Haggling Over The Former Moldavian SSR Dispute
By Michael Averko
Vladimir Socor's May 19 Eurasia Daily Monitor article "Soviet Chekists, Slavic Fist and the Medvedev-Yanukovych Declaration on Transnistria" includes this excerpt:
"Originally, Moscow had called for political settlement to be synchronized with Russian troop withdrawal; but it then increased its demands step by step. Instead of withdrawing the troops, Russia wants them to stay on, re-designated from peacekeepers to peace-guarantors, if and when a political settlement is achieved. Moscow would accept a cosmetic internationalization of the troop contingent in return for OSCE legitimization of it. And it would insist (with Ukraine in tow) on 'participating in it actively' so as to minimize international participation in such a contingent."
Not mentioned is that in 2003, the Moldovan government suddenly backed out of a Russian brokered agreement, which included the eventual withdrawal of Russian forces from Pridnestrovie (Transnistria). The Moldovan government's sudden rejection coincided with the stated opposition of the agreement from some leading Western governments and Moldova's political opposition.
If I am not mistaken, Socor opposed that agreement, which would have had Pridnestrovie as an agreed part of a federalized Moldova. Critics of the rejected agreement suspiciously note how it permitted Russian troops to remain in Pridnestrovie for an extended period. On the other hand, in Pridnestrovie, the Russian troop presence is more favorably viewed as a safeguard. (Somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 Russian troops are said to be stationed in Pridnestrovie. This figure is thousands less than the foreign military presence in Kosovo.)
Since 2003, there are several noteworthy occurrences which have some relevance to the matters relating to the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and the other disputed former Communist bloc territories.
- In 2006, Pridnestrovie held a referendum in support of that territory's continued separation from Moldova. (The over 95% in favor tally is on par with the result of Pridnestrovie's referendum in 1991. Such results are evident elsewhere. They include the 2006 referendum in South Ossetia, as well as the referendums in 1967 and 2002 regarding Gibraltar's status. Is it possible for the Pridnestrovie referendum results to each be off by more than 45%?)
- Following Pridnestrovie's 2006 referendum, Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have received some international recognition of their stated independence.
- When compared to his predecessor Victor Yushchenko, Ukraine's newly elected President Viktor Yanukovych appears more willing to sympathize with Pridnestrovie's concerns.
Much of the English language mass media coverage of the former Moldavian SSR continues to not address a number of pertinent facts and fact based opinions.
In relation to history and human rights, Pridnestrovie can reasonably claim that it has a better independence claim than the other disputed former Communist bloc territories. Realpolitik (the views of the major powers) have shortchanged Pridnestrovie's independence desire. It is not in Russia's interests to upset the Moldovan government to drastically undertake policies more distant from Russia. At the same time, some influential elements in the West are apprehensive about recognizing the independence of a Russocentric leaning disputed territory.
Moldova remains unable to govern over Pridnestrovie. Pridnestrovie's government appears to better represent Pridnestrovie than Moldova's government. Moldova desires Pridnestrovie and not the opposite. Pridnestrovie is not like North Korea to the point of being able to successfully intimidate a popular movement in support of the disputed territory becoming a part of Moldova.
The recent meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents restated support for the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic existing as one nation. One idea for settling the former Moldavian SSR dispute takes into consideration such examples as how New York is not a part of New Jersey and vice versa, while both are in the same nation.
As is true with some other issues, there has been mud slinging on the subject of the former Moldavian SSR. This manner can draw attention away from key variables.
In varying degrees, there are negative Soviet era attributes throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. Supporting the ability to defend against certain types of foreign infiltration is not necessarily akin to being soft on abuses related to the Soviet period. References to Soviet like thinking can get selective. The boundaries of the Stalin created Moldavian SSR in 1940, were formalized years after the Soviet Union's founding, with that land mass having never previously existed as an independent state. (During the period between the end of World War I and 1940, Moldova and Pridnestrovie were part of different nations. The two lands had different historical experiences beforehand as well.)
UPDATE: There is a claim making the rounds about a secret agreement between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. The Ukrainian government denies the claim that Ukraine has plans of taking over Pridnestrovie with Russian approval. This particular claim adds that such an occurrence would pressure Moldova into having a closer relationship with Russia.
Logistically, putting Pridnestrovie in Ukraine is not so problematical. There are some other things to consider.
Despite wanting to be on better terms with Russia, Ukraine also wants good relations with the West. This hypothetical move would put both countries on rough terms with the West. Regarding Russia, just how easy would it be for Russia to then move on Moldova as claimed? Moldova would not be in a particularly good mood to come closer to Russia under such a scenario. Moreover, Russia unfriendly folks in the West would gladly tap dance on such an occurrence.
Pridnestrovie's 2006 referendum result supports independence and an eventual reunification with Russia.
Logistically, putting Pridnestrovie in Ukraine is not so problematical. There are some other things to consider.
Despite wanting to be on better terms with Russia, Ukraine also wants good relations with the West. This hypothetical move would put both countries on rough terms with the West. Regarding Russia, just how easy would it be for Russia to then move on Moldova as claimed? Moldova would not be in a particularly good mood to come closer to Russia under such a scenario. Moreover, Russia unfriendly folks in the West would gladly tap dance on such an occurrence.
Pridnestrovie's 2006 referendum result supports independence and an eventual reunification with Russia.
Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. This article first appears in the American Chronicle on May 26.
Thursday, May 27, 2010 |
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Medvedev And Yanukovich Planning ‘Secret Protocol’ On Transdniestria?
By Paul Goble
Although aides to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich are denying it, many commentators and politicians in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania are convinced that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have secretly agreed to a course of action that would have Transdniestria attached to Ukraine and Moldova brought under tight Russian control.
When they met last week, Medvedev and Yanukovich issued a joint declaration about the resolution of the Transdniestria dispute. It contained only general expressions of good will, but a week ago, an official in the Ukrainian president’s protocol service leaked information about the talks of the two presidents that suggested they had agreed on rather more.
Indeed, what some have compared to “the secret protocols” of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the supposed accord calls for a referendum in Transdniestria by the end of the year on its becoming an autonomous republic within Ukraine and pressure on Chisinau to elect a president and form a government more to Moscow’s liking.
In the current issue of “Versiya,” Georgy Filin discusses this case, not only detailing the statements of the various sides but also suggesting some of the consequences for Moldova, Ukraine, and their neighbors if reports about a secret agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich are even partially true (versia.ru/articles/2010/may/24/pridnestrovje).
The leak of information about the supposed accord, Filin says, were “well paid for by functionaries of the Block of Yulia Timoshenko,” and the associates of this anti-Yanukovich party immediately handed copies of the document to Oleh Bilorus, a member of that party who heads the Foreign Relations Committee of the Verkhovna Rada.
Immediately copies were handed over to Chisinau officials where, in Filin’s words, they had “the effect of a bomb going off.” Sergey Mokan, the head of the Moldovan “People’s Action” Movement, said the Medvedev-Yanukovich accord “represents an ultimatum to Moldova and is the beginning of a new military-political expansion in the post-Soviet space.”
“Kyiv and Moscow have decided to act according to the principle of ‘divide and rule.’” Mokan’s comment was expanded upon by Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, who said what Medvedev and Yanukovich had agreed to was like “the swallowing up” businessmen talk about when they takeover companies. And neither asked the Moldovans what they “think.”
“What in fact have Russia and Ukraine prepared for Moldova and Transdniestria?” Filin asks rhetorically. The first thing that has to be said, he points out, is that “the protocols which have fallen into the hands of Ukrainian journalists were prepared by the Ukrainian side” rather than being a joint statement or agreement.
They are thus, the “Versiya” journalist says, “exclusively ‘the Ukrainian vision’ of the resolution of the Transdniestria question and at the same time of the Moldovan one.” That “vision” calls for a referendum in November or December in Transdniestria concerning that breakaway territory’s inclusion into Ukraine as an autonomous republic.
Why, Filin asks, did the accord not call for uniting Transdniestria to the Russian Federation, as many in Transdniestria have proposed? The answer to that question, he continues, is “very simple.” Uniting Transdniestria to Ukraine makes greater sense economically, and doing so will allow Russia to “begin in Moldova a program of ‘an orange counterrevolution.’”
That will allow the Russian powers that be to orchestrate the election by the Moldovan parliament of a pro-Moscow president sometime next year. “Of course,” Filin continues, “one cannot talk about any Anschluss of Moldova by Russia.” In this case, “the technology is different,” one that counts on Moldovan wine producers wanting to sell their output in Russia.
According to Ukrainian parliamentarian Bilorus, “the new leadership of Ukraine has taken a new position concerning Transdniestria, one that in essence is the copy of Russia’s position.” Two years ago, he continued, Moscow offered Kyiv the same deal: ‘You gather in Transdniestria and give us Moldova,” an exchange then-President Viktor Yushchenko rejected.
Romania’s President Traian Basescu has reacted just as harshly as the Moldovans. “If Kyiv has pretensions concerning the return of Transdniestria to Ukraine, then officials there should not forget about the return to Chisinau of Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, territories which the former Ukrainian SSR received after the Second World War.”
And Basescu suggested that “Moscow and now Kyiv are trying to create on the territory which at the end of World War II should have been returned to Romania a pseudo-federation of three political-legal pseudo-subjects. But we will do everything to oppose the Russian-Ukrainian plan for the amputation of Bessarabia.”
Although Filin does not mention it, the possibility that Moldova could become part of Romania if Transdniestria were to become an autonomy within Ukraine is not the only way in which such a Russian-Ukrainian plan would send shockwaves through the international system far beyond Transdniestria.
If Transdniestria were transferred, that would trigger a provision in the 1994 accord between Chisinau and the Gagauz, an Orthodox Christian Turkic-speaking community in southern Moldova. That agreement allows the Gagauz to withdraw from Moldova if the status of Transdniestria were ever to change.
Perhaps because of these reactions or perhaps because the supposed agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich never took place, Yanukovich’s office has been at pains to deny that there is or was any such accord. Anna German, a representative of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration made a public declaration to that effect.
“Transdniestria will remain independent and not become part of Ukraine,” she said. Suggestions to the contrary are “provocations” by Yuliya Timoshenko in order to cast doubt on “the political and diplomatic successes of Viktor Yanukovich in order to destabilize the situation in the country.”
But Filin concludes, her words are less than fully convincing, all the more because the Verkhovna Rada has already discussed the procedure that would have to be followed for places like Transdniestria to join Ukraine. Indeed, he says, the Ukrainian deputies have come up with a slogan: ‘Transdniestria – the First Stage of a New Pereyaslavska Rada’ – neither more nor less!”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Although aides to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich are denying it, many commentators and politicians in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania are convinced that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have secretly agreed to a course of action that would have Transdniestria attached to Ukraine and Moldova brought under tight Russian control.
When they met last week, Medvedev and Yanukovich issued a joint declaration about the resolution of the Transdniestria dispute. It contained only general expressions of good will, but a week ago, an official in the Ukrainian president’s protocol service leaked information about the talks of the two presidents that suggested they had agreed on rather more.
Indeed, what some have compared to “the secret protocols” of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the supposed accord calls for a referendum in Transdniestria by the end of the year on its becoming an autonomous republic within Ukraine and pressure on Chisinau to elect a president and form a government more to Moscow’s liking.
In the current issue of “Versiya,” Georgy Filin discusses this case, not only detailing the statements of the various sides but also suggesting some of the consequences for Moldova, Ukraine, and their neighbors if reports about a secret agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich are even partially true (versia.ru/articles/2010/may/24/pridnestrovje).
The leak of information about the supposed accord, Filin says, were “well paid for by functionaries of the Block of Yulia Timoshenko,” and the associates of this anti-Yanukovich party immediately handed copies of the document to Oleh Bilorus, a member of that party who heads the Foreign Relations Committee of the Verkhovna Rada.
Immediately copies were handed over to Chisinau officials where, in Filin’s words, they had “the effect of a bomb going off.” Sergey Mokan, the head of the Moldovan “People’s Action” Movement, said the Medvedev-Yanukovich accord “represents an ultimatum to Moldova and is the beginning of a new military-political expansion in the post-Soviet space.”
“Kyiv and Moscow have decided to act according to the principle of ‘divide and rule.’” Mokan’s comment was expanded upon by Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, who said what Medvedev and Yanukovich had agreed to was like “the swallowing up” businessmen talk about when they takeover companies. And neither asked the Moldovans what they “think.”
“What in fact have Russia and Ukraine prepared for Moldova and Transdniestria?” Filin asks rhetorically. The first thing that has to be said, he points out, is that “the protocols which have fallen into the hands of Ukrainian journalists were prepared by the Ukrainian side” rather than being a joint statement or agreement.
They are thus, the “Versiya” journalist says, “exclusively ‘the Ukrainian vision’ of the resolution of the Transdniestria question and at the same time of the Moldovan one.” That “vision” calls for a referendum in November or December in Transdniestria concerning that breakaway territory’s inclusion into Ukraine as an autonomous republic.
Why, Filin asks, did the accord not call for uniting Transdniestria to the Russian Federation, as many in Transdniestria have proposed? The answer to that question, he continues, is “very simple.” Uniting Transdniestria to Ukraine makes greater sense economically, and doing so will allow Russia to “begin in Moldova a program of ‘an orange counterrevolution.’”
That will allow the Russian powers that be to orchestrate the election by the Moldovan parliament of a pro-Moscow president sometime next year. “Of course,” Filin continues, “one cannot talk about any Anschluss of Moldova by Russia.” In this case, “the technology is different,” one that counts on Moldovan wine producers wanting to sell their output in Russia.
According to Ukrainian parliamentarian Bilorus, “the new leadership of Ukraine has taken a new position concerning Transdniestria, one that in essence is the copy of Russia’s position.” Two years ago, he continued, Moscow offered Kyiv the same deal: ‘You gather in Transdniestria and give us Moldova,” an exchange then-President Viktor Yushchenko rejected.
Romania’s President Traian Basescu has reacted just as harshly as the Moldovans. “If Kyiv has pretensions concerning the return of Transdniestria to Ukraine, then officials there should not forget about the return to Chisinau of Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, territories which the former Ukrainian SSR received after the Second World War.”
And Basescu suggested that “Moscow and now Kyiv are trying to create on the territory which at the end of World War II should have been returned to Romania a pseudo-federation of three political-legal pseudo-subjects. But we will do everything to oppose the Russian-Ukrainian plan for the amputation of Bessarabia.”
Although Filin does not mention it, the possibility that Moldova could become part of Romania if Transdniestria were to become an autonomy within Ukraine is not the only way in which such a Russian-Ukrainian plan would send shockwaves through the international system far beyond Transdniestria.
If Transdniestria were transferred, that would trigger a provision in the 1994 accord between Chisinau and the Gagauz, an Orthodox Christian Turkic-speaking community in southern Moldova. That agreement allows the Gagauz to withdraw from Moldova if the status of Transdniestria were ever to change.
Perhaps because of these reactions or perhaps because the supposed agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich never took place, Yanukovich’s office has been at pains to deny that there is or was any such accord. Anna German, a representative of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration made a public declaration to that effect.
“Transdniestria will remain independent and not become part of Ukraine,” she said. Suggestions to the contrary are “provocations” by Yuliya Timoshenko in order to cast doubt on “the political and diplomatic successes of Viktor Yanukovich in order to destabilize the situation in the country.”
But Filin concludes, her words are less than fully convincing, all the more because the Verkhovna Rada has already discussed the procedure that would have to be followed for places like Transdniestria to join Ukraine. Indeed, he says, the Ukrainian deputies have come up with a slogan: ‘Transdniestria – the First Stage of a New Pereyaslavska Rada’ – neither more nor less!”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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