Obama Admits Mistakes In US Mideast Policy
US President Barack Obama conceded he had made some mistakes in his administration's approach to the Middle East as he discussed with Jewish Congress members his relations with Israel and strategies to counter the perception that he is not pro-Israel, according to a report from Jordan's Petra state news agency.
"Dealing with the Middle East is like walking in a landmine", Obama told the White House meeting with 37 of the over 40 Jewish members in both Houses of Congress on Tuesday evening, according to Petra, which added that Obama spoke about "new" relations between the US and Israel, referring to some trouble in the way messages had been conveyed between Washington and Tel Aviv.
A White House statement said the conversation included an update on "proximity" talks and administration efforts to strengthen Israel's security, including the administration's recent decision to provide Israel with an additional $205 million in funding for the Iron Dome missile defense system.
The Petra article said that Obama assured the lawmakers, among them some of Obama's toughest critics in the wake of tensions in March between Israel and the United States over settlement building, that he had asked congress to allocate the funding for the missile project.
"Dealing with the Middle East is like walking in a landmine", Obama told the White House meeting with 37 of the over 40 Jewish members in both Houses of Congress on Tuesday evening, according to Petra, which added that Obama spoke about "new" relations between the US and Israel, referring to some trouble in the way messages had been conveyed between Washington and Tel Aviv.
A White House statement said the conversation included an update on "proximity" talks and administration efforts to strengthen Israel's security, including the administration's recent decision to provide Israel with an additional $205 million in funding for the Iron Dome missile defense system.
The Petra article said that Obama assured the lawmakers, among them some of Obama's toughest critics in the wake of tensions in March between Israel and the United States over settlement building, that he had asked congress to allocate the funding for the missile project.
Thursday, May 20, 2010 |
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Breathing New Life Into The Union For The Mediterranean
The second summit of the Union for the Mediterranean being held in Barcelona on 7 June is taking place in difficult circumstances but MEPs are demanding that the process be given a fresh boost in the form of extra funding. Only in this way can it achieve its goals of bringing countries in the region closer together.
The fresh impetus needed by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will require a historic commitment by heads of state and government to provide adequate funding for major projects and consolidate the institutions underpinning the process, says a resolution drafted by Vincent Peillon (S&D, FR) and adopted by show of hands on Thursday. The UfM has undergone a period of political stagnation since the Gaza conflict of December 2008, even though meetings of ministers and senior officials resumed in September 2009.
A major part of the UfM's new projects must be devoted to teaching, school and university exchanges and research, including upgrading the Erasmus Mundus programmes for the Mediterranean and the creation of a Mediterranean "Erasmus Junior", to expand educational exchanges between the Member States of the UfM, believe MEPs.
The UfM, launched in July 2008 in Paris, was intended to revitalise the Barcelona process by structuring cooperation with the Mediterranean countries around six major projects (civil protection, maritime and land highways, de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, a Mediterranean solar energy plan, the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative and a Euromediterranean university) and envisaging the creation of a permanent secretariat from the beginning of March 2010.
Adequate funding
Today's resolution proposes that the secretariat be given increased funding to enable it to function properly. The secretariat, headed by the Jordanian Ahmed Maas'deh, with six deputy secretaries-general, of whom one will be an Israeli and one a Palestinian, will have to breathe new life into a process which is currently stagnating. The secretariat will have to liaise with the European Commission and in particular EuropeAid and the EIB, a major funder of the UfM.
In the longer term, MEPs want to see a considerable increase in the resources for the UfM in the EU's next long-term budgetary plans, for 2014-2020. The resolution also proposes the creation of a Euromediterranean investment and development bank.
Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of the UfM
MEPs also believe that the institutional architecture of the UfM will not be complete without parliamentary scrutiny of the process, which should be devolved to the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA).
The fresh impetus needed by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will require a historic commitment by heads of state and government to provide adequate funding for major projects and consolidate the institutions underpinning the process, says a resolution drafted by Vincent Peillon (S&D, FR) and adopted by show of hands on Thursday. The UfM has undergone a period of political stagnation since the Gaza conflict of December 2008, even though meetings of ministers and senior officials resumed in September 2009.
A major part of the UfM's new projects must be devoted to teaching, school and university exchanges and research, including upgrading the Erasmus Mundus programmes for the Mediterranean and the creation of a Mediterranean "Erasmus Junior", to expand educational exchanges between the Member States of the UfM, believe MEPs.
The UfM, launched in July 2008 in Paris, was intended to revitalise the Barcelona process by structuring cooperation with the Mediterranean countries around six major projects (civil protection, maritime and land highways, de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, a Mediterranean solar energy plan, the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative and a Euromediterranean university) and envisaging the creation of a permanent secretariat from the beginning of March 2010.
Adequate funding
Today's resolution proposes that the secretariat be given increased funding to enable it to function properly. The secretariat, headed by the Jordanian Ahmed Maas'deh, with six deputy secretaries-general, of whom one will be an Israeli and one a Palestinian, will have to breathe new life into a process which is currently stagnating. The secretariat will have to liaise with the European Commission and in particular EuropeAid and the EIB, a major funder of the UfM.
In the longer term, MEPs want to see a considerable increase in the resources for the UfM in the EU's next long-term budgetary plans, for 2014-2020. The resolution also proposes the creation of a Euromediterranean investment and development bank.
Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of the UfM
MEPs also believe that the institutional architecture of the UfM will not be complete without parliamentary scrutiny of the process, which should be devolved to the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA).
Thursday, May 20, 2010 |
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IAEA To Discuss Israel's Nuclear Capabilities For First Time
Israeli nuclear capabilities are on the provisional agenda for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) June 7 meeting, reports Middle East press.
Israel's secretive nuclear activities may undergo unprecedented scrutiny next month, with a key meeting of the IAEA set to focus on the topic for the first time, according to documents shared Friday with the Associated Press, as cited by Petra.
IAEA lists Israeli nuclear capabilities as the eighth item on its agenda, which is the first time that the agency's decision-making body is being asked to deal with the issue in its 52 years of existence, Petra noted.
Petra added that "The agenda can still undergo changes in the month before the start of the meeting, and drop the 8th item if the US and other Israeli allies mount strong opposition, the documents noted."
That said, Petra noted that "Even if the item will be dropped from the final agenda, however its inclusion in the May 7 draft reflects a significant success of Islamic states concern over the Jewish state unrevealed nuclear arsenal said the documents."
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970 facilitates the member states to acquire nuclear energy in return of a pledge not to develop nuclear weapons.
Israel's secretive nuclear activities may undergo unprecedented scrutiny next month, with a key meeting of the IAEA set to focus on the topic for the first time, according to documents shared Friday with the Associated Press, as cited by Petra.
IAEA lists Israeli nuclear capabilities as the eighth item on its agenda, which is the first time that the agency's decision-making body is being asked to deal with the issue in its 52 years of existence, Petra noted.
Petra added that "The agenda can still undergo changes in the month before the start of the meeting, and drop the 8th item if the US and other Israeli allies mount strong opposition, the documents noted."
That said, Petra noted that "Even if the item will be dropped from the final agenda, however its inclusion in the May 7 draft reflects a significant success of Islamic states concern over the Jewish state unrevealed nuclear arsenal said the documents."
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970 facilitates the member states to acquire nuclear energy in return of a pledge not to develop nuclear weapons.
Sunday, May 09, 2010 |
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Environmentalists Issue Stark Warning On River Jordan
Two recent reports by a coalition of Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian environmentalists paint a grim picture of the state of the River Jordan, and urge swift action.
"If immediate action is not taken the River Jordan will run dry by 2011," Baha Afaneh, Jordanian coordinator for the Jordan River Project of Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME), said at a conference in Amman on 3-4 May.
According to a FOEME report, the once mighty river is now barely a trickle, fed by saline water and sewage from Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA).
"Israel has diverted saline water from springs into the river. Today some 20,000 million cubic metres [of saline water] flow into the river annually,'' said Gideon Bromberg, the Israeli director of FOEME.
Some three million cubic metres of untreated sewage per year pours into the river from Beit Shea'an Municipality in Israel, despite the fact that Israel is considered a leading country in the region in terms of sewage treatment, Bromberg said.
According to FOEME, if 400 million cubic metres of fresh water (a third of the historic flow) is not allowed to flow into the river annually, its days are numbered.
Israel diverts the highest amount from the river, 46.47 percent, Syria draws 25.24 percent, Jordan 23.24 percent, and the PA only 5.05 percent. The report said the PA must receive its fair share.
Israel must allow fresh water into the river, while Jordan and the PA need to develop a master plan enabling the inhabitants of the Jordan valley to once again use the river for tourism and agriculture, the report said.
In the last 50 years, the River Jordan's annual flow has dropped from more than 1.3 billion cubic metres per year to less than 100 million. With Israel, Jordan and Syria each grabbing as much clean water as they can, it is ironically the sewage that is keeping the river alive today, according to FOEME.
The second report identifies over a billion cubic metres of water that could be saved if appropriate economies were introduced in Israel, Jordan and even the PA.
"In the middle of the desert we continue to flush our toilets with fresh water rather than using grey water or even better - waterless toilets; and we grow tropical fruit for export. We can do much better in reducing water loss and we need to treat and reuse all of the sewage water that we produce," Bromberg said in a statement.
Source: IRIN
"If immediate action is not taken the River Jordan will run dry by 2011," Baha Afaneh, Jordanian coordinator for the Jordan River Project of Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME), said at a conference in Amman on 3-4 May.
According to a FOEME report, the once mighty river is now barely a trickle, fed by saline water and sewage from Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA).
"Israel has diverted saline water from springs into the river. Today some 20,000 million cubic metres [of saline water] flow into the river annually,'' said Gideon Bromberg, the Israeli director of FOEME.
Some three million cubic metres of untreated sewage per year pours into the river from Beit Shea'an Municipality in Israel, despite the fact that Israel is considered a leading country in the region in terms of sewage treatment, Bromberg said.
According to FOEME, if 400 million cubic metres of fresh water (a third of the historic flow) is not allowed to flow into the river annually, its days are numbered.
Israel diverts the highest amount from the river, 46.47 percent, Syria draws 25.24 percent, Jordan 23.24 percent, and the PA only 5.05 percent. The report said the PA must receive its fair share.
Israel must allow fresh water into the river, while Jordan and the PA need to develop a master plan enabling the inhabitants of the Jordan valley to once again use the river for tourism and agriculture, the report said.
In the last 50 years, the River Jordan's annual flow has dropped from more than 1.3 billion cubic metres per year to less than 100 million. With Israel, Jordan and Syria each grabbing as much clean water as they can, it is ironically the sewage that is keeping the river alive today, according to FOEME.
The second report identifies over a billion cubic metres of water that could be saved if appropriate economies were introduced in Israel, Jordan and even the PA.
"In the middle of the desert we continue to flush our toilets with fresh water rather than using grey water or even better - waterless toilets; and we grow tropical fruit for export. We can do much better in reducing water loss and we need to treat and reuse all of the sewage water that we produce," Bromberg said in a statement.
Source: IRIN
Thursday, May 06, 2010 |
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Palestinians To Decide On Indirect Talks With Israel On Saturday
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has confirmed that the PLO Executive Committee will convene on Saturday and say "its final word" on the planned indirect peace talks with Israel.
"After that, we will inform [the U.S. Mideast envoy George] Mitchell whether we are ready to start the negotiations," he said in a statement after a meeting with Jordan's King Abdullah II on Wednesday.
Palestinians insist that the main disagreements must be discussed during the so-called proximity talks - control of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders and Israel's West Bank settlements.
George Mitchell met for three hours with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday to launch the talks and is due to see Abbas on Friday.
Last Saturday, the foreign ministers of Arab countries promoting the Palestinian-Israeli settlement initiative supported the resumption of indirect talks under U.S. mediation.
Israeli-Palestinian direct peace talks came to a halt in December 2008, when Israel launched an attack on the Gaza Strip in a bid to put an end to the firing of homemade rockets at southern Israel by Palestinian militants based in the enclave. The conflict left 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead.
Palestinians have so far cited ongoing Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, both occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as a main obstacle to the peace process.
Source: RIA Novosti
"After that, we will inform [the U.S. Mideast envoy George] Mitchell whether we are ready to start the negotiations," he said in a statement after a meeting with Jordan's King Abdullah II on Wednesday.
Palestinians insist that the main disagreements must be discussed during the so-called proximity talks - control of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders and Israel's West Bank settlements.
George Mitchell met for three hours with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday to launch the talks and is due to see Abbas on Friday.
Last Saturday, the foreign ministers of Arab countries promoting the Palestinian-Israeli settlement initiative supported the resumption of indirect talks under U.S. mediation.
Israeli-Palestinian direct peace talks came to a halt in December 2008, when Israel launched an attack on the Gaza Strip in a bid to put an end to the firing of homemade rockets at southern Israel by Palestinian militants based in the enclave. The conflict left 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead.
Palestinians have so far cited ongoing Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, both occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as a main obstacle to the peace process.
Source: RIA Novosti
Thursday, May 06, 2010 |
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Current Issues In U.S.-Jordanian Relations
Finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the utmost priority of the Jordanian government.
Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999) ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and Jordan’s support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War which isolated it from the West.38
Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,39 and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the continuation of conflict continues to be a major obstacle to Jordan’s development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the pre-1967 borders of Israel. There are an estimated 1.9 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement.40 Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin descent and rely politically on the support of East Bank tribal families, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a matter of political survival since the government cannot afford to ignore an issue of critical importance to a majority of its citizens. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the “Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the political status quo in Jordan. Like his father before him, King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”
Opposition to Normalization
King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and professional organizations. Among many mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far. Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with Israel, and activists among them have compiled “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and companies that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists, but courts have upheld their right to publish them. In addition, IAF parliamentarians periodically propose legislation to prohibit cooperation with Israel in various sectors. The IAF also has proposed legislation to abrogate Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
Reviving the Arab-Israeli Peace Process
For nearly a decade, King Abdullah II has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and Congress to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. King Abdullah II is a strong supporter of a Saudi initiative, dubbed the “Arab Peace Initiative,” which calls for Israel’s full withdrawal from all occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in exchange for full normalization of relations with all Arab states in the region. In a March 2007 address to a joint session of Congress, King Abdullah II pleaded for U.S. leadership in the peace process, which he called the “core issue in the Middle East.” He suggested that the Arab Peace Initiative is a path to achieve a collective peace treaty. Jordanian officials also have repeatedly condemned Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank, especially in Jerusalem, claiming that they violate international law and heighten tensions in the region.
King Abdullah II supported the convening of the U.S.-sponsored peace conference in Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007, and he has encouraged the United States to push for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over core issues (status of Jerusalem, refugees, and borders). He has warned repeatedly that, without a settlement to the conflict, armed Islamist movements like Hamas and Hezbollah will grow in strength and radicalize Jordan’s own Islamist movements. According to King Abdullah II:
Jordan-Hamas Relations
For two decades, Jordan has had an on-again, off-again relationship with Hamas, the Palestinian militant group and U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Throughout the 1990s, the late King Hussein tolerated a Hamas presence in his kingdom.42 Upon his accession to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II, perhaps realizing that Jordan’s relationship with Hamas was a political liability, reversed his late father’s longstanding policy of tolerating Hamas and closed its Jordan offices permanently.
Since then, Jordan has been a strong backer of Palestinian moderates (such as the Fatah party) loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas and has been determined to bolster the capacity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank in order to prevent Hamas from gaining strength there. Jordan has provided training for several battalions of U.S.-screened Palestinian recruits to serve in an overhauled Palestinian Authority National Security Force.43 The training is conducted by Jordanian police at the Jordanian International Police Training Center near Amman.
Toward the end of 2008, perhaps in order to hedge against the prospect of yet another round of failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, Jordan opened a dialogue with Hamas officials. Led by General Muhammad Dahabi, Jordan reportedly discussed “political and security issues” with their Hamas counterparts (Muhammad Nazzal). Most analysts interpreted this limited engagement as a pragmatic Jordanian maneuver designed to open channels of communication with an emboldened Hamas now in firm control of the Gaza Strip. Jordan may have sought a pledge from Hamas not to interfere in Jordanian domestic politics. According to one observer, “Hamas wants to talk with Jordan and Jordan wants to listen to what Hamas has to say. And it is in Jordan’s interest today to communicate with all and sundry—north, south, east, and west, without changing the underlying fundamentals of its policies, instead of concentrating on an alliance with only two states, the United States and Israel.”44
Since the 2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian Authority legislative elections, the Jordanian government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of its citizenry sympathizes with Hamas and Jordan’s own Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), reportedly maintains close ties to Hamas. The IAF has been careful to downplay these ties and, in August 2009, three high ranking moderate Brotherhood figures resigned from the group’s leadership bureau in protest over Hamas-Jordanian Brotherhood ties. According to one IAF statement, “Abbas is the legitimate Palestinian president and Hamas’s battle should be with the Zionist enemy, not other Palestinians, so we ask them to return to a policy of dialogue and to restore the institutions in Gaza.”45 Some critics of King Abdullah II assert that the Hamas threat to Jordan is a specter used by the royal family to consolidate its rule and repress potential opposition.
The 2008-2009 Israel-Hamas War in Gaza
The Jordanian public and some government officials were extremely critical of Israel’s 2008-2009 military operations against Hamas (Operation Cast Lead) in the Gaza Strip. During the month-long war, hundreds of protests broke out across the country. Most public demonstrations were small in size, but in early January 2009, the Muslim Brotherhood organized an estimated 50,000-person rally at an Amman sports complex. During the event, Dr. Hamam Said, the Brotherhood’s new general guide, stated that the rally’s large size indicated that “this is a vote on the peace treaty with Israel,” as protesters chanted, “no Israeli embassy on Jordanian land.”46 Media coverage focused largely on the Palestinian humanitarian dimension of the conflict. Some protesters tried to approach the Israeli Embassy in Amman but were met by riot police and were dispersed without any major incident.47
At the official level, some Jordanian lawmakers burnt an Israeli flag during a parliamentary session. Lawmakers set the flag aflame inside the lower house chamber during a special session of parliament dedicated to the Gaza war. Other parliamentarians called on the king to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and expel its ambassador. Some members of Jordan’s professional associations also held a demonstration where they burnt Israeli and American consumer products.
At a press conference in Egypt following a January cease-fire, King Abdullah II reiterated the need for a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stating that “If we do not take action towards a permanent solution based on the two-state solution, the world leaders will find themselves once again forced to convene to address a new Israeli aggression on the Palestinians.”48 The King also reportedly dismissed the director of the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) General Muhammad Dahabi during the war, perhaps as an indication that the kingdom would not be further strengthening its relations with Hamas. As noted above, General Dahabi had conducted talks with Hamas leaders just months before the war. At the height of the conflict, some experts feared that the war in Gaza would destabilize moderate Arab governments like Egypt and Jordan which have respective peace treaties with Israel.
Because Jordan has a high percentage of citizens of Palestinian origin, any outbreak in Israeli-Palestinian violence is typically accompanied by speculation over Jordan’s (and the monarchy’s) stability. Nevertheless, though public anger ran high during the war, authorities managed to prevent any large-scale outbreak in violence. In Jordan, the right to assemble and hold demonstrations requires a government permit, and though many spontaneous protests broke out during the war, most Jordanians kept within the bounds of permitted political activity.
The Road Ahead
Jordan’s pro-peace regional foreign policy may continue to face obstacles in the months and years ahead due to the domestic political situation amongst Israelis and Palestinians respectively. Some Jordanians fear that the largely right wing Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will table Israeli-Palestinian peace talks indefinitely. Meanwhile, the lack of a Palestinian unity government also will continue to stall progress on peace talks as many countries refuse to deal with Hamas until it renounces violence and recognizes Israel. Senator George J. Mitchell, the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, travels regularly to the region for consultations.
In May 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Jordan where King Abdullah II reportedly asked his counterpart declare Israel’s commitment to a two-state solution and acceptance of the Arab peace initiative. That same month, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) debated a bill to make Jordan the official homeland for Palestinians now living in the West Bank.
According to one Jordanian lawmaker, “It has done big damage.... Even if it’s not passed, when 53 members of the parliament [Knesset] accept this law in the first reading, this is very important. We can't think it’s just for show; it’s the real thinking of the Israeli parliament and they represent the people.”
In October 2009, King Abdullah II expressed dismay over a perceived lack of Administration focus on the Middle East peace process. In an interview with Italian daily La Repubblica, King Abdullah II said, “I've heard people in Washington talking about Iran, again Iran, always Iran....But I insist on, and keep insisting on the Palestinian question: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most serious threat to the stability of the region and the Mediterranean.”
Iraq
Jordan’s relations with Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era were strong. In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed military action against Iraq, but it informally and quietly provided logistical support to the U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein. Since 2003, Jordanians have repeatedly criticized what they perceive to be the political marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. Unlike Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan has a limited ability to intervene in Iraq’s affairs at present, and, since 2003, Jordanian leaders have been far more concerned with Iraq’s influence on the kingdom’s own politics, trade, and internal security.
In 2008, as the situation in Iraq stabilized, Jordan moved to normalize its relations with the predominately Shiite Iraqi government. In August 2008, perhaps as a response to U.S. demands that Arab states end their isolation of Iraq, King Abdullah II became the first Arab leader to visit Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. Earlier in the year, Jordan announced that it had appointed an ambassador to Baghdad, the first nation to do so since all Arab governments withdrew their ambassadors after the 2005 kidnapping and murder of Egypt’s former envoy.49
Prospects for Improved Relations
At the official level, government-to-government relations between Jordan and Iraq are likely to improve as long as Iraq remains stable and relatively free of sectarian bloodshed. Nevertheless, Jordan’s Sunni tribal Arab elite had strong ties to the Saddam Hussein regime, and few analysts expect Jordan-Iraqi relations to revert back to earlier times. In the months and years ahead, both sides will have to tackle the Iraqi refugee issue, energy deals, border security, and, most importantly, their relationship with Iran. Jordan, like other Sunni Arab states, is suspicious of Iranian intentions in the region.
Oil
Jordan has consistently sought to reap tangible benefits from relations with its larger, oil-rich neighbor. During the Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq provided nearly all of Jordan’s domestic oil needs, half of it free of charge.50 After the U.S. invasion in 2003 and until 2008, Jordan was forced to receive or purchase its oil elsewhere, as its relationship with a fledgling, Shiite dominated Iraqi government in the throes of an insurgency and civil war hindered the normalization of bilateral ties. The two sides did reach a tentative oil deal in August 2006; however, security and logistical concerns prevented the resumption of oil shipments.
After years of delay, Iraqi crude oil shipments began arriving in Jordan in September 2008. Under the original terms of their agreement, Jordan was to receive approximately 10,000 barrels of oil per day (roughly 10% of their daily consumption) from Iraq, at a price between $10-$18 per barrel. This quantity would increase to 30,000 barrels at a later stage, based on the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries. Due to spiraling global oil prices, Iraq revised the agreement in 2008 to provide crude oil to Jordan at $22 per barrel—still a substantial discount from the international market price for Brent crude oil. Jordan and Iraq had discussed the construction of a pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba but cost projections have scuttled this proposal. Reportedly, the Jordanian government is now seeking international financing for the construction of a 600-mile railroad system to ferry Iraqi crude oil directly to Jordan’s sole refinery in the industrial town of Zarqa.51
Iraqi Refugees in Jordan
With over half of Jordan’s population claiming Palestinian descent, the kingdom has coped with refugee issues for decades. Nevertheless, the estimated 400,000-500,000 Iraqis living in Jordan have not been welcomed by the government and face difficult day-to-day circumstances there.
For a small, relatively poor country such as Jordan, the Iraqi influx is creating profound changes in Jordan’s economy and society. Since 2003, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees into greater Amman has caused housing shortages and led to rising rents and real estate prices. By some accounts, Amman is now one of the most expensive Arab capital cities in the region. Inflation has soared, creating hardships for middle class Jordanians of all backgrounds. In early 2007, Jordan sealed its borders and has since tried to stop any further inflow of Iraqis into the capital Amman and its environs.
In addition to concerns over absorbing more Iraqis, the Jordanian government may be treating the steady inflow of Iraqi refugees as a national security issue. Jordanian authorities have imposed restrictions on young Iraqi males to prevent their entering the country in response to security concerns. The Jordanian government classifies displaced Iraqis living in Jordan as “visitors” or “guests,” not refugees, as Jordan does not have a domestic refugee law, nor is it a party to the 1951 UN refugees’ convention.52 Iraqis who are able to deposit $150,000 in Amman banks are granted residency almost instantly, while the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan have become illegal aliens due to the expiration of their visitor visas.53 Jordan’s positive relationships with Western donor countries and international organizations have enabled it to receive some outside assistance for coping with its large Iraqi refugee population.
The FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28) provided $45 million to Jordan for assistance to Iraqi refugees and an additional $10.3 million in economic assistance for Jordanian communities hosting large refugee populations. P.L. 110-161, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, also provided bilateral aid to Jordan to be used to address social and economic development needs, including for Iraqis seeking refuge in Jordan. P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, also specified up to $175 million in economic aid for Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees. In the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-32, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY2009, lawmakers specified $150 million in economic aid to Jordan to “help mitigate the impact of the global economic crisis including for health, education, water and sanitation, and other impacts resulting from refugee populations in Jordan.”
Terrorism
Jordan is a key partner in fighting international Islamic terrorist groups, as its main intelligence organization, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), is considered one of the most effective organizations in the region at infiltrating Jihadist networks.54 Jordanian intelligence reportedly played a role in assisting U.S. forces in killing Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist mastermind who headed the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization until his death in June 2006.
Zarqawi hailed from the industrial town of Zarqa, several miles northeast of Amman, which is known as a source of Sunni militancy, as dozens of its young men have traveled to Iraq to die as suicide bombers. According to one Islamist community leader in Zarqa, “Most of the young people here in Zarqa are very religious.... And when they see the news and what is going on in the Islamic countries, they themselves feel that they have to go to fight jihad. Today, you don’t need anyone to tell the young men that they should go to jihad. They themselves want to be martyrs.”
Jordan’s cooperative relationship with the United States has made it vulnerable to terrorist attacks, particularly from organizations operating from Iraq. On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al Qaeda in Iraq, formerly headed by Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the act.
Many Jordanians, even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and denounced Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah II has said the attacks were aimed at ordinary Jordanians, not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned, were frequented by local citizens. On November 15, 2005, Jordan’s Minister of the Interior announced new security regulations designed to keep foreign militants from operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for Jordanians to notify authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or a house to foreigners.
Other recent terrorist activity in Jordan include the following:
• On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) program in Jordan, was shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was leaving for work from his residence. A Jordanian military court convicted and sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and presumably involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant. Six of the eight sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and two more were executed on March 11, 2006.
• In April 2004, Jordanian authorities reportedly uncovered a plot by a terrorist cell linked to Zarqawi which planned to launch a chemical attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman. According to press reports, in January 2004, one of the would be perpetrators visited Iraq, where he obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from Syrian donors to pay for the attack. The plot was reportedly foiled by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of operations in Amman.
• On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S. amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and another landing near a hospital; a third rocket struck near the airport at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier was killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with Zarqawi.
• On September 4, 2006, a lone gunman opened fire on a group of Western tourists visiting the historic Roman amphitheater in downtown Amman, killing a British man and wounding six others, including a Jordanian policeman. The assailant was a 38-year old Jordanian named Nabeel Jaoura, who claimed his attack was in retaliation for the murder of his two brothers in 1982 at the hands of Israeli soldiers during the war in southern Lebanon. According to the New York Times, Jaoura had worked in Israel, where he was arrested two years ago for overstaying his visa. Jordanian security officials believe his incarceration may have further radicalized him.55
• In late 2006, Jordanian intelligence authorities thwarted a potential bomb attack against foreign tourists traveling through Queen Alia Airport in Amman. Several of the convicted conspirators were Iraqis, and one of the ringleaders of the plot reportedly had sought to place a bomb in a sports bag using the explosive PE-4A which is used by insurgents in Iraq.
• In September 2009, a Jordanian citizen who was living in the United States illegally was arrested and charged with attempting to blow up a skyscraper in Dallas, Texas. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, age 19, was arrested after planting an inert bomb at Fountain Place, a 60-story glass tower in downtown Dallas following an undercover FBI operation.
Allegations of Torture
As media scrutiny over the CIA’s alleged practice of transporting terrorism suspects to detention facilities abroad has grown in recent years, Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) has been accused of detaining and torturing CIA prisoners captured in other countries. According to a Washington Post article on the GID, “Its [GID] interrogators had a reputation for persuading tight-lipped suspects to talk, even if that meant using abusive tactics that could violate U.S. or international law.”56 In July 2006, the human rights group Amnesty International accused the Jordanian security establishment of torturing terrorist suspects on behalf of the United States government. Amnesty International identified 10 suspected cases of men subjected to rendition from U.S. custody to interrogation centers in Jordan.57 A second report, released by Human Rights Watch in September 2006, claimed that the GID carries out arbitrary arrests and abuses suspects in its own detention facility. The report studied the cases of 16 men whom the GID had arrested and found that in 14 of the 16 cases, detainees were tortured or ill-treated. In response, the GID denied any wrongdoing. Finally, in a January 2007 report, Manfred Nowak, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, concluded that “the practice of torture persists in Jordan because of a lack of awareness of the problem, and because of institutionalized impunity.” In April 2008, three prisoners were killed and dozens of others injured during a riot at Muwaqqar prison. According to the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), “Mistreatment and beatings of inmates by some policemen at the Muaqqar prison led to the rioting.”
Despite government denials or statements suggesting that reforms are underway, international monitoring groups continue to charge that torture in the Jordanian prison system is widespread. An October 2008 Human Rights Watch report alleged that despite an amendment to the penal code to make torture a crime, Jordan’s measures have been insufficient and the practice continues.
According to Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, “Torture in Jordan’s prison system is widespread even two years after King Abdullah II called for reforms to stop it once and for all.... The mechanisms for preventing torture by holding torturers accountable are simply not working.”58
This article is an edited portion of the much longer April 9, 2010 report, "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations" (a PDF copy can be found here) prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, for the Congressional Research Service.
NOTES:
38 In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan. See Section 502 of P.L. 102-27, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and Pensions, and Urgent Needs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
39 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
40 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large presence in Jordan. UNRWA has 7,000 staff in Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 174 schools in Jordan (providing education through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government) According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104 million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees live outside of UNRWA camps.
41 “Jordan’s King Warns that Annapolis Conference Last Chance for Palestinians,” Associated Press, February 10, 2008.
42 In 1997, Israeli agents disguised as Canadian tourists attempted to poison Khaled Meshaal, head of the Hamas political bureau and one of its founding members. The agents were captured by Jordanian authorities, and Israel was forced to release a number of high profile Hamas members in order to secure the return of their operatives. King Hussein had reportedly threatened to abrogate the Israel-Jordan 1994 peace treaty if Israel failed to provide an antidote and release other Hamas prisoners.
43 “Palestinian Forces Enter Jordan for Training Under U.S. Program,” Ha’aretz, January 24, 2008 and “500 Palestinian Security Force Members Head to Jordan for U.S.-funded Training,” Ha’aretz, September 18, 2008. Jordan has helped train 3,000 Palestinian cadets at the U.S.-funded Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC).
44 “Report on Jordan-Hamas Talks,” Al-Hayat (London), accessed via Open Source Center, Document ID#GMP20080817837001, August 17, 2008.
45 “Egypt and Jordan Quietly Back Abbas, Too,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2007.
46 “Tens of Thousands Participate in Weekend Rallies,” Jordan Times, January 4, 2009.
47 Open Source Center, “State PAO: Jordanian Media Highlights for 16-19 Jan 2009,” Amman US Embassy Public Affairs Office, January 19, 2009, p. Document ID# GMP20090119644008.
48 “We don’t Need an all New Peace Process,” Jordan Times, January 19, 2009.
49 In August 2003, 17 people were killed outside the Jordanian embassy in an insurgent attack designed to deter Arab cooperation with coalition forces.
50 During the decade preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom while Iraq was under an international economic embargo, Jordan imported between 70,000 and 95,000 barrels per day of oil and oil products from Iraq. Jordan bought the oil at discounted prices, and actual payments were made in commodities rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian goods from Jordan to Iraq. These transactions were outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food program; however, the United Nations “took note” of Jordan’s position that it had no other source of oil, and U.S. administrations waived legislation that would have penalized Jordan for these transactions on this basis.
51 “Jordan Plans Regional Railway, Oil Link with Iraq,” Agence France Presse, July 27, 2008.
52 According to the UNHCR’s representative in Jordan, Robert Breen, “The term ‘refugee’ has political implications for the government and Iraqis because of the Palestinian question.... Most Iraqis, who represent a very diverse group here, don’t view themselves as refugees.” See, “Uncertain Future for Jordan’s ‘Guests,’” Financial Times, March 12, 2007.
53 Many Iraqis in Jordan lack valid residency permits or visas altogether. “Uneasy Havens Await Those Who Flee Iraq,” New York Times, December 8, 2006.
54 For years, some experts have speculated that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support to the GID has been substantial. One expert wrote that “the agency created a Jordanian intelligence service, which lives today as its liaison to much of the Arab world.” See, Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, New York, Anchor Books, 2008. In addition, there is a long history of U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation. According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, the GID collaborated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1980s to disrupt the Abu Nidal organization and in 1999 was instrumental in foiling Al-Qaeda’s ‘millennium plot.’ It also may have been responsible for foiling planned bombings of the US, Jordanian and British embassies in Beirut in 2001 as well as the US embassy in Amman in 2004. See, “Jordanian-US intelligence co-operation: Iraq and beyond,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, November 9, 2007.
55 “Typical of a New Terror Threat: Anger of a Gunman in Jordan,” New York Times, September 6, 2006.
56 “Jordan’s Spy Agency: Holding Cell for the CIA,” Washington Post, December 1, 2007.
57 “Group: Jordan Tortures Suspects for U.S.,” Associated Press, July 24, 2006.
58 “Jordan: Torture in Prisons Routine and Widespread,” Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2008.
Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999) ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and Jordan’s support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War which isolated it from the West.38
Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,39 and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the continuation of conflict continues to be a major obstacle to Jordan’s development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the pre-1967 borders of Israel. There are an estimated 1.9 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement.40 Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin descent and rely politically on the support of East Bank tribal families, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a matter of political survival since the government cannot afford to ignore an issue of critical importance to a majority of its citizens. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the “Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the political status quo in Jordan. Like his father before him, King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”
Opposition to Normalization
King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and professional organizations. Among many mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far. Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with Israel, and activists among them have compiled “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and companies that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists, but courts have upheld their right to publish them. In addition, IAF parliamentarians periodically propose legislation to prohibit cooperation with Israel in various sectors. The IAF also has proposed legislation to abrogate Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
Reviving the Arab-Israeli Peace Process
For nearly a decade, King Abdullah II has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and Congress to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. King Abdullah II is a strong supporter of a Saudi initiative, dubbed the “Arab Peace Initiative,” which calls for Israel’s full withdrawal from all occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in exchange for full normalization of relations with all Arab states in the region. In a March 2007 address to a joint session of Congress, King Abdullah II pleaded for U.S. leadership in the peace process, which he called the “core issue in the Middle East.” He suggested that the Arab Peace Initiative is a path to achieve a collective peace treaty. Jordanian officials also have repeatedly condemned Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank, especially in Jerusalem, claiming that they violate international law and heighten tensions in the region.
King Abdullah II supported the convening of the U.S.-sponsored peace conference in Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007, and he has encouraged the United States to push for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over core issues (status of Jerusalem, refugees, and borders). He has warned repeatedly that, without a settlement to the conflict, armed Islamist movements like Hamas and Hezbollah will grow in strength and radicalize Jordan’s own Islamist movements. According to King Abdullah II:
The process that started in Annapolis is, from our perspective, a positive development, but it also may be our last chance for peace for many, many years to come.... For us to fully realize the benefits of reform, we need to be able to exchange goods and services with our neighbors and facilitate the movement of people.... So in that respect, conflict holds everyone up, and the longer we delay conflict resolution, the more we risk greater instability down the road.41
Jordan-Hamas Relations
For two decades, Jordan has had an on-again, off-again relationship with Hamas, the Palestinian militant group and U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Throughout the 1990s, the late King Hussein tolerated a Hamas presence in his kingdom.42 Upon his accession to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II, perhaps realizing that Jordan’s relationship with Hamas was a political liability, reversed his late father’s longstanding policy of tolerating Hamas and closed its Jordan offices permanently.
Since then, Jordan has been a strong backer of Palestinian moderates (such as the Fatah party) loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas and has been determined to bolster the capacity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank in order to prevent Hamas from gaining strength there. Jordan has provided training for several battalions of U.S.-screened Palestinian recruits to serve in an overhauled Palestinian Authority National Security Force.43 The training is conducted by Jordanian police at the Jordanian International Police Training Center near Amman.
Toward the end of 2008, perhaps in order to hedge against the prospect of yet another round of failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, Jordan opened a dialogue with Hamas officials. Led by General Muhammad Dahabi, Jordan reportedly discussed “political and security issues” with their Hamas counterparts (Muhammad Nazzal). Most analysts interpreted this limited engagement as a pragmatic Jordanian maneuver designed to open channels of communication with an emboldened Hamas now in firm control of the Gaza Strip. Jordan may have sought a pledge from Hamas not to interfere in Jordanian domestic politics. According to one observer, “Hamas wants to talk with Jordan and Jordan wants to listen to what Hamas has to say. And it is in Jordan’s interest today to communicate with all and sundry—north, south, east, and west, without changing the underlying fundamentals of its policies, instead of concentrating on an alliance with only two states, the United States and Israel.”44
Since the 2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian Authority legislative elections, the Jordanian government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of its citizenry sympathizes with Hamas and Jordan’s own Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), reportedly maintains close ties to Hamas. The IAF has been careful to downplay these ties and, in August 2009, three high ranking moderate Brotherhood figures resigned from the group’s leadership bureau in protest over Hamas-Jordanian Brotherhood ties. According to one IAF statement, “Abbas is the legitimate Palestinian president and Hamas’s battle should be with the Zionist enemy, not other Palestinians, so we ask them to return to a policy of dialogue and to restore the institutions in Gaza.”45 Some critics of King Abdullah II assert that the Hamas threat to Jordan is a specter used by the royal family to consolidate its rule and repress potential opposition.
The 2008-2009 Israel-Hamas War in Gaza
The Jordanian public and some government officials were extremely critical of Israel’s 2008-2009 military operations against Hamas (Operation Cast Lead) in the Gaza Strip. During the month-long war, hundreds of protests broke out across the country. Most public demonstrations were small in size, but in early January 2009, the Muslim Brotherhood organized an estimated 50,000-person rally at an Amman sports complex. During the event, Dr. Hamam Said, the Brotherhood’s new general guide, stated that the rally’s large size indicated that “this is a vote on the peace treaty with Israel,” as protesters chanted, “no Israeli embassy on Jordanian land.”46 Media coverage focused largely on the Palestinian humanitarian dimension of the conflict. Some protesters tried to approach the Israeli Embassy in Amman but were met by riot police and were dispersed without any major incident.47
At the official level, some Jordanian lawmakers burnt an Israeli flag during a parliamentary session. Lawmakers set the flag aflame inside the lower house chamber during a special session of parliament dedicated to the Gaza war. Other parliamentarians called on the king to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and expel its ambassador. Some members of Jordan’s professional associations also held a demonstration where they burnt Israeli and American consumer products.
At a press conference in Egypt following a January cease-fire, King Abdullah II reiterated the need for a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stating that “If we do not take action towards a permanent solution based on the two-state solution, the world leaders will find themselves once again forced to convene to address a new Israeli aggression on the Palestinians.”48 The King also reportedly dismissed the director of the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) General Muhammad Dahabi during the war, perhaps as an indication that the kingdom would not be further strengthening its relations with Hamas. As noted above, General Dahabi had conducted talks with Hamas leaders just months before the war. At the height of the conflict, some experts feared that the war in Gaza would destabilize moderate Arab governments like Egypt and Jordan which have respective peace treaties with Israel.
Because Jordan has a high percentage of citizens of Palestinian origin, any outbreak in Israeli-Palestinian violence is typically accompanied by speculation over Jordan’s (and the monarchy’s) stability. Nevertheless, though public anger ran high during the war, authorities managed to prevent any large-scale outbreak in violence. In Jordan, the right to assemble and hold demonstrations requires a government permit, and though many spontaneous protests broke out during the war, most Jordanians kept within the bounds of permitted political activity.
The Road Ahead
Jordan’s pro-peace regional foreign policy may continue to face obstacles in the months and years ahead due to the domestic political situation amongst Israelis and Palestinians respectively. Some Jordanians fear that the largely right wing Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will table Israeli-Palestinian peace talks indefinitely. Meanwhile, the lack of a Palestinian unity government also will continue to stall progress on peace talks as many countries refuse to deal with Hamas until it renounces violence and recognizes Israel. Senator George J. Mitchell, the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, travels regularly to the region for consultations.
In May 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Jordan where King Abdullah II reportedly asked his counterpart declare Israel’s commitment to a two-state solution and acceptance of the Arab peace initiative. That same month, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) debated a bill to make Jordan the official homeland for Palestinians now living in the West Bank.
According to one Jordanian lawmaker, “It has done big damage.... Even if it’s not passed, when 53 members of the parliament [Knesset] accept this law in the first reading, this is very important. We can't think it’s just for show; it’s the real thinking of the Israeli parliament and they represent the people.”
In October 2009, King Abdullah II expressed dismay over a perceived lack of Administration focus on the Middle East peace process. In an interview with Italian daily La Repubblica, King Abdullah II said, “I've heard people in Washington talking about Iran, again Iran, always Iran....But I insist on, and keep insisting on the Palestinian question: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most serious threat to the stability of the region and the Mediterranean.”
Iraq
Jordan’s relations with Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era were strong. In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed military action against Iraq, but it informally and quietly provided logistical support to the U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein. Since 2003, Jordanians have repeatedly criticized what they perceive to be the political marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. Unlike Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan has a limited ability to intervene in Iraq’s affairs at present, and, since 2003, Jordanian leaders have been far more concerned with Iraq’s influence on the kingdom’s own politics, trade, and internal security.
In 2008, as the situation in Iraq stabilized, Jordan moved to normalize its relations with the predominately Shiite Iraqi government. In August 2008, perhaps as a response to U.S. demands that Arab states end their isolation of Iraq, King Abdullah II became the first Arab leader to visit Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. Earlier in the year, Jordan announced that it had appointed an ambassador to Baghdad, the first nation to do so since all Arab governments withdrew their ambassadors after the 2005 kidnapping and murder of Egypt’s former envoy.49
Prospects for Improved Relations
At the official level, government-to-government relations between Jordan and Iraq are likely to improve as long as Iraq remains stable and relatively free of sectarian bloodshed. Nevertheless, Jordan’s Sunni tribal Arab elite had strong ties to the Saddam Hussein regime, and few analysts expect Jordan-Iraqi relations to revert back to earlier times. In the months and years ahead, both sides will have to tackle the Iraqi refugee issue, energy deals, border security, and, most importantly, their relationship with Iran. Jordan, like other Sunni Arab states, is suspicious of Iranian intentions in the region.
Oil
Jordan has consistently sought to reap tangible benefits from relations with its larger, oil-rich neighbor. During the Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq provided nearly all of Jordan’s domestic oil needs, half of it free of charge.50 After the U.S. invasion in 2003 and until 2008, Jordan was forced to receive or purchase its oil elsewhere, as its relationship with a fledgling, Shiite dominated Iraqi government in the throes of an insurgency and civil war hindered the normalization of bilateral ties. The two sides did reach a tentative oil deal in August 2006; however, security and logistical concerns prevented the resumption of oil shipments.
After years of delay, Iraqi crude oil shipments began arriving in Jordan in September 2008. Under the original terms of their agreement, Jordan was to receive approximately 10,000 barrels of oil per day (roughly 10% of their daily consumption) from Iraq, at a price between $10-$18 per barrel. This quantity would increase to 30,000 barrels at a later stage, based on the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries. Due to spiraling global oil prices, Iraq revised the agreement in 2008 to provide crude oil to Jordan at $22 per barrel—still a substantial discount from the international market price for Brent crude oil. Jordan and Iraq had discussed the construction of a pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba but cost projections have scuttled this proposal. Reportedly, the Jordanian government is now seeking international financing for the construction of a 600-mile railroad system to ferry Iraqi crude oil directly to Jordan’s sole refinery in the industrial town of Zarqa.51
Iraqi Refugees in Jordan
With over half of Jordan’s population claiming Palestinian descent, the kingdom has coped with refugee issues for decades. Nevertheless, the estimated 400,000-500,000 Iraqis living in Jordan have not been welcomed by the government and face difficult day-to-day circumstances there.
For a small, relatively poor country such as Jordan, the Iraqi influx is creating profound changes in Jordan’s economy and society. Since 2003, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees into greater Amman has caused housing shortages and led to rising rents and real estate prices. By some accounts, Amman is now one of the most expensive Arab capital cities in the region. Inflation has soared, creating hardships for middle class Jordanians of all backgrounds. In early 2007, Jordan sealed its borders and has since tried to stop any further inflow of Iraqis into the capital Amman and its environs.
In addition to concerns over absorbing more Iraqis, the Jordanian government may be treating the steady inflow of Iraqi refugees as a national security issue. Jordanian authorities have imposed restrictions on young Iraqi males to prevent their entering the country in response to security concerns. The Jordanian government classifies displaced Iraqis living in Jordan as “visitors” or “guests,” not refugees, as Jordan does not have a domestic refugee law, nor is it a party to the 1951 UN refugees’ convention.52 Iraqis who are able to deposit $150,000 in Amman banks are granted residency almost instantly, while the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan have become illegal aliens due to the expiration of their visitor visas.53 Jordan’s positive relationships with Western donor countries and international organizations have enabled it to receive some outside assistance for coping with its large Iraqi refugee population.
The FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28) provided $45 million to Jordan for assistance to Iraqi refugees and an additional $10.3 million in economic assistance for Jordanian communities hosting large refugee populations. P.L. 110-161, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, also provided bilateral aid to Jordan to be used to address social and economic development needs, including for Iraqis seeking refuge in Jordan. P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, also specified up to $175 million in economic aid for Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees. In the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-32, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY2009, lawmakers specified $150 million in economic aid to Jordan to “help mitigate the impact of the global economic crisis including for health, education, water and sanitation, and other impacts resulting from refugee populations in Jordan.”
Terrorism
Jordan is a key partner in fighting international Islamic terrorist groups, as its main intelligence organization, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), is considered one of the most effective organizations in the region at infiltrating Jihadist networks.54 Jordanian intelligence reportedly played a role in assisting U.S. forces in killing Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist mastermind who headed the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization until his death in June 2006.
Zarqawi hailed from the industrial town of Zarqa, several miles northeast of Amman, which is known as a source of Sunni militancy, as dozens of its young men have traveled to Iraq to die as suicide bombers. According to one Islamist community leader in Zarqa, “Most of the young people here in Zarqa are very religious.... And when they see the news and what is going on in the Islamic countries, they themselves feel that they have to go to fight jihad. Today, you don’t need anyone to tell the young men that they should go to jihad. They themselves want to be martyrs.”
Jordan’s cooperative relationship with the United States has made it vulnerable to terrorist attacks, particularly from organizations operating from Iraq. On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al Qaeda in Iraq, formerly headed by Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the act.
Many Jordanians, even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and denounced Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah II has said the attacks were aimed at ordinary Jordanians, not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned, were frequented by local citizens. On November 15, 2005, Jordan’s Minister of the Interior announced new security regulations designed to keep foreign militants from operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for Jordanians to notify authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or a house to foreigners.
Other recent terrorist activity in Jordan include the following:
• On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) program in Jordan, was shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was leaving for work from his residence. A Jordanian military court convicted and sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and presumably involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant. Six of the eight sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and two more were executed on March 11, 2006.
• In April 2004, Jordanian authorities reportedly uncovered a plot by a terrorist cell linked to Zarqawi which planned to launch a chemical attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman. According to press reports, in January 2004, one of the would be perpetrators visited Iraq, where he obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from Syrian donors to pay for the attack. The plot was reportedly foiled by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of operations in Amman.
• On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S. amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and another landing near a hospital; a third rocket struck near the airport at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier was killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with Zarqawi.
• On September 4, 2006, a lone gunman opened fire on a group of Western tourists visiting the historic Roman amphitheater in downtown Amman, killing a British man and wounding six others, including a Jordanian policeman. The assailant was a 38-year old Jordanian named Nabeel Jaoura, who claimed his attack was in retaliation for the murder of his two brothers in 1982 at the hands of Israeli soldiers during the war in southern Lebanon. According to the New York Times, Jaoura had worked in Israel, where he was arrested two years ago for overstaying his visa. Jordanian security officials believe his incarceration may have further radicalized him.55
• In late 2006, Jordanian intelligence authorities thwarted a potential bomb attack against foreign tourists traveling through Queen Alia Airport in Amman. Several of the convicted conspirators were Iraqis, and one of the ringleaders of the plot reportedly had sought to place a bomb in a sports bag using the explosive PE-4A which is used by insurgents in Iraq.
• In September 2009, a Jordanian citizen who was living in the United States illegally was arrested and charged with attempting to blow up a skyscraper in Dallas, Texas. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, age 19, was arrested after planting an inert bomb at Fountain Place, a 60-story glass tower in downtown Dallas following an undercover FBI operation.
Allegations of Torture
As media scrutiny over the CIA’s alleged practice of transporting terrorism suspects to detention facilities abroad has grown in recent years, Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) has been accused of detaining and torturing CIA prisoners captured in other countries. According to a Washington Post article on the GID, “Its [GID] interrogators had a reputation for persuading tight-lipped suspects to talk, even if that meant using abusive tactics that could violate U.S. or international law.”56 In July 2006, the human rights group Amnesty International accused the Jordanian security establishment of torturing terrorist suspects on behalf of the United States government. Amnesty International identified 10 suspected cases of men subjected to rendition from U.S. custody to interrogation centers in Jordan.57 A second report, released by Human Rights Watch in September 2006, claimed that the GID carries out arbitrary arrests and abuses suspects in its own detention facility. The report studied the cases of 16 men whom the GID had arrested and found that in 14 of the 16 cases, detainees were tortured or ill-treated. In response, the GID denied any wrongdoing. Finally, in a January 2007 report, Manfred Nowak, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, concluded that “the practice of torture persists in Jordan because of a lack of awareness of the problem, and because of institutionalized impunity.” In April 2008, three prisoners were killed and dozens of others injured during a riot at Muwaqqar prison. According to the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), “Mistreatment and beatings of inmates by some policemen at the Muaqqar prison led to the rioting.”
Despite government denials or statements suggesting that reforms are underway, international monitoring groups continue to charge that torture in the Jordanian prison system is widespread. An October 2008 Human Rights Watch report alleged that despite an amendment to the penal code to make torture a crime, Jordan’s measures have been insufficient and the practice continues.
According to Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, “Torture in Jordan’s prison system is widespread even two years after King Abdullah II called for reforms to stop it once and for all.... The mechanisms for preventing torture by holding torturers accountable are simply not working.”58
This article is an edited portion of the much longer April 9, 2010 report, "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations" (a PDF copy can be found here) prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, for the Congressional Research Service.
NOTES:
38 In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan. See Section 502 of P.L. 102-27, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and Pensions, and Urgent Needs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
39 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
40 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large presence in Jordan. UNRWA has 7,000 staff in Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 174 schools in Jordan (providing education through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government) According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104 million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees live outside of UNRWA camps.
41 “Jordan’s King Warns that Annapolis Conference Last Chance for Palestinians,” Associated Press, February 10, 2008.
42 In 1997, Israeli agents disguised as Canadian tourists attempted to poison Khaled Meshaal, head of the Hamas political bureau and one of its founding members. The agents were captured by Jordanian authorities, and Israel was forced to release a number of high profile Hamas members in order to secure the return of their operatives. King Hussein had reportedly threatened to abrogate the Israel-Jordan 1994 peace treaty if Israel failed to provide an antidote and release other Hamas prisoners.
43 “Palestinian Forces Enter Jordan for Training Under U.S. Program,” Ha’aretz, January 24, 2008 and “500 Palestinian Security Force Members Head to Jordan for U.S.-funded Training,” Ha’aretz, September 18, 2008. Jordan has helped train 3,000 Palestinian cadets at the U.S.-funded Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC).
44 “Report on Jordan-Hamas Talks,” Al-Hayat (London), accessed via Open Source Center, Document ID#GMP20080817837001, August 17, 2008.
45 “Egypt and Jordan Quietly Back Abbas, Too,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2007.
46 “Tens of Thousands Participate in Weekend Rallies,” Jordan Times, January 4, 2009.
47 Open Source Center, “State PAO: Jordanian Media Highlights for 16-19 Jan 2009,” Amman US Embassy Public Affairs Office, January 19, 2009, p. Document ID# GMP20090119644008.
48 “We don’t Need an all New Peace Process,” Jordan Times, January 19, 2009.
49 In August 2003, 17 people were killed outside the Jordanian embassy in an insurgent attack designed to deter Arab cooperation with coalition forces.
50 During the decade preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom while Iraq was under an international economic embargo, Jordan imported between 70,000 and 95,000 barrels per day of oil and oil products from Iraq. Jordan bought the oil at discounted prices, and actual payments were made in commodities rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian goods from Jordan to Iraq. These transactions were outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food program; however, the United Nations “took note” of Jordan’s position that it had no other source of oil, and U.S. administrations waived legislation that would have penalized Jordan for these transactions on this basis.
51 “Jordan Plans Regional Railway, Oil Link with Iraq,” Agence France Presse, July 27, 2008.
52 According to the UNHCR’s representative in Jordan, Robert Breen, “The term ‘refugee’ has political implications for the government and Iraqis because of the Palestinian question.... Most Iraqis, who represent a very diverse group here, don’t view themselves as refugees.” See, “Uncertain Future for Jordan’s ‘Guests,’” Financial Times, March 12, 2007.
53 Many Iraqis in Jordan lack valid residency permits or visas altogether. “Uneasy Havens Await Those Who Flee Iraq,” New York Times, December 8, 2006.
54 For years, some experts have speculated that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support to the GID has been substantial. One expert wrote that “the agency created a Jordanian intelligence service, which lives today as its liaison to much of the Arab world.” See, Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, New York, Anchor Books, 2008. In addition, there is a long history of U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation. According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, the GID collaborated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1980s to disrupt the Abu Nidal organization and in 1999 was instrumental in foiling Al-Qaeda’s ‘millennium plot.’ It also may have been responsible for foiling planned bombings of the US, Jordanian and British embassies in Beirut in 2001 as well as the US embassy in Amman in 2004. See, “Jordanian-US intelligence co-operation: Iraq and beyond,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, November 9, 2007.
55 “Typical of a New Terror Threat: Anger of a Gunman in Jordan,” New York Times, September 6, 2006.
56 “Jordan’s Spy Agency: Holding Cell for the CIA,” Washington Post, December 1, 2007.
57 “Group: Jordan Tortures Suspects for U.S.,” Associated Press, July 24, 2006.
58 “Jordan: Torture in Prisons Routine and Widespread,” Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2008.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010 |
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Jordan Proposed Nuclear Sites 'Suitable'
Geological and site studies in southern Jordan have shown the proposed locations to be suitable to house the country's first nuclear reactor.
The studies, carried out by Tractebel Engineering of Belgium, proved that a "number of locations" in southern Jordan are suitable for a nuclear reactor, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) chairman Khaled Toukan told a workshop on nuclear plant financing. The meeting was attended by the country's prime minister, Samir Rifai, and reported by state news agency PETRA. The first studies would be followed by studies assessing environmental and safety impacts, Toukan said.
According to JAEC's web site the location to be the focus of the environmental impact studies is about 20 kilometres from Aqaba, several kilometres inland and around 450 metres above sea level.
A government-private sector partnership is being considered as a means of financing the project to build the country's first power reactor.
Jordan is set to get its first research reactor by 2014 under a contract signed by JAEC and a consortium headed by the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (Kaeri) with Daewoo in December 2009. The country plans to start building a nuclear power plant by 2013, and has been evaluating the design offerings of various international reactor vendors. Earlier this year, JAEC granted Areva exclusive mining rights for uranium in central Jordan.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
The studies, carried out by Tractebel Engineering of Belgium, proved that a "number of locations" in southern Jordan are suitable for a nuclear reactor, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) chairman Khaled Toukan told a workshop on nuclear plant financing. The meeting was attended by the country's prime minister, Samir Rifai, and reported by state news agency PETRA. The first studies would be followed by studies assessing environmental and safety impacts, Toukan said.
According to JAEC's web site the location to be the focus of the environmental impact studies is about 20 kilometres from Aqaba, several kilometres inland and around 450 metres above sea level.
A government-private sector partnership is being considered as a means of financing the project to build the country's first power reactor.
Jordan is set to get its first research reactor by 2014 under a contract signed by JAEC and a consortium headed by the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (Kaeri) with Daewoo in December 2009. The country plans to start building a nuclear power plant by 2013, and has been evaluating the design offerings of various international reactor vendors. Earlier this year, JAEC granted Areva exclusive mining rights for uranium in central Jordan.
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Georgian PM Visits Jordan
(Civil.Ge) -- Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri left for Jordan on April 26, the Georgian government’s press office reported.
During one-day visit PM Gilauri plans a meeting with Jordanian PM Samir Rifai, as well as with the representatives of Jordanian business circles.
According to the Georgian government, an agreement on trade-economic cooperation between the two countries will be signed during the visit.
During one-day visit PM Gilauri plans a meeting with Jordanian PM Samir Rifai, as well as with the representatives of Jordanian business circles.
According to the Georgian government, an agreement on trade-economic cooperation between the two countries will be signed during the visit.
Monday, April 26, 2010 |
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Yemen Investigates Human Organ Traffickers
Twelve suspects are being investigated in Yemen a on charges of trading in human organs, the September website reported on Tuesday, according to the state news agency SABA.
Chief of the Criminal Investigative Department Rezk al-Jawfi said five of the suspects held Egyptian, Yemeni and Jordanian nationalities, according to the report, adding that the investigation was coordinated by Interpol in Yemen and Egypt.
The main suspects in the investigation is an Egyptian medical doctor who worked in a Cairo hospital and a broker between the Yemeni victims and those who traded in their organs who recieved received between $20,000 to $60,000 a year, SABA reported.
The going price for a kidney, according to report, was $5,000.
Chief of the Criminal Investigative Department Rezk al-Jawfi said five of the suspects held Egyptian, Yemeni and Jordanian nationalities, according to the report, adding that the investigation was coordinated by Interpol in Yemen and Egypt.
The main suspects in the investigation is an Egyptian medical doctor who worked in a Cairo hospital and a broker between the Yemeni victims and those who traded in their organs who recieved received between $20,000 to $60,000 a year, SABA reported.
The going price for a kidney, according to report, was $5,000.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010 |
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Israel's 'No' Blocks EuroMed Water Accord
Israel’s opposition to the expression “Occupied Territories” in reference to Palestinian areas under its military occupation is said to have blocked the approval of a common “Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean”, an accord aimed toward defending an essential human right in an area that is still traversed by tension and conflicts.
The secretary general for the Union for The Mediterranean (UPM), Jordanian Ahmad Massa’deh, said at the end of the conference in Barcelona that the lack of an agreement is a reason for ‘great sadness”.
Pierre Lellouche, the French minister for European affairs, said that the delegations from 43 countries had managed to find an accord “over 99% of the technical issues related to water” only to fall “victim to the degradation of the conflict in the Middle East”.
The “Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean” was to have constituted a fundamental document for the II Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the UPM which also takes place in Barcelona starting next June 7.
The basic idea was to prevent that water might fuel new conflicts in the region, even in the West Bank and Gaza, where, for millions of Palestinians, water is an even more precious resource.
According to UN estimates, in the next 15 years demographic growth, climate changes and increase demand from agriculture and industry might compromise the right to water for some 290 million people.
Source: MISNA
The secretary general for the Union for The Mediterranean (UPM), Jordanian Ahmad Massa’deh, said at the end of the conference in Barcelona that the lack of an agreement is a reason for ‘great sadness”.
Pierre Lellouche, the French minister for European affairs, said that the delegations from 43 countries had managed to find an accord “over 99% of the technical issues related to water” only to fall “victim to the degradation of the conflict in the Middle East”.
The “Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean” was to have constituted a fundamental document for the II Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the UPM which also takes place in Barcelona starting next June 7.
The basic idea was to prevent that water might fuel new conflicts in the region, even in the West Bank and Gaza, where, for millions of Palestinians, water is an even more precious resource.
According to UN estimates, in the next 15 years demographic growth, climate changes and increase demand from agriculture and industry might compromise the right to water for some 290 million people.
Source: MISNA
Wednesday, April 14, 2010 |
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Middle East Bishops Emphasize Pope’s Transparency In Handling Abuse Cases
(CNA) -- In response to the media campaign designed to portray Pope Benedict as covering up cases of sexual abuse by priests, various bishops in the Middle East have expressed their solidarity with the Holy Father.
In an interview with SIR news agency, Archbishop Emil Nona of Mosul said that in Iraq, “The faithful are convinced that all of this is propaganda against the Church, designed to smear her in the eyes of the world. There is certainly sorrow over what has happened,” he added. “For our part, we are explaining what the Pope has said about this scandal as well as the measures adopted to shed light on the different cases which are being addressed with firmness, transparency and severity.”
“The grave errors committed by a few cannot cast doubt on everything that the Church has always done in support of children, young people and those who are most vulnerable,” Mosul’s archbishop emphasized.
Chaldean Bishop Michel Kassarji of Beirut said, “A scandal that is shaking the Church must not be used to discredit her... The Church, with the Pope at the helm, is confronting this scandal with firmness and it is good that people know this,” Bishop Kassarji affirmed.
“Trust in the Church must not be undermined by incidents like these that do not involve everyone,” he added. “Therefore, the testimony of intense prayer has never been more important than right now.”
The Chaldean Bishop Antoine Audo of Alep, Syria made remarks saying, “We are witnessing a grave form of anti-Catholic propaganda that creates difficulties and must be confronted. We are comforted by the firmness of Benedict XVI in addressing this issue. For our part we are doing everything possible to correctly inform the faithful, even when it is difficult due to the fact that we do not have access to the media.”
Msgr. Salim Sayegh, the Latin Patriarchal Vicar of Jerusalem in Jordan, said that the Catholic Church alone “has the courage to look inside herself to repair the mistakes.”
“We are close to Benedict XVI at this time in which he and the Church are being attacked,” he said. “We have profound confidence in all the measures adopted to prevent similar things from happening again.”
“Here in Jordan,” he continued, “the faithful are close to the Pontiff and are determined to bear witness to their faith. We believe this is the best answer to those, including fundamentalist groups, who want to take advantage of these incidents.”
In an interview with SIR news agency, Archbishop Emil Nona of Mosul said that in Iraq, “The faithful are convinced that all of this is propaganda against the Church, designed to smear her in the eyes of the world. There is certainly sorrow over what has happened,” he added. “For our part, we are explaining what the Pope has said about this scandal as well as the measures adopted to shed light on the different cases which are being addressed with firmness, transparency and severity.”
“The grave errors committed by a few cannot cast doubt on everything that the Church has always done in support of children, young people and those who are most vulnerable,” Mosul’s archbishop emphasized.
Chaldean Bishop Michel Kassarji of Beirut said, “A scandal that is shaking the Church must not be used to discredit her... The Church, with the Pope at the helm, is confronting this scandal with firmness and it is good that people know this,” Bishop Kassarji affirmed.
“Trust in the Church must not be undermined by incidents like these that do not involve everyone,” he added. “Therefore, the testimony of intense prayer has never been more important than right now.”
The Chaldean Bishop Antoine Audo of Alep, Syria made remarks saying, “We are witnessing a grave form of anti-Catholic propaganda that creates difficulties and must be confronted. We are comforted by the firmness of Benedict XVI in addressing this issue. For our part we are doing everything possible to correctly inform the faithful, even when it is difficult due to the fact that we do not have access to the media.”
Msgr. Salim Sayegh, the Latin Patriarchal Vicar of Jerusalem in Jordan, said that the Catholic Church alone “has the courage to look inside herself to repair the mistakes.”
“We are close to Benedict XVI at this time in which he and the Church are being attacked,” he said. “We have profound confidence in all the measures adopted to prevent similar things from happening again.”
“Here in Jordan,” he continued, “the faithful are close to the Pontiff and are determined to bear witness to their faith. We believe this is the best answer to those, including fundamentalist groups, who want to take advantage of these incidents.”
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 |
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Sirte Declaration Includes Plan To Counter Jerusalem's 'Judaization'
Arab leaders on Sunday concluded the 22nd Arab League summit held in Serit, Libya agreeing on a series of political and legal measures to counter Israeli attempts to "Judaise" occupied East Jerusalem and violations of holy shrines in the city, reports Middle East media.
The Sirte Declaration expressed full Arab support of Jerusalem and its "steadfast" people in facing continued Israeli aggression, particularly assaults on Al Aqsa Mosque, according to Jordan's state news agency Petra, adding that the final communique stressed that East Jerusalem is an "indivisible part" of Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and that all Israeli measures in the city are null and void and unacceptable.
Ma'an reported that the Arab leaders pronounced their full support for Jerusalem and its residents, "on their land in the face of continued Israeli aggression against them and their holy places, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque."
Arab League Chief Amr Moussa said Israel's settlement enterprise could spell the end of negotiations, adding that Arab leaders "are waiting to see if they are serious. If they are serious they have to deal with the situation in the occupied territories in a different way," he said during a news conference at the summit's close, reported Ma'an.
For its part, Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem was quoted by that country's state media as saying that "Syria is not a party of any statement issued by the meeting of the committee in Sirte … Syria considers the issue of indirect negotiations on the Palestinian track as a Palestinian issue, and the Palestinian authority alone shoulders its responsibility in this regard."
"All the measures taken by Israeli occupation authorities are invalid and without legal ground as they will not in any way change the city's status as an occupied city or its status as the capital of the state of Palestine," it said, according to Petra.
The leaders agreed to hold an international conference on Jerusalem this year under the sponsorship of the Arab League and with the participation of all Arab states, professional unions and concerned civil society institutions.
The statement also backed efforts to reconcile Palestinian groups and asked Egypt to press ahead with mediation to clinch a deal that all factions should sign.
"The continuation of Palestinian division poses a real danger to the future of Palestinian people and their cause," it warned, calling on all the groups to take action to heal the rift and move toward the aspired reconciliation, reported Petra.
The Sirte Declaration expressed full Arab support of Jerusalem and its "steadfast" people in facing continued Israeli aggression, particularly assaults on Al Aqsa Mosque, according to Jordan's state news agency Petra, adding that the final communique stressed that East Jerusalem is an "indivisible part" of Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and that all Israeli measures in the city are null and void and unacceptable.
Ma'an reported that the Arab leaders pronounced their full support for Jerusalem and its residents, "on their land in the face of continued Israeli aggression against them and their holy places, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque."
Arab League Chief Amr Moussa said Israel's settlement enterprise could spell the end of negotiations, adding that Arab leaders "are waiting to see if they are serious. If they are serious they have to deal with the situation in the occupied territories in a different way," he said during a news conference at the summit's close, reported Ma'an.
For its part, Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem was quoted by that country's state media as saying that "Syria is not a party of any statement issued by the meeting of the committee in Sirte … Syria considers the issue of indirect negotiations on the Palestinian track as a Palestinian issue, and the Palestinian authority alone shoulders its responsibility in this regard."
"All the measures taken by Israeli occupation authorities are invalid and without legal ground as they will not in any way change the city's status as an occupied city or its status as the capital of the state of Palestine," it said, according to Petra.
The leaders agreed to hold an international conference on Jerusalem this year under the sponsorship of the Arab League and with the participation of all Arab states, professional unions and concerned civil society institutions.
The statement also backed efforts to reconcile Palestinian groups and asked Egypt to press ahead with mediation to clinch a deal that all factions should sign.
"The continuation of Palestinian division poses a real danger to the future of Palestinian people and their cause," it warned, calling on all the groups to take action to heal the rift and move toward the aspired reconciliation, reported Petra.
Sunday, March 28, 2010 |
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Abbas Injured After Fall In Jordan
(Ma'an) -- President Mahmoud Abbas was lightly injured after falling in his hotel room in Amman, Jordan on Friday, an official said.
Presidential spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh said Abbas suffered bruises and would require physical therapy and a few days of rest.
"We are following up with treatment, but his health is good and there is no cause for concern," said Dr Abdullah Al-Bashir, Abbas' physician.
Nasser Al-Lozy, the head of the Jordanian cabinet, visited Abbas shortly after the accident.
Abbas, 75, has served as head of the PLO since 2004. He was elected Palestinian president in 2005.
Presidential spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh said Abbas suffered bruises and would require physical therapy and a few days of rest.
"We are following up with treatment, but his health is good and there is no cause for concern," said Dr Abdullah Al-Bashir, Abbas' physician.
Nasser Al-Lozy, the head of the Jordanian cabinet, visited Abbas shortly after the accident.
Abbas, 75, has served as head of the PLO since 2004. He was elected Palestinian president in 2005.
Friday, March 19, 2010 |
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Kido Malware Attacked 17% Of Jordan's Computers
A total of 17 per cent of Jordan's computers were infiltrated by a variant of the notorious Kido malware, according to the latest malware report of Kaspersky Lab, a developer of secure content management solutions.
"Kido has been mostly successful in Jordan at wreaking havoc in large corporation networks, due to its advanced network worm replication functions, that make it a nightmare for system administrators," said Costin Raiu, Senior Anti Virus Expert, Head of Kaspersky EEMEA Virus Lab.
"Kido.ih has been active in other ME countries as well, being one of the most successful variant. It is also one of the last variants, with its authors apparently having stopped the active development of this family of malware. Nevertheless, it is still spreading in the wild and causing problems for users," he said.
Kaspersky Lab's malware report for Jordan also shows a proliferation of Sality, a virus that affected 14.32 percent of all the country's affected systems in December last year. This malware preferred attacks on home PC users.
"Sality, on the other hand, is most of the time passed through infected software, or it piggybacks on other malware, but seems to be more prevalent for home users. This makes its detection a non-trivial task," according to Raiu.
"It has worm capabilities, meaning, it can spread through networks, by copying itself to other computers directly. When it does that, it takes advantage of the Windows Autorun 'feature'. Because of all these things, Sality is not only hard to catch once it infects a system, but also hard to disinfect," he added
Other popular malware affecting Jordanian users in the same month included Mabezat - 8.84 percent of all infected computers - which operates by attaching itself to executables, while being polymorphic and spreading through network drives.
"Kido has been mostly successful in Jordan at wreaking havoc in large corporation networks, due to its advanced network worm replication functions, that make it a nightmare for system administrators," said Costin Raiu, Senior Anti Virus Expert, Head of Kaspersky EEMEA Virus Lab.
"Kido.ih has been active in other ME countries as well, being one of the most successful variant. It is also one of the last variants, with its authors apparently having stopped the active development of this family of malware. Nevertheless, it is still spreading in the wild and causing problems for users," he said.
Kaspersky Lab's malware report for Jordan also shows a proliferation of Sality, a virus that affected 14.32 percent of all the country's affected systems in December last year. This malware preferred attacks on home PC users.
"Sality, on the other hand, is most of the time passed through infected software, or it piggybacks on other malware, but seems to be more prevalent for home users. This makes its detection a non-trivial task," according to Raiu.
"It has worm capabilities, meaning, it can spread through networks, by copying itself to other computers directly. When it does that, it takes advantage of the Windows Autorun 'feature'. Because of all these things, Sality is not only hard to catch once it infects a system, but also hard to disinfect," he added
Other popular malware affecting Jordanian users in the same month included Mabezat - 8.84 percent of all infected computers - which operates by attaching itself to executables, while being polymorphic and spreading through network drives.
Sunday, March 14, 2010 |
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The Shia Crescent Revisited
By Rannie Amiri
It was not just a geographic designation but a warning that King Abdullah had issued after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. It spoke of the consequences of a string of countries where the Shia were either the majority and held power (Iraq and Iran), were of a sizable minority in close proximity (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states – with the exception of Bahrain, where they constitute an overwhelming majority but are nevertheless not in power), formed a plurality (Lebanon), or maintained close ties with Iran (Syria, although technically run by Alawis). Without a doubt, his comments belied a racism consistent with the Arab Shias’ historical discrimination at the hands of both religious and secular Sunni Arab rulers.
Three seminal events
Punctuating the apprehensions of King Abdullah II, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and the royal families from the Gulf countries to Morocco were three seminal events:
First was the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Iran and the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It stoked fears that what had led to the toppling of a Western-backed tyrant would soon find its way to their borders. The internal fallout was the ostracization of the Arab world’s Shia Muslims who were now regarded as “fifth columnists” for Iran – a non-Arab Shia country.
Indeed, in a 2006 interview with Al-Arabiya TV, Mubarak deliberately conflated Arab Shias with Iranians and questioned their fidelity: “There are Shias in all these countries (of the region), significant percentages, and Shias are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live.”
Second was the 2004 fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the end of Ba’ath party rule, both of which had persecuted and brutally suppressed the country’s Shia population for decades.
Third was the integration of Hezbollah into Lebanon’s political structure and the widespread popularity of its leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. After nearly two decades of occupation, Hezbollah forcing the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 and battling them to a draw in the July 2006 war made Nasrallah one of the most admired leaders in the Middle East. The silence of the region’s heads of state while Lebanon came under relentless Israeli bombardment in 2006 was in contrast to the support both he and Hezbollah had found on the Arab street.
Unbalanced power
The “traditional balance of power” which Abdullah so feared was in jeopardy of being “altered” as a result of the above events betrays a history of deep political and socioeconomic marginalization of the Shia. Detailing it is beyond the scope of this article, but readers are referred to The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims by Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke (Pelgrave Macmillin, 2000) for further reference.
So is Abdullah’s concern for maintaining the “traditional balance of power” simply a hope for the continued domination of the Sunni Muslim political elite over the Shia? Is this what he feared would be “altered” by the end of Saddam Hussein’s despotism? Rather than hope for a brighter future for all Iraqis, apparent regret over a more equitable redistribution of power speaks volumes.
The recent explanation and clarification of his original remarks this past January was not only disingenuous, but continues to fuel misconceptions and stereotypes:
The one who created and promulgated the “Shia crescent” concept was King Abdullah himself, as his 2004 statement clearly describes (down to the exact geography). Blame should not now be placed on the Iranian government. Doing so indicates that he has yet to forsake sectarianism as a political tool.
Abdullah is again keen on underlining the “fault line” between Muslims, this time extending it all the way to India. Even more telling is why he believes it to be such a “catastrophic subject.”
Should the Arab Shia be prohibited from freely airing their grievances and demanding accountability for past injustices? Stopped from speaking out against the crimes perpetrated against them under Saddam (in which many in the Arab world were complicit)? Prevented from attempting to lift the heavy hand of institutionalized discrimination levied against them in Saudi Arabia? Barred from seeking an end to their disenfranchisement in Bahrain – where they make up at least 70 percent of the population yet constitute no part of the government or security services? Forbidden from asking why the language of sectarianism was used to justify and amplify the carnage in north Yemen?
To open this subject and deal with it forthrightly and with justice would indeed be “catastrophic” to the regimes mentioned, and for all those who instigate, support, or benefit from these practices.
Unfortunately the people who have been pushing a sectarian agenda have been a handful of Middle East dictators and monarchs, specifically King Abdullah II of Jordan, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the Al-Khalifah family in Bahrain, King Mohammed VI of Morocco, and President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. Each of these countries – Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and Yemen – are guilty of fanning sectarian flames.
In Aug. 2009, Jordan put six Shia Muslims on trial in a military court “for promoting Shia ideology.” And both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have recently been harshly criticized by Human Rights Watch for overtly discriminatory practices toward, and torture of their Shia citizens.
Even the desperate people of Gaza have suffered as a consequence; it was the Arab regimes who abandoned Gaza’s Palestinians while Israel imposed its inhumane siege on them, and one of the main reasons was Iran’s vocal support for Hamas.
Why Mid-East leaders promote sectarianism
So why do these leaders promote sectarianism?
To answer this, one must have some familiarity with the Shia ethos.
Ingrained in the fifth school of Islam is the notion of resistance against despotic rule and rulers. This dates back to the epic battle fought on the plains of Karbala, Iraq by the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Hussain, against the tyrannical reign of the caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya in the year 680 A.D. Outnumbered by the tens of thousands, Hussain and his small band of followers fought bravely but were brutally massacred. The “tragedy of Karbala” as it known continues to serve as inspiration to the Shia; endowing them with the belief that standing up to oppression and injustice, no matter how great or at what odds, is an act of faith.
The events of Karbala were recalled by Khomeini in the 1979 Revolution deposing the Shah and even by anti-government protestors after Iran’s June’s elections. Although it would be incorrect to conclude that Shias are in a continuous state of revolt against the established order of the state, their 1991 uprising against Saddam in aftermath of the first Gulf War, Hezbollah’s battles against the militarily superior Israeli Army in the 1990s and 2006, and the recent clashes between Zaidi Shia rebels and the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, are all viewed with a leery eye by the Sunni political class in the Middle East.
The aforementioned regimes therefore believe that if a “Shia crescent” was to take shape and become reality, their authority, power and influence might be swept aside by the people as quickly as was the Shah’s.
They also believe that if Arab Shias were accorded fair and equal rights, given the full benefits of citizenship, not treated as fifth columnists, not conflated with “Persians” and accorded the same dignity and religious liberties as all other citizens, domestic harmony would exist and render ineffective the use of sectarianism to further anti-Iranian sentiment.
If they did forsake it, attention could instead be paid to more pressing issues such as education, economic development, combating corruption, ending poverty and resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
One is left to wonder, though, whether these leaders believe it best to purposely ignore these critical needs in favor of conjuring up fictitious crescents, lest it unmask their own incompetence in real governance.
Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at rbamiri AT yahoo DOT com.
“If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government, a new ‘crescent’ of dominant Shia movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon could emerge, he [King Abdullah of Jordan] said, alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to U.S. interests and allies.”Although Jordan’s reigning monarch had the dubious distinction of being the first to publicly articulate the fears of Arab dictators over the rise of the region’s Shia Muslims – perceived as the emergence of a “Shia crescent” – it had no doubt been in their collective conscience ever since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.
-- The Washington Post, 8 December 2004.
Zakaria: “You spoke a couple of years ago about the danger of a Shia crescent, meaning the Shias in Iran, a Shia-dominated government in Iraq, presumably Shias in the Gulf. Do you regret having made that comment?”
King Abdullah: “No, well, that’s not what I said. What I said is I was worried about members – certain members – of the Iranian government using an agenda to create the perception of a Shia crescent, because the last thing that we need in this part of the world is a conflict between Sunnis and Shias. And so when I raise the alarm bell, I saw a political strategy that would as an endgame have the Sunnis and Shias at each other’s throats ... the fault line between Shias and Sunnis goes from Beirut all the way to Bombay and it’s a catastrophic subject to play with. In my view, I felt that there was an agenda out there that was going to try and push it in that respect, and also raising the alarm bell that that cannot happen.”
-- Excerpt from Fareed Zakaria’s interview with King Abdullah II in Davos, Switzerland, 29 January 2010.
It was not just a geographic designation but a warning that King Abdullah had issued after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. It spoke of the consequences of a string of countries where the Shia were either the majority and held power (Iraq and Iran), were of a sizable minority in close proximity (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states – with the exception of Bahrain, where they constitute an overwhelming majority but are nevertheless not in power), formed a plurality (Lebanon), or maintained close ties with Iran (Syria, although technically run by Alawis). Without a doubt, his comments belied a racism consistent with the Arab Shias’ historical discrimination at the hands of both religious and secular Sunni Arab rulers.
Three seminal events
Punctuating the apprehensions of King Abdullah II, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and the royal families from the Gulf countries to Morocco were three seminal events:
First was the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Iran and the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It stoked fears that what had led to the toppling of a Western-backed tyrant would soon find its way to their borders. The internal fallout was the ostracization of the Arab world’s Shia Muslims who were now regarded as “fifth columnists” for Iran – a non-Arab Shia country.
Indeed, in a 2006 interview with Al-Arabiya TV, Mubarak deliberately conflated Arab Shias with Iranians and questioned their fidelity: “There are Shias in all these countries (of the region), significant percentages, and Shias are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live.”
Second was the 2004 fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the end of Ba’ath party rule, both of which had persecuted and brutally suppressed the country’s Shia population for decades.
Third was the integration of Hezbollah into Lebanon’s political structure and the widespread popularity of its leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. After nearly two decades of occupation, Hezbollah forcing the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 and battling them to a draw in the July 2006 war made Nasrallah one of the most admired leaders in the Middle East. The silence of the region’s heads of state while Lebanon came under relentless Israeli bombardment in 2006 was in contrast to the support both he and Hezbollah had found on the Arab street.
Unbalanced power
The “traditional balance of power” which Abdullah so feared was in jeopardy of being “altered” as a result of the above events betrays a history of deep political and socioeconomic marginalization of the Shia. Detailing it is beyond the scope of this article, but readers are referred to The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims by Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke (Pelgrave Macmillin, 2000) for further reference.
So is Abdullah’s concern for maintaining the “traditional balance of power” simply a hope for the continued domination of the Sunni Muslim political elite over the Shia? Is this what he feared would be “altered” by the end of Saddam Hussein’s despotism? Rather than hope for a brighter future for all Iraqis, apparent regret over a more equitable redistribution of power speaks volumes.
The recent explanation and clarification of his original remarks this past January was not only disingenuous, but continues to fuel misconceptions and stereotypes:
“I was worried about members ... of the Iranian government using an agenda to create the perception of a Shia crescent.”
The one who created and promulgated the “Shia crescent” concept was King Abdullah himself, as his 2004 statement clearly describes (down to the exact geography). Blame should not now be placed on the Iranian government. Doing so indicates that he has yet to forsake sectarianism as a political tool.
“ ... the fault line between Shias and Sunnis goes from Beirut all the way to Bombay and it’s a catastrophic subject to play with.”
Abdullah is again keen on underlining the “fault line” between Muslims, this time extending it all the way to India. Even more telling is why he believes it to be such a “catastrophic subject.”
Should the Arab Shia be prohibited from freely airing their grievances and demanding accountability for past injustices? Stopped from speaking out against the crimes perpetrated against them under Saddam (in which many in the Arab world were complicit)? Prevented from attempting to lift the heavy hand of institutionalized discrimination levied against them in Saudi Arabia? Barred from seeking an end to their disenfranchisement in Bahrain – where they make up at least 70 percent of the population yet constitute no part of the government or security services? Forbidden from asking why the language of sectarianism was used to justify and amplify the carnage in north Yemen?
To open this subject and deal with it forthrightly and with justice would indeed be “catastrophic” to the regimes mentioned, and for all those who instigate, support, or benefit from these practices.
“I felt that there was an agenda out there that was going to try and push it in that respect, and also raising the alarm bell that that cannot happen.”
Unfortunately the people who have been pushing a sectarian agenda have been a handful of Middle East dictators and monarchs, specifically King Abdullah II of Jordan, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the Al-Khalifah family in Bahrain, King Mohammed VI of Morocco, and President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. Each of these countries – Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and Yemen – are guilty of fanning sectarian flames.
In Aug. 2009, Jordan put six Shia Muslims on trial in a military court “for promoting Shia ideology.” And both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have recently been harshly criticized by Human Rights Watch for overtly discriminatory practices toward, and torture of their Shia citizens.
Even the desperate people of Gaza have suffered as a consequence; it was the Arab regimes who abandoned Gaza’s Palestinians while Israel imposed its inhumane siege on them, and one of the main reasons was Iran’s vocal support for Hamas.
Why Mid-East leaders promote sectarianism
So why do these leaders promote sectarianism?
To answer this, one must have some familiarity with the Shia ethos.
Ingrained in the fifth school of Islam is the notion of resistance against despotic rule and rulers. This dates back to the epic battle fought on the plains of Karbala, Iraq by the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Hussain, against the tyrannical reign of the caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya in the year 680 A.D. Outnumbered by the tens of thousands, Hussain and his small band of followers fought bravely but were brutally massacred. The “tragedy of Karbala” as it known continues to serve as inspiration to the Shia; endowing them with the belief that standing up to oppression and injustice, no matter how great or at what odds, is an act of faith.
The events of Karbala were recalled by Khomeini in the 1979 Revolution deposing the Shah and even by anti-government protestors after Iran’s June’s elections. Although it would be incorrect to conclude that Shias are in a continuous state of revolt against the established order of the state, their 1991 uprising against Saddam in aftermath of the first Gulf War, Hezbollah’s battles against the militarily superior Israeli Army in the 1990s and 2006, and the recent clashes between Zaidi Shia rebels and the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, are all viewed with a leery eye by the Sunni political class in the Middle East.
The aforementioned regimes therefore believe that if a “Shia crescent” was to take shape and become reality, their authority, power and influence might be swept aside by the people as quickly as was the Shah’s.
They also believe that if Arab Shias were accorded fair and equal rights, given the full benefits of citizenship, not treated as fifth columnists, not conflated with “Persians” and accorded the same dignity and religious liberties as all other citizens, domestic harmony would exist and render ineffective the use of sectarianism to further anti-Iranian sentiment.
If they did forsake it, attention could instead be paid to more pressing issues such as education, economic development, combating corruption, ending poverty and resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
One is left to wonder, though, whether these leaders believe it best to purposely ignore these critical needs in favor of conjuring up fictitious crescents, lest it unmask their own incompetence in real governance.
Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at rbamiri AT yahoo DOT com.
Sunday, February 21, 2010 |
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Why The European Union Needs A ‘Broader Middle East’ Policy
By Edward Burke, Ana Echagüe and Richard Youngs for FRIDE
European foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a highly fragmented construction. Since the mid-1990s the EU’s policies with Maghreb and Mashreq countries have been pursued under the rubric of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and now the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
This plethora of highly institutionalised initiatives has been developed with negligible linkage to policy in the rest of the Middle East. Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remain low key and strikingly disconnected from the EMP. Contrary to its rhetorical emphasis on supporting regional integration around the world, the EU has failed to build its strategy towards Iran and Iraq into a regional security framework. Even more reproachable, given its credibility and influence in the economic sphere, has been the EU’s inability to foster regional economic integration between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.
Many member states have for long held up the Mediterranean’s separation from other dimensions of Middle Eastern policy as a positive distinction of European foreign policy. This overarching policy design certainly seems highly distinctive to the United States, other powers and international institutions who structure their efforts in terms of a Middle East policy rather than separate Mediterranean and Gulf policies.
Many European diplomats still argue that organising policy around a Mediterranean logic is a welcome advance on the historical legacy of colonialism.
However, important trends now render the divide between Europe’s Mediterranean and Gulf policies increasingly incongruous. We identify here two factors that are of particular importance. First, Gulf states are increasingly active in and interdependent with Mediterranean (Maghreb and Mashreq) states.
Second, the Obama administration is making efforts to re-engage more positively with the Arab world in a way that links together challenges in different parts of the Middle East. It makes little sense for the EU to work against the grain of these trends.
In response to these changes, the EU should work towards a single Middle East policy. Splitting up North Africa and the rest of the Middle East for the EU’s bureaucratic convenience belies the political logic of the region. The continued resistance of many member states to such a step is a costly mistake. It privileges narrow-minded short-term interest to the detriment of strategic foresight. We suggest six policy questions in
relation to which Europe, southern Mediterranean states and Gulf countries can more productively work together under a broader Middle East regional framework.
The Gulf in the Mediterranean
Gulf states are playing an increasingly influential role in the Mediterranean. This trend has been most recently illustrated by the repercussions of the Dubai debt restructuring announcement on the Egyptian stock exchange.1 European Middle Eastern policy must begin to react to the deeper linkages taking shape between the Gulf and the Mediterranean in a range of areas: economics, politics, social and communications exchanges, remittances and development assistance.
The long decline and traumatic implosion of Iraq, the isolation of Egypt following its recognition of Israel, and suspicions over Syria’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, combined with the poor economic performance of all three countries, have resulted in the rise of Saudi Arabia as the most influential country in the Arab world. Saudi leadership has yet to prove effective – the country has been late to get involved in Iraq, thwarted in its attempts to create a unity government in Palestine, caught flat-footed in its response to an escalating terrorist threat from Yemen and obliged to watch others take the initiative in Lebanon. However, its rising power cannot be ignored.
Saudi Arabia has spent millions supporting Lebanon’s pro-western Sunni political bloc in its struggle with Hezbollah, is critical to the future stability of Yemen and is seen as the only regional power capable of bringing Arab countries into line with the goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal.2
Qatar has also taken it upon itself to act as mediator in regional affairs. Its increasing diplomatic hyperactivity has been viewed as an annoyance by the US, except perhaps for its involvement in negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for a ceasefire and the movement of Hezbollah’s militia away from the border with Israel.
Qatar is seen by the US to be unhelpful in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the challenge of Iranian ambitions, and is generally regarded as punching above its weight. Saudi Arabia has also viewed Qatar’s mediation efforts, most particularly in Lebanon and Yemen, with a strong degree of scepticism. Ultimately, however, Qatar’s ties with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Zaydi Shia rebels in Yemen, as well as its long-standing ties with Israel, give it unique leverage and position in the region. The highly disparate approaches of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to regional diplomacy, combined with the pragmatism of the other GCC member states’ relations with Iran, have severely hampered prospects for the emergence of a common Gulf political strategy for the region.
Economically, MENA trade and investment figures confirm a glaring, and even widening, gap between wealth concentrated in the GCC and the struggles of the Maghreb and Mashreq. The GCC’s population is a mere 42.5 million out of a total 345 million for the region, yet it dominates the region’s foreign exports earnings. In 2007 $477 billion of the MENA region’s total exports of $654 billion were from the GCC countries.3 The relative peace enjoyed within the Gulf, the decoupling of political disputes from the maintenance of pragmatic economic relations, improved management of energy revenues leading to a degree of economic diversification, and the emergence of the region’s only truly successful economic union, the GCC, has resulted in the region rapidly out-performing other countries in the MENA. In recent years Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its share of new intra-Arab investments to over 50 per cent.4
GCC investments in the region have grown considerably, due to a period of high energy revenues and increased investor confidence following infrastructure and internal market reforms in many Mashreq and Maghreb countries. From 2003 to 2008 GCC countries’ investment in the rest of the MENA amounted to over $110 billion.5 The rapid increase of trade with the rest of the MENA, coupled with rising intra-GCC trade, means that the EU’s share of overall investment by GCC countries is declining. Such a trend is corroborated by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which has reported a 10-15 per cent rise in FDI holdings from the GCC in other MENA countries.6 The type of GCC investment has also shifted: whereas in the 1970s and the 1980s GCC investments in the MENA were mainly in hydrocarbons and real estate, today they include financial services and manufacturing – these two sectors together add up to the 70 per cent of GCC investments in Egypt for 2007-2008, for example. The UAE is easily the most prolific Gulf investor in the Mashreq and the Maghreb, holding over 52 per cent of new investments from 2003 to late 2009, a significant portion of which are Dubai held assets.7
The GCC also has a rapidly increasing influence over the development of communications in the region, not least with regard to the proliferation of news and entertainment channels. Arabsat has more than 164 million viewers, carrying such channels as al-Jazeera, which has a major influence on pan-Arab opinion. An important recent measure led by the GCC states was the establishment of an Arab Network of Regulators (ARNET), which has moved to harmonise regulatory practices including National Information and Communication Technology (ICT).8
The value of Gulf investments over those from Europe can be measured in sheer scale. An average Gulf investment in the MENA is $268 million compared to $70 million from Europe.9 Gulf investors have become a vital source of job creation in the region.
GCC investments now constitute a third of foreign holding in Egypt and almost half in Jordan. (In contrast, GCC investors have avoided Algeria due to the complexity of regulations and the erratic behaviour of the government in Algiers.10) Despite an ambiguous political relationship with the Iraqi government, the UAE and Kuwait have recognised the enormous economic potential of Iraq and have been willing to put aside distaste for some of that country’s ruling factions to invest heavily – the UAE topped the list of foreign investors for the first nine months of 2009 with holdings of $37 billion, while Kuwait spent $6.8 billion.11
The long period of economic decline in the 1980s and 1990s after the misspent boom of the 1970s, during which time the MENA share of global trade fell from 8 per cent to 2.5 per cent, served as a sharp lesson for the region.12 Despite the failure to negotiate a comprehensive FTA for the MENA, in 2007 intraregional trade constituted 11.1 per cent of total foreign trade. This is still a modest figure, but a significant increase from the stagnant levels of the mid-1990s. In the non-energy sector, intraregional trade now accounts for just under 25 per cent of all exports.13
Many problems persist. The negotiation and implementation of a raft of trade agreements aimed at integrating the economies of the MENA has been notoriously slow and ineffectual. Implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), negotiated in 1997, has varied considerably from country to country.
The World Bank estimates that the total gain from GAFTA to the MENA economy has so far amounted to a modest 0.1 per cent boost to regional income, which compares very unfavourably with the benefits of bilateral trade agreements with the EU.14
In the same way, the lack of integration of the MENA with the global economy represents a missed opportunity for economic growth – the World Bank has calculated that if the MENA had maintained its 1985 share of world exports (which was already relatively low), it would have received some $2 trillion in extra export revenues during the period 1986-2003. By extension, if a comprehensive MENA FTA existed during this period it would have boosted trade by a further 147 per cent.15
However, while such problems exist, the emerging opportunities of deeper intra-MENA integration reflect an incipient trend that the EU should lock onto.
The reasons for the non-emergence of a free trade area in the MENA include the frequency of war and severe political disagreement in the region, high transportation and communication costs and, perhaps most importantly, the preponderance of a corrupt and bloated public sector. In some ways, external actors have added to the problems: the lure of trade agreements with the US, the EU and other external powers has shifted the focus away from intra-regional efforts.16 The GCC has been quick to complain about not being consulted on EU initiatives in the Maghreb and Mashreq, such as the Union for the Mediterranean – although it has itself been generally reactive and unimaginative in its relations with other Arab states.17
Although the proportion of expatriate Arab workers in the Gulf has declined considerably since the 1970s and 1980s, remittances to other Arab countries remain a vital source of income, totalling $31 billion in 2008.
The MENA region mainly relies on two regions, the GCC and the EU, as a source of remittances. Egypt and Morocco receive the highest volume of remittances in the MENA region. Remittances to Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt are predominately derived from expatriate labour in the GCC, while those of Morocco and Algeria are mostly from the EU. Iraq and Syria are exceptions to the Mashreq-Maghreb divide, as for these states
both the EU and the GCC are an important source of remittances. As a share of GDP for countries in the region, Lebanon ranks highest with 20 per cent and 400,000 expatriates in the Gulf alone, followed by Jordan at 14 per cent, and Morocco at 8 per cent.18
There is, finally, a growing trend of MENA dependence on aid from the Gulf region. In 2007 alone Jordan received $565 million in aid from Saudi Arabia.19
There is also an increasing awareness within the GCC of the leading role the Gulf must play in preparing the MENA for the challenges the region will face in the future – 80 million new jobs alone will have to be created in the region by 2020 to avoid severe political and social upheaval in an already combustible regional environment.20 There have been some encouraging signs that the Gulf is increasing its aid to the MENA.
GCC member states’ aid is predominantly distributed bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels. The main multilateral institutions in the region are the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Arab Fund), the OPEC Fund for International Development (OPEC Fund), the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Of these, the IDB distributes the largest amount of multilateral assistance in the region, providing 38 per cent of the total, compared to 30 per cent from the Arab Fund, 17 per cent from the AMF and 10 per cent from the OPEC Fund. The Saudi Fund for Development operates almost exclusively in the form of bilateral loans from a capital base of $8.2 billion.21 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development also provides similar loans to recipient governments. In total the Kuwait Fund has provided 17 per cent of Arab financial aid during the last thirty years, compared to 4 per cent of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development.22 The Saudi Fund allocates half its budget to Arab countries, similar to that of the Kuwait Fund but less than the 79 per cent distributed to Arab recipients by the Abu Dhabi Fund.
The OPEC Fund, by contrast, concentrates its $3.5 billion capital on projects in sub-Saharan Africa, contributing only 17 per cent of its annual budget to the MENA region.23 In 2007 the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, donated $10 billion towards supporting the education of young Arabs in the region.
The GCC member state Development Funds that provide loans and other forms of assistance generally do not maintain an in-country team to monitor the use of funds and there are few reporting obligations on the part of the recipient country. Yet there are emerging exceptions. Innovative Gulf development organisations such as ‘Dubai Cares’ have already gained a reputation for their close monitoring of projects, working with international NGOs such as Care International, and may offer a useful template for other emerging Gulf development agencies. A cash-strapped Europe would do well to seize upon opportunities for the enhanced coordination of development funds and programmes with willing Gulf partners.
The initial years of excessive optimism on the part of GCC investors and recipient countries are now likely to give way to a more realistic review of investments following the global financial crisis, beginning with a debt-ridden Dubai. A serious downturn in the GCC may feel like a ‘crash landing’ for the rest of the MENA.
Egypt, with over two million citizens working in the GCC, is heavily dependent upon the $3 billion of remittances it receives from this labour. Any further increases in food prices in the region could also see an increase in unrest, as already witnessed in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen during 2008 and the first half of 2009. Reduced EU and GCC remittances, investment and development assistance will seriously strain governments’ ability to maintain political and economic stability in the region.
For now much of the Gulf appears to have weathered the economic storm, largely due to resurgent oil prices, but both regions would do well to take note of the vulnerability of parts of the Mashreq and Maghreb to the current global crisis.
Obama’s re-engagement
A second trend highly germane to the design of European Middle Eastern policy is the evolution of US strategy in the region. The administration of Barack Obama has sought to move beyond the more pernicious elements of the Bush era, by engaging in the Middle East with a new tone and a more sophisticated effort to link the region’s problems together in a more holistic strategy. The EU needs to seize this as an opportunity and support such efforts rather than undercut them by stubbornly prioritising the institutional structures of its own fragmented Middle Eastern initiatives.
The EU has traditionally been very protective of its policies towards the Mediterranean construct in an attempt to carve out for itself a parcel of influence within the dominant US policy towards the Middle East. The Mediterranean offered an area where the EU could claim an advantage and where it did not have to follow the US’s lead. Obama’s efforts at re-starting the US relationship with the Middle East on a more even footing offer an opportunity for the EU to let go of an outdated mind-set which has proved pernicious to its interests. By parcelling out the Mediterranean as a Euro-sphere of influence, the EU has ceded the upper hand (even further) to the US in the Gulf. Obama’s new MENA policies restructure the EU-US-MENA triangle, and require a flexible response from the EU.
Institutionally, the US approach to the region reflects a broader approach, with the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs covering all Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf countries while singling out Iraq, Palestine, counterterrorism and economic and political reform as particular regional concerns. The EU would be well served to heed this approach, not in an effort to mimic the US, but because it is reflective of geographic and geostrategic reality.
Gulf states view the ‘Mediterranean’ as defined by the EU as a construct less reflective of local realities than of European interests. The EU often overlooks the strong relations between Mediterranean and Gulf states and the bonds of ‘Arabism’ that play into these relations. The Obama administration has heralded changes in tone and approach, which make it easier for the EU to respond and engage in a broader Middle East policy.
There has been a significant change in style, tone and attitude which reflects greater sensitivity, a US willingness to engage and to listen rather than dictate.
The Obama administration’s change of approach has also been reflected in the newfound willingness to engage with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in an effort to seek negotiated solutions to long-standing problems. This is the type of approach long favoured by the EU and a far cry from the axis of evil listings promulgated by Bush.
As Obama stated in an interview with Al Arabiya, the US is ‘ready to initiate a new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest.’ Under-Secretary of State William Burns further elaborated: ‘We have reoriented our approach to diplomacy, focusing on partnership, pragmatism, and principle. This puts a premium on listening to each other, respecting differences and seeking common ground and areas of shared interests.’24 This attempt to reconcile principle and pragmatism reflects the EU’s stated approach to external affairs, although in reality it is often member state narrow interests that take precedence over EU principles. The potential for deeper US-EU cooperation in the region is being squandered by the competition between member states to secure lucrative bilateral defence procurement deals. While the extent of discussions with European governments is unclear, France, Spain and Germany have been talking with individual members of the GCC about security issues.25
The failure of the EU and US to coordinate means that both are beginning to lose out to third players, not only in terms of defence procurement but also in terms of trade and energy. Up to now, American and European military suppliers have provided 90 per cent of the weapons sought by the Gulf countries. But now a potential Russian deal has taken shape to sell $2 billion worth of tanks and helicopters to Saudi Arabia. In 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Saudi Arabia, the first official visit by a Russian head of state to the kingdom. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia as a member of the G20, have played an important role in supporting international efforts to stem the global financial crisis. While the GCC’s weight in economics and international finance has increased, the half century of US predominance in the region in economic terms is over. The centre of gravity is clearly shifting eastwards as the loss of US standing in the region is being filled not by Europe, but rather by emerging Asian states.
The Obama administration believes that the challenges which confront the US in the region - regional conflicts, undiversified economies, unresponsive political systems, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and violent extremist groups - are all connected and thus should be treated simultaneously, on a panregional basis.
It also recognises the significant role Gulf states could play in regional issues. In June 2009 Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the array of security issues affecting the Gulf are all interrelated, and thus would be best addressed through a comprehensive approach. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke has stated that the US seeks to ‘establish an intellectual strategic base’ with the Gulf states to coordinate policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Middle East issues. On Iran, the Gulf states have repeatedly asked the US to coordinate its policies with them.
The Obama administration has also declared a willingness to address the Israel-Palestine issue as a vital lynchpin of progress on all other issues in the region. For the first time the US seems to acknowledge the importance of a conflict which other Arab states consider to be the key to regional stability. Although Obama began well by appointing as his Middle East special envoy the respected former senator George Mitchell and calling for a freeze on all Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, his resolve has since floundered and disappointment has set in throughout the region. At the beginning of December 2009 the EU agreed on a statement of policy on Palestine and Israel which the US considered to be an unwelcome intrusion.
If the EU had not willingly ceded ground to the US in all areas save the Mediterranean, its policies could be coordinated with, rather than being subservient to, the US. It is no longer expedient for the EU to sit back in the knowledge that the Gulf region is a US sphere of influence. Despite Obama’s ‘punt on multilateralism’ it is unlikely that the US administration will go out of its way to cooperate with the EU in the Gulf. The Obama administration might prefer to work with a more united Europe, but it is up to the EU to live up to the rhetoric and forge a strategy in the Gulf that places it in a credible role as interlocutor for both the US and the GCC. To do so it must incorporate the Gulf and the Mediterranean into a common overarching MENA strategy. A more proactive EU role which takes into account the Gulf states’ aspirations and builds on its credibility could go a long way towards reestablishing some of Europe’s lost influence in the region.
While the Obama administration is seeking to regain credibility, the EU can still play a much-needed role in helping smooth persistent tensions between the US and MENA countries. The US ‘has so far failed to come to terms with the GCC states defining their own interests outside of the context of the need for US military protection’.26 The US still has to realise that the security-for-oil equation is no longer a panacea. The Gulf
states feel neglected by the US, especially in terms of dealing with Iran, and annoyed at being asked publicly to provide confidence building measures to Israel. More than anything else the Gulf states want movement on the Palestinian front, for Iran to be contained but not appeased at their expense, and general recognition for their role in the region. On all these concerns, the EU needs to take advantage of the current juncture in US policy, help mediate between Washington and the region, and adapt its own policies to back up the stated desire for a more holistic approach.
Joining the dots
European Union policy statements and ministerial speeches often refer to the need to link together events and trends in different parts of the MENA region. In 2004, when defining the need for a European Strategic Partnership with the region, the European Council observed that ‘Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East are joined together both by geography and shared history. […] Our geographical proximity is a longstanding reality underpinning our growing interdependence; our policies in future years must reflect these realities and seek to ensure that they continue to develop positively.’27
There is much talk of the need for ‘triangulation’ between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf. But in practice it is remarkable how far European policy is still divided into separate ‘policy blocks’. One covers the Mediterranean, another the Gulf, another Iraq, another Iran, and yet another Yemen’s fragile state status. The disjuncture between the Mediterranean and Gulf components is especially notable. In 2008, amidst much fanfare, the Union for the Mediterranean was launched. At the same time, the EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Broader Middle East was being quietly forgotten. No attempt was made to get these two initiatives ‘talking to each other’.
Several member states have been actively hostile towards submerging the EU’s Mediterranean policy into a ‘broader Middle East’ policy. In a contemporary institutional sense, the ‘Mediterranean’ is a distinctively European construct. Other powers do not have ‘Mediterranean’ policies separate from their Middle East strategies. But the reasons for blocking better coordination are not good ones. Southern EU member states must move beyond a defensive position of defending ‘Mediterranean primacy’ merely because they fear losing a privileged EU focus on their immediate neighbours in North Africa. GCC states increasingly seek EU support for initiatives in the Middle East that dovetail with their own activity.
A broader and less fragmented approach to the Middle East would be especially valuable in relation to six policy challenges:
1) Iraq, Iran and regional security
It is often pointed out that the MENA is the only region lacking an institutionalised security framework. The EU should seek to exercise what influence it has to rectify this situation. It has the potential to play such a role by harnessing its firmly institutionalised ‘collective security’ arrangements in and with the southern Mediterranean as a template to extend into the broader Middle East. In particular this would entail triangulating EU-Mediterranean-GCC strategies towards Iran and Iraq. GCC states have for some time pushed the EU to assist more generously and determinedly in Iraq’s reconstruction and stabilisation;
Gulf states feel that the EU’s reluctance to engage fully in Iraq, to take GCC concerns over the direction of that country into account and to include the GCC in their planning for future strategy in that country represents one of the major strategic blockages in relations with Europe.28 Gulf concerns over events in Iraq and Iran, including fear of increasing Iranian influence, represent one of the region’s most pressing strategic preoccupations – one they feel Europe still has little empathy for.
The EU’s aims in this sense must of necessity be modest. But some concrete moves could begin to move security deliberations in this more pan-MENA direction. The Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East agreed in 2004 has been a profound disappointment, having delivered little in tangible terms that helps broaden out Europe’s policies across the MENA. New and much more concrete steps should be implemented. For example, the EU could hold joint meetings of its EU-Mediterranean and EU-GCC security dialogues, and use this as an opportunity to provide an incentive to Iraq and Iran to participate in the first steps towards a broader collective security architecture. This would constitute a major upgrading of the current ‘Iraq and its Neighbourhood’ multilateral initiative. By addressing Gulf concerns in this way, the EU would be more likely to convince GCC regimes to deploy their own vast financial resources to help stabilise Iraq.29
And it must be the case that a more unified EU-GCC-Mediterranean alliance would have much more chance to influence developments in Iran in a positive direction.
2) Palestine
Saudi Arabia and Egypt hold key roles in the Middle East peace process. There is some competition between their respective approaches and initiatives that risks being highly prejudicial. Here the EU might find a role in mediating and ensuring that such competition between Mediterranean and Gulf initiatives does not begin to harm the prospects for peace.
The EU should also move to reassure Saudi Arabia that rejection of the Fatah-Hamas Mecca Agreement in 2007 by the Bush administration represented a major missed opportunity to establish a working relationship between the two Palestinian factions and that the EU seeks strengthened cooperation with Riyadh on this crucial issue. The EU also urgently needs to engage other GCC states, not least Qatar, on its vision for a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, urging caution where necessary and harmonising efforts where possible. A sine qua non to an improved EU-GCC political relationship on this issue is for the EU to take a firm position against the continued expansion of Israeli settlements within the Palestinian territories.
3) Trade relations
The EU has been pursuing two free trade areas, one with the Mediterranean and another with the Gulf. The former is due for completion in 2010, but is well behind schedule. The free trade agreement with the GCC is still not signed, after nineteen years of talks. The EU should re-energise efforts to sign both these outstanding trade deals and demonstrate greater flexibility to this end.
But over the medium term, the two respective EU FTAs could and should be joined. It is well known that inter-regional interdependence is at a lower level in the Middle East than in other regions. Joining the separate strands of EU commercial relations together could help correct this dearth. Iraq’s putative Partnership and Cooperation Agreement could eventually be linked into this widened area of trade liberalisation. The EU could in this way use the undoubted leverage of its common commercial regulations and norms as a means of enhancing integration within the broader Middle East region – so vital in political and strategic terms for Europe and the region itself.
4) Responses to the financial crisis
The crisis is arriving in force on North Africa’s shores. The EU and the GCC have a joint interest in helping the Mediterranean weather the storm; it will be harder for each to help effectively on their own. Several European governments now work with Saudi Arabia within the G20. They should form an alliance to address together prudential regulatory weaknesses in the southern Mediterranean. The same implies the other way around: the regular dialogue and engagement the EU has built up in the Mediterranean could be extremely
helpful in shoring up European efforts to reach further and deeper into the Gulf. Much more cooperation is needed on international currency issues too. The fallout over the Dubai debt crisis in December 2009 also points to a need for an enhanced economic dialogue.
With the GCC inching towards a possible single currency, this is an obvious area of under-explored ‘lesson sharing’. It is an area of policy cooperation that needs to be triangulated with a Mediterranean dimension too, to reflect the growing economic and financial interdependence of different parts of the MENA region.
It is here that the EU should enhance cooperation with Gulf development funds, to pool efforts to palliate the effects of the financial crisis and encourage the economic and social reforms necessary to sustained recovery. In an effort to support regional economic integration across MENA, the EU could extend some of the funding projects and measures which have proved most effective in its relations with the Mediterranean countries, namely those relative to the economic basket, coordination of regulatory and legal reform, building standards and capacity, judicial training and reform, bureaucratic reform, technical cooperation and capacity building in cross-border projects, twinning, and administrative secondments.
5) Energy
Today it makes little sense for the EU to pursue separate energy dialogues and policies in the Mediterranean and Gulf. Policy-makers do recognise this. The prospective pan-Arab pipeline, which the EU has promised to support, requires a restructuring of European energy policy. Iraq, which holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas deposits and has an egregiously low reserve-to-production ratio, is perhaps the energy partner in the Middle East with which Europe is underperforming most. In January 2008, Commissioners Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations) and Andris Piebalgs (Energy) spoke of a new ‘EU-Iraq energy partnership’, noting that the EU was ‘keen to see Iraq play a full role in the Arab gas pipeline which will supply the EU including through the Nabucco.’ These encouraging statements have not been followed up by a regular high-level political and energy dialogue with Iraq, neither has significant assistance been forthcoming to improve Iraq’s creaking infrastructure in order to link it for export to European markets.30 There is also potential for the EU to link GCC energy exports through an enhanced pipeline grid via Iraq to European markets.
The Commission has proposed extending the structure of both the ENP Energy Treaty and the Euro-Med Common Energy House to the GCC states, as well as offering the latter the kind of energy agreement offered to Algeria and Egypt. Cooperation between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf has begun on the issue of solar energy. However, the continued impasse in trade negotiations between the EU and the GCC undercuts the prospects for other aspects of policy cooperation on a broader Middle East basis. The EU has proposed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation, but the GCC states have rejected the idea, insisting that an FTA is the precursor to deepening other areas of cooperation. A long-standing bi-annual EU-GCC energy experts meeting has been diminished rather than expanded in recent years, with officials of a lower level than was previously the case presiding on both sides. The Commission has sought to deepen energy cooperation at the bilateral level with individual GCC states, but here the potential is limited to technical issues such as reducing flaring and energy efficient product development. Elaborating a triangulated EU-Mediterranean-GCC energy strategy would offer the potential for unblocking some of these frustrating and persistent shortcomings.
6) Counter-terrorism
Saudi Arabia’s well-known influence over Islamist trends across the Mediterranean means that it must be brought into any comprehensive European efforts to deal with radicalisation. GCC cooperation is also critical to stopping the flow of money to jihadi groups in places such as Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon. The EU and the GCC also face a mounting terrorist threat emanating from Yemen. The GCC is the largest donor to Yemen and critical to the future stabilisation of that country. Although Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to engage in bi-lateral talks on Europe’s concerns in Yemen, other GCC countries have shown a more open approach. Enhanced cooperation on these issues will only arise out of a trust-building dialogue and strategic thinking with the Gulf on major political concerns in the region, an approach that has been evidently lacking to date.
Careful steps forward
In sum, the overarching institutional logic should be one of graduated regionalism. This does not mean abandoning existing initiatives, such as the EMP or ENP. But it does mean shifting the balance of diplomatic effort to deepen the linkages between the Mediterranean, the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. A better and clearer balance is required between bilateral, subregional and ‘broader Middle East’ dynamics. These different levels must be made to lock into and reinforce emerging pan-regional dynamics, rather than cutting across them. The ENP offers at least a partial model of ‘bilateralism-within-regionalism’, which could be useful within the broader Middle East too. The MENA region is changing; US policy in the region is changing too. If the EU fails to move with these changes, instead sticking fast to its own idiosyncratic institutional structures, this head-in-the-sand stubbornness will soon consign it to irrelevance.
Edward Burke and Ana Echagüe are researchers at FRIDE. Richard Youngs is a Director at FRIDE. This article (PDF) was originally published by FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
NOTES:
1 Andrew England, ‘First signs of contagion as Egyptian stocks take a battering’, The Financial Times, 1 December 2009.
2 Margaret Coker, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Renewed Political Influence Counters Tehran’, The Wall Street Journa1, 12 June 2009.
3 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’, pp. 104–114.
4 The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, ‘Investment Climate in the Arab countries’, 2007, p. 2.
5 Samba Financial Group, ‘Tracking GCC Foreign Investments: How the Strategies are Changing with Markets in Turmoil’, December 2008, p. 12.
6 Ibid, p. 4.
7 ANIMA Investment Network, ‘Mapping Investment in the Mediterranean’, 2 October 2009, http://www.animaweb.org/en/index.php
8 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
9 Pierre Henry, Samir Abdelkrim and Bénédict de Saint-Laurent, ‘Foreign direct investment into MEDA in 2007: The switch’, ANIMA Investment Network, July 2008.
10 Mahmoud Mohieldin, ‘Neighbourly Investments’, Finance and Development, December 2008.
11 Dunia Frontier Consultants, ‘Private Foreign Investment in Iraq: Update November 2009’, Dubai, November 2009.
12 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p. 1
13 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
14 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p.12.
15 Ibid, p. 8.
16 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
17 Speech by Prince Turki al-Faisal, Eurogolfe conference, Venice,
17 October 2008.
18 International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia’, May 2009.
19 Andrew Mernin, ‘Amman on a mission’, Arabian Business, 18 February 2007.
20 Lionel Barber, ‘Restive young a matter of national security’, The Financial Times, 2 June 2008.
21 See the website of the Saudi Fund for Development, www.sfd.gov.sa
22 Espen Villanger, ‘Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives’, CMI Report R 2007: 2, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, p. 9.
23 See the website of the OPEC Fund, www.ofid.org
24 Speech by William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Conference on ‘US-Saudi Relations in a World Without Equilibrium’, New America Foundation, 27 April 2009.
25 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Global Strategic Assessment 2009:America’s Security Role in a Changing World, Washington D.C., September 2009, p. 199.
26 Christian Koch, ‘Respecting Arab interests’, Khaleej Times, 26 October 2007.
27 See ‘Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf
28 Oxford Research Group, King Faisal Center, Saudi Diplomatic Institute, ‘From the Swamp to Tierra Firma: The regional role in the stabilization of Iraq’, June 2008.
29 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Europe and the Gulf Region – Towards a New Horizon’, Discussion paper presented at the 12th Kronberg Talks, Riyadh, May 2009, p. 16.
30 Edward Burke, ‘The Case for a New European Engagement in Iraq’, FRIDE Working Paper 74, January 2009.
European foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a highly fragmented construction. Since the mid-1990s the EU’s policies with Maghreb and Mashreq countries have been pursued under the rubric of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and now the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
This plethora of highly institutionalised initiatives has been developed with negligible linkage to policy in the rest of the Middle East. Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remain low key and strikingly disconnected from the EMP. Contrary to its rhetorical emphasis on supporting regional integration around the world, the EU has failed to build its strategy towards Iran and Iraq into a regional security framework. Even more reproachable, given its credibility and influence in the economic sphere, has been the EU’s inability to foster regional economic integration between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.
Many member states have for long held up the Mediterranean’s separation from other dimensions of Middle Eastern policy as a positive distinction of European foreign policy. This overarching policy design certainly seems highly distinctive to the United States, other powers and international institutions who structure their efforts in terms of a Middle East policy rather than separate Mediterranean and Gulf policies.
Many European diplomats still argue that organising policy around a Mediterranean logic is a welcome advance on the historical legacy of colonialism.
However, important trends now render the divide between Europe’s Mediterranean and Gulf policies increasingly incongruous. We identify here two factors that are of particular importance. First, Gulf states are increasingly active in and interdependent with Mediterranean (Maghreb and Mashreq) states.
Second, the Obama administration is making efforts to re-engage more positively with the Arab world in a way that links together challenges in different parts of the Middle East. It makes little sense for the EU to work against the grain of these trends.
In response to these changes, the EU should work towards a single Middle East policy. Splitting up North Africa and the rest of the Middle East for the EU’s bureaucratic convenience belies the political logic of the region. The continued resistance of many member states to such a step is a costly mistake. It privileges narrow-minded short-term interest to the detriment of strategic foresight. We suggest six policy questions in
relation to which Europe, southern Mediterranean states and Gulf countries can more productively work together under a broader Middle East regional framework.
The Gulf in the Mediterranean
Gulf states are playing an increasingly influential role in the Mediterranean. This trend has been most recently illustrated by the repercussions of the Dubai debt restructuring announcement on the Egyptian stock exchange.1 European Middle Eastern policy must begin to react to the deeper linkages taking shape between the Gulf and the Mediterranean in a range of areas: economics, politics, social and communications exchanges, remittances and development assistance.
The long decline and traumatic implosion of Iraq, the isolation of Egypt following its recognition of Israel, and suspicions over Syria’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, combined with the poor economic performance of all three countries, have resulted in the rise of Saudi Arabia as the most influential country in the Arab world. Saudi leadership has yet to prove effective – the country has been late to get involved in Iraq, thwarted in its attempts to create a unity government in Palestine, caught flat-footed in its response to an escalating terrorist threat from Yemen and obliged to watch others take the initiative in Lebanon. However, its rising power cannot be ignored.
Saudi Arabia has spent millions supporting Lebanon’s pro-western Sunni political bloc in its struggle with Hezbollah, is critical to the future stability of Yemen and is seen as the only regional power capable of bringing Arab countries into line with the goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal.2
Qatar has also taken it upon itself to act as mediator in regional affairs. Its increasing diplomatic hyperactivity has been viewed as an annoyance by the US, except perhaps for its involvement in negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for a ceasefire and the movement of Hezbollah’s militia away from the border with Israel.
Qatar is seen by the US to be unhelpful in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the challenge of Iranian ambitions, and is generally regarded as punching above its weight. Saudi Arabia has also viewed Qatar’s mediation efforts, most particularly in Lebanon and Yemen, with a strong degree of scepticism. Ultimately, however, Qatar’s ties with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Zaydi Shia rebels in Yemen, as well as its long-standing ties with Israel, give it unique leverage and position in the region. The highly disparate approaches of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to regional diplomacy, combined with the pragmatism of the other GCC member states’ relations with Iran, have severely hampered prospects for the emergence of a common Gulf political strategy for the region.
Economically, MENA trade and investment figures confirm a glaring, and even widening, gap between wealth concentrated in the GCC and the struggles of the Maghreb and Mashreq. The GCC’s population is a mere 42.5 million out of a total 345 million for the region, yet it dominates the region’s foreign exports earnings. In 2007 $477 billion of the MENA region’s total exports of $654 billion were from the GCC countries.3 The relative peace enjoyed within the Gulf, the decoupling of political disputes from the maintenance of pragmatic economic relations, improved management of energy revenues leading to a degree of economic diversification, and the emergence of the region’s only truly successful economic union, the GCC, has resulted in the region rapidly out-performing other countries in the MENA. In recent years Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its share of new intra-Arab investments to over 50 per cent.4
GCC investments in the region have grown considerably, due to a period of high energy revenues and increased investor confidence following infrastructure and internal market reforms in many Mashreq and Maghreb countries. From 2003 to 2008 GCC countries’ investment in the rest of the MENA amounted to over $110 billion.5 The rapid increase of trade with the rest of the MENA, coupled with rising intra-GCC trade, means that the EU’s share of overall investment by GCC countries is declining. Such a trend is corroborated by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which has reported a 10-15 per cent rise in FDI holdings from the GCC in other MENA countries.6 The type of GCC investment has also shifted: whereas in the 1970s and the 1980s GCC investments in the MENA were mainly in hydrocarbons and real estate, today they include financial services and manufacturing – these two sectors together add up to the 70 per cent of GCC investments in Egypt for 2007-2008, for example. The UAE is easily the most prolific Gulf investor in the Mashreq and the Maghreb, holding over 52 per cent of new investments from 2003 to late 2009, a significant portion of which are Dubai held assets.7
The GCC also has a rapidly increasing influence over the development of communications in the region, not least with regard to the proliferation of news and entertainment channels. Arabsat has more than 164 million viewers, carrying such channels as al-Jazeera, which has a major influence on pan-Arab opinion. An important recent measure led by the GCC states was the establishment of an Arab Network of Regulators (ARNET), which has moved to harmonise regulatory practices including National Information and Communication Technology (ICT).8
The value of Gulf investments over those from Europe can be measured in sheer scale. An average Gulf investment in the MENA is $268 million compared to $70 million from Europe.9 Gulf investors have become a vital source of job creation in the region.
GCC investments now constitute a third of foreign holding in Egypt and almost half in Jordan. (In contrast, GCC investors have avoided Algeria due to the complexity of regulations and the erratic behaviour of the government in Algiers.10) Despite an ambiguous political relationship with the Iraqi government, the UAE and Kuwait have recognised the enormous economic potential of Iraq and have been willing to put aside distaste for some of that country’s ruling factions to invest heavily – the UAE topped the list of foreign investors for the first nine months of 2009 with holdings of $37 billion, while Kuwait spent $6.8 billion.11
The long period of economic decline in the 1980s and 1990s after the misspent boom of the 1970s, during which time the MENA share of global trade fell from 8 per cent to 2.5 per cent, served as a sharp lesson for the region.12 Despite the failure to negotiate a comprehensive FTA for the MENA, in 2007 intraregional trade constituted 11.1 per cent of total foreign trade. This is still a modest figure, but a significant increase from the stagnant levels of the mid-1990s. In the non-energy sector, intraregional trade now accounts for just under 25 per cent of all exports.13
Many problems persist. The negotiation and implementation of a raft of trade agreements aimed at integrating the economies of the MENA has been notoriously slow and ineffectual. Implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), negotiated in 1997, has varied considerably from country to country.
The World Bank estimates that the total gain from GAFTA to the MENA economy has so far amounted to a modest 0.1 per cent boost to regional income, which compares very unfavourably with the benefits of bilateral trade agreements with the EU.14
In the same way, the lack of integration of the MENA with the global economy represents a missed opportunity for economic growth – the World Bank has calculated that if the MENA had maintained its 1985 share of world exports (which was already relatively low), it would have received some $2 trillion in extra export revenues during the period 1986-2003. By extension, if a comprehensive MENA FTA existed during this period it would have boosted trade by a further 147 per cent.15
However, while such problems exist, the emerging opportunities of deeper intra-MENA integration reflect an incipient trend that the EU should lock onto.
The reasons for the non-emergence of a free trade area in the MENA include the frequency of war and severe political disagreement in the region, high transportation and communication costs and, perhaps most importantly, the preponderance of a corrupt and bloated public sector. In some ways, external actors have added to the problems: the lure of trade agreements with the US, the EU and other external powers has shifted the focus away from intra-regional efforts.16 The GCC has been quick to complain about not being consulted on EU initiatives in the Maghreb and Mashreq, such as the Union for the Mediterranean – although it has itself been generally reactive and unimaginative in its relations with other Arab states.17
Although the proportion of expatriate Arab workers in the Gulf has declined considerably since the 1970s and 1980s, remittances to other Arab countries remain a vital source of income, totalling $31 billion in 2008.
The MENA region mainly relies on two regions, the GCC and the EU, as a source of remittances. Egypt and Morocco receive the highest volume of remittances in the MENA region. Remittances to Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt are predominately derived from expatriate labour in the GCC, while those of Morocco and Algeria are mostly from the EU. Iraq and Syria are exceptions to the Mashreq-Maghreb divide, as for these states
both the EU and the GCC are an important source of remittances. As a share of GDP for countries in the region, Lebanon ranks highest with 20 per cent and 400,000 expatriates in the Gulf alone, followed by Jordan at 14 per cent, and Morocco at 8 per cent.18
There is, finally, a growing trend of MENA dependence on aid from the Gulf region. In 2007 alone Jordan received $565 million in aid from Saudi Arabia.19
There is also an increasing awareness within the GCC of the leading role the Gulf must play in preparing the MENA for the challenges the region will face in the future – 80 million new jobs alone will have to be created in the region by 2020 to avoid severe political and social upheaval in an already combustible regional environment.20 There have been some encouraging signs that the Gulf is increasing its aid to the MENA.
GCC member states’ aid is predominantly distributed bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels. The main multilateral institutions in the region are the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Arab Fund), the OPEC Fund for International Development (OPEC Fund), the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Of these, the IDB distributes the largest amount of multilateral assistance in the region, providing 38 per cent of the total, compared to 30 per cent from the Arab Fund, 17 per cent from the AMF and 10 per cent from the OPEC Fund. The Saudi Fund for Development operates almost exclusively in the form of bilateral loans from a capital base of $8.2 billion.21 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development also provides similar loans to recipient governments. In total the Kuwait Fund has provided 17 per cent of Arab financial aid during the last thirty years, compared to 4 per cent of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development.22 The Saudi Fund allocates half its budget to Arab countries, similar to that of the Kuwait Fund but less than the 79 per cent distributed to Arab recipients by the Abu Dhabi Fund.
The OPEC Fund, by contrast, concentrates its $3.5 billion capital on projects in sub-Saharan Africa, contributing only 17 per cent of its annual budget to the MENA region.23 In 2007 the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, donated $10 billion towards supporting the education of young Arabs in the region.
The GCC member state Development Funds that provide loans and other forms of assistance generally do not maintain an in-country team to monitor the use of funds and there are few reporting obligations on the part of the recipient country. Yet there are emerging exceptions. Innovative Gulf development organisations such as ‘Dubai Cares’ have already gained a reputation for their close monitoring of projects, working with international NGOs such as Care International, and may offer a useful template for other emerging Gulf development agencies. A cash-strapped Europe would do well to seize upon opportunities for the enhanced coordination of development funds and programmes with willing Gulf partners.
The initial years of excessive optimism on the part of GCC investors and recipient countries are now likely to give way to a more realistic review of investments following the global financial crisis, beginning with a debt-ridden Dubai. A serious downturn in the GCC may feel like a ‘crash landing’ for the rest of the MENA.
Egypt, with over two million citizens working in the GCC, is heavily dependent upon the $3 billion of remittances it receives from this labour. Any further increases in food prices in the region could also see an increase in unrest, as already witnessed in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen during 2008 and the first half of 2009. Reduced EU and GCC remittances, investment and development assistance will seriously strain governments’ ability to maintain political and economic stability in the region.
For now much of the Gulf appears to have weathered the economic storm, largely due to resurgent oil prices, but both regions would do well to take note of the vulnerability of parts of the Mashreq and Maghreb to the current global crisis.
Obama’s re-engagement
A second trend highly germane to the design of European Middle Eastern policy is the evolution of US strategy in the region. The administration of Barack Obama has sought to move beyond the more pernicious elements of the Bush era, by engaging in the Middle East with a new tone and a more sophisticated effort to link the region’s problems together in a more holistic strategy. The EU needs to seize this as an opportunity and support such efforts rather than undercut them by stubbornly prioritising the institutional structures of its own fragmented Middle Eastern initiatives.
The EU has traditionally been very protective of its policies towards the Mediterranean construct in an attempt to carve out for itself a parcel of influence within the dominant US policy towards the Middle East. The Mediterranean offered an area where the EU could claim an advantage and where it did not have to follow the US’s lead. Obama’s efforts at re-starting the US relationship with the Middle East on a more even footing offer an opportunity for the EU to let go of an outdated mind-set which has proved pernicious to its interests. By parcelling out the Mediterranean as a Euro-sphere of influence, the EU has ceded the upper hand (even further) to the US in the Gulf. Obama’s new MENA policies restructure the EU-US-MENA triangle, and require a flexible response from the EU.
Institutionally, the US approach to the region reflects a broader approach, with the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs covering all Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf countries while singling out Iraq, Palestine, counterterrorism and economic and political reform as particular regional concerns. The EU would be well served to heed this approach, not in an effort to mimic the US, but because it is reflective of geographic and geostrategic reality.
Gulf states view the ‘Mediterranean’ as defined by the EU as a construct less reflective of local realities than of European interests. The EU often overlooks the strong relations between Mediterranean and Gulf states and the bonds of ‘Arabism’ that play into these relations. The Obama administration has heralded changes in tone and approach, which make it easier for the EU to respond and engage in a broader Middle East policy.
There has been a significant change in style, tone and attitude which reflects greater sensitivity, a US willingness to engage and to listen rather than dictate.
The Obama administration’s change of approach has also been reflected in the newfound willingness to engage with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in an effort to seek negotiated solutions to long-standing problems. This is the type of approach long favoured by the EU and a far cry from the axis of evil listings promulgated by Bush.
As Obama stated in an interview with Al Arabiya, the US is ‘ready to initiate a new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest.’ Under-Secretary of State William Burns further elaborated: ‘We have reoriented our approach to diplomacy, focusing on partnership, pragmatism, and principle. This puts a premium on listening to each other, respecting differences and seeking common ground and areas of shared interests.’24 This attempt to reconcile principle and pragmatism reflects the EU’s stated approach to external affairs, although in reality it is often member state narrow interests that take precedence over EU principles. The potential for deeper US-EU cooperation in the region is being squandered by the competition between member states to secure lucrative bilateral defence procurement deals. While the extent of discussions with European governments is unclear, France, Spain and Germany have been talking with individual members of the GCC about security issues.25
The failure of the EU and US to coordinate means that both are beginning to lose out to third players, not only in terms of defence procurement but also in terms of trade and energy. Up to now, American and European military suppliers have provided 90 per cent of the weapons sought by the Gulf countries. But now a potential Russian deal has taken shape to sell $2 billion worth of tanks and helicopters to Saudi Arabia. In 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Saudi Arabia, the first official visit by a Russian head of state to the kingdom. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia as a member of the G20, have played an important role in supporting international efforts to stem the global financial crisis. While the GCC’s weight in economics and international finance has increased, the half century of US predominance in the region in economic terms is over. The centre of gravity is clearly shifting eastwards as the loss of US standing in the region is being filled not by Europe, but rather by emerging Asian states.
The Obama administration believes that the challenges which confront the US in the region - regional conflicts, undiversified economies, unresponsive political systems, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and violent extremist groups - are all connected and thus should be treated simultaneously, on a panregional basis.
It also recognises the significant role Gulf states could play in regional issues. In June 2009 Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the array of security issues affecting the Gulf are all interrelated, and thus would be best addressed through a comprehensive approach. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke has stated that the US seeks to ‘establish an intellectual strategic base’ with the Gulf states to coordinate policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Middle East issues. On Iran, the Gulf states have repeatedly asked the US to coordinate its policies with them.
The Obama administration has also declared a willingness to address the Israel-Palestine issue as a vital lynchpin of progress on all other issues in the region. For the first time the US seems to acknowledge the importance of a conflict which other Arab states consider to be the key to regional stability. Although Obama began well by appointing as his Middle East special envoy the respected former senator George Mitchell and calling for a freeze on all Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, his resolve has since floundered and disappointment has set in throughout the region. At the beginning of December 2009 the EU agreed on a statement of policy on Palestine and Israel which the US considered to be an unwelcome intrusion.
If the EU had not willingly ceded ground to the US in all areas save the Mediterranean, its policies could be coordinated with, rather than being subservient to, the US. It is no longer expedient for the EU to sit back in the knowledge that the Gulf region is a US sphere of influence. Despite Obama’s ‘punt on multilateralism’ it is unlikely that the US administration will go out of its way to cooperate with the EU in the Gulf. The Obama administration might prefer to work with a more united Europe, but it is up to the EU to live up to the rhetoric and forge a strategy in the Gulf that places it in a credible role as interlocutor for both the US and the GCC. To do so it must incorporate the Gulf and the Mediterranean into a common overarching MENA strategy. A more proactive EU role which takes into account the Gulf states’ aspirations and builds on its credibility could go a long way towards reestablishing some of Europe’s lost influence in the region.
While the Obama administration is seeking to regain credibility, the EU can still play a much-needed role in helping smooth persistent tensions between the US and MENA countries. The US ‘has so far failed to come to terms with the GCC states defining their own interests outside of the context of the need for US military protection’.26 The US still has to realise that the security-for-oil equation is no longer a panacea. The Gulf
states feel neglected by the US, especially in terms of dealing with Iran, and annoyed at being asked publicly to provide confidence building measures to Israel. More than anything else the Gulf states want movement on the Palestinian front, for Iran to be contained but not appeased at their expense, and general recognition for their role in the region. On all these concerns, the EU needs to take advantage of the current juncture in US policy, help mediate between Washington and the region, and adapt its own policies to back up the stated desire for a more holistic approach.
Joining the dots
European Union policy statements and ministerial speeches often refer to the need to link together events and trends in different parts of the MENA region. In 2004, when defining the need for a European Strategic Partnership with the region, the European Council observed that ‘Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East are joined together both by geography and shared history. […] Our geographical proximity is a longstanding reality underpinning our growing interdependence; our policies in future years must reflect these realities and seek to ensure that they continue to develop positively.’27
There is much talk of the need for ‘triangulation’ between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf. But in practice it is remarkable how far European policy is still divided into separate ‘policy blocks’. One covers the Mediterranean, another the Gulf, another Iraq, another Iran, and yet another Yemen’s fragile state status. The disjuncture between the Mediterranean and Gulf components is especially notable. In 2008, amidst much fanfare, the Union for the Mediterranean was launched. At the same time, the EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Broader Middle East was being quietly forgotten. No attempt was made to get these two initiatives ‘talking to each other’.
Several member states have been actively hostile towards submerging the EU’s Mediterranean policy into a ‘broader Middle East’ policy. In a contemporary institutional sense, the ‘Mediterranean’ is a distinctively European construct. Other powers do not have ‘Mediterranean’ policies separate from their Middle East strategies. But the reasons for blocking better coordination are not good ones. Southern EU member states must move beyond a defensive position of defending ‘Mediterranean primacy’ merely because they fear losing a privileged EU focus on their immediate neighbours in North Africa. GCC states increasingly seek EU support for initiatives in the Middle East that dovetail with their own activity.
A broader and less fragmented approach to the Middle East would be especially valuable in relation to six policy challenges:
1) Iraq, Iran and regional security
It is often pointed out that the MENA is the only region lacking an institutionalised security framework. The EU should seek to exercise what influence it has to rectify this situation. It has the potential to play such a role by harnessing its firmly institutionalised ‘collective security’ arrangements in and with the southern Mediterranean as a template to extend into the broader Middle East. In particular this would entail triangulating EU-Mediterranean-GCC strategies towards Iran and Iraq. GCC states have for some time pushed the EU to assist more generously and determinedly in Iraq’s reconstruction and stabilisation;
Gulf states feel that the EU’s reluctance to engage fully in Iraq, to take GCC concerns over the direction of that country into account and to include the GCC in their planning for future strategy in that country represents one of the major strategic blockages in relations with Europe.28 Gulf concerns over events in Iraq and Iran, including fear of increasing Iranian influence, represent one of the region’s most pressing strategic preoccupations – one they feel Europe still has little empathy for.
The EU’s aims in this sense must of necessity be modest. But some concrete moves could begin to move security deliberations in this more pan-MENA direction. The Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East agreed in 2004 has been a profound disappointment, having delivered little in tangible terms that helps broaden out Europe’s policies across the MENA. New and much more concrete steps should be implemented. For example, the EU could hold joint meetings of its EU-Mediterranean and EU-GCC security dialogues, and use this as an opportunity to provide an incentive to Iraq and Iran to participate in the first steps towards a broader collective security architecture. This would constitute a major upgrading of the current ‘Iraq and its Neighbourhood’ multilateral initiative. By addressing Gulf concerns in this way, the EU would be more likely to convince GCC regimes to deploy their own vast financial resources to help stabilise Iraq.29
And it must be the case that a more unified EU-GCC-Mediterranean alliance would have much more chance to influence developments in Iran in a positive direction.
2) Palestine
Saudi Arabia and Egypt hold key roles in the Middle East peace process. There is some competition between their respective approaches and initiatives that risks being highly prejudicial. Here the EU might find a role in mediating and ensuring that such competition between Mediterranean and Gulf initiatives does not begin to harm the prospects for peace.
The EU should also move to reassure Saudi Arabia that rejection of the Fatah-Hamas Mecca Agreement in 2007 by the Bush administration represented a major missed opportunity to establish a working relationship between the two Palestinian factions and that the EU seeks strengthened cooperation with Riyadh on this crucial issue. The EU also urgently needs to engage other GCC states, not least Qatar, on its vision for a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, urging caution where necessary and harmonising efforts where possible. A sine qua non to an improved EU-GCC political relationship on this issue is for the EU to take a firm position against the continued expansion of Israeli settlements within the Palestinian territories.
3) Trade relations
The EU has been pursuing two free trade areas, one with the Mediterranean and another with the Gulf. The former is due for completion in 2010, but is well behind schedule. The free trade agreement with the GCC is still not signed, after nineteen years of talks. The EU should re-energise efforts to sign both these outstanding trade deals and demonstrate greater flexibility to this end.
But over the medium term, the two respective EU FTAs could and should be joined. It is well known that inter-regional interdependence is at a lower level in the Middle East than in other regions. Joining the separate strands of EU commercial relations together could help correct this dearth. Iraq’s putative Partnership and Cooperation Agreement could eventually be linked into this widened area of trade liberalisation. The EU could in this way use the undoubted leverage of its common commercial regulations and norms as a means of enhancing integration within the broader Middle East region – so vital in political and strategic terms for Europe and the region itself.
4) Responses to the financial crisis
The crisis is arriving in force on North Africa’s shores. The EU and the GCC have a joint interest in helping the Mediterranean weather the storm; it will be harder for each to help effectively on their own. Several European governments now work with Saudi Arabia within the G20. They should form an alliance to address together prudential regulatory weaknesses in the southern Mediterranean. The same implies the other way around: the regular dialogue and engagement the EU has built up in the Mediterranean could be extremely
helpful in shoring up European efforts to reach further and deeper into the Gulf. Much more cooperation is needed on international currency issues too. The fallout over the Dubai debt crisis in December 2009 also points to a need for an enhanced economic dialogue.
With the GCC inching towards a possible single currency, this is an obvious area of under-explored ‘lesson sharing’. It is an area of policy cooperation that needs to be triangulated with a Mediterranean dimension too, to reflect the growing economic and financial interdependence of different parts of the MENA region.
It is here that the EU should enhance cooperation with Gulf development funds, to pool efforts to palliate the effects of the financial crisis and encourage the economic and social reforms necessary to sustained recovery. In an effort to support regional economic integration across MENA, the EU could extend some of the funding projects and measures which have proved most effective in its relations with the Mediterranean countries, namely those relative to the economic basket, coordination of regulatory and legal reform, building standards and capacity, judicial training and reform, bureaucratic reform, technical cooperation and capacity building in cross-border projects, twinning, and administrative secondments.
5) Energy
Today it makes little sense for the EU to pursue separate energy dialogues and policies in the Mediterranean and Gulf. Policy-makers do recognise this. The prospective pan-Arab pipeline, which the EU has promised to support, requires a restructuring of European energy policy. Iraq, which holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas deposits and has an egregiously low reserve-to-production ratio, is perhaps the energy partner in the Middle East with which Europe is underperforming most. In January 2008, Commissioners Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations) and Andris Piebalgs (Energy) spoke of a new ‘EU-Iraq energy partnership’, noting that the EU was ‘keen to see Iraq play a full role in the Arab gas pipeline which will supply the EU including through the Nabucco.’ These encouraging statements have not been followed up by a regular high-level political and energy dialogue with Iraq, neither has significant assistance been forthcoming to improve Iraq’s creaking infrastructure in order to link it for export to European markets.30 There is also potential for the EU to link GCC energy exports through an enhanced pipeline grid via Iraq to European markets.
The Commission has proposed extending the structure of both the ENP Energy Treaty and the Euro-Med Common Energy House to the GCC states, as well as offering the latter the kind of energy agreement offered to Algeria and Egypt. Cooperation between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf has begun on the issue of solar energy. However, the continued impasse in trade negotiations between the EU and the GCC undercuts the prospects for other aspects of policy cooperation on a broader Middle East basis. The EU has proposed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation, but the GCC states have rejected the idea, insisting that an FTA is the precursor to deepening other areas of cooperation. A long-standing bi-annual EU-GCC energy experts meeting has been diminished rather than expanded in recent years, with officials of a lower level than was previously the case presiding on both sides. The Commission has sought to deepen energy cooperation at the bilateral level with individual GCC states, but here the potential is limited to technical issues such as reducing flaring and energy efficient product development. Elaborating a triangulated EU-Mediterranean-GCC energy strategy would offer the potential for unblocking some of these frustrating and persistent shortcomings.
6) Counter-terrorism
Saudi Arabia’s well-known influence over Islamist trends across the Mediterranean means that it must be brought into any comprehensive European efforts to deal with radicalisation. GCC cooperation is also critical to stopping the flow of money to jihadi groups in places such as Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon. The EU and the GCC also face a mounting terrorist threat emanating from Yemen. The GCC is the largest donor to Yemen and critical to the future stabilisation of that country. Although Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to engage in bi-lateral talks on Europe’s concerns in Yemen, other GCC countries have shown a more open approach. Enhanced cooperation on these issues will only arise out of a trust-building dialogue and strategic thinking with the Gulf on major political concerns in the region, an approach that has been evidently lacking to date.
Careful steps forward
In sum, the overarching institutional logic should be one of graduated regionalism. This does not mean abandoning existing initiatives, such as the EMP or ENP. But it does mean shifting the balance of diplomatic effort to deepen the linkages between the Mediterranean, the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. A better and clearer balance is required between bilateral, subregional and ‘broader Middle East’ dynamics. These different levels must be made to lock into and reinforce emerging pan-regional dynamics, rather than cutting across them. The ENP offers at least a partial model of ‘bilateralism-within-regionalism’, which could be useful within the broader Middle East too. The MENA region is changing; US policy in the region is changing too. If the EU fails to move with these changes, instead sticking fast to its own idiosyncratic institutional structures, this head-in-the-sand stubbornness will soon consign it to irrelevance.
Edward Burke and Ana Echagüe are researchers at FRIDE. Richard Youngs is a Director at FRIDE. This article (PDF) was originally published by FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
NOTES:
1 Andrew England, ‘First signs of contagion as Egyptian stocks take a battering’, The Financial Times, 1 December 2009.
2 Margaret Coker, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Renewed Political Influence Counters Tehran’, The Wall Street Journa1, 12 June 2009.
3 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’, pp. 104–114.
4 The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, ‘Investment Climate in the Arab countries’, 2007, p. 2.
5 Samba Financial Group, ‘Tracking GCC Foreign Investments: How the Strategies are Changing with Markets in Turmoil’, December 2008, p. 12.
6 Ibid, p. 4.
7 ANIMA Investment Network, ‘Mapping Investment in the Mediterranean’, 2 October 2009, http://www.animaweb.org/en/index.php
8 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
9 Pierre Henry, Samir Abdelkrim and Bénédict de Saint-Laurent, ‘Foreign direct investment into MEDA in 2007: The switch’, ANIMA Investment Network, July 2008.
10 Mahmoud Mohieldin, ‘Neighbourly Investments’, Finance and Development, December 2008.
11 Dunia Frontier Consultants, ‘Private Foreign Investment in Iraq: Update November 2009’, Dubai, November 2009.
12 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p. 1
13 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
14 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p.12.
15 Ibid, p. 8.
16 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
17 Speech by Prince Turki al-Faisal, Eurogolfe conference, Venice,
17 October 2008.
18 International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia’, May 2009.
19 Andrew Mernin, ‘Amman on a mission’, Arabian Business, 18 February 2007.
20 Lionel Barber, ‘Restive young a matter of national security’, The Financial Times, 2 June 2008.
21 See the website of the Saudi Fund for Development, www.sfd.gov.sa
22 Espen Villanger, ‘Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives’, CMI Report R 2007: 2, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, p. 9.
23 See the website of the OPEC Fund, www.ofid.org
24 Speech by William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Conference on ‘US-Saudi Relations in a World Without Equilibrium’, New America Foundation, 27 April 2009.
25 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Global Strategic Assessment 2009:America’s Security Role in a Changing World, Washington D.C., September 2009, p. 199.
26 Christian Koch, ‘Respecting Arab interests’, Khaleej Times, 26 October 2007.
27 See ‘Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf
28 Oxford Research Group, King Faisal Center, Saudi Diplomatic Institute, ‘From the Swamp to Tierra Firma: The regional role in the stabilization of Iraq’, June 2008.
29 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Europe and the Gulf Region – Towards a New Horizon’, Discussion paper presented at the 12th Kronberg Talks, Riyadh, May 2009, p. 16.
30 Edward Burke, ‘The Case for a New European Engagement in Iraq’, FRIDE Working Paper 74, January 2009.
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