Moroccan Ulema Council Addresses Controversial Fatwas
By Siham Ali
The Council of Ulemas called a two-day conference in Morocco to clarify the procedure of issuing fatwas and to put an end to the spate of controversial fatwas issued in the past few weeks.
One such fatwa published in newspaper Attajdid calls on females to only visit female doctors.
The fatwa conference convened May 15th "to provide a response to any misguided attitude which could be harmful to the religion", said council general-secretary Mohammed Yessef.
The conference is also intended to bar the way for "those who want to use this specialist tool as a way of making political capital", he added.
"One characteristic of a fatwa should be its flexibility and vitality, so that there could be a guaranteed harmony between religious practices and the needs of modern life," said Islamic Affairs Minister Ahmed Toufiq.
Among the conclusions reached at the meeting was an agreement on the need to update fatwas according to time and place, so that the interpretation of issues concerning religion would evolve seamlessly alongside society's direction.
The final report issued by conference participants also emphasised the importance of the collective fatwa, since it is the result of consultation between experts from different specialist areas and therefore has greater weight.
The Unified Socialist Party (PSU) also criticised obscurantist groups for their contentious religious directives.
"The fatwas recently pronounced by fundamentalist groups and defended by writers from these groups are in contradiction to the principles of reason, science and logic; they call for the law to be broken, and oppose the values of tolerance and openness to be found in Moroccan society," read a statement released by PSU.
PSU member Mohamed Sassi said that some fatwas made life more difficult, rather than making it easier. Morocco must beware of fatwas of this kind, which encourage sectarianism and oppose the values of human rights, he added.
According to professor of Islamic education Driss Hamzaoui, fatwas should only originate from the Council of Ulemas, especially where major issues are concerned.
"If you leave the door open to personal initiatives, then you risk having a range of mistaken and backward-looking judgments, like the one giving permission for young girls to be given in marriage," he said.
Law student Fatima Rouahli said Arab satellite channels are often a source of the more controversial fatwas.
"Some fatwas are over the top, but the way in which they're explained means that the ulemas manage to persuade religious satellite TV devotees that they're appropriate," she pointed out.
"Take, for example, the full veil: it's not mandatory, but it's presented as such, to the extent that some of my girlfriends who wear the veil are thinking of taking the burkha."
Public-sector worker Ahmed Semlali is also concerned about the growing number of restrictive fatwas.
"The Moroccan authorities need to put a stop to these radical fatwas coming through the media," he said.
Source: Magharebia
The Council of Ulemas called a two-day conference in Morocco to clarify the procedure of issuing fatwas and to put an end to the spate of controversial fatwas issued in the past few weeks.
One such fatwa published in newspaper Attajdid calls on females to only visit female doctors.
The fatwa conference convened May 15th "to provide a response to any misguided attitude which could be harmful to the religion", said council general-secretary Mohammed Yessef.
The conference is also intended to bar the way for "those who want to use this specialist tool as a way of making political capital", he added.
"One characteristic of a fatwa should be its flexibility and vitality, so that there could be a guaranteed harmony between religious practices and the needs of modern life," said Islamic Affairs Minister Ahmed Toufiq.
Among the conclusions reached at the meeting was an agreement on the need to update fatwas according to time and place, so that the interpretation of issues concerning religion would evolve seamlessly alongside society's direction.
The final report issued by conference participants also emphasised the importance of the collective fatwa, since it is the result of consultation between experts from different specialist areas and therefore has greater weight.
The Unified Socialist Party (PSU) also criticised obscurantist groups for their contentious religious directives.
"The fatwas recently pronounced by fundamentalist groups and defended by writers from these groups are in contradiction to the principles of reason, science and logic; they call for the law to be broken, and oppose the values of tolerance and openness to be found in Moroccan society," read a statement released by PSU.
PSU member Mohamed Sassi said that some fatwas made life more difficult, rather than making it easier. Morocco must beware of fatwas of this kind, which encourage sectarianism and oppose the values of human rights, he added.
According to professor of Islamic education Driss Hamzaoui, fatwas should only originate from the Council of Ulemas, especially where major issues are concerned.
"If you leave the door open to personal initiatives, then you risk having a range of mistaken and backward-looking judgments, like the one giving permission for young girls to be given in marriage," he said.
Law student Fatima Rouahli said Arab satellite channels are often a source of the more controversial fatwas.
"Some fatwas are over the top, but the way in which they're explained means that the ulemas manage to persuade religious satellite TV devotees that they're appropriate," she pointed out.
"Take, for example, the full veil: it's not mandatory, but it's presented as such, to the extent that some of my girlfriends who wear the veil are thinking of taking the burkha."
Public-sector worker Ahmed Semlali is also concerned about the growing number of restrictive fatwas.
"The Moroccan authorities need to put a stop to these radical fatwas coming through the media," he said.
Source: Magharebia
Monday, May 24, 2010 |
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Plot By Radical Muslims To Kill Pope Prevented
(CNA/EWTN News) -- Two Moroccan students who attended a university in the central Italian city of Perugia were expelled from the country last month after it was discovered that they were conspiring to kill Pope Benedict. One of them allegedly said he wished to “earn a place in Paradise.”
According to Italian weekly newspaper Panorama, conversations intercepted by Italian authorities led to the arrest and deportation of the two suspects.
The order for expulsion reportedly included the transcript of a conversation in which one of the students, Mohammed Hlal, said that he wished “death to the head of the Vatican City State” and was "ready to assassinate him to earn a place in Paradise."
The 26-year-old Hlal was speaking over the phone with 22-year-old Ahmed Errahmouni when he made the statements which earned them the attention of the local police and a trip back to Morocco.
They were deemed a “threat to national security” in the document signed by the Italian Minister of the Interior and expelled on April 29, Panorama reports.
According to an investigation begun last October by the Italian anti-mafia police, the two were known to have a radical vision of Islam and had expressed a desire to obtain explosive materials. It was reported that no material used to construct explosives was found in their residence hall rooms.
Hlal studied international communications, while Errahmouni was a student of math and physics at the University of Perugia.
According to Italian weekly newspaper Panorama, conversations intercepted by Italian authorities led to the arrest and deportation of the two suspects.
The order for expulsion reportedly included the transcript of a conversation in which one of the students, Mohammed Hlal, said that he wished “death to the head of the Vatican City State” and was "ready to assassinate him to earn a place in Paradise."
The 26-year-old Hlal was speaking over the phone with 22-year-old Ahmed Errahmouni when he made the statements which earned them the attention of the local police and a trip back to Morocco.
They were deemed a “threat to national security” in the document signed by the Italian Minister of the Interior and expelled on April 29, Panorama reports.
According to an investigation begun last October by the Italian anti-mafia police, the two were known to have a radical vision of Islam and had expressed a desire to obtain explosive materials. It was reported that no material used to construct explosives was found in their residence hall rooms.
Hlal studied international communications, while Errahmouni was a student of math and physics at the University of Perugia.
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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Spain Commits Electricity Grid Integration To North And South Of Mediterranean
Spain is committed to greater physical integration by means of connections to transport excess electricity between the north and south of the Mediterranean, according to Spain's Secretary of State for Energy, Pedro Marín.
Speaking at the conference on the Mediterranean Solar Plan, being held on Tuesday and Wednesday in Valencia, Marín said this plan "can and must be" a step forward in energy cooperation policy, but also in many other areas.
Spain's Secretary of State believes that developing renewable energies in the Mediterranean will generate greater economic activity, employment and income, and could make it a leading area in the world over the medium term.
Marín therefore said it was important to raise awareness among society that the costs of power generation must be passed on in the price, and that subsidies must be limited.
The Mediterranean Solar Plan could also help to combat "energy poverty" in rural or outlying urban areas without access to power.
Clean energy
In a recorded message played during the conference, the European Commissioner for Energy, Gunther Oettinger, said that the countries of the southern Mediterranean need clean energy for their social and economic development.
He stressed the European Commission's support for the Solar Plan as the "cooperation flagship" with the south of the Mediterranean, and said that priority must be placed on "specific" pilot projects that will start up within the next two to three years, in order to start developing renewable sources in the Mediterranean basin and Africa.
Partnership projects
The deputy director general of the European Commission's Directorate General for Energy, Fabrizio Barbaso, gave a more in-depth explanation of the Commission's support for the development of renewable energies and the "common need" to set up partnership projects on the two shores of the Mediterranean.
Barbaso said focus should be placed on cost recovery and that subsidies for fossil fuels should progressively be eliminated.
He also mentioned the importance of "predictability" and clarity in the regulatory framework for investors, saying the countries would have to align themselves with the regulatory framework of the European Union.
Objectives of the Plan
The Mediterranean Solar Plan aims to achieve 20 gigawatts of installed capacity from renewable sources by 2020 in the region, given the high potential of countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean to produce energy from renewable sources.
Some of the challenges the plan must overcome include the high financial costs involved, the need for a stable institutional setting in order to stimulate investment, the elimination of legal barriers and the construction of suitable infrastructure and interconnections.
In terms of financing, Barbaso said the technical assistance project for the Solar Plan will start up within a few months, adding that the projects will require solid feasibility studies.
Speaking at the conference on the Mediterranean Solar Plan, being held on Tuesday and Wednesday in Valencia, Marín said this plan "can and must be" a step forward in energy cooperation policy, but also in many other areas.
Spain's Secretary of State believes that developing renewable energies in the Mediterranean will generate greater economic activity, employment and income, and could make it a leading area in the world over the medium term.
Marín therefore said it was important to raise awareness among society that the costs of power generation must be passed on in the price, and that subsidies must be limited.
The Mediterranean Solar Plan could also help to combat "energy poverty" in rural or outlying urban areas without access to power.
Clean energy
In a recorded message played during the conference, the European Commissioner for Energy, Gunther Oettinger, said that the countries of the southern Mediterranean need clean energy for their social and economic development.
He stressed the European Commission's support for the Solar Plan as the "cooperation flagship" with the south of the Mediterranean, and said that priority must be placed on "specific" pilot projects that will start up within the next two to three years, in order to start developing renewable sources in the Mediterranean basin and Africa.
Partnership projects
The deputy director general of the European Commission's Directorate General for Energy, Fabrizio Barbaso, gave a more in-depth explanation of the Commission's support for the development of renewable energies and the "common need" to set up partnership projects on the two shores of the Mediterranean.
Barbaso said focus should be placed on cost recovery and that subsidies for fossil fuels should progressively be eliminated.
He also mentioned the importance of "predictability" and clarity in the regulatory framework for investors, saying the countries would have to align themselves with the regulatory framework of the European Union.
Objectives of the Plan
The Mediterranean Solar Plan aims to achieve 20 gigawatts of installed capacity from renewable sources by 2020 in the region, given the high potential of countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean to produce energy from renewable sources.
Some of the challenges the plan must overcome include the high financial costs involved, the need for a stable institutional setting in order to stimulate investment, the elimination of legal barriers and the construction of suitable infrastructure and interconnections.
In terms of financing, Barbaso said the technical assistance project for the Solar Plan will start up within a few months, adding that the projects will require solid feasibility studies.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 |
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Update On European Air Traffic Situation - Eurocontrol
As of 10.30 CET on 11 May 2010, Eurocontrol has the following update to make with regard to the situation of air traffic in Europe:
Today Eurocontrol expects approximately 29,000 flights within the European area which is close to normal for a Tuesday at this time of year.
Areas of high ash concentration are this morning impacting southern and central Spain and Portugal including the Canary Islands and Madeira. The areas of high ash concentration on high altitudes in the middle of the North Atlantic is dispersing, easing the previously difficult situation for Trans Atlantic flights.
At the current time airports on the Canary Islands, some in south-west Spain and some in Morocco are closed. According to the forecasts, during the afternoon, areas of higher ash concentration could move in a north-easterly direction cutting across the Iberian Iberian Peninsula and into south east France. These areas are of high altitude and are not expected to impact airports. The latest ‘Air Ash Concentration Charts’, valid at 14.00CET describing those areas where no-fly zone proposals have been made to the Eurocontrol Member States are attached.
On Monday 10 May, there were 29,155 flights within the Eurocontrol CFMU area, which is not far from normal traffic levels.
At the same time, ongoing work by the UK Met Office and the UK CAA has confirmed the effectiveness of the model used to determine the areas where ash concentration could be above engine tolerance levels. For that reason, as from noon today, the 60 nautical mile ‘Buffer Zone’ which was initially added to the proposed no-fly zone will be omitted. Work will continue between aircraft operators, Service Providers, the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre to refine the model used for predicting ash dispersion.
Today Eurocontrol expects approximately 29,000 flights within the European area which is close to normal for a Tuesday at this time of year.
Areas of high ash concentration are this morning impacting southern and central Spain and Portugal including the Canary Islands and Madeira. The areas of high ash concentration on high altitudes in the middle of the North Atlantic is dispersing, easing the previously difficult situation for Trans Atlantic flights.
At the current time airports on the Canary Islands, some in south-west Spain and some in Morocco are closed. According to the forecasts, during the afternoon, areas of higher ash concentration could move in a north-easterly direction cutting across the Iberian Iberian Peninsula and into south east France. These areas are of high altitude and are not expected to impact airports. The latest ‘Air Ash Concentration Charts’, valid at 14.00CET describing those areas where no-fly zone proposals have been made to the Eurocontrol Member States are attached.
On Monday 10 May, there were 29,155 flights within the Eurocontrol CFMU area, which is not far from normal traffic levels.
At the same time, ongoing work by the UK Met Office and the UK CAA has confirmed the effectiveness of the model used to determine the areas where ash concentration could be above engine tolerance levels. For that reason, as from noon today, the 60 nautical mile ‘Buffer Zone’ which was initially added to the proposed no-fly zone will be omitted. Work will continue between aircraft operators, Service Providers, the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre to refine the model used for predicting ash dispersion.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 |
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Eurocontrol Says Ash Clouds Still Affect Air Traffic In Spain, Portugal
Areas of high ash concentration Tuesday morning are impacting southern and central Spain and Portugal including the Canary Islands and Madeira, Eurocontrol announced Tuesday.
At the current time airports on the Canary Islands, some in south-west Spain and some in Morocco are closed, said the Brussels-based aviation body.
According to the forecasts, during the afternoon, areas of higher ash concentration could move in a north-easterly direction cutting across the Iberian Peninsula and into south east France. These areas are of high altitude and are not expected to impact airports.
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation said it expects approximately 29,000 flights within the European area which is close to normal for a Tuesday at this time of year.
On Monday , there were 29,155 flights which is not far from normal traffic levels.
At the current time airports on the Canary Islands, some in south-west Spain and some in Morocco are closed, said the Brussels-based aviation body.
According to the forecasts, during the afternoon, areas of higher ash concentration could move in a north-easterly direction cutting across the Iberian Peninsula and into south east France. These areas are of high altitude and are not expected to impact airports.
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation said it expects approximately 29,000 flights within the European area which is close to normal for a Tuesday at this time of year.
On Monday , there were 29,155 flights which is not far from normal traffic levels.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 |
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Polisario Demands Sanctions Against Morocco
The Polisario Front (Popular Liberation Front for Saguía, Hamra and Río de Oro) is denouncing to the international community “the continuous degradation of the humanitarian situation” in the region, as well as asking for “the necessary sanctions” to be imposed on the Moroccan government, “responsible for human rights violations in Western Sahara”, reports MISNA.
The sanctions, says the separatist movement, must be matched by “effective control mechanisms with the deployment of international observers in regular intervals to avoid that new violations produce themselves in the expectation of a definitive solution of the conflict”.
In the document, the Polisario Front exhorts the UN, moreover, “to shed light on the fate and conditions of some 150 Sahrawi prisoners detained in Moroccan jails as prisoners of war”.
Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony which gained independence in 1975 only to be occupied by Morocco, resulting in what is now a more than 30 years old dispute: in conformance with UN Security Council Resolution.
The Polisario and the Sahrawi people want a referendum although which to apply the right of self determination, while the Moroccan government is only willing to concede political and administrative autonomy to the region.
The sanctions, says the separatist movement, must be matched by “effective control mechanisms with the deployment of international observers in regular intervals to avoid that new violations produce themselves in the expectation of a definitive solution of the conflict”.
In the document, the Polisario Front exhorts the UN, moreover, “to shed light on the fate and conditions of some 150 Sahrawi prisoners detained in Moroccan jails as prisoners of war”.
Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony which gained independence in 1975 only to be occupied by Morocco, resulting in what is now a more than 30 years old dispute: in conformance with UN Security Council Resolution.
The Polisario and the Sahrawi people want a referendum although which to apply the right of self determination, while the Moroccan government is only willing to concede political and administrative autonomy to the region.
Monday, May 10, 2010 |
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France Welcomes New Resolution On Western Sahara
France welcomed on Monday the unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of resolution 1920 concerning the situation in Western Sahara, whereas French authorities urged the parties to pursue a 'mutually acceptable" political solution to the dispute that involves Morocco and the Polisario Front.
France also rejected criticism from Polisario leaders, who said that the French government was behind the failure of the resolution to provide sufficiently for UN oversight of human rights in the Western Sahara area.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Bernard Valero refuted claims by Polisario leader Mohamed Abdulaziz, who accused France of "engineering" the resolution so that the UN mission in the region would not have responsibility for human rights.
Valero said that a report from the UN Secretary General on April 6 made no mention of this being an issue and did not mention the need for an international mechanism for human rights.
The UNSC had followed the recommendations of the report, Valero indicated.
The latest resolution "reiterates the support of the international community for the negotiating process, started in Manhasset in 2007, as well as to resolutions 1813 and 1871," the French official said.
He added that France continued to support the "informal talks" held regularly in the United States, and noted that Paris once again issued a message of solidarity for the efforts of UN Special Envoy Christopher Ross, who has been seeking to broker a settlement since his appointment.
France especially welcomed the UN 1920 resolution for its "clear message" in respect of family visits and the granting of land passage in cooperation with the UN High Commission for Refugees.
In the meantime, the French official urged the parties to mobilize in favor of a political solution and to refrain from any provocation or steps that could harm goodwill in the peace process.
Source: VOA
France also rejected criticism from Polisario leaders, who said that the French government was behind the failure of the resolution to provide sufficiently for UN oversight of human rights in the Western Sahara area.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Bernard Valero refuted claims by Polisario leader Mohamed Abdulaziz, who accused France of "engineering" the resolution so that the UN mission in the region would not have responsibility for human rights.
Valero said that a report from the UN Secretary General on April 6 made no mention of this being an issue and did not mention the need for an international mechanism for human rights.
The UNSC had followed the recommendations of the report, Valero indicated.
The latest resolution "reiterates the support of the international community for the negotiating process, started in Manhasset in 2007, as well as to resolutions 1813 and 1871," the French official said.
He added that France continued to support the "informal talks" held regularly in the United States, and noted that Paris once again issued a message of solidarity for the efforts of UN Special Envoy Christopher Ross, who has been seeking to broker a settlement since his appointment.
France especially welcomed the UN 1920 resolution for its "clear message" in respect of family visits and the granting of land passage in cooperation with the UN High Commission for Refugees.
In the meantime, the French official urged the parties to mobilize in favor of a political solution and to refrain from any provocation or steps that could harm goodwill in the peace process.
Source: VOA
Monday, May 03, 2010 |
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EU, Maghreb 'Share Common Interests' On Migration, Security
Jean-Thomas Lesueur, a general delegate at the Thomas More Institute, stressed the need for increased cooperation between the European Union and the Maghreb countries in an interview with EurActiv France.
The figures are startlingly low, says Lesueur: intra-regional trade between the five Maghreb countries of North Africa represents just 3% of the trade taking place in the region.
"In an October 2009 report, the IMF indicated that the lack of regional integration made even more severe the impact of the economic crisis on the Maghreb region," he said.
Lesueur stressed the need for dialogue between these countries. For example, Algerian oil and gas remain in the domestic market and the intra-Maghreb high-speed motorway project has been talked about for 30 years.
Striking a more optimistic note, "some Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian entrepreneurs think that they must work together" and put political considerations aside, he said.
Lesueur said the EU had a role to play in putting an end to the conflict between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara, a 266,000 square-kilometre territory that has been a bone of contention between the two countries.
According to him, the new distribution of portfolios within the European Commission should accelerate progress, as several commissioners are concerned by the issue. He also proposed to appoint a coordinator.
"We urge the EU to reinvest itself in the region and place its relations with the Maghreb at the top of its agenda," he said.
Moreover, "the EU should help projects and business development," he said, stressing the importance of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), launched in 2008 under the French EU Presidency.
Migration and anti-terrorism policy
On migration, Lesueur explained that Morocco had problems similar to those faced by Europe in dealing with its southern neighbourhood. As sub-Sahel migrants move north to reach Europe, "Maghreb countries are transforming themselves into transit countries, and are also slowly turning into host countries," he said, remarking that thousands of Senegalese are currently living in Algerian capital Tangiers.
This, he argued, highlights the common challenges faced by Europe and the Maghreb, as he says the countries in the region may soon start experiencing ethnic tensions and even racism.
To deal with such problems, Lesueur says the EU's Frontex agency should open offices in the South Sahel region and work in close cooperation with Maghreb countries. "It is not sufficient to return illegal migrants from Spain to Morocco," he stressed.
In reality, he said the EU's migration policy "is being played out in Nouakchott [Mauritania] and Dakar [Senegal]," not on the island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily. "Lampedusa represents the failure of the EU's migration policy," he said.
Similarly, he said European security and anti-terrorism policy is not being played out at the EU's southern borders, but 3,000 kilometres away. "In the anti-terrorism area, Algeria and Morocco have pretty well cleared Al Qaeda off the ground," he remarked. But the organisation has now retreated further south to Mali, Cameroon and Senegal, he said.
Source: EurActi
The figures are startlingly low, says Lesueur: intra-regional trade between the five Maghreb countries of North Africa represents just 3% of the trade taking place in the region.
"In an October 2009 report, the IMF indicated that the lack of regional integration made even more severe the impact of the economic crisis on the Maghreb region," he said.
Lesueur stressed the need for dialogue between these countries. For example, Algerian oil and gas remain in the domestic market and the intra-Maghreb high-speed motorway project has been talked about for 30 years.
Striking a more optimistic note, "some Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian entrepreneurs think that they must work together" and put political considerations aside, he said.
Lesueur said the EU had a role to play in putting an end to the conflict between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara, a 266,000 square-kilometre territory that has been a bone of contention between the two countries.
According to him, the new distribution of portfolios within the European Commission should accelerate progress, as several commissioners are concerned by the issue. He also proposed to appoint a coordinator.
"We urge the EU to reinvest itself in the region and place its relations with the Maghreb at the top of its agenda," he said.
Moreover, "the EU should help projects and business development," he said, stressing the importance of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), launched in 2008 under the French EU Presidency.
Migration and anti-terrorism policy
On migration, Lesueur explained that Morocco had problems similar to those faced by Europe in dealing with its southern neighbourhood. As sub-Sahel migrants move north to reach Europe, "Maghreb countries are transforming themselves into transit countries, and are also slowly turning into host countries," he said, remarking that thousands of Senegalese are currently living in Algerian capital Tangiers.
This, he argued, highlights the common challenges faced by Europe and the Maghreb, as he says the countries in the region may soon start experiencing ethnic tensions and even racism.
To deal with such problems, Lesueur says the EU's Frontex agency should open offices in the South Sahel region and work in close cooperation with Maghreb countries. "It is not sufficient to return illegal migrants from Spain to Morocco," he stressed.
In reality, he said the EU's migration policy "is being played out in Nouakchott [Mauritania] and Dakar [Senegal]," not on the island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily. "Lampedusa represents the failure of the EU's migration policy," he said.
Similarly, he said European security and anti-terrorism policy is not being played out at the EU's southern borders, but 3,000 kilometres away. "In the anti-terrorism area, Algeria and Morocco have pretty well cleared Al Qaeda off the ground," he remarked. But the organisation has now retreated further south to Mali, Cameroon and Senegal, he said.
Source: EurActi
Monday, April 26, 2010 |
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$854 Billion Removed From Africa By Illicit Financial Flows From 1970 To 2008
Africa lost $854 billion in illicit financial outflows from 1970 through 2008, according to a report from Global Financial Integrity (GFI).
The report, "Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development" debuts new estimates for volume and patterns of illicit financial outflows from Africa, building upon GFI's 2009 report, which estimated that developing countries were losing as much as $1 trillion every year in illicit outflows.
"The amount of money that has been drained out of Africa-hundreds of billions decade after decade-is far in excess of the official development assistance going into African countries," said GFI director Raymond Baker. "Staunching this devastating outflow of much-needed capital is essential to achieving economic development and poverty alleviation goals in these countries."
Examining data for a 39-year range from 1970 to 2008, key report findings include:
"This report breaks new ground in the fight to end global poverty with analyses and measurements of illicit financial outflows never before undertaken," said Baker. "As long as these countries are losing massive amounts of money to illicit financial outflows, economic development and prosperity will remain elusive."
"The drivers of illicit financial outflows vary from country to country but overall transparency in the global financial system would curtail all forms of outflows by making it harder for money to disappear once it exits the country," said Baker. "When the G20 meets in Canada this June, the problem of illicit financial flows must be at the top of the agenda."
The report, "Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development" debuts new estimates for volume and patterns of illicit financial outflows from Africa, building upon GFI's 2009 report, which estimated that developing countries were losing as much as $1 trillion every year in illicit outflows.
"The amount of money that has been drained out of Africa-hundreds of billions decade after decade-is far in excess of the official development assistance going into African countries," said GFI director Raymond Baker. "Staunching this devastating outflow of much-needed capital is essential to achieving economic development and poverty alleviation goals in these countries."
Examining data for a 39-year range from 1970 to 2008, key report findings include:
- Total illicit financial outflows from Africa, conservatively estimated, were approximately $854 billion;
- Total illicit outflows from Africa may be as high as $1.8 trillion;
- Sub-Saharan African countries experienced the bulk of illicit financial outflows with the West and Central African region posting the largest outflow numbers;
- The top five countries with the highest outflow measured were: Nigeria ($89.5 billion) Egypt ($70.5 billion), Algeria ($25.7 billion), Morocco ($25 billion), and South Africa ($24.9 billion);
- Illicit financial outflows from the entire region outpaced official development assistance going into the region at a ratio of at least 2 to 1;
- Illicit financial outflows from Africa grew at an average rate of 11.9 percent per year.
"This report breaks new ground in the fight to end global poverty with analyses and measurements of illicit financial outflows never before undertaken," said Baker. "As long as these countries are losing massive amounts of money to illicit financial outflows, economic development and prosperity will remain elusive."
"The drivers of illicit financial outflows vary from country to country but overall transparency in the global financial system would curtail all forms of outflows by making it harder for money to disappear once it exits the country," said Baker. "When the G20 meets in Canada this June, the problem of illicit financial flows must be at the top of the agenda."
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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Morocco Sends Relief Aid To Niger
Five planes left Morocco on Sunday and Monday to dispatch relief aid to Niger, where famine is looming amid a poor harvest, according to the Moroccan government.
The relief aid, made up of foodstuff and medicines, comes in response to the call made by the Niger's government to help the African country face famine.
Niger's trade minister, who was among officials who received the aid, extended thanks to HM king Mohammed VI for this important emergency aid, recalling that it is not the first time the country has contributed to helping the Republic of the Niger.
Hamid Ahmed pointed out, in a statement to the Moroccan TV channel, that Kingdom's help also covers education, training and new technologies.
The Nigerian official voiced satisfaction at the long-standing friendly relations between the two countries.
In 2005, Niger was hit by a drought and the crops were ravaged by locusts threatening some 3.2 million people with famine.
Mass starvation was avoided thanks to an intervention of the international community.
Niger's state media reported late March that at least 55 children had died of malnutrition since the beginning of the year.
The relief aid, made up of foodstuff and medicines, comes in response to the call made by the Niger's government to help the African country face famine.
Niger's trade minister, who was among officials who received the aid, extended thanks to HM king Mohammed VI for this important emergency aid, recalling that it is not the first time the country has contributed to helping the Republic of the Niger.
Hamid Ahmed pointed out, in a statement to the Moroccan TV channel, that Kingdom's help also covers education, training and new technologies.
The Nigerian official voiced satisfaction at the long-standing friendly relations between the two countries.
In 2005, Niger was hit by a drought and the crops were ravaged by locusts threatening some 3.2 million people with famine.
Mass starvation was avoided thanks to an intervention of the international community.
Niger's state media reported late March that at least 55 children had died of malnutrition since the beginning of the year.
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 |
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Morocco: Are Christians At Risk?
By Jillian C. York
In early March, observers watched as around 20 long-time Christian orphanage workers were expelled from the country they called home. The incident, and others which followed it, have brought to light the debate surrounding Christianity in the Kingdom.
While the official Moroccan line is that 98.7-99 per cent of the population is Muslim (the remainder being approximately 1% Christian and 0.2% Jewish), that statistic includes ethnic Europeans residing in Morocco. Proselytizing is illegal, as is conversion away from Islam. Still, foreign Christians are allowed to practice freely, and a number of churches, mostly from the era of French colonization, remain. In contrast, the country's tiny Jewish population is almost entirely native, and is also allowed free practice of their faith.
Despite guarantees of freedom, it would appear that the government is taking a stronger approach of late to proselytism, both real and perceived. The Moroccan Dispatches shares a recent incident in which an Egyptian Catholic priest was expelled from the country:
This article by Jillian C. York was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
In early March, observers watched as around 20 long-time Christian orphanage workers were expelled from the country they called home. The incident, and others which followed it, have brought to light the debate surrounding Christianity in the Kingdom.
While the official Moroccan line is that 98.7-99 per cent of the population is Muslim (the remainder being approximately 1% Christian and 0.2% Jewish), that statistic includes ethnic Europeans residing in Morocco. Proselytizing is illegal, as is conversion away from Islam. Still, foreign Christians are allowed to practice freely, and a number of churches, mostly from the era of French colonization, remain. In contrast, the country's tiny Jewish population is almost entirely native, and is also allowed free practice of their faith.
Despite guarantees of freedom, it would appear that the government is taking a stronger approach of late to proselytism, both real and perceived. The Moroccan Dispatches shares a recent incident in which an Egyptian Catholic priest was expelled from the country:
Evangelicals have operated for years in Morocco, with their main purpose being the conversion of Muslims. Catholics have operated for longer, but purposefully have not engaged in proselytizing. So it came as a surprise that a Catholic priest was also detained and then exported during last week's crackdown.The blogger shares a message he received from the church in Casablanca:
On Sunday the 7th of March, five minutes before mass began; the police in the city of Larache entered our friary and arrested one of our confrères, Rami Zaki, a young Egyptian friar still in initial formation who was spending a year with us. He was ordered to go with the police, had no possibility to collect anything, and was given no explanation for his arrest…In another post, the blogger demonstrates that the public has joined in the crackdowns, citing a recent incident in which a cross was removed from its site of many years:
…When Rami was put on the plane, his passport was taken from him and given to the pilot who later surrendered it with Rami to the police in Cairo. He was detained by the police in Cairo for another seven hours for interrogation before he was permitted to telephone his community of friars. From Sunday, the morning of his arrest, to Tuesday afternoon, when he was released – a total of more than 50 hours – Rami was deprived by the police in Morocco and Egypt of any of his human rights.
This is the place where a cross used to hang in Meknes' medina. The Catholics who teach Moroccans languages and career skills in this building do not engage in proselytism but have caught up in the anti-Christian sentiment following the recent expulsions of Christians. Last week, the cross was knocked down and beaten into pieces. On a positive note, Moroccans who have benefited from their services have volunteered to reconstruct the cross.In a more recent post, the same blogger assesses a TelQuel article on the situation, and says of it:
In the main article, it points out that most Moroccans convert to Christianity more as a result of Arabic media and not from foreign missionaries. This jives with my experience: a number of Moroccans I know have had long conversations with Christian missionaries about religion and none have converted. Some defended Islam while smoking hashish just to piss off the Christians, it that gives you an idea of how many Moroccans understand their Islamic identity. This observation about foreign missionaries, of course, undermines the rationale behind the recent expulsions of many foreigners.To conclude, the blogger notes the recent media crackdowns and laments:
Other media critical of the government have been shut down recently. And the same could happen to Tel Quel. But as long as they are still around, there will be at least some debate and critical thinking about current events.
This article by Jillian C. York was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
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Why The European Union Needs A ‘Broader Middle East’ Policy
By Edward Burke, Ana Echagüe and Richard Youngs for FRIDE
European foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a highly fragmented construction. Since the mid-1990s the EU’s policies with Maghreb and Mashreq countries have been pursued under the rubric of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and now the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
This plethora of highly institutionalised initiatives has been developed with negligible linkage to policy in the rest of the Middle East. Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remain low key and strikingly disconnected from the EMP. Contrary to its rhetorical emphasis on supporting regional integration around the world, the EU has failed to build its strategy towards Iran and Iraq into a regional security framework. Even more reproachable, given its credibility and influence in the economic sphere, has been the EU’s inability to foster regional economic integration between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.
Many member states have for long held up the Mediterranean’s separation from other dimensions of Middle Eastern policy as a positive distinction of European foreign policy. This overarching policy design certainly seems highly distinctive to the United States, other powers and international institutions who structure their efforts in terms of a Middle East policy rather than separate Mediterranean and Gulf policies.
Many European diplomats still argue that organising policy around a Mediterranean logic is a welcome advance on the historical legacy of colonialism.
However, important trends now render the divide between Europe’s Mediterranean and Gulf policies increasingly incongruous. We identify here two factors that are of particular importance. First, Gulf states are increasingly active in and interdependent with Mediterranean (Maghreb and Mashreq) states.
Second, the Obama administration is making efforts to re-engage more positively with the Arab world in a way that links together challenges in different parts of the Middle East. It makes little sense for the EU to work against the grain of these trends.
In response to these changes, the EU should work towards a single Middle East policy. Splitting up North Africa and the rest of the Middle East for the EU’s bureaucratic convenience belies the political logic of the region. The continued resistance of many member states to such a step is a costly mistake. It privileges narrow-minded short-term interest to the detriment of strategic foresight. We suggest six policy questions in
relation to which Europe, southern Mediterranean states and Gulf countries can more productively work together under a broader Middle East regional framework.
The Gulf in the Mediterranean
Gulf states are playing an increasingly influential role in the Mediterranean. This trend has been most recently illustrated by the repercussions of the Dubai debt restructuring announcement on the Egyptian stock exchange.1 European Middle Eastern policy must begin to react to the deeper linkages taking shape between the Gulf and the Mediterranean in a range of areas: economics, politics, social and communications exchanges, remittances and development assistance.
The long decline and traumatic implosion of Iraq, the isolation of Egypt following its recognition of Israel, and suspicions over Syria’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, combined with the poor economic performance of all three countries, have resulted in the rise of Saudi Arabia as the most influential country in the Arab world. Saudi leadership has yet to prove effective – the country has been late to get involved in Iraq, thwarted in its attempts to create a unity government in Palestine, caught flat-footed in its response to an escalating terrorist threat from Yemen and obliged to watch others take the initiative in Lebanon. However, its rising power cannot be ignored.
Saudi Arabia has spent millions supporting Lebanon’s pro-western Sunni political bloc in its struggle with Hezbollah, is critical to the future stability of Yemen and is seen as the only regional power capable of bringing Arab countries into line with the goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal.2
Qatar has also taken it upon itself to act as mediator in regional affairs. Its increasing diplomatic hyperactivity has been viewed as an annoyance by the US, except perhaps for its involvement in negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for a ceasefire and the movement of Hezbollah’s militia away from the border with Israel.
Qatar is seen by the US to be unhelpful in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the challenge of Iranian ambitions, and is generally regarded as punching above its weight. Saudi Arabia has also viewed Qatar’s mediation efforts, most particularly in Lebanon and Yemen, with a strong degree of scepticism. Ultimately, however, Qatar’s ties with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Zaydi Shia rebels in Yemen, as well as its long-standing ties with Israel, give it unique leverage and position in the region. The highly disparate approaches of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to regional diplomacy, combined with the pragmatism of the other GCC member states’ relations with Iran, have severely hampered prospects for the emergence of a common Gulf political strategy for the region.
Economically, MENA trade and investment figures confirm a glaring, and even widening, gap between wealth concentrated in the GCC and the struggles of the Maghreb and Mashreq. The GCC’s population is a mere 42.5 million out of a total 345 million for the region, yet it dominates the region’s foreign exports earnings. In 2007 $477 billion of the MENA region’s total exports of $654 billion were from the GCC countries.3 The relative peace enjoyed within the Gulf, the decoupling of political disputes from the maintenance of pragmatic economic relations, improved management of energy revenues leading to a degree of economic diversification, and the emergence of the region’s only truly successful economic union, the GCC, has resulted in the region rapidly out-performing other countries in the MENA. In recent years Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its share of new intra-Arab investments to over 50 per cent.4
GCC investments in the region have grown considerably, due to a period of high energy revenues and increased investor confidence following infrastructure and internal market reforms in many Mashreq and Maghreb countries. From 2003 to 2008 GCC countries’ investment in the rest of the MENA amounted to over $110 billion.5 The rapid increase of trade with the rest of the MENA, coupled with rising intra-GCC trade, means that the EU’s share of overall investment by GCC countries is declining. Such a trend is corroborated by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which has reported a 10-15 per cent rise in FDI holdings from the GCC in other MENA countries.6 The type of GCC investment has also shifted: whereas in the 1970s and the 1980s GCC investments in the MENA were mainly in hydrocarbons and real estate, today they include financial services and manufacturing – these two sectors together add up to the 70 per cent of GCC investments in Egypt for 2007-2008, for example. The UAE is easily the most prolific Gulf investor in the Mashreq and the Maghreb, holding over 52 per cent of new investments from 2003 to late 2009, a significant portion of which are Dubai held assets.7
The GCC also has a rapidly increasing influence over the development of communications in the region, not least with regard to the proliferation of news and entertainment channels. Arabsat has more than 164 million viewers, carrying such channels as al-Jazeera, which has a major influence on pan-Arab opinion. An important recent measure led by the GCC states was the establishment of an Arab Network of Regulators (ARNET), which has moved to harmonise regulatory practices including National Information and Communication Technology (ICT).8
The value of Gulf investments over those from Europe can be measured in sheer scale. An average Gulf investment in the MENA is $268 million compared to $70 million from Europe.9 Gulf investors have become a vital source of job creation in the region.
GCC investments now constitute a third of foreign holding in Egypt and almost half in Jordan. (In contrast, GCC investors have avoided Algeria due to the complexity of regulations and the erratic behaviour of the government in Algiers.10) Despite an ambiguous political relationship with the Iraqi government, the UAE and Kuwait have recognised the enormous economic potential of Iraq and have been willing to put aside distaste for some of that country’s ruling factions to invest heavily – the UAE topped the list of foreign investors for the first nine months of 2009 with holdings of $37 billion, while Kuwait spent $6.8 billion.11
The long period of economic decline in the 1980s and 1990s after the misspent boom of the 1970s, during which time the MENA share of global trade fell from 8 per cent to 2.5 per cent, served as a sharp lesson for the region.12 Despite the failure to negotiate a comprehensive FTA for the MENA, in 2007 intraregional trade constituted 11.1 per cent of total foreign trade. This is still a modest figure, but a significant increase from the stagnant levels of the mid-1990s. In the non-energy sector, intraregional trade now accounts for just under 25 per cent of all exports.13
Many problems persist. The negotiation and implementation of a raft of trade agreements aimed at integrating the economies of the MENA has been notoriously slow and ineffectual. Implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), negotiated in 1997, has varied considerably from country to country.
The World Bank estimates that the total gain from GAFTA to the MENA economy has so far amounted to a modest 0.1 per cent boost to regional income, which compares very unfavourably with the benefits of bilateral trade agreements with the EU.14
In the same way, the lack of integration of the MENA with the global economy represents a missed opportunity for economic growth – the World Bank has calculated that if the MENA had maintained its 1985 share of world exports (which was already relatively low), it would have received some $2 trillion in extra export revenues during the period 1986-2003. By extension, if a comprehensive MENA FTA existed during this period it would have boosted trade by a further 147 per cent.15
However, while such problems exist, the emerging opportunities of deeper intra-MENA integration reflect an incipient trend that the EU should lock onto.
The reasons for the non-emergence of a free trade area in the MENA include the frequency of war and severe political disagreement in the region, high transportation and communication costs and, perhaps most importantly, the preponderance of a corrupt and bloated public sector. In some ways, external actors have added to the problems: the lure of trade agreements with the US, the EU and other external powers has shifted the focus away from intra-regional efforts.16 The GCC has been quick to complain about not being consulted on EU initiatives in the Maghreb and Mashreq, such as the Union for the Mediterranean – although it has itself been generally reactive and unimaginative in its relations with other Arab states.17
Although the proportion of expatriate Arab workers in the Gulf has declined considerably since the 1970s and 1980s, remittances to other Arab countries remain a vital source of income, totalling $31 billion in 2008.
The MENA region mainly relies on two regions, the GCC and the EU, as a source of remittances. Egypt and Morocco receive the highest volume of remittances in the MENA region. Remittances to Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt are predominately derived from expatriate labour in the GCC, while those of Morocco and Algeria are mostly from the EU. Iraq and Syria are exceptions to the Mashreq-Maghreb divide, as for these states
both the EU and the GCC are an important source of remittances. As a share of GDP for countries in the region, Lebanon ranks highest with 20 per cent and 400,000 expatriates in the Gulf alone, followed by Jordan at 14 per cent, and Morocco at 8 per cent.18
There is, finally, a growing trend of MENA dependence on aid from the Gulf region. In 2007 alone Jordan received $565 million in aid from Saudi Arabia.19
There is also an increasing awareness within the GCC of the leading role the Gulf must play in preparing the MENA for the challenges the region will face in the future – 80 million new jobs alone will have to be created in the region by 2020 to avoid severe political and social upheaval in an already combustible regional environment.20 There have been some encouraging signs that the Gulf is increasing its aid to the MENA.
GCC member states’ aid is predominantly distributed bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels. The main multilateral institutions in the region are the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Arab Fund), the OPEC Fund for International Development (OPEC Fund), the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Of these, the IDB distributes the largest amount of multilateral assistance in the region, providing 38 per cent of the total, compared to 30 per cent from the Arab Fund, 17 per cent from the AMF and 10 per cent from the OPEC Fund. The Saudi Fund for Development operates almost exclusively in the form of bilateral loans from a capital base of $8.2 billion.21 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development also provides similar loans to recipient governments. In total the Kuwait Fund has provided 17 per cent of Arab financial aid during the last thirty years, compared to 4 per cent of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development.22 The Saudi Fund allocates half its budget to Arab countries, similar to that of the Kuwait Fund but less than the 79 per cent distributed to Arab recipients by the Abu Dhabi Fund.
The OPEC Fund, by contrast, concentrates its $3.5 billion capital on projects in sub-Saharan Africa, contributing only 17 per cent of its annual budget to the MENA region.23 In 2007 the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, donated $10 billion towards supporting the education of young Arabs in the region.
The GCC member state Development Funds that provide loans and other forms of assistance generally do not maintain an in-country team to monitor the use of funds and there are few reporting obligations on the part of the recipient country. Yet there are emerging exceptions. Innovative Gulf development organisations such as ‘Dubai Cares’ have already gained a reputation for their close monitoring of projects, working with international NGOs such as Care International, and may offer a useful template for other emerging Gulf development agencies. A cash-strapped Europe would do well to seize upon opportunities for the enhanced coordination of development funds and programmes with willing Gulf partners.
The initial years of excessive optimism on the part of GCC investors and recipient countries are now likely to give way to a more realistic review of investments following the global financial crisis, beginning with a debt-ridden Dubai. A serious downturn in the GCC may feel like a ‘crash landing’ for the rest of the MENA.
Egypt, with over two million citizens working in the GCC, is heavily dependent upon the $3 billion of remittances it receives from this labour. Any further increases in food prices in the region could also see an increase in unrest, as already witnessed in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen during 2008 and the first half of 2009. Reduced EU and GCC remittances, investment and development assistance will seriously strain governments’ ability to maintain political and economic stability in the region.
For now much of the Gulf appears to have weathered the economic storm, largely due to resurgent oil prices, but both regions would do well to take note of the vulnerability of parts of the Mashreq and Maghreb to the current global crisis.
Obama’s re-engagement
A second trend highly germane to the design of European Middle Eastern policy is the evolution of US strategy in the region. The administration of Barack Obama has sought to move beyond the more pernicious elements of the Bush era, by engaging in the Middle East with a new tone and a more sophisticated effort to link the region’s problems together in a more holistic strategy. The EU needs to seize this as an opportunity and support such efforts rather than undercut them by stubbornly prioritising the institutional structures of its own fragmented Middle Eastern initiatives.
The EU has traditionally been very protective of its policies towards the Mediterranean construct in an attempt to carve out for itself a parcel of influence within the dominant US policy towards the Middle East. The Mediterranean offered an area where the EU could claim an advantage and where it did not have to follow the US’s lead. Obama’s efforts at re-starting the US relationship with the Middle East on a more even footing offer an opportunity for the EU to let go of an outdated mind-set which has proved pernicious to its interests. By parcelling out the Mediterranean as a Euro-sphere of influence, the EU has ceded the upper hand (even further) to the US in the Gulf. Obama’s new MENA policies restructure the EU-US-MENA triangle, and require a flexible response from the EU.
Institutionally, the US approach to the region reflects a broader approach, with the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs covering all Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf countries while singling out Iraq, Palestine, counterterrorism and economic and political reform as particular regional concerns. The EU would be well served to heed this approach, not in an effort to mimic the US, but because it is reflective of geographic and geostrategic reality.
Gulf states view the ‘Mediterranean’ as defined by the EU as a construct less reflective of local realities than of European interests. The EU often overlooks the strong relations between Mediterranean and Gulf states and the bonds of ‘Arabism’ that play into these relations. The Obama administration has heralded changes in tone and approach, which make it easier for the EU to respond and engage in a broader Middle East policy.
There has been a significant change in style, tone and attitude which reflects greater sensitivity, a US willingness to engage and to listen rather than dictate.
The Obama administration’s change of approach has also been reflected in the newfound willingness to engage with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in an effort to seek negotiated solutions to long-standing problems. This is the type of approach long favoured by the EU and a far cry from the axis of evil listings promulgated by Bush.
As Obama stated in an interview with Al Arabiya, the US is ‘ready to initiate a new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest.’ Under-Secretary of State William Burns further elaborated: ‘We have reoriented our approach to diplomacy, focusing on partnership, pragmatism, and principle. This puts a premium on listening to each other, respecting differences and seeking common ground and areas of shared interests.’24 This attempt to reconcile principle and pragmatism reflects the EU’s stated approach to external affairs, although in reality it is often member state narrow interests that take precedence over EU principles. The potential for deeper US-EU cooperation in the region is being squandered by the competition between member states to secure lucrative bilateral defence procurement deals. While the extent of discussions with European governments is unclear, France, Spain and Germany have been talking with individual members of the GCC about security issues.25
The failure of the EU and US to coordinate means that both are beginning to lose out to third players, not only in terms of defence procurement but also in terms of trade and energy. Up to now, American and European military suppliers have provided 90 per cent of the weapons sought by the Gulf countries. But now a potential Russian deal has taken shape to sell $2 billion worth of tanks and helicopters to Saudi Arabia. In 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Saudi Arabia, the first official visit by a Russian head of state to the kingdom. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia as a member of the G20, have played an important role in supporting international efforts to stem the global financial crisis. While the GCC’s weight in economics and international finance has increased, the half century of US predominance in the region in economic terms is over. The centre of gravity is clearly shifting eastwards as the loss of US standing in the region is being filled not by Europe, but rather by emerging Asian states.
The Obama administration believes that the challenges which confront the US in the region - regional conflicts, undiversified economies, unresponsive political systems, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and violent extremist groups - are all connected and thus should be treated simultaneously, on a panregional basis.
It also recognises the significant role Gulf states could play in regional issues. In June 2009 Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the array of security issues affecting the Gulf are all interrelated, and thus would be best addressed through a comprehensive approach. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke has stated that the US seeks to ‘establish an intellectual strategic base’ with the Gulf states to coordinate policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Middle East issues. On Iran, the Gulf states have repeatedly asked the US to coordinate its policies with them.
The Obama administration has also declared a willingness to address the Israel-Palestine issue as a vital lynchpin of progress on all other issues in the region. For the first time the US seems to acknowledge the importance of a conflict which other Arab states consider to be the key to regional stability. Although Obama began well by appointing as his Middle East special envoy the respected former senator George Mitchell and calling for a freeze on all Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, his resolve has since floundered and disappointment has set in throughout the region. At the beginning of December 2009 the EU agreed on a statement of policy on Palestine and Israel which the US considered to be an unwelcome intrusion.
If the EU had not willingly ceded ground to the US in all areas save the Mediterranean, its policies could be coordinated with, rather than being subservient to, the US. It is no longer expedient for the EU to sit back in the knowledge that the Gulf region is a US sphere of influence. Despite Obama’s ‘punt on multilateralism’ it is unlikely that the US administration will go out of its way to cooperate with the EU in the Gulf. The Obama administration might prefer to work with a more united Europe, but it is up to the EU to live up to the rhetoric and forge a strategy in the Gulf that places it in a credible role as interlocutor for both the US and the GCC. To do so it must incorporate the Gulf and the Mediterranean into a common overarching MENA strategy. A more proactive EU role which takes into account the Gulf states’ aspirations and builds on its credibility could go a long way towards reestablishing some of Europe’s lost influence in the region.
While the Obama administration is seeking to regain credibility, the EU can still play a much-needed role in helping smooth persistent tensions between the US and MENA countries. The US ‘has so far failed to come to terms with the GCC states defining their own interests outside of the context of the need for US military protection’.26 The US still has to realise that the security-for-oil equation is no longer a panacea. The Gulf
states feel neglected by the US, especially in terms of dealing with Iran, and annoyed at being asked publicly to provide confidence building measures to Israel. More than anything else the Gulf states want movement on the Palestinian front, for Iran to be contained but not appeased at their expense, and general recognition for their role in the region. On all these concerns, the EU needs to take advantage of the current juncture in US policy, help mediate between Washington and the region, and adapt its own policies to back up the stated desire for a more holistic approach.
Joining the dots
European Union policy statements and ministerial speeches often refer to the need to link together events and trends in different parts of the MENA region. In 2004, when defining the need for a European Strategic Partnership with the region, the European Council observed that ‘Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East are joined together both by geography and shared history. […] Our geographical proximity is a longstanding reality underpinning our growing interdependence; our policies in future years must reflect these realities and seek to ensure that they continue to develop positively.’27
There is much talk of the need for ‘triangulation’ between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf. But in practice it is remarkable how far European policy is still divided into separate ‘policy blocks’. One covers the Mediterranean, another the Gulf, another Iraq, another Iran, and yet another Yemen’s fragile state status. The disjuncture between the Mediterranean and Gulf components is especially notable. In 2008, amidst much fanfare, the Union for the Mediterranean was launched. At the same time, the EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Broader Middle East was being quietly forgotten. No attempt was made to get these two initiatives ‘talking to each other’.
Several member states have been actively hostile towards submerging the EU’s Mediterranean policy into a ‘broader Middle East’ policy. In a contemporary institutional sense, the ‘Mediterranean’ is a distinctively European construct. Other powers do not have ‘Mediterranean’ policies separate from their Middle East strategies. But the reasons for blocking better coordination are not good ones. Southern EU member states must move beyond a defensive position of defending ‘Mediterranean primacy’ merely because they fear losing a privileged EU focus on their immediate neighbours in North Africa. GCC states increasingly seek EU support for initiatives in the Middle East that dovetail with their own activity.
A broader and less fragmented approach to the Middle East would be especially valuable in relation to six policy challenges:
1) Iraq, Iran and regional security
It is often pointed out that the MENA is the only region lacking an institutionalised security framework. The EU should seek to exercise what influence it has to rectify this situation. It has the potential to play such a role by harnessing its firmly institutionalised ‘collective security’ arrangements in and with the southern Mediterranean as a template to extend into the broader Middle East. In particular this would entail triangulating EU-Mediterranean-GCC strategies towards Iran and Iraq. GCC states have for some time pushed the EU to assist more generously and determinedly in Iraq’s reconstruction and stabilisation;
Gulf states feel that the EU’s reluctance to engage fully in Iraq, to take GCC concerns over the direction of that country into account and to include the GCC in their planning for future strategy in that country represents one of the major strategic blockages in relations with Europe.28 Gulf concerns over events in Iraq and Iran, including fear of increasing Iranian influence, represent one of the region’s most pressing strategic preoccupations – one they feel Europe still has little empathy for.
The EU’s aims in this sense must of necessity be modest. But some concrete moves could begin to move security deliberations in this more pan-MENA direction. The Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East agreed in 2004 has been a profound disappointment, having delivered little in tangible terms that helps broaden out Europe’s policies across the MENA. New and much more concrete steps should be implemented. For example, the EU could hold joint meetings of its EU-Mediterranean and EU-GCC security dialogues, and use this as an opportunity to provide an incentive to Iraq and Iran to participate in the first steps towards a broader collective security architecture. This would constitute a major upgrading of the current ‘Iraq and its Neighbourhood’ multilateral initiative. By addressing Gulf concerns in this way, the EU would be more likely to convince GCC regimes to deploy their own vast financial resources to help stabilise Iraq.29
And it must be the case that a more unified EU-GCC-Mediterranean alliance would have much more chance to influence developments in Iran in a positive direction.
2) Palestine
Saudi Arabia and Egypt hold key roles in the Middle East peace process. There is some competition between their respective approaches and initiatives that risks being highly prejudicial. Here the EU might find a role in mediating and ensuring that such competition between Mediterranean and Gulf initiatives does not begin to harm the prospects for peace.
The EU should also move to reassure Saudi Arabia that rejection of the Fatah-Hamas Mecca Agreement in 2007 by the Bush administration represented a major missed opportunity to establish a working relationship between the two Palestinian factions and that the EU seeks strengthened cooperation with Riyadh on this crucial issue. The EU also urgently needs to engage other GCC states, not least Qatar, on its vision for a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, urging caution where necessary and harmonising efforts where possible. A sine qua non to an improved EU-GCC political relationship on this issue is for the EU to take a firm position against the continued expansion of Israeli settlements within the Palestinian territories.
3) Trade relations
The EU has been pursuing two free trade areas, one with the Mediterranean and another with the Gulf. The former is due for completion in 2010, but is well behind schedule. The free trade agreement with the GCC is still not signed, after nineteen years of talks. The EU should re-energise efforts to sign both these outstanding trade deals and demonstrate greater flexibility to this end.
But over the medium term, the two respective EU FTAs could and should be joined. It is well known that inter-regional interdependence is at a lower level in the Middle East than in other regions. Joining the separate strands of EU commercial relations together could help correct this dearth. Iraq’s putative Partnership and Cooperation Agreement could eventually be linked into this widened area of trade liberalisation. The EU could in this way use the undoubted leverage of its common commercial regulations and norms as a means of enhancing integration within the broader Middle East region – so vital in political and strategic terms for Europe and the region itself.
4) Responses to the financial crisis
The crisis is arriving in force on North Africa’s shores. The EU and the GCC have a joint interest in helping the Mediterranean weather the storm; it will be harder for each to help effectively on their own. Several European governments now work with Saudi Arabia within the G20. They should form an alliance to address together prudential regulatory weaknesses in the southern Mediterranean. The same implies the other way around: the regular dialogue and engagement the EU has built up in the Mediterranean could be extremely
helpful in shoring up European efforts to reach further and deeper into the Gulf. Much more cooperation is needed on international currency issues too. The fallout over the Dubai debt crisis in December 2009 also points to a need for an enhanced economic dialogue.
With the GCC inching towards a possible single currency, this is an obvious area of under-explored ‘lesson sharing’. It is an area of policy cooperation that needs to be triangulated with a Mediterranean dimension too, to reflect the growing economic and financial interdependence of different parts of the MENA region.
It is here that the EU should enhance cooperation with Gulf development funds, to pool efforts to palliate the effects of the financial crisis and encourage the economic and social reforms necessary to sustained recovery. In an effort to support regional economic integration across MENA, the EU could extend some of the funding projects and measures which have proved most effective in its relations with the Mediterranean countries, namely those relative to the economic basket, coordination of regulatory and legal reform, building standards and capacity, judicial training and reform, bureaucratic reform, technical cooperation and capacity building in cross-border projects, twinning, and administrative secondments.
5) Energy
Today it makes little sense for the EU to pursue separate energy dialogues and policies in the Mediterranean and Gulf. Policy-makers do recognise this. The prospective pan-Arab pipeline, which the EU has promised to support, requires a restructuring of European energy policy. Iraq, which holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas deposits and has an egregiously low reserve-to-production ratio, is perhaps the energy partner in the Middle East with which Europe is underperforming most. In January 2008, Commissioners Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations) and Andris Piebalgs (Energy) spoke of a new ‘EU-Iraq energy partnership’, noting that the EU was ‘keen to see Iraq play a full role in the Arab gas pipeline which will supply the EU including through the Nabucco.’ These encouraging statements have not been followed up by a regular high-level political and energy dialogue with Iraq, neither has significant assistance been forthcoming to improve Iraq’s creaking infrastructure in order to link it for export to European markets.30 There is also potential for the EU to link GCC energy exports through an enhanced pipeline grid via Iraq to European markets.
The Commission has proposed extending the structure of both the ENP Energy Treaty and the Euro-Med Common Energy House to the GCC states, as well as offering the latter the kind of energy agreement offered to Algeria and Egypt. Cooperation between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf has begun on the issue of solar energy. However, the continued impasse in trade negotiations between the EU and the GCC undercuts the prospects for other aspects of policy cooperation on a broader Middle East basis. The EU has proposed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation, but the GCC states have rejected the idea, insisting that an FTA is the precursor to deepening other areas of cooperation. A long-standing bi-annual EU-GCC energy experts meeting has been diminished rather than expanded in recent years, with officials of a lower level than was previously the case presiding on both sides. The Commission has sought to deepen energy cooperation at the bilateral level with individual GCC states, but here the potential is limited to technical issues such as reducing flaring and energy efficient product development. Elaborating a triangulated EU-Mediterranean-GCC energy strategy would offer the potential for unblocking some of these frustrating and persistent shortcomings.
6) Counter-terrorism
Saudi Arabia’s well-known influence over Islamist trends across the Mediterranean means that it must be brought into any comprehensive European efforts to deal with radicalisation. GCC cooperation is also critical to stopping the flow of money to jihadi groups in places such as Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon. The EU and the GCC also face a mounting terrorist threat emanating from Yemen. The GCC is the largest donor to Yemen and critical to the future stabilisation of that country. Although Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to engage in bi-lateral talks on Europe’s concerns in Yemen, other GCC countries have shown a more open approach. Enhanced cooperation on these issues will only arise out of a trust-building dialogue and strategic thinking with the Gulf on major political concerns in the region, an approach that has been evidently lacking to date.
Careful steps forward
In sum, the overarching institutional logic should be one of graduated regionalism. This does not mean abandoning existing initiatives, such as the EMP or ENP. But it does mean shifting the balance of diplomatic effort to deepen the linkages between the Mediterranean, the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. A better and clearer balance is required between bilateral, subregional and ‘broader Middle East’ dynamics. These different levels must be made to lock into and reinforce emerging pan-regional dynamics, rather than cutting across them. The ENP offers at least a partial model of ‘bilateralism-within-regionalism’, which could be useful within the broader Middle East too. The MENA region is changing; US policy in the region is changing too. If the EU fails to move with these changes, instead sticking fast to its own idiosyncratic institutional structures, this head-in-the-sand stubbornness will soon consign it to irrelevance.
Edward Burke and Ana Echagüe are researchers at FRIDE. Richard Youngs is a Director at FRIDE. This article (PDF) was originally published by FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
NOTES:
1 Andrew England, ‘First signs of contagion as Egyptian stocks take a battering’, The Financial Times, 1 December 2009.
2 Margaret Coker, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Renewed Political Influence Counters Tehran’, The Wall Street Journa1, 12 June 2009.
3 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’, pp. 104–114.
4 The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, ‘Investment Climate in the Arab countries’, 2007, p. 2.
5 Samba Financial Group, ‘Tracking GCC Foreign Investments: How the Strategies are Changing with Markets in Turmoil’, December 2008, p. 12.
6 Ibid, p. 4.
7 ANIMA Investment Network, ‘Mapping Investment in the Mediterranean’, 2 October 2009, http://www.animaweb.org/en/index.php
8 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
9 Pierre Henry, Samir Abdelkrim and Bénédict de Saint-Laurent, ‘Foreign direct investment into MEDA in 2007: The switch’, ANIMA Investment Network, July 2008.
10 Mahmoud Mohieldin, ‘Neighbourly Investments’, Finance and Development, December 2008.
11 Dunia Frontier Consultants, ‘Private Foreign Investment in Iraq: Update November 2009’, Dubai, November 2009.
12 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p. 1
13 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
14 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p.12.
15 Ibid, p. 8.
16 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
17 Speech by Prince Turki al-Faisal, Eurogolfe conference, Venice,
17 October 2008.
18 International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia’, May 2009.
19 Andrew Mernin, ‘Amman on a mission’, Arabian Business, 18 February 2007.
20 Lionel Barber, ‘Restive young a matter of national security’, The Financial Times, 2 June 2008.
21 See the website of the Saudi Fund for Development, www.sfd.gov.sa
22 Espen Villanger, ‘Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives’, CMI Report R 2007: 2, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, p. 9.
23 See the website of the OPEC Fund, www.ofid.org
24 Speech by William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Conference on ‘US-Saudi Relations in a World Without Equilibrium’, New America Foundation, 27 April 2009.
25 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Global Strategic Assessment 2009:America’s Security Role in a Changing World, Washington D.C., September 2009, p. 199.
26 Christian Koch, ‘Respecting Arab interests’, Khaleej Times, 26 October 2007.
27 See ‘Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf
28 Oxford Research Group, King Faisal Center, Saudi Diplomatic Institute, ‘From the Swamp to Tierra Firma: The regional role in the stabilization of Iraq’, June 2008.
29 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Europe and the Gulf Region – Towards a New Horizon’, Discussion paper presented at the 12th Kronberg Talks, Riyadh, May 2009, p. 16.
30 Edward Burke, ‘The Case for a New European Engagement in Iraq’, FRIDE Working Paper 74, January 2009.
European foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a highly fragmented construction. Since the mid-1990s the EU’s policies with Maghreb and Mashreq countries have been pursued under the rubric of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and now the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
This plethora of highly institutionalised initiatives has been developed with negligible linkage to policy in the rest of the Middle East. Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remain low key and strikingly disconnected from the EMP. Contrary to its rhetorical emphasis on supporting regional integration around the world, the EU has failed to build its strategy towards Iran and Iraq into a regional security framework. Even more reproachable, given its credibility and influence in the economic sphere, has been the EU’s inability to foster regional economic integration between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.
Many member states have for long held up the Mediterranean’s separation from other dimensions of Middle Eastern policy as a positive distinction of European foreign policy. This overarching policy design certainly seems highly distinctive to the United States, other powers and international institutions who structure their efforts in terms of a Middle East policy rather than separate Mediterranean and Gulf policies.
Many European diplomats still argue that organising policy around a Mediterranean logic is a welcome advance on the historical legacy of colonialism.
However, important trends now render the divide between Europe’s Mediterranean and Gulf policies increasingly incongruous. We identify here two factors that are of particular importance. First, Gulf states are increasingly active in and interdependent with Mediterranean (Maghreb and Mashreq) states.
Second, the Obama administration is making efforts to re-engage more positively with the Arab world in a way that links together challenges in different parts of the Middle East. It makes little sense for the EU to work against the grain of these trends.
In response to these changes, the EU should work towards a single Middle East policy. Splitting up North Africa and the rest of the Middle East for the EU’s bureaucratic convenience belies the political logic of the region. The continued resistance of many member states to such a step is a costly mistake. It privileges narrow-minded short-term interest to the detriment of strategic foresight. We suggest six policy questions in
relation to which Europe, southern Mediterranean states and Gulf countries can more productively work together under a broader Middle East regional framework.
The Gulf in the Mediterranean
Gulf states are playing an increasingly influential role in the Mediterranean. This trend has been most recently illustrated by the repercussions of the Dubai debt restructuring announcement on the Egyptian stock exchange.1 European Middle Eastern policy must begin to react to the deeper linkages taking shape between the Gulf and the Mediterranean in a range of areas: economics, politics, social and communications exchanges, remittances and development assistance.
The long decline and traumatic implosion of Iraq, the isolation of Egypt following its recognition of Israel, and suspicions over Syria’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, combined with the poor economic performance of all three countries, have resulted in the rise of Saudi Arabia as the most influential country in the Arab world. Saudi leadership has yet to prove effective – the country has been late to get involved in Iraq, thwarted in its attempts to create a unity government in Palestine, caught flat-footed in its response to an escalating terrorist threat from Yemen and obliged to watch others take the initiative in Lebanon. However, its rising power cannot be ignored.
Saudi Arabia has spent millions supporting Lebanon’s pro-western Sunni political bloc in its struggle with Hezbollah, is critical to the future stability of Yemen and is seen as the only regional power capable of bringing Arab countries into line with the goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal.2
Qatar has also taken it upon itself to act as mediator in regional affairs. Its increasing diplomatic hyperactivity has been viewed as an annoyance by the US, except perhaps for its involvement in negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for a ceasefire and the movement of Hezbollah’s militia away from the border with Israel.
Qatar is seen by the US to be unhelpful in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the challenge of Iranian ambitions, and is generally regarded as punching above its weight. Saudi Arabia has also viewed Qatar’s mediation efforts, most particularly in Lebanon and Yemen, with a strong degree of scepticism. Ultimately, however, Qatar’s ties with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Zaydi Shia rebels in Yemen, as well as its long-standing ties with Israel, give it unique leverage and position in the region. The highly disparate approaches of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to regional diplomacy, combined with the pragmatism of the other GCC member states’ relations with Iran, have severely hampered prospects for the emergence of a common Gulf political strategy for the region.
Economically, MENA trade and investment figures confirm a glaring, and even widening, gap between wealth concentrated in the GCC and the struggles of the Maghreb and Mashreq. The GCC’s population is a mere 42.5 million out of a total 345 million for the region, yet it dominates the region’s foreign exports earnings. In 2007 $477 billion of the MENA region’s total exports of $654 billion were from the GCC countries.3 The relative peace enjoyed within the Gulf, the decoupling of political disputes from the maintenance of pragmatic economic relations, improved management of energy revenues leading to a degree of economic diversification, and the emergence of the region’s only truly successful economic union, the GCC, has resulted in the region rapidly out-performing other countries in the MENA. In recent years Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its share of new intra-Arab investments to over 50 per cent.4
GCC investments in the region have grown considerably, due to a period of high energy revenues and increased investor confidence following infrastructure and internal market reforms in many Mashreq and Maghreb countries. From 2003 to 2008 GCC countries’ investment in the rest of the MENA amounted to over $110 billion.5 The rapid increase of trade with the rest of the MENA, coupled with rising intra-GCC trade, means that the EU’s share of overall investment by GCC countries is declining. Such a trend is corroborated by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which has reported a 10-15 per cent rise in FDI holdings from the GCC in other MENA countries.6 The type of GCC investment has also shifted: whereas in the 1970s and the 1980s GCC investments in the MENA were mainly in hydrocarbons and real estate, today they include financial services and manufacturing – these two sectors together add up to the 70 per cent of GCC investments in Egypt for 2007-2008, for example. The UAE is easily the most prolific Gulf investor in the Mashreq and the Maghreb, holding over 52 per cent of new investments from 2003 to late 2009, a significant portion of which are Dubai held assets.7
The GCC also has a rapidly increasing influence over the development of communications in the region, not least with regard to the proliferation of news and entertainment channels. Arabsat has more than 164 million viewers, carrying such channels as al-Jazeera, which has a major influence on pan-Arab opinion. An important recent measure led by the GCC states was the establishment of an Arab Network of Regulators (ARNET), which has moved to harmonise regulatory practices including National Information and Communication Technology (ICT).8
The value of Gulf investments over those from Europe can be measured in sheer scale. An average Gulf investment in the MENA is $268 million compared to $70 million from Europe.9 Gulf investors have become a vital source of job creation in the region.
GCC investments now constitute a third of foreign holding in Egypt and almost half in Jordan. (In contrast, GCC investors have avoided Algeria due to the complexity of regulations and the erratic behaviour of the government in Algiers.10) Despite an ambiguous political relationship with the Iraqi government, the UAE and Kuwait have recognised the enormous economic potential of Iraq and have been willing to put aside distaste for some of that country’s ruling factions to invest heavily – the UAE topped the list of foreign investors for the first nine months of 2009 with holdings of $37 billion, while Kuwait spent $6.8 billion.11
The long period of economic decline in the 1980s and 1990s after the misspent boom of the 1970s, during which time the MENA share of global trade fell from 8 per cent to 2.5 per cent, served as a sharp lesson for the region.12 Despite the failure to negotiate a comprehensive FTA for the MENA, in 2007 intraregional trade constituted 11.1 per cent of total foreign trade. This is still a modest figure, but a significant increase from the stagnant levels of the mid-1990s. In the non-energy sector, intraregional trade now accounts for just under 25 per cent of all exports.13
Many problems persist. The negotiation and implementation of a raft of trade agreements aimed at integrating the economies of the MENA has been notoriously slow and ineffectual. Implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), negotiated in 1997, has varied considerably from country to country.
The World Bank estimates that the total gain from GAFTA to the MENA economy has so far amounted to a modest 0.1 per cent boost to regional income, which compares very unfavourably with the benefits of bilateral trade agreements with the EU.14
In the same way, the lack of integration of the MENA with the global economy represents a missed opportunity for economic growth – the World Bank has calculated that if the MENA had maintained its 1985 share of world exports (which was already relatively low), it would have received some $2 trillion in extra export revenues during the period 1986-2003. By extension, if a comprehensive MENA FTA existed during this period it would have boosted trade by a further 147 per cent.15
However, while such problems exist, the emerging opportunities of deeper intra-MENA integration reflect an incipient trend that the EU should lock onto.
The reasons for the non-emergence of a free trade area in the MENA include the frequency of war and severe political disagreement in the region, high transportation and communication costs and, perhaps most importantly, the preponderance of a corrupt and bloated public sector. In some ways, external actors have added to the problems: the lure of trade agreements with the US, the EU and other external powers has shifted the focus away from intra-regional efforts.16 The GCC has been quick to complain about not being consulted on EU initiatives in the Maghreb and Mashreq, such as the Union for the Mediterranean – although it has itself been generally reactive and unimaginative in its relations with other Arab states.17
Although the proportion of expatriate Arab workers in the Gulf has declined considerably since the 1970s and 1980s, remittances to other Arab countries remain a vital source of income, totalling $31 billion in 2008.
The MENA region mainly relies on two regions, the GCC and the EU, as a source of remittances. Egypt and Morocco receive the highest volume of remittances in the MENA region. Remittances to Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt are predominately derived from expatriate labour in the GCC, while those of Morocco and Algeria are mostly from the EU. Iraq and Syria are exceptions to the Mashreq-Maghreb divide, as for these states
both the EU and the GCC are an important source of remittances. As a share of GDP for countries in the region, Lebanon ranks highest with 20 per cent and 400,000 expatriates in the Gulf alone, followed by Jordan at 14 per cent, and Morocco at 8 per cent.18
There is, finally, a growing trend of MENA dependence on aid from the Gulf region. In 2007 alone Jordan received $565 million in aid from Saudi Arabia.19
There is also an increasing awareness within the GCC of the leading role the Gulf must play in preparing the MENA for the challenges the region will face in the future – 80 million new jobs alone will have to be created in the region by 2020 to avoid severe political and social upheaval in an already combustible regional environment.20 There have been some encouraging signs that the Gulf is increasing its aid to the MENA.
GCC member states’ aid is predominantly distributed bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels. The main multilateral institutions in the region are the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Arab Fund), the OPEC Fund for International Development (OPEC Fund), the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Of these, the IDB distributes the largest amount of multilateral assistance in the region, providing 38 per cent of the total, compared to 30 per cent from the Arab Fund, 17 per cent from the AMF and 10 per cent from the OPEC Fund. The Saudi Fund for Development operates almost exclusively in the form of bilateral loans from a capital base of $8.2 billion.21 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development also provides similar loans to recipient governments. In total the Kuwait Fund has provided 17 per cent of Arab financial aid during the last thirty years, compared to 4 per cent of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development.22 The Saudi Fund allocates half its budget to Arab countries, similar to that of the Kuwait Fund but less than the 79 per cent distributed to Arab recipients by the Abu Dhabi Fund.
The OPEC Fund, by contrast, concentrates its $3.5 billion capital on projects in sub-Saharan Africa, contributing only 17 per cent of its annual budget to the MENA region.23 In 2007 the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, donated $10 billion towards supporting the education of young Arabs in the region.
The GCC member state Development Funds that provide loans and other forms of assistance generally do not maintain an in-country team to monitor the use of funds and there are few reporting obligations on the part of the recipient country. Yet there are emerging exceptions. Innovative Gulf development organisations such as ‘Dubai Cares’ have already gained a reputation for their close monitoring of projects, working with international NGOs such as Care International, and may offer a useful template for other emerging Gulf development agencies. A cash-strapped Europe would do well to seize upon opportunities for the enhanced coordination of development funds and programmes with willing Gulf partners.
The initial years of excessive optimism on the part of GCC investors and recipient countries are now likely to give way to a more realistic review of investments following the global financial crisis, beginning with a debt-ridden Dubai. A serious downturn in the GCC may feel like a ‘crash landing’ for the rest of the MENA.
Egypt, with over two million citizens working in the GCC, is heavily dependent upon the $3 billion of remittances it receives from this labour. Any further increases in food prices in the region could also see an increase in unrest, as already witnessed in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen during 2008 and the first half of 2009. Reduced EU and GCC remittances, investment and development assistance will seriously strain governments’ ability to maintain political and economic stability in the region.
For now much of the Gulf appears to have weathered the economic storm, largely due to resurgent oil prices, but both regions would do well to take note of the vulnerability of parts of the Mashreq and Maghreb to the current global crisis.
Obama’s re-engagement
A second trend highly germane to the design of European Middle Eastern policy is the evolution of US strategy in the region. The administration of Barack Obama has sought to move beyond the more pernicious elements of the Bush era, by engaging in the Middle East with a new tone and a more sophisticated effort to link the region’s problems together in a more holistic strategy. The EU needs to seize this as an opportunity and support such efforts rather than undercut them by stubbornly prioritising the institutional structures of its own fragmented Middle Eastern initiatives.
The EU has traditionally been very protective of its policies towards the Mediterranean construct in an attempt to carve out for itself a parcel of influence within the dominant US policy towards the Middle East. The Mediterranean offered an area where the EU could claim an advantage and where it did not have to follow the US’s lead. Obama’s efforts at re-starting the US relationship with the Middle East on a more even footing offer an opportunity for the EU to let go of an outdated mind-set which has proved pernicious to its interests. By parcelling out the Mediterranean as a Euro-sphere of influence, the EU has ceded the upper hand (even further) to the US in the Gulf. Obama’s new MENA policies restructure the EU-US-MENA triangle, and require a flexible response from the EU.
Institutionally, the US approach to the region reflects a broader approach, with the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs covering all Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf countries while singling out Iraq, Palestine, counterterrorism and economic and political reform as particular regional concerns. The EU would be well served to heed this approach, not in an effort to mimic the US, but because it is reflective of geographic and geostrategic reality.
Gulf states view the ‘Mediterranean’ as defined by the EU as a construct less reflective of local realities than of European interests. The EU often overlooks the strong relations between Mediterranean and Gulf states and the bonds of ‘Arabism’ that play into these relations. The Obama administration has heralded changes in tone and approach, which make it easier for the EU to respond and engage in a broader Middle East policy.
There has been a significant change in style, tone and attitude which reflects greater sensitivity, a US willingness to engage and to listen rather than dictate.
The Obama administration’s change of approach has also been reflected in the newfound willingness to engage with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in an effort to seek negotiated solutions to long-standing problems. This is the type of approach long favoured by the EU and a far cry from the axis of evil listings promulgated by Bush.
As Obama stated in an interview with Al Arabiya, the US is ‘ready to initiate a new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest.’ Under-Secretary of State William Burns further elaborated: ‘We have reoriented our approach to diplomacy, focusing on partnership, pragmatism, and principle. This puts a premium on listening to each other, respecting differences and seeking common ground and areas of shared interests.’24 This attempt to reconcile principle and pragmatism reflects the EU’s stated approach to external affairs, although in reality it is often member state narrow interests that take precedence over EU principles. The potential for deeper US-EU cooperation in the region is being squandered by the competition between member states to secure lucrative bilateral defence procurement deals. While the extent of discussions with European governments is unclear, France, Spain and Germany have been talking with individual members of the GCC about security issues.25
The failure of the EU and US to coordinate means that both are beginning to lose out to third players, not only in terms of defence procurement but also in terms of trade and energy. Up to now, American and European military suppliers have provided 90 per cent of the weapons sought by the Gulf countries. But now a potential Russian deal has taken shape to sell $2 billion worth of tanks and helicopters to Saudi Arabia. In 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Saudi Arabia, the first official visit by a Russian head of state to the kingdom. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia as a member of the G20, have played an important role in supporting international efforts to stem the global financial crisis. While the GCC’s weight in economics and international finance has increased, the half century of US predominance in the region in economic terms is over. The centre of gravity is clearly shifting eastwards as the loss of US standing in the region is being filled not by Europe, but rather by emerging Asian states.
The Obama administration believes that the challenges which confront the US in the region - regional conflicts, undiversified economies, unresponsive political systems, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and violent extremist groups - are all connected and thus should be treated simultaneously, on a panregional basis.
It also recognises the significant role Gulf states could play in regional issues. In June 2009 Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the array of security issues affecting the Gulf are all interrelated, and thus would be best addressed through a comprehensive approach. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke has stated that the US seeks to ‘establish an intellectual strategic base’ with the Gulf states to coordinate policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Middle East issues. On Iran, the Gulf states have repeatedly asked the US to coordinate its policies with them.
The Obama administration has also declared a willingness to address the Israel-Palestine issue as a vital lynchpin of progress on all other issues in the region. For the first time the US seems to acknowledge the importance of a conflict which other Arab states consider to be the key to regional stability. Although Obama began well by appointing as his Middle East special envoy the respected former senator George Mitchell and calling for a freeze on all Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, his resolve has since floundered and disappointment has set in throughout the region. At the beginning of December 2009 the EU agreed on a statement of policy on Palestine and Israel which the US considered to be an unwelcome intrusion.
If the EU had not willingly ceded ground to the US in all areas save the Mediterranean, its policies could be coordinated with, rather than being subservient to, the US. It is no longer expedient for the EU to sit back in the knowledge that the Gulf region is a US sphere of influence. Despite Obama’s ‘punt on multilateralism’ it is unlikely that the US administration will go out of its way to cooperate with the EU in the Gulf. The Obama administration might prefer to work with a more united Europe, but it is up to the EU to live up to the rhetoric and forge a strategy in the Gulf that places it in a credible role as interlocutor for both the US and the GCC. To do so it must incorporate the Gulf and the Mediterranean into a common overarching MENA strategy. A more proactive EU role which takes into account the Gulf states’ aspirations and builds on its credibility could go a long way towards reestablishing some of Europe’s lost influence in the region.
While the Obama administration is seeking to regain credibility, the EU can still play a much-needed role in helping smooth persistent tensions between the US and MENA countries. The US ‘has so far failed to come to terms with the GCC states defining their own interests outside of the context of the need for US military protection’.26 The US still has to realise that the security-for-oil equation is no longer a panacea. The Gulf
states feel neglected by the US, especially in terms of dealing with Iran, and annoyed at being asked publicly to provide confidence building measures to Israel. More than anything else the Gulf states want movement on the Palestinian front, for Iran to be contained but not appeased at their expense, and general recognition for their role in the region. On all these concerns, the EU needs to take advantage of the current juncture in US policy, help mediate between Washington and the region, and adapt its own policies to back up the stated desire for a more holistic approach.
Joining the dots
European Union policy statements and ministerial speeches often refer to the need to link together events and trends in different parts of the MENA region. In 2004, when defining the need for a European Strategic Partnership with the region, the European Council observed that ‘Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East are joined together both by geography and shared history. […] Our geographical proximity is a longstanding reality underpinning our growing interdependence; our policies in future years must reflect these realities and seek to ensure that they continue to develop positively.’27
There is much talk of the need for ‘triangulation’ between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf. But in practice it is remarkable how far European policy is still divided into separate ‘policy blocks’. One covers the Mediterranean, another the Gulf, another Iraq, another Iran, and yet another Yemen’s fragile state status. The disjuncture between the Mediterranean and Gulf components is especially notable. In 2008, amidst much fanfare, the Union for the Mediterranean was launched. At the same time, the EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Broader Middle East was being quietly forgotten. No attempt was made to get these two initiatives ‘talking to each other’.
Several member states have been actively hostile towards submerging the EU’s Mediterranean policy into a ‘broader Middle East’ policy. In a contemporary institutional sense, the ‘Mediterranean’ is a distinctively European construct. Other powers do not have ‘Mediterranean’ policies separate from their Middle East strategies. But the reasons for blocking better coordination are not good ones. Southern EU member states must move beyond a defensive position of defending ‘Mediterranean primacy’ merely because they fear losing a privileged EU focus on their immediate neighbours in North Africa. GCC states increasingly seek EU support for initiatives in the Middle East that dovetail with their own activity.
A broader and less fragmented approach to the Middle East would be especially valuable in relation to six policy challenges:
1) Iraq, Iran and regional security
It is often pointed out that the MENA is the only region lacking an institutionalised security framework. The EU should seek to exercise what influence it has to rectify this situation. It has the potential to play such a role by harnessing its firmly institutionalised ‘collective security’ arrangements in and with the southern Mediterranean as a template to extend into the broader Middle East. In particular this would entail triangulating EU-Mediterranean-GCC strategies towards Iran and Iraq. GCC states have for some time pushed the EU to assist more generously and determinedly in Iraq’s reconstruction and stabilisation;
Gulf states feel that the EU’s reluctance to engage fully in Iraq, to take GCC concerns over the direction of that country into account and to include the GCC in their planning for future strategy in that country represents one of the major strategic blockages in relations with Europe.28 Gulf concerns over events in Iraq and Iran, including fear of increasing Iranian influence, represent one of the region’s most pressing strategic preoccupations – one they feel Europe still has little empathy for.
The EU’s aims in this sense must of necessity be modest. But some concrete moves could begin to move security deliberations in this more pan-MENA direction. The Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East agreed in 2004 has been a profound disappointment, having delivered little in tangible terms that helps broaden out Europe’s policies across the MENA. New and much more concrete steps should be implemented. For example, the EU could hold joint meetings of its EU-Mediterranean and EU-GCC security dialogues, and use this as an opportunity to provide an incentive to Iraq and Iran to participate in the first steps towards a broader collective security architecture. This would constitute a major upgrading of the current ‘Iraq and its Neighbourhood’ multilateral initiative. By addressing Gulf concerns in this way, the EU would be more likely to convince GCC regimes to deploy their own vast financial resources to help stabilise Iraq.29
And it must be the case that a more unified EU-GCC-Mediterranean alliance would have much more chance to influence developments in Iran in a positive direction.
2) Palestine
Saudi Arabia and Egypt hold key roles in the Middle East peace process. There is some competition between their respective approaches and initiatives that risks being highly prejudicial. Here the EU might find a role in mediating and ensuring that such competition between Mediterranean and Gulf initiatives does not begin to harm the prospects for peace.
The EU should also move to reassure Saudi Arabia that rejection of the Fatah-Hamas Mecca Agreement in 2007 by the Bush administration represented a major missed opportunity to establish a working relationship between the two Palestinian factions and that the EU seeks strengthened cooperation with Riyadh on this crucial issue. The EU also urgently needs to engage other GCC states, not least Qatar, on its vision for a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, urging caution where necessary and harmonising efforts where possible. A sine qua non to an improved EU-GCC political relationship on this issue is for the EU to take a firm position against the continued expansion of Israeli settlements within the Palestinian territories.
3) Trade relations
The EU has been pursuing two free trade areas, one with the Mediterranean and another with the Gulf. The former is due for completion in 2010, but is well behind schedule. The free trade agreement with the GCC is still not signed, after nineteen years of talks. The EU should re-energise efforts to sign both these outstanding trade deals and demonstrate greater flexibility to this end.
But over the medium term, the two respective EU FTAs could and should be joined. It is well known that inter-regional interdependence is at a lower level in the Middle East than in other regions. Joining the separate strands of EU commercial relations together could help correct this dearth. Iraq’s putative Partnership and Cooperation Agreement could eventually be linked into this widened area of trade liberalisation. The EU could in this way use the undoubted leverage of its common commercial regulations and norms as a means of enhancing integration within the broader Middle East region – so vital in political and strategic terms for Europe and the region itself.
4) Responses to the financial crisis
The crisis is arriving in force on North Africa’s shores. The EU and the GCC have a joint interest in helping the Mediterranean weather the storm; it will be harder for each to help effectively on their own. Several European governments now work with Saudi Arabia within the G20. They should form an alliance to address together prudential regulatory weaknesses in the southern Mediterranean. The same implies the other way around: the regular dialogue and engagement the EU has built up in the Mediterranean could be extremely
helpful in shoring up European efforts to reach further and deeper into the Gulf. Much more cooperation is needed on international currency issues too. The fallout over the Dubai debt crisis in December 2009 also points to a need for an enhanced economic dialogue.
With the GCC inching towards a possible single currency, this is an obvious area of under-explored ‘lesson sharing’. It is an area of policy cooperation that needs to be triangulated with a Mediterranean dimension too, to reflect the growing economic and financial interdependence of different parts of the MENA region.
It is here that the EU should enhance cooperation with Gulf development funds, to pool efforts to palliate the effects of the financial crisis and encourage the economic and social reforms necessary to sustained recovery. In an effort to support regional economic integration across MENA, the EU could extend some of the funding projects and measures which have proved most effective in its relations with the Mediterranean countries, namely those relative to the economic basket, coordination of regulatory and legal reform, building standards and capacity, judicial training and reform, bureaucratic reform, technical cooperation and capacity building in cross-border projects, twinning, and administrative secondments.
5) Energy
Today it makes little sense for the EU to pursue separate energy dialogues and policies in the Mediterranean and Gulf. Policy-makers do recognise this. The prospective pan-Arab pipeline, which the EU has promised to support, requires a restructuring of European energy policy. Iraq, which holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas deposits and has an egregiously low reserve-to-production ratio, is perhaps the energy partner in the Middle East with which Europe is underperforming most. In January 2008, Commissioners Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations) and Andris Piebalgs (Energy) spoke of a new ‘EU-Iraq energy partnership’, noting that the EU was ‘keen to see Iraq play a full role in the Arab gas pipeline which will supply the EU including through the Nabucco.’ These encouraging statements have not been followed up by a regular high-level political and energy dialogue with Iraq, neither has significant assistance been forthcoming to improve Iraq’s creaking infrastructure in order to link it for export to European markets.30 There is also potential for the EU to link GCC energy exports through an enhanced pipeline grid via Iraq to European markets.
The Commission has proposed extending the structure of both the ENP Energy Treaty and the Euro-Med Common Energy House to the GCC states, as well as offering the latter the kind of energy agreement offered to Algeria and Egypt. Cooperation between Europe, the Arab Mediterranean and the Gulf has begun on the issue of solar energy. However, the continued impasse in trade negotiations between the EU and the GCC undercuts the prospects for other aspects of policy cooperation on a broader Middle East basis. The EU has proposed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation, but the GCC states have rejected the idea, insisting that an FTA is the precursor to deepening other areas of cooperation. A long-standing bi-annual EU-GCC energy experts meeting has been diminished rather than expanded in recent years, with officials of a lower level than was previously the case presiding on both sides. The Commission has sought to deepen energy cooperation at the bilateral level with individual GCC states, but here the potential is limited to technical issues such as reducing flaring and energy efficient product development. Elaborating a triangulated EU-Mediterranean-GCC energy strategy would offer the potential for unblocking some of these frustrating and persistent shortcomings.
6) Counter-terrorism
Saudi Arabia’s well-known influence over Islamist trends across the Mediterranean means that it must be brought into any comprehensive European efforts to deal with radicalisation. GCC cooperation is also critical to stopping the flow of money to jihadi groups in places such as Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon. The EU and the GCC also face a mounting terrorist threat emanating from Yemen. The GCC is the largest donor to Yemen and critical to the future stabilisation of that country. Although Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to engage in bi-lateral talks on Europe’s concerns in Yemen, other GCC countries have shown a more open approach. Enhanced cooperation on these issues will only arise out of a trust-building dialogue and strategic thinking with the Gulf on major political concerns in the region, an approach that has been evidently lacking to date.
Careful steps forward
In sum, the overarching institutional logic should be one of graduated regionalism. This does not mean abandoning existing initiatives, such as the EMP or ENP. But it does mean shifting the balance of diplomatic effort to deepen the linkages between the Mediterranean, the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. A better and clearer balance is required between bilateral, subregional and ‘broader Middle East’ dynamics. These different levels must be made to lock into and reinforce emerging pan-regional dynamics, rather than cutting across them. The ENP offers at least a partial model of ‘bilateralism-within-regionalism’, which could be useful within the broader Middle East too. The MENA region is changing; US policy in the region is changing too. If the EU fails to move with these changes, instead sticking fast to its own idiosyncratic institutional structures, this head-in-the-sand stubbornness will soon consign it to irrelevance.
Edward Burke and Ana Echagüe are researchers at FRIDE. Richard Youngs is a Director at FRIDE. This article (PDF) was originally published by FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
NOTES:
1 Andrew England, ‘First signs of contagion as Egyptian stocks take a battering’, The Financial Times, 1 December 2009.
2 Margaret Coker, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Renewed Political Influence Counters Tehran’, The Wall Street Journa1, 12 June 2009.
3 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’, pp. 104–114.
4 The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, ‘Investment Climate in the Arab countries’, 2007, p. 2.
5 Samba Financial Group, ‘Tracking GCC Foreign Investments: How the Strategies are Changing with Markets in Turmoil’, December 2008, p. 12.
6 Ibid, p. 4.
7 ANIMA Investment Network, ‘Mapping Investment in the Mediterranean’, 2 October 2009, http://www.animaweb.org/en/index.php
8 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
9 Pierre Henry, Samir Abdelkrim and Bénédict de Saint-Laurent, ‘Foreign direct investment into MEDA in 2007: The switch’, ANIMA Investment Network, July 2008.
10 Mahmoud Mohieldin, ‘Neighbourly Investments’, Finance and Development, December 2008.
11 Dunia Frontier Consultants, ‘Private Foreign Investment in Iraq: Update November 2009’, Dubai, November 2009.
12 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p. 1
13 World Bank, ‘2008 MENA Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness’.
14 Allan Dennis, ‘The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the Middle East North African region’, World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 3837, February 2006, p.12.
15 Ibid, p. 8.
16 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
17 Speech by Prince Turki al-Faisal, Eurogolfe conference, Venice,
17 October 2008.
18 International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia’, May 2009.
19 Andrew Mernin, ‘Amman on a mission’, Arabian Business, 18 February 2007.
20 Lionel Barber, ‘Restive young a matter of national security’, The Financial Times, 2 June 2008.
21 See the website of the Saudi Fund for Development, www.sfd.gov.sa
22 Espen Villanger, ‘Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives’, CMI Report R 2007: 2, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, p. 9.
23 See the website of the OPEC Fund, www.ofid.org
24 Speech by William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Conference on ‘US-Saudi Relations in a World Without Equilibrium’, New America Foundation, 27 April 2009.
25 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Global Strategic Assessment 2009:America’s Security Role in a Changing World, Washington D.C., September 2009, p. 199.
26 Christian Koch, ‘Respecting Arab interests’, Khaleej Times, 26 October 2007.
27 See ‘Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf
28 Oxford Research Group, King Faisal Center, Saudi Diplomatic Institute, ‘From the Swamp to Tierra Firma: The regional role in the stabilization of Iraq’, June 2008.
29 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Europe and the Gulf Region – Towards a New Horizon’, Discussion paper presented at the 12th Kronberg Talks, Riyadh, May 2009, p. 16.
30 Edward Burke, ‘The Case for a New European Engagement in Iraq’, FRIDE Working Paper 74, January 2009.
Sunday, February 14, 2010 |
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Europe And North Africa: The End Of The Euro-Med Vision
By Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs for FRIDE
The Union for the Mediterranean does not represent a rebirth but rather the further atrophy of the vision that infused the inception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. Spain promises to revitalize Euro-Mediterranean relations during its presidency – something each new EU presidency does, ritually. This time, however, broader reassessment is required.
Relations between North Africa and Europe have become increasingly devoid of the ‘transformational’ partnership that has long been promised. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was predicated on joint commitments to cooperative security, region-building, burden-sharing, cultural proximity, economic support and political modernization. That vision languishes today in North Africa.
The policy areas that are flourishing are those of a defensive and exclusionary bent, subverting the EMP’s ostensible rationale. Relations between Europe and North Africa are suspended in unhealthy stasis. Partnership has shifted even further towards controlled surveillance. What might be termed the founding ‘Euro-Med vision’ is about to expire.
The new Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), established at French instigation in July 2008, clearly dilutes the political character and thrust of the EMP vision. Reining in the initial, intemperate proposal put forward by the French government to exclude all but the coastal EU member states afforded some relief, and the new initiative in effect folded into the EMP. But this does not change the substantive gist of the new Union.
Its main focus is on relatively uncontroversial areas of cooperation such as solar power, maritime transport, civil protection, education and small businesses. At this technical level, most policy areas identified as priorities are in fact already the subject of deep institutionalized cooperation.
The idea to lighten bureaucratic procedure is a good one – although not one easily squared with the creation of yet another institution, a Barcelona-based secretariat charged with running the UMed. But the main issue is that the UMed is expressly designed to push the focus of relations away from the most sensitive political areas.
Ill-formed policy linkages
The familiar problem of relations with North Africa being ‘infected’ by the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been overcome. No positive link has been made between policy in North Africa and efforts to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process – supposedly the EMP’s central rationale as a pan-Mediterranean initiative.
The impotence of both European and North African states in the face of Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008 paid tragic testament to this. It demonstrated that the logic of a positive spillover effect from a comprehensive cooperative security endeavor is farther away from being realized than ever. In private, senior diplomats admit that the new, ‘co-owned’ institutional structure even further undermines the potential for a policy toward North Africa that is autonomous from the obstacles of the peace process. In fact, UMed was paralyzed for most of its first year in operation by the Arab League’s insistence on a seat and then by the Gaza conflict.
The bilateralism of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has offered North African states some concrete gains in specific sectors of cooperation that have been liberated from linkage to the problematic regional context. Yet such parcelized approaches sit uneasily with the much proclaimed logic of the EMP.
With Saudi Arabia now playing a leading role in the peace process and so much diplomacy hinging on the link between this and the Syria-Iran nexus, the ‘Mediterranean’ basis of European relations with North Africa looks increasingly at odds with the political dynamics of the broader Middle Eastern region. While Gulf states’ presence is increasingly noted, the EU still refuses to link North Africa with broader Middle East development initiatives.
Nesting North Africa within a broader regional strategy in practice has lost ground. Experts have criticized the ENP for undermining the multilateralism of the Euro-Med vision. UMed is presented as a means of recovering such regionalism, but its form of regionalism makes little sense in geopolitical terms.
Mixing North African challenges with Balkan dynamics must count as one of the more idiosyncratic efforts to improve strategic coherence. (Balkan states are members of UMed.) North African diplomats also complain that the EU jealously guards its own initiatives when the region seeks broader multilateral partnerships. Competition with US initiatives still outweighs transatlantic cooperation to the dismay of North African diplomats. The EU has yet to open up to such cooperation in response to US President Barak Obama’s call for a "new beginning" in the region. The EU has shown no willingness to modify the framework of its own partnerships to incorporate Russian and emerging powers’ roles in the region.
'Just keep them out!'
An exclusionist approach to security increasingly prevails in European policy toward North Africa. The Barcelona process added a fourth chapter in 2005 on Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security. The very rationale of the new Union for the Mediterranean is to address issues that have a specifically trans-Mediterranean dimension, such as reducing illegal migration.
Migration has been increasingly defined as a security concern. The lifting of border controls within Europe has been accompanied by a strengthening of external controls. One of the most extreme cases was Italy’s pressure on Libya in 2004 to sign an agreement to take back illegal migrants and hold them in detention centers ready for return to other African states.
In the summer of 2009, Italian-Libyan cooperation on border patrols was boosted after Colonel Muamar Gaddafi’s meeting with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Most diplomats admit that the security logic is increasingly one of ‘just keep them out!’ The formation of the Algeria-based al-Qaida in the Islamist Maghreb has compounded such thinking, rather than prompting a renewed focus on underlying causes.
The Justice and Home Affairs framework is being mobilized to strengthen North African regimes’ security capacities. Security cooperation and information sharing with North African governments is both proper and necessary. However, it has been prioritized to an extent that Europe now encourages rights derogations in North Africa in pursuit of a ‘surveillance and control’ approach to security.
The European Parliament has been increasingly critical that EU aid is being diverted to counterterrorism from development and social priorities. Interior ministers are increasingly dominant in Euro-Med fora. The securitization of migration has been tenuously conflated with the issue of cross-border criminal networks and illicit trade across the Mediterranean.
European officials insist that their security and counterterrorism initiatives are broader than critics charge and increasingly incorporate rule of law issues and human rights training. The UK says its involvement in such matters has increased under its Contest II program. Yet such efforts remain limited in scope and ambition. While governments label many of their security measures as supportive of governance reform, they are, ironically, not willing to give details of such efforts to improve ‘transparency.’ This ‘radicalization’ approach is increasingly defensive – exactly what the EMP promised to avoid.
A vision unfulfilled
The focus on human rights and democracy has virtually disappeared from view. UMed rolls back the EMP’s aquis on democracy and human rights. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues to militate against European enthusiasm for the democracy agenda and provides North African regimes with a grievance they feel justifies a resistance to partnership on democratic values. And, despite endless rhetoric to the contrary, European governments remain highly cautious about engaging with Islamist opposition forces in North Africa.
After launching a number of useful reform projects under its Engaging with the Islamic World initiative, the UK has disappointingly removed itself from this area of policy. The EU has moved further and further away from seeking a ‘ring of well-governed states’ on its southern edge in favor of a ‘ring of firmly governed states.’ European claims to a ‘postmodern’ approach to security increasingly ring hollow.
The idea of linking political objectives with economic transformation is not fairing much better.
European investment to North Africa remains limited. After increasing in the mid-2000s, 2008 investment flows across the Mediterranean fell by half. The investment that does take place is still oriented to large-scale, state-led projects, not useful for dispersing and energizing grassroots economic activity.
Growth in the southern Mediterranean has been driven in large measure by an expanding informal sector, operating largely outside the framework of Euro-Med linkages. Both UMed and the EMP exclude the focus on economic restructuring that was central to the original Euro-Med vision. Diplomats concur that the goal of creating a Euro-Med free trade area has now been pushed back even further. This is another area of policy drift about which the UK’s voice has been increasingly inaudible.
Under the ENP, southern states have to take on swathes of EU standards, but still do not get full and free access to the European market. Contrary to North African demands, the Commission is still inclined to argue that free trade in agriculture would not be an important incentive for Arab states. As one diplomat acknowledges, "without free access for agriculture, we are not credible as a foreign policy actor." It is an old problem, subject to many promised breakthroughs. Yet it remains.
The North African problems that motivated the creation of the ENP in 1995 have only worsened in the last decade and a half. The critique offered here is not meant to hold the EU to an unrealistically pure standard of idealism. But current policy does not constitute a sustainable, forward-looking strategy. It underestimates growing local instability and protest against regimes in North Africa by failing to acknowledge how brittle the relationship is between populations and regimes. This is not the dramatic conflict that attracts policymakers’ attention elsewhere in the Middle East, but portends much future trouble.
The EU has reacted to the cluster of current strategic, economic, political and energy challenges by fleeing from its own policy prescriptions – just when they are more necessary than ever. Which will the 2010 Spanish presidency prefer: comfortable continuity or a bumpy, but overdue, rethink?
This essay is taken from a longer version of an article published in International Affairs, September 2009.
Dr Richard Youngs is director of research at FRIDE. He served as an EU Marie Curie research fellow from 2001 to 2004. He holds a PhD from the University of Warwick, and previously worked as an analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK.
Kristina Kausch is a researcher at FRIDE. She focuses on on European policies of democracy support in the European neighborhood, in particular in the Southern Mediterranean. She holds an Master's in international relations from the University of Göttingen.
FRIDE, where this article first appeared (PDF), is a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
The Union for the Mediterranean does not represent a rebirth but rather the further atrophy of the vision that infused the inception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. Spain promises to revitalize Euro-Mediterranean relations during its presidency – something each new EU presidency does, ritually. This time, however, broader reassessment is required.
Relations between North Africa and Europe have become increasingly devoid of the ‘transformational’ partnership that has long been promised. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was predicated on joint commitments to cooperative security, region-building, burden-sharing, cultural proximity, economic support and political modernization. That vision languishes today in North Africa.
The policy areas that are flourishing are those of a defensive and exclusionary bent, subverting the EMP’s ostensible rationale. Relations between Europe and North Africa are suspended in unhealthy stasis. Partnership has shifted even further towards controlled surveillance. What might be termed the founding ‘Euro-Med vision’ is about to expire.
The new Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), established at French instigation in July 2008, clearly dilutes the political character and thrust of the EMP vision. Reining in the initial, intemperate proposal put forward by the French government to exclude all but the coastal EU member states afforded some relief, and the new initiative in effect folded into the EMP. But this does not change the substantive gist of the new Union.
Its main focus is on relatively uncontroversial areas of cooperation such as solar power, maritime transport, civil protection, education and small businesses. At this technical level, most policy areas identified as priorities are in fact already the subject of deep institutionalized cooperation.
The idea to lighten bureaucratic procedure is a good one – although not one easily squared with the creation of yet another institution, a Barcelona-based secretariat charged with running the UMed. But the main issue is that the UMed is expressly designed to push the focus of relations away from the most sensitive political areas.
Ill-formed policy linkages
The familiar problem of relations with North Africa being ‘infected’ by the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been overcome. No positive link has been made between policy in North Africa and efforts to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process – supposedly the EMP’s central rationale as a pan-Mediterranean initiative.
The impotence of both European and North African states in the face of Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008 paid tragic testament to this. It demonstrated that the logic of a positive spillover effect from a comprehensive cooperative security endeavor is farther away from being realized than ever. In private, senior diplomats admit that the new, ‘co-owned’ institutional structure even further undermines the potential for a policy toward North Africa that is autonomous from the obstacles of the peace process. In fact, UMed was paralyzed for most of its first year in operation by the Arab League’s insistence on a seat and then by the Gaza conflict.
The bilateralism of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has offered North African states some concrete gains in specific sectors of cooperation that have been liberated from linkage to the problematic regional context. Yet such parcelized approaches sit uneasily with the much proclaimed logic of the EMP.
With Saudi Arabia now playing a leading role in the peace process and so much diplomacy hinging on the link between this and the Syria-Iran nexus, the ‘Mediterranean’ basis of European relations with North Africa looks increasingly at odds with the political dynamics of the broader Middle Eastern region. While Gulf states’ presence is increasingly noted, the EU still refuses to link North Africa with broader Middle East development initiatives.
Nesting North Africa within a broader regional strategy in practice has lost ground. Experts have criticized the ENP for undermining the multilateralism of the Euro-Med vision. UMed is presented as a means of recovering such regionalism, but its form of regionalism makes little sense in geopolitical terms.
Mixing North African challenges with Balkan dynamics must count as one of the more idiosyncratic efforts to improve strategic coherence. (Balkan states are members of UMed.) North African diplomats also complain that the EU jealously guards its own initiatives when the region seeks broader multilateral partnerships. Competition with US initiatives still outweighs transatlantic cooperation to the dismay of North African diplomats. The EU has yet to open up to such cooperation in response to US President Barak Obama’s call for a "new beginning" in the region. The EU has shown no willingness to modify the framework of its own partnerships to incorporate Russian and emerging powers’ roles in the region.
'Just keep them out!'
An exclusionist approach to security increasingly prevails in European policy toward North Africa. The Barcelona process added a fourth chapter in 2005 on Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security. The very rationale of the new Union for the Mediterranean is to address issues that have a specifically trans-Mediterranean dimension, such as reducing illegal migration.
Migration has been increasingly defined as a security concern. The lifting of border controls within Europe has been accompanied by a strengthening of external controls. One of the most extreme cases was Italy’s pressure on Libya in 2004 to sign an agreement to take back illegal migrants and hold them in detention centers ready for return to other African states.
In the summer of 2009, Italian-Libyan cooperation on border patrols was boosted after Colonel Muamar Gaddafi’s meeting with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Most diplomats admit that the security logic is increasingly one of ‘just keep them out!’ The formation of the Algeria-based al-Qaida in the Islamist Maghreb has compounded such thinking, rather than prompting a renewed focus on underlying causes.
The Justice and Home Affairs framework is being mobilized to strengthen North African regimes’ security capacities. Security cooperation and information sharing with North African governments is both proper and necessary. However, it has been prioritized to an extent that Europe now encourages rights derogations in North Africa in pursuit of a ‘surveillance and control’ approach to security.
The European Parliament has been increasingly critical that EU aid is being diverted to counterterrorism from development and social priorities. Interior ministers are increasingly dominant in Euro-Med fora. The securitization of migration has been tenuously conflated with the issue of cross-border criminal networks and illicit trade across the Mediterranean.
European officials insist that their security and counterterrorism initiatives are broader than critics charge and increasingly incorporate rule of law issues and human rights training. The UK says its involvement in such matters has increased under its Contest II program. Yet such efforts remain limited in scope and ambition. While governments label many of their security measures as supportive of governance reform, they are, ironically, not willing to give details of such efforts to improve ‘transparency.’ This ‘radicalization’ approach is increasingly defensive – exactly what the EMP promised to avoid.
A vision unfulfilled
The focus on human rights and democracy has virtually disappeared from view. UMed rolls back the EMP’s aquis on democracy and human rights. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues to militate against European enthusiasm for the democracy agenda and provides North African regimes with a grievance they feel justifies a resistance to partnership on democratic values. And, despite endless rhetoric to the contrary, European governments remain highly cautious about engaging with Islamist opposition forces in North Africa.
After launching a number of useful reform projects under its Engaging with the Islamic World initiative, the UK has disappointingly removed itself from this area of policy. The EU has moved further and further away from seeking a ‘ring of well-governed states’ on its southern edge in favor of a ‘ring of firmly governed states.’ European claims to a ‘postmodern’ approach to security increasingly ring hollow.
The idea of linking political objectives with economic transformation is not fairing much better.
European investment to North Africa remains limited. After increasing in the mid-2000s, 2008 investment flows across the Mediterranean fell by half. The investment that does take place is still oriented to large-scale, state-led projects, not useful for dispersing and energizing grassroots economic activity.
Growth in the southern Mediterranean has been driven in large measure by an expanding informal sector, operating largely outside the framework of Euro-Med linkages. Both UMed and the EMP exclude the focus on economic restructuring that was central to the original Euro-Med vision. Diplomats concur that the goal of creating a Euro-Med free trade area has now been pushed back even further. This is another area of policy drift about which the UK’s voice has been increasingly inaudible.
Under the ENP, southern states have to take on swathes of EU standards, but still do not get full and free access to the European market. Contrary to North African demands, the Commission is still inclined to argue that free trade in agriculture would not be an important incentive for Arab states. As one diplomat acknowledges, "without free access for agriculture, we are not credible as a foreign policy actor." It is an old problem, subject to many promised breakthroughs. Yet it remains.
The North African problems that motivated the creation of the ENP in 1995 have only worsened in the last decade and a half. The critique offered here is not meant to hold the EU to an unrealistically pure standard of idealism. But current policy does not constitute a sustainable, forward-looking strategy. It underestimates growing local instability and protest against regimes in North Africa by failing to acknowledge how brittle the relationship is between populations and regimes. This is not the dramatic conflict that attracts policymakers’ attention elsewhere in the Middle East, but portends much future trouble.
The EU has reacted to the cluster of current strategic, economic, political and energy challenges by fleeing from its own policy prescriptions – just when they are more necessary than ever. Which will the 2010 Spanish presidency prefer: comfortable continuity or a bumpy, but overdue, rethink?
This essay is taken from a longer version of an article published in International Affairs, September 2009.
Dr Richard Youngs is director of research at FRIDE. He served as an EU Marie Curie research fellow from 2001 to 2004. He holds a PhD from the University of Warwick, and previously worked as an analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK.
Kristina Kausch is a researcher at FRIDE. She focuses on on European policies of democracy support in the European neighborhood, in particular in the Southern Mediterranean. She holds an Master's in international relations from the University of Göttingen.
FRIDE, where this article first appeared (PDF), is a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010 |
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Spain’s Diminished Policy In The Mediterranean
By Kristina Kausch for FRIDE
Spain has been losing influence in the Mediterranean. Nicolas Sarkozy’s re-shaping of the EU–Mediterranean policy framework according to French preferences in a revamped Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) poured water on an already dampened Spanish spirit.
While the Felipe González administration was able to introduce a number of key initiatives during the early 1990s (the Barcelona Process, the Madrid peace conference and the 5+5 dialogue), the José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero government has not been able to establish itself as a leader in the Mediterranean. The withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq in 2004 has re-established a largely positive image of Spain in the Southern Mediterranean. In terms of concrete policy, however, the Zapatero government has yet to show visionary leadership – something sorely needed in this region beset by historic conflict, economic weakness and political oppression.
The Alliance of Civilisations (AoC), Zapatero’s major initiative aimed at fostering intercultural understanding between the West and the Arab world, was picked up by the UN and supported by a wide range of governments. But it remains low profile with few clear results.
Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos argued that the endorsement of the AoC by many governments was in itself an indicator of its success. This is a rather unconvincing measure, however. It remains doubtful to what extent the AoC’s aim of using intercultural dialogue to prevent terrorism can be achieved through an initiative that mainly reinforces ties between authoritarian governments whose very actions are among the main causes of radicalisation. What appears to have been one of the Alliance’s implicit purposes – positioning Zapatero on the international map – has largely remained unfulfilled.
Focusing on trade, narrowly defined security concerns and non-interventionist diplomacy, Spain’s approach in the Mediterranean has failed to put into practice the kind of over-arching normative multilateralism so ardently evoked by Zapatero in countless speeches. There have been a number of detours into the normative terrain, including a substantial increase in Spain’s development budget. Overall, however, Spain has been among the major driving forces of the EU’s return to old-fashioned, realist security approaches and the proliferation of narrowly defensive and exclusionary policies in the Mediterranean. The Barcelona process was based on the post-modern idea of aspiring to turn the Mediterranean into an area of cooperative security, stability and shared prosperity. Designed to move the focus of relations between Europe and North Africa away from the most sensitive (but also most urgent) political areas, the Union for the Mediterranean has institutionalised lowered expectations.
The trend towards securitisation and a stronger prioritisation of national interests evident in EU member states’ policies towards the Mediterranean has been especially apparent in Spanish perspectives. Spain has been an active promoter of its political and economic interests across the Mediterranean. Through the Union for the Mediterranean and the promotion of trade and investment between the two shores under its EU presidency, Spain hopes to boost its economy, which has been more adversely affected by the economic crisis than other EU member states.
Morocco is Spain’s top priority. This special relationship is reflected in Spain’s successful lobbying to grant Morocco an ‘advanced status’ in its relations with the EU (due for its first evaluation in an EU–Morocco summit under the Spanish EU presidency). Relations with Algeria have been dominated by economic concerns, notably energy, and have experienced a number of tensions due to Madrid’s position of so-called ‘active neutrality’ in the Western Sahara conflict.
Spain depends more heavily than other EU member states on Algerian (and to a lesser degree, Libyan) gas imports. Roughly one-third of Spanish energy supplies come from the Middle East and North Africa.
Spain’s interests in Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon are largely embedded in their respective roles in the Middle East peace process and other conflicts in the region. Spain is still mostly active in the Eastern Mediterranean through multilateral channels. The increasing Spanish role in multilateral peacekeeping efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean, via the presence of Spanish troops under the mandate of UNIFIL in Lebanon, has been noted positively. Turkey has occupied an increasingly important position among Spain’s Mediterranean partners, and the Zapatero government has been a strong advocate of Turkey’s EU membership.
Compared to other EU member states, Spain is known for its soft stance towards redressing the autocratic status quo in the Mediterranean. The Spanish government maintains excellent relations with the region’s worst dictators, earning it increasing criticism from within and beyond Spanish borders. The government’s largely uncritical pro-Moroccan posture regarding the Western Sahara issue has been the subject of numerous demonstrations and parliamentary hearings in the Spanish Congress. Most recently, the case of Saharawi rights activist Aminatou Haidar displayed the unsustainability of Spain’s approach towards the Western Sahara issue, and Moroccan authoritarianism in general.
Spanish relations with Ben Ali’s dictatorial regime in Tunisia, the region’s most overlooked dictatorship, are regularly qualified as ‘excellent’. Tunisia aspires to an upgrade of relations with the EU similar to Morocco’s ‘advanced status’. As the Swedish EU presidency emphasised the country’s terrible democracy and human rights record, Tunisia chose to await the – likely more convivial – Spanish presidency to proceed with negotiations. Unlike most of his European homologues, Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos attended Colonel Gaddafi’s 2009 military parade in Libya to celebrate the dictator’s 40 years in power. The declared objective in Spain’s General Human Rights Plan that ‘The promotion of human rights across the world is a priority objective of the Government that transcends all governmental actions’ remains empty rhetoric in the Mediterranean. This has been one of the main sources of criticism from other EU member states against the Zapatero government, and a major dent in its international ‘progressive’ reputation.
During the Spanish EU presidency in the first half of 2010, Spain will declare the Mediterranean one of its many priorities. The Spanish presidency wants to breathe new life into the Union for the Mediterranean, put its legal and institutional structure into place, and crown this with the celebration of an EU–Mediterranean summit in Barcelona in June 2010, at which the first approved projects on infrastructure, education and employment will be re-launched. On the bilateral level, the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans with several Southern partners is due in 2010.
Several Southern Mediterranean ENP countries have requested an upgrade of relations with the EU similar to Morocco’s statut avancé. Among them is Egypt, for whose request the Zapatero government has already signalled its support; an EU-Egypt summit will be held under the Spanish Presidency. The Spanish Presidency also aims to close an EU framework agreement with Libya and an Energy Partnership with Algeria; improve the Association Agreement with Tunisia; and hold a summit under the 5+5 Mediterranean security dialogue. In addition to these significant commitments, Spain has also vowed to work – in close cooperation with the US government – towards a revitalisation of the Middle East peace process.
UNDERLYING CAUSES, COMPETING INTERESTS
In a number of instances, the Spanish government has spoken out against human rights violations, most recently against Morocco in the case of Aminatou Haidar. These examples are few, however, and consequently attract far less public attention than the many cases where the Spanish government has declined to stand up for human rights. Spain’s incoherent normative policies may be partly rooted in the narrow conception of human rights protection that underlies Spanish external action.
Zapatero often speaks about human rights, but never about democracy. The government seeks to strengthen the UN Human Rights Council, but refuses to meet with dissidents or discuss the need for systemic democratic transformation in its partner countries. When Tunisian dictator Ben Ali recently got himself ‘re-elected’ in an entirely rigged poll in which political opposition was fiercely oppressed, the Spanish government refrained from comment.
Asked about the reasons for this Spanish silence, a senior ministry official replied that Spain was ‘focusing on human rights’ instead. This extremely narrow understanding of human rights protection ignores the institutional causes that allow human rights violations. As such, it is at odds with the notion of human security that the Spanish government proclaims elsewhere. The Zapatero government promotes women’s and children’s rights and opposes the death penalty, but fails to promote a political environment in the southern Mediterranean that would empower citizens to protect themselves against state abuses and render human rights protection by outside actors unnecessary. Crucially, Spanish policy in the region suggests that the Spanish government lacks a coherent, sustainable long-term vision for the Mediterranean.
Due to closer political and economic ties and differing foreign policy traditions, the southern European EU member states have long pursued a more unadulterated interest-based policy in the Mediterranean than northern EU member states.
Although Spanish diplomacy has ‘Europeanised’ significantly in both structure and state of mind over the last decade, out-dated concepts such as the narrow-minded focus on Spanish national interests suggest that Spanish foreign policy is still not perceived as fully ‘European’ by its partners.
Paradoxically, and to the regret of many human rights activists in the Maghreb, the relatively recent experience of the Spanish transition, which enjoyed substantial support from abroad, appears not to have meaningfully fostered Spain’s vocation to strengthen democratic transitions in its immediate neighbourhood.
The particularly strong link of foreign policy to domestic developments in Spain has significantly influenced the government’s foreign policy. In addition, the strong influence of political parties and the marked ideological polarisation of the Spanish political landscape between the social democrat PSOE and the conservative PP have played an important role through the large number of political appointments in foreign ministry top positions and in shaping the political debate in Spain.
Institutionally, Spain has a head start on most EU foreign ministries in terms of closeness of relations and experience in the Mediterranean, and has a number of civil servants specialising in this area. However, limited coordination among different divisions and insufficient personnel capacities hinder strategic policy planning and underline the need for a reform of the Spanish Foreign Service.
One notable feature of Spanish Mediterranean policy is its tendency to brand initiatives with a Spanish label. In countless Spanish policy documents and top diplomats’ statements, the emphasis on Spanish protagonism in the Mediterranean often appears to prevail over serious reflections on finding sustainable solutions to the region’s problems. Some ascribe the Spanish urge to position itself thus to an abiding inferiority complex relative to France. Others ascribe it to the Zapatero government’s need to produce ameaningful foreign policy legacy by the end of its second term. The establishment of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean in Barcelona, for example, was no doubt a success for Spanish diplomacy. However, the way this success has been over-emphasised in diplomats’ public statements suggests that its location is more important than both the Secretariat itself and the substantial work it will be carrying out.
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
Its turn in the rotating EU presidency gives the so far inward-looking Spanish government a unique opportunity to become a more significant player in terms of EU foreign policy. In the Mediterranean Spain must focus more on substance, less on branding. It must show that it can deal with complex interdependences and put into practice the effective multilateralism it has promised to promote. Crucially, it must prioritise EU consensus and unity in the face of huge regional challenges and post-Lisbon internal governance confusions. If the Spanish EU presidency were to pass up this opportunity by putting its own interests first, this would be a tragedy for Europe, and a historic embarrassment for Zapatero.
The Spanish government can do the Mediterranean (and thereby Spanish interests) some good and at the same time finish the Spanish EU presidency with its head held high. Spanish influence in the Mediterranean should not be overestimated. Spain has declared that it will prioritise an injection of new impetus to the Middle East peace process during its presidency, but this issue will not be solved by Spanish or EU initiatives. Moratinos’ considerable personal experience notwithstanding, Spain should avoid infecting the young, fragile UfM with an improbable peace initiative. Rather it should focus on consolidating Spain’s recently improved relationship with the US, and be ready to assist and foster consensus among EU member states if the opportunity arises.
Relations with Morocco are a potential area of mutual interest for Spain and the EU. The Spanish EU presidency should use its privileged position to fill the ‘advanced status’ with meaning. The current policy of interwoven dependencies in Spain’s bilateral relations with Morocco is in principle a forward-looking (although not infallible) policy to tie Morocco to Europe. By making the statut avancé into a new model of integration with the South, Spain would be able to show sceptical northern EU member states that the south of the Mediterranean is not a lost cause and that integration, short of EU membership, can still provide a successful model.
However, Spain must make sure that the EU’s approach towards Morocco is balanced and in line with basic European values and commitments both in terms of discourse and practice. A promotion of substantial economic and social reforms in Morocco without equally painful systemic reforms in the political sphere might be favourable for immediate Spanish trade and security interests. In the mid-term, however, such a policy damages key European security interests in the region by ignoring the risk of radicalisation generated by political oppression. The case of Aminatou Haidar is only the most recent example of the unsustainability of the largely uncritical pro-Moroccan Spanish stance towards the Western Sahara issue and shows how these policies will increasingly backfire as integration advances.
This also includes the consideration of alternative interlocutors in the region, as Northern Africa is preparing for a wave of ‘successions’ with no clear outcome. The comfortable tacit alliance with the old generation of authoritarian rulers will thus soon be over either way. On top of this, the precedent of the Moroccan statut avancé will determine the future of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In order to avoid making a mockery of the ENP’s conditionality rationale – and thereby its credibility – the EU must make the statut avancé into a framework for meaningful political reform rather than a mere symbolic diplomatic decoration.
Other areas where Spain could play a positive role and add value to sustainable EU policy-making in the Mediterranean include:
Kristina Kausch is a researcher at FRIDE.This article (PDF) was originally published by FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
Spain has been losing influence in the Mediterranean. Nicolas Sarkozy’s re-shaping of the EU–Mediterranean policy framework according to French preferences in a revamped Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) poured water on an already dampened Spanish spirit.
While the Felipe González administration was able to introduce a number of key initiatives during the early 1990s (the Barcelona Process, the Madrid peace conference and the 5+5 dialogue), the José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero government has not been able to establish itself as a leader in the Mediterranean. The withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq in 2004 has re-established a largely positive image of Spain in the Southern Mediterranean. In terms of concrete policy, however, the Zapatero government has yet to show visionary leadership – something sorely needed in this region beset by historic conflict, economic weakness and political oppression.
The Alliance of Civilisations (AoC), Zapatero’s major initiative aimed at fostering intercultural understanding between the West and the Arab world, was picked up by the UN and supported by a wide range of governments. But it remains low profile with few clear results.
Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos argued that the endorsement of the AoC by many governments was in itself an indicator of its success. This is a rather unconvincing measure, however. It remains doubtful to what extent the AoC’s aim of using intercultural dialogue to prevent terrorism can be achieved through an initiative that mainly reinforces ties between authoritarian governments whose very actions are among the main causes of radicalisation. What appears to have been one of the Alliance’s implicit purposes – positioning Zapatero on the international map – has largely remained unfulfilled.
Focusing on trade, narrowly defined security concerns and non-interventionist diplomacy, Spain’s approach in the Mediterranean has failed to put into practice the kind of over-arching normative multilateralism so ardently evoked by Zapatero in countless speeches. There have been a number of detours into the normative terrain, including a substantial increase in Spain’s development budget. Overall, however, Spain has been among the major driving forces of the EU’s return to old-fashioned, realist security approaches and the proliferation of narrowly defensive and exclusionary policies in the Mediterranean. The Barcelona process was based on the post-modern idea of aspiring to turn the Mediterranean into an area of cooperative security, stability and shared prosperity. Designed to move the focus of relations between Europe and North Africa away from the most sensitive (but also most urgent) political areas, the Union for the Mediterranean has institutionalised lowered expectations.
The trend towards securitisation and a stronger prioritisation of national interests evident in EU member states’ policies towards the Mediterranean has been especially apparent in Spanish perspectives. Spain has been an active promoter of its political and economic interests across the Mediterranean. Through the Union for the Mediterranean and the promotion of trade and investment between the two shores under its EU presidency, Spain hopes to boost its economy, which has been more adversely affected by the economic crisis than other EU member states.
Morocco is Spain’s top priority. This special relationship is reflected in Spain’s successful lobbying to grant Morocco an ‘advanced status’ in its relations with the EU (due for its first evaluation in an EU–Morocco summit under the Spanish EU presidency). Relations with Algeria have been dominated by economic concerns, notably energy, and have experienced a number of tensions due to Madrid’s position of so-called ‘active neutrality’ in the Western Sahara conflict.
Spain depends more heavily than other EU member states on Algerian (and to a lesser degree, Libyan) gas imports. Roughly one-third of Spanish energy supplies come from the Middle East and North Africa.
Spain’s interests in Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon are largely embedded in their respective roles in the Middle East peace process and other conflicts in the region. Spain is still mostly active in the Eastern Mediterranean through multilateral channels. The increasing Spanish role in multilateral peacekeeping efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean, via the presence of Spanish troops under the mandate of UNIFIL in Lebanon, has been noted positively. Turkey has occupied an increasingly important position among Spain’s Mediterranean partners, and the Zapatero government has been a strong advocate of Turkey’s EU membership.
Compared to other EU member states, Spain is known for its soft stance towards redressing the autocratic status quo in the Mediterranean. The Spanish government maintains excellent relations with the region’s worst dictators, earning it increasing criticism from within and beyond Spanish borders. The government’s largely uncritical pro-Moroccan posture regarding the Western Sahara issue has been the subject of numerous demonstrations and parliamentary hearings in the Spanish Congress. Most recently, the case of Saharawi rights activist Aminatou Haidar displayed the unsustainability of Spain’s approach towards the Western Sahara issue, and Moroccan authoritarianism in general.
Spanish relations with Ben Ali’s dictatorial regime in Tunisia, the region’s most overlooked dictatorship, are regularly qualified as ‘excellent’. Tunisia aspires to an upgrade of relations with the EU similar to Morocco’s ‘advanced status’. As the Swedish EU presidency emphasised the country’s terrible democracy and human rights record, Tunisia chose to await the – likely more convivial – Spanish presidency to proceed with negotiations. Unlike most of his European homologues, Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos attended Colonel Gaddafi’s 2009 military parade in Libya to celebrate the dictator’s 40 years in power. The declared objective in Spain’s General Human Rights Plan that ‘The promotion of human rights across the world is a priority objective of the Government that transcends all governmental actions’ remains empty rhetoric in the Mediterranean. This has been one of the main sources of criticism from other EU member states against the Zapatero government, and a major dent in its international ‘progressive’ reputation.
During the Spanish EU presidency in the first half of 2010, Spain will declare the Mediterranean one of its many priorities. The Spanish presidency wants to breathe new life into the Union for the Mediterranean, put its legal and institutional structure into place, and crown this with the celebration of an EU–Mediterranean summit in Barcelona in June 2010, at which the first approved projects on infrastructure, education and employment will be re-launched. On the bilateral level, the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans with several Southern partners is due in 2010.
Several Southern Mediterranean ENP countries have requested an upgrade of relations with the EU similar to Morocco’s statut avancé. Among them is Egypt, for whose request the Zapatero government has already signalled its support; an EU-Egypt summit will be held under the Spanish Presidency. The Spanish Presidency also aims to close an EU framework agreement with Libya and an Energy Partnership with Algeria; improve the Association Agreement with Tunisia; and hold a summit under the 5+5 Mediterranean security dialogue. In addition to these significant commitments, Spain has also vowed to work – in close cooperation with the US government – towards a revitalisation of the Middle East peace process.
UNDERLYING CAUSES, COMPETING INTERESTS
In a number of instances, the Spanish government has spoken out against human rights violations, most recently against Morocco in the case of Aminatou Haidar. These examples are few, however, and consequently attract far less public attention than the many cases where the Spanish government has declined to stand up for human rights. Spain’s incoherent normative policies may be partly rooted in the narrow conception of human rights protection that underlies Spanish external action.
Zapatero often speaks about human rights, but never about democracy. The government seeks to strengthen the UN Human Rights Council, but refuses to meet with dissidents or discuss the need for systemic democratic transformation in its partner countries. When Tunisian dictator Ben Ali recently got himself ‘re-elected’ in an entirely rigged poll in which political opposition was fiercely oppressed, the Spanish government refrained from comment.
Asked about the reasons for this Spanish silence, a senior ministry official replied that Spain was ‘focusing on human rights’ instead. This extremely narrow understanding of human rights protection ignores the institutional causes that allow human rights violations. As such, it is at odds with the notion of human security that the Spanish government proclaims elsewhere. The Zapatero government promotes women’s and children’s rights and opposes the death penalty, but fails to promote a political environment in the southern Mediterranean that would empower citizens to protect themselves against state abuses and render human rights protection by outside actors unnecessary. Crucially, Spanish policy in the region suggests that the Spanish government lacks a coherent, sustainable long-term vision for the Mediterranean.
Due to closer political and economic ties and differing foreign policy traditions, the southern European EU member states have long pursued a more unadulterated interest-based policy in the Mediterranean than northern EU member states.
Although Spanish diplomacy has ‘Europeanised’ significantly in both structure and state of mind over the last decade, out-dated concepts such as the narrow-minded focus on Spanish national interests suggest that Spanish foreign policy is still not perceived as fully ‘European’ by its partners.
Paradoxically, and to the regret of many human rights activists in the Maghreb, the relatively recent experience of the Spanish transition, which enjoyed substantial support from abroad, appears not to have meaningfully fostered Spain’s vocation to strengthen democratic transitions in its immediate neighbourhood.
The particularly strong link of foreign policy to domestic developments in Spain has significantly influenced the government’s foreign policy. In addition, the strong influence of political parties and the marked ideological polarisation of the Spanish political landscape between the social democrat PSOE and the conservative PP have played an important role through the large number of political appointments in foreign ministry top positions and in shaping the political debate in Spain.
Institutionally, Spain has a head start on most EU foreign ministries in terms of closeness of relations and experience in the Mediterranean, and has a number of civil servants specialising in this area. However, limited coordination among different divisions and insufficient personnel capacities hinder strategic policy planning and underline the need for a reform of the Spanish Foreign Service.
One notable feature of Spanish Mediterranean policy is its tendency to brand initiatives with a Spanish label. In countless Spanish policy documents and top diplomats’ statements, the emphasis on Spanish protagonism in the Mediterranean often appears to prevail over serious reflections on finding sustainable solutions to the region’s problems. Some ascribe the Spanish urge to position itself thus to an abiding inferiority complex relative to France. Others ascribe it to the Zapatero government’s need to produce ameaningful foreign policy legacy by the end of its second term. The establishment of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean in Barcelona, for example, was no doubt a success for Spanish diplomacy. However, the way this success has been over-emphasised in diplomats’ public statements suggests that its location is more important than both the Secretariat itself and the substantial work it will be carrying out.
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
Its turn in the rotating EU presidency gives the so far inward-looking Spanish government a unique opportunity to become a more significant player in terms of EU foreign policy. In the Mediterranean Spain must focus more on substance, less on branding. It must show that it can deal with complex interdependences and put into practice the effective multilateralism it has promised to promote. Crucially, it must prioritise EU consensus and unity in the face of huge regional challenges and post-Lisbon internal governance confusions. If the Spanish EU presidency were to pass up this opportunity by putting its own interests first, this would be a tragedy for Europe, and a historic embarrassment for Zapatero.
The Spanish government can do the Mediterranean (and thereby Spanish interests) some good and at the same time finish the Spanish EU presidency with its head held high. Spanish influence in the Mediterranean should not be overestimated. Spain has declared that it will prioritise an injection of new impetus to the Middle East peace process during its presidency, but this issue will not be solved by Spanish or EU initiatives. Moratinos’ considerable personal experience notwithstanding, Spain should avoid infecting the young, fragile UfM with an improbable peace initiative. Rather it should focus on consolidating Spain’s recently improved relationship with the US, and be ready to assist and foster consensus among EU member states if the opportunity arises.
Relations with Morocco are a potential area of mutual interest for Spain and the EU. The Spanish EU presidency should use its privileged position to fill the ‘advanced status’ with meaning. The current policy of interwoven dependencies in Spain’s bilateral relations with Morocco is in principle a forward-looking (although not infallible) policy to tie Morocco to Europe. By making the statut avancé into a new model of integration with the South, Spain would be able to show sceptical northern EU member states that the south of the Mediterranean is not a lost cause and that integration, short of EU membership, can still provide a successful model.
However, Spain must make sure that the EU’s approach towards Morocco is balanced and in line with basic European values and commitments both in terms of discourse and practice. A promotion of substantial economic and social reforms in Morocco without equally painful systemic reforms in the political sphere might be favourable for immediate Spanish trade and security interests. In the mid-term, however, such a policy damages key European security interests in the region by ignoring the risk of radicalisation generated by political oppression. The case of Aminatou Haidar is only the most recent example of the unsustainability of the largely uncritical pro-Moroccan Spanish stance towards the Western Sahara issue and shows how these policies will increasingly backfire as integration advances.
This also includes the consideration of alternative interlocutors in the region, as Northern Africa is preparing for a wave of ‘successions’ with no clear outcome. The comfortable tacit alliance with the old generation of authoritarian rulers will thus soon be over either way. On top of this, the precedent of the Moroccan statut avancé will determine the future of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In order to avoid making a mockery of the ENP’s conditionality rationale – and thereby its credibility – the EU must make the statut avancé into a framework for meaningful political reform rather than a mere symbolic diplomatic decoration.
Other areas where Spain could play a positive role and add value to sustainable EU policy-making in the Mediterranean include:
- taking advantage of positive Spanish-Turkish relations by giving new impetus to Turkey’s EU membership aspirations;
- strengthening the focus on the underlying causes of migratory pressures in EU migration policies;
- lobbying among EU member states to use the integrative and peace-making potential of economic liberalisation in the Mediterranean via enhanced trade liberalisation in agriculture and services and increased mobility of workers and students;
- and backing and actively strengthening the newly created EU institutions in order to foster EU consensus and strengthen effective multilateralism in the Mediterranean.
Kristina Kausch is a researcher at FRIDE.This article (PDF) was originally published by FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. The article appears here with permission.
Sunday, January 17, 2010 |
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