Peru Court Grants Parole To US Citizen

A Peruvian court has granted parole to an American woman after she served 15 years in prison for aiding leftist rebels.

Lori Berenson is expected to be released from a prison in Lima on Wednesday.

The judge in the case told Berenson her release is conditional on her staying in Peru.

Berenson, who is 40, was arrested in 1995 and accused of being involved in a failed attempt by the rebel Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement to seize Peru's Congress.

A military court initially convicted and sentenced her to life in prison. That sentence was overturned in 2000 and Berenson was re-tried by a civilian court.

She was acquitted of being an active member of the group but convicted of helping the guerrillas and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Berenson will be released before serving the full sentence, and has maintained her innocence.

Last May, Berenson gave birth to a son. The infant's father is Anibal Apari, who spent 12.5 years in prison for involvement with the rebels. He has been married to Berenson since 2003 and has been allowed to see her in prison.

Source: VOA
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The Honduras Government's Truth

The Honduras´ government on May 4 appointed a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) to investigate the coup last June 28 that kicked President Manuel Zelaya from office, but human rights groups worry that it will fail to address right violations stemming from the ouster.

The five-member commission that includes former Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo Stein, former Canadian diplomat Michael Kergin, former Peruvian Justice Minister María Zavala, Honduran legal expert Jorge Omar Caso and president of the National Autonomous University of Honduras, Julieta Castellanos, will have eight months to investigate those responsible for the coup.

The commission “will get to the bottom of what caused the political crisis,” said Stein. “We want it to be clear that we haven´t come to the commission to be chroniclers, because for that they should have hired a historian.”

But rights groups and members of the Honduran opposition said the commission falls short of investigating the repression that followed the coup.

Opposition members have called an alternative truth commission that will include Nobel Peace Prize winners Rigoberta Menchú and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel.

The New York-based International Center for Transitional Justice, or ICTJ, said in a statement that the commission´s mandate is vague and makes no mention of human rights.

“The TRC´s mandate is a cause for concern,” said Javier Ciurlizza, director of ICTJ´s Americas Program, who also was executive secretary of Peru´s truth commission that investigated the deaths during the 1980-2000 internal armed conflict. “It does not cover assassinations and attacks perpetrated against journalists and social activists since June 2009. And it’s alarming that the mandate also appears to omit past events in the history of Honduras, which has a serious history of authoritarianism and de facto regimes.”

"There cannot be reconciliation without full truth and justice for victims. The lack of direct consultation with victims and a broad range of political and civil society actors raises questions about the integrity of this effort,” he added. “The international community should carefully judge the legitimacy of this initiative before normalizing political and economic relations with Honduras.” The government of President Porfirio Lobo, which began on Jan. 27, has only been recognized by Central American governments, except Nicaragua, and Colombia and Peru in South America.

Source:  Latinamerica Press
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Peru Sees Slight Reduction In Povery Despite Financial Crisis

According to the Peruvian national statistics and information office (INEI), poverty in Peru dropped in 2009, moving from 36.2% to 34.8%, based on a total population of 30 million.

“This result contrasts with other countries in which the financial crisis has caused an increase in poverty levels” said the director of INEI, Renán Quispe.

The biggest drop was noted in urban centers, where the poverty rate dropped from 23.5% in 2008 to 21.1% in 2009.

Even indigence has dropped, in the same period, by nine percentage points.

Peru’s GDP increased, in 2009, by 1.12% compared to 9.89% in 2008.

Source: MISNA
Thursday, May 20, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

EU And Andean Community Agree To Strengthen Fight Against Drug Trafficking

The EU and the four Andean countries of Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, held a summit in Madrid to tackle an important agenda on issues such as drug trafficking, the environment and climate change, migration, the economic crisis and regional integration.

The Sixth EU-Andean Community Summit agreed to give a political boost to the fight against illegal drugs to maintain a joint position on this global problem as well as associated crimes such as money laundering.

The EU and the Andean countries have therefore decided to raise the level of the Specialised Dialogue on Drugs, which currently meets at expert level, so that participants will be political figures with decision making capacity.

This decision is backed by a substantial increase in the financial support that the European Commission gives to the four Andean countries to help in the fight against drug trafficking. For the EU, illegal drugs and drug trafficking are important threats, not only from the point of view of safety but also of democracy.

The President of the Spanish government and head of the current rotating presidency of the EU, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, expressed his satisfaction at the results of the summit that “renews the EU's political will to strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with a region that seeks integration”, something that “we view as extremely favourable”.

In addition to Zapatero, the EU was represented by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso.On the Andean side, the presidents of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe; Ecuador, Rafael Correa; Bolivia, Evo Morales; and Peru, Alan García, were all present.

Climate change and financial crisis

The European and South American leaders also focused an important part of their discussions on the fight against climate change with a view to the upcoming meeting in Cancun (Mexico) in December. According to Van Rompuy, the important thing now is to restore confidence among all the negotiating parties and to work ambitiously but realistically to achieve concrete results: a broad, binding agreement which includes the largest possible number of countries.

They also spoke of the international financial crisis which, according to President Alan García, has shown that subregional economic integration is the best way to create employment, to attract investment and to promote growth.

Agreements

At the end of the summit, a trade agreement was signed between the EU and Peru and Colombia which aims to free up trade in sectors such as industrial products, agriculture and fishing, services and investment, and also encompasses cooperation and political dialogue on human rights.

It is an ambitious agreement that contains important commitments for all three parties, which will generate new opportunities for economic agents and will act as an incentive for the two Andean countries to progress their reform agendas and to develop the means for greater social protection.

This “multi-party” trade agreement respects the right of the rest of the Andean countries to join whenever they consider appropriate. The EU had originally planned to sign a wide-ranging agreement of association with the Andean Community but as a result of the breakdown in negotiations in 2008, a new mandate was proposed, agreeing thematic and geographic separation.

In this framework, "multi-party" trade talks were held with Peru and Colombia, leading to an agreement last March after nine separate rounds of negotiations.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

EU, Latin American And Caribbean Heads Analyse Global Challenges

Approximately sixty heads of state will attend the VI Summit of European Union, Latin American and Caribbean countries, which will take place today in Madrid. Their aim is to strengthen relations in order to better meet global challenges such as the economic crisis, financial instability, climate change, energy problems, as well as inequality and poverty.

In his opening address, the President of the Government of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, made reference to the improvement in relations between the two continents over the last decade, with the result that they are now 'global allies facing global challenges'.

'Today, Latin America and the Caribbean mutually affirm their partnership in the face of the global agenda's most pressing issues', said Zapatero, the summit's host and President-in-turn of the EU.
Herman van Rompuy, European Council President

The President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, underscored the cultural and historical ties between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, before going onto stress the importance of a strategic partnership, given that together they comprise a quarter of the entire international system, with a combined population of one billion people. 'The EU is the LAC's principal investor and second largest trade partner, he added.

Van Rompuy noted the progress made by Latin America in its progressive integration via regional partnerships, as well as pending challenges with regard to the fact that 'sustainable growth is impossible unless accompanied by social cohesion'.

Alan García, the President of Perú

In his address, the President of Perú, Alan García, who hosted the last EU-LAC summit held in 2008 in Lima, underscored that it was essential for 'a new voice to be heard on the world stage', in order to constructively reorganise the multipolarity which exists at the international level.

After asserting that 'we are Euro-Americans' and that 'Europeans and Latin Americans share a common inspiration that transcends commercial interests' , Alan García confirmed that the agreement which Columbia and Peru will sign up to with the EU at the Madrid Summit is 'more than a trade agreement; it is an economic, social and political agreement as well'.

José Manuel Durao Barroso, European Commission President

The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durao Barroso, underscored the positive results attained by the EU-LAC association in areas such as sustainable development, climate change, immigration, the fight against drugtrafickking, and the struggle for social cohesion.

He stressed the importance of both countries working together to 'carry out more effective multilateral actions', given that they comprise one third of the UN and G20, and represent a quarter of all world trade.

Cristina Fernández, the Argentine President

The Argentine President, Cristina Fernández, who spoke on behalf of all Latin American and Caribbean countries, defended the resurgence of a form of multilateralism 'for which there is an urgent need on the world-wide political and economic stage', and she supported the suppression of protectionist policies 'in all of their forms'.

She also called for an avoidance of 'penalties and discriminatory acts' towards immigrants, despite the international crisis, in favour of a 'realistic economy' based on the economic and social well-being of communities.

Those countries exercising the greatest responsibility in multinational organisations are those which 'bear the most responsibility', underscored the Argentinean head of state, who gave the final address at the opening ceremony.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Drug Trafficking Violence In Mexico: Implications For US

Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI
Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, DEA

Statement Before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control

May 5, 2010

Chairman Feinstein, Co-Chairman Grassley, and distinguished members of the caucus, on behalf of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Acting Administrator Michele Leonhart and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert S. Mueller, III, we appreciate your invitation to testify today regarding violence in Mexico and its implications for the United States. The Department of Justice law enforcement agencies have outstanding relationships with law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border. With the assistance of our counterparts, the Department strives to coordinate investigative activity and develop intelligence in order to efficiently and effectively manage law enforcement efforts with the goal of identifying, infiltrating, and dismantling drug trafficking organizations that are directly responsible for the violence in Mexico.

The DEA, in conjunction with the FBI, has been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to work with foreign law enforcement counterparts in confronting the organizations that profit from the global drug trade. The Department recognizes that in order to effectively attack the international drug trade it has to forward deploy its personnel into the foreign arena. DEA has the largest federal law enforcement presence overseas. DEA has 83 offices in 62 countries and works with host governments in assessing drug threats, gathering intelligence, targeting major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and, in coordination with the Department of State, assisting host governments in developing comprehensive counternarcotics strategies. The FBI has a legal attaché office in Mexico City which works closely with counterparts, shares intelligence, and coordinates international investigations. In addition, the FBI has Border Liaison Officers who travel to Mexico on a weekly basis to coordinate with law enforcement partners.

The Southwest Border

The Southwest border (SWB) of the United States is the principal arrival zone for most of the illicit drugs smuggled into the United States, as well as the predominant staging area for the drugs’ subsequent distribution throughout the country. According to El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) drug seizure data, most of the cocaine, foreign-source marijuana and methamphetamine, and Mexican-source heroin available in the United States is smuggled into the country across the SWB. The SWB is particularly vulnerable to drug smuggling because of the enormous volume of people and goods legitimately crossing the border between the two countries every day. Moreover, large sections of the nearly 2,000-mile land border between Mexico and the United States are both vast and remote, and this provides additional smuggling opportunities for Mexican DTOs. Once at the border, Mexican traffickers use every method imaginable to smuggle drugs into this country including aircraft, backpackers, couriers, horses and mules, maritime vessels, rail, tunnels, and vehicles.

In response, the DEA and FBI, in cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other federal, state, local, and foreign counterparts, are attacking these organizations at all levels. The disruption and dismantlement of these organizations, the denial of proceeds, and the seizure of assets significantly impacts the DTOs’ ability to exercise influence and to further destabilize the region. Key to DEA and FBI operational success is the collection and sharing of intelligence, which is made possible and enhanced through EPIC, DEA’s Special Operations Division (SOD), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, and DEA’s and FBI’s participation in the intelligence community. In short, guided by intelligence, DEA and the FBI are working diligently on both sides of the border to stem the flow of illicit drugs and assist the government of Mexico (GOM) in breaking the power and impunity of the drug cartels.

The Scope of Drug Trafficking on the Southwest Border

Prior to addressing Mexico’s security situation, it is important to have a clear picture of the illicit drug-trafficking industry within Mexico as it relates to the United States. No other country in the world has a greater impact on the drug situation in the United States than does Mexico. The influence of Mexico on the U.S. drug trade is truly unmatched: the result of a shared border; Mexico’s strategic location between drug-producing and drug-consuming countries; a long history of cross-border smuggling; and the existence of diversified, poly-drug, profit-minded DTOs. Each of the four major drugs of abuse—marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine—are either produced in, or transshipped through, Mexico before reaching the United States. The vast majority of bulk currency interdicted within the U.S. is derived from drug trafficking activities. It is estimated that approximately 18-39 billion dollars annually is moved from the interior of the U.S. to the Southwest border on behalf of Mexican and Colombian DTOs. Thus, billions of U.S. dollars are sent back to Mexico annually. From the Mexican perspective, the flow of vast sums of money engenders corruption. The strategic consequence of the continuous seeping of illicit proceeds into the Mexican economy discourages the long-term growth of—indeed even the incentive to sustain—legitimate businesses and institutions. For all of these reasons, the U.S. and Mexican governments share the responsibility to defeat the threat of drug-trafficking.

Heroin: Mexico is an opium poppy-cultivating/heroin-producing country. While Mexico accounts for only about 6 percent of the world’s opium poppy cultivation and heroin production, it is a major supplier of heroin to abusers in the United States, particularly in regions west of the Mississippi River. It has been alarming to note that Mexican black tar and brown heroin has appeared increasingly in eastern-U.S. drug markets over the past several years. According to DEA’s Heroin Signature Program (HSP), Mexico was identified as the source country for 39 percent of the samples classified under the HSP during 2008, the largest representation of Mexican-source heroin in the United States in the past 20 years. We assess with high confidence that Mexican cartels are seeking to maximize revenues from an industry that they control from production through distribution.

Marijuana: Mexico is the number one foreign supplier of marijuana abused in the United States. In fact, according to a 2008 inter-agency report, marijuana is the top revenue generator for Mexican DTOs—a cash crop that finances corruption and the carnage of violence year after year. The profits derived from marijuana trafficking—an industry with minimal overhead costs, controlled entirely by the traffickers—are used not only to finance other drug enterprises by Mexico’s poly-drug cartels, but also to pay recurring “business” expenses, purchase weapons, and bribe corrupt officials. Though the GOM has a robust eradication program, many of the military personnel traditionally assigned to eradicate marijuana and opium poppy have recently been diverted to the offensive against the cartels.

Methamphetamine: Mexico is also the number-one foreign supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. Although the Mexican government has made enormous strides in controlling—even banning—the importation of methamphetamine precursor chemicals such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenyl acetic acid, Mexican methamphetamine-producing and trafficking organizations are proving to be extremely resourceful in circumventing the strict regulatory measures put in place by the Calderon Administration. As with heroin, there is considerable financial incentive for the Mexican DTOs to sustain a trade they control from manufacture to distribution and, in fact, Mexican authorities seized more methamphetamine labs in 2009—210—than in the five previous years combined.

Cocaine: Mexico’s importance in the cocaine trade cannot be overstated. Since the 1980s, Mexico has served as a primary transportation corridor for cocaine destined for the United States. While Mexico is not a coca-producing country and therefore cannot control the trade from beginning to end, traffickers in Mexico have managed nonetheless to exert increasing control over the trade in exchange for shouldering the greater risk inherent in transporting the cocaine and ensuring its distribution in the United States. In recent years, Mexican trafficking organizations have extended their reach deep into South America to augment—or personally facilitate—cooperation with Colombian sources of supply, or to develop relationships with alternate sources of supply in other cocaine-producing countries, particularly Peru. Demonstrating an even further reach into global cocaine markets, Mexican drug traffickers have evolved into intermediate sources of supply for cocaine in Europe, Australia, Asia, and the Middle East. More important for our discussion today, Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale distribution of cocaine and other drugs of abuse throughout the U.S.

Current estimates suggest that approximately 93 percent of the cocaine leaving South America for the United States moves through Mexico. In just the past year, however, more cocaine—about 60 percent of the 90 percent, according to inter-agency estimates—stops first in a Central American country, before onward shipment to Mexico, than at any time since the inter-agency began tracking cocaine movement. This trend suggests that the Calderon Administration’s initiatives, particularly those related to port security and the tracking of suspicious aircraft, are having an impact on how the cartels do business, requiring them to take the extra—and ostensibly more costly and vulnerable—step of arranging multi-stage transportation systems.

Changes in cocaine movement patterns are not the only measurable trend. Beginning in January of 2007—immediately after the Calderon government was installed—the price per gram of cocaine in the United States began to rise, with a correlative drop in cocaine purity. We are now in a 36-month sustained period of declining purity and increasing price in nearly every major cocaine market in the United States. During this period, we have seen prices increase by almost 72 percent and purity fall by nearly 33 percent.

Violence in Mexico: Statistics and Causes

While it may seem counterintuitive, the extraordinary level of violence in Mexico is another signpost of successful law-and-order campaigns by military and law enforcement officials in Mexico. The violence in Mexico can be organized into three broad categories: intra-cartel violence that occurs among and between members of the same criminal syndicate, inter-cartel violence that occurs between rival groups, and cartel-versus-government violence. It is important to note that intra- and inter-cartel violence have always been associated with the Mexican drug trade. DEA and FBI assesses that the current surge in violence is driven in large measure by the GOM’s proactive actions against the traffickers, along with other variables, such as cartel on cartel violence.

The drug trade in Mexico has been rife with violence for decades, though the level and the severity of violence we are seeing today is unprecedented. Without minimizing the severity of the problems we are confronted with today, it is nonetheless critical to understand the background of the “culture of violence” associated with Mexican DTOs and the cyclical nature of the “violence epidemics” with which Mexico is periodically beset. We do not have to go very far back in history to recall the cross-border killing spree engaged in by Los Zetas operatives in the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo area during 2004-05. But one thing must remain clear in any discussion of violence in Mexico, or violence practiced by Mexican traffickers operating in the United States: drug gangs are inherently violent, and nowhere is this more true than in Mexico, where Wild West-style shootouts between the criminals and the cops, and/or elements of opposing trafficking groups is far too common. Since 2007, there have been over 22,000 drug-related murders in Mexico, as reported by the Mexican Attorney General’s Office.

We cringe at news stories detailing the arrest of a “pozolero” (stew-maker), a killer who disposes of his victims’ body parts in barrels of acid, or the discovery of a mass grave containing the remains of countless victims decomposing under a layer of lime. But these and other gruesome tactics are not new. What is both new and disturbing are the sustained efforts of Mexican DTOs to use violence as a tool to undermine public support for the government’s counter-drug efforts. Traffickers have made a concerted effort to send a public message through their bloody campaign of violence. They now often resort to leaving the beheaded and mutilated bodies of their tortured victims out for public display with the intent of intimidating government officials and the public alike.

Particularly worrisome are those tactics intended to intimidate police and public officials, and law-abiding citizens. The intimidation of public and police officials through violence or the threat of violence has a more insidious side. Not all corruption is a clear cut, money-for-cooperation, negotiation: the intimidation of officials, threats against their lives or their families’ lives, is a much more widespread and effective tactic, and likely accounts for a plurality of corrupt law enforcement officials in Mexico.

Murder is not solely a coercive strategy on the part of the cartels. The murders are acts of desperation. Operational successes by the military and law enforcement, and massive reforms being undertaken by the judiciary, have provided the catalyst for much of the violence. The deployment of tens of thousands of military troops—mobilized specifically to confront DTOs in “hot spots” throughout the country—along with concerted law enforcement operations targeting specific cartel members or specific import/export hubs, have disrupted supply routes both into and out of Mexico, and have shattered alliances. Entry ports for large maritime shipments of cocaine from South America, previously wholly controlled by the cartels through corruption, intimidation, and force, are instead patrolled and inspected by vetted members of Mexico’s armed forces. The lucrative transportation corridors within Mexico and into the United States, once incontestably held by cartel “gatekeepers” and “plaza bosses,” are now riddled with military checkpoints and monitored by Mexican law enforcement.

Disrupted supply routes translate to intense competition between the drug trafficking organizations who control still-viable routes, and those who want to control them. These stressors are further compounded by shifting alliances, long-standing feuds, and record-breaking seizures by the GOM. Challenging the status quo and holding the traffickers accountable demonstrates the resolve of President Calderon’s government. Successfully transforming the situation from one that represents a serious threat to the national security of both Mexico and the U.S. to a problem that can effectively be dealt with as a traditional criminal justice problem will require considerably more work, particularly with regard to institutional reform and anticorruption efforts. Fortunately, President Calderon has already committed to these reforms, both in rhetoric and in action.

Spillover Violence

Excessive violence by the cartels is a national security problem for Mexico, and—as our close neighbor and political ally—presents high stakes for the United States. In the past year, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked diligently to reach a consensus view on “spillover” violence and on U.S. vulnerability to the Mexican cartels’ violent tactics. These discussions required the interagency to define “spillover” in practical terms. As agreed to by the interagency community, spillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. This definition does not include trafficker on trafficker violence, whether perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S.

Spillover violence is a complicated issue. It is crucial, in order to address the problem with the appropriate programs, resources, and operations, that we understand the difference between the intentional targeting of innocent civilians in the United States, or official U.S. government interests in Mexico or the United States, and actions that are characteristic of violent drug culture, such as the killing of an individual who owes a drug debt to the organization. Certain isolated incidents in the United States, such as the torture by a Mexican trafficker of a Dominican drug customer in Atlanta, are frightening, but do not represent a dramatic departure from the violence that has always been associated with the drug trade.

Much of the risk of spillover violence is posed by younger-generation traffickers whose approach to the drug trade is less rational and profit-minded than that of their “elders,” or by multi-national street and prison gangs working in concert with Mexican cartels as enforcers and street-level drug distributors. As the GOM has continuously and successfully disrupted the cartels’ command and control structure through operations against their leaders, less-experienced “junior” cartel members are inhabiting roles formerly held by traffickers of long standing who, while violent, tended to be more deliberate and cautious in their actions. In Ciudad Juarez, where three individuals associated with the U.S. consulate were killed in March, the Barrio Azteca (BA) street gang is the best known of several gangs being used as enforcers by La Linea, gatekeepers for the Juarez Cartel. The BA has been linked to drug trafficking, prostitution, extortion, assaults, murder, and the retail sale of drugs obtained by Mexican DTOs. Elsewhere in Mexico, the link between street gangs and the Mexican cartels is more fluid and tenuous, with gang members typically filling retail drug sales roles rather than providing enforcement.

Between March 18 and 21, the FBI and DEA led a collaborative effort of more than 200 federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel in “Operation Knockdown.” Through Operation Knockdown, interviews of over 350 Barrio Azteca gang members in El Paso and New Mexico were conducted. The interviews focused on the activities of drug hit squads in the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso corridor, with a particular focus on gathering intelligence related to the March 13 murders of three individuals associated with our consulate in Ciudad Juarez. The interviews were also an attempt to generate information regarding the FBI Top Ten fugitive and BA member Eduardo Ravelo’s possible location. Intelligence from Operation Knockdown led to 54 arrests, and the seizure of various items of documentary evidence. As a result of this heightened law enforcement pressure, officials are gleaning actionable information directly from gang members.

Government of Mexico Initiatives

In the three years since Felipe Calderon assumed his post as President of Mexico, he and his administration have acted with unprecedented vigor and resolve against organized crime and its primary purveyors, the drug cartels. With sustained efforts in attacking the insidious problems of drug-related corruption and violence on every front, the Calderon Administration must be credited at least partially with the sustained reduction in the availability of cocaine in the United States.

Having deployed the military to replace state and local police in the most violence-plagued areas of the country, President Calderon attacked the very core of cartel power: the corruption of public officials. With narco-corruption cases increasingly pointing to high-ranking federal officials in the Mexican government, President Calderon launched Operation Limpieza (Clean Sweep). Designed to improve operational integrity within several Mexican government agencies, including the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), the Secretariat of Public Security, and the military, Operation Limpieza has already resulted in the arrests of dozens of corrupt public officials, and the drafting of a joint GOM-U.S. Department of Justice proposal on police and judicial reforms. Benchmark reforms include improvements in internal security processes (such as background investigations, internal affairs/disciplinary actions, and ethics training), information security processes (such as evidence handling and case file management), and physical security processes (such as structural improvements and access limitations).

The Southwest border is a particular focus of the Department’s corruption-fighting efforts. Of the 700 FBI agents leading our charge against public corruption, approximately 120 are working along the Southwest border. The FBI coordinates its investigative efforts along the Southwest border with the Department of Homeland Security - Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement - Office of Professional Responsibility (ICE-OPR); Customs and Border Protection- Internal Affairs (CBP-IA); Transportation Security Administration (TSA); the DEA; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). As a result, over 400 public corruption cases originate from that region. In fiscal year 2009, there were over 100 arrests and over 130 state and federal cases prosecuted.

The FBI’s 12 border corruption task forces along the Southwest border share information with the Southwest Intelligence Group (SWIG), EPIC, and Mexican legal attachés to both identify and disrupt Mexican drug trafficking organizations from utilizing and soliciting United States public officials to commit criminal activities. The National Border Corruption Task Force (NCBTF) has been established at FBI Headquarters. Consisting of representatives from the FBI, DHS-OIG, ICE OPR, CBP-IA, and TSA, this task force ensures general guidance and oversight of border corruption programs across the country. Internally, our NCBTF is coordinating with other impacted divisions at FBI Headquarters. These include the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, Counterintelligence Division, Counterterrorism Division, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. Through trend analysis, intelligence and information sharing, and the utilization of lessons learned and best practices, we are becoming more nimble in our approach and making great strides. In addition, the GOM created the Special Organized Crime Court (SOCC), which has jurisdiction over organized crime investigations throughout the Republic of Mexico, and has three primary functions: 1) to authorize the provisional detention of organized crime suspects; 2) to authorize search warrants; and 3) to authorize the interception of communications for evidentiary purposes. The SOCC has nationwide jurisdiction, which not only eliminates the administrative inefficiencies of the previous system, but should also resolve intimidation and corruption-related issues associated with the previous requirement that prosecutors go to local judges in close proximity to the suspected criminal activity.

In June 2008, President Calderon approved a Constitutional amendment permitting the GOM’s transition from a written inquisitorial (confession-based) justice system, to an oral adversarial (investigations-based) system. This transition is a significant step toward improving transparency in legal proceedings in Mexico and helps insure the integrity of the judicial process.

The United States is engaged in cooperative efforts with Mexican law enforcement to provide information, training, and equipment that will allow Mexican authorities to investigate, capture, and prosecute members of Mexico’s most dangerous and powerful drug cartels. The quantifiable impact of huge drug, weapons, and money seizures presents an incomplete picture. While more difficult to measure, the enormous psychological impact of high-level arrests and record numbers of extraditions completes the picture. No other action by the GOM strikes quite so deeply at cartel fears than an arrest and extradition.

Beginning only weeks after his inauguration, President Calderon began extraditing high-profile criminals to the United States. In January 2007, President Calderon took the politically courageous step of extraditing 15 individuals to stand trial in the United States, including notorious Gulf Cartel head, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen who, just this past February, was sentenced to 25 years in prison. In fact, February 2010 was a landmark month. On February 19, the GOM extradited Vicente Zambada-Niebla, son of kingpin Ismael “Mayo” Zambada-Garcia and a leader in the Sinaloa Cartel. On February 25, Miguel Caro-Quintero was sentenced to 17 years in a U.S. federal prison, after having been extradited last January. Miguel Caro-Quintero had assumed control of the family organization after the arrest of his brother Rafael Caro-Quintero, who was complicit in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena.

Since that day, the government of Mexico has extradited in excess of 280 criminals to the United States. These individuals are associated with some of the most notorious Mexican drug trafficking organizations: the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the Arellano Felix Organization.

During the past year, the GOM has achieved unprecedented success in apprehending high-value targets based in Mexico. For example, in March 2009, DEA fugitive Vicente Zambada-Niebla, mentioned previously as a recently-extradited leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, was arrested in Mexico City. In October 2009, another Sinaloa Cartel leader and DEA fugitive, Oscar Nava-Valencia (known as "El Lobo") was apprehended near Guadalajara, Mexico. Nava is currently incarcerated in Mexico, pending extradition to the U.S. In December 2009, the "Boss of Bosses" Arturo Beltran-Leyva was killed in Cuernavaca, Mexico during an arrest operation after a two-hour gun battle with Mexican military forces. Beltran was considered one of the most powerful drug lords in Mexico. And finally, on January 12, 2010, DEA and the U.S. Marshals Service identified the residence of one of Mexico’s most wanted fugitives and co-leader of the Tijuana Cartel, Eduardo Garcia-Simental (known as “El Teo”), who was responsible for many of the homicides, kidnappings, and tortures in Tijuana. El Teo’s brother, Manuel, and their chief lieutenant Raydel Lopez-Uriarte, were arrested less than one month later, on February 8. All these high-impact actions—seizures, arrests and extraditions—serve to make one important point: drug traffickers are inherently violent—but desperate, vulnerable drug traffickers operating under unprecedented stress are exceedingly violent.

Interagency Initiatives Along the Southwest Border

DEA and the FBI are agencies with global reach who work vigorously with law enforcement counterparts in both the United States and Mexico to address the violence in Mexico through joint investigations and the sharing of intelligence. We routinely collect and share intelligence pertaining to those violent drug trafficking organizations and armed groups operating in and around “hot spots” along the Southwest border. Additionally, DEA has the largest U.S. law enforcement presence in Mexico with offices in Mexico City, Tijuana, Hermosillo, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez, Mazatlan, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Merida. As of April 2010, DEA has 1,205 special agent positions working in domestic offices with responsibilities for the SWB, representing approximately 23 percent of DEA’s total special agent workforce. In addition, DEA has the largest law enforcement presence of any U.S. agency in Mexico, with 62 special agents. Overall, some 24 percent of DEA’s total special agent workforce is assigned to either Mexico or the Southwest border.

FBI Resolution Six (R-6) agents, co-located with DEA agents, coordinate drug and gang investigations conducted in Mexico. They are also responsible for supporting domestic cases for U.S. prosecution, cultivating liaison contacts within Mexico, and supporting bilateral criminal enterprise initiatives. Working closely with counterparts assigned to the Mexican Embassy, legal attachés, the El Paso Intelligence Center, and the Southwest Intelligence Group as well as with our federal partners in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, we leverage all available resources and expertise. Our close coordination with impacted state and local law enforcement and our Mexican counterparts allow us real-time access to intelligence and information that in 2009, alone, enabled us to realize over 800 convictions related to Mexican DTOs.

As the lead U.S. law enforcement agency responsible for enforcing the drug laws of the United States, DEA has been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to work with foreign law enforcement counterparts in confronting the organizations that profit from the global drug trade. DEA’s success is due, at least in part, to its single-mission focus. DEA is well positioned to mount a sustained attack on the command and control elements of drug trafficking organizations; however, DEA does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, DEA and FBI, in conjunction with the Department of Justice; the Department of Homeland Security; the Department of Defense; the intelligence community; and state, local, other federal, and foreign counterparts, mount a coordinated attack against all levels of the drug trade with an aim at disrupting and dismantling the command and control elements of these organizations.

Several noteworthy interagency efforts are being coordinated along the SWB:
  • Most recently, on June 5 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney General Holder, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Napolitano, and Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director Kerlikowske released President Obama’s National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, designed to stem the flow of illegal drugs and their illicit proceeds across the Southwest Border and to reduce associated crime and violence in the region.
  • The SWB Initiative is a multi-agency, federal law enforcement operation that attacks Mexico-based DTOs operating along the SWB by targeting the communication systems of their command and control centers. The SWB Initiative has been in operation since 1994. As part of a cooperative effort, DEA, the FBI, CBP, ICE, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices around the country conduct wiretaps that ultimately identify all levels of Mexico or Colombia-based DTOs. This strategy allows tracking of the drugs as they flow from Colombia or Mexico to the streets of the United States.
  • The Southwest Border Intelligence Collection Plan (SWBICP) was initiated by DEA in October 2009 to provide a regional intelligence collection framework to support enforcement operations on the SWB of the United States. The SWBICP provides operational, tactical, strategic, and policy-level intelligence used to support investigations, regional planning, and resource decision-making. Intelligence gathered under the guidance of the SWBICP is shared with the intelligence community and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The SWBICP also provides a mechanism to collect information needed to assess counterdrug measures and security threats along the U.S.-Mexico border. The SWBICP evolved from DEA’s previous highly-successful SWB-focused intelligence collection plan, Operation Black Flag.
  • The Concealment Trap Initiative (CTI) targets those vital service providers who build concealed trap compartments or use natural voids in vehicles or other conveyances and residences for DTOs to conceal bulk cash or other contraband. Drug traffickers recognize that “bulk” currency is subject to seizure and easily forfeited when discovered by law enforcement authorities. To counter this, drug traffickers employ a myriad of techniques, including the use of concealment traps, to impede and frustrate law enforcement’s efforts to discover and seize illicit drug proceeds. The CTI addresses the challenge of helping law enforcement officers and agents keep up with the technology behind these traps, including training them to identify and locate the traps, and establish probable cause toward obtaining a search warrant or consent to search the vehicle or residence in which the trap is located. DEA expended $3 million on the CTI program in 2009, and seized over $28 million, in addition to drugs and weapons.
  • Bulk Cash Seizures represent the cash proceeds obtained from the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, and persons and are targeted by DEA, FBI, ICE, and other federal and state and local law enforcement partners for use in obtaining valuable investigative leads and intelligence data. Going forward, information regarding bulk cash seizures will be simultaneously shared between ICE’s Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC) in Vermont and the National Seizure System (NSS) at EPIC. ICE’s BCSC is a 24/7 investigative support and operations facility providing real-time tactical assistance to the field, while the EPIC-NSS functions as, among other things, a repository for detailed bulk currency seizure information from both domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies. NSS analyzes volumes of bulk currency seizure data and develops investigative lead reports and responds to requests for bulk currency seizure data from agents and officers in the field. EPIC provides a broad spectrum of interagency information and intelligence systems which are capable of immediately assessing the information and assisting law enforcement agencies in obtaining probable cause for search warrants, link cases together and follow up on existing cases.
  • Since the FBI’s establishment of the Safe Streets Violent Crimes (SSVC) Initiative in 1992, we have focused on violent gangs by identifying major groups who act as significant criminal enterprises. The Department’s goal is not just to disrupt their activities, but to dismantle these dangerous gangs entirely. FBI agents assigned to each of the eight FBI field offices along the border conduct multi-subject and multi-jurisdictional investigations concentrating resources to remove the leadership and the most dangerous gangs and seize their criminally obtained assets. As of March 1, 2010, there were 124 pending kidnapping cases and 33 pending extortion cases throughout the FBI’s eight border field offices.
  • In addition, the FBI has established Violent Crime Safe Streets Task Forces (SSTF) in San Diego, Los Angeles, Phoenix, El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston. By coordinating our efforts with partners at all levels of law enforcement, we are able to leverage all available resources and expertise while sharing intelligence and information. For its part, the SSTF program also coordinates with our colleagues at the El Paso Intelligence Center, the Southwest Intelligence Center, the Mexican Embassy and Mexican legal attaché, as well as with Mexican law enforcement.
  • Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF): The OCDETF program was initiated in 1982 to combine federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts into a comprehensive attack against organized crime and drug traffickers. DEA and the FBI are active components of the OCDETF program, including OCDETF Strike Forces. OCDETF Strike Forces collaborate with the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) regional task forces in Arizona, California, New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas. Southwest Border HIDTA Task Forces represent federal, state, and local partnerships that target Mexican drug cartels and their smuggling and transportation networks that spawn cartel violence along the border. The Southwest Border HIDTAs is one of 29 HIDTAs which are funded via the Office of National Drug Control Policy. HIDTA Task Forces have had enormous success dismantling major Mexican drug trafficking organizations linked to Mexico-based cartels.
  • DEA is a member of the DHS Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), an ICE-led initiative designed to increase the flow of information between participating agencies regarding transnational criminal organizations and violent gangs operating along our shared borders. In particular, BESTs target the underlying source of cross border violence along the SWB: weapons smuggling, narcotics and human smuggling as well as bulk cash smuggling. BESTs commenced in Laredo, Texas in July 2005; DEA’s participation in the Laredo BEST began on May 3, 2006. Based on the success of the Laredo BEST, the BEST program has expanded to 17 locations, 10 of which, including Laredo, are situated along the SWB: Rio Grande Valley, Texas; El Paso, Texas; Las Cruces, New Mexico; Deming, New Mexico; Tucson, Arizona; Phoenix. Arizona; Yuma, Arizona; Imperial Valley, California; and San Diego, California. BESTs incorporate personnel from ICE; CBP; USSS; DEA; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; FBI; U.S. Coast Guard; and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, along with other key federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement agencies including the Mexican law enforcement agency Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP).
  • The Department’s Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS) is an innovative, multi-agency strategy, designed to disrupt significantly the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between source zones and the United States by attacking vulnerabilities in the supply chains, transportation systems, and financial infrastructure of major drug trafficking organizations. DFAS calls for aggressive, well-planned, and coordinated enforcement operations in cooperation with host-nation counterparts in global source and transit zones. Operation All-Inclusive (OAI) is the primary DFAS enforcement component in the source and transit zones. Iterations of OAI have been staged annually since 2005.
    • Operation Doble Via (ODV), the domestic component of OAI, was conducted between April and September 2007 to disrupt the flow of drugs, chemicals, and money across the SWB. ODV took place on both sides of the border and the main participants were DEA, CBP, Texas Department of Public Safety, and several Mexican agencies, including the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), the military, and the Deputy Attorney General’s Office of Special Investigations on Organized Crime (SIEDO). Operation Doble Via II will be conducted this year, with a focus on the Arizona-Mexico border. Through the collection of law enforcement intelligence information and the development of investigations specifically targeting the Arizona border region, ODV-II will seek to dismantle those drug trafficking organizations and other armed groups responsible for the violence in Sonora, Mexico and the movement of drugs, weapons, and money across the border with Arizona.
  • EPIC is a national tactical intelligence center that focuses its efforts on supporting law enforcement efforts in the Western Hemisphere, with a significant emphasis on the SWB. Through its 24-hour watch function, EPIC provides immediate access to participating agencies' databases to law enforcement agents, investigators, and analysts. This function is critical in the dissemination of relevant information in support of tactical and investigative activities, deconfliction, and officer safety. EPIC also provides significant, direct tactical intelligence support to state and local law enforcement agencies, especially in the areas of clandestine laboratory investigations and highway interdiction.
    • EPIC’s Gatekeeper Project is a comprehensive, multi-source assessment of trafficking organizations involved in and controlling movement of illegal contraband through “entry corridors” along the SWB. The analysis of Gatekeeper organizations not only provides a better understanding of command and control, organizational structure, and methods of operation, but also serves as a guide for policymakers to initiate and prioritize operations by U.S. anti-drug elements. Numerous “Gatekeepers” have direct links to Priority Target Organizations and/or Consolidated Priority Organization Targets.
    • Implementation of License Plate Readers (LPR) along the SWB by the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security has provided a surveillance method that uses optical character recognition on images that read vehicle license plates. The purpose of the LPR Initiative is to combine existing DEA and other law enforcement database capabilities with new technology to identify and interdict conveyances being utilized to transport bulk cash, drugs, and weapons, as well as other illegal contraband. Almost 100 percent of the effort and cost associated with monitoring southbound traffic is directed at the identification, seizure, and forfeiture of bulk cash and weapons, while the effort and cost of monitoring northbound traffic is both enforcement and forfeiture-related, in that suspect conveyances can be identified for later southbound monitoring. DEA components have the ability to query and input alerts on license plates via an existing DEA database, and other law enforcement agencies can do the same via EPIC. DEA and CBP are currently working together in order to merge existing CBP LPRs at the points of entry with DEA’s LPR Initiative.
  • The OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC) provides investigative and operational intelligence support to OCDETF investigations through the development of organizational target profiles and the development of specific investigative leads. These leads and intelligence products are disseminated to the appropriate field elements of the OCDETF agencies through SOD. Intelligence and leads relating to other criminal activities, including terrorism, are disseminated through SOD to the appropriate agencies.
  • The DEA-led multi-agency Special Operations Division’s (SOD) mission is to establish seamless law enforcement strategies and operations aimed at dismantling national and international trafficking organizations by attacking their command and control communications. SOD is able to facilitate coordination and communication amongst law enforcement entities with overlapping investigations and ensure tactical and operational intelligence is shared and that enforcement operations and investigations are fully coordinated among and between law enforcement agencies.

Conclusion

The daily challenges posed by drug trafficking organizations in the United States and Mexico are significant, but are overshadowed of late by a very specific set of challenges: ensuring that the rampant violence in Mexico does not spill over our border; closely monitoring the security situation in Mexico; and, perhaps most importantly, lending our assistance and support to the Calderon Administration to ensure its continued success against the ruthless and powerful cartels. The GOM has realized enormous gains in re-establishing the rule of law in Mexico, and in breaking the power and impunity of the DTOs who threaten Mexico’s, and our, national security. The Calderon Administration’s gains translate to an unparalleled positive impact on the U.S. drug market as well: from January 2007 through December 2009, the price per gram of cocaine increased 72 percent from $98.88 to $169.93, while the average purity decreased by almost 33 percent. These statistics paint a clear picture of restricted drug flow into the United States and decreased availability. While spikes—upward or downward—in price and purity have been observed in the past, these indicators typically normalize within a few months. Unlike in the past, we are now in the midst of a sustained, three-year period of escalating prices and decreasing purity. Anecdotal evidence from around the country and closer to home here in the District of Columbia, including intercepted communications of the traffickers themselves, corroborates the fact that President Calderon’s efforts are making it more difficult for traffickers to supply the U.S.
market with illicit drugs.

The Department recognizes that interagency and international collaboration and coordination is fundamental to our success. It is imperative that we sustain the positive momentum by supporting President Calderon’s heroic efforts against organized crime. We must also manage expectations, as we anticipate that the gruesome violence in Mexico may get worse before it gets better. We must recognize that we are witnessing acts of true desperation: the actions of wounded, vulnerable, and dangerous criminal organizations. We remain committed to working with our U.S. law enforcement and intelligence partners as well, to stem the flow of bulk cash and weapons south, while also working to sustain the disruption of drug transportation routes northward. Bringing to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in the cultivation, manufacture, and distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit trafficking in the United States remains the core of our focus.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this important issue. We will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Saturday, May 15, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

EU-Latin America Summit In Madrid To Be 'Historic' - Moratinos

The Sixth EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit, which will get underway on 17 May in Madrid, will be “a historic summit that the Spanish Presidency wants to be a landmark in relations between the European Union and Latin America”, according to Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos.

"I can assure you there will be a large number of participants. I am sure the summit will be a success because we have already seen that the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean all want it to be successful and achieve positive results", the minister said at the opening of the Sixth EU-Latin America Organised Civil Society Forum, which is the first of the meetings to be held within the process of the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid.

Moratinos said the summit has been "well organised", as can be seen in the fact it "will be attended by practically all the heads of state and government" of the 60 EU-LAC countries. "You don't just put together a summit in two weeks or three months - it takes a very long time", he added.

He emphasised that this biregional summit, which is being held for the sixth time, will mark a turning point, after admitting that Europe had not shown much interest in Latin America in recent years.

"We have to be truthful: things aren't going well between Latin America and the EU. Relations between the two sides aren't living up to ambitions and expectations, nor fulfilling their true potential", he added.

In his opinion, he said, "the Europeans, apart from Portugal, Spain and up to a point Italy have ignored Latin America over recent years". To illustrate this, he pointed out that, on average, barely seven ministers from the EU-27 take part in the yearly meeting between the Foreign Affairs ministers of the two regions.

Moratinos said the EU "is starting to rouse itself and get interested" in working with Latin America to tackle common global challenges such as climate change and the overhaul of the financial markets, since together the two regions make up one-third of the UN - adding that this development came “not a moment too soon”.

"What we need to do at the meeting in Madrid is to consolidate this new interest and prove that it's not going to fade away again and disappear in a lack of action and relations", he added.

This summit "will not just be another one of many", said the minister, who added he was confident it would end with specific results such as the agreements with Central America, Colombia and Peru, and the renewal of talks with Mercosur.

Aside from the final political declaration, a working agenda has already been agreed, which will include mandates to continue with the two-year period between summits.
Friday, May 07, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Murky Waters Flow From Peruvian Andes

(Tierramérica) -- The Olmos megaproject, which will divert water from the Huancabamba River through a trans-Andean tunnel to desert land along Peru's northern coast, is being presented as a catalyst for farm development, but disputes are heating up over land, crops and water.

The goal of moving water from the Atlantic side of the continental divide to the Pacific side for the Olmos hydroelectric and irrigation plan in the northwestern region of Lamayeque has been an 80-year dream, with an endless series of steps forwards and backwards.

In the original plan, there were three phases: diverting the Huancabamba River, which comes from the mountains of the Piura region, through a tunnel under the Andes Mountains; the construction of a hydroelectric complex; and the irrigation of 110,000 hectares in the coastal valley of Olmos. In March 2006, the Brazilian firm Odebrecht won the bid to build the diversion. In its first stage it would move some 400 million cubic meters of water - of the 750 million initially projected.

Odebrecht also was put in charge of the irrigation project, estimated at more than 200 million dollars. But the hydroelectric plans are on hold.

In the opinion of the Olmos Special Project's management, it is the cure-all for Peru. The nearly 20-kilometer tunnel under the mountains is being touted on U.S. television's Discovery Channel as the world's second longest.

According to a Discovery report, some 2.5 million cubic meters of water will reach the country's poorest farmers if the expansion of the initial plan is carried out.

What is certain is that the 38,000 hectares to be irrigated in the first phase do not belong to small or even medium farms.

They are lands that the Alberto Fujimori government (1990-2000) expropriated from the peasant community of Olmos, and will be put up for sale in lots of at least 1,000 hectares at a base price of 4,100 dollars each.

"But the peasant farmers are waiting expectantly anyway, because they think that they will be able to irrigate their land. That is going to generate conflict, Luis Carbajal, secretary of the non-governmental Defense Committee of Lambayeque Megaprojects, told Tierramérica.

Olmos general manager Enrique Salazar confirmed that the lots will be sold to "entrepreneurs who are economically solvent and can confront a demanding agro-export market."

"This is not designed for small properties. The idea is to generate permanent units of production so that the farmers have employment, elevate their standard of living, and move beyond the forgotten peasant class," he told Tierramérica.

In addition, he said, 5,500 hectares of land belonging to farmers in the old valley of Olmos will be irrigated, who would pay Odebrecht for it.

According to the Defense Committee's Carbajal, such an approach will lead to a land invasion. And it is likely that the small farmers will begin to cut down native forests of carob, zapote, huarango and hualtaco, to replace them with exportable le crops, such as asparagus or artichokes.

Juan Sandoval, natural resources manager for the regional government of Lambayeque, said efforts are under way to set aside two conservation areas in order to reduce harm to flora and fauna. But he acknowledged it is insufficient and that the 38,000 hectares include "virgin lands with forests, both thin and dense."

Carbajal noted that the project had included a hydroelectric component to make use of the waterfall. But because that phase was suspended, 80 million cubic meters of water of the 400 million needed for the entire area will go to waste, he said.

The Lambayeque Defense Committee filed a complaint against the regional government with the Comptroller General's office for allegedly short-valuing the project. Rejected there, the complaint went to the Attorney General's Office, where it is still being reviewed.

The controversy even extended to the Cabinet of President Alan García. Economy Minister Mercedes Aráoz argued about the Odebrecht budget for irrigation with Prime Minister Javier Velásquez Quesquén, who thought it should be improved.

Former economy minister Cecilia Blume explained to Tierramérica that the government provided 70 million dollars to Lambayeque for the diversion project, and served as guarantor for the remaining 330 million dollars needed for the investment. That sum should be generated by the sale of government-owned lands in Olmos.

However, the value of the land, according to Blume, depends on the irrigation. If they can only count on having water half the day, as Odebrecht proposed, the land prices will fall, and with it, the funds to pay for the diversion.

As the result of an Apr. 13 meeting between the government and Odebrecht, according to an announcement by Aráoz, the company improved its proposal.

"Before, even with all the revenues, the irrigation project was only going to provide 74 million dollars to the people in 200 years. Today we can say there will be 98 million in 40 years, which means the payment of 35 percent of the diversion in that period," she told the local press.

The payment for the lands, said Aráoz, will be immediate, and the time period to complete the sale of the 38,000 hectares is 20 months.
Thursday, April 29, 2010 | 1 comments | Read more...

Small-Scale Miners' Protest In Peru Turns Deadly

By Ramiro Escobar

A protest by small-scale miners in the coastal town of Chala in southern Peru ended with five dead demonstrators, killed by police bullets.

The protesters, who had blocked roads and clashed with police April 4-7, were demanding the government scrap a decree to stamp out illegal mining in the Amazon basin region of Madre de Dios.

The protest, called by the National Federation of Artisanal Miners of Peru, a labor group with 60,000 members, many of whom are based in Chala, also called for and end to two other decrees passed for the free trade agreement with the United States that aim to open up some areas where small-scale miners work to large-scale mining companies.

The some 250,000 small-scale miners in Peru — who operate both illegally and legally — are mainly focused on gold extraction, and the Andean country is the world´s sixth-largest producer of the metal.

At least three-quarters of Peru´s small-scale miners work informally.

“It employs double the number of people that formal mining employs,” said José de Echave, director of CooperAcción, a Peruvian organization dedicated to sustainable development and natural resources.

In the forested Madre de Dios region, there are at least 2,700 mining concessions and another 1,500 requested. The government, however, issued a decree putting a cap on new mining concessions in the area, citing environmental damage from the use of toxic mercury and other chemicals to extract the gold to deforestation, a measure that sparked the protest.

Some miners in that region also use dredges and light machinery to extract the ore from riverbeds and banks, causing extensive damage to the ecosystem. Gold mining accounts for at least 40 percent of the impoverished region´s economy.

Absence of the state

April´s protest, which was also focused in Madre de Dios, was broadly frowned upon in Peru because of the environmental impact of informal and small-scale mining, which is blamed for the destruction of several Amazon ecosystems and also been tied to lawless land grabs.

But still, the problem appears difficult to stop abruptly because of what caused it.

“All of this is the result of a very permissive economic model,” said Peruvian economist Humberto Campodónico, noting that corporate, large-scale miners have also been granted lax state control of the industry.

Peru produced 183,215 kilograms of gold last year, and 88 percent came from medium- and large-sized miners. Informal mining produced 17,215 kilograms. But a study by engineer Héctor Benavente Revilla, a consultant for small miner Fidami SA, says this figure is more to the tune of 30,000 kilograms, or close to 15 percent of Peru´s total gold extraction. In mid-April, Peru´s tax agency, Sunat, said it would fine four mining companies for buying gold from informal producers for tax evasion.

The other side of the mining boom

Peru is the only country of the Andean Community bloc that does not list the origins of all of its gold exports, some of which clearly come from illegal mining.

Kathia Romero, of the International Labor Organization, said that a study in 2001 found that there were 200,000 artisanal miners in Peru, most of them working illegally, and even worse, there were 50,000 children working in the industry in 2001, painting a bleak picture of the social consequences of this activity.

Minors under the age of 14 are prohibited from working in Peru in any form.

Along with the boom of informal mining towns in the jungle and in the 17 other regions of Peru where informal mining is present, is the sexual exploitation of minors.

“This is an economic activity that doesn´t get you rich, said Romero. “It´s about survival and it involves entire families ... and it gets worse when it starts to develop in areas where the state is absent or has a minimal presence.”

The Ministry of Energy and Mines estimates that Madre de Dios produces US$1.3 billion of illegally mined gold a year, a large sum considering the state´s tardy and weak response to the issue, which fails to address the poor work opportunities and other root causes of the problem.

Source: Latinamerica Press.
Saturday, April 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Terrorism In Latin America

Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America has intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation.

In its April 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which triggers a number of economic sanctions.

Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian terrorist groups. The State Department terrorism report noted, however, that President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America.

In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region, but stated that there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.

Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Concerns about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America center on the country’s ties to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks in Argentina.

In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410 (Berman), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision calling for a report on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 17, 2009, the House approved H.Con.Res. 156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among other provisions, condemns the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, and urges Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist groups. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (Levin), which included reporting requirements on Venezuela and Cuba, but the provisions were not included in the final enacted measure.

Other introduced measures include H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen) and H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), which, among their provisions, would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba; H.R. 2272 (Rush), which includes a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list; and H.Res. 872 (Mack), which calls for Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism.

Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes.

The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The April 2009 report maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall, however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.

The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by “corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report lauded counterterrorism efforts in Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, but noted that some other countries “lacked urgency and resolve to address counterterrorism deficiencies.” It also noted that most hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United States on terrorism issues, especially at the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.

Colombia

Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The ELN has a dwindling membership of about 2,000 fighters and reduced offensive capability, but has inflicted casualties through the increased use of land mines and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking.

Peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government remain stalled. With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal organization, but some AUC renegades continued to engage in criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking, according to the terrorism report. According to the report, the Colombian government continued to process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes and return all illicit profits.

The FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s military campaign against it, including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation rescued 15 long-held hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors held since February 2003: Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; and other Colombians. In addition, according to the State Department’s terrorism report, Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders in 2008 and reduced the amount of territory where the FARC could freely operate. Desertions among FARC members also increased in 2008 to more than 3,000 compared to almost 2,500 in 2007.

Nevertheless, the FARC has continued tactical-level terrorist activities, kidnapping for profit (including the holding of 24 “high value” political hostages and hundreds of other kidnap victims), and narcotrafficking activities. The group launched several bombings against civilian and military targets in urban areas and targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and political opponents in dozens of attacks.

Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors, according to the State Department terrorism report. The FARC uses Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training in addition to coca processing and limited planting and production. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia remain tense in the aftermath of Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory, Ecuador’s military has increased the number of operations against the FARC in its northern border region.

Both the FARC and the ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. According to the terrorism report, the Venezuelan government did not systematically police the country’s 1,400-mile border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Moreover, limited amounts of weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, reportedly have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.

In September 2008, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of he FARC. In Panama, the terrorism report maintained that the FARC was active in Panama’s Darien province and was reported to have entered several villages in order to steal supplies. Panama’s Public Forces were reported to closely monitor the FARC’s activities and have captured several FARC members. With regard to Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases.

Peru

The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison.

According to the current State Department terrorism report, there are two SL remnants in Peru operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley, which combined were reported to have several hundred armed combatants. Both groups engage in drug trafficking and carried out 64 terrorist acts in 2008, with 31 people killed, including four civilians.

As noted above, the FARC was reported was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department terrorism report, experts contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the Peruvian population in border areas.


Cuba

Since 1982, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism (the other states currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.

The language in the State Department’s terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.”

While the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.

The terrorism report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also asserts that the Cuban government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006. Most of the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States.

Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.

Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list while North Korea and Libya have been removed, and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.

Cuba has called for the United States to surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. Most recently, Posada was indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas in April 2009 in which he was accused, among other things, of lying during immigration proceedings regarding his involvement in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled until February 2010 in order to give him time to prepare his defense. Press reports maintain that Posada is also being investigated by a grand jury in New Jersey for his role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba.1

In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), introduced May 6, 2009, has a provision that would remove Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list.

Venezuela

Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela was not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a result, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Eritrea , Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.)

The State Department’s annual terrorism report maintained that while Venezuela President Hugo Chávez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the ELN had limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism, President Chávez publicly changed course in June 2008 and called on the FARC to unconditionally release all hostages, declaring that armed struggle is “out of place” in modern Latin America. In July 2008, the Venezuelan military detained a senior FARC official and handed him over to Colombian authorities. Nevertheless, in September 2008, the Treasury Department designated two senior Venezuelan government officials for assisting the FARC’s drug trafficking activities.

As noted above, the State Department terrorism report stated that the FARC, ELN and remnants of the AUC often crossed into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans in order to finance their operations. The Venezuelan government also did not systematically police its country’s border with Colombia to prevent the movement of armed groups or to interdict the flow of narcotics. Some limited amounts of weapons and ammunition from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities were reported to have ended up in the hands of Colombian terrorist groups.

The State Department terrorism report also cited two other concerns about Venezuela. First, as noted in the past, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Second, the report noted that passengers on weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas.

There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s increasing interest in Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. One reason for the concern is Iran’s ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is reported to have been linked to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. In June 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to Hezbollah. In the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Res. 435 (Klein) in November 2007, which expressed concern about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and noted Venezuela’s increasing cooperation with Iran.

In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011, on June 10, 2009, with a provision in section 1011 requiring a report within 90 days on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. The provision cited the State Department’s 2008 terrorism report that noted the passengers on the weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas were reportedly subject to only cursory immigration and customs controls in Caracas. On July 23, 2009, the Senate approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin), with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.

Several other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, includes a provision identical to that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October 27, 2009, would call on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of its alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.


This article is an edited portion of a longer January 25, 2010 CRS report, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (PDF) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

NOTES:

1 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007; Jay Weaver, “U.S.Probes Haunt 80-year Old Anti-Castro Cuban,” Houston Chronicle, March 2, 2008; Jay Weaver, “Posada Gets More Time for Perjury Defense,” Miami Herald, June 16, 2009.
Friday, April 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

HRW Urges Investigation Into Peru Killings

Peru should conduct a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation into the killing of 6 civilians during a confrontation with the police in Chala, Human Rights Watch said.

On April 4, 2010, approximately 200 members of the police tried to disperse a demonstration of at least 6,000 miners, who had closed a major highway in Chala, in Caravelí province, according to local press reports. The reports said that demonstrators threw stones and sticks at the police, and the police used tear gas and opened live fire to disperse the demonstration. According to the local press reports and non-governmental organizations, the police gunfire killed five demonstrators and wounded about 30 others. A woman who was not participating in the events reportedly died of a heart attack.

“An independent and impartial investigation is absolutely critical to ensure that those responsible for these killings are brought to justice,” said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch.

The demonstrators were calling for the repeal of a presidential decree issued in February that aimed at regulating illegal mining in Madre de Dios.

Local press reported that on the evening of April 5, demonstrators agreed to end the blockade and to allow vehicles to go by for two hours in exchange for the release of 28 demonstrators who had been detained after the confrontation. Only one demonstrator, who allegedly had explosives, remained in detention.

Several government officials said publicly that the Peruvian government declared a state of emergency in the region on April 1 and suspended certain rights in the expectation of protests over the mining decree. Victor García Toma, Peru’s minister of justice, said in a televised interview that the demonstration in Chala was a “delinquent act” that was “totally unreasonable” and “has no legal support.”

“If the government expected demonstrations, it should have issued clear instructions to security forces that efforts to restore order must be consistent with international human rights standards,” Vivanco said. “Using lethal force to disperse a demonstration is not permitted simply by declaring a state of emergency. Any use of force must be absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate, even in states of emergency.”

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Peru in April 1978, and the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by Peru in July 1978, state that the right to life is non-derogable during states of emergency. The UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions also make clear that “exceptional circumstances including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions. Such executions shall not be carried out under any circumstances including, but not limited to … excessive or illegal use of force by a public official…”

The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall use restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence. The legitimate objective should be achieved with minimal damage and injury, and preservation of human life respected.
Wednesday, April 07, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Andes Uplift Slower Than Previously Thought

The South American Andes, stretching more than 7000 km north to south, reach an average elevation of about 4000 metres, with some peaks higher than 6000 metres.

In recent years, scientists have tried various techniques to quantify the elevation history of these impressive mountains: Previous techniques suggest a rapid uplift of the central Andes of about 2500 metres during the late Miocene, ten to six million years ago.

Now these models are corrected by Prof. Todd Ehlers of the Institute of Geosciences of Tübingen University and Prof. Christopher Poulsen a Humboldt fellow visiting from the University of Michigan, as well as Nadja Insel, a graduate student at Michigan.

Their work suggests previous data for Andean uplift do not necessarily indicate a rapid uplift of the Andes. The data rather suggest a slow-and-steady rise of the Andes accompanied with dramatic climate change that was unaccounted for in previous models. The research results were published on 1 April by the journal Science – News and Science.

The Andes are forming at the Western edge of the South American Plate where it collides with the Nazca Plate. The South American Plate is pressed against the subducted Nazca Plate where rocks piled up to form the Andes mountains.

What geoscientists know about the timing of the uplift of the Andes is due to the fact that oxygen atoms of different masses exist. Besides the 16O-atoms 18O-atoms are found in a very low percentage. Both types of atoms are present in rainwater and preserved in soil deposits. The fewer 18O-atoms in the soil sediments, the higher above the ocean the area has been at the time of the soil formation.

"That is because rain clouds ascend mountains and the water molecules containing the 18O-atoms rainout first, as they are heavier," Todd Ehlers said.

Current measurements of modern rainfall mirror this relation precisely: A difference of height of 1000 metres makes a difference of three per mill of 18O-atoms in the soil sediments. Applying this relation to soil sediments of the Andes of known age at different heights let to the supposition that the Andes had risen in a short period of some million years in the late Miocene by about 2500 metres.

In a 2008 Earth and Planetary Science Letters publication Todd Ehlers and Christopher Poulsen criticized that there was one thing their colleagues didn’t reckon with: climate change associated with Andean mountain uplift. In a simulation of South American palaeoclimate forthcoming in the journal Science Poulsen, Ehlers, and Insel have now tracked the pathways of the different oxygen types in atmospheric vapor during uplift of the Andes. The simulation suggested a change in the winds and rainfall amounts in the late Miocene influence the 18O-content deposited in soils of that age.

At the beginning these influences weren’t significant, "but as the Andes reached a height of about 2000 metres convective rainfall intensified on the Eastern slopes of the central Andes. More intense rainfall causes a removal of 18O from atmospheric water vapor and gives the appearance of artificially low elevations in ancient soil deposits. Other scientists have found by totally different methods, i. e. examination of the vegetation changes and other isotopic variations, that the climate of the Andes became more wet at the time," Todd Ehlers said.

That means the former models for Andean surface uplift have to be corrected: The mountains have reached their impressive height through a slow and steady uplift over the last forty million years and not from a rapid rise in the last ten to six million years.
Friday, April 02, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Earthquake Preparedness Still Lacking In Peru

By Ramiro Escobar

It took the devastating 8.8-magnitude earthquake that destroyed parts of neighboring Chile on Feb. 27, for Peru´s government to scramble to form an earthquake preparedness plan, even though less than three years earlier, an 8.0-magnitude quake rocked Peru´s south-central coast, killing more than 500 people.

Following the quake in Chile, President Alan García announced that the country would install a tsunami alert system, despite the fact that there was a tsunami alert following the August 2007 earthquake in Peru. He also unveiled a National Prevention Plan against Earthquakes, even those experts have been clamoring for one for years.

Poverty´s weight

Pedro Ferradas, who heads the disaster prevention program at the international technical support and sustainable development organization ITDG-Soluciones Practicas, said consecutive governments have not done enough to strengthen state-run disaster response bodies.

The National Civil Defense Institute, which was founded in 1973, during the 1968-80 military government, “is a vertical authority, that works from the top down” and that it has “deficiencies.”

Some experts, such as José Sato, of the Center for Disaster Prevention and Studies, argues that Peru faces potentially disastrous natural phenomena constantly, such as floods, droughts and landslides, and that the government is overdue for instating better plans.

Close to three years after the Aug. 15, 2007 earthquake, which destroyed the southern port city of Pisco, and was followed by a slow and chaotic aid distribution, residents are still demanding aid from the government for reconstruction. García made big promises to Pisco, and a government-run commission he appointed to oversee the reconstruction effort crumbled amid claims of inefficiencies.

“Poverty is our greatest vulnerability,” said Sato, who believes disasters are not natural, but social. The lack of coordination between government institutions and response teams create a dangerous cocktail with the population´s poor quality of life and the absence of the state to see imprudent living conditions.

Many people in Peru build their homes on the sandy ground of the country´s coast — home to more than two-thirds of the population — or with weak materials, such as cheap adobe, or near riverbanks, threatened by floods or any movement of the land in this seismically active country. In some cases, construction permits are granted for construction in precarious areas.

Ferradas warns that current legislation impedes fluid communication between municipalities and civil defense. Every municipality must have a Civil Defense Committee, led by the mayor, and including police and other government officials, and in some cases, churches, but in many cases these committee members are not trained to handle potential disasters.

Useless deaths

In February, thousands of tourists were stranded in Aguas Calientes, the small town and gateway to the Inca citadel of Machu Picchu, Peru´s top tourist destination, when heavy rains flooded train tracks and hiking trails. Hundreds had to be airlifted out of the town.

An Argentine woman and a Peruvian guide were killed in a landslide.

In the same department, Cuzco, in the villages of Zurite and Taray, seven people were killed from the heavy rains and landslides, illustrating again just how ill-prepared Peru is for potential disasters.

Sato added that the government´s major error is waiting until these disasters happen. He suggested that the population should become more involved and should receive education for preparedness, such as evacuation drills and other preventative measures.

But government inaction is not just three years old, since the Pisco earthquake. One of the worst natural disasters in world history took place in Peru´s Andes 40 years ago, and still did not convince the government to instate strong prevention policies. In the Andean department of Ancash in May 1970, a massive earthquake struck, and the impact chipped off a piece of glacier from Peru´s highest mountain, Huascaran, burying the entire village of Yungay, killing tens of thousands of people. Now, four decades later, it looks unlikely that the government could respond to a large-scale earthquake on the coastal desert capital, Lima.

Source: Latinamerica Press.
Monday, March 29, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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