RWE Dea Soon TO Start Development Of UK Natural Gas Fields

RWE Dea said that with an operating profit of roughly 128 million euro in the first quarter 2010 the company remains on its growth track in the international gas and oil business. While several field development projects in the UK and Northern Africa are on the brink, RWE Dea also successfully accomplished the acquisition of two new licence areas in the United Kingdom.

“I am confident of likewise making substantial progress with our announced growth targets as well as the planned production increase”, said Thomas Rappuhn, CEO of RWE Dea AG. The company will invest in promising projects, such as field developments in the UK, Norway, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. “By developing successfully explored gas fields in the UK, we lay the foundations for further growth of the company,” Thomas Rappuhn continued.

The last two years have changed the face of RWE Dea UK. RWE Dea has almost doubled its acreage in UK and has shares in 10 exploration and 21 production licences. For about 60 percent of the acreage, RWE Dea holds operatorship including the producing fields Cavendish and Topaz. This month, RWE Dea UK was awarded the blocks 43/17a and 43/18a remaining from the 25th licence round. These adjacent blocks are situated in the Southern North Sea. RWE Dea will be operator for both blocks.

RWE Dea UK is now at the beginning of key field development work. Three development projects are about to start, two of them operated by RWE Dea UK - Clipper South and Breagh, the other - Devenick under BP operatorship.

The biggest RWE Dea project in the UK is the development of the Breagh field, one of the largest natural gas fields still to be developed in the Southern North Sea: The Breagh field is a conventional Carboniferous reservoir in the north of the UK Southern North Sea some 65 km off the NE coast of England. After last year’s acquisition of the Breagh area (RWE Dea as operator with 70 %) with own reserves of up to 13 billion m³ of gas, RWE Dea as operator is intensifying the development with the aim of launching production as early as 2012.

Last Sunday the drilling rig Ensco 72 came on hire for RWE Dea’s 2010 exploration campaign. The rig has arrived in the Breagh area on location in Block 42/19a and is about to spud the Airidh exploration well to explore further potential in this area. “The anticipated drilling time is about a month, that means we will have the results by the end of June. Drilled back to back, the next well will be Macanta in Block 42/14. Here the target is slightly deeper and it will take about two months to reach it”, Managing Director of RWE Dea UK, René Pawel, explained.

For the second development project, Clipper South RWE Dea (operator with a 50% stake) is well placed to develop the gas field located in Blocks 48/19a, 19c, 20a and 20b in the Southern North Sea approximately 60 kilometres north east of the eastern coastline of Great Britain. In the base plan, the field will be developed by horizontal multi-fraced wells. The platform installation is planned for late summer 2011 with drilling to begin thereafter. First gas is expected end of 2011.

The Devenick development operated by BP, where RWE Dea has a share of 11.3% is a gas condensate reservoir located in UKCS Blocks 9/29a and 9/24b in the northern North Sea approximately 187 km south east of the Fair Isle, 192 km south east of Shetland. The Devenick development lies in a water depth of approximately 114 m. Drilling will start later in 2010, offshore installation of pipeline and facilities will start in 2011. First gas is planned mid 2012.

René Pawel said, “Our current development projects will enable us to significantly increase our production by 2012. Further appraisal and exploration potential in the Breagh area and our other licences will contribute to our efforts to maintain this production level in the future.”

RWE Dea will continue to participate as competent partner in upcoming licence rounds, in order to further extend the portfolio accordingly, the company added.
Friday, May 28, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

70 Dutch, 2 Belgians Among 103 Victims In Libya Air Crash

The number of Dutch people killed in Wednesday's Tripoli air disaster has risen to 70, the Dutch Foreign Ministry announced Thursday afternoon, reported the SABA news agency.

Up to 38 of the victims were travelling with the travel agency Stip and 24 with the travel agency Kras, KUNA reported.

SABA reported that nine Dutch people had booked their flight themselves. They include the family of the nine-year-old boy Ruben, the sole survivor of the disaster, said the statement The Belgian foreign Ministry said two Belgians, one man and one woman, are among the Victims.

Belgian media said it is not ruled out other Belgians could be among the dead. The Airbus belonging to Libya's Afriqiyah Airways crashed while landing at Tripoli on a flight from Johannesburg, South Africa. A large number of the passengers on board were due to fly on to Brussels.
Thursday, May 13, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

UN General Assembly To Pick New Members To Rights Body, As Criticism Grows

By Antoine Blua

(RFE/RL) -- Member states of the United Nations General Assembly in New York are scheduled to vote on 14 new members for the UN's leading human rights body.

Fourteen candidates are running unopposed, to the dismay of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that argue a number of them currently fall short of the standards set for membership of the UN Human Rights Council.

Hillel Neuer, executive director of the Geneva-based UN Watch, calls the election process a "farce," adding that this year's elections are "without competition. That makes no sense. We have countries like Libya that are running for a seat and have atrocious human rights records."

UN Watch heads a coalition of 37 human rights organizations from around the world that campaigned for the United States and the European Union to defeat Libya's candidacy due to the country's human rights record.

In a letter to the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, and Spain's ambassador, Juan Antonio Yanez-Barnuevo -- whose country currently holds the rotating EU Presidency -- the coalition described Libya as "one of the world's most repressive societies," where political parties, free speech, and open media are banned.

Iran initially wanted to run but withdrew from the race last month in the face of mounting opposition.
Separately, UN Watch and the U.S.-based organization Freedom House are also calling on diplomats to reject the candidacy of Angola, Malaysia, Mauritania, and Qatar.

Another coalition of 12 organizations has chosen to highlight Uganda and Thailand -- in addition to Libya, Angola, and Malaysia. The NGO Coalition for an Effective Human Rights Council urged UN members to seek specific human rights improvements from these states before deciding whether to vote to elect them to the council.

'Fundamental Flaw'

The election of the 14 candidates is not a foregone conclusion, as each candidate must receive the affirmative votes of more than half (97 countries) of the overall UN membership.

The council was created in 2006, replacing the UN Commission on Human Rights, which had been widely condemned as a place where abusers protected each other from criticism.

The nomination of Libya to run the UN watchdog in 2003 highlighted what many saw as a fundamental flaw in the way the commission was set up. But its replacement has been a disappointment to critics like Neuer

"We were promised competitive elections at the Human Rights Council as part of the 2006 reform that would bring the best candidate forward," the UN Watch head says.

"This was supposed to be a council for the victims, it was supposed to be a voice for the victims, and today we're seeing tragically a council for the perpetrators of human rights violations."

The General Assembly resolution that established the council stated that members should uphold the "highest standards" of human rights and that they "fully cooperate" with the council.

Victim Of Politics

The resolution also envisioned an election process in which states would issue pledges and commitments that UN members should consider in casting their votes.

That process has deteriorated as fewer states have competed each year.

"We were all very disappointed that this year for the first time all the regional blocks were putting forward a 'clean slate,' which in many ways does undermine the election process," says Laetitia Bader, human rights officer for the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Network in Kampala, Uganda.

The make-up of the council reflects the United Nations' geographic composition, and seats are allotted by regional group.

This year, 14 candidates were designated by countries in five different regions to replace 14 seats to be vacated in the 47-member council.
  • Ecuador and Guatemala are running for the two Latin American seats;
  • Africa endorsed Angola, Libya, Mauritania, and Uganda;
  • the Eastern European group named Moldova and Poland;
  • Spain and Switzerland will run for the Western European and Other group's only two seats;
  • and Malaysia, Maldives, Qatar, and Thailand have been designated by Asia.


Iran initially wanted to run but withdrew from the race last month in the face of mounting opposition based on its severe human rights abuses, rather than face likely defeat in the General Assembly.

"Although we are seeing some negative developments, we are also seeing the fact that international pressure can still have a positive impact on the election process," Bader says.

Rights activists say campaigns have led to the election defeat of other states with poor human rights records, including Belarus in 2007 and Azerbaijan in 2009, when those states faced competitive races in their regions.


Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. 
Thursday, May 13, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Over 100 Die In Plane Crash In Libya

A plane crashed on Wednesday in the Libyan capital of Tripoli, killing 105 people, the AFP news agency said, citing police sources.

The plane, en route from South Africa, crashed during landing. There is as yet no news on the type of aircraft involved.

The police source said that 94 passengers and 11 crew members died.

An investigation is underway into the circumstances of the crash.

Source: RIA Novosti
Wednesday, May 12, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Judge Denies Habeas Petition Of Ill And Abused Libyan In Guantánamo

By Andy Worthington

On April 20, unnoticed by any media outlet whatsoever, a Libyan prisoner at Guantánamo, Omar Mohammed Khalifh (also identified as Omar Abu Bakr) lost his habeas corpus petition.


I learned about the ruling through a “Guantánamo Habeas Scorecard” maintained by the Center for Constitutional Rights, but although Judge James Robertson’s unclassified opinion is not yet available, to ascertain why he decided that the government had met its burden of proof in establishing that Khalifh was part of, or supported al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban, at least part of his story — and of the government’s allegations — can be found through publicly available documents, and through representations made on his behalf by his lawyer, Edmund Burke. Other information has been provided to me by the former Guantánamo prisoner Omar Deghayes, who is aware of how Khalifh has been treated at Guantánamo over the last eight years.

As I explained in my book The Guantánamo Files, drawing on the publicly available information, Khalifh (or Abu Bakr) was seized during a series of house raids in Karachi, Pakistan in February 2002, which led to the capture of Abdu Ali Sharqawi, a Yemeni also identified as Sharqwi Abdu Ali al-Hajj, and more commonly known as Riyadh the Facilitator, and at least 15 other men. Sharqawi was subsequently rendered to Jordan, where he was tortured on behalf of the CIA, and the fruits of this torture were recently excluded as evidence in the habeas petition of another Guantánamo prisoner, Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman, as I explained in a recent article. Without access to the unclassified opinion, I have no idea whether the government alleged that Khalifh was seized with Sharqawi, although it is noticeable that Burke claimed that he was not, and it is also worth noting that the majority of the other men seized at this time have been released from Guantánamo.

In The Guantánamo Files, my analysis of Khalifh’s story was as follows:
It was claimed that he traveled to Afghanistan in 1998, that he was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, who was “known to assist Osama bin Laden in purchasing weapons,” that he was a military trainer for the LIFG, that he established a training camp in summer 2001, that he “was a military leader of Arabs,” who fought against the Northern Alliance near Taloqan, that he “met with Taliban leaders to plan military operations,” and that he and his group were directed to Tora Bora [where a showdown took place between al-Qaeda and the US in November and December 2001] by Osama bin Laden.

One of his lawyers, Edmund Burke, refuted all the allegations, however. He acknowledged that his client had been a member of the LIFG, and had worked for the Taliban as a mine cleaner until 1998, when his right leg was severely damaged by a land mine, but said that he spent the ensuing years moving from hospital to hospital in Afghanistan to receive treatment for his leg, which was eventually amputated. He added that he moved to Pakistan in 2001, and was living in a school for boys when it was raided by Pakistani police. Pointing out that his client “can’t bear his weight on his good leg and only hobbles about with the help of a walker or crutches,” he explained, “It’s very hard to imagine him as a combatant of any kind.”
In the government’s most recent allegations, it was noted that Khalifh had “worked overseeing Sudanese drivers for one of Osama bin Laden’s construction companies in Sudan,” had been “identified” as a trainer and the leader of a Libyan training camp near Kabul, visited by bin Laden, where he was “identified as someone whom others would approach to receive explosives training if they wanted to commit a terrorist attack,” had allegedly attended two other training camps in 1996-97, and had also been “identified” as “a military leader in charge of many Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Gulf States while on the front line” in 2001, who, as alleged before, “would meet with other Taliban leaders to plan military operations.”

These sound like typically overblown assertions, based on dubious evidence produced by Khalifh’s fellow prisoners under duress, or as a result of bribery, or as a result of false confessions made by Khalifh himself, given that the other narrative identified by Burke — that he worked as a mine cleaner for the Taliban until he lost his leg — is also included, and suggests a much more humble role than the leadership role ascribed to him by the government’s unidentified witnesses.

Moreover, this conclusion is one endorsed by Omar Deghayes, who explained to me that Khalifh’s status has been exaggerated by the authorities in Guantánamo. “They call him ‘The General,’” Deghayes told me, “not because of anything he has done, but because he decided that life would be easier for him in Guantánamo if he said yes to every allegation laid against him.” Even so, as Deghayes also explained, this cooperation has been futile, as Khalifh has been subjected to appalling ill-treatment, held in a notorious psychiatric block where the use of torture was routine, and denied access to adequate medical attention for the many problems that afflict him, beyond the loss of his leg. As Deghayes described it, “He has lost his sight in one eye, has heart problems and high blood pressure, and his remaining leg is mostly made of metal, from an old accident in Libya a long time ago when a wall fell on him. He describes himself as being nothing more than ‘the spare parts of a car.’”

Given that this information is unlikely to have been included in the documents compiled by the government for its response to Khalifh’s habeas corpus petition, it’s possible that Judge Robertson’s unclassified opinion will reveal only that Khalifh lost his habeas petition based solely on his work as a mine cleaner for the Taliban, which, under the detention standards decided by the courts, would be sufficient to justify his ongoing detention. If so, he will be yet another insignificant player in Afghanistan’s inter-Muslim civil war, which predated the 9/11 attacks, and had nothing to do with international terrorism, who is consigned to oblivion in Guantánamo on an apparently legal basis, even though there is no logical justification for equating the Taliban’s military activities (whether before or after the 9/11 attacks) with acts of international terrorism committed by al-Qaeda. In addition, he will also be another victim of Guantánamo, whose hidden story of abuse and exploitation never even surfaces publicly to reveal darker truths about how the prison has operated.


Andy Worthington is the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press, distributed by Macmillan in the US, and available from Amazon — click on the following for the US and the UK). To receive new articles in your inbox, please subscribe to hisRSS feed (he can also be found on Facebook and Twitter). Also see his definitive Guantánamo prisoner list, updated in January 2010, and, if you appreciate his work, feel free to make a donation. This article is reprinted with permission.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Around 150 Abandoned Illegal Immigrants In Libyan Jail

MISNA reports that 149 migrants who tried to reached the northern shore of Libya, from Mali, without the proper documents were left abandoned on the runway of Bamako airport.

They had been held a few months in Libyan jails says ‘Le Républicain’ which recounts the abuse suffered by the migrants and the poor hygienic and nutritional conditions they were forced to endure.

Speaking to the Mali based paper, the spokesman of the group, Satigui Sidibé, claimed that some of them had been detained since last December and that the decision to expel them was taken after the death of two migrants who could not get adequate cures for their illnesses.

Another 150 migrants from Mali are still being detained for having illegally entered Libya.

‘Le Républicain’ adds that Libya has paid an unspecified sum of money to Mali as a kind of compensation or contribution for the reintegration of the migrants in their country of origin.

Libya is one of the main countries in the migration route that illegal migrants choose to use in their attempts to reach Europe and it has signed bilateral accords with European countries – including Italy – to block migrants lacking the proper authority to cross the Mediterranean.

Source: MISNA
Thursday, May 06, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Libya: Dissident's Release A Move For Justice

The acquittal by the Libyan state security court of a dissident charged with "insulting judicial authorities" is a positive sign but highlights the need to end criminalization of free expression, Human Rights Watch said. Jamal al-Haji, the dissident, was freed on April 14, 2010, after four months in prison.

"Acquitting al-Haji for criticizing the government was the right thing to do," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "But Libyans need to know that they can complain to the judiciary or criticize public officials for their performance without fear of arrest or imprisonment."

Al-Haji wrote regularly online about sensitive human rights issues such as the government's responsibility in the death in May 2009 of a prominent political prisoner, Fathi al-Jahmi. On September 1, al-Haji told BBC World television: "It is disaster for Libya to have this regime for 40 years. There is no freedom here; there is no democracy. The UK, France, Italy, I don't know why they support this dictatorship. But we will never forget."

His arrest stemmed from a five-page complaint he sent to Justice Secretary Mostafa Abdeljalil on May 24, 2009, about violations of his basic rights, including torture and inhumane conditions, when he spent two years as a political prisoner from 2007 to 2009, and the refusal since his release to allow him to travel abroad. He also criticized Libya's lack of judicial independence, interference by security services in the judiciary, and the arbitrary detention of hundreds of people. Al-Haji had been convicted of "attempting to overthrow the political system" and "communication with enemy powers" for planning a demonstration in February 2007.

On November 5, the general prosecutor summoned al-Haji to respond to a criminal defamation complaint concerning his May letter. On December 8, the prosecutor ordered him detained in Jdaida prison in Tripoli pending trial. On December 9, the office of General Prosecutor Abdurahman Elabbar released a memorandum stating that it had "investigated the allegations in [al-Haji's] complaint and proved that they were untrue and therefore slanderous, which is punishable by law under article 195 of the penal code." That article provides a prison term of between 3 and 15 years for "insulting judicial authorities."

Al-Haji appeared before the state security court on February 17 without access to a lawyer, and the judge adjourned the session until March 3 to allow him to obtain one, Omar al Habbasi.

"Jamal al-Haji's case is the perfect illustration of why the penal code needs to be amended immediately," Whitson said. "The authorities have been promising to present a new draft penal code for years, but now they need to act."

The Libyan penal code includes a number of overly broad provisions that criminalize expression in violation of Libya's obligations under international law. Article 178 provides a life sentence for disseminating information considered to "tarnish [the country's] reputation or undermine confidence in it abroad." Article 174 provides a minimum of 10 years in prison for anyone who promotes "principles or theories that aim at changing the governing system."

A 2009 proposed draft penal code reduces some sentences but retains provisions that violate freedom of expression, including prison terms for offending a public official, insulting the Libyan leader, Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi, or illegally promoting principles with the aim of changing the country's Jamahiriya system of "rule by the people." The restrictions go beyond what is permitted under international law and would perpetuate an atmosphere that stifles free speech and criticism, Human Rights Watch said.

The right to criticize one's government is of crucial importance under international law because it provides a foundation for promoting and protecting many other basic rights against government infringement, Human Rights Watch said.
Saturday, April 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

More Dark Truths From Guantánamo, As Five Innocent Men Released

By Andy Worthington

After eight years’ imprisonment without charge or trial, five former Guantanamo prisoners are beginning new lives this week — two in Switzerland and three in Georgia. Their stories reveal, yet again, how Republican lawmakers and media pundits in the US, who have, in recent months, renewed their fear-filled attacks on those still held, are guilty of hyperbolic and unprincipled outbursts, and, in addition, how these critics’ attacks are damaging to the prospects of cleared men, seized by mistake, finding new homes in countries that, unlike the US, are prepared to offer them a chance to rebuild their shattered lives on a humanitarian basis.

All five men were cleared for release from Guantánamo on two or three separate occasions — through Bush-era military review boards, through the deliberations of an interagency Task Force established by President Obama, and, in some cases, through successfully having their habeas corpus petitions granted by a US court. However, difficulties arose when it came to freeing them because they feared torture or other ill-treatment if returned to their home countries, and the US government (first under George W. Bush, and now under Barack Obama) recognized its obligations, under international treaties, not to repatriate them, but to find other countries prepared to take them instead.

The fact that Georgia — the former Soviet satellite in the Caucasus — is the new home of three of these men, and not the US state, demonstrates another obstacle to the men’s release. Had President Obama acted decisively last April, two Uighurs (Muslims from China’s Xinjiang province, seized by mistake in December 2001) would have been freed in the US, and others would undoubtedly have followed. However, when the President bowed to pressure from Republican critics, and turned down a plan, put forward by White House Counsel Greg Craig, and backed by defense secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which involved bringing the two men to live in the US, the job of Obama’s Special Envoy, Daniel Fried, who was charged with finding new homes for dozens of cleared prisoners from countries including Algeria, China, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Uzbekistan, was made considerably more difficult.

America’s allies had to overcome their obvious impulse — refusing to help unless the US also acknowledged its own mistakes by giving new homes to cleared prisoners — and it is a tribute to the governments of Switzerland and Georgia that they felt able to place humanitarian concerns above political pragmatism by accepting the men. Switzerland had already accepted an Uzbek ex-prisoner in January this year, and Georgia now joins Switzerland in a distinguished club that also includes Albania, Belgium, Bermuda, France, Hungary, Ireland, Palau, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. These countries have all shown up the US (and other European countries, including the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark), who have turned their backs on the dozens of cleared prisoners who will languish in Guantánamo until new homes can be found for them.

The Uighur brothers released in Switzerland

The two men given new homes in the Swiss canton of Jura are brothers, Arkin Mahmud, 45, and Bahtiyar Mahnut, 34, Two of the 22 Uighurs originally held at Guantánamo (five of whom were released by George W. Bush in Albania in 2006), the men had been living in a small, rundown settlement in Afghanistan’s Tora Bora mountains at the time of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, either because they had been thwarted in their attempts to travel to Turkey or Europe in search of work, or because they nurtured futile hopes of finding some way to rise up against the Chinese government. They were sold to US forces by Pakistani villagers when their temporary home was destroyed in a US bombing raid and they had crossed the border into Pakistan.

The US government understood almost immediately that they had been seized by mistake, but that did not prevent senior officials from allowing Chinese interrogators to visit them at Guantánamo, and, it seems, securing a guarantee in UN negotiations that China would not oppose the invasion of Iraq by designating a Uighur separatist group as a global terrorist organization.

Attempts to conveniently tie the Guantanamo Uighurs to this group came unstuck in June 2008, when a US court derided the government’s supposed evidence as being akin to a nonsense poem by Lewis Carroll, author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, but it was not until October 2008 that the government finally abandoned all claims that the men were “enemy combatants.” That month, their habeas corpus petition finally reached Judge Ricardo Urbina, in the District Court in Washington D.C., who ordered their release into the United States, pointing out that holding innocent men was unconstitutional.

The Bush administration appealed, and the appeal was approved in February 2009 by the notoriously right-wing Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who ruled (with the blessing, sadly, of President Obama’s Justice Department), that matters of immigration were to be decided by the Executive and not the courts, thereby gutting the men’s habeas victory of any practical meaning.

After Greg Craig’s honorable plan to rehouse two of the men in the US was scrapped, Daniel Fried was obliged to undertake numerous missions to persuade other countries to offer them new homes. Fried eventually persuaded Bermuda and the Pacific island of Palau to take ten of the men, but Arkin Mahmud and Bahtiyar Mahnut in particular remained a problem. Palau had refused to offer a new home to Mahmud, who had developed mental health problems in Guantanamo, and, in solidarity, his brother, who had been offered a new home, turned down the offer, preferring to stay with his brother in Guantánamo instead.

An appeal to the government by the Washington Post, asking that the men be allowed into the US, was subsequently ignored, but it seemed that Obama was on a collision course with the Supreme Court, which accepted the men’s case last October, until Switzerland obligingly offered the men a new home in January this year.

As Arkin Mahmud and Bahtiyar Mahnut begin their new lives in Switzerland, five Uighurs remain in Guantánamo, but their fate is unknown. The Supreme Court refused to proceed with their case at the start of this month (although they did vacate the terrible Court of Appeals ruling), essentially because the five remaining men had also been offered new homes in Palau, but had turned them down, and it remains to be seen if Palau will renew its offer, if another country will rescue them from their seemingly endless ordeal, or if the lower courts will, once more, attempt to order their release into the United States.

A Libyan refugee released in Georgia

Announcing the release of the other three men from Guantánamo, the Justice Department refused to reveal their identities, but Candace Gorman, the indefatigable attorney representing Abdul Hamid al-Ghizzawi, a Libyan, revealed that one of the three is her client, and it appears that the second man is also Libyan, and that the third is from an unidentified country in the Middle East (perhaps Libya, again, or Syria or Tunisia).
The release of Abdul Hamid al-Ghizzawi brings to an end another of Guantánamo’s many particularly bleak stories. A refugee from Libya, al-Ghizzawi had settled in Afghanistan in the 1990s, where he married an Afghan woman and had a child. Together, he and his wife ran a small bakery in Jalalabad, but after the US-led invasion, hearing that Arabs were being targeted, he decided to seek refuge with his in-laws in his wife’s home village. There, however, he was seized by bounty hunters and sold to US forces.

In Guantánamo, al-Ghizzawi suffered horribly. Afflicted with tuberculosis and hepatitis B, he nevertheless received little or no treatment, in common with the majority of those with medical problems, whose treatment was dependent on cooperation with their interrogators. In practical terms, what this meant for innocent men like al-Ghizzawi was that they would not be treated unless they provided false confessions to their interrogators, which could be used to justify their own detention, or the detention of others identified in these false confessions.

Al-Ghizzawi’s case is also notorious in terms of the warped review processes masquerading as justice at Guantánamo, as was revealed in 2007 by Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham, a veteran of US intelligence who had been involved in compiling the information used as evidence in the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo in 2004-05. In an affidavit filed in a case submitted to the Supreme Court, Lt. Col. Abraham explained how the tribunal system, designed to review the prisoners’ cases to ascertain whether they had been correctly designated as “enemy combatants,” who could be held indefinitely, was a sham, and that the information used consisted of intelligence “of a generalized nature — often outdated, often ‘generic,’ rarely specifically relating to the individual subjects of the CSRTs or to the circumstances related to those individuals’ status.”

Lt. Col. Abraham also explained how he had taken part in one of the tribunals, and, with his fellow officers, had concluded that the government had failed to establish that the prisoner before them had any connection whatsoever to al-Qaeda or the Taliban for the very reasons described above. That prisoner was Abdul Hamid al-Ghizzawi, and, as Lt. Col. Abraham added, the authorities refused to accept the tribunal’s decision, dismissing all three officers, and conducting a second tribunal that reached the conclusion the government wanted; namely, that al-Ghizzawi was an “enemy combatant,” and that he could continue to be held indefinitely. This was not the only “do-over” tribunal, but the fact that it happened at all is a disgrace, and the fact that al-Ghizzawi continued to be held for another six years after Lt. Col. Abraham exposed the shortcomings in the government’s so-called evidence is a disturbingly clear example of the complete disregard for any notions of justice or decency in the running of Guantánamo.

It was not until June last year that al-Ghizzawi was finally cleared for release by the interagency Task Force established by President Obama to review all the Guantánamo cases, and even then the Justice Department behaved appallingly, neglecting to inform Candace Gorman of the decision and then gagging her when she tried to inform al-Ghizzawi’s family, and his wife, who, in despair after years of waiting, had decided to seek a divorce.

Unprincipled obstacles to the closure of Guantánamo

I have no idea if the identities of the other two men released in Georgia will be made available, but it is clear that they too have been deprived of their freedom for up to eight years not as a result of any coherent policy, but as a direct result of the Bush administration’s arrogance and incompetence in establishing Guantánamo as a prison outside the law filled largely with men who were seized and sold to US forces by their Afghan and Pakistani allies, and who had no connection whatsoever to al-Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks, or any other group involved in international terrorism.

With 183 prisoners still at Guantánamo, and 101 of these cleared for release by Obama’s Task Force, and, in some cases, by the US courts, the shrill rhetoric of those who still insist that the prison is full of terrorists should have been silenced, but as the cynical fearmongering of recent months has shown all too clearly, when it comes to Guantánamo, Republican lawmakers are more than happy to stir up unsubstantiated hysteria about the prison, playing the fear card as the mid-term elections approach, and encouraging Democrats to do the same.

I have my doubts that the other 82 men qualify as terrorists, but presume that the 35 proposed for trials (either in federal courts or in Military Commissions) will one day have their cases considered by a judge and jury, and that the other 47 men, who the Task Force recommended be held indefinitely without charge or trial, will be able to challenge this deeply distressing advice in a US court, before judges reviewing their habeas corpus petitions. As with 34 of the 46 cases so far decided, the judges will, no doubt, conclude that, in many of these cases, the government’s assertions that they are too dangerous to release, despite a lack of usable evidence, will be revealed as distortions based on the kind of false confessions that Abdul Hamid al-Ghizzawi resisted making in exchange for medical treatment.

For now, however, while readers should bear in mind that only between 5 and 10 percent of the total number of prisoners held at Guantánamo will, in the end, be judged to have had any connection to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the release of these five prisoners to Switzerland and Georgia continues to demonstrate that innocent men are still held at Guantánamo, and that the fearmongering in the US is both unjustifiable and potentially damaging to these men’s prospects of being rehoused elsewhere.

Given these obstacles — and lawmakers’ refusal to accept any cleared prisoners into the US — Daniel Fried is to be congratulated for successfully concluding the complex negotiations leading to the release of these men, and, sometimes single-handedly, it seems, working towards the closure of Guantánamo, which remains a stain on America’s reputation, and a dark symbol of the Bush administration policies that Obama has found himself unwilling, or unable to thoroughly repudiate.

Andy Worthington is the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press, distributed by Macmillan in the US, and available from Amazon — click on the following for the US and the UK). To receive new articles in your inbox, please subscribe to hisRSS feed (he can also be found on Facebook and Twitter). Also see his definitive Guantánamo prisoner list, updated in January 2010, and, if you appreciate his work, feel free to make a donation. This article is reprinted with permission.
Thursday, April 01, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Georgia Officials Say Guantanamo Prisoners Pose No Threat

By Molly Corso

Eager to demonstrate its reliability as Washington’s strategic partner, the Georgian government is downplaying security concerns about three former prisoners dispatched from the United States’ Guantanamo Bay prison to Georgia.

US President Barack Obama’s administration has been under ongoing pressure to find new homes for prisoners housed at the US-run Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba after pledging to close the facility by January 2010. Over 180 prisoners remain in limbo.

Georgian opposition groups have raised concerns about potential risks from Tbilisi’s willingness to help house former Guantanamo detainees, but ruling party politicians and government officials have brushed aside worries that the three men pose any security threat.

"The Georgian government made the decision to accept several detainees as part of our strategic partnership with the United States," Deputy Parliamentary Speaker Gigi Tsereteli commented to EurasiaNet.org.

"Three or four people is [sic] not any threat for the Georgian state."

One senior Ministry of Internal Affairs official underlined that the trio will live "normal lives" in their host country.

A special group of ministry representatives traveled to the Guantanamo prison in December 2009 to interview possible detainees for relocation, said Shota Utiashvili, head of the ministry’s analytical department. The Georgian government was satisfied that the men are not dangerous, although wanted to confirm that they were not "psychologically damaged," he added.

The men have already contacted their families, and are free to bring them to Georgia if they wish, Utiashvili continued.

The men are currently housed in Tbilisi and have been provided with language tutors to help them learn Georgian.

Utiashvili said that the Georgian government is not paying for the men’s accommodations or needs, but would not elaborate about who is covering the cost of their care.

He would not identify any of the ex-prisoners.

The US attorney for one of the men, however, maintains that he is far from being a terrorist.

In March 23 comments posted on her blog, Chicago-based attorney H. Candace Gorman identified one of the transferred prisoners as Abdul Hamid al-Ghizzawi. In published interviews, Gorman has described al-Ghizzawi as a Libyan baker in his mid-40s with an Afghan wife and small daughter.

He allegedly fled Libya for Afghanistan in the 1980s, and opened a spice shop and bakery.

His story appears to be well known among anti-Guantanamo activists like British journalist and filmmaker Andy Worthington, who has made a documentary about the prison.

Worthington claims that al-Ghizzawi was among scores of Arab nationals scooped up by bounty hunters looking to trade alleged Al-Qaeda sympathizers for cash.

al-Ghizzawi was declared innocent by a military tribune in 2004, but was not released. Attorney Gorman writes on her blog that he suffered health problems while in prison and was often in solitary confinement.

Utiashvili would not confirm or deny that al-Ghizzawi is one of the three former Guantanamo prisoners sent to Georgia.

Opposition figures like Irakli Alasania, Georgia’s former ambassador to the United Nations, have called for greater transparency about the transfer. Discussions about such a transfer were ongoing as of late autumn 2009, according to Georgian government statements made to EurasiaNet.org. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

But filmmaker Worthington noted that it is often in the men’s best interests not to be identified. Family members at home could face retribution, he said.

Another concern is the reaction in the host country.

Detainees face "almost complete ignorance about any of the details of Guantanamo" in any host country, which can lead to misperceptions by the local population, Worthington claimed.

So far, however, ordinary Georgians, long used to riding the waves of larger powers’ foreign policies, appear to have responded to the trio’s arrival with equanimity.

The three men have, in fact, already contributed to the country’s rich culture of self-deprecating jokes.

A cartoon published on March 29 by the weekly newspaper Kviris Palitra illustrated their reaction to being transferred to Georgia, a country still struggling to recover from the 2008 war with Russia and years of economic decline.

Lament the men: "But we didn’t harm (America) that much!"

Molly Corso is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Sirte Declaration Includes Plan To Counter Jerusalem's 'Judaization'

Arab leaders on Sunday concluded the 22nd Arab League summit held in Serit, Libya agreeing on a series of political and legal measures to counter Israeli attempts to "Judaise" occupied East Jerusalem and violations of holy shrines in the city, reports Middle East media.

The Sirte Declaration expressed full Arab support of Jerusalem and its "steadfast" people in facing continued Israeli aggression, particularly assaults on Al Aqsa Mosque, according to Jordan's state news agency Petra, adding that the final communique stressed that East Jerusalem is an "indivisible part" of Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and that all Israeli measures in the city are null and void and unacceptable.

Ma'an reported that the Arab leaders pronounced their full support for Jerusalem and its residents, "on their land in the face of continued Israeli aggression against them and their holy places, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque."

Arab League Chief Amr Moussa said Israel's settlement enterprise could spell the end of negotiations, adding that Arab leaders "are waiting to see if they are serious. If they are serious they have to deal with the situation in the occupied territories in a different way," he said during a news conference at the summit's close, reported Ma'an.

For its part, Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem was quoted by that country's state media as saying that "Syria is not a party of any statement issued by the meeting of the committee in Sirte … Syria considers the issue of indirect negotiations on the Palestinian track as a Palestinian issue, and the Palestinian authority alone shoulders its responsibility in this regard."

"All the measures taken by Israeli occupation authorities are invalid and without legal ground as they will not in any way change the city's status as an occupied city or its status as the capital of the state of Palestine," it said, according to Petra.

The leaders agreed to hold an international conference on Jerusalem this year under the sponsorship of the Arab League and with the participation of all Arab states, professional unions and concerned civil society institutions.

The statement also backed efforts to reconcile Palestinian groups and asked Egypt to press ahead with mediation to clinch a deal that all factions should sign.

"The continuation of Palestinian division poses a real danger to the future of Palestinian people and their cause," it warned, calling on all the groups to take action to heal the rift and move toward the aspired reconciliation, reported Petra.
Sunday, March 28, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Gaddafi's Call For Christian-Muslim Split Denounced In Nigeria

By Lekan Otufodunrin

Nigerian religious and political leaders have criticised Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi's call for the partitioning of Africa's most populous nation into two countries - one for Christians and one for Muslims

Nigeria said on 19 March it was recalling its ambassador to Libya, noting that Gaddafi’s remarks were offensive and irresponsible.

Gaddafi said on 17 March that partition had saved many lives in India and Pakistan. He asserted that splitting Nigeria into two "would stop the bloodshed and burning of places of worship".

Gaddafi's comments came in a speech to students and were quoted by the Libyan State news agency, Jana.

"The entire population of Muslims and Christians in this country has not shown any sign to say that they cannot peacefully coexist," said Methodist Church Nigeria Prelate, the Rev. Sunday Ola Makinde.

The Rev. John Hayab, spokesperson for the Christian Association of Nigeria in northern Nigeria, said Gaddafi's suggestion should be ignored. He noted that the former president of the Africa Union sponsors State terrorism around the world.

Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at in Nigeria described Gaddafi's statement as uncalled for. The Islamic group said Nigeria needs true federalism.

The head of Ahmadiyya in Nigeria, Moshood Adenrele Fashola, told the annual Convention of the Jama'at, "We should not be divided into two. This is because we are brothers and sisters. What we have in Jos is more ethnic than religious because no religion tolerates killing one another for no just cause."

Recurring violence in the central Nigeria Jos area, Gaddafi noted is a "deep conflict of a religious nature" caused by the federal state, "which was made and imposed by the British in spite of the people's resistance to it".

Nigeria's 149 million people are almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims.

The West Africa nation has a history of sectarian clashes which has resulted in the killing of many persons and the burning of property.

Jos, the capital of Plateau State in North Central Nigeria, has this year recorded three incidents of religious and ethnic clashes that has claimed hundreds of lives this year.

Makinde said it is cynical for anyone to suggest that partition would resolve an ethno-religious crisis when there has been a series of attacks launched on Islamic faithful "by fellow Muslims [extremists]".

"Why are Muslims and Christians in the South not in crisis? I wish to put on record once again, that any attempt to Islamise Nigeria will fail. What should be done at this moment is for justice to be done because life is sacrosanct and no one has the right to take another man’s life," said Makinde.

The spokesperson for the Arewa Consultative Forum, a social cultural group in Northern Nigeria, Anthony Sani, said Gaddafi's call is an indication that he is ignorant of the fact that no Nigerian community has 100 percent of its inhabitants practicing either Islam or Christianity.

"The recent orgy of killings in Jos, the Plateau State capital, was not enough grounds for the country to be dismembered along such impossible lines as demanded by Gaddafi," Sani noted.


Source: ENI
Thursday, March 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence

Libya’s peace diplomacy in Chad has met with some success, but lack of follow-up to implement the deals suggests Muammar Gaddafi is less interested in the country’s long-term stabilisation than in asserting his regional influence.

Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the evolution of Tripoli’s policy towards its neighbour from open imperialism to support in peace negotiations with armed rebels and with Sudan. Libya has been the most important country for Chad since Gaddafi came to power in 1969, but its approach has had mixed results.

“Gaddafi makes no secret that he wants his mediations to advance his geostrategic ambitions”, says Daniela Kroslak, Deputy Director of Crisis Group’s Africa Program. “Even though Libya has the financial means and regional authority to bring the protagonists to the table, it does little to assist the implementation of the agreements it chaperones”.

In one way or other, Gaddafi has been involved in almost all the internal Chadian negotiations, most notably those at Syrte in 2007. Because of Chad’s internal political crisis and the deterioration of its relationship with Sudan, Libya has been able to solidify its position as a powerbroker. It has used its links to the armed opposition on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border to become the principal mediator between the rebel factions. It also helped to re-establish contact between N’Djamena and Khartoum, in the process perhaps preventing what could have been a direct war between the two regimes with disastrous regional consequences.

Still, Libya’s successes have been short lived, due to a lack of focus on longer-term reforms that would further the stabilisation of Chad. Tripoli rarely uses its authority to force the parties to stick to the deals it brokers, and those parties always suspect a hidden agenda behind Gaddafi’s diplomacy. At the same time, the Chad government uses Libya’s good offices to co-opt armed opponents, who in turn try to make the most personal profit out of the peace deals. Lack of coordination between Libyan and other peace initiatives has led to a struggle for influence that allows the protagonists to play the several interlocutors against each other. If Libya were to engage politically in structural reforms necessary for the stabilisation of Chad, it would be able to capitalise on its mediation efforts while maintaining its regional influence.

“Gaddafi’s efforts provide the financial and political underpinnings for Chad President Déby’s strategy of buying off his opponents with positions and money”, says François Grignon, Director of Crisis Group’s Africa Program. “But it thus hampers any serious internal reform that might eventually lead the country out of its lengthy political crisis”.
Thursday, March 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Sahelian Foreign Ministers Discuss al-Qaida Threat

By Scott Stearns
Foreign ministers from Africa's Sahelian countries are meeting in Algeria to better coordinate their response to al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists who are responsible for a series of bombings and kidnappings.

The meeting outside Algiers includes foreign ministers from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. They are working on a joint plan of action to confront the group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, which operates across parts of the Sahara kidnapping foreigners and bombing military posts.

The group claims responsibility for last week's bombing of an army barracks in western Niger. It is holding two Spanish aid workers and an Italian couple kidnapped in Mauritania.

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb last year killed a British hostage in Mali and shot dead a U.S. aid worker in Nouakchott before bombing the French Embassy there in August.

Mauritania's state-run news agency says government officials are concerned the deserts of northern Mauritania and Mali will be the next battlefield as more Algerian terrorists cross the border to join the group.

While al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is not large enough to topple a government, diplomats fear it could make the Sahara a safe haven for terrorists planning attacks elsewhere.

"I think there is a threat to stability in the sense that these are countries that are not terribly stable in the first place. This is not an organization that risks taking over a country," says Marina Ottaway, who directs the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Sunni group began in Algeria in 1992 after military rulers canceled parliamentary elections when it appeared Islamist groups might take power. They have since aligned themselves with the broader al-Qaida terrorist network, but Ottaway says they remain a loosely-organized group.

"They have had their problems in the sense that they started out trying to present themselves as, 'We are it', essentially," said Marina Ottaway. "'We are controlling all of the operations in the area.' They have not succeeded in getting all groups to join them. The Libyans have not joined them."

The U.S. State Department says it hopes the meeting in Algeria consolidates collective action against groups seeking to exploit the region to attack civilians.

The top U.S. military commander for Africa met with Algeria's president last November to discuss joint anti-terrorism efforts. The head of U.S. Air Forces in Africa met with senior Algerian Air Force officers earlier this year.

Ottaway says too much U.S. involvement may be counter-productive.

"I think it is open to discussion to me whether it is really in the best interest of these governments to all come together, particularly to come together with the U.S. military, to try and work out a common front because in a sense, by doing that, they also encourage these various groups to come together," said Ottaway. "All the groups involved in terrorist activities, kidnappings and so on, also find more of a reason to centralize their activities. So that it may in fact lead to have some unintended consequences."

Regional diplomats say this meeting in Algeria is especially important given the fall-out over Mali's release of four suspected militants last month. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb demanded their release or said it would kill French hostage Pierre Camatte.

He was freed, but Algeria and Mauritania withdrew their ambassadors to Mali in protest as they intended to try their own nationals among the suspected terrorists. Algeria said Mali's actions played into the hands of the insurgents.

Source_ VOA
Tuesday, March 16, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Lebanon, Libya And A Lingering Question

By Rannie Amiri

It took no longer than the announcement that Libya would host this year’s Arab League summit in late March for controversy to ensue. One of the League’s 22 member states has already threatened to boycott and, some would say, with good cause.

It is the one Arab country in which Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi has not dared set foot for the past 32 years.

That nation is Lebanon, and the circumstance that eventually led its judiciary to issue a warrant for Qadhafi’s arrest was the 1978 disappearance of Imam Moussa al-Sadr.

Born in Iran to a Lebanese family, Imam Moussa al-Sadr was a Qum and Najaf-trained philosopher who became one of Lebanon’s most revered religious and political figures. Answering the call to become imam of Tyre, he moved to Lebanon in 1960. For the next two decades, his tireless devotion to enfranchising the marginalized Shia population while maintaining respect for, and tranquil relations with, all of Lebanon’s confessional groups won him wide praise. Al-Sadr helped redistribute needed resources to the country’s underdeveloped and impoverished south. With the institution of an array of social welfare programs, he quickly gained a reputation as a genuine reformer.

Al-Sadr became head of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council in 1969, making him de facto leader of this community. In 1974, he founded the “Movement for the Disinherited” which continued to advocate for Shia political and socioeconomic rights. Its armed wing, “The Lebanese Resistance Detachment,” became better known by its Arabic acronym, AMAL (“Hope”) which persists today as a political party.

The complete biography and works of Moussa al-Sadr are beyond the scope of this article. What brings us to the present conflict between Lebanon and Libya however, centers around al-Sadr’s 1978 visit to Libya.

In August of that year, he and two companions—Sheikh Muhammad Yaqoub and journalist Abbas Badreddine—flew from Beirut to Tripoli, Libya to meet Qadhafi and other government officials.

They were never seen or heard from again.

It is believed that on orders from Qadhafi, al-Sadr and his two aides were imprisoned and/or murdered. His motivation for doing so remains murky, although he may have regarded al-Sadr as a political or religious rival. Qadhafi denies any knowledge of their fate, saying the three had left Libya for Italy. After Aug. 31, though, no trace of them was found in either country. Other than contending they had departed for Rome, Qadhafi has persistently refused to comment on the matter.

In an Oct. 1978 article entitled “An Imam Is Missing,” Time recounted that although al-Sadr had flown to Libya to attend ceremonies celebrating Qadhafi’s ascent to power, an Alitalia flight was booked in his name the day before those celebrations were scheduled to take place. The crew did not report seeing him on the plane and Italian police found no evidence he had ever been in Rome.

As Time reported:

“Whatever the explanation of Moussa Sadr's disappearance, troubled Lebanon had lost a potent moderating force in the Imam. As a political as well as spiritual leader of the country's most impoverished community, he had founded technical schools, sports centers and medical clinics for the poor. He had repeatedly attempted to head off bloody sectarian strife.”

In a recent report by the English language Web site of Lebanon’s government-aligned daily An-Nahar (no friend of Amal, Hezbollah, or affiliated parties), it was written:

“Sadr was a towering figure in Lebanon as he was trusted by political leaders from across the spectrum. He personified the essence of Lebanon's national unity and many believed that Lebanon could have been spared the agony of Civil War had Sadr been there.”

Thirty years later, on Aug. 27, 2008, Lebanese courts indicted Qadhafi and six other Libyans on charges of conspiring to kidnap and false imprisonment.

In light of Qadhafi’s indictment and presumed involvement in al-Sadr’s disappearance, there are calls for Lebanon to boycott the upcoming Arab League summit in Tripoli—the same city from which he mysteriously vanished.

Both Vice President of the Higher Shia Council, Sheikh Abdul-Amir Qabalan, and Amal head Nabih Berri said Lebanon should not participate until all questions on al-Sadr’s fate are fully answered. President Michel Suleiman publicly asked of the Libyan government, “Where are Imam Moussa al-Sadr and his companions? We need to answer this question.”

Qadhafi has already threatened to expel the 20,000 Lebanese nationals living in Libya and institute other “painful” measures should a boycott take place.

This notwithstanding, Lebanon should still boycott the summit. Although nothing of substance has ever emerged from these gatherings, Lebanon has the opportunity to take a powerful stand before it even convenes.

For a country that has endured so much in civil strife since the disappearance of Imam Moussa al-Sadr, a boycott would send the message that the lives of great men who uplifted the downtrodden, crossed sectarian lines to promote communal harmony and fought for the well-being of the Lebanese people will not be easily forgotten.

Facing Lebanon’s empty seat in Tripoli, leaders of the Arab League’s 21 other member states would learn what dignity, self-respect and the pursuit of justice are all about.

Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at: rbamiri (a) yahoo (dot) com. This article originally appeared at Counterpunch and is reprinted with permission.
Saturday, March 13, 2010 | 1 comments | Read more...

Egypt Ratifies Deal To Join International Gas Cartel

Egypt's parliament has ratified a deal officially confirming the North African country's participation in an international gas cartel, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram reported on Sunday.

The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), a "gas equivalent" of the OPEC oil cartel, comprises Qatar, Russia, Algeria, Bolivia, Venezuela, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and Equatorial Guinea.

The GECF was established in the Iranian capital Tehran in 2001. Its charter was adopted at the seventh ministerial meeting in Moscow in 2008.

The paper quoted Egyptian MPs as saying that the country's involvement in the global gas system will enable the country to obtain advanced technologies of natural gas prospecting, mining and transportation, gain access to analytical and research information and participate in international gas transportation projects.

Egypt's proven natural gas reserves total 1.89 billion cubic meters. Egypt exports both natural gas and liquefied natural gas, holding the sixth place in the world in terms of gas exports.

Source: RIA Novosti
Sunday, March 07, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation And Security Issues

By Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, for CRS

Chronic political instability in Pakistan and the current offensive against the Taliban in the northwest of the country have called attention to the issue of the security of the country’s nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen described U.S. concern about the matter during a September 22, 2008, speech:

To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven't changed. That said, they are their weapons. They're not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I've spoken with on both the military and civilian side understand that.

U.S. officials continue to be concerned about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons in a destabilized Pakistan. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified March 31, 2009, that “Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.”

Nevertheless, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. President Obama addressed this issue in an April 29, 2009, press conference, stating, “I’m confident that we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We've got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation.” He also recognized the sensitivity of the issue for Pakistan, saying, “We want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don't end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.”1 Declining to engage in “hypotheticals” when asked if the United States is ready to secure the nuclear arsenal if the Pakistani government could not do so, President Obama said he felt “confident that that nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.”

General Petraeus reaffirmed this confidence on May 10: “With respect to the—the nuclear weapons and—and sites that are controlled by Pakistan … we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.”2 Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a May 14, 2009, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told a journalist that Islamabad has “given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures,”3 but U.S. knowledge of Pakistan’s arsenal remains limited, according to U.S. officials. Mullen stated that “we’re limited in what we actually know” about Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Leon Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, similarly acknowledged in a May 18 speech that the United States does not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons-related sites.

Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia.

The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.

Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles—steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that probably triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.4 Deterring India’s nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan’s inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Observers point to India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program.

Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. The country’s main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have other enrichment sites.5

Islamabad gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to have included uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, and missile technology from China.

The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs,6 but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device is unclear. A 1985 National Intelligence Council report stated that Pakistan “probably has a workable design for a nuclear explosive device” and was “probably ... a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough” highly enriched uranium for such a device. A 1993 National Security Council report to Congress stated that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons efforts “culminated with the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear device if necessary by the end of the 1980s.”7 A.Q. Khan stated in an interview published in May 1998 that Islamabad “attained” the capability to detonate such a device “at the end of 1984.”8 In any case, President Bush’s failure to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not “possess a nuclear explosive device” led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment.9

When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998, Pakistan’s government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.10 The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. According to most public estimates, Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, though it could have more;11 a recent public estimate from two prominent experts on the subject stated that the country has between 70 and 90 nuclear weapons.12 Pakistan’s nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU.13 Islamabad reportedly continues to produce HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year.14

Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads and continues to produce plutonium for weapons. Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998.15 It appears that Islamabad is constructing two additional heavy-water reactors, which will expand considerably Pakistan’s plutonium production capacity, at the same site.16 Additionally, Pakistan has a reprocessing facility17 at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and is apparently constructing other such facilities. Nuclear Fuel reported in 2000 that, according to “senior U.S. government officials,” Islamabad had begun operating a “pilot-scale” reprocessing facility at the New Laboratories facility at PINSTECH.18

Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing facility at the site 19 and may be completing a reprocessing facility located at Chasma.20

Islamabad’s construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities could indicate plans to increase and improve Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal in the near future. Indeed, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Maples told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that “Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems.”21

Similarly, Admiral Mullen confirmed during the May 14 hearing that the United States has “evidence” that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal.

Responding to India?

Pakistani officials have indicated that they have already determined the arsenal size needed for a minimum nuclear deterrent and that they will not engage in an arms race with India.

Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India’s nuclear arsenal. Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts.

India has stated that it needs only a “credible minimum deterrent,” but New Delhi has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both the agreement and associated 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to exempt India from some of its export guidelines will renew New Delhi’s access to the international uranium market. This access will result in more indigenous Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India’s newly safeguarded reactors.22

Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same. According to an April 2006 television broadcast, Pakistani officials from the government’s National Command Authority expressed “concern” that the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could tilt the strategic balance between India and Pakistan in favor of the former. The officials suggested that Islamabad may need to increase or improve its nuclear arsenal in order to “to meet all requirements of minimum credible defence deterrence.”23 (See the “Nuclear Doctrine” section for more on Pakistan’s deterrence concept.) Similarly, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wrote in July 2008 that the agreement could cause a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.24 Moreover, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson indicated during a May 21, 2009, press briefing that, despite the government’s continued opposition to a “nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia,” Pakistan may need to increase its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian conventional and nuclear arms expansion.

Illustrating this point, a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson reacted to India’s July 26, 2009, launch of its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine by asserting that “continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability,” adding that “[w]ithout entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance in South Asia.” The submarine, which has not yet been deployed, will reportedly be capable of carrying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.25

Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the U.S.-India agreement is unclear, partly because the government’s decisions regarding those facilities are not publicly available.

In addition to making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons. For example, Peter Lavoy has argued that India’s efforts to improve its conventional military capabilities could enable New Delhi to achieve “technical superiority” in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as precision targeting, providing India with “the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan.”26 Islamabad could respond by lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons, according to Lavoy. Indeed, a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned in May 2009 that Islamabad could take this step. (See the “Nuclear Doctrine” section.)

Nevertheless, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program apparently faces some budget constraints.

Maples testified that “the economic decline will likely slow” the government’s progress in improving its nuclear and conventional military forces. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is reportedly facing “severe financial cuts.”27

Delivery Vehicles Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s purchased from the United States, provided that modifications are made. It is widely believed that Islamabad has made modifications to the F-16s previously sold to them.28 Although concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia,29 the U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F-16s to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power.30 The contract for provision of an additional 36 aircraft was signed on September 30, 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those aircraft and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan’s F-16A/B model aircraft. Pakistan’s F-16 fleet will therefore be expanded, but it is unclear what portion of the fleet will be capable of a nuclear mission. Mirage III and V aircraft could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5’s may have been modified to carry a nuclear payload.31

After India’s first test of its Prithvi ballistic missile in 1988, Pakistan jump-started its own missile program and has three types of ballistic missiles thought to be nuclear-capable: the solid-fuel Hatf-III (Ghaznavi), with a range of about 400 kilometers; the solid-fuel Hatf-IV (Shaheen), with a range of over 450 kilometers32; and the liquid-fuel Hatf-V (Ghauri), with an approximate range of almost 1,300 kilometers.33 34 The solid-fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2) missile, when deployed, will be “capable of reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers,” Maples stated March 10,35 adding that Islamabad has made “significant progress” on the missile. A 2009 National Air and Space Intelligence Center report appears to support this conclusion, stating that the missile “probably will soon be deployed.”

Islamabad continues to carry out ballistic missile tests, but notifies India in advance in accordance with an October 2005 bilateral missile pre-notification pact.36 Maples also indicated that Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles; the Babur (groundlaunched) and the Ra’ad (air-launched), both of which will have estimated ranges of 320 kilometers.37

Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, but prominent officials and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic tenets.38 Describing the guiding principle as minimum credible nuclear deterrence, high-level officials’ statements point to four policy objectives for Islamabad’s nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia.39 Pakistani officials have also indicated that this nuclear posture is designed to preserve territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main rival’s conventional superiority.40

Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out firstuse against a nuclear-armed aggressor, such as India.41 Some analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence against India’s conventional superiority; the Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21 that “there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbour which will disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower the nuclear threshold.” Other analysts argue that keeping the first-use option against New Delhi allows Islamabad to conduct sub-conventional operations, such as support for low intensity conflict or proxy war in Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at the strategic level.42 Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles, deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures.43

Command and Control

Pakistan’s command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. The government’s command and control system is based on “C4I2SR” (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). Islamabad’s Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands.

The NCA, established in 2000, supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces.44 The Prime Minister, as Head of Government, is Chairperson of the NCA.45 The NCA also includes the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Finance, the Director- General of the SPD, and the Commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA; the Chairperson must cast the final vote. The NCA is comprised of two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), each of which includes a mix of civilian and military officials. The ECC’s functions include establishing a command and control system over the use of nuclear weapons. The DCC “exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons.”46 The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA.

The SPD’s functions include formulating Islamabad’s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. 47

On December 13, 2007, then-President Musharraf formalized these authorities and structure in the “National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007.”48 The NCA was established by administrative order, but now has a legal basis. Analysts point out that the timing of this ordinance was meant to help the command and control system weather political transitions and potentially preserve the military’s strong control over the system. The ordinance also addresses the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of “secured information,” gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws. As a result, Pakistani authorities say that the ordinance should strengthen their control over strategic organizations and their personnel.

Security Concerns

According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are probably stored in component form,”49 which suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives.50 But whether this is actually the case is unclear; one report states that the warheads and delivery vehicles are probably stored separately in facilities close to one another, but says nothing about the fissile cores.51 And, according to an account of a 2008 experts’ group visit to Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of the SPD, suggested that the nuclear warheads (containing the fissile cores) may be mated with their delivery vehicles.52 According to Kidwai, the report says, the SPD’s official position is that the weapons “will be ready when required, at the shortest notice; [but] the Pakistani doctrine is not endorsing a US-USSR model with weapons on hair trigger alert.” The 2001 Defense Department report says that Pakistan can probably assemble its weapons fairly quickly.53

It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized people to remove a weapon’s fissile material core if it is not assembled. Dispersal of the assets may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of diversion.54

As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after September 11, 2001, President Musharraf reportedly ordered that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal be redeployed to “at least six secret new locations.”55 This action came at a time of uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad’s leadership was uncertain whether the United States would decide to conduct military strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban. Indeed, President Musharraf cited protection of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for Islamabad’s dramatic policy shift.56

These events, in combination with the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict with India at the Line of Control, and revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, inspired a variety of reforms to secure the nuclear complex. Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999 Kargil crisis, when the Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped missiles.57 It should be noted that, even at the high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no reports of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems.58

In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the country’s arsenal if political instability were to persist.59 Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the country.60 Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that “a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country’s President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief” could jeopardize the army’s unity of command, which “is essential for nuclear security.”61 During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.62 Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons.63 Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.64

However, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed greater confidence regarding the security of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on November 7, 2007 said he believed that there is “plenty of succession planning that’s going on in the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”65 Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience May 29, 2008, that the Pakistani military’s control of the nuclear weapons is “a good thing because that’s an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.” A Department of Defense spokesperson told reporters December 9, 2008, that Washington has “no reason at this point to have any concern with regards to the security” of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. More recently, Maples stated March 10, 2009, that Islamabad “has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons,” although he pointed out that “vulnerabilities exist.” Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

For example, Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances.66 Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under pretty close lock and key.” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, however, sounded somewhat less optimistic in a March 24, 2009, television interview, stating that Moscow is “very much concerned” about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal.67

Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country’s nuclear arsenal. Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “total custodial controls.”68 More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN December 2, 2008, that the country’s nuclear command and control system “is working well.” Additionally, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009, that “there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. We have full confidence in our procedures, mechanisms and command and control systems.”

In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could also be jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining that an “escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons.” This is because [w]hen tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapon storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites—and therefore targeted by opposing forces—the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and launchers in motion are also more susceptible to “insider” threats and accidents.69

Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army’s unity of command. Krepon has also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India.70

U.S. Assistance and Pakistani Nuclear Security

U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani government were famously addressed during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s confirmation hearing in January 2005. In response to a question from Senator John Kerry asking what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”71 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said, “Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty,” emphasizing that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons have been under “strong multi-layered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998.” 72 The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan’s government.73

More recently, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, responding to a report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad’s nuclear weapons, stated November 8, 2009, that Pakistan “does not require any foreign assistance in this regard.” Pakistan will never “allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities,” the spokesperson said, adding that “no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with US officials.”74 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stated the same day that the United States “has no intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material.”

The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon after September 11, 2001.75 U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability.76 Some press reports say that the United States provided Pakistan with Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, although former Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed PALs for its warheads without assistance.77

PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. As noted above, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.78 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000-member security force, commanded by a two-star general.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview that there has been U.S. assistance in this area, explaining that the United States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.”79 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed out in May 2009 that “there’s not a lot of transparency into” how Islamabad spends the U.S. funds, but he nevertheless characterized them as “money well spent.”80 A Pakistani official said in November 2009 that Pakistan reserves the right to “pick and choose” the nuclear security measures it will undertake, adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are “nonintrusive.” 81

The extent to which Pakistan has shared information about its nuclear arsenal with the United States is unclear. Although, as noted, former President Musharraf has acknowledged Islamabad’s sharing of some information, General Tariq Majid, Chair of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated November 9, 2009, that “there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear assets.”82

The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country.83 Pakistan’s response to these proposals is unclear.

It is worth noting that, according to some observers, spent fuel from Pakistan’s Karachi and Chasma nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to theft or attack.84 Pakistani officials have expressed confidence in the security of its facilities, however.85

Proliferation Threat

Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.86 Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.87

Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States “received fragmentary information from an intelligence service” that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had “sent emissaries to establish contact” with the network.88 Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda “had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.”89 Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.

The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S. reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007, statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.”90

More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said that the network “is no longer operating.” For its part, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated February 7, 2009, that Pakistan “has dismantled the nuclear black market network.” Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview whether North Korea was transferring “nuclear weapons” or related advice to North Korea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied that there is “no evidence” that Pakistan is doing so However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:

I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say that.

Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007 report that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could ... resume their black-market business.”91

Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had “personal, consistent access” to Khan, but added that he did not “have all the details of everything we’ve done.” Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the agency’s investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.92 Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation “closed”—a position an Office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009.

The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on 13 individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The sanctions were imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and Executive Orders 12938 and 13382.

Pakistan’s Response to the Proliferation Threat

Undersecretary Burns testified in July 2007 that the Bush administration has “told the Pakistani government that it is its responsibility ... to make sure” that neither the Khan network nor a “similar organization” resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the Khan network, Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to what extent these efforts have been successful is not yet clear. It is worth noting that, because Khan conducted his proliferation activities as a government official, they do not necessarily indicate a failure of Islamabad’s export controls.

Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials.93 For example, Islamabad adopted in September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for “goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use” of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali, Director of Pakistan’s Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV),94 the lists, which were issued in October 2005 and are to be periodically updated, include items controlled by multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.95 The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.96

The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has established the SECDIV and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary.

Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear security. For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is “implementing a National Security Action Plan with the [IAEA’s] assistance.” That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S.- and Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As noted above, the December 2007 National Command Authority Ordinance also includes measures to prevent the spread of nuclear related materials and expertise.

Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making security clearance procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.97 Similarly, Admiral Mullen stated May 14, 2009, that the country’s personnel reliability system must “continue to improve.”

The United States has also provided export control assistance to Pakistan. Burns described several such efforts in his July 2007 testimony.98 And according to an October 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Islamabad was during FY2003-FY2006 the second-largest recipient of bilateral U.S. assistance designed to improve target countries’ export controls. Pakistan received such assistance from the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security.99

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security-Designate Ellen Tauscher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Obama administration does not support conditioning aid to Pakistan on permitting direct U.S. access to Khan, arguing, in part, that the United States has “obtained a great deal of information about the Khan network without havingdirect access to A.Q. Khan.”100

Issues for Congress

Members of Congress have also expressed concerns regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and related material. Senator Richard Lugar has spoken out in favor of using the cooperative threat reduction tools in Pakistan to help with the security of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and weapons in the country.101

Additionally, a number of pieces of legislation appear designed to influence Islamabad’s policies regarding the Khan network. Section 2 of H.R. 1463, which was introduced March 12, 2009, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the same day, states that U.S. military assistance may be provided to Pakistan only if the President certifies that Islamabad is both making A.Q.

Khan available to the United States for questioning and “providing adequate assurances to the United States Government that it will monitor Khan’s movements and activities in such a manner as to prevent his participation in any efforts to disseminate nuclear technology or know-how.”

This section allows the President to waive restrictions on U.S. assistance imposed pursuant to the proposed legislation if the President “certifies to Congress that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so.”

H.R. 2481, the United States-Pakistan Security and Stability Act, which was introduced May 19, 2009, and referred the same day to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Intelligence Committee, would require the President to “develop and transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan for long-term security and stability in Pakistan.”

The strategy is to include a “description of how United States assistance” authorized by the bill “will be used to achieve the objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan,” one of which is “to empower and enable” Islamabad to “maintain robust command and control over its nuclear weapons technology.” The bill would authorize foreign assistance for Pakistan, including funds for improving the government’s counter-insurgency capability.

H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009, would authorize U.S. assistance to Pakistan for a variety of purposes. These include strengthening democratic institutions and law enforcement, as well as supporting economic development, education, human rights, and heath care. The bill would also authorize additional U.S. security assistance for Islamabad. However, Section 206 of the bill places conditions on some of this assistance; it states that no U.S. military assistance shall be provided to Pakistan if the President has not made a series of determinations, one of which is that the government “is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials, including, as necessary, providing access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.” The section includes a national security waiver. The bill also requires a report to Congress that includes a “description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise” and an “assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan pursuant to this Act has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.” The committee report underlines continuing concerns about getting full information about the activities of the Khan network and development of Pakistan’s own nuclear arsenal:

Pakistan’s history of nuclear development and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s establishment of a nuclear proliferation network remain a source for concern to many in the United States, particularly since the Committee understands that representatives of the United States have not interviewed certain individuals involved in the network. The Committee believes the United States should continue to engage the Government of Pakistan on the network, and should, as necessary, obtain direct access to the individuals covered by this subsection, including Dr. Khan. The Committee also maintains strong concerns regarding recent reports of Pakistan expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Given the expanding threat of Pakistan’s domestic insurgency, the Government of Pakistan’s further development of nuclear materials appears inconsistent with its immediate security threats and is unhelpful in the context of efforts to strengthen U.S.-Pakistani relations.

H.R. 1886 was introduced April 2, 2009, and referred the same day to both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Rules Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported the bill May 22, and the Rules Committee discharged it the same day. The bill was referred to the House Armed Services Committee May 22 and discharged June 2. On June 11, the House passed H.R. 1886, which was appended to H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. H.R. 2410 has been received by the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Senate passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962) unanimously on June 24, 2009. This bill would provide aid to Pakistan but does not include conditions regarding the nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear weapons activities. The Senate report (S.Rept. 111-33) says that “Any use of funds contained in this legislation for the purpose of augmenting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program would be directly contrary to Congressional intent.”

S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 represents a compromise between H.R. 1886 and S. 962. It passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 24, 2009. The House passed the bill on September 30. It became public law (P.L. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060) on October 15, 2009.

Section 203 (c) of S. 1707 requires that the President certifies that Pakistan is “continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.” It also requires a Semi-Annual Monitoring Report that would include a detailed description of Pakistan’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts and an assessment of whether assistance has “directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program.”

In response to concerns expressed in Pakistan over the intent of the bill, a “Joint Explanatory Statement” was submitted for the Congressional Record by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman. The statement emphasizes that “the legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations.” Regarding reporting requirements on nuclear nonproliferation cooperation, the statement says:

The many requirements of this report are intended as a way for Congress to assess how effectively U.S. funds are being spent, shortfalls in U.S. resources that hinder the use of such funds, and steps the Government of Pakistan has taken to advance our mutual interests in countering extremism and nuclear proliferation and strengthening democratic institutions.

There is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any U.S. role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military.102

Authors: Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation and Mary Beth Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation. This report was prepared for by the Congressional Report Service, December 9, 2009 and may be found here at the FAS website (PDF)

NOTES:

1 President Obama’s 100th-Day Press Briefing transcript, April 29, 2009, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/29text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
2 Interview with General David H. Petraeus, FOX News Sunday, May 10, 2009. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,519696,00.html.
3 Seymour M. Hersh, “Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be Kept Safe?” The New Yorker, November 16, 2009.
4 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 37.
5 Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006 and David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” in A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) May 2002. For a list of Pakistani nuclear facilities, see chart in Pakistan chapter of Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
6 See, for example, a 1978 Central Intelligence Agency report, available at http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/44/
0000107983/(UNTITLED)-RE.html, as well as a 1983 State Department document, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf.
7 National Security Council, Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, 1993. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/930728-wmd.htm.
8 “Pakistan: Qadeer Khan Interviewed on Pakistan N-Test,” The News, May 30, 1998.
9 The Pressler Amendment (August 1985) linked aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid ‘will reduce significantly the risk’ that Pakistan will possess such a device. For background summary of sanctions legislation, see CRS Report 98-486, Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and CRS Report RS22757, U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan, by Richard F. Grimmett.
10 Seismic data showed yields less than those officially announced by Pakistan and India. See Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennet, “False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty,” Arms Control Today, May 1998 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_05/vimy98.asp.
11Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.asp; “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” International Panel on Fissile Materials http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf; SIPRI Yearbook 2007. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that Pakistan has enough fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for 65-80 nuclear weapons; this estimate assumes 25 kilograms of HEU per weapon and 4.5-6 kilograms of plutonium per weapon (“Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr08cv.pdf).
12 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2009.
13 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007.
14 “Global Fissile Material Report 2007.”
15 A Pakistani newspaper reported in April 1998 that, according to a “top government source,” the reactor had begun operating (“Pakistan’s Indigenous Nuclear Reactor Starts Up,” The Nation, April 13, 1998). A June 15, 2000 article cited “U.S. officials” who indicated that the reactor had begun operating two years earlier (Mark Hibbs, “After 30 Years, PAEC Fulfills Munir Khan’s Plutonium Ambition,” Nucleonics Week, June 15, 2000). A 2001 Department of Defense report stated that the reactor “will produce plutonium,” but did not say whether it was operating (U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27).
16 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Update on Khushab Plutonium Production Reactor Construction Projects in Pakistan,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 23, 2009; Mark Hibbs and Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan Civilian Fuel Cycle Plan Linked To NSG Trade Exception,” Nuclear Fuels, August 27, 2007.
17 “Reprocessing” refers to the process of separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.
18 Hibbs, June 15, 2000. According to a 1983 State Department document, the New Laboratories facility was “capable of extracting small quantities of plutonium,” but large enough to “allow for expansion of reprocessing capacity.” Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf.
19 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 19, 2009. The 2001 Defense Department report stated that reprocessing facilities “are under construction,” but did not identify any sites (Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27).
20 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma Nuclear Site in Pakistan with Possible Reprocessing Plant,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 18, 2007. Construction on the facility was begun during the 1970s with French assistance, but France cancelled its assistance for the project later that decade.
21 Norris and Kristensen explain that plutonium reactors “provide the Pakistani military with several options: fabricating weapons that use plutonium cores, mixing plutonium with HEU to make composite cores, or using tritium to ‘boost’ the warheads’ yield.” (Norris and Kristensen, 2007).
22 See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
23 “Pakistan Command Meeting Voices Concern Over Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” Pakistan TV, April 12, 2006.
24 Available at http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/07/indian-separation-plan.html.
25 Bappa Majumdar, “India Launches Its First Nuclear-Powered Submarine,” Reuters, July 26, 2009; Nasir Jaffry, “Pakistan Hits Out At ‘Detrimental’ Indian Nuclear Sub,” Agence France Presse, July 28, 2009; “Induction Of Indigenous Nuke Sub Into Navy Longway Off: Experts,” The Press Trust of India, July 26, 2009; “N-Submarine Still Wrapped In Secrecy,” Indo-Asian News Service, July 27, 2009.
26 Peter Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future:Worries Beyond War, Henry Sokolski, Ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute) January 2008. p. 158.
27 “Pak Nuclear Program Faces 35% Cut,” The News, May 1, 2009.
28 The 1993 National Security Council report indicated that Pakistan would use these aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. See National Security Council, Report to Congress.
29 CRS Report RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications, by Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmett, and K. Alan Kronstadt; Zachary Ginsburg, “US Renews Fighter Exports to Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, September 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/USPakistan.asp.
30 “Release of these systems would not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage. Release of these modifications to Pakistan will neither affect the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology as this level of capability or higher already exists in other countries in the region.” Defense Security and Cooperation Agency news release, June 28, 2006. http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2006/Pakistan_06-11.pdf.
31 CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
32 Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman of Pakistan’s National Engineering and Scientific Commission, gave the missile’s range as 700 kilometers during a 2004 television interview (“Capital Talk Special,” GEO-TV, May 3, 2004).
33 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009.
34 All ballistic missiles described in this paragraph are road-mobile.
35 See also, Nuclear Notebook, ibid.; “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” Arms Control Today Fact Sheet, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp; and Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, July 2004. http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2004-3375p.pdf. Mubarakmand gave the missile’s range as 2,500 kilometers in the 2004 interview.
36“Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.” Full text on the Henry L. Stimson Center website: http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207949.
37 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2009.
38 Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Paper presented to the Conference on Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, Nonproliferation Education Center, Washington, DC, April 28, 2006: http://www.npecweb.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070121-Lavoy-PakistanNuclearPosture&PDFFolder=Essays.
39 Durrani, 2004.
40 For an in-depth discussion of minimum deterrence, see Naeem Salik, “Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan,” Landau Network Centro Volta South Asia Security Project Case Study, January 2006. http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/South%20Asia%20Security%20Program_file%5CDocumenti%5CCase%20Studies%5CSalik%20-
%20S.A.%20Case%20Study%202006.pdf.
41 It is worth noting, however, that President Zardari stated in late 2008 that Pakistan would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against India. See James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan In Trade And Arms Offer To India,” Financial Times, November 23, 2008; “Pakistan Against Use Of Nuclear Weapons: Zardari,” Associated Press of Pakistan, November 22, 2008; “Interview with President Asif Ali Zardari,” CNN Larry King Live, December 2, 2008.
42 Kanti Bajpai, “No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context,” Pugwash Workshop No. 279, November 2002. http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/bajpai.htm.
43 Lavoy, 2006.
44 December 2007 Ordinance To Provide For The Constitution And Establishment Of National Command Authority.
45 When the NCA was established in 2000, the government’s announcement designated the Head of Government, or Prime Minister, as Chairperson. At that time, General Musharraf, as Chief Executive, became Chairperson and stayed in that position after becoming President in 2002. He appointed the Prime Minister as Vice Chairman. However, President Zardari returned the NCA to its original structure when, in a November 2009 re-promulgation of the 2007 NCA Ordinance, he specified that the Prime Minister would be Chairperson, removing himself from that position (this re-promulgation also abolished the position of Vice Chairman). Zardari may have done this in reaction to Parliamentary pressure, and perhaps to boost his waning political support. According to Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik, the change in Chairmanship may have only a symbolic impact on nuclear policy-making, since no changes were made to the Strategic Plans Division itself. The Pakistani Parliament is now considering a bill, the National Command Bill of 2009, which includes these provisions, and could add reporting requirements on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. A July 2009 Supreme Court decision required that the Ordinances from the Musharraf era be made law. 46 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2007. p. 111; Pakistan Announcement of Nuclear-Weapons Command-and-Control Mechanism, Associated Press of Pakistan, February 3, 2000. Nuclear Black Markets, pp. 110-111, has organization charts of the NCA and SPD.
47 See P. Cotta-Ramusino and M. Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability And Nuclear Strategy In Pakistan: A Concise Report Of A Visit By Landau Network - Centro Volta,” January 14, 2002. Available at http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm; Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, December 2007; Robin Walker, “Pakistan’s Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State: Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai’s CCC Address, Strategic Insights, November 1, 2006.
48 “President Promulgated National Command Authority Ordinance,” Associated Press of Pakistan, December 13, 2007.
49 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27.
50 Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned; Lack of Knowledge About Arsenal May Limit U.S. Options,” Washington Post, November 11, 2007; Peter Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan’s Drive To Guard Its A-Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007; David E. Sanger, “Trust Us: So, What About Those Nukes?,” New York Times, November 11, 2007; Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p.33; Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini, 2002. See also, George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace quoted in Nigel Hawkes, “Pakistan Could Lose Control of its Arsenal,” The Times (London), September 20, 2001.
51 Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation.” p. 141.
52 Maurizio Martellini, “Security and Safety Issues about the Nuclear Complex: Pakistan’s Standpoints. A Concise Report Of A Visit To Islamabad By Landau Network Centro Volta (LNCV) Mission Carried Out On February 9-13
2008.”
53 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 28.
54 See Graham Allison, “What About the Nukes?” Newsweek Web, December 28, 2007. http://www.newsweek.com/id/82259
55 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons - Musharraf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure,” Washington Post, November 11, 2001.
56 “Partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf’s televised speech asking the people of Pakistan to support his course of action,” September 19, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/pakistantext_091901.html.
57 Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series, 2002. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/reidel.pdf.
58 Lavoy, 2006.
59 “Opinions Mixed on Pakistani Nuclear Security,” Global Security Newswire, November 6, 2007. http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/recent_stories.asp?category=nuclear#6783E660.
60 Also see comments by David Albright in the same interview (“Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir Bhutto,” CNN, November 5, 2007).
61 “U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relations,” Statement before the Committee on Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security June 12, 2008.
62 “Lieutenant General Carter Ham Holds a Defense Department Briefing,” CQ Transcripts, November 7, 2007.
63 “Al Baradei to Al Hayat,” Dar Al Hayat, English Edition on-line, January 10, 2008, http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/01-2008/Article-20080110-639032eb-c0a8-10ed-01ae-81ab2ea588db/story.html.
64 Also see comments by David Albright in “Pakistan in Crisis,” 2007.
65 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Democracy, Authoritarianism and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan, November 7, 2007.
66 “Pak Nukes Safely Guarded, Says Narayanan,” The Press Trust of India, December 16, 2007.
67 Lyubov Pronina and Ellen Pinchuk, “Russia ‘Concerned’ About Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Bloomberg, March 25, 2009.
68 “Pakistan Nukes Under Control: Musharraf,” Agence France Presse, November 13, 2007.
69 Krepon, June 12, 2008.
70 Michael Krepon, “Complexities Of Nuclear Risk Reduction In South Asia,” The Hindu, May 29, 2009.
71 “The Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State,” Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18 and 19, 2005. The concept of a contingency plan to take over Pakistan’s nuclear assets was first written about by Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads,” The New Yorker, November 5, 2001.
72 “Strategic Assets Are Safe, Says FO,” Dawn, November 12, 2007.
73 “Pentagon Readies Plan for Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” The Guardian, December 28, 2007. For a discussion of the difficulties of such a scenario, see Shaun Gregory, “The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief_22finalised.pdf
74 “Pakistan Foreign Office Rejects U.S. Media Report on Nuclear Arsenal,” Associated Press of Pakistan, November 9, 2009.
75 Alex Wagner, “U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, December 2001. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/paknucsecdec01.asp.
76 Joby Warrick, “U.S. Has Concerns Over Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, November 11, 2007; David Sanger and William Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 17, 2007.
77 Kaushik Kapisthalam, “Guarding Pakistan’s Nuclear Estate,” Asia Times, April 6, 2005. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD06Df04.html; Robert Windrem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear History Worries Insiders,” NBC News, November 6, 2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660667/. General Kidwai has stated that “if a country can make complex nuclear weapons and ballistic cruise missiles grant it that PALs is a far simpler technology.” (Cited in Martellini, 2008).
78 Mubarakmand provided some details about Pakistan’s use of such codes in the 2004 interview.
79 “A Conversation With Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,” PBS: The Charlie Rose Show, November 6, 2007.
80 Ben Arnoldy, “Could Taliban Get Keys To Pakistan’s A-Bomb? Experts See The Islamic Fighters As Less Of A Risk Than Radical Insiders Gaining Access To Nuclear Materials,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 2009.
81 Mariana Baabar, “Pak N-safety Plan,” The News International, November 10, 2009.
82 Ibid.
83 Bryan Bender, “Pakistan, US In Talks On Nuclear Security,” The Boston Globe, May 5, 2009.
84 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008.
85 Martellini, 2008.
86 For more information on Pakistani proliferation, see CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options, by Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni. Also see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
87 Libya obtained uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weapons designs that could support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea currently has a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and may also have a uranium-based program. Iran is suspected of pursuing both plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs.
88 Tenet, George and Harlow, Bill, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, HarperCollins: New York, 2007. p. 261.
89 The report is available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html.
90 Unclassified Statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.
91 Nuclear Black Markets, 2007, p. 159.
92 Personal communication, November 9, 2007.
93 Details of Pakistan’s nuclear-related legislation can be found in the country’s reports to the UN 1540 Committee. Both can be found at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/597/46/PDF/N0459746.pdf?OpenElement.
94 Presentation given to Partnership for Global Security Workshop, “Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan,” February 21-22, 2008. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/zafar_export.pdf.
95 The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multilateral, voluntary group of nuclear supplier states which have agreed to coordinate their exports of civilian nuclear technology and materials in order to prevent importers from using them to produce nuclear weapons. The Australia Group is a voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement through which participating countries coordinate their national export controls to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents, as well as related equipment, technologies, and knowledge, to countries and nonstate entities suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons capabilities. The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal, voluntary arrangement in which participants agree to adhere to common export policy guidelines applied to an “annex” that lists items related to the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
96 The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance of 2000 regulates the import and export of chemicals in accordance with the convention.
97 Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security: Workshop Synopsis. April 30, 2007.
98 Burns mentioned Pakistan’s participation in the Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative. Under these programs, “the United States and Pakistan worked together to install screening and radiation detection equipment to scan U.S.-bound cargo.” He also stated that the Department of Energy “is working with Pakistan on radiation source security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings.”
99 GAO Report, Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results, October 31, 2007.
100 Question #54, Pre-Hearing Questions for the Record by Senator Richard Lugar Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination of Ellen M. Tauscher to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/TauscherQFR.pdf.
101 “Statement by Sen. Lugar on Nunn-Lugar and Pakistan,” May 6, 2009, http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=312588&
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