already so entrenched with a high level of interoperability that loosening the alliance involves undoing at least some of the interoperable features. But entrapment fear can lead to side payments if one’s “buck passing” deepens the other’s abandonment fear so much that the abandonment fear must be addressed, as, for example, when the Eisenhower administration agreed to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with President Syngman Rhee as a way to end its entrapment in the Korean War. President Nixon tried to reduce the U.S. defense burden and entrapment in Asia by withdrawing some forces from the region, but he ended up agreeing to increase military assistance to allay Seoul’s security concerns.
Entrapment itself can be highly costly, as Jefferson said when he warned the neophyte republic against “entanglement” in costly European wars. Despite the warning, the United States has been entrapped in its allies’ or friends’ wars at a great cost to itself. While President Park voluntarily dispatched the Korean military to Vietnam out of political and economic considerations, President Roh Moo-hyun came under pressure from the George W. Bush administration to contribute to the U.S. war in Iraq and later Afghanistan. In 1994, President Kim Young-sam found himself caught in the uncomfortable position of having to deal with the likelihood that the United States might use its military against North Korea’s nuclear facilities in Yongbyun.
States have used various measures to address the contradictory fears associated with alliances but have found no satisfactory solution that can allay both fears at the same time. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) pursued by the Bush administration is perhaps unique in simultaneously exacerbating both of these fears inherent in an alliance relationship, even though part of its goal was to allay them. The military transformation has sought to leverage new technological developments to maximize the mobility as well as the accuracy and lethality of the U.S. military. Its emphasis on mobility frees the forces from a fixed battle position and enables them to be rapidly deployed to distant places, making it possible to move U.S. bases out of inhospitable or potentially dangerous areas. While this may reduce American fears of entrapment, it increases their allies’ concerns about abandonment. At the same time, the newly acquired U.S. mobility, which may reduce American fears of abandonment, makes it potentially more likely that American allies can be involuntarily drawn into a conflict in which the United States is engaged, either because the U.S. military is deployed from allied bases or because U.S. forces are brought in from afar, dragging the ally into the conflict.
Not only does the military transformation shift the burden of the twin fears to allies, it also adds a new challenge to keep up with America’s transformation so that allied militaries might operate seamlessly together. As the U.S. military leapfrogs into a 21st-century high-tech force equipped with state-of-the-art weapons systems, its allied militaries come under pressure to follow suit or modernize their forces enough to maintain interoperability with the U.S. military. The U.S. military’s adoption of network-centric warfare and its emphasis on jointness drive allied militaries to train their forces about the new ways of fighting lest they have difficulties working with the new U.S. forces.
The MND’s Defense Reform 2020 Basic Plan notes that “the Korean military faces the requirement to transform into a futuristic force structure because of revolutionary changes in the war-fighting paradigm triggered by the development of information-science technology.” To effectively prepare for the future warfare, the MND is emphasizing the concepts of “jointness” and Network Centric Warfare, the very core concepts highlighted by the U.S. military transformation. A majority of force improvements envisioned by the Defense Reform 2020 are driven by these concepts. The Korean military is, for example, slated to acquire the following: satellites, airborne early warning control system, C4I, K series battle tanks, Aegis ships, F-15K/F-X fighters, aerial refueling aircraft, and precision guided missiles. These changes are driven by the agreement that Seoul’s and Washington’s militaries made in 2003: “the ROK will develop and transform its own military capabilities in reference to US military transformation.”
South Korea had a high level of entrapment fear when the Bush administration asked Seoul to contribute to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its fear was brought home when a Korean man, Kim Sŏnil, was kidnapped and executed in Iraq in 2004. But it was the military transformation and its attendant alliance transformation that created a serious debate about entrapment. As the U.S. military was being transformed into rapid deployment forces, some feared that the “strategic flexibility” adopted by the U.S.-ROK alliance could allow U.S. forces deployed in Korea to be deployed to other places, such as China, dragging South Korea into a conflict it did not desire.
At the same time, South Korea’s abandonment fear is increasing as the alliance goes through a transformation. Wartime operational control is scheduled to be returned to the ROKA by 2012, and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to be disbanded by the same time, according to the agreement signed in February 2007. The USFK is being moved away from frontline positions to rear areas—Osan and Daegu—while its overall size is shrinking. These changes are creating a fear among some Koreans, particularly conservatives, that Washington might abandon Korea at a time of crisis.
The twin fears of entrapment and abandonment are visible in the defense reform plan for 2020. On the one hand, in order to reduce entrapment fears, the MND emphasizes the need to develop an independent defense capability: “it is now more urgent than anytime before that we must develop our own capability to defend ourselves in order to ensure our survival.” To develop the capability, it is restructuring the ROKA’s command control system and acquiring the weapons systems necessary for the ROKA’s independent command control.
On the other hand, in order to address the abandonment fears, the ministry is working with the Pentagon to develop new coordinating mechanisms. It is also highlighting the need to make concentrated investments early on. Its urgent call for an “early harvest” in reality translates into acquiring existing U.S. weapons systems such as C4I systems, AWACS (airborne warning and control system), and theater operation command control systems, because of the interoperability built into the Korean military.
Also, the alliance produced pressure on Korea to emulate the trend in the ally’s weapons R&D, since the Korean army needed to ensure that its weapons systems and doctrines remained interoperable with those of its ally in the future. Korean weapons researchers and officers, therefore, constantly looked to their American counterparts to keep up with their research. Just as the RMA was driving military R&D in the United States in the 1990s, it was also starting to affect Korea's debate on the future of its arms industry. Specifically exploring Korea's possible response to the American debate on the RMA, No Hun and I Chae-Uk argued that "it is natural that the Korean military follows American trends in the RMA and uses them as a base to explore Korea’s own way of RMA." Weapons research was developing a life of its own, being driven more by its own needs or by developments in the ally’s weapons research than by the actual security environment.
Conclusion
In the end, South Korea’s defense expenditure is determined by a combination of all the factors discussed in this article. North Korea’s strategic threat remains the overwhelming rationale, although it alone cannot explain the South’s disproportionately high spending relative to that of the North. Domestic interests go a long way toward accounting for the decision to purchase weapons systems whose strategic utility, vis-à-vis the North Korean military, is dubious. The alliance produces countervailing effects on Seoul’s defense expenditure: It exerts a downward pressure by supplementing the ROKA, but it creates various interests that add to Seoul’s spending. While South Korea’s military expenditure probably represents the sum of these forces, the alliance figures prominently as a central factor that reflects the overall size of Seoul’s military spending and the shape of its military transformation.Furthermore, it is notable that the alliance’s effects are expansionary in recent years. First, Seoul bears some of the direct and indirect cost of keeping U.S. forces in Korea, and its share of the burden has gone up in recent years. It has provided land, facilities, and services, as well as tax breaks, an indirect cost that amounted to $773 million in 2000 alone. Beginning in 1991 when it signed the Special Measures Agreement, South Korea has increased its share of the direct cost from 107.3 billion won to 741.5 billion won in 2008. If one adds the cost to relocate the USFK headquarters at Yongsan and consolidate other U.S. bases in Osan, Seoul’s total burden quickly increases. As Seoul’s capability grows, so does its contribution to the alliance cost. Furthermore, Washington’s expenses go up even as Seoul’s share of in-country costs increases because the U.S. military is going through an expensive transformation. Because the size of the alliance pie grows as a result, neither ally’s increased contribution replaces or reduces the other’s burden.
Second, not only is the size of the alliance pie expanding; the alliance’s area of operation is growing. As early as 2000, the two allies agreed that “the alliance will serve to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the Korean peninsula.” They have since extended their bilateral logistical support to a global level so that South Korea’s military might provide logistical support to U.S. forces operating, for example, in Central Asia. They have also agreed to the “strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces based in South Korea,” opening the door to the possibility that American forces could be projected from South Korea to anywhere outside the peninsula. The expansion has furthermore gotten the Korean military involved in such far-flung conflicts as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
Finally, Seoul’s military spending expands at least partly to acquire capabilities necessary for out-of-area operations. The Force Improvement Plan (FIP), originally conceived to expand South Korean military capability in response to the perceived superiority of the North, in recent years has reflected a "strategic vision" that looks beyond the North-South rivalry to plan for an eventually unified Korea's regional role. Reflecting such a vision, the Ministry of National Defense is making efforts to develop a more “balanced” force, with increased emphasis on maritime and air capabilities that would find limited application in an intra-Korean conflict. The navy is acquiring a blue sea capability, while the air force is being equipped with longer-range aircraft and aerial refueling planes. While it is at least debatable that Korea has an immediate need to prepare for an eventual conflict with Japan or China, it is notable that Seoul's strategic vision requires mostly U.S. weapons systems. The MND favors American missiles, the air force is purchasing American F-15Ks, the army is repeating the U.S. argument about the “military transformation,” and the navy is operating American-style Aegis-class destroyers. The ROKA is forging ahead toward “network-centric warfare.” So the alliance looms large even as South Korea busily prepares for strategic uncertainty in the region.
This essay was originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer and in FPIF
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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South Japan Declares Emergency Over Foot-And-Mouth Disease
(KUNA) -- The Governor of Miyazaki Prefecture, southern Japan, on Tuesday declared a state of emergency in the prefecture as an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease spreads in the region.
"We are facing the risk that the disease could spread across Japan," Miyazaki Governor Hideo Higashikokubaru told a news conference, saying his prefecture has failed to stop the disease from spreading.
"We would like to ask residents living in the affected areas to refrain from going outside unless necessary," Higashikokubaru said.
He also urged residents in Miyazaki to delay social events and business meetings even outside the affected areas.
As of Tuesday, cows, pigs and other livestock at 126 farms and facilities in Miyazaki Prefecture are suspected of having been infected with the disease since April 20, with a total of more than 114,000 animals subject to slaughter, according to the prefecture.
In Tokyo, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said, "The government will have to be united in working to avert further expansion of the infection."
"There may have been certain problems as regards having done everything we could to prevent the spread of the disease," Hatoyama told reporters, admitting that it was slow to detect an outbreak in Miyazaki.
The government on Monday set up a task force to deal with the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among livestock in the prefecture. The task force decided to expand areas in the prefecture to be disinfected and to send Self-Defense Force personnel to help with the work.
Foot-and-mouth disease, also called "hoof-and-mouth" disease, is highly contagious and fatal to cattle and pigs, but rarely to humans. The cull is more than 100 times larger than during Japan's last outbreak in 2000, when 740 animals were killed.
"We are facing the risk that the disease could spread across Japan," Miyazaki Governor Hideo Higashikokubaru told a news conference, saying his prefecture has failed to stop the disease from spreading.
"We would like to ask residents living in the affected areas to refrain from going outside unless necessary," Higashikokubaru said.
He also urged residents in Miyazaki to delay social events and business meetings even outside the affected areas.
As of Tuesday, cows, pigs and other livestock at 126 farms and facilities in Miyazaki Prefecture are suspected of having been infected with the disease since April 20, with a total of more than 114,000 animals subject to slaughter, according to the prefecture.
In Tokyo, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said, "The government will have to be united in working to avert further expansion of the infection."
"There may have been certain problems as regards having done everything we could to prevent the spread of the disease," Hatoyama told reporters, admitting that it was slow to detect an outbreak in Miyazaki.
The government on Monday set up a task force to deal with the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among livestock in the prefecture. The task force decided to expand areas in the prefecture to be disinfected and to send Self-Defense Force personnel to help with the work.
Foot-and-mouth disease, also called "hoof-and-mouth" disease, is highly contagious and fatal to cattle and pigs, but rarely to humans. The cull is more than 100 times larger than during Japan's last outbreak in 2000, when 740 animals were killed.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Japan's Central Bank Resumes Dollar Supply Operation
(KUNA) -- Japan's central bank on Tuesday resumed a dollar fund-supplying market operation as part of concerted efforts with other major central banks worldwide to increase market liquidity amid ongoing worries about the European sovereign debt crisis.
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) accepted all the bids it received from commercial financial institutions for a total of USD 210 million in dollar-denominated loans.
The BOJ will offer the loans for 84 days from May 20 to August 12 at a fixed interest rate of 1.24 percent against pooled collateral.
The BOJ decided on May 10 to revive a US dollar swap agreement with the US Federal Reserve as major central banks work closely together to ease tensions in global financial markets.
The Fed launched a similar program after the global financial meltdown following the bankruptcy of US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008.
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) accepted all the bids it received from commercial financial institutions for a total of USD 210 million in dollar-denominated loans.
The BOJ will offer the loans for 84 days from May 20 to August 12 at a fixed interest rate of 1.24 percent against pooled collateral.
The BOJ decided on May 10 to revive a US dollar swap agreement with the US Federal Reserve as major central banks work closely together to ease tensions in global financial markets.
The Fed launched a similar program after the global financial meltdown following the bankruptcy of US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Euro Hits 4-Year Low Against Dollar In Tokyo
(KUNA) -- The euro plunged to a four-year low against the dollar on Monday in Tokyo on mounting concerns that Europe's debt problems would negatively affect a recovery in the euro zone area.
At one point in the morning, the euro touched USD 1.2234, the lowest level in Tokyo since April 18, 2006.
The single European currency also fell sharply against the yen.
The dollar traded at JPY 92.09-12 versus JPY 92.40-50 in New York and JPY 92.72-75 in Tokyo late Friday
At one point in the morning, the euro touched USD 1.2234, the lowest level in Tokyo since April 18, 2006.
The single European currency also fell sharply against the yen.
The dollar traded at JPY 92.09-12 versus JPY 92.40-50 in New York and JPY 92.72-75 in Tokyo late Friday
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Japanese Suicides Top 30,000 For 12th Year In 2009
(KUNA) -- The number of people who committed suicide in Japan last year stood at 32,845, topping 30,000 for the 12th year in a row, with more people killing themselves due to depression and economic hardships, the National Police Agency (NPA) announced Thursday.
The number of suicides in 2009 increased 1.85 percent from the year before, and the figure was also the fifth-highest since 1978, when statistics were first compiled, the NPA said.
The suicide rate was the highest among those in their 50s and 60s, followed by those in their 60s and 40s, the survey showed. Men accounted for 71.5 percent of the total cases.
Of the total, 8,377 people killed themselves due to economic hardship, up 13.1 percent from the year before, and 1,071 people killed themselves after losing their job, marking a 65 percent increase.
Those who committed suicide due to hardships in life also surged 34.3 percent to 1,731. Depression remained one of the biggest reasons for the third consecutive year, up 7.1 percent from the previous year to 6,949.
According to World Health Organization (WHO), Japan has the second-highest suicide rate after Russia among the Group of Eight (G8) leading industrialized nations.
Japan's jobless rate hit a record high of 5.7 percent in July 2009 as the world's second-biggest economy was in severe recession.
Earlier this year, the government has set up an emergency task force to address the high suicide numbers.
The number of suicides in 2009 increased 1.85 percent from the year before, and the figure was also the fifth-highest since 1978, when statistics were first compiled, the NPA said.
The suicide rate was the highest among those in their 50s and 60s, followed by those in their 60s and 40s, the survey showed. Men accounted for 71.5 percent of the total cases.
Of the total, 8,377 people killed themselves due to economic hardship, up 13.1 percent from the year before, and 1,071 people killed themselves after losing their job, marking a 65 percent increase.
Those who committed suicide due to hardships in life also surged 34.3 percent to 1,731. Depression remained one of the biggest reasons for the third consecutive year, up 7.1 percent from the previous year to 6,949.
According to World Health Organization (WHO), Japan has the second-highest suicide rate after Russia among the Group of Eight (G8) leading industrialized nations.
Japan's jobless rate hit a record high of 5.7 percent in July 2009 as the world's second-biggest economy was in severe recession.
Earlier this year, the government has set up an emergency task force to address the high suicide numbers.
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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