Moscow Building ‘Our Lady Of The Microphones’ In Paris, French Say

By Paul Goble

During Soviet times, US diplomats at the American embassy in Moscow often referred to a nearby Russian Orthodox Church as “Our Lady of the Microphones,” a reference to their assumption that the church served not a religious purpose but rather was an intelligence collection point.

Now, in an echo of the Cold War, the French intelligence services are worried that a Russian Orthodox Church which is scheduled to be built in the center of Paris sometime after 2012 will be used for espionage against the French government rather than or at least in addition to the conduct of religious services.

Drawing on reports in the French, British and US press, Gzt.ru says today that French concerns are based on a combination of three things: First, the land on which the church is to be built currently is owned by Vladimir Kozhin, who Paris believes was “a former agent of the KGB (www.gzt.ru/topnews/realty/-frantsuzy-objyavili-russkii-hram-v-parizhe-/37791.html).

Second, the parcel is in the very center of Paris, not far from the Quay d’Orsay, where both the French foreign ministry and the DCRI, the internal security intelligence service, have their headquarters, and a district in which many prominent French officials, including advisors to President Nicolas Sarkozy, have their residences.

And third, according to French intelligence, there has been a “sharp increase in the activity of Russian spies” in France since Sarkozy’s election, a rise that has reached levels “comparable to those of the mid-1980s,” the last years before Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader.

The French, Western and Russian media suggest, have been especially concerned by Kozhin’s background even though there is no reference in his various biographical reports to service in the KGB, not that there would be if he were truly under deep cover, something that has allowed some journalists to charge that he is or at least was an agent.

Kozhin himself, GZT.ru notes, “ says of this connection that “everything developed according to the standard course. During the last year at a [Soviet] electro-technical institute, he was approached as was at one time Vladimir Putin and offered work in the KGB.” Kozhin says now that he agreed, “and the [clearance] process went forward.”

“Everything was approaching its logical conclusion but the all-powerful Communist Party interfered and sent [him] after finishing the higher educational institution not to the KGB but rather to the Petrograd district committee of the Komsomol. Further conversations about a transfer to the organs did not arise.”

But there is another reason for concern about the possible use by the Russian intelligence services of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad, one that the French are certainly familiar with even though they have not yet made public reference to it in the current case but one that makes such a possibility even more likely.
In 1972, Russian émigré writer Vladimir Volkoff published in Paris his novel, “Le tretre,” a word that combines the French words for priest and traitor. (The English translation is less meaningfully, “The Traitor.”)

The book tells how Moscow made such frequent use of Russian Orthodox priests that the latter often were uncertain of whom they served.

After that book was published, numerous European commentators called attention to the ways in which Soviet intelligence operatives were put into at least some of the Russian Orthodox Churches outside of Russia which were loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and to the cooperation the hierarchs felt compelled to give.

The resurgence of so many aspects of the Soviet past in the behavior of the Russian powers that be and the constantly expressed willingness of the Moscow Patriarchate to be in the service of the Russian state may thus be even greater cause for concern in Paris and elsewhere than the less “religious” reasons French intelligence has offered for its fears.


 Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .    
Sunday, May 30, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russia’s Muslims And Buddhists Want Public Holidays For Their Faiths Too

By Paul Goble

Now that the Russian Duma has approved the Day of the Baptism of Rus’ as a public holiday, leaders of Russia’s Islamic and Buddhist communities say they want their faiths to be recognized in the same way, yet another example of the way in which Moscow’s efforts to use Orthodoxy to unite the country in fact is dividing them.

Wednesday, the Federation Council gave its approval to the bill, earlier passed by the Duma to make the Day of the Baptism of Rus’ a public holiday to be marked in Russia each year on July 28th. That date thus becomes the ninth such holiday in the post-Soviet Russian calendar, but its appearance has sparked demands from other religions for still more.

After the Federation Council voted, Amir Gallyamov, the senator from the Amur oblast, proposed creating another holiday for the Day of the Adoption of Islam, and Buddhists, especially in Kalmykia, suggested that they should have a similar public holiday for their faith. If that happens, these would be the 10th and 11th such holidays.

Gallyamov justified his call by pointing out that Islam had been adopted on the territory of the Russian Federation “66 years” earlier than Orthodoxy was and that it thus deserves a holiday. Federation Council Speaker Sergey Mironov agreed, saying that it would only be fair to take such a step.

Today, the “Svobodnaya pressa” portal published a survey of the reactions of various religious leaders to all these ideas, reactions that suggest the adoption of a Christian holiday in a country with many religions and whose Constitution defines it as a secular state is fraught with dangers (svpressa.ru/society/article/25705/).

Geydar Dzhemal, the outspoken president of the Islamic Committee of Russia, said that adopting a Russian state holiday for Muslims was “absolutely justified and logical. More than that,” he continued, “to ignore this demand would mean offending Muslims.” In a country like Russia, he said, “there must be parity.”

Moreover, Dzhemal argued, “the baptism of Rus,” unlike the acceptance of Islam by the leaders of the Bulgar State, whose territories were subsequently incorporated into Russia, “took place on territories which now belong to another state,” that is to Kyiv in the Republic of Ukraine.

If Moscow creates a holiday for Christians but not for Muslims, he continued, “this will underscore what Muslims already feel, that they are second-class citizens and marginals.” And that in turn will generate a sense among them that they must “change the situation at any price.” If democracy doesn’t work to achieve that end, he said, then they will use “force.”

Asked about the two other so-called “traditional” religions of Russia – Judaism and Buddhism – Dzhemal said that “it is possible to derive the [Jewish] tradition from the Khazar kaganate,” but that state was “an enemy of Rus and Rus defeated it.” In fact, he continued, Jews “arrived in Russia” much later.

As far as Buddhism is concerned, the Muslim activist continued, “it never was a state religion in Russia,” while “Islam was a religion of a sovereign subject of international law, Volga Bulgaria. And if one takes Daghestan into consideration, then it was adopted there still earlier, and there too were state formations.”

Given that religious history, he concluded, the Russian state could be completely neutral if it did not celebrate as a public holiday any religious event. But if it celebrates the holiday of one, as Moscow clearly intends, then Dzhemal concluded, it must mark the holidays of all the other major ones.

Konstantin Bendas, a representative of the Protestant Pentacostals, told “Svobodnaya pressa” that he did not see any need for a “Protestant” public holiday in Russia, and Kapiton Alekseyev, an Old Believer pastor in Moscow oblast, said that he did not even want to talk about the possibility of such a linking of the state and any religion.

Meanwhile, Drikung Kag’yu, a representative of the Buddhist Center, said that “justice requires” creating a public holiday for Russian Buddhists now that one has been created for Russian Orthodox Christians. He said that the best date for that would be May 27th, the birthday of Buddha. That date, he pointed out, is already marked in Kalmykia and Buryatia.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .     
Friday, May 28, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Moscow Patriarch, Catholic Pope Call For Preservation Of Europe’s Christian Roots

By Paul Goble

In yet another sign of the growing rapprochement between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Roman Catholic church, both Patriarch Kirill I and Pope Benedict XVI simultaneously issued statements calling for the preservation of the Christian roots of Europe through the maintenance of Christianity-infused culture.

The two appeals were released last Thursday at a special concert of Russian spiritual music in Rome organized by the Russian Orthodox Church in honor of the fifth anniversary of the papacy of Benedict and attended by him and by a large number of members of the Curia (www.newsru.com/religy/21may2010/aufruf.html).

Kirill’s message was read out by Metropolitan Ilarion, the head of the Patriarchate’s foreign relations department. In it, Kirill noted that “for the first time in history, three outstanding musical collectives, the Russian national Orchestra, the Moscow Synod Choir, and the Rogov Capella of St. Petersburg had come together in the Vatican.”

“During the years of oppression against the Church and the domination of atheism in the state, when the majority of the population could not come into contact with spiritual music, these works, like Russian literature as well, made possible the dissemination of the Gospel message, bringing to the secular world high moral and spiritual ideals.”

In response, Benedict noted that “the coming together of peoples and the dialogue of cultures” is needed for the preservation of a European culture “inspired by the Christian faith” given that this culture now is being neglected. Christianity as reflected in art and culture, he said, can thus spread to the entire society.
“Today,” the pope added, “these roots in the West and in the East can and must inspire a new humanism and become a response to the challenges of contemporary society.” And he expressed gratitude to Kirill for “the moment of meeting with dear brothers from the Moscow Patriarchate” (www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/news/common/news10108.html).

Moscow news sources took note of the fact that the Pope delivered his remarks in Russian, an indication they suggested of the Vatican’s desire to move toward closer relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and possibly another step toward a possible papal visit to the Russian Federation (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=34431).

Before the concern, Metropolitan Ilarion delivered a broader even programmatic message to the Vatican. Arguing that “Russian culture is called upon to assist Europe” with its difficulties, the hierarch said that “cultural exchange must become the main line in the sphere of Orthodox-Catholic relations” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=41717).

At the present time “in the life of multi-national Europe,” Ilarion said, “Russian culture must play a unique role because all of its forms are infused with a Christian spirit. Russian culture possesses a powerful missionary potential and therefore is called to help Europe preserve its Christian heritage and identity.”


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .    
Thursday, May 27, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Moscow Wants To Replace Saakashvili And Lukashenka

By Paul Goble

That Moscow would like to see Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili replaced isn’t news to anyone but that it would like to have someone else in the place of his Belarusian counterpart Alyaksandr Lukashenka may come as a surprise, although Russian analysts say it is far from clear who that might be or how Moscow could arrange it.

Last week, “Newsweek” reported that having claimed “two political scalps” in the last few months with the replacement of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev with more malleable leaders, Moscow was now looking to replace others in the former Soviet space with which it is unhappy.

Not surprisingly, the weekly suggested that Saakashvili was “target number one,” but more interestingly, it indicated that Lukashenka ranked just behind him in the Kremlin’s wish list. Now this week, in “Novaya politika,” Lidiya Adrusenko considers what may happen in Georgia and Belarus and concludes that Moscow faces enormous obstacles in both.

Some of the Moscow officials and analysts with whom “Newsweek” spoke suggested that a move against Saakashvili might begin as early as May 30th when elections are held for the mayor of Tbilisi and for the leaders of other local government bodies across Georgia (www.novopol.ru/-vremya-novyih-liderov-esche-ne-prishlo-text85198.html).

The possibility of using elections in Georgia as the occasion for a kind of “reverse orange-style revolution” was first put forward, Adrusenko points out, not by Duma deputy Sergey Markov as “Newsweek” reported but rather by Zurab Nogaideli, the former Georgian premier who “more often than his other colleagues visits Moscow.”

Nogaideli suggested that “if Saakashvili tries to falsify the vote, then an uprising will begin in Tbilisi similar to ‘the Bishkek revolution.’” But later, the Moscow commentator notes, Nogaideli reversed himself, saying that there would not be a Kyrgyz variant in Georgia, and that “scenarios” of this type were being dreamed up by Saakashvili but not in Moscow.

“Serious analysts,” Andrusenko continues, conclude that “the upcoming elections may turn out to be a complete defeat of the opposition figures, because they cannot unite and are competing among themselves.” Moreover, polls show that 51 percent of Georgians “positively assess” Saakashvili, while “12 percent support the opposition.”

Saakashvili’s ruling party should win without difficulty, these analysts say, “not because the population of Georgia is satisfied with him but because it is disappointed in other political forces” and is not prepared, as the failed counter-demonstration of May 6 showed, ready to follow its lead.

Thus, Andrusenko sums up for Georgia, “Saakashvili’s time has still not come to an end, and Moscow must carry out a lengthy search for an alternative leader on whom it might rely.” But Russia does have one advantage now: It won’t be acting alone because both the EU and the US are increasingly cool toward someone they had earlier enthusiastically backed.

The situation for Moscow in Belarus is more complicated for three reasons: First, although Russian leaders are “terribly tired” of Lukashenka, he is “formally” Russia’s ally, so moving against him is hard. Second, Lukashenka exercises much greater control in his country that Saakashvili does in his.

And third, the opposition in Belarus is far weaker than is its counterpart in Georgia. Those factors combine to mean that Moscow has had far fewer contacts with the Belarusian opposition than it has had with the Georgian one and that the Russian leadership thus has fewer choices about how to proceed to have any chance of success.

Later this year or the beginning of next, Belarus is scheduled to have presidential elections, an event that Moscow might seek to make use of. Lukashenka has indicated that he is ready to serve a fourth term, and all indications are that despite his international isolation he almost certainly could guarantee his “re-election.”

Despite that, Andrusenko continues, Russian officials are beginning to say “and quite openly at that” that they would like to be able “to deal in Belarus with another leader.” For them, the analyst says, the question isn’t so much about whether he would be “pro-Russian” or “pro-European” but rather more pragmatic and predictable.

Alyaksandr Milinkevich, the leader of the pro-Western united Belarusian opposition, is unlikely to get Moscow’s backing, but other leaders who have been discussed include Andrey Sannikov, the former foreign minister, who Andrusenko suggests views the relations Ukraine is now establishing with Moscow as “an example” for Belarus.

But some commentators in Moscow suggest that mentions of Sannikov are “only for cover,” while Moscow finds someone else. And they suggest that the Russiana powers that be might push current head of the Belarusian cabinet Sergey Sidorsky, even though he has expressed no interest in the race.

Consequently and despite Moscow’s desires, Andrusenko concludes, “the epoch of Lukashenka” in Belarus is not likely to come to an end as a result of the elections because the current Belarusian leader has created a political system in which “no one except for himself has a chance to become president” – at least by electoral means.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Thursday, May 27, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Kadyrov Reaches Out To 600,000 Ex-Pat Chechens

By Paul Goble

In his latest bid to boost his power in Grozny and his influence in Moscow, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov is seeking closer ties with the 600,000 ethnic Chechens outside the republic, about half of whom have fled the violence there during the last 20 years and about half consist of communities that have existed for more than a century.

On the one hand, Kadyrov’s efforts are likely to be welcomed in Moscow as a way of reducing the anti-Moscow rhetoric of many in the Chechen diaspora. But on the other, his moves in that direction may inspire other non-Russian groups in Russia to develop similar programs, a trend that could force the powers that be to change the compatriots program.

Indeed, there is some evidence that this may already be happening. Even as Kadyrov made his announcement, government officials and ethnic activists in Mari El have announced plans to reach out to Finno-Ugric groups abroad, something Moscow may be significantly less happy about (gov.mari.ru/main/news/rep/gov/2010/2105_1.phtml).

At a meeting at the end of last week with Chechen Foreign Minister Shamsail Saraliyev and Presidential press secretary Alvi Karimov, Kadyrov said that “it is necessary to establish close ties with the Chechen diaspora,” a group evenly divided between those in other regions of Russia and those further afield (chechnya.gov.ru/page.php?r=126&id=7476).

Of the 600,000 Chechens living outside the republic, 300,000 live in Russian regions, the Chechen president said, with the remainder living in Europe, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As far as the total number of Chechens in Chechnya, Kadyrov continued, that remains to be established by a census he plans there.

“During my recent visit to Turkey and Syria,” the Chechen leader said, “I met with people who came from the Chechen Republic. This people sincerely worry about their Motherland, have been pleased by the changes which have taken place there, and are proud of their origin, even though many of them do not speak their native language.”

“I consider it necessary to organize for them cultural measures,” Kadyrov continued, including exhibits, concerts, and visits. These events, he said, “must be directed at the popularization of the Chechen language and culture. “In Syria, Chechens said that since we launched the Grozny satellite television channel, their children had begun to learn the language.”

According to Kadyrov, “in certain countries, there exist entirely population points in which a large share of the population consists of Chechens.” While in Turkey, he continued, he said he “found out by accident that in one of the population points live more than 7,000 Chechens and the head of their village is also a Chechen. In such places, we must send our representatives so that people will understand that their link with the Motherland is unbroken.”

According to the Chechen Presidential news portal, Karimov said that work in this direction is “already being carried out.” Indeed, he said, “for that part of the diaspora which does not know its native language, [Grozny] intends to prepare books in two language, Arabic and Turkic, in which will be included translations of the works of Chechen writers and poets.”

A significant fraction of the Chechen communities formed more than a century ago are in the Middle East, and it is often from them that Chechens returned to fight against the Russians in the 1990s, leading to the suggestion that there were a large number of Arabs in the Chechen resistance.

In fact, there were Arabs, but they were never as numerous as Moscow claimed; and at least some of the Arabic speakers were ethnic Chechens whose ancestors had left the Russian Empire for the Ottoman Empire and then moved from Anatolia to countries in the Arab world (belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/12785/chechens_in_the_middle_east.html).

Chechens who have fled since 1991 are more often to be found in Europe or the United States, and it is unclear whether Kadyrov’s program will extend to them, all the more so since they typically have been far more antagonistic to his regime than have Chechens living in the Middle East.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Medvedev And Yanukovich Planning ‘Secret Protocol’ On Transdniestria?

By Paul Goble

Although aides to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich are denying it, many commentators and politicians in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania are convinced that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have secretly agreed to a course of action that would have Transdniestria attached to Ukraine and Moldova brought under tight Russian control.

When they met last week, Medvedev and Yanukovich issued a joint declaration about the resolution of the Transdniestria dispute. It contained only general expressions of good will, but a week ago, an official in the Ukrainian president’s protocol service leaked information about the talks of the two presidents that suggested they had agreed on rather more.

Indeed, what some have compared to “the secret protocols” of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the supposed accord calls for a referendum in Transdniestria by the end of the year on its becoming an autonomous republic within Ukraine and pressure on Chisinau to elect a president and form a government more to Moscow’s liking.

In the current issue of “Versiya,” Georgy Filin discusses this case, not only detailing the statements of the various sides but also suggesting some of the consequences for Moldova, Ukraine, and their neighbors if reports about a secret agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich are even partially true (versia.ru/articles/2010/may/24/pridnestrovje).

The leak of information about the supposed accord, Filin says, were “well paid for by functionaries of the Block of Yulia Timoshenko,” and the associates of this anti-Yanukovich party immediately handed copies of the document to Oleh Bilorus, a member of that party who heads the Foreign Relations Committee of the Verkhovna Rada.

Immediately copies were handed over to Chisinau officials where, in Filin’s words, they had “the effect of a bomb going off.” Sergey Mokan, the head of the Moldovan “People’s Action” Movement, said the Medvedev-Yanukovich accord “represents an ultimatum to Moldova and is the beginning of a new military-political expansion in the post-Soviet space.”

“Kyiv and Moscow have decided to act according to the principle of ‘divide and rule.’” Mokan’s comment was expanded upon by Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, who said what Medvedev and Yanukovich had agreed to was like “the swallowing up” businessmen talk about when they takeover companies. And neither asked the Moldovans what they “think.”

“What in fact have Russia and Ukraine prepared for Moldova and Transdniestria?” Filin asks rhetorically. The first thing that has to be said, he points out, is that “the protocols which have fallen into the hands of Ukrainian journalists were prepared by the Ukrainian side” rather than being a joint statement or agreement.

They are thus, the “Versiya” journalist says, “exclusively ‘the Ukrainian vision’ of the resolution of the Transdniestria question and at the same time of the Moldovan one.” That “vision” calls for a referendum in November or December in Transdniestria concerning that breakaway territory’s inclusion into Ukraine as an autonomous republic.

Why, Filin asks, did the accord not call for uniting Transdniestria to the Russian Federation, as many in Transdniestria have proposed? The answer to that question, he continues, is “very simple.” Uniting Transdniestria to Ukraine makes greater sense economically, and doing so will allow Russia to “begin in Moldova a program of ‘an orange counterrevolution.’”

That will allow the Russian powers that be to orchestrate the election by the Moldovan parliament of a pro-Moscow president sometime next year. “Of course,” Filin continues, “one cannot talk about any Anschluss of Moldova by Russia.” In this case, “the technology is different,” one that counts on Moldovan wine producers wanting to sell their output in Russia.

According to Ukrainian parliamentarian Bilorus, “the new leadership of Ukraine has taken a new position concerning Transdniestria, one that in essence is the copy of Russia’s position.” Two years ago, he continued, Moscow offered Kyiv the same deal: ‘You gather in Transdniestria and give us Moldova,” an exchange then-President Viktor Yushchenko rejected.

Romania’s President Traian Basescu has reacted just as harshly as the Moldovans. “If Kyiv has pretensions concerning the return of Transdniestria to Ukraine, then officials there should not forget about the return to Chisinau of Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, territories which the former Ukrainian SSR received after the Second World War.”

And Basescu suggested that “Moscow and now Kyiv are trying to create on the territory which at the end of World War II should have been returned to Romania a pseudo-federation of three political-legal pseudo-subjects. But we will do everything to oppose the Russian-Ukrainian plan for the amputation of Bessarabia.”

Although Filin does not mention it, the possibility that Moldova could become part of Romania if Transdniestria were to become an autonomy within Ukraine is not the only way in which such a Russian-Ukrainian plan would send shockwaves through the international system far beyond Transdniestria.

If Transdniestria were transferred, that would trigger a provision in the 1994 accord between Chisinau and the Gagauz, an Orthodox Christian Turkic-speaking community in southern Moldova. That agreement allows the Gagauz to withdraw from Moldova if the status of Transdniestria were ever to change.

Perhaps because of these reactions or perhaps because the supposed agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich never took place, Yanukovich’s office has been at pains to deny that there is or was any such accord. Anna German, a representative of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration made a public declaration to that effect.

“Transdniestria will remain independent and not become part of Ukraine,” she said. Suggestions to the contrary are “provocations” by Yuliya Timoshenko in order to cast doubt on “the political and diplomatic successes of Viktor Yanukovich in order to destabilize the situation in the country.”

But Filin concludes, her words are less than fully convincing, all the more because the Verkhovna Rada has already discussed the procedure that would have to be followed for places like Transdniestria to join Ukraine. Indeed, he says, the Ukrainian deputies have come up with a slogan: ‘Transdniestria – the First Stage of a New Pereyaslavska Rada’ – neither more nor less!”


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .  
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Shiite Principles Allow Iran To Lie About Nuclear Plans, Russian Scholar Says

By Paul Goble

The current standoff between Iran and much of the rest of the world over nuclear issues, one of Russia’s leading specialists on Islam says, is complicated by the specific features of Shiite Islam regarding dealings with non-Muslims, features that not only provide for but in fact justify lying by Shiite political leaders tabout their plans.

In an essay in the current issue of “NG-Religii,” Ignatenko, the president of the Moscow Institute of Religion and Politics and a member of Dmitry Medvedev’s Council on Relations with Religious Organizations, discusses these features and their consequences for current and future exchanges (religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-05-19/6_cheaters.html).

According to Ignatenko, “in discussions about the Iranian nuclear bomb there is a clash between two different political cultures,” a Western one which is “rational” and which requires clear and unambiguous answers to questions” and “Islamic political culture, the basis of which is the use of cleverness and their combinations.

And there is, the Moscow scholar continues, “one additional principled distinction: Western politicians are responsible to their citizens and worry about being caught lying,” while “Iranian [leaders] are responsible before Allah, who prohibits lying” but whose followers have interpreted that ban in interesting ways.

“In all schools of Islamic shariat … in addition to the common definition of a lie (‘qizb’), there are a multitude of other terms which designate other kinds of deception which allow those who follow this system to get around the religious prohibition on lies” and in certain cases even justify doing exactly that, Ignatenko says.

Iranian Shiites, the Moscow scholar goes on, have the principle of “taqia,” which “allows a Shiite in the case of definite danger to conceal his true faith and even to assert that he is a Sunni. Or [more generally, Ignatenko continues] to conceal his political views and goals,” something that opens the way to outright lies.

Indeed, drawing on this idea, “cleverness, deception or confusing an opponent is not only not prohibited but it is even recommended,” on the basis of numerous Koranic passages. The Koran asserts that “Allah has all cleverness” (13:42), and a hadith ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed has it that “war is deception.”

Recently, Ignatenko continues, “Ali Aqbar Salehi, the Iranian vice president who oversees Tehran’s nuclear program, wrote in a Russian newspaper that “Our spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Hameni has declared that the creation of a [nuclear] bomb is illegally and contradicts Islam. A nuclear bomb is something prohibited,” as is its possession and use.

That might seem to some to be an absolute assertion that Iran will not build a bomb, the Moscow researcher says, but “read this passage again. Here is not said precisely and unambiguously that the Iranians will not create a nuclear bomb,” adding that he, Ignatenko, would not want anyone concerned about Iran’s plans to be less so as a result.

The reason is that today such a weapon may be “a sin,” but tomorrow it can be “permitted.” As the Moscow scholar notes, “The Shiite religious leadership have a very convenient principle: ‘according to the conditions of the time’ which allows them with a pure conscience to publish fetwas that contradict one another on any given question.”

In 1979, for example, Imam Khomeini declared the caviar business to be “sinful” before he came to power, but then after he overthrew the shah, he issued “a special fetwa which completely overturned the content of the earlier one” and declared that the production and sale of caviar was permitted.

Another reason for being skeptical about Iranian statements, Ignatenko says, has to do with the Shiite understanding of theodicy, of the way in which evil emerged in a world created by a totally good Allah. That involves the principle of “emanation” -- in Persian, “faiz” -- which holds that something which is at one time good or bad may be transformed into its opposite.

And in addition, Ignatenko continues, “an analysis of the declarations of the Iranian leadership and its real actions in the foreign policy arena in the light of the traditions of Islamic political culture shows that the Iranians are following a strategy which could be called, ‘two melons in one hand,’ derived from the Persian saying that ‘one can’t hold two melons at once.’”

At present, he argues, Tehran is pursuing two different goals: the nuclearization of Iran and the expansion of Iranian influence in the Greater Middle East, each of which has the intended effect of detracting the attention of some from the other and thus opening the way for Iran to succeed in ways they do not expect.

This dual purpose, Ignatenko says, explains why Iran, “instead of making friends with its Arab neighbors against Israel and the United States, is manifesting antagonism” to them. That distracts some but far from all Arabs from seeing the Iranian threat just as Iran’s nuclear project distorts the understanding of the West from Tehran’s regional activities.

“The gradual nuclearization of Iran which is taking place in reality plays the role of a ‘red flag’ which the clever Iranians throw out when it is necessary to distract attention from the unceasing process of the creation by them of ‘a Shiite crescent’” across the Middle East, Ignatenko continues.

And such a distraction gives Iran something else: a chance to “realize its genuine goals [because] the international community is ready to assist the nuclearization of Iran on favorable conditions, as long as it rejects the creation of nuclear weapons. But Iran has not refused.” And it will continue to use the bomb as a kind of negotiating instrument in “a Persian bazaar.”

According to Ignatenko, there have been signals from Washington concerning a possible American recognition of “a regional role” for Iran. And it “must not be excluded that the US is prepared” to yield to Iran regarding the Arab countries if Tehran agrees not to produce a nuclear weapon.

“The deteriorating relations of the US with Israel under Barak Obama demonstrate that the American do not have ‘eternal allies,’” Ignatenko insists, adding that “it is perfectly possible that the US and Iran are conducting secret talks.” If that is happening, he concludes, then Israel and the Arab countries may find common ground – against Iran.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .  
Monday, May 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Are More Border Changes Ahead In Eurasia?

By Paul Goble

Since 1991, the post-Soviet governments and the international community have been adamant against any change in the borders in Eurasia, and many expressed concerns that one of the results of Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be to spark demands for border changes or even the formation of new independent states.

There have been demands by various groups across the post-Soviet space since that time, but this week featured three such calls, an indication ever more people may think they now have a chance to achieve such outcomes and thus a challenge to the supporters of current arrangements even if nothing comes of their appeals.

The first of these calls came from the Mezhdurechensk miners, at least some of whom are calling for the creation of a West Siberian Republic as a way of forcing out the current powers that be at a minimum and possibly leading to the creation of their own independent state, something that would cut the Russian Federation in half (imc-siberia.org/ru/node/4676).

The second comes from a group calling itself “Vally Karjala” or “Free Karelia, which is using both print media and the Internet to push the idea that Karelia should be allowed to become a free and independent state, the successor to the Ukhta Republic of 1920 whose 90th anniversary the group is celebrating (mariuver.wordpress.com/2010/05/19/kareliju-svobodnoi/#more-17289).

And the third involves speculation that, in the words of the New Region agency, “as a result of secret agreements of Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovich, the unrecognized Transdniestr Republic can be folded into Ukraine, and Moldova can thereby return to the zone of Russian influence (www.nr2.ru/283874.html).

(Indeed, according to Oleh Bilorus, Ukraine’s first ambassador to the US and currently chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign relations committee, this is the direction the Kyiv appears to be moving in even though the consequences of such an action would be enormous not only in Moldova, which might disappear, but throughout the Balkans.)

None of these calls or speculations is likely to have a result, just as none of the efforts of various ethnic communities in the North Caucasus to redraw the map there is. But what is striking is that more and more groups are prepared to identify such changes as part of their agenda, an indication the taboo that Vladimir Putin worked so hard to impose is decaying.

And that in turn means that more groups, both those like the Ingermanlanders in the Northwest and ethnic communities across the Russian Federation and predominantly ethnic Russian regions are now going to be discussing such possibilities, discussions that by their very nature will force Moscow and other capitals to take a position.

Again, the chances that any or even a few of these changes will occur are not great, but public discussions about them at the very least will highlight the problems underlying many of the borders imposed by Stalin and make in more likely that those who feel new borders or even new states are the only way to proceed will be less likely to back down.

That could have its most immediate consequences on some of the “frozen” conflicts, making their resolution more rather than less difficult and highlighting the way in which Moscow’s incautious approach to Georgia in 2008 is going to continue to have consequences far beyond the borders of the Caucasus.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com . 
Sunday, May 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russian Intelligence Services’ Return to Crimea Seen Having Far-Reaching Consequences

By Paul Goble

Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of Russia’s FSB, and Valery Khoroshkovsky, head of Ukraine’s SBU, have signed a five-year agreement that will allow Moscow again to put intelligence agents in Crimea, from which 19 such Russian officers were expelled at the end of last year for attempting to recruit Ukrainians as spies.
While the new accord reportedly allows Ukraine the right to approve or disapprove Russian officers to be sent there, something the 2000 accord Kyiv denounced in December 2009 did not, many Ukrainian analysts have expressed doubts that this provision will protect Kyiv’s interests and fears that the accord will have serious and far-reaching consequences for Ukraine.

Nadezhda Maynaya of “Glavred” interviewed two Ukrainian analysts to get their reactions to this latest development in the ongoing warming of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Their responses should set off alarm bells not only in Ukraine but also in regional and Western capitals (glavred.info/archive/2010/05/19/170153-4.html).

The behavior of Russian agents last year, Rostislav Pavlenko, the director of the School of Political Analysis of the Kyiv-Mohylev Academy, said, raises doubts as to whether any document Moscow officials sign or any statements they make can be trusted. After all, what the Russians did last year was prohibited by bilateral agreements.

“Today,” the Ukrainian analyst continued, “we observe in fact an invitation to the Russian special services to return to the territory of Ukraine,” a development that he said has at least three serious consequences. First, the presence of Russian special service officers in Ukraine has been legalized,” opening the way to more abuse.

Second, the accords create problems by setting up “a collision of legislation,” with Russian law calling for one thing and Ukrainian another. And third, Pavlenko said, “there can arise definite geopolitical and geo-strategic problems,” such as occurred in August 2008 when Ukraine took Georgia’s side following Moscow’s invasion of the Caucasus country.

Given that Ukraine has agreed to extend the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for another 25 years, there is certainly time for the appearance of a situation “when the Black Sea Fleet and the special services based within it can be used in actions that are counter to the interests of Ukraine.”

But the impact of this FSB-SBU accord is likely to be even larger, Ukrainian political scientist Yevgeny Zherebetsky argued. That is because the commanders of the Black Sea Fleet, immediately after the extension of the basing accord, began a “massive” downsizing, retiring some 7500 staffers, “of whom 6500 are civilians and citizens of Ukraine.”

In addition, the fleet plans to retire 550 officers, many of whom will like the civilians have relatively low pensions and thus be open as are the civilians for recruitment by the Russian special services for work against Ukraine as a way to supplement their relatively small benefit checks.

According to Zherebetsky, it is “very important for Russians to obtain control over Crimea” because it lacks warm water ports. But “if everything will develop so ‘well’ [for Moscow] as it is now, then the Russians will try to extend their influence to Odessa, Kherson, and Nikolayev,” in an arc extending from Transdniestria to Abkhazia.

For that purpose, he continued, “Russia needs a broad network of agents of the special services,” but its prospects for success if these agents are active are very good because “over the course of the period of independence, the Ukrainian leadership has done nothing so that Ukraine could obtain complete power over the territory of Crimea.”

Pavlenko agreed, and he added that “the official strengthening of the return of FSB agents to Ukraine are steps toward the development, legalization and creation of opportunities which are in no way connected only with the defense of the Black Sea Fleet” but rather are intended to create “a mechanism of influence on Ukraine.”

And this problem is going to arise very quickly, Zherebetsky added. One issue that seems certain to break into the open is the question of whether the Russian ships carry nuclear weapons. As a declared non-nuclear state, Ukraine cannot have military units on its territory that have such weapons, but the new accord makes it impossible for Kyiv to know whether they are there.

Moreover, even as this agreement was being signed, Russian officials were signaling that they want even more. One Russian leader suggested that the sailors in the Black Sea Fleet should have dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship (news.liga.net/news/N1014381.html), and another said Moscow wants all of Sevastopol back (news.km.ru/rossiya_mozhet_potrebovat_sevast).



Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Moscow To Rotate MVD Chiefs In Regions To Maintain Control

By Paul Goble

After local OMON commanders in Mezhdurechensk refused to move against demonstrators there and with the prospect that the powers that be will face more protests in the future as the economic situation in the regions deteriorates, the Russian interior minister has announced that regional MVD heads will be rotated on a regular basis.

At a meeting in Kazan Wednesday of the heads of CIS interior ministries, Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev announced that at the direction of President Dmitry Medvedev he would rotate regional MVD chiefs according to “a strictly defined schedule” rather than allowing them to remain in place for long periods (www.rg.ru/2010/05/20/srok.html).

“Today,” Nurgaliyev continued, “the position of the senior command staff cannot be vacant more than three months. Filling such posts “on a priority basis must be done from the federal cadres reserve, formed from leaders who have been trained at the MVD Administration Academy over the last two years.”

As “Rossiiskaya gazeta” reported Thursday, the Russian interior minister indicated that “the practice of rotation of leads of the organs of internal affairs at various levels, both vertically and horizontally, has already successfully recommended itself. And he said that Moscow plans to set specific limits on how long any commander can serve in such posts before being transferred.

Not surprisingly, Nurgaliyev presented this innovation as “an anti-corruption measure,” given that it is “no secret that some leaders of administration sitting in a senior position for a decade acquire ‘useful’ ties and feel themselves to be princes” beyond the control of the law or of Moscow.

There are other reasons for this change as well. “Rossiiskaya gazeta” pointed to one of them: An MVD official who has been in one region for a long time often overlooks things that a new arrival would see immediately. Consequently, installing a new commander should improve law enforcement.

But a second reason, not mentioned directly by the Moscow paper, may be more important. Local MVD chiefs who have served in one place for a long time may be reluctant to follow orders to direct their subordinates to move against local people who are protesting Russian policies.

Last winter, the MVD chief in Vladivostok refused to order his men to disperse a demonstration there, and last week, his counterpart in Mezhdurechensk did the same, forcing Moscow in both instances to bring in OMON from other regions in order to counter the protesters.

It appears from Nurgaliyev’s comments that Moscow has decided it may be better to shift commanders, who will then be less likely to be infected with “localism,” than to find itself forced on a regular basis to move entire OMON units around to wherever the latest demonstration takes place.

That more demonstrations are likely is suggested by a second article in “Rossiiskaya gazeta”. According to the Ministry of Regional Affairs, “the list of Russian regions with a stable situation continues to decline, as the economic woes that have hit many of them spread to others (www.rg.ru/2010/05/20/regiony.html).

And many of the systemic and extra-systemic political movements have called for protests of various kinds, ranging from regular demonstrations to the organization of flash mobs, a kind of protest that the powers that be are likely to find it especially difficult to counter in the current environment (www.newizv.ru/news/2010-05-20/126720/).

It is far from clear whether Nurgaliyev’s new policy, one that as he indicated is being taken at Medvedev’s behest, will save the situation. But one thing is certain: Moscow’s decision to take a step that will certainly be unpopular with many MVD commanders is an indication of just how worried some of the powers that be are about unrest and their ability to contain it.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Lukashenka Turning Belarus Into 'A North Korea In The Center Of Europe’

By Paul Goble

Faced with mounting economic difficulties at home and increasing isolation abroad, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is transforming his country into “a North Korea in the center of Europe,” an effort that involves ever more repression against the Belarusian democracy movement and the possibility of a political explosion against him.

Over the last week, the Charter 97 organization reports, Belarusian KGB and militia officers have fanned out across the country confiscating equipment and publications of the Belarusian opposition and arresting activists not only in Mensk but in all other major Belarusian cities (charter97.org/ru/news/2010/5/18/29082/).

But those actions are only a symptom of a broader problem, Belarusian commentator Yuri Baranchik says, Lukashenka’s efforts to convert his country into “a kind of analogue of North Korea in the center of Europe” in advance of presidential elections which are supposed to be held before the end of the year (fondsk.ru/article.php?id=3043).

The reasons behind this drive, Baranchik says, are to be found in the country’s current economic difficulties and the likelihood that they will get worse over the next months, developments that almost certainly would undermine the support the Belarusian leader has generated on the basis of his past ability to maintain Belarusians’ standard of living.

Belarus’s foreign indebtedness has grown so rapidly over the last few months, the analyst says, that “several days ago A. Lukashenka [was forced] to sign a decree increasing the state debt limit from 9.5 to 12 billion dollars.” Moreover, the current economic situation means Mensk has had to put off its plans to sell euro-denominated bonds abroad.

Worse, Belarusian industries are increasingly unable to sell their production, with most of them having three to four months of unsold inventory, Baranchik continues. And “the lost of the Russian market [ -- something that is happening now -- ] is bringing with it especially great risks for the Belarusian economy.”

Mensk has been forced to reduce pensions over the last six months, and it has frozen wages and salaries, especially difficult that inflation is far higher than the 10 to 12 percent that the Belarusian government claims and that is hitting people at all levels of the income pyramid because of the rising cost of the standard market basket of goods.

Meanwhile, Baranchik says, the country’s gold reserve has fallen by 50 percent to only 11 billion US dollars, and it faces the threat of even greater losses if Moscow routes oil across Ukraine rather than Belarus and thus stops paying the transit fees on which Lukashenka and his regime have relied.

Moscow has a particular interest in cutting back these payments because of “the adventurist foreign economic projects” Mensk has gotten involved with, including the purchase of Venezuelan oil, a product it doesn’t need and now can’t sell either to Europe or to Ukraine, following Kyiv’s rapprochement with the Russian Federation.

Even if Moscow does not stop all transit of oil, the Russian government this year will end its transfer of three to five billion US dollars a year. “Next year, these funds will not be coming” to Mensk. That almost certainly means that the standard of living of Belarusians will fall and that some of them will step up their efforts to oust Lukashenka.

In that event, Moscow would be unlikely to do anything to help the incumbent president, especially since he has refused to go along with Russian policy on many questions and has not shown any interest in building the union state with the Russian Federation that Belarusians have twice voted for.

Indeed, there have been rumors that Moscow might even be interested in orchestrating Lukashenka’s ouster (www.nr2.ru/policy/283265.html), although the likelihood that a successor to Lukashenka would be more pro-Russian and more anti-European than he has been off and on is far from certain.

Consequently, because of these economic trends and his personal fears, Lukashenka is circling the wagons much as the leaders of North Korea have done. But it is clear that his past bet on “economic nationalism” and “self-sufficiency” has not worked and that even before the presidential elections, the Belarusian president may be forced to declare his country in default.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Bishkek Fears Russia Wants A Protectorate Over Kyrgyzstan

By Paul Goble

Continuing violence in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the south, and Russian moves that some in Bishkek see as intended to discredit the Provisional Government have prompted some in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere to speculate that Russia wants to establish a protectorate over Kyrgyzstan in order to restore order.

But according to an analysis posted online in Moscow today, the Russian government is extremely reluctant to move in that direction, having been chastened by the costs financial and political of its recognition of and assumption of responsibility for Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the August 2008 war with Georgia.
Writing for Stoletiye.ru, Aleksandr Shustov, a frequent commentator on Central Asia, says that increasing violence in Kyrgyzstan has “increased concerns about the possibility of the introduction of ‘external rule’ or ‘a protectorate’” by Russia or some combination of powers (www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/moskve_navazyvajut_protektorat_nad_kirgizijej_2010-05-20.htm).

The Moscow analyst suggests that people who were part of the former Kyrgyzstan government have as their “tactical goal” the “seizure of power in three southern oblasts which they to all appearances in the case of irresoluteness or slowness on the part of the Provisional Government, they count on holding.”

The “strategic” goal of these people, Shustov continues, citing media reports, is the maintenance of control over economic interests so that they can play this “card” in future relations with Bishkek regardless of whether it succeeds in stabilizing the situation or ultimately fails to do so.

Toward those ends, the Russian commentator says, “the opponents of the Provisional Government are attempting to use [the latter’s] lack of legitimacy and consequently the shaky legal status of the governors it has assigned in the southern regions,” as well as discontent among non-Kyrgyz nationalities, Islamist radicals, and criminal groups with ties to the drug trade.

Two days ago, Azimbek Beknazarov, the vice president of the Provisional Government who has been tracking developments in the south, said that “we are predicting the third wave of the counter-revolution in Kyrgyzstan,” a prediction that the clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups in Jalal-Abad yesterday appears to confirm.

According to the Provisional Government leader, “the next attempt at destabilization of the situation will be undertaken on an inter-ethnic basis,” with the regime’s opponents seeking to exploit ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south. The events of the last 24 hours suggest his prediction was accurate.
But because of this instability, Shustov continues, rumors are circulating in Bishkek “about the possible introduction of “foreign rule’ or a protectorate which Russia and Kazakhstan may establish.” These rumors have been sparked by the appointment of Vladimir Rushaylo, the former Russian interior minister, as special representative of Moscow and Astana.

Moreover, as Elmira Nogoybayeva, the head of the Kyrgyz Polis Asia Analytic Center has noted, “there has been a consistent campaign in the mass media of Kazakhstan and Russia aimed at discrediting the image of Kyrgyzstan, all the more so after the Provisional Government announced a draft constitution calling for a parliamentary form of government.

Such a regime if established would by its very nature, she argued, represent a challenge to the authoritarian presidential regimes in both Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. But criticism of Bishkek’s plans, she insisted, represents “crude interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Kyrgyzstan.”

According to Shustov, “the idea of introducing a Russian protectorate in Kyrgyzstan came from beyond the ocean” in an analysis prepared by Nikolay Zlobin of the Washington Institute of World Security. The Russian-American analyst suggested that a protectorate might be the only way to save the situation and prevent an unwelcome Chinese intervention. .

But according to Shustov, this idea does not currently enjoy “particular enthusiasm” either in Kyrgyzstan where it might lead to the extinction of independence or in Russia where it would mean the assumption by Moscow of “all responsibility for the situation” in that Central Asian republic.

People in Moscow have not forgotten the enormous expenses it assumed and continues to pay for in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and they know that “support of the much larger and more populous Kyrgyzstan, a republic without a common border with Russia would require much greater expenditures.”

But even more important, any such Russian move would not only force Russia to use its own forces to control the situation but could trigger a new outburst of hostility toward Moscow much as the August 2008 war in Georgia did. And consequently, Shustov concludes, it is “not accidental” that Rushaylo has insisted that he “does not intend” to interfere in Kyrgyz affairs.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .  
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Moscow Not Ready To Risk Absorbing South Ossetia, Markedonov Says

By Paul Goble

Despite calls by the president of North Ossetia for uniting his republic with South Ossetia within in the Russian Federation, Moscow is not yet ready to take that step lest it trigger a new round of instability in the North Caucasus and further complicate relations with Moscow’s various foreign partners, according to a leading Russian analyst.

In an article posted online, Sergey Markedonov, one of Russia’s most thoughtful commentators on the Caucasus, says that North Ossetian President Taymuras Mamsurov’s May 12th call is hardly surprising given that the idea of uniting the two Ossetias has a history going back to the end of the Soviet period (www.politcom.ru/10121.html).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, he writes, the idea of uniting the two Ossetias, one inside the Russian Federation and the other in Georgia was “intensively discussed on both sides of the Caucasus mountains,” in the South in response to the rising tide of Georgian ethno-nationalism and in the North for that reason and because of the North’s clash with Ingushetia.

Some in Moscow were prepared to back such a combination, seeing it “as an alternative to the parade of sovereignties that was then gathering strength.” Later, in March 1993, the North Ossetian parliament took the further step of recognizing South Ossetia as an independent republic, doing so 15 years “earlier than Russia,” Markedonov notes.

But from 1993 to 2004, Markedonov writes, the idea of combining the two republics was put on hold, as the result of Moscow’s policies and the approach of North Ossetia’s second president Aleksandr Dzasokhov, even though many Ossetians in both continued to be interested in linking their two republics more closely.
The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 and Moscow’s diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia changed all this. But Mamsurov’s declaration earlier this month raises the question as to “the readiness of the Russian leadership to yet again revise the status quo in the Caucasus region.”

According to Markedonov, “the existence of South Ossetia creates more than a few political-level paradoxes. On the one hand, it enjoys some of the attributes of an independent state. But on the other, it is far smaller than North Ossetia which “is not an independent formation.”

North Ossetia is more than twice as large and its population may be as much as 15 times as great as South Ossetia, and North Ossetians have typically viewed themselves as fulfilling the function of “the elder brother,” not the junior partner. Moreover, all Ossetians know that “the South Ossetian project initially was defined not as a separatist but as an irredentist effort.”

Even after August 2008, the independence of South Ossetia, “in contrast to that of Abkhazia,” was viewed by most people in the region as “an intermediate result,” that would ultimately result in the absorption of South Ossetia into North Ossetia and the Russian Federation.

But there are compelling reasons, Markedonov argues, to think that Moscow is not prepared to take this step just yet and that Mamsurov’s comments have more to do with internal North Ossetian politics than they do with Moscow’s policies.

On the one hand, any decision to unite South Ossetia with the Russian Federation is “not a narrow regional question” but rather one that involves a range of domestic and foreign policies. Taking this step would not only exacerbate the Ossetian-Ingush conflict but energize the increasingly active Circassian movement, one of several seeking to overcome ethnic divisions.

And on the other, “recognition of formally external subjects by Moscow is not the same thing as joining new territories to the Russian Republic,” a step that would challenge the existing status quo across the region and raise questions among Russians foreign interlocutors about what Moscow might do next.

Indeed, Markedonov suggests, “a unilateral violation by Moscow of the status quo in the Caucasus could introduce new problems in relations with governments not only in the West” but also with those of Turkey and Iran, both of whom are also very much interested in maintaining the status quo.

Consequently, it is certain that Mamsurov was not speaking as Moscow’s representative but rather as someone forced to make such remarks given the political situation in his own republic which requires him to win legitimacy at a time when there are no elections and with a clear eye on his own political future, which will be determined by Moscow on June 7th.

. It is therefore not useful, Markedonov concludes, to view Mamsurov’s remarks as part of some sort of “big game” by Moscow officials, although he concedes that “it is impossible to exclude an interest on the part of certain highly-placed supporters of ‘a special path’” on this issue, whatever its consequences might be.


 Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com . 
Thursday, May 20, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Many Senior Russian Officers Psychologically Unfit For Their Positions - Study

By Paul Goble

The results of a new MVD study of senior militia officers has confirmed various high-profile cases have shown and many Russians have long suspected: many of these officers are “psychologically unfit” to perform their studies and should receive counseling or be dismissed.

This week, the MVD released a study on “the social-psychological problems in particular territorial organizations and educational institutions” of the ministry, a description probably intended to distract attention from what the study’s findings say about the Russian militia command as a whole (www.newsru.com/russia/18may2010/neadekvaty.html).

The MVD report found that in these organizations in 2009 there were “526 leaders with an inadequate style of leadership,” a figure up from 367 in 2008. The new study, which was conducted without prior notice, involved a survey of more than 21,000 militiamen and identified “1906 leaders with violations of social-psychological adaptation.”

The report said that officials had resolved 2758 “conflict situations” in MVD groups, including 91 “in educational institutions of the MVD of Russia.” And with some 3,000 leaders, “complete psychological work” otherwise unspecified was begun on the basis of this broad survey.

According to the authors of the report, “despite a general improvement in the quality of psychological work with employees, included in the reserve for promotion to leadership positions, there were a number of shortcomings in the organizations” of various regions, including perhaps especially importantly, in the North Caucasus transportation militia.

But what is particularly disturbing, the report continued was that the number of psychological problems among MVD officers in educational institutions increased more than twice as fast as the rate among all MVD officers, an indication that new officers on the way up may be more troubled than longer serving ones.

Two experts provided their assessment of this report to “Svobodnaya pressa.” Vladimir Ovchinsky, a militia major general who serves as an advisor to the chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, said that such an investigation “should have been conducted a long time ago” (svpressa.ru/society/article/25370/).

He said he had repeatedly called for such research and believes that “it is necessary to introduce a system of regular investigation of the entire staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” Every six months, he said, militia officers should undergo psychological testing and checks for alcoholism and drugs, with lie detectors used to ensure reliable answers.

“Thank God,” Ovchinsky said, “this process has begun,” adding that he was confident that the figures released this week “reflect the real situation” and are “above all true.” That is something that the entire chain of command in the ministry is now going to have to take seriously in the future.

The militia major general said that he was not interested in using such testing only to get rid of bad officers. Some should be separated from the service, but others simply need treatment or reassignment. “One needs to understand what is taking place with each individual” rather than make sweeping judgments.

Ovchinsky’s most intriguing comment is his call for testing not only militiamen and their commanders but also “the leaders of the MVD and Administrations of Internal Affairs of the subjects of the federation and their deputies.” There would not be “anything terrible in doing this, and on this basis could be identified anomalies” before they lead to problems.

He added that “the very same thing should be done as well in the central apparatus of the Interior Ministry, the procuracy, the narcotics control agencies and the FSB.” Challenged that such testing might not be realistic, Ovchinsky said he saw no reason to conclude that. After all, he said, officers in Western countries routinely have to take such tests.

The second expert, Mikhail Pashkin, who heads the Union of Militia Officers of the City of Moscow, says that the real figures of militia officers with psychological problems “must be increased by a factor of ten.” But he stressed, “the question is not in the bosses themselves but in the system” in which they work.

Officers are paid far too little, they have learned from their commanders that they can behave brutally toward one another, and because of that, he said, they behave the same way with ordinary citizens, treating them as little more than “slaves.” The only way to address these problems, he says, is to turn the system upside down, something he does not expect to happen.


 Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com . 
Thursday, May 20, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Internet Can’t Compensate For Moscow Information Blockade

By Paul Goble

Too few Russians currently go online for their news and even fewer of them can cope with the variety and often contradictory quality of its reporting for the Internet to be able to compensate when Moscow decides to throw up an information blockade around events it would like Russians to ignore, according to Russian observers.

Evidence for that conclusion, the editors of “Nezavisimaya gazeta” say in a lead article today, is provided by what has taken place since Moscow ordered OMON troops to crush protests in Mezhdurechensk. And they continue, it points to ever more serious problems in the future for the Russian state and society (www.ng.ru/editorial/2010-05-19/2_red.html).

Since the OMON clashes with the miners, the paper observes, “the federal television channels have practically ignored the protests of the miners,” leaving most Russians with little or no reliable information about them, especially since “only 38 percent of Russians” have a personal computer linked to the Internet.
(For a more detailed and extensive discussion of the information blockade Moscow and the regional government have imposed on Mezhdurechensk, see the article by Taras Burmistrov at www.russ.ru/pole/Blokada-Kuzbassa and especially the commentary by Marina Litvinovich at www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10115.)

But even those who do, the paper continues, precisely because they were “educated by television are not prepared for the variations of information which the Net guarantees.” (Indeed, another analyst continues, differing reports on the web often cancel each other out, leaving people with little or no information at all (ladno.ru/stranar/14579.html).

As “Nezavisimaya” points out, “Paragraph 29 of the Russian Constitution guarantees citizens the right to information but it does not guarantee them the opportunity to receive it.” And because most Russians still get their news from national television, a medium the government controls, they often do not have that chance.
“What does the television viewer know about the events in Mezhdurechensk?” the paper’s editors ask. “He knows that at the Raspadskaya Mine two explosions occurred, miners and rescuers died, and a time of mourning was declared in the region.” He also “knows” the Vladimir Putin has taken control of the investigation of the accident.

“It is very probably that the television viewer has heard nothing about the blocking of the railroad by the miners on May 15, or if he has heard, then he has heard only about some supposedly organized actions of criminals, which were neutralized in a timely fashion by the forces of order.”

Moreover, the paper says, “the [Russian] TV viewer has not seen ‘pictures’ from the place of events, although it would not have cost federal television anything to have them. He has not heard the participants of the actions and in the best case knows about the demands of the miners only from hearsay.

Thus, the “Nezavisimaya” editors say, “the majority of Russians -- for television viewers are the majority – do not have full information about the central event of the week. [And] they cannot draw independent and objective conclusions” about what has happened and how well the powers that be have coped.

Such a situation completely contradicts the “general line” President Dmitry Medvedev has proclaimed regarding the modernization of the state and society. And it means that TV viewers are being cultivated as a kind of “retro-society” which is given information only of the kind and amount judged necessary by “the elect” which will make all the decisions.

Supporting this situation are the Russian special services who have been “attempting to block the pages on the Runet” that have sought to report on what in fact has taken place. But these efforts have been far from successful: many who use the Internet have quickly found ways to go around them.

But that is not the greatest harm, the paper says. Instead, “the real misfortune” is that “ a government which does not understand how in a contemporary society information can and must be transmitted converts itself into a retro-state,” one that cannot modernize itself or the society even though it has declared itself “the locomotive of modernization.”

By restricting information in the way that it has, “Nezavisimaya” points out, the government has “voluntarily limited its own picture of the world” and ensured disaster. Indeed, “as a result, the powers do not understand their citizens and a society is emerging which does not know itself.”

Such “silence about events will not extinguish the energy they give birth do,” the independent Moscow paper warns. Instead, such enforced silence will “only feed upon itself and transform in dangerous ways,” a trend that the editors suggest will come back to haunt those who are trying, still with some success, to control information as the Soviet system did.


 Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Chechen Muslims Increasingly Intolerant Of Other Faiths, Poll Finds

By Paul Goble

A survey of 200 Chechens in Grozny three weeks ago found that Chechens are more committed to their traditional form of Islam than are most other North Caucasian peoples and that they are relatively intolerant of other strains of Islam and of other faiths altogether.

Since 2004, the Caucasus Times news agency, which is based in Prague, has conducted surveys in the capitals of the North Caucasus republics. Starting in February of this year, Islam Tekushev reported over the weekend, the agency’s correspondents have been asking residents of these cities about Islam (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20207).

For obvious reasons, such polls are not based on a scientifically determined sample: the correspondents simply do not have the opportunity to do more than talk with people they meet on the streets who are willing to respond to their questions. But the results are nonetheless intriguing, providing as they do a kind of data available from no other source.

According to Tekushev who led this collection effort, “the identity of the overwhelming majority of the population of the capital of Chechnya [--95 percent--] is firmly connected with Islam.” There are very few people there who consider themselves to be Christians -- 2 percent -- or atheists -- 3 percent.
Moreover, a large fraction of them – more than eight in ten – say that “religion plays a large role in their lives,” with another 13 percent saying that it plays a relatively large one. Only one in a hundred said that religion plays a small role, and two percent did not answer. Only the atheists said that it did not play any role in their lives.

Eighty-two percent of those questions said that the prayed every day, with another five percent saying that they did not weekly, 12 percent saying they did so “from time to time.” But the share which regularly visits the mosques is much smaller: Eight percent say they do so daily, and 43 percent say they go every week.
Asked about whether the rights of Muslims are observed in Chechnya, 54 percent said yes, and an additional 25 percent said that they were more observed than not. “Only nine percent of those questioned think,” Tekushev reports, “that the rights of Muslims are not observed” as they should be.

The Caucasus Times journalists also asked Grozny residents about their attitudes toward other trends in Islam and toward other atheism and other religions. With regard to the former, 62 percent condemned Wahhabism, although 10 percent had a more or less positive view of it. But an even higher percentage 87 percent condemned atheism.

Grozny residents, most of whom are Muslims, have negative attitudes toward other religions. According to Tekushev, 61 percent have a more or less negative attitude toward Christianity, 87 percent have a more or less negative view of Judaism, and 83 percent have a more or less negative set of attitudes about Buddhism.
Three things are immediately striking about these findings. First, Chechens appear to be much more prepared to identify with Islam now than they were only a few years ago, a reflection of the pro-Muslim policies of Ramzan Kadyrov and his father. Second, as they have become more Muslim, they appear to have become more antagonistic to other faiths.

And third – and as a result of these two trends – Chechens under Kadyrov not only stand out among North Caucasians and other Muslim groups elsewhere in the Russian Federation but also are likely to have more reasons for being at odds with Russians now than ever before, something likely to make integrating them into the Russian political space far more difficult.

Indeed, to the extent that this poll is representative of the attitudes of Chechens more generally – and it is likely that rural Chechens are even more religious than Grozny residents – Moscow may now face in Chechnya a second Daghestan, another republic that is in the minds of its people Muslim before it is Russian.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

‘Spontaneous Outbursts Of Public Anger’ Seen Spreading Across Russia

By Paul Goble

The economic crisis and technogenic failures like the Raspadskaya mine disaster are combining to make “spontaneous outbursts of public anger” an ever more prominent feature of Russian life, a trend the regime appears powerless to reverse but one that may not have serious political consequences unless this anger is shaped by new leaders.

According to an editorial offered by the labor movement portal, Rabkor.ru, yesterday, “the powers that be have been very much afraid of a social explosion” and have taken steps, especially “in major cities” where economic decline has hit large numbers of workers especially hard (www.rabkor.ru/editorial/6946.html).

But, the site points out, Russia’s “misfortune came from where it was not expected,” as a result of a deadly methane explosion in the Raspadskaya Mine in Mezhdurechensk as the rest of the country was celebrating, often in an “expensive and pompous” manner, the 65th anniversary of Victory Day.

“That an outburst of social protest should take place precisely in a mining region should have been predictable given the experience of 1989,” when a miners’ strike “paralyzed the goal industry of the USSR” and “intensified the crisis of the Soviet system.” But there were three reasons why the Russian powers that be thought they were safe in this sector.

First, because the economy is so bad, workers could hardly threaten to strike or quit. If they did, they would be unlikely to find other work and would suffer accordingly. Second, the mines are now owned by private interests rather than the state, allowing officials to believe that any economic protest would not touch them.

And third, as Rabkor.ru laments, the miners’ movement is much weaker than it was. The independent miners’ union has lost “a significant portion of its members and branches.” Mines have been closed, and “failed labor actions have demoralized the workers.” Worse, the union leaders have spent more time fighting among themselves than fighting for the workers.

“In such circumstances,” the editorial continues, “it is completely understandable that neither the government, nor the employers, nor the local powers that be, nor possibly even the miners themselves expected that here could take place something like that which occurred in Mezhdurechensk” last Friday and Saturday.

But the response of the workers to the accident at the Raspadskaya Mine “demonstrated that the patience of people is not unlimited,” especially at a time when mine owners pay themselves first and cut back on safety in order to boost their profits and when this is very much on public view.

Reflecting their traditional understanding, the miners turned first not to the owners but to government officials, who responded over and over again that “all demand must be addressed not to them but to the owners of the mines.” However, as the miners have learned, “the powers that be and the entrepreneurs cooperate closely,” making a demand on one a demand to the other.

According to the Rabkor.ru editors, “the conflict in Mezhdurechensk could have been extinguished by the traditional combination of repressions and concessions. But the events that have taken place testify that despite all the efforts of the government and all the loud declarations about victory over the economic recession, the social crisis in the country is growing.”

(Rabkor.ru may be more confident than the powers that be could win a crackdown than those powers are. At Mezhdurechensk as in Vladivostok earlier, the local OMON refused to disperse the workers, and regional officials had to call in militia units from other regions, a pattern that must give Moscow pause (www.apn-spb.ru/news/comments7301.htm#comments).

Under the circumstances, “no one can predict where and why the next outburst of popular unhappiness will occur,” Rabkor.ru says. But one thing is clear: such outbursts will “shape the changes in the social life of the country in the immediate future,” even if the workers’ lack of organization means that these outbursts may not have the transforming impact they could.

In an analysis following this editorial, Anna Ochkina, who has been researching attitudes among Russian workers since the end of the Soviet period, says that one of the biggest problems of such demonstrations is that workers have not yet moved from being against something to being for something (www.rabkor.ru/analysis/6948.html).

The “positive content” of these actions “was and remains significantly less specific and unconnected with a precise model of a desired society or even a constructive model of social policy,” she observes. As a result, protests do not yet either reflect or promote “consistent” and “specific” convictions allowing participants in one to link up with others.

Nonetheless, Ochkina argues, Russians “are learning to defend their interests, to try different methods [for doing so], and are beginning to understand the benefits from unity.” That may not bear fruit immediately, but such a growth in understanding is perhaps the only way that workers in Russia can create the conditions for determining their own future and that of Russia.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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