ASEAN And SAARC: Resolving Intra Regional Disputes
By Chloe Choquier for IPCS
Prior to the SAARC 16th Summit held in Bhutan’s capital Thimphu in April 2010, Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed had affirmed his hopes about the bilateral meeting between Indian PM Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani. Since bilateral issues cannot officially be tackled in the multilateral forum of SAARC, this comment reflected the common feeling among SAARC member States that the Indo-Pak relations overshadow SAARC meetings. The incapacity of its member States to discuss political issues restrains SAARC’s credibility as a regional organization, but isn’t that the only way for such a discordant association to overcome its divisions? Can the Association learn anything from the ASEAN experience? Does 16th Summit offer any hope for a stronger political dialogue within SAARC in the future?
One of the reasons for creating a regional organization is the shared conviction among neighbours that the stronger the regional links, the lower the incentive to use force to resolve conflicts. In this sense, ASEAN Nations signed in 1975, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopting the principles of renunciation to the threat or the use of force, and settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner. Disputes have not been necessarily absent in Southeast Asia since then, but their common conviction that getting on with each other is an economically win-win situation forced the respect of agreed principles – mainly because, unlike SAARC’s members, ASEAN States are economically interdependent. Because of their complex and confrontational history, SAARC member States have not reached such a level of regional commitment. They agreed to contribute to mutual trust in the region through non-use of force and non-interference, but the absence of political dialogue on bilateral issues made these promises meaningless. Consequently, the threat or use of force between member States of SAARC has remained possible.
The main difference between ASEAN and SAARC lies in the existence of practical diplomatic tools to address these issues. ASEAN member States and other regional and international stakeholders created in 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote confidence-building and develop preventive diplomacy in the region. Often criticized for its lack of efficiency in tackling long-standing issues like Myanmar’s democratization, the ARF has nevertheless established a diplomatic forum to address these specific concerns. A SAARC Regional Forum to discuss disputes would be a proper way to take political pressure away from SAARC Summits but the creation of such a mechanism seems unlikely as long as SAARC lacks a common vision of regionalism. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are in favor of amending the SAARC charter to enable discussion on bilateral issues: they both believe that economic cooperation can’t be achieved without a resolution of political issues first. India, on the contrary, prefers economic cooperation to be the main driving force of regionalism, for fear that the smaller countries might form a united front to overrule Delhi and with the idea that political gains will follow. Unanimity being the one and only decision procedure, a stronger regional political dialogue is not in all likelihood a potential perspective.
It seems SAARC could learn a lesson from the success of informal diplomacy within ASEAN. Informal negotiations over the Spratly Islands dispute have been efficient in creating confidence-building between the actors and peaceful cooperation while official consultations, subjected to media pressure, focused merely on nationalist demands. Since SAARC’s official track is blocked, member States have also used bilateral meetings outside the summits to discuss their security issues. The meeting between Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the 16th Summit also proves the relative success of informal sideline diplomacy. Officially discussing political disagreements during the SAARC Summits would probably threaten dialogue on any other subject and even the very existence of SAARC. Keeping the discussions informal and bilateral allows SAARC to slowly but surely move forward on less controversial issues such as poverty reduction. In a nutshell, proponents of a Charter reform should resign themselves to the idea that bilateral diplomacy is probably the only solution to create a stronger SAARC.
Another explanation for ASEAN’s comparative success in conflict management is the use of alternative dispute resolution, through justice or mediation. If ASEAN countries favor bilateral conflict resolution, the principle of non-intervention pushed them to use the International Court of Justice to resolve territorial disputes like the sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan in 2002 and over Pedra Branca, Middle Rock and South Ledge in 2008. If the recourse to third-party mediation did not determine maritime boundaries, it was often the only way to break impasses and initiate bilateral negotiations. But the lack of confidence in international bodies and the Indian satisfaction with status quo in Kashmir make the use of international justice less likely within SAARC. To conclude, if international and regional ways to deal with disputes are efficient for ASEAN States, it seems bilateral discussions are the only foreseeable solution to make SAARC work in the fields of economic and social development. In this sense, India, as a leading member of SAARC, has a responsibility in convening informal bilateral negotiations with its neighbors to deal with regional disputes.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr. This article was published by IPCS.
Prior to the SAARC 16th Summit held in Bhutan’s capital Thimphu in April 2010, Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed had affirmed his hopes about the bilateral meeting between Indian PM Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani. Since bilateral issues cannot officially be tackled in the multilateral forum of SAARC, this comment reflected the common feeling among SAARC member States that the Indo-Pak relations overshadow SAARC meetings. The incapacity of its member States to discuss political issues restrains SAARC’s credibility as a regional organization, but isn’t that the only way for such a discordant association to overcome its divisions? Can the Association learn anything from the ASEAN experience? Does 16th Summit offer any hope for a stronger political dialogue within SAARC in the future?
One of the reasons for creating a regional organization is the shared conviction among neighbours that the stronger the regional links, the lower the incentive to use force to resolve conflicts. In this sense, ASEAN Nations signed in 1975, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopting the principles of renunciation to the threat or the use of force, and settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner. Disputes have not been necessarily absent in Southeast Asia since then, but their common conviction that getting on with each other is an economically win-win situation forced the respect of agreed principles – mainly because, unlike SAARC’s members, ASEAN States are economically interdependent. Because of their complex and confrontational history, SAARC member States have not reached such a level of regional commitment. They agreed to contribute to mutual trust in the region through non-use of force and non-interference, but the absence of political dialogue on bilateral issues made these promises meaningless. Consequently, the threat or use of force between member States of SAARC has remained possible.
The main difference between ASEAN and SAARC lies in the existence of practical diplomatic tools to address these issues. ASEAN member States and other regional and international stakeholders created in 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote confidence-building and develop preventive diplomacy in the region. Often criticized for its lack of efficiency in tackling long-standing issues like Myanmar’s democratization, the ARF has nevertheless established a diplomatic forum to address these specific concerns. A SAARC Regional Forum to discuss disputes would be a proper way to take political pressure away from SAARC Summits but the creation of such a mechanism seems unlikely as long as SAARC lacks a common vision of regionalism. Pakistan and Sri Lanka are in favor of amending the SAARC charter to enable discussion on bilateral issues: they both believe that economic cooperation can’t be achieved without a resolution of political issues first. India, on the contrary, prefers economic cooperation to be the main driving force of regionalism, for fear that the smaller countries might form a united front to overrule Delhi and with the idea that political gains will follow. Unanimity being the one and only decision procedure, a stronger regional political dialogue is not in all likelihood a potential perspective.
It seems SAARC could learn a lesson from the success of informal diplomacy within ASEAN. Informal negotiations over the Spratly Islands dispute have been efficient in creating confidence-building between the actors and peaceful cooperation while official consultations, subjected to media pressure, focused merely on nationalist demands. Since SAARC’s official track is blocked, member States have also used bilateral meetings outside the summits to discuss their security issues. The meeting between Yousaf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the 16th Summit also proves the relative success of informal sideline diplomacy. Officially discussing political disagreements during the SAARC Summits would probably threaten dialogue on any other subject and even the very existence of SAARC. Keeping the discussions informal and bilateral allows SAARC to slowly but surely move forward on less controversial issues such as poverty reduction. In a nutshell, proponents of a Charter reform should resign themselves to the idea that bilateral diplomacy is probably the only solution to create a stronger SAARC.
Another explanation for ASEAN’s comparative success in conflict management is the use of alternative dispute resolution, through justice or mediation. If ASEAN countries favor bilateral conflict resolution, the principle of non-intervention pushed them to use the International Court of Justice to resolve territorial disputes like the sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan in 2002 and over Pedra Branca, Middle Rock and South Ledge in 2008. If the recourse to third-party mediation did not determine maritime boundaries, it was often the only way to break impasses and initiate bilateral negotiations. But the lack of confidence in international bodies and the Indian satisfaction with status quo in Kashmir make the use of international justice less likely within SAARC. To conclude, if international and regional ways to deal with disputes are efficient for ASEAN States, it seems bilateral discussions are the only foreseeable solution to make SAARC work in the fields of economic and social development. In this sense, India, as a leading member of SAARC, has a responsibility in convening informal bilateral negotiations with its neighbors to deal with regional disputes.
Chloe Choquier is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at chloe_choquier@yahoo.fr. This article was published by IPCS.
Monday, May 24, 2010 |
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Maldives To Re-Settle Two Terrorism Suspects From Guantanamo Bay
By B. Raman
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
- Opposition to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, to New York for trial.
- Some of the suspects from Afghanistan and Yemen, who were released and re-settled in their country because there was no evidence against them to warrant a trial, took to terrorism after their release due to their anger against their alleged ill-treatment in the detention centre by the US. There is a danger that many others, who were arrested by the US authorities on mere suspicion without any evidence of their involvement in terrorism might similarly take to terrorism after their release due to their anger against the US. Yemenis, Pakistanis and Afghans constitute a bulk of such suspects in the detention centre.
- Difficulty in finding countries which would accept those whom the US did not want to send to their home country such as the Uighur suspects. China has been demanding that the Uighurs should be handed over to it for trial. Human rights organizations have been opposing this due to fears that they might be sentenced to death and executed by the Chinese authorities. While willing host- countries have been found to re-settle some of the Uighurs, others are without a willing host-country and hence continue to be at Guantanamo Bay.
Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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