Kazakh Human Rights Activist Languishes in Prison
By Robert Amsterdam
It's been a great disappointment to me how all the media attention has disappeared with regard to the case of the human rights activist Yevgeny Zhovtis in Kazakhstan, who was unlawfully jailed after having the bad luck of being involved in a terrible car accident (which ended up serving as pretext for his persecution). However, I can understand why: it's been incredibly hard for reporters or international observers to have any access to Zhovtis, whom the authorities decided should be incarcerated way out east in Ust-Kamenogorsk near the Russian border (call it the Khodorkovsky treatment - these leaders seem to learn a lot from each other).
Michael Allen at Democracy Digest has posted up a good update, which reports that the Italian Parliamentarian Matteo Mecacci finally succeeded in being granted access to visit Zhovtis. Mecacci stated that "Mr. Zhovtis was in good condition but disappointed in the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the lack of fairness in the legal proceedings," and that the Kazakh courts had failed "to deliver a fair and proportionate judgment in a situation that to independent observers does not entail criminal responsibility."
These were some harsh statements from a diplomat, but I would take it even further: Kazakhstan's appointment to the chairmanship of the OSCE has made a mockery out of the organization and deprived the club of its meaning. They should exhibit their good will toward cooperation with the international community by releasing Zhovtis without delay, and then perhaps a new conversation can begin.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
It's been a great disappointment to me how all the media attention has disappeared with regard to the case of the human rights activist Yevgeny Zhovtis in Kazakhstan, who was unlawfully jailed after having the bad luck of being involved in a terrible car accident (which ended up serving as pretext for his persecution). However, I can understand why: it's been incredibly hard for reporters or international observers to have any access to Zhovtis, whom the authorities decided should be incarcerated way out east in Ust-Kamenogorsk near the Russian border (call it the Khodorkovsky treatment - these leaders seem to learn a lot from each other).
Michael Allen at Democracy Digest has posted up a good update, which reports that the Italian Parliamentarian Matteo Mecacci finally succeeded in being granted access to visit Zhovtis. Mecacci stated that "Mr. Zhovtis was in good condition but disappointed in the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the lack of fairness in the legal proceedings," and that the Kazakh courts had failed "to deliver a fair and proportionate judgment in a situation that to independent observers does not entail criminal responsibility."
These were some harsh statements from a diplomat, but I would take it even further: Kazakhstan's appointment to the chairmanship of the OSCE has made a mockery out of the organization and deprived the club of its meaning. They should exhibit their good will toward cooperation with the international community by releasing Zhovtis without delay, and then perhaps a new conversation can begin.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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Medvedev's Charm Offensive In Turkey
By Robert Amsterdam
As President Dmitry Medvedev departed for a state visit to Turkey this week, there wasn't much debate over whether or not it would be success, but rather what kind of deals would be offered up to get the handshakes - would it be weapons, cheap gas, a pipeline, a Gazprom investment, or the granddaddy of them all, nuclear energy?
Well Turkey is no old maid (sorry, Ukraine), and has many good reasons to call for a high dowry: NATO membership, the largest standing army in Europe, and a booming, modern economy which is closely narrowing the gap with Europe. Most importantly, the country occupies an incredibly important geostrategic position between Europe and the energy basin of Central Asia as well as control over the Bosporus Strait, and will continue to play a key role in the transit of oil and gas.
So it shouldn't come as a complete surprise that during Medvedev's visit Russia signed a $20 billion deal to built Turkey's first nuclear power plant, and another 20 deals and agreements. In this particular situation, Sergei Kiriyenko and Rosatom played the role usually left to Igor Sechin, and carried out the now familiar process of layered bargaining (very few countries in the world can come to one meeting with arms deals, nuclear energy, and 5 or 6 industrial oligarchs in tote to jump in on the deal).
But as usual, behind the deals, some problems in the relationship remain. Turkey and Russia have had a historically rocky relationship dating back to Ottoman support for the Crimean Khanate (who burned down Moscow in 1571), while the Tsarist empire repeatedly clashed with the Turks over the 18th and 19th century and supported Christian separatists. During the Cold War, fears of Russian intervention in Turkey drove them into the arms of NATO, while trade politics over the Black Sea have also come into play. The tensions between historic rivals continues to today with a very large population of Chechens, which some Russian hawks believe is a safe haven for terrorists.
Ankara sees itself as an influential regional leader on the Black Sea, and their conduct following the war in Georgia displayed a distaste of Russia's failure to consult before combat operations. There is of course also Russia's role in supporting Armenia as a client state, as well as other regional problems, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and Turkey's interests in Azerbaijan. Energy, however, really seems to the be trickiest issue of all, and with Russia supplying some 2/3rds of Turkey's natural gas, the government is looking to play both sides of the fence, and above all, maintain strict control over transit points.
Despite some of these tensions, the high stakes involved in Russia's effort to monopolize the flow of energy supplies from east to west (and block the Nabucco pipeline) has led to a hasty and sometimes expensive rapprochement with Turkey. Medvedev's visit builds upon the evident momentum from Vladimir Putin's 2009 visit, which used energy trade and investment as the key vehicle to deepen relations.
Before arriving, Medvedev published an op/ed in Today's Zaman on his vision for the strategic alliance:
Upon completing the series of deals signed this week, the Russian President was ebullient: "Our talks today showed that Turkey and Russia are strategic partners not only in words but in deeds. (...) It really looks rather impressive." It might not be enough to overcome the deep problems in the relationship, as well as the collision of national interests in Turkish and Russian competition in energy transit, but they are certainly getting close.
Once again, we are witnessing a complete lack of awareness or at least a policy failure on behalf of Europe and the United States to offer competing deals to Ankara and keep relations close, and a failure to recognize the importance of this critical ally. Turkey's cooperation with Russia is certainly no doomsday scenario, and, like any other country, they will structure their relations with Moscow as they see fit ... but if Europe somehow thinks that this won't impact their energy security in the long term, they had better get their heads out of the sand.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
As President Dmitry Medvedev departed for a state visit to Turkey this week, there wasn't much debate over whether or not it would be success, but rather what kind of deals would be offered up to get the handshakes - would it be weapons, cheap gas, a pipeline, a Gazprom investment, or the granddaddy of them all, nuclear energy?
Well Turkey is no old maid (sorry, Ukraine), and has many good reasons to call for a high dowry: NATO membership, the largest standing army in Europe, and a booming, modern economy which is closely narrowing the gap with Europe. Most importantly, the country occupies an incredibly important geostrategic position between Europe and the energy basin of Central Asia as well as control over the Bosporus Strait, and will continue to play a key role in the transit of oil and gas.
So it shouldn't come as a complete surprise that during Medvedev's visit Russia signed a $20 billion deal to built Turkey's first nuclear power plant, and another 20 deals and agreements. In this particular situation, Sergei Kiriyenko and Rosatom played the role usually left to Igor Sechin, and carried out the now familiar process of layered bargaining (very few countries in the world can come to one meeting with arms deals, nuclear energy, and 5 or 6 industrial oligarchs in tote to jump in on the deal).
But as usual, behind the deals, some problems in the relationship remain. Turkey and Russia have had a historically rocky relationship dating back to Ottoman support for the Crimean Khanate (who burned down Moscow in 1571), while the Tsarist empire repeatedly clashed with the Turks over the 18th and 19th century and supported Christian separatists. During the Cold War, fears of Russian intervention in Turkey drove them into the arms of NATO, while trade politics over the Black Sea have also come into play. The tensions between historic rivals continues to today with a very large population of Chechens, which some Russian hawks believe is a safe haven for terrorists.
Ankara sees itself as an influential regional leader on the Black Sea, and their conduct following the war in Georgia displayed a distaste of Russia's failure to consult before combat operations. There is of course also Russia's role in supporting Armenia as a client state, as well as other regional problems, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and Turkey's interests in Azerbaijan. Energy, however, really seems to the be trickiest issue of all, and with Russia supplying some 2/3rds of Turkey's natural gas, the government is looking to play both sides of the fence, and above all, maintain strict control over transit points.
Despite some of these tensions, the high stakes involved in Russia's effort to monopolize the flow of energy supplies from east to west (and block the Nabucco pipeline) has led to a hasty and sometimes expensive rapprochement with Turkey. Medvedev's visit builds upon the evident momentum from Vladimir Putin's 2009 visit, which used energy trade and investment as the key vehicle to deepen relations.
Before arriving, Medvedev published an op/ed in Today's Zaman on his vision for the strategic alliance:
Certainly cooperation in the field of energy comprises the main axis of our cooperation. We have critical joint projects that are of top priority in this field. These are the South Stream and Blue Stream-2 natural gas pipelines, the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline and a nuclear power plant to be built by Russia on Turkish soil. I am confident that implementing these projects will be concrete evidence that relations have moved up to a high-quality new level and significantly contribute to consolidating international energy security.
Upon completing the series of deals signed this week, the Russian President was ebullient: "Our talks today showed that Turkey and Russia are strategic partners not only in words but in deeds. (...) It really looks rather impressive." It might not be enough to overcome the deep problems in the relationship, as well as the collision of national interests in Turkish and Russian competition in energy transit, but they are certainly getting close.
Once again, we are witnessing a complete lack of awareness or at least a policy failure on behalf of Europe and the United States to offer competing deals to Ankara and keep relations close, and a failure to recognize the importance of this critical ally. Turkey's cooperation with Russia is certainly no doomsday scenario, and, like any other country, they will structure their relations with Moscow as they see fit ... but if Europe somehow thinks that this won't impact their energy security in the long term, they had better get their heads out of the sand.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Russian Perspectives On International Law
By Robert Amsterdam
In preparing for a talk I will be giving later this week on Russia and international law at Chatham House, I've been combing through some of the classic texts of my archives and rediscovering some of the country's greatest legal minds of past years. Among others, I have found that you could make a good case for Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (also known as Friedrich Martens) to be considered as one of the world's most important lawyers of the 19th century, whose pioneering ideas not only had an impact on the Russian perspective on international law, but also contributed to the so-called architecture of international relations and power politics of this important era.
His work lives on in a principle known as "Martens's formula," which established an overarching presence of normative formulations for the rules of war between states under which "civilized" states would be guided, which is all the more impressive given that these ideas were coming out of a domestic legal environment based on absolutism. Martens and other legal scholars of his time were of course building upon a much earlier tradition set by Shafirov and others resulting of the reforms and Europeanization of Peter the Great, which appealed to the West to show that Russia conformed and lived up to the standards of a "normal country" under this foreign normative concept. The key question, whether it's Shafirov or Martens, deals with universality of international law - and Martens for example was known as a strong defender of conditional application of international only to civilized states.
This ongoing undercurrent of contested universality in the Russian perspective on international law is compelling, fascinating, and important, and can be observed in much more modern examples, including the "dual state" theory put forward by Ernst Fraenkel (see my legal article on this subject here). We are currently observing a period of significant change in Russian power and its relations with other states, and, perhaps naturally, we have seen Vladimir Putin seek to redefine some treaties, laws, and legal interpretations which reflect an expression of how Russia sees its status. The war with Georgia, the dispute over the Arctic, and the ongoing debates over the Energy Charter Treaty and other agreements provide ample examples of these debates.
These conceptual ideals, though vague, have been reiterated by the Russian leadership behind its calls for a "new economic architecture," a new security architecture, multipolarity, multi-vector foreign policy, and many other gestures which can be drawn all the way back to the question of universality, the theories of Martens, and the multiple dualities within the Russian legal environment. What exactly all these means in practical terms, what we believe Putin wants, and the contrasting visions of other contemporary legal scholars are some of the subjects I am hoping to address and discuss at the Chatham House event ... so I look forward to seeing you there.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
In preparing for a talk I will be giving later this week on Russia and international law at Chatham House, I've been combing through some of the classic texts of my archives and rediscovering some of the country's greatest legal minds of past years. Among others, I have found that you could make a good case for Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (also known as Friedrich Martens) to be considered as one of the world's most important lawyers of the 19th century, whose pioneering ideas not only had an impact on the Russian perspective on international law, but also contributed to the so-called architecture of international relations and power politics of this important era.
His work lives on in a principle known as "Martens's formula," which established an overarching presence of normative formulations for the rules of war between states under which "civilized" states would be guided, which is all the more impressive given that these ideas were coming out of a domestic legal environment based on absolutism. Martens and other legal scholars of his time were of course building upon a much earlier tradition set by Shafirov and others resulting of the reforms and Europeanization of Peter the Great, which appealed to the West to show that Russia conformed and lived up to the standards of a "normal country" under this foreign normative concept. The key question, whether it's Shafirov or Martens, deals with universality of international law - and Martens for example was known as a strong defender of conditional application of international only to civilized states.
This ongoing undercurrent of contested universality in the Russian perspective on international law is compelling, fascinating, and important, and can be observed in much more modern examples, including the "dual state" theory put forward by Ernst Fraenkel (see my legal article on this subject here). We are currently observing a period of significant change in Russian power and its relations with other states, and, perhaps naturally, we have seen Vladimir Putin seek to redefine some treaties, laws, and legal interpretations which reflect an expression of how Russia sees its status. The war with Georgia, the dispute over the Arctic, and the ongoing debates over the Energy Charter Treaty and other agreements provide ample examples of these debates.
These conceptual ideals, though vague, have been reiterated by the Russian leadership behind its calls for a "new economic architecture," a new security architecture, multipolarity, multi-vector foreign policy, and many other gestures which can be drawn all the way back to the question of universality, the theories of Martens, and the multiple dualities within the Russian legal environment. What exactly all these means in practical terms, what we believe Putin wants, and the contrasting visions of other contemporary legal scholars are some of the subjects I am hoping to address and discuss at the Chatham House event ... so I look forward to seeing you there.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 |
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Interview With Nasir El-Rufai: Nigeria's Leading Reformer Comes Home
By Robert Amsterdam
Now after having spent two years away from home while earning an advanced degree from Harvard University plus a stint in Dubai, El-Rufai is headed back home, arriving to Abuja at 5AM on Saturday, May 1. I publish these details out of a concern for Nasir's personal safety (his friend and ally Nuhu Ribadu has survived several assassination attempts for his anti-corruption work), because it is important that we make everyone aware of these circumstances, and that we make it clear that the world is watching very closely. We have notified the personnel of several embassies, debriefed key members of international institutions, and done everything possible to make sure that none of these corrupt criminals hiding behind the incapacitated president dare to make a move against El-Rufai upon his arrival.
The return to Nigeria of the country's leading reformer is deeply symbolic, and caps off a tumultuous and dramatic series of political events which began when President Umaru Yar'Adua disappeared from the public eye to receive medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, and didn't utter a word of consolation or leadership to the country for many months - even when a confused young radical was arrested trying to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day. Major media are paying close attention to El-Rufai's return. Tom Burgis at the Financial Times just published a terrific interview with him, writing that "the former minister has been a central figure in the emergence of new campaign groups that have come to the fore during Nigeria's recent power-struggle." Nasir has also been interviewed by the BBC and many Nigerian and African newspapers regarding his much-awaited return.
I had the opportunity to sit down with Nasir here in London right before he packed his bags, and ask him a few questions.
What were some of the factors which led to your decision to return home?
Well I have actually always wanted to return, and these two years of forced exile have been very challenging, to be so far away from my family, my friends, and my country. I had originally planned to return last December, however as you will recall the country suffered a vacuum of leadership and period of uncertainty before Acting President Goodluck Jonathan had been appointed.
Are you planning to run for president or for any other office?
I believe that it's pre-mature to speak with much certainty about that, and I can confirm that I have not made any decision regarding candidacy for any office. I am, however, committed to playing a role along with others to help my country elect the most capable and worthy individuals, and to contribute to the public service sector through my ongoing work with civil society and youth groups.
Are you worried about your personal safety?
Yes, of course, but this is no different from any other time I have had to worry about security, and anyways such matters are quite outweighed by the urgency of other problems we must address in Nigeria. In my case, the person behind my persecution was President Yar'Adua and rent-seekers within his inner circle. The President is still alive, but is almost completely incapacitated and brain-damaged from his illness, unable to stand, to speak, or to demonstrate coherent reason - this is what has been confirmed by the clerics who have visited him, and no one is disputing his state of health. Acting President Goodluck Jonathan has sidelined Yar'Adua's cabal, and they are politically weaker, however the infrastructure which allowed for them to go after their enemies is still completely intact, so considerable risks remain.
How would you characterize the political situation on the ground?
Although things have been managed with great care and sensitivity, and although the country is no longer so close to the brink of the precipice, we are not out of the woods quite yet. The people surrounding the president have spent many years plundering the country, and have hundreds of millions of dollars to spend in order to destabilize the government or politically attack any threat to their revenue streams. This is one of the reasons why Jonathan has been so careful and agnostic, and one of the reasons our legal process has been so slow to properly remove the president formerly from power as obligated under the constitution. These people are mainly motivated to protect their wealth, and any bribery investigations into the conduct of the last government may lead to confiscations, so we can expect them to push back.
There are still a lot of difficult challenges to overcome to put the Yar'Adua era behind us, and repair all the damage that has been done to the functioning of the country's institutions. We must urgently address corruption, which although has always been an endemic and systemic problem in Nigeria, has grown much, much worse over the course of the Yar'Adua administration. For example, I believe that steps must be taken to make every public contract and transaction completely open to the public and media for oversight - we need a freedom of information act more than anyone. In general terms, I view political reform in Nigeria as a marathon, not a sprint, so we must work patiently and with purpose over many years to bring more openness and transparency to the government and create the conditions for civil society to flourish.
What are your plans when you arrive?
On a personal level, I would like to reconnect with my family members, many of whom I have not seen in two years, and I want to get involved in what I have always wanted to do - organizing young people to become involved in public life. The greatest tragedy in Nigeria is that our best and brightest do not have the opportunities they should have, and end up migrating to other countries. Back home, some of the very worse elements of our society are the ones who end up getting involved in politics. I would like to work on convincing young people that politics are worth participating in. For example, I have always wanted to establish a high quality, independent think tank to advise on development, governance, and economic policy, which may help bring about a new generation of leaders to participate in elections.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
As many friends, colleagues, and readers of my blog are aware, for more than a year I have been working along with an international team to support Nasir El-Rufai, the former Minister of the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, Nigeria, and defend him from a politically motivated attack based on false allegations (see our White Paper for more info). El-Rufai is very well known in Nigeria as one of the country's most experienced reformers - a man of committed principle, vision, and a deep sense of public service.
When it comes to talking about El-Rufai and Nigeria, I make no pretense of objectivity. I strongly believe in Nasir and his ability to lead, though I am sure he would modestly disagree with this characterization. Thanks to the hard work and perseverance of the team, and strong support from many Nigerian citizens, we have successfully demonstrated to the world that the cases thrown against him are without merit, evidence, or grounds, pursued by the very individuals who have the most to fear from an open, democratic, and judicially independent government.Now after having spent two years away from home while earning an advanced degree from Harvard University plus a stint in Dubai, El-Rufai is headed back home, arriving to Abuja at 5AM on Saturday, May 1. I publish these details out of a concern for Nasir's personal safety (his friend and ally Nuhu Ribadu has survived several assassination attempts for his anti-corruption work), because it is important that we make everyone aware of these circumstances, and that we make it clear that the world is watching very closely. We have notified the personnel of several embassies, debriefed key members of international institutions, and done everything possible to make sure that none of these corrupt criminals hiding behind the incapacitated president dare to make a move against El-Rufai upon his arrival.
The return to Nigeria of the country's leading reformer is deeply symbolic, and caps off a tumultuous and dramatic series of political events which began when President Umaru Yar'Adua disappeared from the public eye to receive medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, and didn't utter a word of consolation or leadership to the country for many months - even when a confused young radical was arrested trying to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day. Major media are paying close attention to El-Rufai's return. Tom Burgis at the Financial Times just published a terrific interview with him, writing that "the former minister has been a central figure in the emergence of new campaign groups that have come to the fore during Nigeria's recent power-struggle." Nasir has also been interviewed by the BBC and many Nigerian and African newspapers regarding his much-awaited return.
I had the opportunity to sit down with Nasir here in London right before he packed his bags, and ask him a few questions.
What were some of the factors which led to your decision to return home?
Well I have actually always wanted to return, and these two years of forced exile have been very challenging, to be so far away from my family, my friends, and my country. I had originally planned to return last December, however as you will recall the country suffered a vacuum of leadership and period of uncertainty before Acting President Goodluck Jonathan had been appointed.
Are you planning to run for president or for any other office?
I believe that it's pre-mature to speak with much certainty about that, and I can confirm that I have not made any decision regarding candidacy for any office. I am, however, committed to playing a role along with others to help my country elect the most capable and worthy individuals, and to contribute to the public service sector through my ongoing work with civil society and youth groups.
Are you worried about your personal safety?
Yes, of course, but this is no different from any other time I have had to worry about security, and anyways such matters are quite outweighed by the urgency of other problems we must address in Nigeria. In my case, the person behind my persecution was President Yar'Adua and rent-seekers within his inner circle. The President is still alive, but is almost completely incapacitated and brain-damaged from his illness, unable to stand, to speak, or to demonstrate coherent reason - this is what has been confirmed by the clerics who have visited him, and no one is disputing his state of health. Acting President Goodluck Jonathan has sidelined Yar'Adua's cabal, and they are politically weaker, however the infrastructure which allowed for them to go after their enemies is still completely intact, so considerable risks remain.
How would you characterize the political situation on the ground?
Although things have been managed with great care and sensitivity, and although the country is no longer so close to the brink of the precipice, we are not out of the woods quite yet. The people surrounding the president have spent many years plundering the country, and have hundreds of millions of dollars to spend in order to destabilize the government or politically attack any threat to their revenue streams. This is one of the reasons why Jonathan has been so careful and agnostic, and one of the reasons our legal process has been so slow to properly remove the president formerly from power as obligated under the constitution. These people are mainly motivated to protect their wealth, and any bribery investigations into the conduct of the last government may lead to confiscations, so we can expect them to push back.
There are still a lot of difficult challenges to overcome to put the Yar'Adua era behind us, and repair all the damage that has been done to the functioning of the country's institutions. We must urgently address corruption, which although has always been an endemic and systemic problem in Nigeria, has grown much, much worse over the course of the Yar'Adua administration. For example, I believe that steps must be taken to make every public contract and transaction completely open to the public and media for oversight - we need a freedom of information act more than anyone. In general terms, I view political reform in Nigeria as a marathon, not a sprint, so we must work patiently and with purpose over many years to bring more openness and transparency to the government and create the conditions for civil society to flourish.
What are your plans when you arrive?
On a personal level, I would like to reconnect with my family members, many of whom I have not seen in two years, and I want to get involved in what I have always wanted to do - organizing young people to become involved in public life. The greatest tragedy in Nigeria is that our best and brightest do not have the opportunities they should have, and end up migrating to other countries. Back home, some of the very worse elements of our society are the ones who end up getting involved in politics. I would like to work on convincing young people that politics are worth participating in. For example, I have always wanted to establish a high quality, independent think tank to advise on development, governance, and economic policy, which may help bring about a new generation of leaders to participate in elections.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Saturday, May 01, 2010 |
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The Things They Carried
By Robert Amsterdam
Do these details of objects and possessions make you care more? Is it somewhat more convincing than simply hearing the brutal facts of another pedestrian political murder condoned or at least tolerated by this odious government? Tough-minded apathy is a trait many Russians hold dearly after having survived the deprivations and insults of decades of communism, the savage cruelties of the 1990s, and the current deformity of the Putin years, but there has to be a tipping point to such willful blindness to injustice inside every human soul. That's not to say that it is any different or better outside of Russia, where the opportunists would sooner indulge in the fantasies of the tabula rasa-like reset button and the untold imagined fortunes of doing business in such a bountiful market.
I for one will not be thinking of Gummi Bears and all the everyday errands we undertake for our families and loved ones in the same way, among everything else we take for granted. If there exists some kind of new approach out there to cause people both inside and outside of Russia to give pause, share a moment of reflection, or somehow otherwise show that they give a damn about any of these murders, I would be very interested in being a part of it.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
One of the most powerful literary accounts of the Vietnam War was Tim O'Brien's famous collection of stories The Things They Carried, which as a rhetorical device categorically listed the minute objects of possession carried by the soldiers with devastating effect, from bug spray to love letters to superstitious trinkets. The impact of O'Brien's humanizing of all these young men sent into the maw of war through their objects is considerably felt, leading one reviewer to comment that this approach "lends a palpability that makes the emotional freight (fear, horror, guilt) correspond superbly."
I felt as though the same effect is achieved in the chilling lede of Monday's dispatch from C.J. Chivers in the New York Times on the political murder of a Chechen citizen: "Umar S. Israilov, a whistleblower living in hiding after accusing Chechnya's president of personally participating in torture, kidnapping and murder, was gunned down here last year as he stepped from a grocery store with yogurt, eggs and bags of M&M's and Gummi Bears for his three young children."
What other things were they, the murdered dissidents of modern Russia, carrying when they suddenly met their end? Ivan Safronov, the apolitical military reporter who was thrown off his balcony in a simulated suicide, had just arrived home from the market with a bag of ripe oranges he had planning to eat. Anna Politkovskaya had also just come home from the supermarket before her assassination, and was on the way back down to the car to fetch the remaining bags, which contained special food for her pregnant daughter. When lawyer Stanislav Markelov was first beat up by skinheads in 2004 on his way home, they left him his wallet and cheap watch, but took his briefcase stuffed with legal files on a Chechen rape case against a powerful military general. When he was shot dead five years later on a snowy Moscow sidewalk along with a young journalist, the killer fled without bothering to steal the speaking notes he was carrying from his most recent press conference.I felt as though the same effect is achieved in the chilling lede of Monday's dispatch from C.J. Chivers in the New York Times on the political murder of a Chechen citizen: "Umar S. Israilov, a whistleblower living in hiding after accusing Chechnya's president of personally participating in torture, kidnapping and murder, was gunned down here last year as he stepped from a grocery store with yogurt, eggs and bags of M&M's and Gummi Bears for his three young children."
Do these details of objects and possessions make you care more? Is it somewhat more convincing than simply hearing the brutal facts of another pedestrian political murder condoned or at least tolerated by this odious government? Tough-minded apathy is a trait many Russians hold dearly after having survived the deprivations and insults of decades of communism, the savage cruelties of the 1990s, and the current deformity of the Putin years, but there has to be a tipping point to such willful blindness to injustice inside every human soul. That's not to say that it is any different or better outside of Russia, where the opportunists would sooner indulge in the fantasies of the tabula rasa-like reset button and the untold imagined fortunes of doing business in such a bountiful market.
I for one will not be thinking of Gummi Bears and all the everyday errands we undertake for our families and loved ones in the same way, among everything else we take for granted. If there exists some kind of new approach out there to cause people both inside and outside of Russia to give pause, share a moment of reflection, or somehow otherwise show that they give a damn about any of these murders, I would be very interested in being a part of it.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010 |
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Murdering Justice - Assassination Of Russian Judge By Suspected Ultra-Nationalists
By Robert Amsterdam
The assassination this week of Russian Judge Eduard Chuvashov by suspected ultra-nationalists was a violently outrageous reminder of the vulnerability of judicial independence in the country, but it was not necessarily surprising.
Reports indicate that a lone gunman murdered the judge in a contract style hit in the stairwell of his apartment building on April 12th, not unlike the circumstances in which journalist Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in 2006. Unlike the famous journalist who was a critic of the government, the judge dedicated himself to the courageous and dangerous work of trying extremism and hate crime cases.
Judge Chuvashov had been receiving death threats for several weeks in relation to his tough sentences meted out to various members of skinhead gangs and others charged with racially inspired extremism, including a website which displayed his photo and biographical details for would-be attackers. According to Galina Kozhevnikova of SOVA, quoted by REF/RL, "His picture was posted, together with a small audio recording from a closed court hearing. The recording had an incorrect transcription and the judge was accused of Russophobia. This post generated a huge number of aggressive comments."
The grotesque nature of this murder is in part a reflection of the disturbing phenomenon of ethnic hatred and organized violent youth groups (certainly not unique to Russia), but it also needs to be viewed in the context of the national rule of law deficit which plagues the country. Though they were working on different and unrelated subjects, we can observe a direct line connecting the murders of people as diverse as Stanislav Markelov and Eduard Chuvashov.
There is in Russia today a privatized but officially tolerated culture of intimidation; a well oiled machine will strike down an opponent with lethal efficiency, whether they are a human rights activist, an independent member of the court, a personal competitor, a successful businessman, or a simple annoyance to the power.
How is it possible for Russia's legal system to withstand the kinds of pressure these murders, fake arrests, and jail sentences for the innocent create to threaten the basic performance of their duties? This horrible murder is what happens when you have a country in which the authority of the police and prosecutors are dedicated toward the creation of crimes for profit instead of the actual criminal deterrence, while at the same time mob bosses, convicted rapists, drunk drivers (if they have enough power) are let off the hook. If you can kill an unpopular journalist or beat up an opposition leader with zero consequence and near total impunity, then why not murder a judge - especially one who is erroneously branded as "russophobic"?
There are many arguments as to why Russia has failed to genuinely attack legal nihilism and build the foundations for a strong judiciary. Some say that it is impossible, given the staggering levels of basic corruption and the absence of political will. Others inevitably offer the proposal that legal reform is underway, but slowly, very slowly, which is the only way the changes can take root. In an op/ed I wrote for the Washington Post last year, I argued that like Hugo Chavez, who also has informal armed gangs roaming the streets which produce a higher body count than the Gaza Strip in wartime, Vladimir Putin sees a certain benefit to maintaining a culture of impunity and outsourced intimidation. Here he has an instrument which punishes and threatens his opponents (as well as many other collateral victims) yet is completely separate from the state and "out of his control." There is a political convenience to the chaos, while the judicial independence of a real legal system may at some point lead to challenges against the executive.
I realize that these concerns and arguments may seem abberant in light of this very recent murder of Judge Chuvashov, which, by the way, may even be related to the clan wars as he was the one to make the decision to release Alexander Bulbov from prison - an outcome vehemently opposed by Igor Sechin. Instead we will likely fall into our typical post-murder routine, bemoan the hideous racism of Russian nationalism, and do our best to pretend that this tragedy has nothing to do with the systemic collapse of Russian justice.
Just think how many fewer judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and lawyers in the country are going to be willing to work on controversial cases following this heinous killing. The costs and penalties, it seems, far outweigh the meager benefits.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
The assassination this week of Russian Judge Eduard Chuvashov by suspected ultra-nationalists was a violently outrageous reminder of the vulnerability of judicial independence in the country, but it was not necessarily surprising.
Reports indicate that a lone gunman murdered the judge in a contract style hit in the stairwell of his apartment building on April 12th, not unlike the circumstances in which journalist Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in 2006. Unlike the famous journalist who was a critic of the government, the judge dedicated himself to the courageous and dangerous work of trying extremism and hate crime cases.
Judge Chuvashov had been receiving death threats for several weeks in relation to his tough sentences meted out to various members of skinhead gangs and others charged with racially inspired extremism, including a website which displayed his photo and biographical details for would-be attackers. According to Galina Kozhevnikova of SOVA, quoted by REF/RL, "His picture was posted, together with a small audio recording from a closed court hearing. The recording had an incorrect transcription and the judge was accused of Russophobia. This post generated a huge number of aggressive comments."
The grotesque nature of this murder is in part a reflection of the disturbing phenomenon of ethnic hatred and organized violent youth groups (certainly not unique to Russia), but it also needs to be viewed in the context of the national rule of law deficit which plagues the country. Though they were working on different and unrelated subjects, we can observe a direct line connecting the murders of people as diverse as Stanislav Markelov and Eduard Chuvashov.
There is in Russia today a privatized but officially tolerated culture of intimidation; a well oiled machine will strike down an opponent with lethal efficiency, whether they are a human rights activist, an independent member of the court, a personal competitor, a successful businessman, or a simple annoyance to the power.
How is it possible for Russia's legal system to withstand the kinds of pressure these murders, fake arrests, and jail sentences for the innocent create to threaten the basic performance of their duties? This horrible murder is what happens when you have a country in which the authority of the police and prosecutors are dedicated toward the creation of crimes for profit instead of the actual criminal deterrence, while at the same time mob bosses, convicted rapists, drunk drivers (if they have enough power) are let off the hook. If you can kill an unpopular journalist or beat up an opposition leader with zero consequence and near total impunity, then why not murder a judge - especially one who is erroneously branded as "russophobic"?
There are many arguments as to why Russia has failed to genuinely attack legal nihilism and build the foundations for a strong judiciary. Some say that it is impossible, given the staggering levels of basic corruption and the absence of political will. Others inevitably offer the proposal that legal reform is underway, but slowly, very slowly, which is the only way the changes can take root. In an op/ed I wrote for the Washington Post last year, I argued that like Hugo Chavez, who also has informal armed gangs roaming the streets which produce a higher body count than the Gaza Strip in wartime, Vladimir Putin sees a certain benefit to maintaining a culture of impunity and outsourced intimidation. Here he has an instrument which punishes and threatens his opponents (as well as many other collateral victims) yet is completely separate from the state and "out of his control." There is a political convenience to the chaos, while the judicial independence of a real legal system may at some point lead to challenges against the executive.
I realize that these concerns and arguments may seem abberant in light of this very recent murder of Judge Chuvashov, which, by the way, may even be related to the clan wars as he was the one to make the decision to release Alexander Bulbov from prison - an outcome vehemently opposed by Igor Sechin. Instead we will likely fall into our typical post-murder routine, bemoan the hideous racism of Russian nationalism, and do our best to pretend that this tragedy has nothing to do with the systemic collapse of Russian justice.
Just think how many fewer judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and lawyers in the country are going to be willing to work on controversial cases following this heinous killing. The costs and penalties, it seems, far outweigh the meager benefits.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 |
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Canada Underestimates Russia's Arctic Intentions
By Robert Amsterdam
Though my home country Canada often has the reputation as the world's boy scout, seeking the approval of others for its moral conduct, there is also a sense of healthy chauvinism when it comes to defending basic independence, territory, and sovereignty. However the push to claim an enormous slice of the Arctic by the Russian government over the past number of years has put these two national personalities to the acid test.
It is disheartening to see that the current reaction of Canada to Russia's string of provocations, from flag planting to dropping paratroopers into the disputed territory, has been reckless nonchalance. In comments made earlier this week and quoted in the Globe and Mail, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon displayed what is in my opinion a deep misunderstanding of Kremlin motives: "I don't take this Russian initiative very seriously," he said, "it seemed to me that the Russians were just pulling stunts."
I have for some time urged the Canadian government to thoughtfully study the Russian approach to the Arctic, a policy which under the direction of Igor Sechin and others represents a far greater threat to Canadian interests than Cannon appears to realize. These gestures are much more meaningful than simple stunts. This morning I had the opportunity to call a friend and colleague in Moscow, Vladimir Gladyshev, who is an international lawyer and expert on Russia's approach to territorial issues (as well as one of the key witnesses in the precedent-setting Yukos Energy Charter Treaty decision). Gladyshev had the following to say on Cannon's remarks to the Globe and Mail:
My law firm Amsterdam & Peroff is planning on hosting a panel debate on Canadian and Russian interests in the Arctic later this year, so please do get in contact with us if you have interest in attending. Vladimir Gladyshev and I will also be speaking at Chatham House (London, UK) on May 13th on the subject of Russian law.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Though my home country Canada often has the reputation as the world's boy scout, seeking the approval of others for its moral conduct, there is also a sense of healthy chauvinism when it comes to defending basic independence, territory, and sovereignty. However the push to claim an enormous slice of the Arctic by the Russian government over the past number of years has put these two national personalities to the acid test.
It is disheartening to see that the current reaction of Canada to Russia's string of provocations, from flag planting to dropping paratroopers into the disputed territory, has been reckless nonchalance. In comments made earlier this week and quoted in the Globe and Mail, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon displayed what is in my opinion a deep misunderstanding of Kremlin motives: "I don't take this Russian initiative very seriously," he said, "it seemed to me that the Russians were just pulling stunts."
I have for some time urged the Canadian government to thoughtfully study the Russian approach to the Arctic, a policy which under the direction of Igor Sechin and others represents a far greater threat to Canadian interests than Cannon appears to realize. These gestures are much more meaningful than simple stunts. This morning I had the opportunity to call a friend and colleague in Moscow, Vladimir Gladyshev, who is an international lawyer and expert on Russia's approach to territorial issues (as well as one of the key witnesses in the precedent-setting Yukos Energy Charter Treaty decision). Gladyshev had the following to say on Cannon's remarks to the Globe and Mail:
There are two levels to the globe and mail story. One is ostensibly the tug-of-war on the outer limits of the national continental shelves of the Russian Federation and Canada.
However, this is not the whole story. In principle, any temporary physical action either by Russia or Canada are irrelevant for the consideration of the outer limit of the continental shelf by the UN Commission. The latter works on the basis of a complex political-geographical-geological formula of UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Stunts like paratroopers and submarine launchers do not affect such deliberations.
However, a deeper and unarticulated agenda is at work. It is a competition of national creeping jurisdictions of Arctic countries among themselves, with Canada and Russia at the front.
An early indication that Arctic countries might be interested, jointly, just in such thing, was the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was signed in Oslo, November 15, 1973, backed by the five arctic countries. The preamble recognized special responsibility and special interests of the five countries in the ecology of the Arctic area. Foreign ministries of the five countries quietly regarded it as a first step to converting Arctic into the area that would be shared by them.
UNCLOS, signed in 1982, included so-called Canadian article, inserted at the initiative of the Canadian delegation, that gave Arctic coastal state powers to regulate international shipping in the 200-miles exclusive economic zone (in other ocean areas under 200-miles jurisdictional claims by coastal states convention essentially preserved traditional freedom of high seas shipping).
The Soviet Union, meantime, dissatisfied with what it considered as a too modest reach of their Canadian article, strived to extend, step by step, its full sovereignty over the whole "Soviet Arctic Sector" as described in the Supreme Soviet decree of 1926.
However, the main impediment for extending full sovereignty during the Cold War era was not the complex and clever formulas of UNCLOS (which strived to reconcile various maritime interests through heavy reliance on constructive ambiguity), but the strategic games of the superpowers.
Both the United States and Russia were interested in an unimpeded under ice passage for their nuclear submarines as a important part of strategic nuclear deterrence.
Since this particular interest is now radically diminished or non-existent, it no longer impedes a rapid proliferation of creeping national jurisdiction over Arctic polar regions.
However, Arctic players are left with sundry and often incompatible bits of legal regimes, policy positions and conflicting interests - some left over from the previous decades, some brand new.
In this climate of legal uncertainty, symbolic gestures have more that symbolic value - they may plausibly tip the scales of negotiations over the future of Arctics to one or the other country.
The question - should the foreign ministries of the Arctic countries be left to hammer out a legal regime of Arctics quietly in their studies (while regaling the public with publicity stunts), or the topic is too important to be left without input of the industry and environmental concerns?
My law firm Amsterdam & Peroff is planning on hosting a panel debate on Canadian and Russian interests in the Arctic later this year, so please do get in contact with us if you have interest in attending. Vladimir Gladyshev and I will also be speaking at Chatham House (London, UK) on May 13th on the subject of Russian law.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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Khodorkovsky And The Trial That Scared The Kremlin
By Robert Amsterdam
Among the regime's many defenders, the leadership of the Kremlin can count upon a supportive chorus in the West to parlay any criticism of Russia's democratic bankruptcy - happily pointing to high GDP growth over the past decade, and deriding the opposition's alleged lack of support. "Human rights" is just a hypocritical attack of those fearing the great Russian revival, they proudly declare. Authoritarian cronyism really isn't such a bad way to go, they argue, perhaps citing some recent attempt toward ideology by Surkov or complaining of NATO encirclement. Corruption, perhaps, is just a topic best avoided and ignored for them.
But the one thing that can't really be accounted for by these voices of repressive reason is Russia's political prisoners. There's no good way to argue one's way out of the death of Hermitage lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, there's no plausible excuse for the medical blackmail of Yukos lawyer Vasily Alexanyan, and there's certainly no way for the authorities to hide the small detail of who benefitted from the theft of Russia's largest oil company in the current second trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev.
Political prisoners are truly the Achilles' heel of modern authoritarianism - the one record of conduct that cannot withstand the burden of serious consideration.
The Russian authorities appear to understand this, and have shown their open fear of the Khodorkovsky trial, revealing doubts in their own legitimacy. This week, the defense has been suddenly tasked with opening up its case at a moment of dubious timing ... right around the Easter holiday, a week after a new wave of terror bombings has gripped Moscow, and coming shortly before a major meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev to sign an arms treaty (let us assume that when these two men embrace their nuke trade off, that rule of law is one item which was removed from the table).
Timing may or may not be conspirational (it certainly has been in the past), but now they are even opening up an investigation into Nezavisimaya Gazeta for having published Khodorkovsky's article on how the "conveyor belt" of Russian justice works to establish a system of "legalized violence." Allegedly, the prosecutors appear to be concerned that the article contained extremist statements ... as though we needed further proof of the political nature of this process.
The idea that Vladimir Putin will be called upon to testify as a witness in this trial, which most likely he will be forced to refuse or escape in a show of public cowardice, has deepened these fears and doubts among the leadership. If the siloviki are afraid of even going through the motions of a rigged but public process, then what else, we must ask, are they hiding?
In short the timing couldn't be worse for the world to pay attention to this "tragi-farcical" event, a process which makes Kafka's trial look realistic and fair by comparison. The very charges underpinning this years-long process, costing the Russian people an absurd amount of public budget and costing these two men more years in prison than is tolerable, are completely incoherent: you cannot say that someone stole all of Yukos oil while at the same time sustaining that they had failed to pay taxes on profits made from selling that same oil! The fact that major news organizations even have to pretend that what is occurring in this courtroom is somehow related to the administration of judicial affairs is an insult to the intelligence of the Russian people.
Nevertheless, they defense team continues forward, trapped in a process that they know is arbitrary, biased, and rigged, and yet obligated to participate in it and validating the state's performance. In the coming weeks, I expect very interesting information to be disclosed, and then ignored, at this trial. But at least in one area, concerned observers can help by simply paying attention to what's being said, and remembering just how bad rule of law can get in a political case in Putin's Russia.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Among the regime's many defenders, the leadership of the Kremlin can count upon a supportive chorus in the West to parlay any criticism of Russia's democratic bankruptcy - happily pointing to high GDP growth over the past decade, and deriding the opposition's alleged lack of support. "Human rights" is just a hypocritical attack of those fearing the great Russian revival, they proudly declare. Authoritarian cronyism really isn't such a bad way to go, they argue, perhaps citing some recent attempt toward ideology by Surkov or complaining of NATO encirclement. Corruption, perhaps, is just a topic best avoided and ignored for them.
But the one thing that can't really be accounted for by these voices of repressive reason is Russia's political prisoners. There's no good way to argue one's way out of the death of Hermitage lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, there's no plausible excuse for the medical blackmail of Yukos lawyer Vasily Alexanyan, and there's certainly no way for the authorities to hide the small detail of who benefitted from the theft of Russia's largest oil company in the current second trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev.
Political prisoners are truly the Achilles' heel of modern authoritarianism - the one record of conduct that cannot withstand the burden of serious consideration.
The Russian authorities appear to understand this, and have shown their open fear of the Khodorkovsky trial, revealing doubts in their own legitimacy. This week, the defense has been suddenly tasked with opening up its case at a moment of dubious timing ... right around the Easter holiday, a week after a new wave of terror bombings has gripped Moscow, and coming shortly before a major meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev to sign an arms treaty (let us assume that when these two men embrace their nuke trade off, that rule of law is one item which was removed from the table).
Timing may or may not be conspirational (it certainly has been in the past), but now they are even opening up an investigation into Nezavisimaya Gazeta for having published Khodorkovsky's article on how the "conveyor belt" of Russian justice works to establish a system of "legalized violence." Allegedly, the prosecutors appear to be concerned that the article contained extremist statements ... as though we needed further proof of the political nature of this process.
The idea that Vladimir Putin will be called upon to testify as a witness in this trial, which most likely he will be forced to refuse or escape in a show of public cowardice, has deepened these fears and doubts among the leadership. If the siloviki are afraid of even going through the motions of a rigged but public process, then what else, we must ask, are they hiding?
In short the timing couldn't be worse for the world to pay attention to this "tragi-farcical" event, a process which makes Kafka's trial look realistic and fair by comparison. The very charges underpinning this years-long process, costing the Russian people an absurd amount of public budget and costing these two men more years in prison than is tolerable, are completely incoherent: you cannot say that someone stole all of Yukos oil while at the same time sustaining that they had failed to pay taxes on profits made from selling that same oil! The fact that major news organizations even have to pretend that what is occurring in this courtroom is somehow related to the administration of judicial affairs is an insult to the intelligence of the Russian people.
Nevertheless, they defense team continues forward, trapped in a process that they know is arbitrary, biased, and rigged, and yet obligated to participate in it and validating the state's performance. In the coming weeks, I expect very interesting information to be disclosed, and then ignored, at this trial. But at least in one area, concerned observers can help by simply paying attention to what's being said, and remembering just how bad rule of law can get in a political case in Putin's Russia.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Monday, April 05, 2010 |
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Rise Of Anti-Semitic Party Darkens Hungary's Elections
By Robert Amsterdam
On March 15th, tens of thousands of people filled the streets of Hungary's beautiful capital Budapest, ostensibly to celebrate the 162nd anniversary of the 1848-1948 revolution and war of independence. Among the many events commemorating this anniversary across city, a multitudinous political rally for the far-right party Jobbik garnered the most attention, as restless young supporters showed up sporting Hitler-like mustaches and army fatigues to hear the party leader Gábor Vona threaten retribution against corrupt lawmakers and "gypsy criminality." With a parliamentary election coming up on April 11th, this increasingly popular nationalist party is sending a shock through minority communities in Hungary.
Some observers say we shouldn't worry about Jobbik. The party is making an effort to portray itself as a normal, mainstream conservative party, but this thought disappears whenever Vona speaks in public: one of his favorite refrains is that "Hungary is for Hungarians," and that the country must be stoutly defended from outside "foreign speculators," often pointing to some imagined evil agenda of Israel in Central Europe. He has drawn up a long list of enemies (including the United States), and said he would shut down several television stations once in power. Given that the party is linked with the violent paramilitary brigade "Magyar Gárda," which was banned last summer, these promises of violence are not just idle talk.
So there is a potentially threatening anti-Semitic political sentiment rising once again in Hungary, what else is new? Well it seems that this time things are different, as Jobbik is feared to headed toward winning as much as 20% of the vote in the upcoming April elections, giving them a significantly powerful block in parliament capable of great damage.
Considering the widespread alarm recently displayed following Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front party comeback in France which netted less than 12% of the national vote across all regions, we are looking at a situation which could be twice as bad in terms of seats - with Jobbik's militaristic rhetoric and hate speech several notches above Le Pen's brand of anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Hungarian and Central European Jewish communities are on red alert. Writing for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Ruth Ellen Gruber interviews the academic Andras Kovacs of the Central European University: "Jobbik frequently uses anti-Semitic rhetoric, not directly but through code words and references, as well as symbols and appearances. (...) This is frightening for the Jewish population." Kovacs continued, "Loud verbal anti-Semitism can lead to a very polarized and intense atmosphere, which in turn could facilitate, for example, anti-Jewish street violence."
One example of the symbols appropriated by Jobbik has been the the flag of the Árpád Stripes, frequently carried by their supporters at rallies and often among the outlawed Hungarian Guard themselves. Though the origin of the flag has a deeply convoluted historical roots going back to the foundation of Hungarian national identity, it is most well known to remind people of the Arrow Cross Party, which for seven months in 1944-1945 formed an alliance with the Nazis. Whether or not the Arpad Stripes are an emblem of fascism may be up for debate, but for some the implication is clear.
The political gains of Jobbik are no accident, however, as dismal governance and poor economic management by the ruling Socialists (MSZP) party widely opened up the political field for certain victory for the center-right party Fidesz, which made a decision early on to run on almost no campaign, and ambiguously slide toward the majority vote. However few were able to predict just how strongly Jobbik would be able to pick off the Fidesz margins and overpass the left's share of the vote - thanks in part to apathy and lower turnout. The current political concern is whether or not Fidesz will have to tilt further to the right and appeal to some of Jobbik's base - though the party has ruled out any ruling coalition with the extremists. Oddly, the future of Hungary's parliament will depend in large in the many voters who have chosen to stay home, or those willing to make a last minute switch to Fidesz to avoid more seats for Jobbik.
Even if the nationalist sensation currently subsuming Hungary did not feature the trappings of racism and anti-Semitism, the rise of Jobbik bodes ill for the country's young membership in the European Union and its democratic and institutional future. Gábor Vona has pledged to "radically" reorient the country's foreign policy toward the East, meaning the Moscow would gain control over a critical Central European state and look to continue its energy exploitation of the country which began under the defeated socialist Ferenc Gyurcsány, while hostile relations with Brussels, Washington, and the IMF are unlikely to help return Hungary to the path of economic growth and institutional stability.
To get a sense of the turning tide in Hungary, look no further than the treatment of Mayor of Budapest Gábor Demszky, a former anti-Communist hero, who was booed and harassed by angry crowds before his speech on the March 15 National Day. "The more seats Jobbik wins in parliament, the worse for the Hungarian nation and the more vulnerable Hungarian democracy will become," he said, summarizing the central concern of this election.
Both Europe and the international community would do well to consider Demszky's warning very carefully.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
On March 15th, tens of thousands of people filled the streets of Hungary's beautiful capital Budapest, ostensibly to celebrate the 162nd anniversary of the 1848-1948 revolution and war of independence. Among the many events commemorating this anniversary across city, a multitudinous political rally for the far-right party Jobbik garnered the most attention, as restless young supporters showed up sporting Hitler-like mustaches and army fatigues to hear the party leader Gábor Vona threaten retribution against corrupt lawmakers and "gypsy criminality." With a parliamentary election coming up on April 11th, this increasingly popular nationalist party is sending a shock through minority communities in Hungary.
Some observers say we shouldn't worry about Jobbik. The party is making an effort to portray itself as a normal, mainstream conservative party, but this thought disappears whenever Vona speaks in public: one of his favorite refrains is that "Hungary is for Hungarians," and that the country must be stoutly defended from outside "foreign speculators," often pointing to some imagined evil agenda of Israel in Central Europe. He has drawn up a long list of enemies (including the United States), and said he would shut down several television stations once in power. Given that the party is linked with the violent paramilitary brigade "Magyar Gárda," which was banned last summer, these promises of violence are not just idle talk.
So there is a potentially threatening anti-Semitic political sentiment rising once again in Hungary, what else is new? Well it seems that this time things are different, as Jobbik is feared to headed toward winning as much as 20% of the vote in the upcoming April elections, giving them a significantly powerful block in parliament capable of great damage.
Considering the widespread alarm recently displayed following Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front party comeback in France which netted less than 12% of the national vote across all regions, we are looking at a situation which could be twice as bad in terms of seats - with Jobbik's militaristic rhetoric and hate speech several notches above Le Pen's brand of anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Hungarian and Central European Jewish communities are on red alert. Writing for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Ruth Ellen Gruber interviews the academic Andras Kovacs of the Central European University: "Jobbik frequently uses anti-Semitic rhetoric, not directly but through code words and references, as well as symbols and appearances. (...) This is frightening for the Jewish population." Kovacs continued, "Loud verbal anti-Semitism can lead to a very polarized and intense atmosphere, which in turn could facilitate, for example, anti-Jewish street violence."
One example of the symbols appropriated by Jobbik has been the the flag of the Árpád Stripes, frequently carried by their supporters at rallies and often among the outlawed Hungarian Guard themselves. Though the origin of the flag has a deeply convoluted historical roots going back to the foundation of Hungarian national identity, it is most well known to remind people of the Arrow Cross Party, which for seven months in 1944-1945 formed an alliance with the Nazis. Whether or not the Arpad Stripes are an emblem of fascism may be up for debate, but for some the implication is clear.
The political gains of Jobbik are no accident, however, as dismal governance and poor economic management by the ruling Socialists (MSZP) party widely opened up the political field for certain victory for the center-right party Fidesz, which made a decision early on to run on almost no campaign, and ambiguously slide toward the majority vote. However few were able to predict just how strongly Jobbik would be able to pick off the Fidesz margins and overpass the left's share of the vote - thanks in part to apathy and lower turnout. The current political concern is whether or not Fidesz will have to tilt further to the right and appeal to some of Jobbik's base - though the party has ruled out any ruling coalition with the extremists. Oddly, the future of Hungary's parliament will depend in large in the many voters who have chosen to stay home, or those willing to make a last minute switch to Fidesz to avoid more seats for Jobbik.
Even if the nationalist sensation currently subsuming Hungary did not feature the trappings of racism and anti-Semitism, the rise of Jobbik bodes ill for the country's young membership in the European Union and its democratic and institutional future. Gábor Vona has pledged to "radically" reorient the country's foreign policy toward the East, meaning the Moscow would gain control over a critical Central European state and look to continue its energy exploitation of the country which began under the defeated socialist Ferenc Gyurcsány, while hostile relations with Brussels, Washington, and the IMF are unlikely to help return Hungary to the path of economic growth and institutional stability.
To get a sense of the turning tide in Hungary, look no further than the treatment of Mayor of Budapest Gábor Demszky, a former anti-Communist hero, who was booed and harassed by angry crowds before his speech on the March 15 National Day. "The more seats Jobbik wins in parliament, the worse for the Hungarian nation and the more vulnerable Hungarian democracy will become," he said, summarizing the central concern of this election.
Both Europe and the international community would do well to consider Demszky's warning very carefully.
Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here) appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010 |
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