History, BP Oil Spill Haunt Caspian Sea
By Antoine Blua
(RFE/RL) -- For years, the race to tap into the Caspian Sea's vast oil and gas resources has outweighed any desire to protect its delicate environment.
All five littoral states -- Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan -- have plans to further exploit the sea's estimated 44 billion barrels of oil reserves.
Such projects mean drilling new wells, highlighting risks for an incident that could cause a catastrophic oil spill in the landlocked sea -- the largest inland body of water on earth.
Mais Gulaliyev, co-chairman of Azerbaijan's Green Party, tells RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service he has called for measures to prevent such a threat from becoming reality.
"The accident in the Gulf of Mexico shows us that such a disaster could happen anywhere. The United States, with its super-modern technologies, is barely capable of stopping this disaster," Gulaliyev says. "You can imagine the scale of the damages to the environment from such incidents in countries like Azerbaijan."
At least 5,000 barrels of oil a day have been gushing into the Gulf of Mexico since an April 20 explosion destroyed a drilling rig leased and operated by BP, threatening unique wildlife refuges, beaches, and fishing grounds along the southern U.S. coast.
History Of Environmental Damage
The dangers of the Caspian Sea's oil fields gained international attention during the last days of the Soviet Union, when a well at Kazakhstan's huge Tengiz oil field blew out in 1985. The well burned for more than a year before it was eventually put out.
Makhamet Khakimov tells RFE/RL's Kazakh Service that little has been done since the incident in which 3 million tons of oil and tens of billions of cubic meters of different kinds of gases were burned, harming the population and wildlife in the Atyrau region.
Dozens of platforms are currently operating across the Caspian Sea, mainly in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which have been the focus of Western investment.
Oil exploration and production work have also developed in the remaining three littoral states. LUKoil last month kicked off commercial oil production in the Russian sector of the sea, launching the Yury Korchagin platform. Iran earlier this year started drilling its first exploratory well in the southern Caspian Sea -- the deepest part of the sea -- to search for oil. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is continuing exploration of Caspian shelf deposits along with foreign partners.
Environmentalists say investments in energy projects have often been made to the detriment of local communities.
On May 13, Kazakh Deputy Minister for Environmental Protection Eldana Sadvakasova acknowledged that with the oil price decreasing, oil-extracting companies had "stopped performance of some measures or postponed them for the later periods."
In February, a Kazakh court fined the onshore Karachaganak natural-gas venture, which includes BG, Eni, Chevron, and LUKoil, for environmental violations including excessive waste dumping. The village of Berezovka, which is situated less than 5 kilometers from the field and is exposed to the field's toxic emissions, has been fighting for justice for years.
Environmentalists say energy development is also threatening already endangered species of fish such as the Beluga, Stellate, and Russian sturgeon, the kilka (Caspian sprat), as well as the Caspian seal. In Turkmenistan, energy development is causing particular risk to the Krasovodsk Nature Reserve, home to hundreds of thousands of birds and more than 40 mammal species.
Greater Supervision, Transparency Needed
Energy firms operating in the region, however, argue that they are doing their utmost to ensure the safety of their infrastructure.
"I assure you that we have done and will continue to do everything possible to ensure the full technical security of all our operations in the Caspian," says Tamam Bayatli, public relations manager for BP Azerbaijan, which is involved in a number of exploration and production projects in the country.
"It has been and will remain our No. 1 priority to ensure technical safety and security of the people as well as to protect the environment."
Environmentalists and civil-society activists say the authorities should better supervise the energy companies' work and call for the terms of production-sharing agreements between energy companies and host governments in the Caspian region to be made public.
Kate Watters, executive director of Crude Accountability, a Virginia-based nongovernmental organization that focuses on environmental justice, says the public should be informed about the investments being made and about the environmental and social protection needed to be put in place to safeguard the environment and the health of the local inhabitants.
"The oil companies need to be held to the highest standards, and those standards maybe need to be reexamined," Watters says. "We have a case [in the Gulf of Mexico] where governments are relying on the expertise of private corporations and putting at risk entire populations and ecosystems based on promises that need to be demonstrably fulfilled before a project starts."
Improving Regulation, Or Just Talk?
At a conference in Astrakhan on April 28, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said all work related to the development of fields in the Russian sector of the Caspian is being conducted "in strict compliance with international environmental standards," applying zero discharge technology. This means that waste resultant of production activities is not discharged into the sea, but is collected before being rendered harmless and reprocessed. Putin also voiced hope that companies from other countries operating in the region will join in this initiative.
On the regional level, the five countries around the Caspian Sea have ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, or Tehran Convention, and thus established a framework to jointly address and solve environmental problems in and around the sea.
But Watters is skeptical, saying the absence of public participation in the convention's preparation resulted in a relatively meaningless document.
As BP and the U.S. authorities battle to contain the spill in the Gulf of Mexico and issues of responsibility are being investigated, the U.S. administration has said it will review environmental procedures for offshore drilling.
And in Russia, the State Duma, or lower house of parliament, is considering the need for drafting a law on "environmental control and protection of seas from oil spills."
The head of the Duma's Committee for Natural Resources, Nature Management, and Environment, Yevgeny Tugolukov, announced the move on May 5 in comments on what conclusions Russia should make in the wake of the environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
And at a cabinet meeting on May 4, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov instructed the ministries for oil and gas and for environmental protection to inspect the country's oil-drilling platforms.
But Crude Accountability's Watters doubts the Kazakh measure will be effective. She notes that while BP "has this reputation all over the world for having the best technology, for being green, for being sustainable," the company is responsible for the spill in the Gulf of Mexico "and had absolutely no plan in place if something like this were to happen. So we have no guarantees that any Western company working in the Caspian would act any differently."
So while Watters believes the Kazakh government is acting correctly, "my question would be: 'Do they have the capacity to take care of an accident, should one happen?' And I think the answer is likely 'no.'"
RFE/RL's Azerbaijani and Kazakh services contributed to this report. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
(RFE/RL) -- For years, the race to tap into the Caspian Sea's vast oil and gas resources has outweighed any desire to protect its delicate environment.
All five littoral states -- Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan -- have plans to further exploit the sea's estimated 44 billion barrels of oil reserves.
Such projects mean drilling new wells, highlighting risks for an incident that could cause a catastrophic oil spill in the landlocked sea -- the largest inland body of water on earth.
Mais Gulaliyev, co-chairman of Azerbaijan's Green Party, tells RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service he has called for measures to prevent such a threat from becoming reality.
"The accident in the Gulf of Mexico shows us that such a disaster could happen anywhere. The United States, with its super-modern technologies, is barely capable of stopping this disaster," Gulaliyev says. "You can imagine the scale of the damages to the environment from such incidents in countries like Azerbaijan."
At least 5,000 barrels of oil a day have been gushing into the Gulf of Mexico since an April 20 explosion destroyed a drilling rig leased and operated by BP, threatening unique wildlife refuges, beaches, and fishing grounds along the southern U.S. coast.
History Of Environmental Damage
The dangers of the Caspian Sea's oil fields gained international attention during the last days of the Soviet Union, when a well at Kazakhstan's huge Tengiz oil field blew out in 1985. The well burned for more than a year before it was eventually put out.
Makhamet Khakimov tells RFE/RL's Kazakh Service that little has been done since the incident in which 3 million tons of oil and tens of billions of cubic meters of different kinds of gases were burned, harming the population and wildlife in the Atyrau region.
Dozens of platforms are currently operating across the Caspian Sea, mainly in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which have been the focus of Western investment.
Oil exploration and production work have also developed in the remaining three littoral states. LUKoil last month kicked off commercial oil production in the Russian sector of the sea, launching the Yury Korchagin platform. Iran earlier this year started drilling its first exploratory well in the southern Caspian Sea -- the deepest part of the sea -- to search for oil. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is continuing exploration of Caspian shelf deposits along with foreign partners.
Environmentalists say investments in energy projects have often been made to the detriment of local communities.
On May 13, Kazakh Deputy Minister for Environmental Protection Eldana Sadvakasova acknowledged that with the oil price decreasing, oil-extracting companies had "stopped performance of some measures or postponed them for the later periods."
In February, a Kazakh court fined the onshore Karachaganak natural-gas venture, which includes BG, Eni, Chevron, and LUKoil, for environmental violations including excessive waste dumping. The village of Berezovka, which is situated less than 5 kilometers from the field and is exposed to the field's toxic emissions, has been fighting for justice for years.
Environmentalists say energy development is also threatening already endangered species of fish such as the Beluga, Stellate, and Russian sturgeon, the kilka (Caspian sprat), as well as the Caspian seal. In Turkmenistan, energy development is causing particular risk to the Krasovodsk Nature Reserve, home to hundreds of thousands of birds and more than 40 mammal species.
Greater Supervision, Transparency Needed
Energy firms operating in the region, however, argue that they are doing their utmost to ensure the safety of their infrastructure.
"I assure you that we have done and will continue to do everything possible to ensure the full technical security of all our operations in the Caspian," says Tamam Bayatli, public relations manager for BP Azerbaijan, which is involved in a number of exploration and production projects in the country.
"It has been and will remain our No. 1 priority to ensure technical safety and security of the people as well as to protect the environment."
Environmentalists and civil-society activists say the authorities should better supervise the energy companies' work and call for the terms of production-sharing agreements between energy companies and host governments in the Caspian region to be made public.
Kate Watters, executive director of Crude Accountability, a Virginia-based nongovernmental organization that focuses on environmental justice, says the public should be informed about the investments being made and about the environmental and social protection needed to be put in place to safeguard the environment and the health of the local inhabitants.
"The oil companies need to be held to the highest standards, and those standards maybe need to be reexamined," Watters says. "We have a case [in the Gulf of Mexico] where governments are relying on the expertise of private corporations and putting at risk entire populations and ecosystems based on promises that need to be demonstrably fulfilled before a project starts."
Improving Regulation, Or Just Talk?
At a conference in Astrakhan on April 28, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said all work related to the development of fields in the Russian sector of the Caspian is being conducted "in strict compliance with international environmental standards," applying zero discharge technology. This means that waste resultant of production activities is not discharged into the sea, but is collected before being rendered harmless and reprocessed. Putin also voiced hope that companies from other countries operating in the region will join in this initiative.
On the regional level, the five countries around the Caspian Sea have ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, or Tehran Convention, and thus established a framework to jointly address and solve environmental problems in and around the sea.
But Watters is skeptical, saying the absence of public participation in the convention's preparation resulted in a relatively meaningless document.
As BP and the U.S. authorities battle to contain the spill in the Gulf of Mexico and issues of responsibility are being investigated, the U.S. administration has said it will review environmental procedures for offshore drilling.
And in Russia, the State Duma, or lower house of parliament, is considering the need for drafting a law on "environmental control and protection of seas from oil spills."
The head of the Duma's Committee for Natural Resources, Nature Management, and Environment, Yevgeny Tugolukov, announced the move on May 5 in comments on what conclusions Russia should make in the wake of the environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
And at a cabinet meeting on May 4, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov instructed the ministries for oil and gas and for environmental protection to inspect the country's oil-drilling platforms.
But Crude Accountability's Watters doubts the Kazakh measure will be effective. She notes that while BP "has this reputation all over the world for having the best technology, for being green, for being sustainable," the company is responsible for the spill in the Gulf of Mexico "and had absolutely no plan in place if something like this were to happen. So we have no guarantees that any Western company working in the Caspian would act any differently."
So while Watters believes the Kazakh government is acting correctly, "my question would be: 'Do they have the capacity to take care of an accident, should one happen?' And I think the answer is likely 'no.'"
RFE/RL's Azerbaijani and Kazakh services contributed to this report. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Kazakhstan Reopens Border With Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan reopened its border with Kyrgyzstan on Wednesday after closing it in April due to violent unrest that led to the ouster of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry said.
Kyrgyzstan was rocked by massive protests in early April, with more than 80 people killed as an interim government took power and Bakiyev fled the capital and then the country. His supporters later hit back at the new authorities in an attempt to regain power. Several people were killed and scores were injured in new wave of violence.
"Considering the difficult social and economic situation in Kyrgyzstan and taking into account multiple calls from the people of our friendly country, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has ordered the government to lift all temporary limitations on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz state border," a statement from the ministry said.
The ministry said, however, that the work of border, customs and migration bodies will be tightened.
On Wednesday, the prime minister of Kyrgyzstan's provisional government was given presidential authority until elections are held in the country.
The government adopted a decree delegating power to an interim president until December 31, 2011. The document named interim Roza Otunbayeva as the provisional president, but also envisaged a nationwide referendum on the issue as an option.
Source: RIA Novosti
Kyrgyzstan was rocked by massive protests in early April, with more than 80 people killed as an interim government took power and Bakiyev fled the capital and then the country. His supporters later hit back at the new authorities in an attempt to regain power. Several people were killed and scores were injured in new wave of violence.
"Considering the difficult social and economic situation in Kyrgyzstan and taking into account multiple calls from the people of our friendly country, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has ordered the government to lift all temporary limitations on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz state border," a statement from the ministry said.
The ministry said, however, that the work of border, customs and migration bodies will be tightened.
On Wednesday, the prime minister of Kyrgyzstan's provisional government was given presidential authority until elections are held in the country.
The government adopted a decree delegating power to an interim president until December 31, 2011. The document named interim Roza Otunbayeva as the provisional president, but also envisaged a nationwide referendum on the issue as an option.
Source: RIA Novosti
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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EU's Central Asia Policy 'Confused', Says Expert
By pushing for the Nabucco pipeline, the European Union has signalled its obsession with reducing its dependence on Russian gas. But replacing it with gas from Turkmenistan, an authoritarian country where the EU exerts even less influence, would not improve the situation, a Central Asia expert told EurActiv Germany in an interview.
Michael Laubsch, who works for the 'Eurasian Transition Group', an NGO, says that Turkmenistan is key for the Nabucco pipeline project, which is designed to bring gas to Europe from sources other than Russia.
Unless the political situation in Iran changes, Nabucco must focus on Turkmen gas – otherwise the project does not make sense economically, he argues.
Describing Turkmenistan as a "dictatorship", Laubsch argues that the EU cannot make any plans until the country is transparent about its gas resources.
Western politicians' arguments that an intensified economic relationship would also mean a change of political culture in countries such as Turkmenistan are more or less hypocritical, he said.
"The EU should demand independent and objective test drillings and publication of the results before investing a huge amount of assets," Laubsch insisted.
He argued that Turkmenistan has a tradition of "pendulum" policies between Russia and the EU, which Moscow has always won, resulting in benefits from the Russians for Turkmenistan.
Laubsch warned that China is in fact Russia's real rival in Turkmenistan. "I would predict that during the next decade the Chinese influence in Central Asia will increase, while the Russian influence will decrease and the EU concept can be ignored because of a lack of success," he said.
The expert was also sceptical about plans for a section of Nabucco to cross the Caspian seabed, which is considered to be both an internal sea and the largest lake on Earth.
Oil reserves in the Caspian basin are estimated to be worth several trillion dollars, and negotiations over the demarcation of the Caspian Sea have been ongoing for nearly a decade among the states bordering the Caspian - Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran.
In this context, Laubsch said that the legal status of the Caspian Sea, combined with its estimated energy resources, constitutes a risk to the region's security and stability.
"Unless all Caspian countries solve this problem, Western investments in the region will be at risk," he warned.
Source: EurActiv
Michael Laubsch, who works for the 'Eurasian Transition Group', an NGO, says that Turkmenistan is key for the Nabucco pipeline project, which is designed to bring gas to Europe from sources other than Russia.
Unless the political situation in Iran changes, Nabucco must focus on Turkmen gas – otherwise the project does not make sense economically, he argues.
Describing Turkmenistan as a "dictatorship", Laubsch argues that the EU cannot make any plans until the country is transparent about its gas resources.
Western politicians' arguments that an intensified economic relationship would also mean a change of political culture in countries such as Turkmenistan are more or less hypocritical, he said.
"The EU should demand independent and objective test drillings and publication of the results before investing a huge amount of assets," Laubsch insisted.
He argued that Turkmenistan has a tradition of "pendulum" policies between Russia and the EU, which Moscow has always won, resulting in benefits from the Russians for Turkmenistan.
Laubsch warned that China is in fact Russia's real rival in Turkmenistan. "I would predict that during the next decade the Chinese influence in Central Asia will increase, while the Russian influence will decrease and the EU concept can be ignored because of a lack of success," he said.
The expert was also sceptical about plans for a section of Nabucco to cross the Caspian seabed, which is considered to be both an internal sea and the largest lake on Earth.
Oil reserves in the Caspian basin are estimated to be worth several trillion dollars, and negotiations over the demarcation of the Caspian Sea have been ongoing for nearly a decade among the states bordering the Caspian - Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran.
In this context, Laubsch said that the legal status of the Caspian Sea, combined with its estimated energy resources, constitutes a risk to the region's security and stability.
"Unless all Caspian countries solve this problem, Western investments in the region will be at risk," he warned.
Source: EurActiv
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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Kazakh Human Rights Activist Languishes in Prison
By Robert Amsterdam
It's been a great disappointment to me how all the media attention has disappeared with regard to the case of the human rights activist Yevgeny Zhovtis in Kazakhstan, who was unlawfully jailed after having the bad luck of being involved in a terrible car accident (which ended up serving as pretext for his persecution). However, I can understand why: it's been incredibly hard for reporters or international observers to have any access to Zhovtis, whom the authorities decided should be incarcerated way out east in Ust-Kamenogorsk near the Russian border (call it the Khodorkovsky treatment - these leaders seem to learn a lot from each other).
Michael Allen at Democracy Digest has posted up a good update, which reports that the Italian Parliamentarian Matteo Mecacci finally succeeded in being granted access to visit Zhovtis. Mecacci stated that "Mr. Zhovtis was in good condition but disappointed in the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the lack of fairness in the legal proceedings," and that the Kazakh courts had failed "to deliver a fair and proportionate judgment in a situation that to independent observers does not entail criminal responsibility."
These were some harsh statements from a diplomat, but I would take it even further: Kazakhstan's appointment to the chairmanship of the OSCE has made a mockery out of the organization and deprived the club of its meaning. They should exhibit their good will toward cooperation with the international community by releasing Zhovtis without delay, and then perhaps a new conversation can begin.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
It's been a great disappointment to me how all the media attention has disappeared with regard to the case of the human rights activist Yevgeny Zhovtis in Kazakhstan, who was unlawfully jailed after having the bad luck of being involved in a terrible car accident (which ended up serving as pretext for his persecution). However, I can understand why: it's been incredibly hard for reporters or international observers to have any access to Zhovtis, whom the authorities decided should be incarcerated way out east in Ust-Kamenogorsk near the Russian border (call it the Khodorkovsky treatment - these leaders seem to learn a lot from each other).
Michael Allen at Democracy Digest has posted up a good update, which reports that the Italian Parliamentarian Matteo Mecacci finally succeeded in being granted access to visit Zhovtis. Mecacci stated that "Mr. Zhovtis was in good condition but disappointed in the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the lack of fairness in the legal proceedings," and that the Kazakh courts had failed "to deliver a fair and proportionate judgment in a situation that to independent observers does not entail criminal responsibility."
These were some harsh statements from a diplomat, but I would take it even further: Kazakhstan's appointment to the chairmanship of the OSCE has made a mockery out of the organization and deprived the club of its meaning. They should exhibit their good will toward cooperation with the international community by releasing Zhovtis without delay, and then perhaps a new conversation can begin.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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Fresh Clashes In Kyrgyzstan Prompt Call For Restraint From UN Chief
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has issued a call for calm and restraint as reports of violence and loss of life emerge from Kyrgyzstan, where clashes have broken out between supporters and opponents of the Provisional Government.
One person was reportedly killed and at least 58 wounded in the seizures of Government buildings in Osh, Jalalabad and Batken in southern Kyrgyzstan.
“The Secretary-General urges all concerned to show restraint and to resolve issues peacefully through dialogue,” Mr. Ban’s spokesperson, Martin Nesirky, stated.
“He underlines the need to respect the rule of law and appeals for calm.”
The Provisional Government has been in place in the Central Asian nation since last month, after President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted in a bloody uprising in which dozens of people died.
An arrangement reached between the Provisional Government and the former leader enabled him to leave the country for neighbouring Kazakhstan.
Source: UN News
One person was reportedly killed and at least 58 wounded in the seizures of Government buildings in Osh, Jalalabad and Batken in southern Kyrgyzstan.
“The Secretary-General urges all concerned to show restraint and to resolve issues peacefully through dialogue,” Mr. Ban’s spokesperson, Martin Nesirky, stated.
“He underlines the need to respect the rule of law and appeals for calm.”
The Provisional Government has been in place in the Central Asian nation since last month, after President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted in a bloody uprising in which dozens of people died.
An arrangement reached between the Provisional Government and the former leader enabled him to leave the country for neighbouring Kazakhstan.
Source: UN News
Friday, May 14, 2010 |
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Russia Making New Push In Caspian Basin Energy Sector
By Sergei Blagov
Russian leaders are hoping that the launch of the country’s first major Caspian Sea off-shore energy development project will re-invigorate the Kremlin’s overall oil-and-gas strategy for the region.
Russia’s paramount leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, traveled to the southern Astrakhan region in late April to inaugurate Lukoil's offshore oil rig at the Korchagin deposit. Located about 180 kilometers from the city of Astrakhan, the deposit is estimated to contain nearly 30 million tons of oil and 63 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas. Over the past decade, Lukoil has discovered six deposits in the northern Caspian with total oil reserves estimated at 4.7 billion barrels. Lukoil plans to pump up to 30 million tons per year of oil and 20 bcm per year of gas by 2020.
To date, a major impediment to the development of Caspian Sea energy deposits has been the lack of a territorial agreement. Talks among the five littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan – to divide the seabed are currently stalemated, with Tehran’s insistence on an equal 20 percent share being one of the key obstacles to agreement.
The April 28 ceremony afforded Putin an opportunity to press Russian energy executives to implement development plans, as well as offer the state’s strong backing for additional off-shore and infrastructure projects. Needed improvements could cost upwards of $27 billion, Deputy Energy Minister Sergei Kudryashov said in Astrakhan. The comments of Putin and other top Russian officials were apparently aimed at sending a signal to other Caspian Basin states that Russia was prepared to push ahead the development of off-shore deposits on its own.
Many of Russia’s joint development projects with its Central Asian and Caspian Basin neighbors appear to be stuck in neutral. Five years ago, for example, Russian and Kazakhstani officials finalized plans covering the joint development of the Khvalynskoye oil and gas field in the northern Caspian. Around the same time, the Russian and Kazakhstani state oil firms, Rosneft and KazMunaiGas, signed a 55-year production-sharing agreement covering the Kurmangazy oil field. Both projects, however, are not functioning as originally envisioned.
Russian officials are also interested in accelerating cooperation with Uzbekistan. On April 27, Alexey Miller, the CEO of the state-controlled gas behemoth Gazprom, held talks in Moscow with Uzbekneftegaz head Ulugbek Nazarov to discuss export and development projects. Gazprom has pledged to buy not less than 15.5 bcm of gas from Uzbekistan in 2010. But that figure is largely unchanged from 2009, when Uzbek leader Islam Karimov pledged to supply 16 bcm of gas annually to Russia, and indicated that the export level could rise to 31 bcm by 2019.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Karimov held what they described as a successful summit April 19-20 in Moscow. However, it is noteworthy that they refrained from commenting on energy cooperation.
Meanwhile, Russia’s energy cooperation with Turkmenistan is heading south. Gazprom deputy CEO Valery Golubev reaffirmed in Astrakhan that the firm would buy no more than 10 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan in 2010. Under earlier agreements, Gazprom had committed to purchasing at least 30 bcm per year from Ashgabat.
In the aftermath of the global economic collapse of 2008, Gazrpom’s purchase agreement for Turkmen gas became too pricey, and company officials sought to back out of their previous commitments.
Energy relations between Russia and Turkmenistan have been tense since a pipeline blast in April 2009 caused a prolonged interruption in gas deliveries.
Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Russian leaders are hoping that the launch of the country’s first major Caspian Sea off-shore energy development project will re-invigorate the Kremlin’s overall oil-and-gas strategy for the region.
Russia’s paramount leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, traveled to the southern Astrakhan region in late April to inaugurate Lukoil's offshore oil rig at the Korchagin deposit. Located about 180 kilometers from the city of Astrakhan, the deposit is estimated to contain nearly 30 million tons of oil and 63 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas. Over the past decade, Lukoil has discovered six deposits in the northern Caspian with total oil reserves estimated at 4.7 billion barrels. Lukoil plans to pump up to 30 million tons per year of oil and 20 bcm per year of gas by 2020.
To date, a major impediment to the development of Caspian Sea energy deposits has been the lack of a territorial agreement. Talks among the five littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan – to divide the seabed are currently stalemated, with Tehran’s insistence on an equal 20 percent share being one of the key obstacles to agreement.
The April 28 ceremony afforded Putin an opportunity to press Russian energy executives to implement development plans, as well as offer the state’s strong backing for additional off-shore and infrastructure projects. Needed improvements could cost upwards of $27 billion, Deputy Energy Minister Sergei Kudryashov said in Astrakhan. The comments of Putin and other top Russian officials were apparently aimed at sending a signal to other Caspian Basin states that Russia was prepared to push ahead the development of off-shore deposits on its own.
Many of Russia’s joint development projects with its Central Asian and Caspian Basin neighbors appear to be stuck in neutral. Five years ago, for example, Russian and Kazakhstani officials finalized plans covering the joint development of the Khvalynskoye oil and gas field in the northern Caspian. Around the same time, the Russian and Kazakhstani state oil firms, Rosneft and KazMunaiGas, signed a 55-year production-sharing agreement covering the Kurmangazy oil field. Both projects, however, are not functioning as originally envisioned.
Russian officials are also interested in accelerating cooperation with Uzbekistan. On April 27, Alexey Miller, the CEO of the state-controlled gas behemoth Gazprom, held talks in Moscow with Uzbekneftegaz head Ulugbek Nazarov to discuss export and development projects. Gazprom has pledged to buy not less than 15.5 bcm of gas from Uzbekistan in 2010. But that figure is largely unchanged from 2009, when Uzbek leader Islam Karimov pledged to supply 16 bcm of gas annually to Russia, and indicated that the export level could rise to 31 bcm by 2019.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Karimov held what they described as a successful summit April 19-20 in Moscow. However, it is noteworthy that they refrained from commenting on energy cooperation.
Meanwhile, Russia’s energy cooperation with Turkmenistan is heading south. Gazprom deputy CEO Valery Golubev reaffirmed in Astrakhan that the firm would buy no more than 10 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan in 2010. Under earlier agreements, Gazprom had committed to purchasing at least 30 bcm per year from Ashgabat.
In the aftermath of the global economic collapse of 2008, Gazrpom’s purchase agreement for Turkmen gas became too pricey, and company officials sought to back out of their previous commitments.
Energy relations between Russia and Turkmenistan have been tense since a pipeline blast in April 2009 caused a prolonged interruption in gas deliveries.
Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Friday, May 07, 2010 |
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Kazakhstan Investigates Kazakh Oil Giant $1.25 Bln Embezzlement Scam
Kazakh authorities have launched a criminal investigation against the directors of the oil consortium Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO) suspected of embezzling 187 billion tenge ($1.25 billion), a Kazakh financial police official said on Thursday.
"A criminal lawsuit was filed against KPO's top officials over a 187-billion tenge embezzlement charge by overstating oil production costs in 2002-2007," Murat Zhumanbai said.
Zhumanbai said the embezzlement was revealed after an audit by KTMG Audit and Ernst & Young. "It was confirmed by experts," Zhumanbai said.
In March of this year, the Kazakh financial police accused KPO of illegal oil production and appropriation of $700 million in profits.
The Kazakh Prosecutor General's Office also said it had started investigations into labor and migration violations by KPO.
KPO is a consortium of oil production companies developing the Karachaganak condensed gas deposit in western Kazakhstan. It comprises British energy giant BG Group, an integrated energy company Eni, along with the oil giants Chevron and LukOil.
Source: VOA
"A criminal lawsuit was filed against KPO's top officials over a 187-billion tenge embezzlement charge by overstating oil production costs in 2002-2007," Murat Zhumanbai said.
Zhumanbai said the embezzlement was revealed after an audit by KTMG Audit and Ernst & Young. "It was confirmed by experts," Zhumanbai said.
In March of this year, the Kazakh financial police accused KPO of illegal oil production and appropriation of $700 million in profits.
The Kazakh Prosecutor General's Office also said it had started investigations into labor and migration violations by KPO.
KPO is a consortium of oil production companies developing the Karachaganak condensed gas deposit in western Kazakhstan. It comprises British energy giant BG Group, an integrated energy company Eni, along with the oil giants Chevron and LukOil.
Source: VOA
Thursday, April 29, 2010 |
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Is Kyrgyzstan's Revolution Ready For Export?
By Farangis Najibullah
Could the recent political upheaval that brought down Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev have a domino effect on other countries in Central Asia?
It's a question that is being asked in the region in the wake of Kyrgyzstan's bloody antigovernment demonstrations earlier this month.
The events have been portrayed as a wake-up call to other Central Asian leaders, lest their citizens follow the example set in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. And there are ample similarities between Kyrgyzstan and its fellow Central Asian states to give credence to the suggestion.
The five Central Asian countries all come under criticism in varying degrees over constraints on political freedoms, government pressure on independent media, and free speech. Nepotism and corruption, two key ingredients behind the Kyrgyz unrest, are common complaints across the region.
In Kyrgyzstan, the wave of discontent over Bakiev's appointment of his children, siblings, and other relatives to key official posts eventually swept his government away. In an ironic twist, it was virtually the same wave Bakiev himself rode to power five years before, when his predecessor, Askar Akaev, was ousted as a result of the Tulip Revolution.
Family Factor
Elsewhere in Central Asia -- with the exception of Turkmenistan, where tribal politics reign -- members of presidential families control major businesses, banks, and wield enormous influence in politics.
In Uzbekistan, Gulnara Karimova is often touted as a potential successor to her president father, Islam Karimov. The first daughter enjoys a life of fame as a European-based fashion designer, and riches due to her reputed control of the company Zeromax, which oversees a wide range of oil and gas businesses in Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev's second daughter, Dinara Kulibaeva, has immense influence over the resource-rich country's energy sphere along with her husband, Timur Kulibaev, one of the country's richest men.
In Tajikistan, Rustam Emomali, President Emomali Rahmon's eldest son, recently made his political debut by gaining a seat on Dushanbe city council, sparking speculation that he is being groomed for the presidency.
In the weeks leading up to the Kyrgyz uprising, citizens became increasing vocal in expressing their belief that the presidential family was expanding its influence and wealth as a result of corruption, while the rest of the country struggled with poverty.
Such sentiments can also be found among ordinary people throughout Central Asia, who often feel their respective governments leave them to deal with poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities on their own.
Lack Of Organized Opposition
Many analyses and commentaries published after the Kyrgyz unrest predicted it wouldn't be long before people would be demonstrating against their leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in the region.
"The poverty, corruption, and harsh economic conditions that bred resentment in Kyrgyzstan are also present in abundance in neighboring states," read a passage from an article posted on eurasia.net on April 21. "None of [Central Asian leaders] can rule out turmoil at home."
But while a number of similar ingredients can be found in Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, this doesn't mean they will bring about the same result.
While Kyrgyzstan exhibited signs of a nascent democracy for years -- for example, it is the only country in the region in which the opposition has a parliamentary faction -- the powers that be in the other Central Asian states have maintained a much tighter grip.
The parliament in Uzbekistan, for example, is filled by ruling party members and their colleagues from other pro-government groups. Turkmenistan still practices a one-party system. In Kazakhstan, all parliamentary seats belong to the pro-presidential Nur Otan party.
Tajikistan's opposition Islamic Renaissance Party officially held onto its two parliamentary seats following a February election. But for years, even though one of its two legislators was terminally ill and bed-ridden, it wasn't allowed to replace him with another candidate.
Tajik political analyst Sabur Vahhob says that, compared to Kyrgyzstan, the other Central Asian states lack strong opposition figures. "There aren't experienced political [opposition] leaders, capable of gathering people around themselves," he says. "People need a leader whom they can trust, but we can't see such personalities yet."
Loyal Security Teams
In addition, while Bakiev's government in recent years took steps to clamp down on independent media and imprison opposition leaders, it remained the only country in the region where people enjoyed relative freedom to hold antigovernment protests. Bakiev himself, speaking from exile in Minsk last week, implied he didn't see anything wrong in demonstrations taking place.
Governments across Central Asia have been criticized for restricting political freedom and persecuting their political opponents.
Perhaps the harshest example in recent years came in Uzbekistan, when a rare public demonstration in the eastern town of Andijon in 2005 was brutally suppressed by government forces who fired into the crowd. The government claims 187 people, including police, were killed in the violence, but rights groups say several hundred protesters were killed. Hundreds fled the country following the crackdown, fearing imprisonment.
A key difference between Bakiev and other Central Asian leaders can be found in the people surrounding them. Most of regional leaders have taken firm control over key ministries -- security, defense, and interior -- by appointing close allies. Even at the level of middle management in the security and law enforcement agencies, only those most loyal to the presidential office can be found.
Bakiev, on the other hand, placed a sibling in charge of the elite presidential guard, but was at odds with his defense minister and onetime ally, Ismail Isakov, whom he eventually imprisoned.
Nervous Silence
The minimal coverage of Kyrgyz events by state-run media in Central Asia is indicative of the efforts taken in the region to prevent any carryover effect. Official media in all Central Asian countries have downplayed the scope and significance of the Kyrgyz events, while the Turkmen media has completely ignored them.
Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov -- keeping a nervous eye on Kyrgyzstan?
No Central Asian leader has officially recognized the interim government in Bishkek. But that does not mean the events have gone unnoticed by the governments of Central Asia.
When the unrest in Kyrgyz began to unfold, Kazakh President Nazarbaev was vocal in predicting that similar events would not take place in Kazakhstan. According to Nazarbaev, people in his oil-rich country are content with their living standards.
Speaking during the Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty on April 27, Nazarbaev described the situation in Kyrgyzstan as a mere "fight for power." He added: "It was not a revolution. It was complete banditry."
'Preventative Measures'
Others in the region appear to have taken steps designed to ensure a Kyrgyz-like political scenario does not unfold on their territory. Tajikistan appears to be taking the soft approach, while Uzbekistan is reportedly taking a hard line.
In an April 24 address to the nation, Tajik President Rahmon instructed all local government heads to have "open doors" every Saturday to meet with people and listen to their opinions, problems, and complaints.
The Uzbek response has been starkly different. According to RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, law enforcement officials along with neighborhood committees in the southeastern Ferghana Province are asking people to sign "loyalty letters," promising they will not agitate against the government. Such letters reportedly appeared shortly after the Kyrgyz unrest, and mainly target relatives of dissidents, political activists, and conservative religious people.
If history is any indication, the chances of any export of the revolutionary spirit seen in Kyrgyzstan depend largely on how successful the uprising is at bringing about real democratic change.
The Tulip Revolution five years ago initially brought hope of such change, and was widely welcomed by younger people in Central Asia. But those hopes faded as many expected reforms failed to materialize. This, Kyrgyz say today, merely demonstrated that the 2005 revolution wasn't about democracy, but simply replaced once corrupt strongman with another.
Likewise, if Kyrgyz hopes once again turn into disenchantment, their neighbors' criticisms of the "chronic revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan that lead to nothing will only be strengthened.
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
Could the recent political upheaval that brought down Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev have a domino effect on other countries in Central Asia?
It's a question that is being asked in the region in the wake of Kyrgyzstan's bloody antigovernment demonstrations earlier this month.
The events have been portrayed as a wake-up call to other Central Asian leaders, lest their citizens follow the example set in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. And there are ample similarities between Kyrgyzstan and its fellow Central Asian states to give credence to the suggestion.
The five Central Asian countries all come under criticism in varying degrees over constraints on political freedoms, government pressure on independent media, and free speech. Nepotism and corruption, two key ingredients behind the Kyrgyz unrest, are common complaints across the region.
In Kyrgyzstan, the wave of discontent over Bakiev's appointment of his children, siblings, and other relatives to key official posts eventually swept his government away. In an ironic twist, it was virtually the same wave Bakiev himself rode to power five years before, when his predecessor, Askar Akaev, was ousted as a result of the Tulip Revolution.
Family Factor
Elsewhere in Central Asia -- with the exception of Turkmenistan, where tribal politics reign -- members of presidential families control major businesses, banks, and wield enormous influence in politics.
In Uzbekistan, Gulnara Karimova is often touted as a potential successor to her president father, Islam Karimov. The first daughter enjoys a life of fame as a European-based fashion designer, and riches due to her reputed control of the company Zeromax, which oversees a wide range of oil and gas businesses in Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev's second daughter, Dinara Kulibaeva, has immense influence over the resource-rich country's energy sphere along with her husband, Timur Kulibaev, one of the country's richest men.
In Tajikistan, Rustam Emomali, President Emomali Rahmon's eldest son, recently made his political debut by gaining a seat on Dushanbe city council, sparking speculation that he is being groomed for the presidency.
In the weeks leading up to the Kyrgyz uprising, citizens became increasing vocal in expressing their belief that the presidential family was expanding its influence and wealth as a result of corruption, while the rest of the country struggled with poverty.
Such sentiments can also be found among ordinary people throughout Central Asia, who often feel their respective governments leave them to deal with poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities on their own.
Lack Of Organized Opposition
Many analyses and commentaries published after the Kyrgyz unrest predicted it wouldn't be long before people would be demonstrating against their leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in the region.
"The poverty, corruption, and harsh economic conditions that bred resentment in Kyrgyzstan are also present in abundance in neighboring states," read a passage from an article posted on eurasia.net on April 21. "None of [Central Asian leaders] can rule out turmoil at home."
But while a number of similar ingredients can be found in Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, this doesn't mean they will bring about the same result.
While Kyrgyzstan exhibited signs of a nascent democracy for years -- for example, it is the only country in the region in which the opposition has a parliamentary faction -- the powers that be in the other Central Asian states have maintained a much tighter grip.
The parliament in Uzbekistan, for example, is filled by ruling party members and their colleagues from other pro-government groups. Turkmenistan still practices a one-party system. In Kazakhstan, all parliamentary seats belong to the pro-presidential Nur Otan party.
Tajikistan's opposition Islamic Renaissance Party officially held onto its two parliamentary seats following a February election. But for years, even though one of its two legislators was terminally ill and bed-ridden, it wasn't allowed to replace him with another candidate.
Tajik political analyst Sabur Vahhob says that, compared to Kyrgyzstan, the other Central Asian states lack strong opposition figures. "There aren't experienced political [opposition] leaders, capable of gathering people around themselves," he says. "People need a leader whom they can trust, but we can't see such personalities yet."
Loyal Security Teams
In addition, while Bakiev's government in recent years took steps to clamp down on independent media and imprison opposition leaders, it remained the only country in the region where people enjoyed relative freedom to hold antigovernment protests. Bakiev himself, speaking from exile in Minsk last week, implied he didn't see anything wrong in demonstrations taking place.
Governments across Central Asia have been criticized for restricting political freedom and persecuting their political opponents.
Perhaps the harshest example in recent years came in Uzbekistan, when a rare public demonstration in the eastern town of Andijon in 2005 was brutally suppressed by government forces who fired into the crowd. The government claims 187 people, including police, were killed in the violence, but rights groups say several hundred protesters were killed. Hundreds fled the country following the crackdown, fearing imprisonment.
A key difference between Bakiev and other Central Asian leaders can be found in the people surrounding them. Most of regional leaders have taken firm control over key ministries -- security, defense, and interior -- by appointing close allies. Even at the level of middle management in the security and law enforcement agencies, only those most loyal to the presidential office can be found.
Bakiev, on the other hand, placed a sibling in charge of the elite presidential guard, but was at odds with his defense minister and onetime ally, Ismail Isakov, whom he eventually imprisoned.
Nervous Silence
The minimal coverage of Kyrgyz events by state-run media in Central Asia is indicative of the efforts taken in the region to prevent any carryover effect. Official media in all Central Asian countries have downplayed the scope and significance of the Kyrgyz events, while the Turkmen media has completely ignored them.
Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov -- keeping a nervous eye on Kyrgyzstan?
No Central Asian leader has officially recognized the interim government in Bishkek. But that does not mean the events have gone unnoticed by the governments of Central Asia.
When the unrest in Kyrgyz began to unfold, Kazakh President Nazarbaev was vocal in predicting that similar events would not take place in Kazakhstan. According to Nazarbaev, people in his oil-rich country are content with their living standards.
Speaking during the Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty on April 27, Nazarbaev described the situation in Kyrgyzstan as a mere "fight for power." He added: "It was not a revolution. It was complete banditry."
'Preventative Measures'
Others in the region appear to have taken steps designed to ensure a Kyrgyz-like political scenario does not unfold on their territory. Tajikistan appears to be taking the soft approach, while Uzbekistan is reportedly taking a hard line.
In an April 24 address to the nation, Tajik President Rahmon instructed all local government heads to have "open doors" every Saturday to meet with people and listen to their opinions, problems, and complaints.
The Uzbek response has been starkly different. According to RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, law enforcement officials along with neighborhood committees in the southeastern Ferghana Province are asking people to sign "loyalty letters," promising they will not agitate against the government. Such letters reportedly appeared shortly after the Kyrgyz unrest, and mainly target relatives of dissidents, political activists, and conservative religious people.
If history is any indication, the chances of any export of the revolutionary spirit seen in Kyrgyzstan depend largely on how successful the uprising is at bringing about real democratic change.
The Tulip Revolution five years ago initially brought hope of such change, and was widely welcomed by younger people in Central Asia. But those hopes faded as many expected reforms failed to materialize. This, Kyrgyz say today, merely demonstrated that the 2005 revolution wasn't about democracy, but simply replaced once corrupt strongman with another.
Likewise, if Kyrgyz hopes once again turn into disenchantment, their neighbors' criticisms of the "chronic revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan that lead to nothing will only be strengthened.
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Kazakhstan, South Korea Seek Closer Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy between state-run South Korean and Kazakh corporations came as the countries' presidents called for greater collaboration in uranium mining and reactor development.
KazAtomProm, Kazakhstan's nuclear energy company, announced that it had signed a MoU on cooperation with Korea Electric Power Corp (Kepco) and Korea Resources Corp (Kores). The document, it said, "lays ground for mutually beneficial cooperation between the parties in the peaceful use of atomic energy and further development of the nuclear power industry in both nations."
The MoU was signed on 22 April by KazAtomProm chairman Vladimir Shkolnik, Kepco president and CEO Kim Ssang-Soo, and Kores president and CEO Kim Shin-Jong.
In addition, KazAtomProm and Kores signed a separate MoU on cooperation in joint research, mineral exploration and mining operations in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has been supplying uranium to South Korea since 2005, covering nearly one-quarter of fuel demand for South Korea's nuclear power reactors, according to KazAtomProm. Twenty reactors currently provide almost 40% of South Korea's electricity.
Korea-Kazakhstan
The signing of the MoU came as Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev met with Korean president Lee Myung-bak during a three-day visit to Korea. During their meeting, the presidents discussed issues including bilateral cooperation in the energy and resources sectors. They discussed the possibility of joint projects to mine uranium and develop nuclear reactors.
According to a statement from Korea's presidential office, Nazabayev and Lee agreed to "proactively seek out how to work together on the joint exploration of uranium mines and joint research on the System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART), a Korea-developed model of small- and mid-sized nuclear reactors."
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
KazAtomProm, Kazakhstan's nuclear energy company, announced that it had signed a MoU on cooperation with Korea Electric Power Corp (Kepco) and Korea Resources Corp (Kores). The document, it said, "lays ground for mutually beneficial cooperation between the parties in the peaceful use of atomic energy and further development of the nuclear power industry in both nations."
The MoU was signed on 22 April by KazAtomProm chairman Vladimir Shkolnik, Kepco president and CEO Kim Ssang-Soo, and Kores president and CEO Kim Shin-Jong.
In addition, KazAtomProm and Kores signed a separate MoU on cooperation in joint research, mineral exploration and mining operations in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has been supplying uranium to South Korea since 2005, covering nearly one-quarter of fuel demand for South Korea's nuclear power reactors, according to KazAtomProm. Twenty reactors currently provide almost 40% of South Korea's electricity.
Korea-Kazakhstan
The signing of the MoU came as Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev met with Korean president Lee Myung-bak during a three-day visit to Korea. During their meeting, the presidents discussed issues including bilateral cooperation in the energy and resources sectors. They discussed the possibility of joint projects to mine uranium and develop nuclear reactors.
According to a statement from Korea's presidential office, Nazabayev and Lee agreed to "proactively seek out how to work together on the joint exploration of uranium mines and joint research on the System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART), a Korea-developed model of small- and mid-sized nuclear reactors."
Source: Researched and written by World Nuclear News
Saturday, April 24, 2010 |
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WHO Investigates Polio Outbreak In Tajikistan; Immunization Planned
WHO deployed a team of experts April 16 to investigate a suspected polio outbreak in the south-west of Tajikistan, in the area bordering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.
A sharp increase of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases in early April prompted the Tajik government to notify WHO of a possible polio outbreak. After further investigation by the Tajik national health authorities jointly with WHO, laboratory tests by the WHO collaborating center in Moscow confirmed poliovirus as the cause of the outbreak.
Tests are being done to further characterize the virus.
WHO said it immediately alerted all WHO Member States of this new public health risk in eastern central Asia, as required under the International Health Regulations.
WHO has also alerted the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to intensify surveillance for AFP cases and to rapidly conduct national or subnational polio immunization campaigns.
This is the first outbreak from imported poliovirus in the WHO European Region since the Region was certified polio-free in 2002.
WHO, together with the active participation of its partners in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, said it will continue to provide technical and field support until the outbreak is brought under control.
WHO and its partners will support the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan in conducting a mass immunization campaign.
A sharp increase of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases in early April prompted the Tajik government to notify WHO of a possible polio outbreak. After further investigation by the Tajik national health authorities jointly with WHO, laboratory tests by the WHO collaborating center in Moscow confirmed poliovirus as the cause of the outbreak.
Tests are being done to further characterize the virus.
WHO said it immediately alerted all WHO Member States of this new public health risk in eastern central Asia, as required under the International Health Regulations.
WHO has also alerted the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to intensify surveillance for AFP cases and to rapidly conduct national or subnational polio immunization campaigns.
This is the first outbreak from imported poliovirus in the WHO European Region since the Region was certified polio-free in 2002.
WHO, together with the active participation of its partners in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, said it will continue to provide technical and field support until the outbreak is brought under control.
WHO and its partners will support the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan in conducting a mass immunization campaign.
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Kazakhstan Torture Case Reaches UN
Kazakhstan has failed to prevent, investigate, or punish torture by police according to a complaint filed Thursday before the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) by the Open Society Justice Initiative.
A group of at least five police officers tortured Alexander Gerasimov in 2007, resulting in serious injury and 13 days of hospitalization. Using a technique called "dry submarino," the police tied Gerasimov's hands and held him down on the floor as one officer repeatedly jammed a knee into Gerasimov's back while suffocating him with a plastic bag.
Police also delivered severe blows to Gerasimov's kidneys and threatened him with sexual violence. Gerasimov bled from his nose, ears, and abrasions on his face before finally losing consciousness. He later spent over a month receiving intensive psychiatric treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder arising from the incident.
"Torture is endemic in Central Asia. Police frequently rely on violence to extract confessions rather than conduct proper investigations," said James A. Goldston, executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, which is co-counsel with the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law in the complaint. "Failure to investigate or punish the perpetrators of abuse creates a vicious cycle of impunity and poisons the criminal justice system."
Gerasimov's case is the first individual complaint against Kazakhstan to be filed with the UN CAT since the country's ratification of the Convention Against Torture. It challenges Kazakhstan for torturing Gerasimov and failing to properly investigate his complaints, punish the perpetrators, or provide adequate reparations for his pain and suffering.
"Kazakh President Nazarbaev has pledged to improve democracy and human rights, but it is not enough to sign treaties and make promises-we need to see real reform so that torture like this ends," said Goldston. "If Kazakhstan aspires to be a leader in Central Asia, it needs to protect the basic rights of its citizens."
The Open Society Justice Initiative works together with local partner organizations in Central Asia to document torture, ensure effective prosecution of those responsible, demand justice for victims, and conduct advocacy for a firm policy against using coerced confessions as evidence
A group of at least five police officers tortured Alexander Gerasimov in 2007, resulting in serious injury and 13 days of hospitalization. Using a technique called "dry submarino," the police tied Gerasimov's hands and held him down on the floor as one officer repeatedly jammed a knee into Gerasimov's back while suffocating him with a plastic bag.
Police also delivered severe blows to Gerasimov's kidneys and threatened him with sexual violence. Gerasimov bled from his nose, ears, and abrasions on his face before finally losing consciousness. He later spent over a month receiving intensive psychiatric treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder arising from the incident.
"Torture is endemic in Central Asia. Police frequently rely on violence to extract confessions rather than conduct proper investigations," said James A. Goldston, executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, which is co-counsel with the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law in the complaint. "Failure to investigate or punish the perpetrators of abuse creates a vicious cycle of impunity and poisons the criminal justice system."
Gerasimov's case is the first individual complaint against Kazakhstan to be filed with the UN CAT since the country's ratification of the Convention Against Torture. It challenges Kazakhstan for torturing Gerasimov and failing to properly investigate his complaints, punish the perpetrators, or provide adequate reparations for his pain and suffering.
"Kazakh President Nazarbaev has pledged to improve democracy and human rights, but it is not enough to sign treaties and make promises-we need to see real reform so that torture like this ends," said Goldston. "If Kazakhstan aspires to be a leader in Central Asia, it needs to protect the basic rights of its citizens."
The Open Society Justice Initiative works together with local partner organizations in Central Asia to document torture, ensure effective prosecution of those responsible, demand justice for victims, and conduct advocacy for a firm policy against using coerced confessions as evidence
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Political Islam In Central Asia: The Role Of Hizb Al-Tahrir
By Emmanuel Karagiannis for the CTC-Sentinel
One of the fastest growing global, Sunni Islamic political organizations is Hizb al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party, HT).1 HT often escapes in-depth analysis because the group itself does not use violence to seek political change. As a result, it is not on the U.S. government’s list of terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, HT is pursuing an agenda at odds with the West, and eventually the group could pose an active threat to the United States and its allies.
Profiling HT is important as the group is one of the most popular pan-Islamic organizations, counting tens of thousands of members.2 While it rejects violence at this time, it is open to waging jihad once a proper Islamic state is established with the purpose of creating a global Islamic caliphate. To establish this initial Islamic state, HT is pursuing an agenda to make society more “Islamist” so that such a state can be established peacefully. Nevertheless, the group ascribes to a little discussed strategy called nusra, which means it could support a coup d’etat by an armed force if that force is pursuing an Islamist agenda.
This article will provide background on HT, including its strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate. It will then profile HT’s role in Central Asia, the region in which it is most active.
Background on Hizb al-Tahrir
HT was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin. In the decades since its establishment, HT has become an international movement3 with tens of thousands of followers worldwide. Although the group is primarily active in Central Asia, it also has a large following in a number of Western countries, including in the United States. Today, HT is led by Ata Abu Rashta, a Palestinian civil engineer who studied in Cairo and previously served as the party’s spokesman in Jordan.
HT does not view itself as a religious organization, but as a political party based on Islamic values. HT’s political doctrine is founded on two principles. The first is the need for Islamic law, or Shari`a, to regulate all aspects of human life—politics, economics, science and ethics. The second principle is the need for an authentic Islamic state, which would pave the way for the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. According to HT, a “just” society can only be achieved within such a political entity.
HT’s goal is to create an Islamic state that will first absorb all Muslim-populated territories into its borders to establish a caliphate, and then spread Islam worldwide through jihad. For instance, al-Nabhani wrote in Article 183 of his proposed constitution for the future Islamic state that “conveying the Islamic da’wah [to the world] is the axis around which the foreign policy revolves, and the basis upon which the relation between the [Islamic] state and other states is built.”4 Moreover, “this policy is implemented by a defined method that never changes, which is jihad, regardless of who is in authority. Jihad is the call to Islam which involves fighting or the contribution of money, opinions, or literature towards the fighting.”5 To achieve these goals, HT envisages a three-stage program of action, modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced on his path to establishing the first Islamic state:
To achieve this strategy, HT does not want to seize control of the state by force and coerce society into accepting its political agenda. Rather, HT wants to persuade society to accept its ideas willingly, which would then inevitably lead to a regime change. Yet even in these circumstances, it is likely that HT would use some form of pressure to remove recalcitrant regimes; party ideologues have often implied that regimes could be overthrown by acts of civil disobedience, such as demonstrations and strikes. For example, the media representative of HT in Britain, Imran Waheed, once wrote:
Moreover, HT has also developed the concept of seeking outside support (nusra) to remove a regime from power. HT compares this strategy to how the Prophet Muhammad received support from Arab tribes in his conquest of Medina after he fled Mecca for fear of persecution by the pagan leaders.8 HT has interpreted the conquest of Medina as a coup d’etat orchestrated by the Prophet Muhammad and his allies that took their local opponents by surprise.
According to the group’s literature, if the land was a land of Kufr and the rules of Islam were not put in implementation, then removing the ruler who governs over the Muslims would be through using the method of Nusrah, i.e. seeking [military]9 help. This is the method that the Prophet Muhammad adopted to establish the State of Islam and to implement the Islamic rules.10
In practice, this means that HT could support a coup organized by a military that would have first embraced Islamism as its ideology. For example, HT encouraged elements within the Jordanian armed forces to overthrow the Jordanian government in 1968 and 1969. Moreover, there are indications that some members of HT were linked to a failed coup attempt in Egypt in 1974.11 The objectives of seeking nusra for the re-establishment of the caliphate are twofold: first, to enable HT to continue its political struggle without risking a military confrontation with authorities; second, to propagate its ideology to the security forces so that they overthrow existing regimes and establish an Islamic state.
It is important to note, however, that HT never developed a paramilitary wing and its members did not provide military support for the coup attempts in Jordan and Egypt, although these coups were aimed at establishing an Islamic state. Moreover, HT has not been involved in any other violent or velvet coups in the Muslim world since the mid-1970s.
HT’s Role in Central Asia
Although HT has influence globally—including in the United States and in the West—it is most active in Central Asia because it has faced little competition from other Islamist groups in this region. There are a number of factors that led to HT’s rise in Central Asia, not least of which is the fact that Central Asia is predominately Muslim.12 Poor economic conditions in post-Soviet Central Asia provided fertile soil for Islamist groups to achieve support in changing the current social order. Governments in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan exclude Uzbek minorities, which has allowed HT to recruit among this class in these countries. Furthermore, many in the population are attracted to the prospect of an Islamic government, primarily due to the lack of legitimate channels for protest against the region’s authoritarian governments.
Moreover, the collapse of communism produced an ideological vacuum in Central Asia, which HT has attempted to fill with religious rhetoric. The group appeals to individuals who want to believe in a coherent ideology that provides ready answers not only for spiritual questions, but also practical issues. HT’s vision of a universal Islamic state also appeals to Central Asians who feel nostalgia for the loss of Soviet society, which theoretically promoted values of “solidarity” and “justice.” There are widespread feelings of mistrust in the capability of Central Asian governments to cater to the citizens’ needs. The application of Shari`a, propagated by HT, promises to a fraction of the population a legitimate blueprint for a “just” society. Its radical calls to overthrow regimes through peaceful measures are well received by many people who, while rejecting violence as a method for political change, have lost hope in the Central Asian regimes’ ability to reform themselves.
HT’s emergence in Central Asia was initially an “Uzbek phenomenon.” The early development of a mosque-centered faith in Uzbek-populated areas means that the local population is accustomed to thinking that Islam can provide solutions to problems. Since the late 1990s, however, HT succeeded in spreading its message throughout Central Asia. As a result, HT is the leading Islamist group in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with thousands of members in each country.13 These governments have responded to the emergence of HT with repressive measures against its members and supporters. These punitive measures, however, are having the opposite effect: HT is growing in popularity, as can be measured by its ability to recruit across broad swathes of society, including students, businessmen, intellectuals and women. Only in Turkmenistan does HT have a minimal presence, which is probably due to severe state repression.
HT differs considerably from other clandestine Islamist groups when it comes to recruitment. The group welcomes as members both men and women. HT is more likely to use its female members for demonstrations and protests in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, based on the belief that security services in these countries are less likely to abuse them physically or arrest them. Also, HT has been active in recruiting prisoners in Central Asia. Jailed HT members propagate their ideology to fellow convicts who, due to the harsh prison conditions, are susceptible to Islamist messaging. This has become such a problem that in Uzbekistan, for example, authorities tend to isolate HT members from common prisoners.14
HT pursues a different strategy in each Central Asian country where it is active. In Uzbekistan, HT spreads its message clandestinely. In Kyrgyzstan, it takes advantage of the country’s relatively relaxed political atmosphere to launch public relations campaigns. In Kazakhstan, HT is still growing its cadres while avoiding a confrontation with the authorities. In Tajikistan, HT chooses to confront both the authorities and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, its main political competitor. While maintaining a coherent and concrete agenda, HT has tactically focused on each country’s unique problems.
Prospects for the Future
HT does not constitute an immediate threat to the security of Central Asian states. Nevertheless, HT may in the medium- to long-term ally itself with radical elements within the security services or armed forces to overthrow one or more governments in the Central Asian region in line with the group’s nusra strategy. HT’s rejection of political violence is conditional on the prevailing political circumstances: when nusra is not an option, the group aims at the Islamization of society and the eventual peaceful overthrow of the regime.
Although HT cannot be classified as a terrorist organization, the political implications of its growing influence in the region are serious. The group constitutes an obstacle to the emergence of democracy in Central Asia, since its growing popularity has allowed regional leaders to solidify their positions and resist Western calls for political and economic reforms. Moreover, if HT were to collaborate with an armed force to establish an Islamic state in a country, its next goal would be to re-establish the Islamic caliphate, which would clearly set this new state up for conflict with its regional neighbors.
Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis is an Assistant Professor of Russian and post-Soviet Politics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece and an Investigator at the University of Maryland’s START Center. His new book on Hizb al-Tahrir in Central Asia, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has just been published by Routledge in New York.
This article first appeared in the CTC Sentinel Volume 3-Issue 2 (February 2010), pages 13- 15 (PDF). The CTC Sentinel is published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. This article is reprinted with permission.
NOTES:
1 Hizb al-Tahrir is more commonly transliterated as Hizb ut-Tahrir.
2 HT’s total numbers in Central Asia are not known because the group operates clandestinely. There are, however, some 6,000 HT members and sympathizers serving time in Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik prisons. The U.S. State Department claims, for example, that as many as 4,500 HT members are currently jailed in Uzbekistan alone. See the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Uzbekistan – International Religious Freedom Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007).
3 The terms group, party, organization and movement are used interchangeably in this article.
4 Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1998), p. 275.
5 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
6 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), p. 32.
7 Imrad Waheed, “Who Killed Farhad Usmanov?” Caliphate, July 2002.
8 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 22.
9 HT refers to the “people of support” (ahl un-Nusra) who were physically powerful enough not only to help establish the first Islamic state, but also to defend it against enemies. They were the equivalent of an army. By definition, those who now can help in re-establishing the caliphate must be armed. On more than one occasion, HT has openly asked the armed forces of Muslim countries to intervene in certain states. Therefore, it must be emphasized that HT is interested in those who are militarily (not politically) capable.
10 The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, p. 22.
11 S. Taji-Farouk, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), pp. 27, 168.
12 According to the CIA World Factbook, the Muslim populations in the four Central Asian republics are: Tajikistan (90%), Uzbekistan (88%), Kazakhstan (47%), and Kyrgyzstan (75%).
13 Based on interviews with security officials and group members, as well as extrapolating from the number of arrested members in the country, the author estimates that there are around 10,000-15,000 members and many more sympathizers in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the majority of HT members appear to be from the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent—as assessed by the number of arrested members from these areas. In Tajikistan, despite the existence of a legal Islamic party, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), HT has managed to establish a presence in the country. The first HT cells in Tajikistan were established by Uzbek citizens who moved into northern Tajikistan in the late 1990s. A rough estimate of HT membership in Tajikistan is about 3,000 members. In Kazakhstan, the first HT members appeared in 1998. As in Tajikistan, the first generation of members in southern Kazakhstan were ethnic Uzbeks. In recent years, however, a large number of members are ethnic Kazakhs. HT likely has about 2,000 members in Kazakhstan, mostly active in the south in areas such as Shymkent and Kentau. In Kyrgyzstan, HT is strong in the southern provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken. According to security sources, there are around 4,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan. These details are based on: “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Extremistskaya Organizatsiya,” Shyt [Dushanbe], January 27, 2005; Personal interview, Igor Savin, director of NGO Dialogue, Shymkent, Kazakhstan, February 2004; Personal interview, Kazakh diplomat, Washington, D.C., September 2009; Personal interview, Kazakh security official, Astana, Kazakhstan, February 2009; Personal interview, Sadykdzhan Mahmoudov, director of NGO Rays of Solomon, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2004.
14 Personal interview, member of Hizb al-Tahrir, name withheld at request, Namangan, Uzbekistan, August 2005.
One of the fastest growing global, Sunni Islamic political organizations is Hizb al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party, HT).1 HT often escapes in-depth analysis because the group itself does not use violence to seek political change. As a result, it is not on the U.S. government’s list of terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, HT is pursuing an agenda at odds with the West, and eventually the group could pose an active threat to the United States and its allies.
Profiling HT is important as the group is one of the most popular pan-Islamic organizations, counting tens of thousands of members.2 While it rejects violence at this time, it is open to waging jihad once a proper Islamic state is established with the purpose of creating a global Islamic caliphate. To establish this initial Islamic state, HT is pursuing an agenda to make society more “Islamist” so that such a state can be established peacefully. Nevertheless, the group ascribes to a little discussed strategy called nusra, which means it could support a coup d’etat by an armed force if that force is pursuing an Islamist agenda.
This article will provide background on HT, including its strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate. It will then profile HT’s role in Central Asia, the region in which it is most active.
Background on Hizb al-Tahrir
HT was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin. In the decades since its establishment, HT has become an international movement3 with tens of thousands of followers worldwide. Although the group is primarily active in Central Asia, it also has a large following in a number of Western countries, including in the United States. Today, HT is led by Ata Abu Rashta, a Palestinian civil engineer who studied in Cairo and previously served as the party’s spokesman in Jordan.
HT does not view itself as a religious organization, but as a political party based on Islamic values. HT’s political doctrine is founded on two principles. The first is the need for Islamic law, or Shari`a, to regulate all aspects of human life—politics, economics, science and ethics. The second principle is the need for an authentic Islamic state, which would pave the way for the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. According to HT, a “just” society can only be achieved within such a political entity.
HT’s goal is to create an Islamic state that will first absorb all Muslim-populated territories into its borders to establish a caliphate, and then spread Islam worldwide through jihad. For instance, al-Nabhani wrote in Article 183 of his proposed constitution for the future Islamic state that “conveying the Islamic da’wah [to the world] is the axis around which the foreign policy revolves, and the basis upon which the relation between the [Islamic] state and other states is built.”4 Moreover, “this policy is implemented by a defined method that never changes, which is jihad, regardless of who is in authority. Jihad is the call to Islam which involves fighting or the contribution of money, opinions, or literature towards the fighting.”5 To achieve these goals, HT envisages a three-stage program of action, modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced on his path to establishing the first Islamic state:
Stage One: Recruitment of members.
Stage Two: Islamization of society.
Stage Three: Takeover of the state and jihad against non-believers.6
To achieve this strategy, HT does not want to seize control of the state by force and coerce society into accepting its political agenda. Rather, HT wants to persuade society to accept its ideas willingly, which would then inevitably lead to a regime change. Yet even in these circumstances, it is likely that HT would use some form of pressure to remove recalcitrant regimes; party ideologues have often implied that regimes could be overthrown by acts of civil disobedience, such as demonstrations and strikes. For example, the media representative of HT in Britain, Imran Waheed, once wrote:
a day will come when the Muslims will take revenge against all those who participated in their oppression [i.e. the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan]. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not use weapons or resort to violence, nor uses any physical means in its call…However, do not expect, that these rulers and their regimes will collapse all by themselves. On the contrary, patient believers are required to shake these regimes and uproot them.7
Moreover, HT has also developed the concept of seeking outside support (nusra) to remove a regime from power. HT compares this strategy to how the Prophet Muhammad received support from Arab tribes in his conquest of Medina after he fled Mecca for fear of persecution by the pagan leaders.8 HT has interpreted the conquest of Medina as a coup d’etat orchestrated by the Prophet Muhammad and his allies that took their local opponents by surprise.
According to the group’s literature, if the land was a land of Kufr and the rules of Islam were not put in implementation, then removing the ruler who governs over the Muslims would be through using the method of Nusrah, i.e. seeking [military]9 help. This is the method that the Prophet Muhammad adopted to establish the State of Islam and to implement the Islamic rules.10
In practice, this means that HT could support a coup organized by a military that would have first embraced Islamism as its ideology. For example, HT encouraged elements within the Jordanian armed forces to overthrow the Jordanian government in 1968 and 1969. Moreover, there are indications that some members of HT were linked to a failed coup attempt in Egypt in 1974.11 The objectives of seeking nusra for the re-establishment of the caliphate are twofold: first, to enable HT to continue its political struggle without risking a military confrontation with authorities; second, to propagate its ideology to the security forces so that they overthrow existing regimes and establish an Islamic state.
It is important to note, however, that HT never developed a paramilitary wing and its members did not provide military support for the coup attempts in Jordan and Egypt, although these coups were aimed at establishing an Islamic state. Moreover, HT has not been involved in any other violent or velvet coups in the Muslim world since the mid-1970s.
HT’s Role in Central Asia
Although HT has influence globally—including in the United States and in the West—it is most active in Central Asia because it has faced little competition from other Islamist groups in this region. There are a number of factors that led to HT’s rise in Central Asia, not least of which is the fact that Central Asia is predominately Muslim.12 Poor economic conditions in post-Soviet Central Asia provided fertile soil for Islamist groups to achieve support in changing the current social order. Governments in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan exclude Uzbek minorities, which has allowed HT to recruit among this class in these countries. Furthermore, many in the population are attracted to the prospect of an Islamic government, primarily due to the lack of legitimate channels for protest against the region’s authoritarian governments.
Moreover, the collapse of communism produced an ideological vacuum in Central Asia, which HT has attempted to fill with religious rhetoric. The group appeals to individuals who want to believe in a coherent ideology that provides ready answers not only for spiritual questions, but also practical issues. HT’s vision of a universal Islamic state also appeals to Central Asians who feel nostalgia for the loss of Soviet society, which theoretically promoted values of “solidarity” and “justice.” There are widespread feelings of mistrust in the capability of Central Asian governments to cater to the citizens’ needs. The application of Shari`a, propagated by HT, promises to a fraction of the population a legitimate blueprint for a “just” society. Its radical calls to overthrow regimes through peaceful measures are well received by many people who, while rejecting violence as a method for political change, have lost hope in the Central Asian regimes’ ability to reform themselves.
HT’s emergence in Central Asia was initially an “Uzbek phenomenon.” The early development of a mosque-centered faith in Uzbek-populated areas means that the local population is accustomed to thinking that Islam can provide solutions to problems. Since the late 1990s, however, HT succeeded in spreading its message throughout Central Asia. As a result, HT is the leading Islamist group in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with thousands of members in each country.13 These governments have responded to the emergence of HT with repressive measures against its members and supporters. These punitive measures, however, are having the opposite effect: HT is growing in popularity, as can be measured by its ability to recruit across broad swathes of society, including students, businessmen, intellectuals and women. Only in Turkmenistan does HT have a minimal presence, which is probably due to severe state repression.
HT differs considerably from other clandestine Islamist groups when it comes to recruitment. The group welcomes as members both men and women. HT is more likely to use its female members for demonstrations and protests in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, based on the belief that security services in these countries are less likely to abuse them physically or arrest them. Also, HT has been active in recruiting prisoners in Central Asia. Jailed HT members propagate their ideology to fellow convicts who, due to the harsh prison conditions, are susceptible to Islamist messaging. This has become such a problem that in Uzbekistan, for example, authorities tend to isolate HT members from common prisoners.14
HT pursues a different strategy in each Central Asian country where it is active. In Uzbekistan, HT spreads its message clandestinely. In Kyrgyzstan, it takes advantage of the country’s relatively relaxed political atmosphere to launch public relations campaigns. In Kazakhstan, HT is still growing its cadres while avoiding a confrontation with the authorities. In Tajikistan, HT chooses to confront both the authorities and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, its main political competitor. While maintaining a coherent and concrete agenda, HT has tactically focused on each country’s unique problems.
Prospects for the Future
HT does not constitute an immediate threat to the security of Central Asian states. Nevertheless, HT may in the medium- to long-term ally itself with radical elements within the security services or armed forces to overthrow one or more governments in the Central Asian region in line with the group’s nusra strategy. HT’s rejection of political violence is conditional on the prevailing political circumstances: when nusra is not an option, the group aims at the Islamization of society and the eventual peaceful overthrow of the regime.
Although HT cannot be classified as a terrorist organization, the political implications of its growing influence in the region are serious. The group constitutes an obstacle to the emergence of democracy in Central Asia, since its growing popularity has allowed regional leaders to solidify their positions and resist Western calls for political and economic reforms. Moreover, if HT were to collaborate with an armed force to establish an Islamic state in a country, its next goal would be to re-establish the Islamic caliphate, which would clearly set this new state up for conflict with its regional neighbors.
Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis is an Assistant Professor of Russian and post-Soviet Politics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece and an Investigator at the University of Maryland’s START Center. His new book on Hizb al-Tahrir in Central Asia, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has just been published by Routledge in New York.
This article first appeared in the CTC Sentinel Volume 3-Issue 2 (February 2010), pages 13- 15 (PDF). The CTC Sentinel is published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. This article is reprinted with permission.
NOTES:
1 Hizb al-Tahrir is more commonly transliterated as Hizb ut-Tahrir.
2 HT’s total numbers in Central Asia are not known because the group operates clandestinely. There are, however, some 6,000 HT members and sympathizers serving time in Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik prisons. The U.S. State Department claims, for example, that as many as 4,500 HT members are currently jailed in Uzbekistan alone. See the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Uzbekistan – International Religious Freedom Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007).
3 The terms group, party, organization and movement are used interchangeably in this article.
4 Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1998), p. 275.
5 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
6 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), p. 32.
7 Imrad Waheed, “Who Killed Farhad Usmanov?” Caliphate, July 2002.
8 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 22.
9 HT refers to the “people of support” (ahl un-Nusra) who were physically powerful enough not only to help establish the first Islamic state, but also to defend it against enemies. They were the equivalent of an army. By definition, those who now can help in re-establishing the caliphate must be armed. On more than one occasion, HT has openly asked the armed forces of Muslim countries to intervene in certain states. Therefore, it must be emphasized that HT is interested in those who are militarily (not politically) capable.
10 The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, p. 22.
11 S. Taji-Farouk, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), pp. 27, 168.
12 According to the CIA World Factbook, the Muslim populations in the four Central Asian republics are: Tajikistan (90%), Uzbekistan (88%), Kazakhstan (47%), and Kyrgyzstan (75%).
13 Based on interviews with security officials and group members, as well as extrapolating from the number of arrested members in the country, the author estimates that there are around 10,000-15,000 members and many more sympathizers in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the majority of HT members appear to be from the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent—as assessed by the number of arrested members from these areas. In Tajikistan, despite the existence of a legal Islamic party, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), HT has managed to establish a presence in the country. The first HT cells in Tajikistan were established by Uzbek citizens who moved into northern Tajikistan in the late 1990s. A rough estimate of HT membership in Tajikistan is about 3,000 members. In Kazakhstan, the first HT members appeared in 1998. As in Tajikistan, the first generation of members in southern Kazakhstan were ethnic Uzbeks. In recent years, however, a large number of members are ethnic Kazakhs. HT likely has about 2,000 members in Kazakhstan, mostly active in the south in areas such as Shymkent and Kentau. In Kyrgyzstan, HT is strong in the southern provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken. According to security sources, there are around 4,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan. These details are based on: “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Extremistskaya Organizatsiya,” Shyt [Dushanbe], January 27, 2005; Personal interview, Igor Savin, director of NGO Dialogue, Shymkent, Kazakhstan, February 2004; Personal interview, Kazakh diplomat, Washington, D.C., September 2009; Personal interview, Kazakh security official, Astana, Kazakhstan, February 2009; Personal interview, Sadykdzhan Mahmoudov, director of NGO Rays of Solomon, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2004.
14 Personal interview, member of Hizb al-Tahrir, name withheld at request, Namangan, Uzbekistan, August 2005.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010 |
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Bakiyev's Son Suspected Of Russian Loan Embezzlement
The younger son of the ousted Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev is suspected of embezzling millions of dollars of a loan from Russia, a Kyrgyz Prosecutor's General official said on Friday.
The spokesman said Maxim Bakiyev had placed $35 million of a $300 million loan from Russia into his private bank accounts while chairman of the board of directors at the Kyrgyz Development Fund.
The ousted president is currently in Kazakhstan. He is insisting on amnesty for his himself and his family members as a condition for his resignation.
Earlier on Friday, head of the Kyrgyz interim government, Roza Otunbayeva showed journalists a copy of a fax that she claimed was a resignation letter written by Bakiyev.
But Bakiyev has not officially announced his resignation. His brother, Akhmad Bakiyev, said the document was a fake.
"The issue of his resignation has not yet been raised," he said.
Source: RIA Novosti
The spokesman said Maxim Bakiyev had placed $35 million of a $300 million loan from Russia into his private bank accounts while chairman of the board of directors at the Kyrgyz Development Fund.
The ousted president is currently in Kazakhstan. He is insisting on amnesty for his himself and his family members as a condition for his resignation.
Earlier on Friday, head of the Kyrgyz interim government, Roza Otunbayeva showed journalists a copy of a fax that she claimed was a resignation letter written by Bakiyev.
But Bakiyev has not officially announced his resignation. His brother, Akhmad Bakiyev, said the document was a fake.
"The issue of his resignation has not yet been raised," he said.
Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, April 16, 2010 |
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Kyrgyz President Bakiyev Leaves For Talks With Kazakh Leader
Ousted Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev took off for Kazakhstan on Thursday to hold talks with country's President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Earlier in the day, Bakiyev told his supporters that Nazarbayev had invited him for discussions on how to resolve the current situation in Kyrgyzstan.
Bakiyev fled the capital city of Bishkek at the height of the violent unrest last week and took refuge in his home village in the south of the country.
Source: RIA Novosti
Earlier in the day, Bakiyev told his supporters that Nazarbayev had invited him for discussions on how to resolve the current situation in Kyrgyzstan.
Bakiyev fled the capital city of Bishkek at the height of the violent unrest last week and took refuge in his home village in the south of the country.
Source: RIA Novosti
Thursday, April 15, 2010 |
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Kazakhstan: US, NATO Seek Military Outpost Between Russia And China
By Rick Rozoff
On April 11, the day before the two-day Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, U.S. President Barack Obama met with his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev and their deliberations resulted in the U.S. obtaining the right to fly troops and military equipment over (and later directly into) the territory of Kazakhstan for the escalating war in Afghanistan.
Michael McFaul, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and senior director of Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the United States National Security Council, "told reporters in a conference call that the agreement will allow troops to fly directly from the United States over the North Pole to the region."
McFaul directly stated, "This will save money; it will save time in terms of moving our troops and supplies needed into the theater." The Washington Post cited other White House officials claiming "Sunday's meeting between Obama and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was the turning point," [1] an allusion to the advance it signified over the last agreement on military transport for the Afghan war signed between the two countries in January, which permitted the transport of only non-lethal American military supplies and equipment across the country by rail.
The government of Kazakhstan has also allowed limited flights containing non-lethal military cargo over its territory, but that entailed a lengthy and circuitous route from the eastern United States to Europe and over the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan, ultimately headed to the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, which is currently in jeopardy after the overthrow of the government in that nation on April 7.
However, now "Kazakhstan has agreed to let the United States fly troops and weapons over its territory, a deal that opens a direct and faster route over the North Pole for American forces and lethal equipment headed to Afghanistan." [2]
The new arrangement will also substitute for a previous one under which U.S. military cargo planes flew combat troops and materiel to the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, from there to air bases in Kuwait and other destinations in the Persian Gulf, circumventing Iran which forbids American military overflights, and then either directly into the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan or to Pakistan. The second option often entails using treacherous land routes subject to regular attacks by militants on the Pakistani side of the border.
The Pentagon has also been working on a sea and land route beginning at the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti and from there to fellow Caucasus nation Azerbaijan and that country's Caspian Sea neighbors Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, conspicuously circumventing Russia, as do the oil and natural gas pipelines the West has promoted to transport hydrocarbons in the opposite direction, from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea.
"The new route over the North Pole to Bagram Air Base, the military's main air hub in Afghanistan, will allow troops to fly direct from the United States in a little more than 12 hours." [3]
The Air Force Times detailed that "Flying over Russia and Kazakhstan means Air Force cargo jets could fly from Alaska to Afghanistan without refueling, U.S. Transportation Command officials have said. Chartered passenger jets could leave from Chicago and fly over the North Pole to deliver troops." [4]
Colonel Jon Chicky, a faculty member at the National Defense University, said of the new transport route, "Just look at a map, it’s a lot easier to go over the polar ice cap than all the way across the Atlantic and Europe." [5]
U.S. military planes would necessarily have to fly over Russia from the North Pole to reach Kazakhstan, but there is no information that Russia has approved such overflights.
Sunday's deal is the latest in a steady and expanding series of moves by the Pentagon and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to establish a permanent military outpost in Kazakhstan, the most critically important spot on the earth for the West to monitor its two main potential challengers and to hold joint Russian-Chinese initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [6] in check (if not to tear the heart out of them). Kazakhstan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) along with Russia and five other former Soviet states. In terms of land mass it is the second largest member of the CSTO and the third most populous behind Russia and Uzbekistan.
The geopolitical significance of the country in general has not escaped the U.S. since the day the Soviet Union was fragmented into its fifteen federal republics in 1991 and has been an even greater cynosure of Washington's attention since Barack Obama was elected president on November 4, 2008.
And with good reason. Kazakhstan borders Kyrgyzstan, the most vital transit country for the war in Afghanistan, where according to U.S. Central Command 50,000 U.S. troops passed through on their way to and from Afghanistan last month alone. [7]
It also borders Uzbekistan, which evicted U.S. military forces in 2005, and fellow Caspian Sea nation Turkmenistan, a country in transition since the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov in 2006 and until now the only state from the Balkans to Central Asia not pulled into the Pentagon's and NATO's greater Afghan war network.
Kazakhstan has a 950-mile (1,533-kilometer) border with China and a 4,030-mile (6,846-kilometer) one with Russia, the longest continuous border between any two nations in the world. It is the second largest nation in terms of territory to emerge from the Soviet Union next to Russia and the ninth biggest in the world.
As stated during a visit to the country by then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in June of 2009, it is "a nation almost the size of the whole of western Europe and bordering Russia and China [and] is also part of all the economic and military alliances of its two powerful neighbours, including the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO)." [8]
Kazakhstan has projected oil reserves of 100-110 billion barrels, which if realized will be the third largest in the world. Its projected natural gas reserves are as high as 5 trillion cubic meters.
It possesses the world's largest reserves of uranium, barite, lead and tungsten, and last year became the world's leading uranium producer. In addition, the Central Asian nation has the second largest reserves of chromite, silver, and zinc, the third largest of manganese, and substantial if not yet reliably established deposits of copper, gold and iron ore. [9]
The country has the largest economy in Central Asia and more energy reserves than the other four nations there combined.
It is also home to the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the world's first and largest space launch facility, from which the first manned space flight was launched in 1961. It is currently managed by the Russian Federal Space Agency and the Russian Space Forces under a lease with the Kazakh government. Should Kazakhstan shift further into the U.S. and NATO orbit that arrangement will be subject to change.
In appreciation of its geostrategic location and role, Kazakhstan was brought into NATO's counterintuitively-named Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 and the bloc's 50-nation (28 full member and 22 PfP states) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
In 2003 the U.S. Defense Department signed a five-year Military Cooperation Plan with the country, the only nation in the region the Pentagon has such a program with, which included "such important directions of cooperation as the development of the peacekeeping potential of the Kazakh Armed Forces, improvement of the Kazakhstan system of military education and mutual participation in trainings." Kazakh troops were deployed to Iraq in the same year.
Over 300 Kazakh officers have been sent for training to U.S. military institutions, including the West Point Military Academy and the National Defense University, as part of the agreement
As the Kazakh news source from which the above information originated reported in January of 2009, "Realization of the first Plan successfully ended in 2008. In February 2008 a 2008-2012 Cooperation Plan was signed. Kazakh-American cooperation in defense and security has achieved significant results within implementation of the first plan." [10]
Before that, "Kazakhstan signed two agreements supporting U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan, within the framework of the Enduring Freedom plan, on December 15, 2001, and on June 10, 2002," [11] which were formally ratified by the nation's senate in late 2008.
In December of 2008 the Jamestown Foundation, a U.S. think tank concentrating on the former Soviet Union, featured an analysis of "the renewed focus by American President-elect Barack Obama on Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan," which is worth quoting from at some length.
The nation even then, sixteen months ago, was being prepared for a larger, even preeminent, role in expanding U.S. war plans for South Asia in light of "Obama’s pledge to raise the American contingent in Afghanistan to 20,000 [as] the U.S. forces will not be able to rely entirely on Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan."
More importantly, "by expanding their military presence in Central Asia, the United States and NATO forces are determined to squeeze Russia and China out of the oil-rich and strategically important region.
"This strategy also corresponds to the U.S.-backed plan of creating a Greater Central Asia extending from Afghanistan, through the Central Asian states, to the Middle East."
Specifically, by ratifying the previously-mentioned military agreements, "allowing U.S. and NATO coalition forces to use Almaty airport as an emergency airfield for fighter planes flying on missions to Afghanistan," the Kazakh Senate provided the U.S. "an opportunity to watch and gather intelligence on Chinese nuclear facilities...." [12]
"It appears that for Kazakhstan, NATO, and the United States, the backup airfield will be a symbol of military cooperation between the West and Central Asia...." [13]
The month after that feature appeared, Indian political analyst M. K. Bhadrakumar wrote a column which featured these observations:
"The US is working on the idea of ferrying cargo for Afghanistan via the Black Sea to the port of Poti in Georgia and then dispatching it through the territories of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A branch line could also go from Georgia via Azerbaijan to the Turkmen-Afghan border.
"The project, if it materializes, will be a geopolitical coup - the biggest ever that Washington would have swung in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus. At one stroke, the US will be tying up military cooperation at the bilateral level with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
"Furthermore, the US will be effectively drawing these countries closer into NATO's partnership programs."
"Besides, The US will have virtually dealt a blow to the Russia-led Collective Security Treat Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)."
"[T]he proposed land route covering Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can also be easily converted into an energy corridor and become a Caspian oil and gas corridor bypassing Russia.
"Such a corridor has been a long-cherished dream for Washington. Furthermore, European countries will feel the imperative to agree to the US demand that the transit countries for the energy corridor are granted NATO protection in one form or the other. That, in turn, leads to NATO's expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia.
"The time may not be far off before they begin to sense that the 'war on terror is providing a convenient rubric under which the US is incrementally securing for itself a permanent abode in the highlands of the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs, Central Asian steppes and the Caucasus that form the strategic hub overlooking Russia, China, India and Iran." [14]
Bhadrakumar's contentions had been verified before the fact as it were in June of 2008 when then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza delivered an address in Washington, DC called "Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," which contained the following comments:
"Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed international investors to help develop the Caspian Basin’s mammoth oil and gas reserves. Then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel worked with these leaders, and with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, to develop a revitalized concept of the Great Silk Road in the version of an East-West Corridor of oil and natural gas pipelines."
"The East-West Corridor we had been building from Turkey and the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan and across the Caspian became the strategic
air corridor, and the lifeline, into Afghanistan allowing the United States and our coalition partners to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom."[15]
If the former Indian diplomat asserted that the military corridor from the Black Sea to Afghanistan could be transformed into a strategic energy route running in the opposite direction, the State Department's Bryza had already revealed that under the guise of solely oil and natural gas projects the U.S. and its NATO allies had long in advance of the so-called global war on terror created the infrastructure required to move troops and equipment from Europe to Central and South Asia.
In November of 2008 U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman was in the capital of Azerbaijan, on the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, and said eleven days after the election of Barack Obama that "the incoming Obama administration will maintain an interest in Caspian Sea energy resources.
“It is my firm belief that this effort and this region of the world will also be a priority for the next administration." [16]
To give an indication of how far-reaching U.S. plans are for a trans-Eurasian (Caspian-to-Black-to-Baltic Seas) energy strategy to drive Russia out of the European market, Bodman's comments were delivered at an energy summit attended by the presidents and other leading officials of host nation Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey and Ukraine.
At the same time "the state energy firms of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan agreed [on November 14] to begin shipping Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea from 2013.
"The deal follows up on a 2006 deal for Kazakhstan to partake in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, a pipeline that bypasses Russia to transfer oil from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Turkey." [17]
The month before Washington's Special Envoy for European Affairs and Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy C. Boyden Gray, speaking of the Nabucco natural gas project, spoke in a vein similar to Bodman's in stating "a deal may soon be sealed allowing natural gas from ex-Soviet nations to reach western Europe bypassing Russian territory." [18]
The following January, after the change in U.S. presidential administrations, U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland stated that "President Barack Obama's administration will adhere to policies to develop alternative energy routes from Central Asia," and "I am quite confident that Obama's administration will adhere to several alternative-routes policies for hydrocarbons transportation."[19]
Shortly afterward the same American envoy promoted the long-nurtured U.S. ambition to construct an oil pipeline under the Caspian Sea to transport Kazakh oil to Azerbaijan and connect with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline into Europe, a project fiercely opposed by fellow Caspian nations Iran and Russia for both environmental and economic reasons.
In February of last year Hoagland said: "The U.S. government backs the so-called Kazakh Caspian transport system which calls for supplying crude oil from Eskene in Kurik [in Kazakhstan, the beginning of an Eskene-Kurik-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route] via a pipeline and onwards to Baku via tankers....We think the Trans-Caspian pipeline is technically and economically more advantageous than providing supplies via tankers. It is also politically well-grounded." [20]
It was announced in April of 2009 that Barack Obama would be the first American president to visit Kazakhstan, relations with which he described as "strategic." The plan didn't materialize, but may now after the further warming of relations between the two nations. [21]
On June 24-25 of last year NATO held its third-ever Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in the Kazakh capital of Astana, the first conducted outside Europe and on former Soviet space. It focused on "discussions of Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus and energy security." [22]
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer presided over the event and said, "My presence here today means that cooperation between NATO and Kazakhstan is deepening." [23] Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian nation with a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan.
"Today, Kazakhstan is NATO's most active Partner in the Central Asian region. We have also achieved solid progress in defence and military co-operation, particularly in enhancing the ability of our military forces to work together," Scheffer added. [24]
The Kazinform news agency conducted an interview with Scheffer after the forum, a gathering in which "NATO [was] seeking to deepen cooperation with its partner countries in Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan," and the Alliance's chief's comments included:
"I do believe that both Kazakhstan and NATO influence each other. Kazakhstan's position as an energy supplier and the political role of your president play an important role in different areas and international organizations active in this region.
"I've just come back from the Palace of the President. We did not only discuss the Central Asian region but the Middle East region as well." [25]
In August U.S. Ambassador Hoagland met with Kazakh Defense Minister Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, and the Kazakh Defense Ministry later issued a statement that said in part: "Speaking about interaction in defense and security, it is necessary to stress the importance of the five-year cooperation plan. Operations are successfully conducted in peacekeeping, training, technical assistance and development of military education.
"During the meeting Kazakh Defense Minister Dzhaksybekov paid special attention to the increased number of actions of the plan of military contacts directed to developing Kazbrig, the study of the advanced experience and organization of the U.S army, as well as the exchange of experience.
"Opportunity for training of teachers of our military institutions in the U.S. Military Academy at West Point is new and a very promising trend. During the training they can familiarize [themselves] with advanced methods of teaching and various training programs." [26]
KAZBRIG is "an airborne assault battalion...for deployment in NATO-led peace support operations" provided by Kazakhstan. [27]
In the same month General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to enlist support for the war in Afghanistan, at the time particularly for the transit of non-lethal military freight. There was speculation that Petraeus was also soliciting troop contributions.
Four months before, NATO's Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia and Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Security Cooperation and Partnership Robert Simmons, the individual most responsible for extending NATO bases and troop presence from the Balkans to the Chinese border, [28] was quoted saying "NATO is awaiting a decision from Kazakhstan on dispatching a peacekeeping contingent to Afghanistan." [29]
He made that statement while addressing Kazakh journalists at NATO headquarters in Brussels. "Simmons said Kazakh peacekeepers could be sent to Afghanistan and appropriate documents had been developed by NATO and passed to Kazakhstan." [30]
In September Simmons was in Kazakhstan where he "discussed the further development of Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation at a meeting in the Kazakh Senate." [31]
In September U.S. Ambassador Richard Hoagland reiterated the request. While giving a speech at the opening ceremony of the Steppe Eagle-2009 military training exercise which included "1,300 servicemen from Kazakhstan, the UK, and the U.S." and "100 units of combat and special equipment and military transport aircraft" to "check the coordination of Kazbrig units and NATO forces in peacekeeping operations," he "offered to Kazakhstan to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan." [32]
In the same month NATO held its first military exercise in Central Asia, ZHETYSU 2009, in Kazakhstan. A six-day disaster response exercise, it included 500 Kazakh and an equal amount of NATO and non-Kazakh Partnership for Peace forces.
In early October French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited the capital of Kazakhstan, which took over the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) this year, and signed a bilateral military agreement which allows "France to use Kazakh territory and airspace to supply its 3,070 troops deployed in Afghanistan."
"Paris's unique relationship with Astana might help secure a policy objective long pursued by Washington and London. This relates to convincing Astana to operationally deploy peacekeepers from its peacekeeping brigade (KAZBRIG) to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
"U.S. and U.K. military cooperation with Kazakhstan since 2003 has focused, among other key goals, on developing the country's peace support operations (PSO) capabilities, in line with its NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) goals...." [33]
As part of what was described as a strategic partnership, "The military transit deal had been under discussion for two years and covers both air transit and train transit of French military personnel and equipment via Kazakhstan, according to a French Foreign Ministry spokesman. He said train
traffic could then go through neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where France already has a military presence." [34]
To again illustrate that the NATO corridor from the Black Sea to Central Asia runs in both directions:
"Kazakhstan also awarded a consortium of French companies a deal to take part in building a crucial $2 billion oil pipeline linking the vast Kashagan field to the Caspian. Energy supplies through the route will be transported across the inland sea by tanker to Azerbaijan and pumped by pipeline westward to Europe, circumventing Russia....Other commercial accords included an agreement to create a joint venture between the two countries' state-owned nuclear power companies to produce and market fuel for nuclear power plants." [35]
Only days earlier it was reported that the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan had announced further plans for oil transit arrangements between the two countries: "Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest oil producer, already ships some of its output by tankers across the Caspian to Baku, where it is fed into the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines....Kazakhstan plans to double oil output to 150 million tonnes a year within the next decade, largely by starting production at Kashagan, the world's biggest oil find in the last 30 years." [36]
Earlier in the year the Kazakh Defense Ministry "asked Israel to help it modernize its military and produce weapons that comply with NATO
standards." [37] In July Israeli President Shimon Peres became first high-ranking official of his nation to visit Kazakhstan as well as Azerbaijan. He led a delegation that included Defense Ministry Director-General Pinhas Buchris and "some 60 representatives of military-industrial companies." [38]
At the time the Jerusalem Post reported that "Kazakhstan's commitment to purchase satellite and surveillance technology from Israel reflects the growing role of Israeli defense industries in the country." [39]
The preceding year it was reported that "Jerusalem [has been] supporting the massive Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, or BTC, pipeline that opened its taps across the south Caucasus in 2006.
"The Jewish state also embraced ambitious plans to one day build underwater pipelines beneath the Caspian that would tap into the oil reserves of Kazakhstan and natural-gas fields of Turkmenistan - purportedly the world's second largest - and deliver them westward along those same BTC pipelines." The newspaper account added, "the U.S.-led NATO military alliance considers it a top priority, with many of its members frantic about 'energy security.'” [40]
In mid-October NATO military observers inspected an airfield at the Almaty International Airport in the former Kazakh capital to familiarize themselves with ground assault and airborne units and military aircraft. [41] It is the base that will receive direct military flights from the U.S. in the future.
At the beginning of this year NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in acknowledging the transit agreement with Kazakhstan for the war in Afghanistan that will involve 150,000 U.S. and NATO troops by August said:
"I am...pleased to announce the finalisation of an agreement with Kazakhstan that will allow the transit of supplies for NATO and Partner forces. I thank the Kazakh Government for coming to this agreement with us. This allows supplies for our forces to start moving from Europe to Afghanistan, beginning in the coming days, complementing the very important transit route through Pakistan. [42]
Slightly over two months later the Pentagon would obtain the right to fly troops and military equipment over Kazakhstan via the Arctic Circle.
If developments proceed in the manner they are headed, the Afghan war will secure for the Pentagon and NATO a bulwark in the heart of Eurasia and a permanent military presence in a country bordering almost 5,000 miles of Russian and Chinese territory, far broader in scope than comparable plans for Mongolia. [43]
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
Notes:
1) Washington Post, April 12, 2010
2) New York Times, April 12, 2010
3) Ibid
4) Air Force Times, April 12, 2010
5) Eurasia Insight, April 12, 2010
6) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects For A Multipolar World
Stop NATO, May 21, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/29/150
7) Associated Press, April 8, 2010
8) EUobserver, June 26, 2009
9) About Kazakhstan
http://aboutkazakhstan.com/Kazakhstan_Overview.shtml
10) Kazinform, January 14, 2009
11) Ibid
12) Eurasia Daily Monitor
The Jamestown Foundation
December 5, 2008
13) Ibid
14) The Day After, January 2, 2009
15) U.S. Department of State, June 24, 2008
16) Press TV, November 15, 2008
17) Ibid
18) PanArmenian.net, October 13, 2008
19) Trend News Agency, January 28, 2009
20) Trend News Agency, February 21, 2009
21) Russian Information Agency Novosti, April 7, 2009
22) Trend News Agency, May 29, 2009
23) Trend News Agency, June 25, 2009
24) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 24, 2009
25) Kazinform, July 5, 2009
26) Trend News Agency, August 7, 2009
27) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 24, 2009
28) Mr. Simmons’ Mission: NATO Bases From Balkans To Chinese Border
Stop NATO, March 4, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/mr-simmons-mission-nato-bases-from-balkans-to-chinese-border
29) EurasiaNet, April 24, 2009
30) Interfax, May 15, 2009
31) Trend News Agency, September 11, 2009
32) Interfax, September 14, 2009
33) Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 13, 2009
34) Trend News Agency, October 7, 2009
35) Ibid
36) Reuters/Azeri Press Agency, September 26, 2009
37) Agence France-Presse, January 22, 2009
38) Ynetnews, June 28, 2009
39) Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2009
40) Jewish Telegraph Agency, December 18, 2008
41) Trend News Agency, October 13, 2009
42) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 27, 2010
43) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
On April 11, the day before the two-day Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, U.S. President Barack Obama met with his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev and their deliberations resulted in the U.S. obtaining the right to fly troops and military equipment over (and later directly into) the territory of Kazakhstan for the escalating war in Afghanistan.
Michael McFaul, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and senior director of Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the United States National Security Council, "told reporters in a conference call that the agreement will allow troops to fly directly from the United States over the North Pole to the region."
McFaul directly stated, "This will save money; it will save time in terms of moving our troops and supplies needed into the theater." The Washington Post cited other White House officials claiming "Sunday's meeting between Obama and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was the turning point," [1] an allusion to the advance it signified over the last agreement on military transport for the Afghan war signed between the two countries in January, which permitted the transport of only non-lethal American military supplies and equipment across the country by rail.
The government of Kazakhstan has also allowed limited flights containing non-lethal military cargo over its territory, but that entailed a lengthy and circuitous route from the eastern United States to Europe and over the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan, ultimately headed to the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, which is currently in jeopardy after the overthrow of the government in that nation on April 7.
However, now "Kazakhstan has agreed to let the United States fly troops and weapons over its territory, a deal that opens a direct and faster route over the North Pole for American forces and lethal equipment headed to Afghanistan." [2]
The new arrangement will also substitute for a previous one under which U.S. military cargo planes flew combat troops and materiel to the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, from there to air bases in Kuwait and other destinations in the Persian Gulf, circumventing Iran which forbids American military overflights, and then either directly into the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan or to Pakistan. The second option often entails using treacherous land routes subject to regular attacks by militants on the Pakistani side of the border.
The Pentagon has also been working on a sea and land route beginning at the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti and from there to fellow Caucasus nation Azerbaijan and that country's Caspian Sea neighbors Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, conspicuously circumventing Russia, as do the oil and natural gas pipelines the West has promoted to transport hydrocarbons in the opposite direction, from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea.
"The new route over the North Pole to Bagram Air Base, the military's main air hub in Afghanistan, will allow troops to fly direct from the United States in a little more than 12 hours." [3]
The Air Force Times detailed that "Flying over Russia and Kazakhstan means Air Force cargo jets could fly from Alaska to Afghanistan without refueling, U.S. Transportation Command officials have said. Chartered passenger jets could leave from Chicago and fly over the North Pole to deliver troops." [4]
Colonel Jon Chicky, a faculty member at the National Defense University, said of the new transport route, "Just look at a map, it’s a lot easier to go over the polar ice cap than all the way across the Atlantic and Europe." [5]
U.S. military planes would necessarily have to fly over Russia from the North Pole to reach Kazakhstan, but there is no information that Russia has approved such overflights.
Sunday's deal is the latest in a steady and expanding series of moves by the Pentagon and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to establish a permanent military outpost in Kazakhstan, the most critically important spot on the earth for the West to monitor its two main potential challengers and to hold joint Russian-Chinese initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [6] in check (if not to tear the heart out of them). Kazakhstan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) along with Russia and five other former Soviet states. In terms of land mass it is the second largest member of the CSTO and the third most populous behind Russia and Uzbekistan.
The geopolitical significance of the country in general has not escaped the U.S. since the day the Soviet Union was fragmented into its fifteen federal republics in 1991 and has been an even greater cynosure of Washington's attention since Barack Obama was elected president on November 4, 2008.
And with good reason. Kazakhstan borders Kyrgyzstan, the most vital transit country for the war in Afghanistan, where according to U.S. Central Command 50,000 U.S. troops passed through on their way to and from Afghanistan last month alone. [7]
It also borders Uzbekistan, which evicted U.S. military forces in 2005, and fellow Caspian Sea nation Turkmenistan, a country in transition since the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov in 2006 and until now the only state from the Balkans to Central Asia not pulled into the Pentagon's and NATO's greater Afghan war network.
Kazakhstan has a 950-mile (1,533-kilometer) border with China and a 4,030-mile (6,846-kilometer) one with Russia, the longest continuous border between any two nations in the world. It is the second largest nation in terms of territory to emerge from the Soviet Union next to Russia and the ninth biggest in the world.
As stated during a visit to the country by then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in June of 2009, it is "a nation almost the size of the whole of western Europe and bordering Russia and China [and] is also part of all the economic and military alliances of its two powerful neighbours, including the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO)." [8]
Kazakhstan has projected oil reserves of 100-110 billion barrels, which if realized will be the third largest in the world. Its projected natural gas reserves are as high as 5 trillion cubic meters.
It possesses the world's largest reserves of uranium, barite, lead and tungsten, and last year became the world's leading uranium producer. In addition, the Central Asian nation has the second largest reserves of chromite, silver, and zinc, the third largest of manganese, and substantial if not yet reliably established deposits of copper, gold and iron ore. [9]
The country has the largest economy in Central Asia and more energy reserves than the other four nations there combined.
It is also home to the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the world's first and largest space launch facility, from which the first manned space flight was launched in 1961. It is currently managed by the Russian Federal Space Agency and the Russian Space Forces under a lease with the Kazakh government. Should Kazakhstan shift further into the U.S. and NATO orbit that arrangement will be subject to change.
In appreciation of its geostrategic location and role, Kazakhstan was brought into NATO's counterintuitively-named Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 and the bloc's 50-nation (28 full member and 22 PfP states) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
In 2003 the U.S. Defense Department signed a five-year Military Cooperation Plan with the country, the only nation in the region the Pentagon has such a program with, which included "such important directions of cooperation as the development of the peacekeeping potential of the Kazakh Armed Forces, improvement of the Kazakhstan system of military education and mutual participation in trainings." Kazakh troops were deployed to Iraq in the same year.
Over 300 Kazakh officers have been sent for training to U.S. military institutions, including the West Point Military Academy and the National Defense University, as part of the agreement
As the Kazakh news source from which the above information originated reported in January of 2009, "Realization of the first Plan successfully ended in 2008. In February 2008 a 2008-2012 Cooperation Plan was signed. Kazakh-American cooperation in defense and security has achieved significant results within implementation of the first plan." [10]
Before that, "Kazakhstan signed two agreements supporting U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan, within the framework of the Enduring Freedom plan, on December 15, 2001, and on June 10, 2002," [11] which were formally ratified by the nation's senate in late 2008.
In December of 2008 the Jamestown Foundation, a U.S. think tank concentrating on the former Soviet Union, featured an analysis of "the renewed focus by American President-elect Barack Obama on Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan," which is worth quoting from at some length.
The nation even then, sixteen months ago, was being prepared for a larger, even preeminent, role in expanding U.S. war plans for South Asia in light of "Obama’s pledge to raise the American contingent in Afghanistan to 20,000 [as] the U.S. forces will not be able to rely entirely on Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan."
More importantly, "by expanding their military presence in Central Asia, the United States and NATO forces are determined to squeeze Russia and China out of the oil-rich and strategically important region.
"This strategy also corresponds to the U.S.-backed plan of creating a Greater Central Asia extending from Afghanistan, through the Central Asian states, to the Middle East."
Specifically, by ratifying the previously-mentioned military agreements, "allowing U.S. and NATO coalition forces to use Almaty airport as an emergency airfield for fighter planes flying on missions to Afghanistan," the Kazakh Senate provided the U.S. "an opportunity to watch and gather intelligence on Chinese nuclear facilities...." [12]
"It appears that for Kazakhstan, NATO, and the United States, the backup airfield will be a symbol of military cooperation between the West and Central Asia...." [13]
The month after that feature appeared, Indian political analyst M. K. Bhadrakumar wrote a column which featured these observations:
"The US is working on the idea of ferrying cargo for Afghanistan via the Black Sea to the port of Poti in Georgia and then dispatching it through the territories of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A branch line could also go from Georgia via Azerbaijan to the Turkmen-Afghan border.
"The project, if it materializes, will be a geopolitical coup - the biggest ever that Washington would have swung in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus. At one stroke, the US will be tying up military cooperation at the bilateral level with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
"Furthermore, the US will be effectively drawing these countries closer into NATO's partnership programs."
"Besides, The US will have virtually dealt a blow to the Russia-led Collective Security Treat Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)."
"[T]he proposed land route covering Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can also be easily converted into an energy corridor and become a Caspian oil and gas corridor bypassing Russia.
"Such a corridor has been a long-cherished dream for Washington. Furthermore, European countries will feel the imperative to agree to the US demand that the transit countries for the energy corridor are granted NATO protection in one form or the other. That, in turn, leads to NATO's expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia.
"The time may not be far off before they begin to sense that the 'war on terror is providing a convenient rubric under which the US is incrementally securing for itself a permanent abode in the highlands of the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs, Central Asian steppes and the Caucasus that form the strategic hub overlooking Russia, China, India and Iran." [14]
Bhadrakumar's contentions had been verified before the fact as it were in June of 2008 when then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza delivered an address in Washington, DC called "Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," which contained the following comments:
"Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed international investors to help develop the Caspian Basin’s mammoth oil and gas reserves. Then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel worked with these leaders, and with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, to develop a revitalized concept of the Great Silk Road in the version of an East-West Corridor of oil and natural gas pipelines."
"The East-West Corridor we had been building from Turkey and the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan and across the Caspian became the strategic
air corridor, and the lifeline, into Afghanistan allowing the United States and our coalition partners to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom."[15]
If the former Indian diplomat asserted that the military corridor from the Black Sea to Afghanistan could be transformed into a strategic energy route running in the opposite direction, the State Department's Bryza had already revealed that under the guise of solely oil and natural gas projects the U.S. and its NATO allies had long in advance of the so-called global war on terror created the infrastructure required to move troops and equipment from Europe to Central and South Asia.
In November of 2008 U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman was in the capital of Azerbaijan, on the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, and said eleven days after the election of Barack Obama that "the incoming Obama administration will maintain an interest in Caspian Sea energy resources.
“It is my firm belief that this effort and this region of the world will also be a priority for the next administration." [16]
To give an indication of how far-reaching U.S. plans are for a trans-Eurasian (Caspian-to-Black-to-Baltic Seas) energy strategy to drive Russia out of the European market, Bodman's comments were delivered at an energy summit attended by the presidents and other leading officials of host nation Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey and Ukraine.
At the same time "the state energy firms of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan agreed [on November 14] to begin shipping Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea from 2013.
"The deal follows up on a 2006 deal for Kazakhstan to partake in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, a pipeline that bypasses Russia to transfer oil from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Turkey." [17]
The month before Washington's Special Envoy for European Affairs and Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy C. Boyden Gray, speaking of the Nabucco natural gas project, spoke in a vein similar to Bodman's in stating "a deal may soon be sealed allowing natural gas from ex-Soviet nations to reach western Europe bypassing Russian territory." [18]
The following January, after the change in U.S. presidential administrations, U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland stated that "President Barack Obama's administration will adhere to policies to develop alternative energy routes from Central Asia," and "I am quite confident that Obama's administration will adhere to several alternative-routes policies for hydrocarbons transportation."[19]
Shortly afterward the same American envoy promoted the long-nurtured U.S. ambition to construct an oil pipeline under the Caspian Sea to transport Kazakh oil to Azerbaijan and connect with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline into Europe, a project fiercely opposed by fellow Caspian nations Iran and Russia for both environmental and economic reasons.
In February of last year Hoagland said: "The U.S. government backs the so-called Kazakh Caspian transport system which calls for supplying crude oil from Eskene in Kurik [in Kazakhstan, the beginning of an Eskene-Kurik-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route] via a pipeline and onwards to Baku via tankers....We think the Trans-Caspian pipeline is technically and economically more advantageous than providing supplies via tankers. It is also politically well-grounded." [20]
It was announced in April of 2009 that Barack Obama would be the first American president to visit Kazakhstan, relations with which he described as "strategic." The plan didn't materialize, but may now after the further warming of relations between the two nations. [21]
On June 24-25 of last year NATO held its third-ever Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in the Kazakh capital of Astana, the first conducted outside Europe and on former Soviet space. It focused on "discussions of Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus and energy security." [22]
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer presided over the event and said, "My presence here today means that cooperation between NATO and Kazakhstan is deepening." [23] Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian nation with a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan.
"Today, Kazakhstan is NATO's most active Partner in the Central Asian region. We have also achieved solid progress in defence and military co-operation, particularly in enhancing the ability of our military forces to work together," Scheffer added. [24]
The Kazinform news agency conducted an interview with Scheffer after the forum, a gathering in which "NATO [was] seeking to deepen cooperation with its partner countries in Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan," and the Alliance's chief's comments included:
"I do believe that both Kazakhstan and NATO influence each other. Kazakhstan's position as an energy supplier and the political role of your president play an important role in different areas and international organizations active in this region.
"I've just come back from the Palace of the President. We did not only discuss the Central Asian region but the Middle East region as well." [25]
In August U.S. Ambassador Hoagland met with Kazakh Defense Minister Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, and the Kazakh Defense Ministry later issued a statement that said in part: "Speaking about interaction in defense and security, it is necessary to stress the importance of the five-year cooperation plan. Operations are successfully conducted in peacekeeping, training, technical assistance and development of military education.
"During the meeting Kazakh Defense Minister Dzhaksybekov paid special attention to the increased number of actions of the plan of military contacts directed to developing Kazbrig, the study of the advanced experience and organization of the U.S army, as well as the exchange of experience.
"Opportunity for training of teachers of our military institutions in the U.S. Military Academy at West Point is new and a very promising trend. During the training they can familiarize [themselves] with advanced methods of teaching and various training programs." [26]
KAZBRIG is "an airborne assault battalion...for deployment in NATO-led peace support operations" provided by Kazakhstan. [27]
In the same month General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to enlist support for the war in Afghanistan, at the time particularly for the transit of non-lethal military freight. There was speculation that Petraeus was also soliciting troop contributions.
Four months before, NATO's Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia and Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Security Cooperation and Partnership Robert Simmons, the individual most responsible for extending NATO bases and troop presence from the Balkans to the Chinese border, [28] was quoted saying "NATO is awaiting a decision from Kazakhstan on dispatching a peacekeeping contingent to Afghanistan." [29]
He made that statement while addressing Kazakh journalists at NATO headquarters in Brussels. "Simmons said Kazakh peacekeepers could be sent to Afghanistan and appropriate documents had been developed by NATO and passed to Kazakhstan." [30]
In September Simmons was in Kazakhstan where he "discussed the further development of Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation at a meeting in the Kazakh Senate." [31]
In September U.S. Ambassador Richard Hoagland reiterated the request. While giving a speech at the opening ceremony of the Steppe Eagle-2009 military training exercise which included "1,300 servicemen from Kazakhstan, the UK, and the U.S." and "100 units of combat and special equipment and military transport aircraft" to "check the coordination of Kazbrig units and NATO forces in peacekeeping operations," he "offered to Kazakhstan to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan." [32]
In the same month NATO held its first military exercise in Central Asia, ZHETYSU 2009, in Kazakhstan. A six-day disaster response exercise, it included 500 Kazakh and an equal amount of NATO and non-Kazakh Partnership for Peace forces.
In early October French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited the capital of Kazakhstan, which took over the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) this year, and signed a bilateral military agreement which allows "France to use Kazakh territory and airspace to supply its 3,070 troops deployed in Afghanistan."
"Paris's unique relationship with Astana might help secure a policy objective long pursued by Washington and London. This relates to convincing Astana to operationally deploy peacekeepers from its peacekeeping brigade (KAZBRIG) to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
"U.S. and U.K. military cooperation with Kazakhstan since 2003 has focused, among other key goals, on developing the country's peace support operations (PSO) capabilities, in line with its NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) goals...." [33]
As part of what was described as a strategic partnership, "The military transit deal had been under discussion for two years and covers both air transit and train transit of French military personnel and equipment via Kazakhstan, according to a French Foreign Ministry spokesman. He said train
traffic could then go through neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where France already has a military presence." [34]
To again illustrate that the NATO corridor from the Black Sea to Central Asia runs in both directions:
"Kazakhstan also awarded a consortium of French companies a deal to take part in building a crucial $2 billion oil pipeline linking the vast Kashagan field to the Caspian. Energy supplies through the route will be transported across the inland sea by tanker to Azerbaijan and pumped by pipeline westward to Europe, circumventing Russia....Other commercial accords included an agreement to create a joint venture between the two countries' state-owned nuclear power companies to produce and market fuel for nuclear power plants." [35]
Only days earlier it was reported that the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan had announced further plans for oil transit arrangements between the two countries: "Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest oil producer, already ships some of its output by tankers across the Caspian to Baku, where it is fed into the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines....Kazakhstan plans to double oil output to 150 million tonnes a year within the next decade, largely by starting production at Kashagan, the world's biggest oil find in the last 30 years." [36]
Earlier in the year the Kazakh Defense Ministry "asked Israel to help it modernize its military and produce weapons that comply with NATO
standards." [37] In July Israeli President Shimon Peres became first high-ranking official of his nation to visit Kazakhstan as well as Azerbaijan. He led a delegation that included Defense Ministry Director-General Pinhas Buchris and "some 60 representatives of military-industrial companies." [38]
At the time the Jerusalem Post reported that "Kazakhstan's commitment to purchase satellite and surveillance technology from Israel reflects the growing role of Israeli defense industries in the country." [39]
The preceding year it was reported that "Jerusalem [has been] supporting the massive Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, or BTC, pipeline that opened its taps across the south Caucasus in 2006.
"The Jewish state also embraced ambitious plans to one day build underwater pipelines beneath the Caspian that would tap into the oil reserves of Kazakhstan and natural-gas fields of Turkmenistan - purportedly the world's second largest - and deliver them westward along those same BTC pipelines." The newspaper account added, "the U.S.-led NATO military alliance considers it a top priority, with many of its members frantic about 'energy security.'” [40]
In mid-October NATO military observers inspected an airfield at the Almaty International Airport in the former Kazakh capital to familiarize themselves with ground assault and airborne units and military aircraft. [41] It is the base that will receive direct military flights from the U.S. in the future.
At the beginning of this year NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in acknowledging the transit agreement with Kazakhstan for the war in Afghanistan that will involve 150,000 U.S. and NATO troops by August said:
"I am...pleased to announce the finalisation of an agreement with Kazakhstan that will allow the transit of supplies for NATO and Partner forces. I thank the Kazakh Government for coming to this agreement with us. This allows supplies for our forces to start moving from Europe to Afghanistan, beginning in the coming days, complementing the very important transit route through Pakistan. [42]
Slightly over two months later the Pentagon would obtain the right to fly troops and military equipment over Kazakhstan via the Arctic Circle.
If developments proceed in the manner they are headed, the Afghan war will secure for the Pentagon and NATO a bulwark in the heart of Eurasia and a permanent military presence in a country bordering almost 5,000 miles of Russian and Chinese territory, far broader in scope than comparable plans for Mongolia. [43]
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
Notes:
1) Washington Post, April 12, 2010
2) New York Times, April 12, 2010
3) Ibid
4) Air Force Times, April 12, 2010
5) Eurasia Insight, April 12, 2010
6) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects For A Multipolar World
Stop NATO, May 21, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/29/150
7) Associated Press, April 8, 2010
8) EUobserver, June 26, 2009
9) About Kazakhstan
http://aboutkazakhstan.com/Kazakhstan_Overview.shtml
10) Kazinform, January 14, 2009
11) Ibid
12) Eurasia Daily Monitor
The Jamestown Foundation
December 5, 2008
13) Ibid
14) The Day After, January 2, 2009
15) U.S. Department of State, June 24, 2008
16) Press TV, November 15, 2008
17) Ibid
18) PanArmenian.net, October 13, 2008
19) Trend News Agency, January 28, 2009
20) Trend News Agency, February 21, 2009
21) Russian Information Agency Novosti, April 7, 2009
22) Trend News Agency, May 29, 2009
23) Trend News Agency, June 25, 2009
24) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 24, 2009
25) Kazinform, July 5, 2009
26) Trend News Agency, August 7, 2009
27) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 24, 2009
28) Mr. Simmons’ Mission: NATO Bases From Balkans To Chinese Border
Stop NATO, March 4, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/mr-simmons-mission-nato-bases-from-balkans-to-chinese-border
29) EurasiaNet, April 24, 2009
30) Interfax, May 15, 2009
31) Trend News Agency, September 11, 2009
32) Interfax, September 14, 2009
33) Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 13, 2009
34) Trend News Agency, October 7, 2009
35) Ibid
36) Reuters/Azeri Press Agency, September 26, 2009
37) Agence France-Presse, January 22, 2009
38) Ynetnews, June 28, 2009
39) Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2009
40) Jewish Telegraph Agency, December 18, 2008
41) Trend News Agency, October 13, 2009
42) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 27, 2010
43) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
Thursday, April 15, 2010 |
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EIB Ready To Support Projects In Kazakhstan
The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, H.E. Mr Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s Secretary of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Kanat Saudabayev, and European Investment Bank (EIB) President Philippe Maystadt met Sundday in Brussels for the signature of the framework agreement providing the basis for future EIB lending in Kazakhstan.
EIB President Philippe Maystadt commented: "Kazakhstan is an important partner for the European Union, as set out in the EU’s Central Asia strategy, and it is natural therefore for the EIB, the EU’s bank, to play its part in cementing these ties. This agreement means that we will now be able to actively look for and consider financing eligible projects in the country.”
The EU Council of Ministers decided in November 2008 to extend the EIB’s external lending mandate to the five Central Asian countries for selected projects of common interest in the energy and environment sectors – a decision that was confirmed by the Council and European Parliament in July 2009.
The existing mandate provides for a maximum of EUR 1 billion in loans in Asia, including Central Asia, over the period 2007-13. The European Commission is due to present proposals to revise this mandate at the end of April. In addition, the EIB’s own facility for energy sustainability and security of supply, which has a volume of EUR 3 billion, can be expected to provide finance to a number of energy projects in Kazakhstan, subject to compliance with EIB lending criteria.
The EIB subjects all projects it finances to due diligence to ensure that they comply with relevant technical, economic, financial, environmental, procurement and social standards. In Central Asia the EIB is also committed to working closely with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank.
EIB President Philippe Maystadt commented: "Kazakhstan is an important partner for the European Union, as set out in the EU’s Central Asia strategy, and it is natural therefore for the EIB, the EU’s bank, to play its part in cementing these ties. This agreement means that we will now be able to actively look for and consider financing eligible projects in the country.”
The EU Council of Ministers decided in November 2008 to extend the EIB’s external lending mandate to the five Central Asian countries for selected projects of common interest in the energy and environment sectors – a decision that was confirmed by the Council and European Parliament in July 2009.
The existing mandate provides for a maximum of EUR 1 billion in loans in Asia, including Central Asia, over the period 2007-13. The European Commission is due to present proposals to revise this mandate at the end of April. In addition, the EIB’s own facility for energy sustainability and security of supply, which has a volume of EUR 3 billion, can be expected to provide finance to a number of energy projects in Kazakhstan, subject to compliance with EIB lending criteria.
The EIB subjects all projects it finances to due diligence to ensure that they comply with relevant technical, economic, financial, environmental, procurement and social standards. In Central Asia the EIB is also committed to working closely with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank.
Monday, April 12, 2010 |
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Calls For US To Press Kazakhstan For Rights Reform
President Barack Obama should use the upcoming visit by his Kazakh counterpart to raise concern about Kazakhstan's disappointing human rights record and to press for immediate improvements, Human Rights Watch said. President Nursultan Nazarbaev will be in Washington, DC for the Nuclear Security Summit on April 12 and 13, 2010, and is scheduled to meet with President Obama on April 12.
As the chair-in-office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for 2010, Kazakhstan has a particular obligation to promote and respect human rights, Human Rights Watch said. While Kazakhstan promised human rights reforms in anticipation of the chairmanship, and has produced a plan, the start of its chairmanship has been characterized by inaction on reforms. It maintains restrictive legislation on freedom of assembly, the media, and the internet, and at times blocks a number of websites and weblogs. It refuses to register the main opposition party Alga!, and it has turned down appeals to reopen a case against the country's leading human rights defender, Evgenii Zhovtis, who is in prison following an unfair trial.
"President Obama should make clear that the United States expects meaningful reforms in Kazakhstan," said Andrea Berg, Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. "The meeting is a crucial opportunity to send a strong signal to Kazakhstan's leadership that it should finally improve its human rights performance."
For example, President Obama should make clear that he will only support an OSCE summit meeting that Khazakhstan wants to hold during its tenure if credible reforms are forthcoming, Human Rights Watch said.
Nazarbaev's visit to the United States coincides with the end of the first 100 days of Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship, a role many had hoped would help trigger human rights reforms in the country. Instead, the period has been marked by stagnation and, in some areas, a number of setbacks, Human Rights Watch said.
"If this meeting doesn't result in rapid progress on rights reforms, including Zhovtis's release, it will harm US credibility as it pursues its relationship with Kazakhstan," Berg said.
Human Rights Watch noted that the US took a principled stand on Kazakhstan's chairmanship bid, highlighting concern about its human rights record as falling short of the standards expected of a prospective chair, but ultimately refrained from blocking the appointment. In the two years since Kazakhstan was formally approved to hold the position this year, the United States has on numerous occasions raised concerns regarding human rights setbacks in Kazakhstan and called on the Kazakh government to undertake reforms.
"We count on President Obama to maintain a principled US position on the pressing need for rights reforms in Kazakhstan," Berg said. "He should urge the Kazakh leader to demonstrate a genuine commitment to human rights and carry out the necessary reforms without further delay."
As the chair-in-office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for 2010, Kazakhstan has a particular obligation to promote and respect human rights, Human Rights Watch said. While Kazakhstan promised human rights reforms in anticipation of the chairmanship, and has produced a plan, the start of its chairmanship has been characterized by inaction on reforms. It maintains restrictive legislation on freedom of assembly, the media, and the internet, and at times blocks a number of websites and weblogs. It refuses to register the main opposition party Alga!, and it has turned down appeals to reopen a case against the country's leading human rights defender, Evgenii Zhovtis, who is in prison following an unfair trial.
"President Obama should make clear that the United States expects meaningful reforms in Kazakhstan," said Andrea Berg, Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. "The meeting is a crucial opportunity to send a strong signal to Kazakhstan's leadership that it should finally improve its human rights performance."
For example, President Obama should make clear that he will only support an OSCE summit meeting that Khazakhstan wants to hold during its tenure if credible reforms are forthcoming, Human Rights Watch said.
Nazarbaev's visit to the United States coincides with the end of the first 100 days of Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship, a role many had hoped would help trigger human rights reforms in the country. Instead, the period has been marked by stagnation and, in some areas, a number of setbacks, Human Rights Watch said.
"If this meeting doesn't result in rapid progress on rights reforms, including Zhovtis's release, it will harm US credibility as it pursues its relationship with Kazakhstan," Berg said.
Human Rights Watch noted that the US took a principled stand on Kazakhstan's chairmanship bid, highlighting concern about its human rights record as falling short of the standards expected of a prospective chair, but ultimately refrained from blocking the appointment. In the two years since Kazakhstan was formally approved to hold the position this year, the United States has on numerous occasions raised concerns regarding human rights setbacks in Kazakhstan and called on the Kazakh government to undertake reforms.
"We count on President Obama to maintain a principled US position on the pressing need for rights reforms in Kazakhstan," Berg said. "He should urge the Kazakh leader to demonstrate a genuine commitment to human rights and carry out the necessary reforms without further delay."
Sunday, April 11, 2010 |
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EIB Ready To Support Projects In Kazakhstan
The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, H.E. Mr Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s Secretary of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Kanat Saudabayev, and European Investment Bank (EIB) President Philippe Maystadt met Saturdayday in Brussels for the signature of the framework agreement providing the basis for future EIB lending in Kazakhstan.
EIB President Philippe Maystadt said, "Kazakhstan is an important partner for the European Union, as set out in the EU’s Central Asia strategy, and it is natural therefore for the EIB, the EU’s bank, to play its part in cementing these ties. This agreement means that we will now be able to actively look for and consider financing eligible projects in the country.”
The EU Council of Ministers decided in November 2008 to extend the EIB’s external lending mandate to the five Central Asian countries for selected projects of common interest in the energy and environment sectors – a decision that was confirmed by the Council and European Parliament in July 2009.
The existing mandate provides for a maximum of EUR 1 billion in loans in Asia, including Central Asia, over the period 2007-13. The European Commission is due to present proposals to revise this mandate at the end of April. In addition, the EIB’s own facility for energy sustainability and security of supply, which has a volume of EUR 3 billion, can be expected to provide finance to a number of energy projects in Kazakhstan, subject to compliance with EIB lending criteria.
The EIB subjects all projects it finances to due diligence to ensure that they comply with relevant technical, economic, financial, environmental, procurement and social standards. In Central Asia the EIB is also committed to working closely with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) was founded in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community. The main objective of the EIB is to contribute towards the integration, balanced development and economic and social cohesion of the 27 European Union Member States.
EIB President Philippe Maystadt said, "Kazakhstan is an important partner for the European Union, as set out in the EU’s Central Asia strategy, and it is natural therefore for the EIB, the EU’s bank, to play its part in cementing these ties. This agreement means that we will now be able to actively look for and consider financing eligible projects in the country.”
The EU Council of Ministers decided in November 2008 to extend the EIB’s external lending mandate to the five Central Asian countries for selected projects of common interest in the energy and environment sectors – a decision that was confirmed by the Council and European Parliament in July 2009.
The existing mandate provides for a maximum of EUR 1 billion in loans in Asia, including Central Asia, over the period 2007-13. The European Commission is due to present proposals to revise this mandate at the end of April. In addition, the EIB’s own facility for energy sustainability and security of supply, which has a volume of EUR 3 billion, can be expected to provide finance to a number of energy projects in Kazakhstan, subject to compliance with EIB lending criteria.
The EIB subjects all projects it finances to due diligence to ensure that they comply with relevant technical, economic, financial, environmental, procurement and social standards. In Central Asia the EIB is also committed to working closely with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) was founded in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community. The main objective of the EIB is to contribute towards the integration, balanced development and economic and social cohesion of the 27 European Union Member States.
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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European Satellite On Mission To Study Melting Ice Caps
The European Space Agency (ESA) has launched a satellite dedicated to studying how climate change is affecting the Earth's ice.
The CryoSat-2 was launched April 8 from Kazakhstan. The data it sends back from its polar orbit will help European scientists to monitor when and where ice is melting or growing.
CryoSat-2 replaces the original CryoSat satellite, which was lost in 2005 following a launch failure. The mission objectives, however, remain the same: to measure changes in the thickness of the vast ice sheets that overlie Antarctica and Greenland, as well as variations in the thickness of the relatively thin ice floating in the polar oceans.
"We know from our radar satellites that sea ice extent is diminishing, but there is still an urgent need to understand how the volume of ice is changing," said Volker Liebig, the ESA's director of Earth Observation Programmes.
"To make these calculations, scientists also need information on ice thickness, which is exactly what our new CryoSat satellite will provide. We are now very much looking forward to receiving the first data from the mission," he said.
The launch of CryoSat-2 brings to three the number of its Earth Explorer satellites placed in orbit, all having been launched within a little over 12 months.
CryoSat-2 follows on from the Gravity Field and steady-state Ocean Circulation Explorer (GOCE) mission, launched in March 2009, and the Soil Moisture and Ocean Salinity (SMOS) mission, launched last November.
Earth Explorers are launched in direct response to issues identified by the scientific community and aim to improve our understanding of how the Earth system works and the effect that human activity is having on natural processes, the ESA said.
Now that CryoSat-2 is safely in orbit, the Mission Control Team at ESA's European Space Operations Centre in Darmstadt, Germany, is busy with the critical launch and early operations phase.
Although built mainly in Germany and France, CryoSat-2 is led scientifically from the UK by its proposer and principal investigator, Duncan Wingham of University College London.
"Today, it's just a real pleasure; and I speak on behalf of all the scientists who will use the data to just thank all of those many people who contributed to this mission. Personally, it's been a fabulous ride for me," he told the launch event in Darmstadt.
Source: EurActiv
The CryoSat-2 was launched April 8 from Kazakhstan. The data it sends back from its polar orbit will help European scientists to monitor when and where ice is melting or growing.
CryoSat-2 replaces the original CryoSat satellite, which was lost in 2005 following a launch failure. The mission objectives, however, remain the same: to measure changes in the thickness of the vast ice sheets that overlie Antarctica and Greenland, as well as variations in the thickness of the relatively thin ice floating in the polar oceans.
"We know from our radar satellites that sea ice extent is diminishing, but there is still an urgent need to understand how the volume of ice is changing," said Volker Liebig, the ESA's director of Earth Observation Programmes.
"To make these calculations, scientists also need information on ice thickness, which is exactly what our new CryoSat satellite will provide. We are now very much looking forward to receiving the first data from the mission," he said.
The launch of CryoSat-2 brings to three the number of its Earth Explorer satellites placed in orbit, all having been launched within a little over 12 months.
CryoSat-2 follows on from the Gravity Field and steady-state Ocean Circulation Explorer (GOCE) mission, launched in March 2009, and the Soil Moisture and Ocean Salinity (SMOS) mission, launched last November.
Earth Explorers are launched in direct response to issues identified by the scientific community and aim to improve our understanding of how the Earth system works and the effect that human activity is having on natural processes, the ESA said.
Now that CryoSat-2 is safely in orbit, the Mission Control Team at ESA's European Space Operations Centre in Darmstadt, Germany, is busy with the critical launch and early operations phase.
Although built mainly in Germany and France, CryoSat-2 is led scientifically from the UK by its proposer and principal investigator, Duncan Wingham of University College London.
"Today, it's just a real pleasure; and I speak on behalf of all the scientists who will use the data to just thank all of those many people who contributed to this mission. Personally, it's been a fabulous ride for me," he told the launch event in Darmstadt.
Source: EurActiv
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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Chinese-Central Asian Relationship Requires Delicate Balancing Act
By Bruce Pannier
It would appear to be a match made in heaven. China, in order to fuel its economic ambitions, has moved quickly to snatch up Central Asian resources. Central Asia, looking to upgrade its aging infrastructure, has increasingly opened itself up to Chinese investment.
But while everything appears to be going swimmingly, the idyllic arrangement is not likely to last for long. This is because Central Asian states work alone in wooing the Chinese, which plays to Beijing's strength in bilateral dealings. But the cross-border networks it aims to build require a diplomatic balancing act that China lacks experience to pull off.
A shortage of energy resources is the main threat to China's economic ambitions, leading Chinese companies to sign contracts for energy imports around the world.
Jennifer DeLay, editor of the Edinburgh-based “FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,” says that while the pace of China's economic growth has slowed amid the global financial crisis, "it certainly hasn't reversed." She says China's economy is set to keep growing, requiring more energy, and that gas imports in particular are expected to increase dramatically in the coming years.
DeLay said China is already consuming 4.1 million barrels of oil daily, and just over half of that (51.8 percent) is imported. Natural gas imports account for only 11 percent of current consumption, but are set to increase greatly as China replaces coal with gas.
China's southern neighbors either don't have much to offer, or, in the case of Vietnam, relations are not at a stage where oil imports are up for discussion. DeLay notes that there are plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar to China, but those won't be operational until 2012. With the shortage of direct land routes, China is largely dependent on sea routes.
"The statistic I've seen is that as of January this year, foreign tankers account for about 80 percent of all the oil imported into China," DeLay says. As for natural gas, "again it's very much a majority. China is working to build up an LNG [liquefied natural gas] fleet so that it can import its own LNG, but they don't have it yet."
Fortunately for China, its western neighbors -- the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have vast energy resources, leading Beijing to court them heavily since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Long Courtship
It started with confidence-building agreements along the Sino-CIS border in April 1996 that involved China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The group evolved, adding Uzbekistan and taking on an economic and security dimension.
The grouping now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has enabled China to penetrate deeply into Central Asia's energy resource market in little more than a decade.
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed its first major Central Asian contract with Kazakhstan in 1997. The two parties agreed to build a 2,238-kilometer oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China, which has now started operating. A gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China started operating in December 2009.
"China is currently connected by pipelines to only two countries," DeLay says. "Turkmenistan for gas -- and that pipeline just began operating last December -- and Kazakhstan for oil. That pipeline has been operating since 2006."
These two pipelines receive much attention and by themselves are sufficient to show China's growing influence in Central Asia, but China's interests in Central Asia go much further and involve every country.
Energy Exploration
The CNPC is helping to explore and develop oil and gas fields in eastern and western Uzbekistan, including in the Aral Sea. China Investment Corp bought a 14.5 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production last year, paying $939 million.
Besides the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline that started operations last December, PetroChina is helping build another gas pipeline to ship some 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from western Kazakhstan to the Chinese border. In Turkmenistan, the CNPC is the only foreign company that can boast of having an onshore contract to explore for energy.
Just over the border from where Chinese workers in Turkmenistan are developing gas fields, the possibility of China helping develop gas fields in northwestern Afghanistan is under consideration. During Afghan President Hamid Karzai's recent visit to China, the project not far from where the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline starts was discussed.
Not wishing to rely solely on pipelines to import Central Asian oil and gas, China has embarked on ambitious railway projects. Chinese company HPGI, created specifically to build rail lines between China and Kazakhstan, has plans for 21 new rail lines, eight solely for transporting oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG.
There are also plans to build a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail line that would end in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, near where the CNPC is developing Uzbek oil and gas fields.
Central Asia needs to upgrade its electricity systems and China's Tebian Electric Apparatus is building 220-kV and 500-kV power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's XD Group is modernizing and reconstructing the electricity system for the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.
Chinese companies are also involved in Central Asia's hydropower projects. China's Sinohydro is helping build the Nurobad and Shurob hydroelectric power plants (HPP) in Tajikistan as well as modernizing the Kayrakkum HPP.
Tebian is building three more power plants in Tajikistan, which paid the Chinese company by giving it rights to mine gold, silver, copper, tungsten, mica, and gemstones in the Pamir Mountains. Other Chinese mining companies are also working gold deposits and looking for uranium and rare earth elements in Tajikistan.
China is also looking to increase its civilian nuclear power potential, and there too it can find the resources it needs in Central Asia. The China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation own shares in Kazakh uranium mines, and have contracts to buy uranium from Kazatomprom. In Uzbekistan, a subsidiary of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is jointly prospecting for black-shale uranium in Navoi Province. Sinosteel is prospecting, with Australia's Monaro Mining, for uranium in Kyrgyzstan.
Chinese companies are also constructing or improving roads leading from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, Chinese workers are building a tunnel Tajikistan, and Chinese-made goods can be found at every Central Asian bazaar.
Dangerous Liaisons
The arrangement looks fantastic on the surface. China receives a major portion of the energy resources it needs as long as Beijing finances the development of the oil and gas fields, uranium mines, infrastructure, and import-export routes. Central Asia gets a steady customer who not only pays on time, but is actually constructing the means for the five countries to export their raw materials.
But while China may be a rising world power, its experience in international mediation is limited and Central Asian regional politics are full of potential pitfalls. China holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but is rarely involved in talks aimed at resolving conflicts, the situation with its neighbor North Korea being a notable exception.
On the business end, DeLay says, China has long preferred to keep its business deals on a bilateral level with one foreign partner. Many of the agreements China has worked out in Central Asia follow this model, she says, but geography dictates that Beijing engage in multilateral dealings as well.
For example, the gas pipeline linking China to Turkmenistan passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A rail project linking Uzbekistan to China will go through Kyrgyzstan, requiring Beijing to find common ground with two feuding neighbors.
John MacLeod, the head of Central Asian programs at the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, says that in recent years, “there's constant talk about various kinds of regional economic structures, but they never work out.”
“Even things like simplified customs rules, and even visas for citizens, are constantly a problem because practical things are often tied up with politics and very often with the kind of very individualistic stances of each set of leaderships, who feel that their country is preeminent and they don't want their interests to be encroached upon by the others,” MacLeod says.
NATO just saw an example of such regional complications. When Uzbekistan recently halted train traffic bound for Tajikistan, supplies headed for Tajikistan and then on to NATO troops in Afghanistan were held up. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have never had good relations, but ties are particularly strained amid a dispute over Tajikistan's hydropower plans, leaving Uzbekistan worried it will be left with water shortages.
MacLeod said such incidents highlight the likelihood of breakdowns in China's regional balancing act.
"You have this history of rocky relationships and less than perfect cooperation, so simply managing this new conduit through all their territories could throw up all those problems,” MacLeod says. “You could have a situation where a simple dispute about the division of transit fees -- say, between the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs -- could escalate into something worse given this kind of difficult political relationship.... What is effectively a business dispute over money suddenly takes on this political aspect."
MacLeod notes that the Chinese have worked to ensure these multilateral deals in Central Asia benefit all the parties involved, and cites the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline as an example.
"The Chinese are trying to mitigate that risk by giving each of the players, particularly the Uzbeks, a stake in it by holding out the prospect that they too can export some gas down the pipeline," he says.
The Central Asian states’ reasons for allowing the Chinese so far into the region are clear, MacLeod explains.
"Only China will put in money into things that are not necessarily immediately commercially valuable -- like roads in Tajikistan, like developing oil and gas in Uzbekistan -- where other...commercial players would be more faint-hearted because they know about the kind of terrible legal problems you can have operating in a country like that,” MacLeod says. “So the Chinese are in it for the long game.”
He continues: “The Central Asians appear to be just not thinking about...the big politics and hoping that the Chinese are simply a kind of an investment bank that they can deal with."
This may leave a traditional suitor, Russia, out in the cold. Before the global economic crisis, the Kremlin was spending a lot of the revenues it was receiving from oil and gas sales on projects in Central Asia. But the economic crisis hit Russia hard, leaving financially secure China a free economic hand in Central Asia.
MacLeod said Moscow is putting on a brave face, but cannot be happy with the way things are shaping up in Central Asia.
"I think to an extent the Russians have accepted the Chinese economic expansion in terms of investment and energy exploration in Central Asia as a fact,” MacLeod says. “They may not like it. but they're saying that they're perfectly happy and that it meshes well with their own interests. But of course, to an extent, it doesn't.”
He explains: “Currently Russia -- the Kremlin, through Gazprom, the huge energy company -- has de facto control of the pipeline network coming out of Central Asia. And although Kazakhstan is obviously an independent oil exporter...Russia has a huge say in what happens, especially if there's turbulence at the political level."
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
It would appear to be a match made in heaven. China, in order to fuel its economic ambitions, has moved quickly to snatch up Central Asian resources. Central Asia, looking to upgrade its aging infrastructure, has increasingly opened itself up to Chinese investment.
But while everything appears to be going swimmingly, the idyllic arrangement is not likely to last for long. This is because Central Asian states work alone in wooing the Chinese, which plays to Beijing's strength in bilateral dealings. But the cross-border networks it aims to build require a diplomatic balancing act that China lacks experience to pull off.
A shortage of energy resources is the main threat to China's economic ambitions, leading Chinese companies to sign contracts for energy imports around the world.
Jennifer DeLay, editor of the Edinburgh-based “FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,” says that while the pace of China's economic growth has slowed amid the global financial crisis, "it certainly hasn't reversed." She says China's economy is set to keep growing, requiring more energy, and that gas imports in particular are expected to increase dramatically in the coming years.
DeLay said China is already consuming 4.1 million barrels of oil daily, and just over half of that (51.8 percent) is imported. Natural gas imports account for only 11 percent of current consumption, but are set to increase greatly as China replaces coal with gas.
China's southern neighbors either don't have much to offer, or, in the case of Vietnam, relations are not at a stage where oil imports are up for discussion. DeLay notes that there are plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar to China, but those won't be operational until 2012. With the shortage of direct land routes, China is largely dependent on sea routes.
"The statistic I've seen is that as of January this year, foreign tankers account for about 80 percent of all the oil imported into China," DeLay says. As for natural gas, "again it's very much a majority. China is working to build up an LNG [liquefied natural gas] fleet so that it can import its own LNG, but they don't have it yet."
Fortunately for China, its western neighbors -- the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have vast energy resources, leading Beijing to court them heavily since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Long Courtship
It started with confidence-building agreements along the Sino-CIS border in April 1996 that involved China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The group evolved, adding Uzbekistan and taking on an economic and security dimension.
The grouping now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has enabled China to penetrate deeply into Central Asia's energy resource market in little more than a decade.
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed its first major Central Asian contract with Kazakhstan in 1997. The two parties agreed to build a 2,238-kilometer oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China, which has now started operating. A gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China started operating in December 2009.
"China is currently connected by pipelines to only two countries," DeLay says. "Turkmenistan for gas -- and that pipeline just began operating last December -- and Kazakhstan for oil. That pipeline has been operating since 2006."
These two pipelines receive much attention and by themselves are sufficient to show China's growing influence in Central Asia, but China's interests in Central Asia go much further and involve every country.
Energy Exploration
The CNPC is helping to explore and develop oil and gas fields in eastern and western Uzbekistan, including in the Aral Sea. China Investment Corp bought a 14.5 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production last year, paying $939 million.
Besides the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline that started operations last December, PetroChina is helping build another gas pipeline to ship some 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from western Kazakhstan to the Chinese border. In Turkmenistan, the CNPC is the only foreign company that can boast of having an onshore contract to explore for energy.
Just over the border from where Chinese workers in Turkmenistan are developing gas fields, the possibility of China helping develop gas fields in northwestern Afghanistan is under consideration. During Afghan President Hamid Karzai's recent visit to China, the project not far from where the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline starts was discussed.
Not wishing to rely solely on pipelines to import Central Asian oil and gas, China has embarked on ambitious railway projects. Chinese company HPGI, created specifically to build rail lines between China and Kazakhstan, has plans for 21 new rail lines, eight solely for transporting oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG.
There are also plans to build a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail line that would end in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, near where the CNPC is developing Uzbek oil and gas fields.
Central Asia needs to upgrade its electricity systems and China's Tebian Electric Apparatus is building 220-kV and 500-kV power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's XD Group is modernizing and reconstructing the electricity system for the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.
Chinese companies are also involved in Central Asia's hydropower projects. China's Sinohydro is helping build the Nurobad and Shurob hydroelectric power plants (HPP) in Tajikistan as well as modernizing the Kayrakkum HPP.
Tebian is building three more power plants in Tajikistan, which paid the Chinese company by giving it rights to mine gold, silver, copper, tungsten, mica, and gemstones in the Pamir Mountains. Other Chinese mining companies are also working gold deposits and looking for uranium and rare earth elements in Tajikistan.
China is also looking to increase its civilian nuclear power potential, and there too it can find the resources it needs in Central Asia. The China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation own shares in Kazakh uranium mines, and have contracts to buy uranium from Kazatomprom. In Uzbekistan, a subsidiary of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is jointly prospecting for black-shale uranium in Navoi Province. Sinosteel is prospecting, with Australia's Monaro Mining, for uranium in Kyrgyzstan.
Chinese companies are also constructing or improving roads leading from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, Chinese workers are building a tunnel Tajikistan, and Chinese-made goods can be found at every Central Asian bazaar.
Dangerous Liaisons
The arrangement looks fantastic on the surface. China receives a major portion of the energy resources it needs as long as Beijing finances the development of the oil and gas fields, uranium mines, infrastructure, and import-export routes. Central Asia gets a steady customer who not only pays on time, but is actually constructing the means for the five countries to export their raw materials.
But while China may be a rising world power, its experience in international mediation is limited and Central Asian regional politics are full of potential pitfalls. China holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but is rarely involved in talks aimed at resolving conflicts, the situation with its neighbor North Korea being a notable exception.
On the business end, DeLay says, China has long preferred to keep its business deals on a bilateral level with one foreign partner. Many of the agreements China has worked out in Central Asia follow this model, she says, but geography dictates that Beijing engage in multilateral dealings as well.
For example, the gas pipeline linking China to Turkmenistan passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A rail project linking Uzbekistan to China will go through Kyrgyzstan, requiring Beijing to find common ground with two feuding neighbors.
John MacLeod, the head of Central Asian programs at the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, says that in recent years, “there's constant talk about various kinds of regional economic structures, but they never work out.”
“Even things like simplified customs rules, and even visas for citizens, are constantly a problem because practical things are often tied up with politics and very often with the kind of very individualistic stances of each set of leaderships, who feel that their country is preeminent and they don't want their interests to be encroached upon by the others,” MacLeod says.
NATO just saw an example of such regional complications. When Uzbekistan recently halted train traffic bound for Tajikistan, supplies headed for Tajikistan and then on to NATO troops in Afghanistan were held up. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have never had good relations, but ties are particularly strained amid a dispute over Tajikistan's hydropower plans, leaving Uzbekistan worried it will be left with water shortages.
MacLeod said such incidents highlight the likelihood of breakdowns in China's regional balancing act.
"You have this history of rocky relationships and less than perfect cooperation, so simply managing this new conduit through all their territories could throw up all those problems,” MacLeod says. “You could have a situation where a simple dispute about the division of transit fees -- say, between the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs -- could escalate into something worse given this kind of difficult political relationship.... What is effectively a business dispute over money suddenly takes on this political aspect."
MacLeod notes that the Chinese have worked to ensure these multilateral deals in Central Asia benefit all the parties involved, and cites the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline as an example.
"The Chinese are trying to mitigate that risk by giving each of the players, particularly the Uzbeks, a stake in it by holding out the prospect that they too can export some gas down the pipeline," he says.
The Central Asian states’ reasons for allowing the Chinese so far into the region are clear, MacLeod explains.
"Only China will put in money into things that are not necessarily immediately commercially valuable -- like roads in Tajikistan, like developing oil and gas in Uzbekistan -- where other...commercial players would be more faint-hearted because they know about the kind of terrible legal problems you can have operating in a country like that,” MacLeod says. “So the Chinese are in it for the long game.”
He continues: “The Central Asians appear to be just not thinking about...the big politics and hoping that the Chinese are simply a kind of an investment bank that they can deal with."
This may leave a traditional suitor, Russia, out in the cold. Before the global economic crisis, the Kremlin was spending a lot of the revenues it was receiving from oil and gas sales on projects in Central Asia. But the economic crisis hit Russia hard, leaving financially secure China a free economic hand in Central Asia.
MacLeod said Moscow is putting on a brave face, but cannot be happy with the way things are shaping up in Central Asia.
"I think to an extent the Russians have accepted the Chinese economic expansion in terms of investment and energy exploration in Central Asia as a fact,” MacLeod says. “They may not like it. but they're saying that they're perfectly happy and that it meshes well with their own interests. But of course, to an extent, it doesn't.”
He explains: “Currently Russia -- the Kremlin, through Gazprom, the huge energy company -- has de facto control of the pipeline network coming out of Central Asia. And although Kazakhstan is obviously an independent oil exporter...Russia has a huge say in what happens, especially if there's turbulence at the political level."
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
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