This century has witnessed China's emergence as the main challenger to the superpower status of the United States. In a dramatic fashion, China is beginning to establish its foothold in the highly strategic, energy-rich region of the Middle East by forging strong ties with regional powers and gradually challenging the U.S.-Israeli regional dominance. Thanks to decades of double-digit economic growth and accelerating military modernization, China now has both the need for and the capability of engaging the Middle East.
Confined to the sidelines during the Cold War, the Chinese leadership finally found a window of opportunity to enter the regional politics and expand its military exports. During the 1980s, China increasingly criticized Soviet disinterest in assisting regional "revisionist powers" such as Syria against U.S. allies. Subsequently, it sought regional influence through forging strong ties with leading anti-U.S. powers in the region.
The Middle East was a staging area for Cold War conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union. Will the region become a battleground in the 21st century conflict between a rising China and a stagnant United States?
Iran: Key Partner
Through the 1990s, China provided an increasing amount of ballistic missile technology to Syria. But the key partner to emerge in the region was Iran. During the Iran-Iraq war, China was a key military supplier for Iran. From the 1980s to 1997, support for nuclear programs became a pivotal element of Beijing's effort to forge a strong partnership with Iran.
In the 1990s, Iran embarked on a major program of reconstruction and gradual increases in oil prices accelerated Iran's hopes for a comeback. The reconstruction program expanded Iran's industrial base, and reinvigorated the population and economy. U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan eliminated Iran's enemy to the East and West. Iran was now at a new position of strategic ascendancy and began to step up its rhetoric against the U.S.-Israeli tandem. Faced with such powerful adversaries, it sought deeper cooperation with the rising superpower, China. An emboldened Iran honed its regional influence and consolidated it in Iraq, Lebanon, occupied Palestine, Syria and even in Afghanistan
China's bourgeoning ties with Iran are not really surprising. Iran is a host to the second largest reserves of oil and natural gas. It is also a traditional regional power with a huge network of allies and proxies across the region. For Iran, faced with increasing investment vacuum and international isolation over its nuclear program, China represents a potential remedy for the development of its vast energy resources and a source for modern military technology. China sees Iran as a counter-force to U.S. allies in the region and has contemplated on establishing a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, where 40 percent of global energy is transported.
China has also been a major source of support against the UN Security Council calls for severe sanctions against Iran. As the Atlantic allies together with Russia pushed for more sanctions against Iran, China consistently sabotaged the efforts. In January, it signaled its disinterest in any sanctions by a sending low-level representative to the P5+1 talks (the Security Council plus Germany). During the February Munich Security Conference, China's foreign minister vehemently opposed any prospects of sanctions against Iran. The position was currently reiterated during the April meeting of the leaders of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China).
China's trade-investment interests in Iran are deepening alongside the growing strategic as well as ideological alignment between the two powers. In the last five years, China has emerged as the major investor in Iran, with an estimated $120 billion worth of energy investments. Despite the sanctions already in place, trade between the countries grew by 35 percent in 2008, to $27 billion. In 2009, China signed over $8 billion in new energy investments. Seemingly, there is an emerging China-Iran tandem.
Charming America's Arab Allies
A testament to China's growing diplomatic sophistication is how it has endorsed alternative narratives, norms, and visions to challenge highly unpopular U.S. policies in the Middle East and the Washington consensus on economic development globally. In 1996, China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to balance NATO expansion in central Asia and provide an alternative security community in greater Asia.
In direct contrast to the unpopular American approach, China later developed the Beijing Consensus, which emphasized state-led development, non-interference in the affairs of other countries, and trade without political preconditions. As anti-U.S. sentiment grew in the Middle East, China found it easier to expand ties with all relevant regional powers, including America's Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. China's strategic maneuverings have been a savvy fusion of mercantilist foreign policy and security-focused diplomacy.
Saudi Arabia's vast energy reserves are vital to China's long-term economic interests. In 1988, China provided a desperate Saudi Arabia with intermediate range CSS-2 missiles to meet the country's strategic needs, something that the US refused to do. Since then, relations have grown. Currently, Saudi Arabia is China's biggest supplier of crude oil — followed by Angola and Iran — and China is the Saudis' biggest export market, surpassing the troubled U.S. market.
Since 2006, President Hu Jintao has visited the kingdom twice while King Fahd chose China as his primary destination. Every month, the Chinese send representatives to the Saudi Arabia to ensure relations are on track and energy supplies are secure. Since the establishment of ties between the two countries in 1990, trade has grown from an initial amount of $290 million to about $41.8 billion in 2008.
In 2009, 70 Chinese companies, mainly in construction and employing about 16,000 Chinese workers, were active in the Kingdom. Since 2007, the Chinese have won more than $2 billion in non-energy contracts. In strategic terms, the Saudis are seeking to diversify their foreign relations — or wean themselves of dependence on the United States — by expanding ties with China. They also view their growing ties with the Asian power as a springboard to tap the growing market of Asia as the west struggles to absorb Saudi oil.
Egypt, the strongest Arab military, is a key U.S. ally under Mubarak and has been the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid after Israel. Given such intimate U.S.-Egyptian ties, the Chinese influence in the country should be minimal. But things are beginning to change. By 2008, bilateral trade stood at $6.2 billion and by 2010 China is expected to become Egypt's largest trade partner.
Military ties between the two countries have also been improving. In recent years, high-level military and defense officials have regularly visited each other and worked on ways to expand relations further. Almost a year after a Chinese official met a top Egyptian Air Force commander, Egypt announced its plans in 2010 to co-produce an advanced fighter, under the Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 thunder combat aircraft project. The Egyptians view China as a strategic partner that could help them achieve military self-sufficiency.
China and Israel
Through a clandestine set of operations from the 1980s until the end of the century, Israel provided China with almost $4 billion in sensitive technology. These exports, some traced back to the United States, contributed immensely to China's military modernization by upgrading Soviet technology and incorporating U.S. technology.
As China's relations with Syria and Iran improved, there has been a marked deterioration in China-Israel relations. Pressure from the United States has also prompted Israel to put some distance between itself and China. In recent years, Israeli officials angered the Chinese leadership by making diplomatic and cultural visits to Taiwan, and the Israeli media has implicitly acknowledged Taiwan's sovereignty.
Since Deng Xiaoping, China shifted to a more pragmatic view of the Israeli-Arab conflict and has emphasized peaceful mutual co-existence, recognition of Israel by its Arab neighbors, and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories along with a security guarantee by Arab countries. Although China is part of the Security Council, it isn't formally part of the Middle East quartet of the United States, European Union, Russia, and the UN. China has yet to exercise a decisive role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although China has been more sympathetic toward Hamas, Hezbollah, and other resistance groups in the region, it opposes terrorism as a means for accomplishing political objectives.
China-U.S. strategic competition
China's push into the Middle East is a calculated extension of its rising global status. Already a major ally of the only Muslim nuclear power — Pakistan — China is deepening its ties with the main U.S. foe in the region, Iran, while wooing America's main Arab allies. Consequently, China's support has emboldened Iran's defiance and dampened prospects of serious sanctions.
U.S. critics of China, particularly on the right, view China as a strategic competitor rather than a strategic partner and are deeply apprehensive about China's growing influence in the Middle East. They understand China's expanding ties with regional powers — such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt — as a direct challenge to U.S. control over strategic energy reserves in the region and are especially concerned over Chinese exports of strategic military hardware such as ballistic missiles to its allies in the region. They see China as blocking attempts to isolate Iran and empowering anti-U.S. forces in the region, hence undermining U.S. power in the region.
"Instead of practically begging China for support," writes former U.S. representative at the UN John Bolton, "America should be making its own hard decisions to do what is necessary to prevent what now looks almost inevitable absent an Israeli military strike: Iran with nuclear weapons."
China has also opposed U.S. military expansion in the Persian Gulf and military adventurism in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has described the United States as a source of destabilization in the region. China has also repeatedly criticized U.S. plans to sanction and isolate Sudan over allegations of genocide, instead calling for a peaceful resolution of the issue. In general, China views sanctions as a counterproductive and ineffective means for policy change.
The United States remains the preponderant military power in the world. But while paying a heavy price — materially and ideologically — in its wars in the region and struggling with a troubled domestic economy, the United States watches as China positions itself at the center of regional politics and swiftly expands its investments, trade, and military relations with powerful regional players. Flushed with cash and clout, Beijing is changing the regional balance of power even as a relative newcomer to the Middle East. Washington, meanwhile, is too distracted by its wars to do much more than observe the tectonic shifts.
GE Signs Procurement Agreement With Saudi Aramco
GE has signed a corporate procurement agreement (CPA) with Saudi Aramco, the national oil company of Saudi Arabia, which establishes a long-term framework for the supply of GE turbomachinery equipment and services to support the efficient production of oil and gas in the Kingdom.
Nassir Al-Yami, executive director of materials supply, Saudi Aramco said, “We are delighted to have a solid framework of cooperation in place with GE Oil & Gas. Over the last 50 years, GE has played an important role in supporting the efficient production of oil and gas in the Kingdom. I’m confident that today’s agreement paves the way for even greater accomplishments in the coming years.”
John Krenicki, vice chairman of GE and president and CEO, GE Energy, said, “This agreement reflects GE’s commitment to long- term investment in Saudi Arabia and elevates our strong relationship with Saudi Aramco to an exciting new level. Moving beyond project-by-project oil and gas sector transactions will enable GE to support the optimized performance of Saudi Aramco’s installed turbomachinery fleet. Through the new framework agreement, GE will provide the technology leadership, service excellence, skills development and training required to support Saudi Arabia’s long-term oil and gas production goals.”
Setting out the terms of cooperation between the partners and a standardized contractual format for future projects, the CPA is designed to streamline and simplify working processes, leading to reduced costs and shorter cycle times for Saudi Aramco’s projects.
In addition, the CPA includes a joint technology development program that builds on GE’s turbomachinery expertise and includes cooperation on initiatives focused on optimizing the performance of Saudi Aramco’s installed fleet of turbomachinery equipment, which includes over 60 gas turbines, 90 compressors and more than 100 pumps.
With several strategic public and private partnerships in various growth sectors including oil and gas, energy, aviation, healthcare and water, Saudi Arabia is home to seven GE facilities and the largest regional workforce of more than 700 employees.
Nassir Al-Yami, executive director of materials supply, Saudi Aramco said, “We are delighted to have a solid framework of cooperation in place with GE Oil & Gas. Over the last 50 years, GE has played an important role in supporting the efficient production of oil and gas in the Kingdom. I’m confident that today’s agreement paves the way for even greater accomplishments in the coming years.”
John Krenicki, vice chairman of GE and president and CEO, GE Energy, said, “This agreement reflects GE’s commitment to long- term investment in Saudi Arabia and elevates our strong relationship with Saudi Aramco to an exciting new level. Moving beyond project-by-project oil and gas sector transactions will enable GE to support the optimized performance of Saudi Aramco’s installed turbomachinery fleet. Through the new framework agreement, GE will provide the technology leadership, service excellence, skills development and training required to support Saudi Arabia’s long-term oil and gas production goals.”
Setting out the terms of cooperation between the partners and a standardized contractual format for future projects, the CPA is designed to streamline and simplify working processes, leading to reduced costs and shorter cycle times for Saudi Aramco’s projects.
In addition, the CPA includes a joint technology development program that builds on GE’s turbomachinery expertise and includes cooperation on initiatives focused on optimizing the performance of Saudi Aramco’s installed fleet of turbomachinery equipment, which includes over 60 gas turbines, 90 compressors and more than 100 pumps.
With several strategic public and private partnerships in various growth sectors including oil and gas, energy, aviation, healthcare and water, Saudi Arabia is home to seven GE facilities and the largest regional workforce of more than 700 employees.
Thursday, May 27, 2010 |
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US Reportedly Authorizes More Secret Military Activity In Hot Spots
News reports say the U.S. military has authorized an expansion of covert operations in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia to disrupt terrorist groups in the region.
The media reports, released Tuesday, say the head of U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, signed a secret directive last September authorizing U.S. Special Operations troops to be sent to both friendly and hostile nations that include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia.
The information was first reported by The New York Times. The report says the order would allow for reconnaissance that could assist military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear program were to escalate.
Defense Department officials also told the Times the new order would allow for more systematic and long-term covert operations than in previous administrations.
Officials have told media organizations the program's goals would be to build networks and ties with local security forces that could "penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy" al Qaida and other militant groups.
The Times says it withheld some details in the seven-page directive in response to a U.S. Central Command official's concerns about troop safety.
Some Pentagon officials told the Times they are concerned the new policy could strain relations with friendly nations in the region and incite anger in hostile nations such as Iran or Syria.
There was no immediate official comment on the report from the Pentagon or White House.
Source: VOA
The media reports, released Tuesday, say the head of U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, signed a secret directive last September authorizing U.S. Special Operations troops to be sent to both friendly and hostile nations that include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia.
The information was first reported by The New York Times. The report says the order would allow for reconnaissance that could assist military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear program were to escalate.
Defense Department officials also told the Times the new order would allow for more systematic and long-term covert operations than in previous administrations.
Officials have told media organizations the program's goals would be to build networks and ties with local security forces that could "penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy" al Qaida and other militant groups.
The Times says it withheld some details in the seven-page directive in response to a U.S. Central Command official's concerns about troop safety.
Some Pentagon officials told the Times they are concerned the new policy could strain relations with friendly nations in the region and incite anger in hostile nations such as Iran or Syria.
There was no immediate official comment on the report from the Pentagon or White House.
Source: VOA
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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The Foreign Policy Legacy Of George W. Bush
By Deepak Tripathi
Despite the 'surge' that General Stanley McChrystal asked for and President Obama approved after weeks of reflection, militants on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border continue to defy American power. High-profile military operations against the Taliban in Helmand and elsewhere illustrate both abilities and limitations of a superpower. This is not new. The Soviet occupation forces went through a similar experience during their occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Like the Soviets, the Americans are increasingly finding that it is possible to wrest control of specific areas, but only as long as their troops are in occupation of those areas. As they move on for other operations, the insurgents make a come back.
There are similarities between the recent American surge approved by President Obama and the increase in the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the USSR in 1985. Early on, Gorbachev had decided to bring his troops home following a costly war in Afghanistan. But he also ordered reinforcements similar in size to the American surge now. Ostensibly, it was to give the Soviet armed forces one last chance to win the Afghan war, but more realistically because before a planned withdrawal, the Soviet Union needed to reinforce. Troops being withdrawn have to partially disarm. The heavy equipment to be transported cannot be operational at the same time. Soldiers moving out carry light arms for self-defense, not heavy lethal weapons for attack. At the same time, the surge of more mobile units is intended to warn the enemy of more trouble coming.
President Obama has already announced that American troops will begin to leave Afghanistan by the middle of 2011. My recent visit to South Asia reinforced this impression. Obama is smart enough to know history and its lessons. He has disappointed many of his liberal supporters who had expected much more from him. But there is not much doubt that he would like to withdraw from Afghanistan. Re-election in 2012 would depend on it to a considerable degree, along with the economy. The wreckage of military ventures abroad and economic collapse at home left by the preceding administration must be prominent on Obama’s mind. What Obama will achieve is by no means certain. But there are lessons to be learned from the past.
The presidency of George W Bush was rooted in a manifesto we know as the Project for the New American Century. The project was born in reaction to the Clinton presidency in the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s. The alliance of neoconservatives and the Christian Right provided George W Bush with core support. Above all, the Bush presidency will be remembered for America’s foreign military ventures in the shape of three wars: the Afghan war, the Iraq war, and a third war, borderless and timeless – the ‘global war on terror’.
The events of 9/11 posed an unprecedented security challenge. The most important questions in Washington at the time should have been: Where to start and where to stop? What should be the scale and proportion of America’s response? However, such considerations were absent as the talk of a ‘long war’ or ‘generational war’ illustrated, certainly in the first term of President Bush.
The record of great powers fighting long or generational wars against insurgents is not good. The United States learned this in Vietnam. The Soviet Union did so in Afghanistan. A long war suits insurgent forces deeply embedded in the locale and culture of the theater. They enjoy considerable support in the battleground. Denial of this reality is often fatal. A United States president has numerous issues to deal with. But the overwhelming weight of events of the last decade leads to the conclusion that the Bush presidency was all about war. The foreign ventures he embarked on within months of inauguration eclipsed everything else during his presidency. It is therefore appropriate to evaluate the Bush presidency’s legacy in terms of the ‘war on terrorism’.
The objective of the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was regime change. There has been a long debate about the true objective of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq: weapons of mass destruction or regime change. Time and events seem to have settled that debate. It was claimed that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons that could be activated within 45 minutes. Such weapons were not found. A lot more about the considerations and deliberations between Washington and London, and in each capital, has come to light. We know more about the private communication between President Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the run up to the Iraq invasion – communication that other significant figures who should have been made aware of did not know. And we have learned from Tony Blair that even with knowledge of there being no weapons of mass destruction, he would have employed other arguments to remove Saddam Hussein.
Much has been said about mistakes being made in Afghanistan and, more specifically, Iraq. The biggest error of judgment was that two very different countries were given the same treatment of military power. In doing do, the intervenors appeared to act with vengeance more than a planned strategy. Otherwise, why would Afghanistan – an utterly failed state – be subjected to sustained destructive air power and left without a serious attempt at rebuilding for so long. And the primary intervenor moved on to Iraq to dismantle a well-organized state structure, after the dictator had been overthrown. By treating Afghanistan and Iraq in the same way, the intervenors did the opposite of what was needed in each country.
To view al Qaeda and the various nationalist movements in the Arab world as one ‘enemy’ in the ‘war on terror’ was an historic miscalculation. The determination under the Bush presidency to crush nationalism in the Muslim world exacted a high price from the West. But countries in the region paid, and continue to pay, a price even greater. Al Qaeda’s terrorist violence has been answered by the terror of American military power. Differing agendas of regional powers became fused with America’s aims in the ‘war on terror’. The impact was huge across the region, producing anger, resentment and outright rebellion in the wider populace.
In a country without national infrastructure, or where infrastructure is destroyed, there will be certain consequences. The essence of the state’s role is maintaining order. It does so by means of coercion, taxation and distribution. In a country such as Afghanistan, self, family, clan, tribe and ethnic group acquire much greater significance. In a failed or weak state, other agencies – a village elder, tribal chief or warlord – replace the state. They command popular following, because they make things happen.
In Iraq, two early decisions by the American administrator Paul Bremer after the 2003 invasion triggered a multi-layered conflict. By Order Number 1 of May 16, Bremer dissolved the Ba’ath Party. In an article in Le Monde diplomatique, the British academic Toby Dodge described the Iraqi population a month after the arrival of the US forces as dominated by a Hobbesian nightmare. Dodge estimated that between 20000 and 120000 senior and middle-ranking Iraqi officials lost their jobs in the civil service purge alone. They would have constituted the very force capable of restoring order amid chaos and violence. Dodge wrote that 17 of Baghdad’s 23 ministries were completely gutted, stripped of all portable items like computers, furniture and fittings – all within three weeks. There were not enough American troops to stop it.
Bremer’s Order Number 2 dismantled the most important state institutions and subordinates such as government ministries, Iraqi military and paramilitary organizations, the National Assembly, courts and emergency forces. To be prepared with alternatives to take over the functions of these organizations was essential in a country of 30 million people. Bremer’s two edicts left a vacuum that was rapidly filled by new violent players.
I want to offer a brief explanation of the nature of the other conflict – Afghan war – since the 1970s. It also applies to an extent to Iraq. Afghanistan has striking parallels with other conflicts in Palestine, Yemen and elsewhere. These conflicts can be seen in four separate yet overlapping, often simultaneous stages. This is how.
Stage 1: internal conflict. In Afghanistan, internal conflict is a fact of history. For simplicity, let’s begin from the ‘decade of liberalism and modernization’ in the 1960s. The conflict escalated after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 – and again after the 1978 coup by young Soviet-oriented military officers, who feared that President Daud was taking the country too close to the United States.
Stage 2: increase in great power involvement. External intervention fuels the unrest, and upsets the balance of forces locally. This, in turn, attracts more external forces, until they begin to dictate the scale and course of events. But their unacceptability among local players, and active resistance by local groups, hinder the creation and functioning of institutions.
Stage 3: state disintegration. In Afghanistan, the death of the state was slow, taking more than two decades. In Iraq, too, considering the effects of sanctions and isolation, we are talking about more than a decade. After Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, the final blow came relatively quickly.
Stage 4: foreign indifference and rise of extremism. I have in mind the decade of the 1990s and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Soviet state had been defeated and had disintegrated. For the United States, exhausted and occupied with the urgency to manage the wreckage of the Soviet Union, most importantly its nuclear arsenal, Afghanistan was simply not a priority.
There is a general lesson to be learned. A prolonged war leads to fatigue and indifference among external intervenors. A culture of violence matures. Expectations on all sides are altered and violence becomes a way of life. Actors left behind acquire a habit of using coercion. And citizens come to expect solutions to be found through violence. That few intervening powers grasp this lesson is a tragedy.
We have at present a mix of the McChrystal plan of military surge and counterinsurgency and President Obama’s wish to start drawing down the combat forces in mid-2011. His wish is driven by the 2012 presidential election in America. And it is dependent upon recruitment, training and ultimately guaranteed discipline of a 300000-strong Afghan national force.
However, history shows that integrity in the Afghan armed forces is difficult to achieve. Tribal realities among Pashtun officers and rank-and-file soldiers – and distrust for Pashtuns among non-Pashtuns – cannot be wished away. It would require a generation to transform the culture of the armed forces and the country even if the United States and allies had the will. In the absence of that will, I have some fears. They are –
1. As soon as President Obama begins to draw down the combat forces in mid-2011, altering the balance of power, or that prospect is near, dramatic shifts of loyalties will occur in the Afghan armed forces. This has happened before and could happen again.
2. The Karzai government cannot survive if the military disintegrates along tribal and ethnic lines. The Afghan armed forces and police lack cohesion already.
3. Afghanistan has weapons in abundance. Guns poured into the country, with the best possible intention of equipping the military, would fall into the wrong hands. And I am not even talking about increased activity by Pakistan’s ISI and other regional players.
All these are ingredients of a state of nature again.
The answer is a long-term regional project, led but not dictated by the United States, involving Iran, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and India; and a deliberate policy of demilitarization, however difficult and painful. Internally, a type of tribal democracy, certainly outside Kabul and other main cities, is what is realistic to hope for.
But the current state of America’s relations with China, Iran and Russia does not favor such a prospect. Tensions have grown with Pakistan and Turkey. And I know there is uncertainty, if not outright unhappiness, over the Obama administration’s policies elsewhere in the region. This makes cooperation much more difficult. The current strategy in Afghanistan lays too much emphasis on military tactics. And it does not appreciate nearly enough how objectionable, how provocative, foreign military presence is to Afghans. The sentiment goes beyond the Taliban – and the primary reason why external intervenors have found it impossible to tame the independent spirit of Afghans permanently.
Deepak Tripathi has taken a close interest in the United States, great power relations and South and West Asia for more than 30 years. His book Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, D.C.) has just been published. He recently presented an earlier version of this paper at the Eccles Center for American Studies at the British Library in London. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: http://deepaktripathi.wordpress.com. This article is reprinted with permission.
Despite the 'surge' that General Stanley McChrystal asked for and President Obama approved after weeks of reflection, militants on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border continue to defy American power. High-profile military operations against the Taliban in Helmand and elsewhere illustrate both abilities and limitations of a superpower. This is not new. The Soviet occupation forces went through a similar experience during their occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Like the Soviets, the Americans are increasingly finding that it is possible to wrest control of specific areas, but only as long as their troops are in occupation of those areas. As they move on for other operations, the insurgents make a come back.
There are similarities between the recent American surge approved by President Obama and the increase in the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the USSR in 1985. Early on, Gorbachev had decided to bring his troops home following a costly war in Afghanistan. But he also ordered reinforcements similar in size to the American surge now. Ostensibly, it was to give the Soviet armed forces one last chance to win the Afghan war, but more realistically because before a planned withdrawal, the Soviet Union needed to reinforce. Troops being withdrawn have to partially disarm. The heavy equipment to be transported cannot be operational at the same time. Soldiers moving out carry light arms for self-defense, not heavy lethal weapons for attack. At the same time, the surge of more mobile units is intended to warn the enemy of more trouble coming.
President Obama has already announced that American troops will begin to leave Afghanistan by the middle of 2011. My recent visit to South Asia reinforced this impression. Obama is smart enough to know history and its lessons. He has disappointed many of his liberal supporters who had expected much more from him. But there is not much doubt that he would like to withdraw from Afghanistan. Re-election in 2012 would depend on it to a considerable degree, along with the economy. The wreckage of military ventures abroad and economic collapse at home left by the preceding administration must be prominent on Obama’s mind. What Obama will achieve is by no means certain. But there are lessons to be learned from the past.
The presidency of George W Bush was rooted in a manifesto we know as the Project for the New American Century. The project was born in reaction to the Clinton presidency in the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s. The alliance of neoconservatives and the Christian Right provided George W Bush with core support. Above all, the Bush presidency will be remembered for America’s foreign military ventures in the shape of three wars: the Afghan war, the Iraq war, and a third war, borderless and timeless – the ‘global war on terror’.
The events of 9/11 posed an unprecedented security challenge. The most important questions in Washington at the time should have been: Where to start and where to stop? What should be the scale and proportion of America’s response? However, such considerations were absent as the talk of a ‘long war’ or ‘generational war’ illustrated, certainly in the first term of President Bush.
The record of great powers fighting long or generational wars against insurgents is not good. The United States learned this in Vietnam. The Soviet Union did so in Afghanistan. A long war suits insurgent forces deeply embedded in the locale and culture of the theater. They enjoy considerable support in the battleground. Denial of this reality is often fatal. A United States president has numerous issues to deal with. But the overwhelming weight of events of the last decade leads to the conclusion that the Bush presidency was all about war. The foreign ventures he embarked on within months of inauguration eclipsed everything else during his presidency. It is therefore appropriate to evaluate the Bush presidency’s legacy in terms of the ‘war on terrorism’.
The objective of the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was regime change. There has been a long debate about the true objective of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq: weapons of mass destruction or regime change. Time and events seem to have settled that debate. It was claimed that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons that could be activated within 45 minutes. Such weapons were not found. A lot more about the considerations and deliberations between Washington and London, and in each capital, has come to light. We know more about the private communication between President Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the run up to the Iraq invasion – communication that other significant figures who should have been made aware of did not know. And we have learned from Tony Blair that even with knowledge of there being no weapons of mass destruction, he would have employed other arguments to remove Saddam Hussein.
Much has been said about mistakes being made in Afghanistan and, more specifically, Iraq. The biggest error of judgment was that two very different countries were given the same treatment of military power. In doing do, the intervenors appeared to act with vengeance more than a planned strategy. Otherwise, why would Afghanistan – an utterly failed state – be subjected to sustained destructive air power and left without a serious attempt at rebuilding for so long. And the primary intervenor moved on to Iraq to dismantle a well-organized state structure, after the dictator had been overthrown. By treating Afghanistan and Iraq in the same way, the intervenors did the opposite of what was needed in each country.
To view al Qaeda and the various nationalist movements in the Arab world as one ‘enemy’ in the ‘war on terror’ was an historic miscalculation. The determination under the Bush presidency to crush nationalism in the Muslim world exacted a high price from the West. But countries in the region paid, and continue to pay, a price even greater. Al Qaeda’s terrorist violence has been answered by the terror of American military power. Differing agendas of regional powers became fused with America’s aims in the ‘war on terror’. The impact was huge across the region, producing anger, resentment and outright rebellion in the wider populace.
In a country without national infrastructure, or where infrastructure is destroyed, there will be certain consequences. The essence of the state’s role is maintaining order. It does so by means of coercion, taxation and distribution. In a country such as Afghanistan, self, family, clan, tribe and ethnic group acquire much greater significance. In a failed or weak state, other agencies – a village elder, tribal chief or warlord – replace the state. They command popular following, because they make things happen.
In Iraq, two early decisions by the American administrator Paul Bremer after the 2003 invasion triggered a multi-layered conflict. By Order Number 1 of May 16, Bremer dissolved the Ba’ath Party. In an article in Le Monde diplomatique, the British academic Toby Dodge described the Iraqi population a month after the arrival of the US forces as dominated by a Hobbesian nightmare. Dodge estimated that between 20000 and 120000 senior and middle-ranking Iraqi officials lost their jobs in the civil service purge alone. They would have constituted the very force capable of restoring order amid chaos and violence. Dodge wrote that 17 of Baghdad’s 23 ministries were completely gutted, stripped of all portable items like computers, furniture and fittings – all within three weeks. There were not enough American troops to stop it.
Bremer’s Order Number 2 dismantled the most important state institutions and subordinates such as government ministries, Iraqi military and paramilitary organizations, the National Assembly, courts and emergency forces. To be prepared with alternatives to take over the functions of these organizations was essential in a country of 30 million people. Bremer’s two edicts left a vacuum that was rapidly filled by new violent players.
I want to offer a brief explanation of the nature of the other conflict – Afghan war – since the 1970s. It also applies to an extent to Iraq. Afghanistan has striking parallels with other conflicts in Palestine, Yemen and elsewhere. These conflicts can be seen in four separate yet overlapping, often simultaneous stages. This is how.
Stage 1: internal conflict. In Afghanistan, internal conflict is a fact of history. For simplicity, let’s begin from the ‘decade of liberalism and modernization’ in the 1960s. The conflict escalated after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 – and again after the 1978 coup by young Soviet-oriented military officers, who feared that President Daud was taking the country too close to the United States.
Stage 2: increase in great power involvement. External intervention fuels the unrest, and upsets the balance of forces locally. This, in turn, attracts more external forces, until they begin to dictate the scale and course of events. But their unacceptability among local players, and active resistance by local groups, hinder the creation and functioning of institutions.
Stage 3: state disintegration. In Afghanistan, the death of the state was slow, taking more than two decades. In Iraq, too, considering the effects of sanctions and isolation, we are talking about more than a decade. After Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, the final blow came relatively quickly.
Stage 4: foreign indifference and rise of extremism. I have in mind the decade of the 1990s and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Soviet state had been defeated and had disintegrated. For the United States, exhausted and occupied with the urgency to manage the wreckage of the Soviet Union, most importantly its nuclear arsenal, Afghanistan was simply not a priority.
There is a general lesson to be learned. A prolonged war leads to fatigue and indifference among external intervenors. A culture of violence matures. Expectations on all sides are altered and violence becomes a way of life. Actors left behind acquire a habit of using coercion. And citizens come to expect solutions to be found through violence. That few intervening powers grasp this lesson is a tragedy.
We have at present a mix of the McChrystal plan of military surge and counterinsurgency and President Obama’s wish to start drawing down the combat forces in mid-2011. His wish is driven by the 2012 presidential election in America. And it is dependent upon recruitment, training and ultimately guaranteed discipline of a 300000-strong Afghan national force.
However, history shows that integrity in the Afghan armed forces is difficult to achieve. Tribal realities among Pashtun officers and rank-and-file soldiers – and distrust for Pashtuns among non-Pashtuns – cannot be wished away. It would require a generation to transform the culture of the armed forces and the country even if the United States and allies had the will. In the absence of that will, I have some fears. They are –
1. As soon as President Obama begins to draw down the combat forces in mid-2011, altering the balance of power, or that prospect is near, dramatic shifts of loyalties will occur in the Afghan armed forces. This has happened before and could happen again.
2. The Karzai government cannot survive if the military disintegrates along tribal and ethnic lines. The Afghan armed forces and police lack cohesion already.
3. Afghanistan has weapons in abundance. Guns poured into the country, with the best possible intention of equipping the military, would fall into the wrong hands. And I am not even talking about increased activity by Pakistan’s ISI and other regional players.
All these are ingredients of a state of nature again.
The answer is a long-term regional project, led but not dictated by the United States, involving Iran, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and India; and a deliberate policy of demilitarization, however difficult and painful. Internally, a type of tribal democracy, certainly outside Kabul and other main cities, is what is realistic to hope for.
But the current state of America’s relations with China, Iran and Russia does not favor such a prospect. Tensions have grown with Pakistan and Turkey. And I know there is uncertainty, if not outright unhappiness, over the Obama administration’s policies elsewhere in the region. This makes cooperation much more difficult. The current strategy in Afghanistan lays too much emphasis on military tactics. And it does not appreciate nearly enough how objectionable, how provocative, foreign military presence is to Afghans. The sentiment goes beyond the Taliban – and the primary reason why external intervenors have found it impossible to tame the independent spirit of Afghans permanently.
Deepak Tripathi has taken a close interest in the United States, great power relations and South and West Asia for more than 30 years. His book Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, D.C.) has just been published. He recently presented an earlier version of this paper at the Eccles Center for American Studies at the British Library in London. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: http://deepaktripathi.wordpress.com. This article is reprinted with permission.
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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Ferrovial Creates Qatar Subsidiary To Develop Services Business
Ferrovial, a world-leading infrastructure company, and Qatari company Q.mobility have established Ferrovial Qatar to offer services in the fields of civil engineering, facility management, and infrastructure maintenance in the Emirate of Qatar and the region.
The new company, which will be based in Doha, offers new business opportunities for Ferrovial Services and is a further step forward in its internationalization strategy. The division obtained 62% of revenues from outside Spain in the first quarter of 2010. Santiago Olivares, CEO of Ferrovial Services, highlighted that "this operation is strategic for the company.
Ferrovial Qatar will offer Ferrovial's full know-how and technology, as well as our experience and work methods, in the areas of civil engineering, facility management and road maintenance." Fernando Guedán, General Manager of Ferrovial Qatar: "it is very important to have a Doha-based partner to ensure service quality and offer top-line after-sales maintenance."
Fernando Guedán was formerly Head of Investment Projects at Ferrovial Services. Sheikh al Hussein Bin Ali Bin Ahmed Al Thani , chairman of Ferrovial Qatar, said that "the new Qatari company will have all the support needed from Ferrovial and Q.mobility to explore new opportunities, and prove itself on the local market in order to expand further in the region".
Expanding internationally
Ferrovial has been operating in Saudi Arabia since 2006, via Cadagua, Ferrovial Agromán's water subsidiary. It is the only Spanish company to have obtained a seawater desalination project in that country. The company has a permanent Middle East regional office in Dubai. Ferrovial Agromán also moved into India recently and has offices in New Delhi.
It has already landed a contact in India, to design and build a drinking water treatment plant in Hogenakkal, in Tamil Nadu state.
The new company, which will be based in Doha, offers new business opportunities for Ferrovial Services and is a further step forward in its internationalization strategy. The division obtained 62% of revenues from outside Spain in the first quarter of 2010. Santiago Olivares, CEO of Ferrovial Services, highlighted that "this operation is strategic for the company.
Ferrovial Qatar will offer Ferrovial's full know-how and technology, as well as our experience and work methods, in the areas of civil engineering, facility management and road maintenance." Fernando Guedán, General Manager of Ferrovial Qatar: "it is very important to have a Doha-based partner to ensure service quality and offer top-line after-sales maintenance."
Fernando Guedán was formerly Head of Investment Projects at Ferrovial Services. Sheikh al Hussein Bin Ali Bin Ahmed Al Thani , chairman of Ferrovial Qatar, said that "the new Qatari company will have all the support needed from Ferrovial and Q.mobility to explore new opportunities, and prove itself on the local market in order to expand further in the region".
Expanding internationally
Ferrovial has been operating in Saudi Arabia since 2006, via Cadagua, Ferrovial Agromán's water subsidiary. It is the only Spanish company to have obtained a seawater desalination project in that country. The company has a permanent Middle East regional office in Dubai. Ferrovial Agromán also moved into India recently and has offices in New Delhi.
It has already landed a contact in India, to design and build a drinking water treatment plant in Hogenakkal, in Tamil Nadu state.
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Petrobras Signs Preliminary Agreement For Investments In Saudi Arabia
Petrobras signed a preliminary agreement earlier this week with Saudi outfit company Modern Mining Holding Company Limited, to undertake an in-depth study of the feasibility of developing, funding, building and operating calcined petroleum coke (CPC) plant in Saudi Arabia.
CPC is a raw material for the aluminum industry and results from the process of calcining green petroleum coke (CVP). The technique consists of heating the CVP at high temperatures to remove residues.
In 2009, the Petrobras and Modern Mining Holding Company Limited signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the intention of building a plant for calcining green petroleum coke, which evolved into the agreement signed.
The plant is expected to be built in Jubail or Raz az Zawr and to process up to 700,000 tons of CPC per year, with CVP provided by Petrobras. The estimated investment for the project is approximately $450 million, to be financed in equal shares by the partners, with the possibility of funding from government and financial institutions. The plant is forecast to go on stream in the second half of 2012.
CPC is a raw material for the aluminum industry and results from the process of calcining green petroleum coke (CVP). The technique consists of heating the CVP at high temperatures to remove residues.
In 2009, the Petrobras and Modern Mining Holding Company Limited signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the intention of building a plant for calcining green petroleum coke, which evolved into the agreement signed.
The plant is expected to be built in Jubail or Raz az Zawr and to process up to 700,000 tons of CPC per year, with CVP provided by Petrobras. The estimated investment for the project is approximately $450 million, to be financed in equal shares by the partners, with the possibility of funding from government and financial institutions. The plant is forecast to go on stream in the second half of 2012.
Friday, May 21, 2010 |
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Saudi Colonel Arrested For Alleged World Cup Terror Plot
(BuaNews) -- Officials in Iraq on Monday arrested a Saudi army official on allegations he was planning to participate in Al-Qaeda attacks on the World Cup.
Colonel Azzam al-Qahtani was accused of conspiring with the terrorist organisations in Baghdad.
Officials behind the arrest were not giving any details of what alleged World Cup attack plans they uncovered.
South African police commissioner Bheki Cele told the South African Parliament two weeks ago that South African police had investigated a threat by Al Shabaab, an al-Qaeda offshoot, and decided it was not credible.
Cele insisted South Africa was more than prepared for any terror threat to the World Cup.
Colonel Azzam al-Qahtani was accused of conspiring with the terrorist organisations in Baghdad.
Officials behind the arrest were not giving any details of what alleged World Cup attack plans they uncovered.
South African police commissioner Bheki Cele told the South African Parliament two weeks ago that South African police had investigated a threat by Al Shabaab, an al-Qaeda offshoot, and decided it was not credible.
Cele insisted South Africa was more than prepared for any terror threat to the World Cup.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 |
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Sudanese Man Facing Execution In Saudi Arabia Over ‘Sorcery’ Charges
Amnesty International has urged the Saudi Arabian authorities to intervene to halt the possibly imminent execution of a Sudanese man who was sentenced to death for “sorcery”.
Abdul Hamid Bin Hussain Bin Moustafa al-Fakki was sentenced to death by a Madina court on 27 March 2007, after he was accused of producing a spell that would lead to the reconciliation of his client’s divorced parents.
Very little is known about his trial proceedings as they were held in secret. Three years since he was sentenced to death, it is not known what stage his case is at or if his execution has been scheduled, but it is likely to be imminent given the time that has elapsed.
“‘Abdul Hamid al-Fakki appears to have been convicted solely for the peaceful exercise of his rights to freedom of expression and religion,” said Philip Luther, Deputy Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa programme.
“We are calling on King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia not to let this or other executions go ahead.”
‘Abdul Hamid Bin Hussain Bin Moustafa al-Fakki was arrested on 8 December 2005 in the city of Madina by the Mutawa’een (religious police), officially called the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV).
He was accused of practising sorcery, after being entrapped by the CPVPV. It is not clear why the authorities targeted him. A man working for the CPVPV approached ‘Abdul Hamid and asked him to produce a spell that would lead to the man’s father separating from his second wife and returning to his first wife, the man’s mother.
‘Abdul Hamid apparently accepted to do this in exchange for 6,000 Saudi Arabian riyals (approximately US$1,600).
He apparently took an advance of 2,000 riyals from the man, together with the names of his father and the father’s second wife, as well as the names of their mothers, and agreed to meet the man afterwards to deliver his work.
He went to the agreed meeting place and was seen by CPVPV agents getting into the man’s car. He delivered his work, consisting of nine pieces of paper with codes written on them with saffron, and received the rest of the money.
He was then arrested while in possession of bank notes whose serial numbers had been recorded by the CPVPV.
He was questioned and apparently beaten, and is believed to have confessed that he did carry out acts of sorcery in a bid to solve the family problems of the man who had approached him.
The crime of “sorcery” is not defined in Saudi Arabian law, and has been used to punish people for the legitimate exercise of their human rights, including the rights to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and expression.
The Saudi Arabian authorities arrested scores of people for “sorcery” in 2009, and have arrested over 20 more this year. Often arrests are carried out by the Mutawa’een, which uses entrapment to secure charges not only of “sorcery” but also of other offences such as khilwa (being in the company of members of the opposite sex who are not close relatives).
The last known execution for “sorcery” was that of Egyptian national Mustafa Ibrahim, on 2 November 2007. He had been arrested in May 2007 in the town of ‘Arar, where he worked as a pharmacist, and accused of “apostasy” for having degraded a copy of the Qur’an by putting it in a toilet.
Saudi Arabia applies the death penalty for a wide range of offences, including some with no lethal consequences such as sorcery. Court proceedings fall far short of international standards for fair trial.
Defendants are rarely allowed formal representation by a lawyer, and in many cases are not informed of the progress of legal proceedings against them.
They may be convicted solely on the basis of confessions obtained under duress or deception. Prisoners in Saudi Arabia may be put to death without a scheduled date for execution being made known to them or their families. Since the beginning of 2010, at least 11 people have been executed.
Abdul Hamid Bin Hussain Bin Moustafa al-Fakki was sentenced to death by a Madina court on 27 March 2007, after he was accused of producing a spell that would lead to the reconciliation of his client’s divorced parents.
Very little is known about his trial proceedings as they were held in secret. Three years since he was sentenced to death, it is not known what stage his case is at or if his execution has been scheduled, but it is likely to be imminent given the time that has elapsed.
“‘Abdul Hamid al-Fakki appears to have been convicted solely for the peaceful exercise of his rights to freedom of expression and religion,” said Philip Luther, Deputy Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa programme.
“We are calling on King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia not to let this or other executions go ahead.”
‘Abdul Hamid Bin Hussain Bin Moustafa al-Fakki was arrested on 8 December 2005 in the city of Madina by the Mutawa’een (religious police), officially called the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV).
He was accused of practising sorcery, after being entrapped by the CPVPV. It is not clear why the authorities targeted him. A man working for the CPVPV approached ‘Abdul Hamid and asked him to produce a spell that would lead to the man’s father separating from his second wife and returning to his first wife, the man’s mother.
‘Abdul Hamid apparently accepted to do this in exchange for 6,000 Saudi Arabian riyals (approximately US$1,600).
He apparently took an advance of 2,000 riyals from the man, together with the names of his father and the father’s second wife, as well as the names of their mothers, and agreed to meet the man afterwards to deliver his work.
He went to the agreed meeting place and was seen by CPVPV agents getting into the man’s car. He delivered his work, consisting of nine pieces of paper with codes written on them with saffron, and received the rest of the money.
He was then arrested while in possession of bank notes whose serial numbers had been recorded by the CPVPV.
He was questioned and apparently beaten, and is believed to have confessed that he did carry out acts of sorcery in a bid to solve the family problems of the man who had approached him.
The crime of “sorcery” is not defined in Saudi Arabian law, and has been used to punish people for the legitimate exercise of their human rights, including the rights to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and expression.
The Saudi Arabian authorities arrested scores of people for “sorcery” in 2009, and have arrested over 20 more this year. Often arrests are carried out by the Mutawa’een, which uses entrapment to secure charges not only of “sorcery” but also of other offences such as khilwa (being in the company of members of the opposite sex who are not close relatives).
The last known execution for “sorcery” was that of Egyptian national Mustafa Ibrahim, on 2 November 2007. He had been arrested in May 2007 in the town of ‘Arar, where he worked as a pharmacist, and accused of “apostasy” for having degraded a copy of the Qur’an by putting it in a toilet.
Saudi Arabia applies the death penalty for a wide range of offences, including some with no lethal consequences such as sorcery. Court proceedings fall far short of international standards for fair trial.
Defendants are rarely allowed formal representation by a lawyer, and in many cases are not informed of the progress of legal proceedings against them.
They may be convicted solely on the basis of confessions obtained under duress or deception. Prisoners in Saudi Arabia may be put to death without a scheduled date for execution being made known to them or their families. Since the beginning of 2010, at least 11 people have been executed.
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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Kuwait Energy Profile - Still Heavily Dependent On Oil Export Revenue
(EIA) -- Kuwait is one of the world’s top exporters of oil, with about 2.4 million barrels per day exported in 2008. Kuwait's economy is heavily dependent on oil export revenues which account for roughly 90 percent of total export earnings. Kuwait channels around 10 percent of its oil revenues into the "Future Generations Fund" for the day when oil income runs out.
The Kuwaiti constitution forbids foreign ownership of Kuwait's mineral resources. The Kuwaiti Parliament passed the “Foreign Direct Investment Act” in 2001, aimed at promoting foreign investment in Kuwait’s oil and gas sectors, which facilitated some development in those sectors.
However, major projects such as Project Kuwait remain at a standstill due to disagreements between Parliament and the ruling Al-Sabah family.
Oil
According to Oil and Gas Journal, as of January 2010 Kuwait’s territorial boundaries contained an estimated 101.5 billion barrels (bbl) of proven oil reserves, roughly 8 percent of the world total.
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (a.k.a. Divided Zone, Neutral Zone), which Kuwait shares 50-50 with Saudi Arabia, holds an additional 5 billion bbl of reserves, bringing Kuwait's total oil reserves to 104 billion bbl.
Overview
The Supreme Petroleum Council oversees Kuwait’s oil sector and sets oil policy. The Kuwait Petroleum Council (KPC) manages domestic and foreign oil investments.
KOC, nationalized in 1979, is KPC’s upstream arm in Kuwait. The Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC), set up in 2002, oversees the bulk of Kuwait’s interests in the Neutral Zone. Most Kuwaiti crude oil is sold on term contracts, with the price of Kuwaiti crude oil tied to Saudi Arabian Medium (for western customers) and a monthly average of Dubai and Oman crudes (for Asian buyers).
Most of Kuwait's oil reserves are located south of Kuwait City. The 70-billion bbl Greater Burgan area, which comprises the Burgan, Magwa and Ahmadi fields, is widely considered the world's second largest oil field, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field. Producing oil since the 1950’s, Greater Burgan generally produces lighter crudes with API’s in the 28°-36° range, and has a production capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d. The South Magwa field (discovered in 1984) is estimated to hold at least 25 billion bbl of light crude.
Other fields surrounding the Greater Burgan area include Umm Gudair, Minagish, and Abdaliya. Umm Gudair and Minagish produce heavier crude oil, with gravities in the 22°-26° API range, and have a combined production capacity of 200,000 bbl per day. In January 2003, water injection began at Minagish to enhance oil recovery and offset natural declines in production.
Northern Kuwait holds the majority of Kuwait’s larger fields after Greater Burgan. Kuwait’s second largest field, Raudhatain, was discovered in 1955 by KOC, and has 9.55 billion bbl of proven and probable recoverable oil. Raudhatain has the capacity to produce 450,000 bbl of oil per day.
Partitioned Neutral Zone
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) was established in 1922 to settle a territorial dispute between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The PNZ encompasses a 6,200 square-mile area and contains an estimated 5 billion bbl of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. A Joint Operations Committee, with representatives from both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, manages the resources in the PNZ. Kuwait is represented by the Wafra Joint Operations Group, and Saudi Arabia is represented by Chevron. Oil production capacity in the PNZ is currently about 600,000 barrels per day, all of which is divided equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Onshore production in the PNZ centers on Wafra. On stream since 1954, Wafra is the largest of the PNZ’s onshore fields with approximately 3.4 billion in proven and probable reserves. Wafra has related production facilities and gathering centers with South Umm Gudair and South Fuwaris. Onshore production in the PNZ has a capacity of around 274,000 bbl/d.
The production capacity of offshore fields in the PNZ is 300,000 bbl/d, with almost 90 percent coming from Khafji. Offshore production is about four times as expensive in the PNZ as in the rest of Kuwait. Khafji, an extension of Saudi Arabia’s Safaniyah (the world’s largest offshore field), Hout, also an extension of Safaniyah, and Dorra, an extension of Iran’s Arash, are the largest fields. Dorra is not currently under production pending resolution of boundary demarcation negotiations between Kuwait and Iran.
Production & Consumption
In 2009, Kuwait’s total oil production approximated 2.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), including approximately 300,000 bbl/d production from the PNZ; 2008 total oil production was roughly 2.7 million bbl/d (PNZ production roughly the same). Of 2009 production, 2.3 million bbl/d was crude and approximately 200,000 bbl/d was non-crude liquids. Overall, around two-thirds of Kuwaiti oil production comes from the southeast of the country. Kuwait’s total oil consumption equaled roughly 350,000 bbl/d in 2008.
OPEC Crude Oil Production 2009
Most of Kuwait’s major producing fields are over sixty years old, and therefore field maturity is becoming a concern. In 2005, KOC, citing field exhaustion, lowered its production plateau estimates for the Greater Burgan area from 2 million bbl/d to 1.7 million bbl/d over a 20-30 year period. This issue places added significance on development of other Kuwaiti reserves going forward.
Developments
Kuwait plans to increase crude oil production capacity from its current 2.6 million bbl/d to 4 million bbl/d by 2020, largely via Project Kuwait (PK). Progress towards enacting PK, however, remains caught in the disagreement between Parliament and the ruling family on how best to proceed.
Kuwait's constitution - and longtime policy - bars foreign investment in the country's natural resources, except as provided for by law. In order to allow IOC involvement, "incentivized buy-back contract" (IBBC) arrangements, which do not involve production sharing, concessions, or the "booking" of reserves by foreign companies, have been created. The structure of the IBBC agreements allows the Kuwaiti government to retain full ownership of oil reserves, control over oil production levels, and strategic management of the ventures. Foreign firms are to be paid a "per barrel" fee, along with allowances for capital recovery and incentive fees for increasing reserves, in their role as service provider/contractor. In May 2007, the Kuwaiti ruling family conceded the responsibility to approve each related IBBC for Project Kuwait to Parliament.
PK aims to increase the country's oil production capacity from four northern oil fields – Raudhatain, Sabriya, Ratqa, and Abdali - to 3.5 million bbl/d by 2015, and then 4 million bbl/d by 2020 with the help of international oil companies (IOC). Heavy oil is a major component of Kuwait’s increased production capacity plans. Estimated heavy oil reserves of approximately 13 billion bbl are located primarily in the north of Kuwait.
KOC also plans to drill for oil in South East Kuwait and West Kuwait. In South East Kuwait, which holds the vast Burgan field, production is to increase by 200,000 b/d to a total of 1.7 million bbl/d; KOC hopes to maintain capacity in West Kuwait at 500,000 b/d.
Kuwait is expected to increase its crude oil production capacity by approximately 170,000 bbl/d in 2011 with Gathering Center (GC) 24 in the Sabriya oil field. Western Kuwait’s GC-16 is expected to add another 100,000 bbl/d in production capacity, but its startup date is uncertain.
Exports
Kuwait exports the majority of its crude and refined products to the Asia-Pacific region.
In 2008, Kuwait’s total exports of crude oil and refined products reached nearly 2.4 million bbl/d. The Asia-Pacific region received approximately 1.5 million bbl/d, the United States received approximately 210,000 bbl/d, and Western Europe received 180,000 bbl/d. Kuwait's single export blend ("Kuwait Export") has a specific gravity of 31.4°API (a typical medium Mideast crude), and is considered sour with 2.52 percent sulfur content.
Mina al-Ahmadi is the country's main port for the export of crude oil. Kuwait also has operational oil export terminals at Mina Abdullah, Shuaiba, and at Mina Saud. To handle increased production generated by Project Kuwait, a new terminal is planned for construction on Bubiyan Island.
Downstream
Kuwait's three domestic refineries have a combined capacity of roughly 936,000 bbl/d. The country's largest refinery is Mina al-Ahmadi, with capacity of 466,000 bbl/d, followed by Mina Abdullah (270,000 bbl/d) and Shuaiba (200,000 bbl/d).
Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI; a.k.a. “Q8”) manages KPC's refining and marketing operations internationally, with approximately 4,000 retail stations across Western Europe (Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Italy). KPI owns an 80,000 bbl/d refinery in Rotterdam, Netherlands and has a 50:50 joint venture with AGIP in the 240,000 bbl/d capacity refinery in Milazzo, Italy.
With the growth of downstream markets in Asia, Kuwait is interested in acquiring downstream assets in large emerging markets such as China. In China’s Guangdong Province, KPC is negotiating a partnership with China’s Sinopec and Dow Chemical Company. The plant will feature a 300,000 bbl/d capacity refinery and a 1 million tons per year ethylene steam cracker.
Clean Fuels Project
The Clean Fuels Project (CFP) is the umbrella under which Kuwait’s existing refineries will be upgraded. With a 2008 price tag of $18 billion, the CFP is split into three packages. In Package 1, Mina Abdullah’s distillation capacity will be increased to 420,000 bbl/d. Package 2 will consist of revamping Mina Abdullah’s utilities both on and offsite. Package 3 will restore and repair necessary elements of Mina Al-Ahmadi.
Natural Gas
According to Oil and Gas Journal, in January 2010 Kuwait’s estimated natural gas reserves stood at nearly 63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Kuwait produces a relatively modest volume of dry natural gas, approximately 449 billion cf (Bcf) in 2008, the vast majority of which is "associated gas" (i.e., found and produced in conjunction with oil).
Production
Kuwait seeks to significantly increase its use of natural gas in electricity generation, water desalination, and petrochemicals to free up as much as 100,000 barrels per day of oil for export. Kuwait hopes to accomplish this through increased drilling for natural gas, and tying together gathering centers to create the infrastructure necessary to reduce associated gas flaring.
In 2005, an estimated 35 Tcf of non-associated gas was discovered in several fields near Sabriya and Umm Niga in northern Kuwait. In the summer of 2008, Kuwait began production of approximately 175 million cf per day, planned to rise to nearly 1 Bcf per day by 2015. The new production is not expected to offset Kuwait’s rising demand.
As with oil, negotiations continue between Kuwait and Iran regarding the disputed Dorra offshore natural gas field and any development requires resolution of demarcation issues. The Dorra field has been claimed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, and may contain up to 11 Tcf of recoverable natural gas reserves. It is not currently in production.
Consumption & Imports
In 2008, Kuwait consumed approximately 449 Bcf of natural gas. Although on an annual basis natural gas consumption matches production, in recent years, Kuwait’s electricity demand, the generation of which is fueled by natural gas, has outpaced natural gas production during the summer months, resulting in the shutdown of refinery and petrochemical operations to meet the increased demand in electricity.
To mitigate the demand shortage, in June 2009 Kuwait signed a deal with Shell to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), receiving the first cargo in August 2009. Kuwait took delivery of the LNG at the Persian Gulf’s first regasification terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi GasPort. Mina al-Ahmadi’s regasification capacity is approximately 10,300 tonnes of LNG per day (500 million cubic feet per day). In addition to the contract with Shell, Kuwait takes on spot cargoes as needed.
Kuwait and Qatar continue to explore options by which Qatar might supply Kuwait with LNG cargoes. Besides Qatar, Kuwait seeks to import natural gas from Iran, most likely from its huge South Pars gas field. Iran and Kuwait signed a preliminary memorandum of understanding for natural gas sales in March 2005, but commerce requires the resolution of maritime border issues in the region, specifically with regards to Dorra.
The Kuwaiti constitution forbids foreign ownership of Kuwait's mineral resources. The Kuwaiti Parliament passed the “Foreign Direct Investment Act” in 2001, aimed at promoting foreign investment in Kuwait’s oil and gas sectors, which facilitated some development in those sectors.
However, major projects such as Project Kuwait remain at a standstill due to disagreements between Parliament and the ruling Al-Sabah family.
Oil
According to Oil and Gas Journal, as of January 2010 Kuwait’s territorial boundaries contained an estimated 101.5 billion barrels (bbl) of proven oil reserves, roughly 8 percent of the world total.
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (a.k.a. Divided Zone, Neutral Zone), which Kuwait shares 50-50 with Saudi Arabia, holds an additional 5 billion bbl of reserves, bringing Kuwait's total oil reserves to 104 billion bbl.
Overview
The Supreme Petroleum Council oversees Kuwait’s oil sector and sets oil policy. The Kuwait Petroleum Council (KPC) manages domestic and foreign oil investments.
KOC, nationalized in 1979, is KPC’s upstream arm in Kuwait. The Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC), set up in 2002, oversees the bulk of Kuwait’s interests in the Neutral Zone. Most Kuwaiti crude oil is sold on term contracts, with the price of Kuwaiti crude oil tied to Saudi Arabian Medium (for western customers) and a monthly average of Dubai and Oman crudes (for Asian buyers).
Most of Kuwait's oil reserves are located south of Kuwait City. The 70-billion bbl Greater Burgan area, which comprises the Burgan, Magwa and Ahmadi fields, is widely considered the world's second largest oil field, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field. Producing oil since the 1950’s, Greater Burgan generally produces lighter crudes with API’s in the 28°-36° range, and has a production capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d. The South Magwa field (discovered in 1984) is estimated to hold at least 25 billion bbl of light crude.
Other fields surrounding the Greater Burgan area include Umm Gudair, Minagish, and Abdaliya. Umm Gudair and Minagish produce heavier crude oil, with gravities in the 22°-26° API range, and have a combined production capacity of 200,000 bbl per day. In January 2003, water injection began at Minagish to enhance oil recovery and offset natural declines in production.
Northern Kuwait holds the majority of Kuwait’s larger fields after Greater Burgan. Kuwait’s second largest field, Raudhatain, was discovered in 1955 by KOC, and has 9.55 billion bbl of proven and probable recoverable oil. Raudhatain has the capacity to produce 450,000 bbl of oil per day.
Partitioned Neutral Zone
The Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) was established in 1922 to settle a territorial dispute between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The PNZ encompasses a 6,200 square-mile area and contains an estimated 5 billion bbl of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. A Joint Operations Committee, with representatives from both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, manages the resources in the PNZ. Kuwait is represented by the Wafra Joint Operations Group, and Saudi Arabia is represented by Chevron. Oil production capacity in the PNZ is currently about 600,000 barrels per day, all of which is divided equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Onshore production in the PNZ centers on Wafra. On stream since 1954, Wafra is the largest of the PNZ’s onshore fields with approximately 3.4 billion in proven and probable reserves. Wafra has related production facilities and gathering centers with South Umm Gudair and South Fuwaris. Onshore production in the PNZ has a capacity of around 274,000 bbl/d.
The production capacity of offshore fields in the PNZ is 300,000 bbl/d, with almost 90 percent coming from Khafji. Offshore production is about four times as expensive in the PNZ as in the rest of Kuwait. Khafji, an extension of Saudi Arabia’s Safaniyah (the world’s largest offshore field), Hout, also an extension of Safaniyah, and Dorra, an extension of Iran’s Arash, are the largest fields. Dorra is not currently under production pending resolution of boundary demarcation negotiations between Kuwait and Iran.
Production & Consumption
In 2009, Kuwait’s total oil production approximated 2.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), including approximately 300,000 bbl/d production from the PNZ; 2008 total oil production was roughly 2.7 million bbl/d (PNZ production roughly the same). Of 2009 production, 2.3 million bbl/d was crude and approximately 200,000 bbl/d was non-crude liquids. Overall, around two-thirds of Kuwaiti oil production comes from the southeast of the country. Kuwait’s total oil consumption equaled roughly 350,000 bbl/d in 2008.
OPEC Crude Oil Production 2009
Most of Kuwait’s major producing fields are over sixty years old, and therefore field maturity is becoming a concern. In 2005, KOC, citing field exhaustion, lowered its production plateau estimates for the Greater Burgan area from 2 million bbl/d to 1.7 million bbl/d over a 20-30 year period. This issue places added significance on development of other Kuwaiti reserves going forward.
Developments
Kuwait plans to increase crude oil production capacity from its current 2.6 million bbl/d to 4 million bbl/d by 2020, largely via Project Kuwait (PK). Progress towards enacting PK, however, remains caught in the disagreement between Parliament and the ruling family on how best to proceed.
Kuwait's constitution - and longtime policy - bars foreign investment in the country's natural resources, except as provided for by law. In order to allow IOC involvement, "incentivized buy-back contract" (IBBC) arrangements, which do not involve production sharing, concessions, or the "booking" of reserves by foreign companies, have been created. The structure of the IBBC agreements allows the Kuwaiti government to retain full ownership of oil reserves, control over oil production levels, and strategic management of the ventures. Foreign firms are to be paid a "per barrel" fee, along with allowances for capital recovery and incentive fees for increasing reserves, in their role as service provider/contractor. In May 2007, the Kuwaiti ruling family conceded the responsibility to approve each related IBBC for Project Kuwait to Parliament.
PK aims to increase the country's oil production capacity from four northern oil fields – Raudhatain, Sabriya, Ratqa, and Abdali - to 3.5 million bbl/d by 2015, and then 4 million bbl/d by 2020 with the help of international oil companies (IOC). Heavy oil is a major component of Kuwait’s increased production capacity plans. Estimated heavy oil reserves of approximately 13 billion bbl are located primarily in the north of Kuwait.
KOC also plans to drill for oil in South East Kuwait and West Kuwait. In South East Kuwait, which holds the vast Burgan field, production is to increase by 200,000 b/d to a total of 1.7 million bbl/d; KOC hopes to maintain capacity in West Kuwait at 500,000 b/d.
Kuwait is expected to increase its crude oil production capacity by approximately 170,000 bbl/d in 2011 with Gathering Center (GC) 24 in the Sabriya oil field. Western Kuwait’s GC-16 is expected to add another 100,000 bbl/d in production capacity, but its startup date is uncertain.
Exports
Kuwait exports the majority of its crude and refined products to the Asia-Pacific region.
In 2008, Kuwait’s total exports of crude oil and refined products reached nearly 2.4 million bbl/d. The Asia-Pacific region received approximately 1.5 million bbl/d, the United States received approximately 210,000 bbl/d, and Western Europe received 180,000 bbl/d. Kuwait's single export blend ("Kuwait Export") has a specific gravity of 31.4°API (a typical medium Mideast crude), and is considered sour with 2.52 percent sulfur content.
Mina al-Ahmadi is the country's main port for the export of crude oil. Kuwait also has operational oil export terminals at Mina Abdullah, Shuaiba, and at Mina Saud. To handle increased production generated by Project Kuwait, a new terminal is planned for construction on Bubiyan Island.
Downstream
Kuwait's three domestic refineries have a combined capacity of roughly 936,000 bbl/d. The country's largest refinery is Mina al-Ahmadi, with capacity of 466,000 bbl/d, followed by Mina Abdullah (270,000 bbl/d) and Shuaiba (200,000 bbl/d).
Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI; a.k.a. “Q8”) manages KPC's refining and marketing operations internationally, with approximately 4,000 retail stations across Western Europe (Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Italy). KPI owns an 80,000 bbl/d refinery in Rotterdam, Netherlands and has a 50:50 joint venture with AGIP in the 240,000 bbl/d capacity refinery in Milazzo, Italy.
With the growth of downstream markets in Asia, Kuwait is interested in acquiring downstream assets in large emerging markets such as China. In China’s Guangdong Province, KPC is negotiating a partnership with China’s Sinopec and Dow Chemical Company. The plant will feature a 300,000 bbl/d capacity refinery and a 1 million tons per year ethylene steam cracker.
Clean Fuels Project
The Clean Fuels Project (CFP) is the umbrella under which Kuwait’s existing refineries will be upgraded. With a 2008 price tag of $18 billion, the CFP is split into three packages. In Package 1, Mina Abdullah’s distillation capacity will be increased to 420,000 bbl/d. Package 2 will consist of revamping Mina Abdullah’s utilities both on and offsite. Package 3 will restore and repair necessary elements of Mina Al-Ahmadi.
Natural Gas
According to Oil and Gas Journal, in January 2010 Kuwait’s estimated natural gas reserves stood at nearly 63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Kuwait produces a relatively modest volume of dry natural gas, approximately 449 billion cf (Bcf) in 2008, the vast majority of which is "associated gas" (i.e., found and produced in conjunction with oil).
Production
Kuwait seeks to significantly increase its use of natural gas in electricity generation, water desalination, and petrochemicals to free up as much as 100,000 barrels per day of oil for export. Kuwait hopes to accomplish this through increased drilling for natural gas, and tying together gathering centers to create the infrastructure necessary to reduce associated gas flaring.
In 2005, an estimated 35 Tcf of non-associated gas was discovered in several fields near Sabriya and Umm Niga in northern Kuwait. In the summer of 2008, Kuwait began production of approximately 175 million cf per day, planned to rise to nearly 1 Bcf per day by 2015. The new production is not expected to offset Kuwait’s rising demand.
As with oil, negotiations continue between Kuwait and Iran regarding the disputed Dorra offshore natural gas field and any development requires resolution of demarcation issues. The Dorra field has been claimed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, and may contain up to 11 Tcf of recoverable natural gas reserves. It is not currently in production.
Consumption & Imports
In 2008, Kuwait consumed approximately 449 Bcf of natural gas. Although on an annual basis natural gas consumption matches production, in recent years, Kuwait’s electricity demand, the generation of which is fueled by natural gas, has outpaced natural gas production during the summer months, resulting in the shutdown of refinery and petrochemical operations to meet the increased demand in electricity.
To mitigate the demand shortage, in June 2009 Kuwait signed a deal with Shell to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), receiving the first cargo in August 2009. Kuwait took delivery of the LNG at the Persian Gulf’s first regasification terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi GasPort. Mina al-Ahmadi’s regasification capacity is approximately 10,300 tonnes of LNG per day (500 million cubic feet per day). In addition to the contract with Shell, Kuwait takes on spot cargoes as needed.
Kuwait and Qatar continue to explore options by which Qatar might supply Kuwait with LNG cargoes. Besides Qatar, Kuwait seeks to import natural gas from Iran, most likely from its huge South Pars gas field. Iran and Kuwait signed a preliminary memorandum of understanding for natural gas sales in March 2005, but commerce requires the resolution of maritime border issues in the region, specifically with regards to Dorra.
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Tuesday, May 11, 2010 |
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Saudi King Orders Trials Over Jeddah Floods Disaster
Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz on Monday ordered the prosecution of a number of officials over their presumed responsibility for last November's floods disaster in the port city of Jeddah which left over 150 people killed, according to Middle East reports
"All the accused in this case are to be referred to the Control and Investigation Board and the Saudi Commission for investigation and prosecution," the monarch said in a royal decree carried by official SPA news agency, noted Yemen's SABA state agency.
The Saudi government was under criticism over its failure to deal with the Nov. 25 flash floods that engulfed the city in the heaviest rainfall the kingdom witnessed in years. Besides the 150- plus fatalities, the floods reportedly left at least 7,797 families homeless, 11,849 buildings damaged, and 10,913 vehicles destroyed.
In December, Saudi authorities arrested eight senior officials from the city mayor's office on charges of alleged corruption and malfeasance that might worsen the impact of the torrents.
At least 30 officials and developers were also arrested over accusations of involvement in construction on the flood routes, SABA reported, adding they also face charges of negligence and wasting public funds.
"All the accused in this case are to be referred to the Control and Investigation Board and the Saudi Commission for investigation and prosecution," the monarch said in a royal decree carried by official SPA news agency, noted Yemen's SABA state agency.
The Saudi government was under criticism over its failure to deal with the Nov. 25 flash floods that engulfed the city in the heaviest rainfall the kingdom witnessed in years. Besides the 150- plus fatalities, the floods reportedly left at least 7,797 families homeless, 11,849 buildings damaged, and 10,913 vehicles destroyed.
In December, Saudi authorities arrested eight senior officials from the city mayor's office on charges of alleged corruption and malfeasance that might worsen the impact of the torrents.
At least 30 officials and developers were also arrested over accusations of involvement in construction on the flood routes, SABA reported, adding they also face charges of negligence and wasting public funds.
Monday, May 10, 2010 |
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The Middle East Is Watching Iran's Nuclear Program
By Abbas Djavadi
(RFE/RL) -- Will Iran's uranium-enrichment work, which has provoked much alarm that Tehran could be seeking to build nuclear weapons, trigger a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East?
So far, the answer is no. Since 2005, more than a dozen countries in the region have announced new or renewed interest in building nuclear power plants for civilian use. But no serious voices in Cairo, Ankara, Riyadh, or other capitals have been urging the development of nuclear weapons as a way to counter the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Turkey, Egypt, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC comprises Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates) are among those considered desirous of civilian nuclear energy. Experts and politicians in these countries have argued that they need to diversify their sources of energy, in part to increase electricity production or run seawater desalination plants. Other countries lack either the technological and human infrastructure for such an undertaking or are too instable domestically to consider it.
But for many in the countries that are pushing toward nuclear technology, the quest has become a matter of national pride, a way of boosting the political prestige and influence of a country and its leadership. In the case of the GCC countries, their oil wealth bolsters the argument that what they are really after is political capital. In Egypt, the proposed nuclear project has become a major subject on the domestic political agenda of Gamal Mubarak, who reportedly seeks to succeed his father as president.
Turkey and other Middle Eastern states have urged Iran to cooperate openly and fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations. However, they oppose harsh sanctions against Tehran and view Iran's nuclear program in the context of the entire region.
Regional Approach
Israel is the only country in the region believed to possess nuclear weapons. It has refused to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has never confirmed or denied that it possesses such weapons.
However, when Middle Eastern leaders are asked about Iran's nuclear program, they often raise the topic of Israel's. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan often raises this matter and criticizes "the West's silence about it."
Egypt too, although much more suspicious of Tehran than Turkey is, rejects pressuring Iran while ignoring Israel's purported weapons. "Success in dealing with Iran will depend to a large extent on how successfully we deal with the establishment of a nuclear-free zone" in the Middle East, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Maged Abdelaziz was quoted as saying in the run-up to the NPT review conference in New York this week.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia takes a regional approach to nuclear issues and advocates a nuclear-free Middle East. But Riyadh is the most vehement opponent of Iran's nuclear program in the Middle East (after Israel) and feels more directly threatened by Tehran than any Arab state.
Claiming leadership of the Sunni-Arab world against Shi'ite Iran and engaged in regional competition with Iran in countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia cannot be expected to do nothing if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. According to unconfirmed Israeli intelligence reports, the Saudis might consider allowing Pakistani warheads to be stationed on their territory in response to an Iranian weapons test.
Iran The De-Stabilizer
But is it "good news" for Iran that other Middle Eastern countries have adopted this regional approach and link Iran's nuclear program with Israel's? Not necessarily, since these countries also realize that continued suspicions about Iran's nuclear program could lead to a devastating war with Israel (and, perhaps, the United States) with unforeseeable consequences for the entire region.
They also realize that an offensive nuclear program could increase Tehran's leverage throughout the Middle East and further destabilize some of the more vulnerable countries of the region, including countries where Iran is already deeply engaged through its support of organizations like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Lebanon's Hizballah.
However, if Iran fails to allay suspicions about its nuclear program, countries in the region -- particularly those around the Persian Gulf -- will likely step up efforts to bolster their own security. A nuclear-armed Iran might not provoke a proliferation cascade -- Israel's suspected acquisition of nuclear arms in the 1950s did not -- but it could prompt an uptick in spending on conventional arms and missile defenses.
So far, Iran's caginess about its nuclear program has not boosted its global or regional prestige or influence. The Tehran regime has acquired a reputation for intransigence and subterfuge rather than for transparency and cooperation. It is seen as a source of increased tension and conflict, rather than as a facilitator of dialogue and compromise.
And, of course, it is the people of Iran who are paying the highest price for Tehran's inability to find a productive place in the international order. That is why one of the most popular slogans of the mass opposition demonstrations in Iran over the last 10 months has been: "Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon -- my life is devoted to Iran."
Abbas Djavadi is an associate director of broadcasting at RFE/RL. The views expressed in this commentary, which is based on remarks presented at a conference of the German Marshall Fund and the Center for European Studies on May 5-6 in Brussels, are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
(RFE/RL) -- Will Iran's uranium-enrichment work, which has provoked much alarm that Tehran could be seeking to build nuclear weapons, trigger a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East?
So far, the answer is no. Since 2005, more than a dozen countries in the region have announced new or renewed interest in building nuclear power plants for civilian use. But no serious voices in Cairo, Ankara, Riyadh, or other capitals have been urging the development of nuclear weapons as a way to counter the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Turkey, Egypt, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC comprises Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates) are among those considered desirous of civilian nuclear energy. Experts and politicians in these countries have argued that they need to diversify their sources of energy, in part to increase electricity production or run seawater desalination plants. Other countries lack either the technological and human infrastructure for such an undertaking or are too instable domestically to consider it.
But for many in the countries that are pushing toward nuclear technology, the quest has become a matter of national pride, a way of boosting the political prestige and influence of a country and its leadership. In the case of the GCC countries, their oil wealth bolsters the argument that what they are really after is political capital. In Egypt, the proposed nuclear project has become a major subject on the domestic political agenda of Gamal Mubarak, who reportedly seeks to succeed his father as president.
Turkey and other Middle Eastern states have urged Iran to cooperate openly and fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations. However, they oppose harsh sanctions against Tehran and view Iran's nuclear program in the context of the entire region.
Regional Approach
Israel is the only country in the region believed to possess nuclear weapons. It has refused to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has never confirmed or denied that it possesses such weapons.
However, when Middle Eastern leaders are asked about Iran's nuclear program, they often raise the topic of Israel's. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan often raises this matter and criticizes "the West's silence about it."
Egypt too, although much more suspicious of Tehran than Turkey is, rejects pressuring Iran while ignoring Israel's purported weapons. "Success in dealing with Iran will depend to a large extent on how successfully we deal with the establishment of a nuclear-free zone" in the Middle East, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Maged Abdelaziz was quoted as saying in the run-up to the NPT review conference in New York this week.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia takes a regional approach to nuclear issues and advocates a nuclear-free Middle East. But Riyadh is the most vehement opponent of Iran's nuclear program in the Middle East (after Israel) and feels more directly threatened by Tehran than any Arab state.
Claiming leadership of the Sunni-Arab world against Shi'ite Iran and engaged in regional competition with Iran in countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia cannot be expected to do nothing if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. According to unconfirmed Israeli intelligence reports, the Saudis might consider allowing Pakistani warheads to be stationed on their territory in response to an Iranian weapons test.
Iran The De-Stabilizer
But is it "good news" for Iran that other Middle Eastern countries have adopted this regional approach and link Iran's nuclear program with Israel's? Not necessarily, since these countries also realize that continued suspicions about Iran's nuclear program could lead to a devastating war with Israel (and, perhaps, the United States) with unforeseeable consequences for the entire region.
They also realize that an offensive nuclear program could increase Tehran's leverage throughout the Middle East and further destabilize some of the more vulnerable countries of the region, including countries where Iran is already deeply engaged through its support of organizations like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Lebanon's Hizballah.
However, if Iran fails to allay suspicions about its nuclear program, countries in the region -- particularly those around the Persian Gulf -- will likely step up efforts to bolster their own security. A nuclear-armed Iran might not provoke a proliferation cascade -- Israel's suspected acquisition of nuclear arms in the 1950s did not -- but it could prompt an uptick in spending on conventional arms and missile defenses.
So far, Iran's caginess about its nuclear program has not boosted its global or regional prestige or influence. The Tehran regime has acquired a reputation for intransigence and subterfuge rather than for transparency and cooperation. It is seen as a source of increased tension and conflict, rather than as a facilitator of dialogue and compromise.
And, of course, it is the people of Iran who are paying the highest price for Tehran's inability to find a productive place in the international order. That is why one of the most popular slogans of the mass opposition demonstrations in Iran over the last 10 months has been: "Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon -- my life is devoted to Iran."
Abbas Djavadi is an associate director of broadcasting at RFE/RL. The views expressed in this commentary, which is based on remarks presented at a conference of the German Marshall Fund and the Center for European Studies on May 5-6 in Brussels, are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Saturday, May 08, 2010 |
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Saudi Aramco's Ju'aymah NGL Plant Now World's Largest
By Khalid Altowelli
At first glance, the Ju‘aymah NGL Fractionation Plant (JNGLF) near Ras Tanura looks like most of Saudi Aramco’s gas processing facilities, but in fact it is the largest fractionation plant in the world.
An expansion of JNGLF with a fourth fractionation module, built under the Hawiyah NGL program and commissioned in July 2009, brought the fractionation capacity of the plant up to 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd), which, according to independent industry sources, makes it the world’s largest.
With a fractionation capacity of up to 1.1 million barrels per day, the Ju‘aymah NGL Fractionation Plant is ranked as the world’s largest by independent sources. The plant got the ranking after it was expanded with a fourth fractionation unit as part of the Hawiyah NGL Project. The plant produces ethane, propane, butane and heavier gases.
Fractionation is the process by which important products for petrochemical industries are separated from natural gas and then prepared for shipment to a variety of users.
The plant was expanded to meet future increase in demand for ethane, propane, butane and heavier gases (C2+) feeds, which are used to produce raw materials for the plastics industry and for petrochemical feedstock derivatives.
An earlier expansion of capacity in 1999 added a third fractionation module to the original two 528-bpd-capacity modules, built in1978. That made JNGLF a crucial part of the petrochemical industry, the Kingdom and the world economy.
The feed for the JNGLF plant comes from upstream gas plants. JNGLF receives the ethane plus feed from the Shedgum Gas Plant, ‘Uthmaniyah Gas Plant, the Hawiyah NGL Plant and the Khursaniah Gas Plant.
Propane-plus is received from Abqaiq Plants and Berri Gas Plant. Also, JNGLF receives propane-plus feed from the newly commissioned Qatif and Abu Safah facilities and Khursaniyah Gas Plant.
Most of the propane produced from the fractionation modules is transported to Jubail customers. The rest is refrigerated and sent to four storage tanks, each with a capacity of 600,000 barrels. The propane is then pumped to the Sea Island for international export.
Similarly, most of the butane product is transported to Jubail customers, and the remaining refrigerated product is sent to three storage tanks, each with a capacity of 600,000 barrels. Pentane and natural gasoline products are sent to Jubail and to the Ras Tanura NGL Plants, while Hexane plus (C6+) is sent to Saudi Chevron Phillips Co. at Jubail.
JNGLF will continue to be a reliable supplier of feedstock to local and international customers. Ethane, propane, butane and natural gasoline allocations to domestic customers will increase in the coming few years. JNGLF is fully equipped to handle the expected increase. It still will supply the international market with refrigerated propane and butane.
JNGLF can export and import butane and natural gasoline to and from Ras Tanura and will be able to exchange propane with Ras Tanura, once an ongoing propane pipeline project is completed.
Source: Saudi Aramco
At first glance, the Ju‘aymah NGL Fractionation Plant (JNGLF) near Ras Tanura looks like most of Saudi Aramco’s gas processing facilities, but in fact it is the largest fractionation plant in the world.
An expansion of JNGLF with a fourth fractionation module, built under the Hawiyah NGL program and commissioned in July 2009, brought the fractionation capacity of the plant up to 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd), which, according to independent industry sources, makes it the world’s largest.
With a fractionation capacity of up to 1.1 million barrels per day, the Ju‘aymah NGL Fractionation Plant is ranked as the world’s largest by independent sources. The plant got the ranking after it was expanded with a fourth fractionation unit as part of the Hawiyah NGL Project. The plant produces ethane, propane, butane and heavier gases.
Fractionation is the process by which important products for petrochemical industries are separated from natural gas and then prepared for shipment to a variety of users.
The plant was expanded to meet future increase in demand for ethane, propane, butane and heavier gases (C2+) feeds, which are used to produce raw materials for the plastics industry and for petrochemical feedstock derivatives.
An earlier expansion of capacity in 1999 added a third fractionation module to the original two 528-bpd-capacity modules, built in1978. That made JNGLF a crucial part of the petrochemical industry, the Kingdom and the world economy.
The feed for the JNGLF plant comes from upstream gas plants. JNGLF receives the ethane plus feed from the Shedgum Gas Plant, ‘Uthmaniyah Gas Plant, the Hawiyah NGL Plant and the Khursaniah Gas Plant.
Propane-plus is received from Abqaiq Plants and Berri Gas Plant. Also, JNGLF receives propane-plus feed from the newly commissioned Qatif and Abu Safah facilities and Khursaniyah Gas Plant.
Most of the propane produced from the fractionation modules is transported to Jubail customers. The rest is refrigerated and sent to four storage tanks, each with a capacity of 600,000 barrels. The propane is then pumped to the Sea Island for international export.
Similarly, most of the butane product is transported to Jubail customers, and the remaining refrigerated product is sent to three storage tanks, each with a capacity of 600,000 barrels. Pentane and natural gasoline products are sent to Jubail and to the Ras Tanura NGL Plants, while Hexane plus (C6+) is sent to Saudi Chevron Phillips Co. at Jubail.
JNGLF will continue to be a reliable supplier of feedstock to local and international customers. Ethane, propane, butane and natural gasoline allocations to domestic customers will increase in the coming few years. JNGLF is fully equipped to handle the expected increase. It still will supply the international market with refrigerated propane and butane.
JNGLF can export and import butane and natural gasoline to and from Ras Tanura and will be able to exchange propane with Ras Tanura, once an ongoing propane pipeline project is completed.
Source: Saudi Aramco
Thursday, May 06, 2010 |
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Yemen Prevents Ethiopians Entering Into Saudi Arabia
Yemeni Security forces in Haradh border district of the Hajjah province thwarted an attempt by a group of Ethiopians to pass into Saudi Arabia territory, the Yemen Interior Ministry said on Tuesday, according to the state media news agency SABA.
The ministry said that counting today's operation, security authorities in Haradh area now "frustrated 15 attempts of African citizens to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia since the beginning of 2010," reported SABA.
SABA said that around 200 Africans from Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia have been captured in the operations, as well as 10 Yemenis who were involved in human traficking.
SABA noted that "Yemen is considered to be a gateway for Somalis to the Middle East. It recognizes all Somalis as refugees on a 'prima facie basis,' meaning they are automatically granted the right to stay. But many of those who cross the Gulf of Aden move on to Yemen's neighbors Saudi Arabia and Oman in pursuit of jobs."
The escalating numbers of refugees is placing an increasing strain on Yemen's limited resources.
The ministry said that counting today's operation, security authorities in Haradh area now "frustrated 15 attempts of African citizens to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia since the beginning of 2010," reported SABA.
SABA said that around 200 Africans from Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia have been captured in the operations, as well as 10 Yemenis who were involved in human traficking.
SABA noted that "Yemen is considered to be a gateway for Somalis to the Middle East. It recognizes all Somalis as refugees on a 'prima facie basis,' meaning they are automatically granted the right to stay. But many of those who cross the Gulf of Aden move on to Yemen's neighbors Saudi Arabia and Oman in pursuit of jobs."
The escalating numbers of refugees is placing an increasing strain on Yemen's limited resources.
Tuesday, May 04, 2010 |
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Saudi Arabia: Covering Riyadh Rain And Flood - Videos
By Amira Al Hussaini
Saudi Arabia's citizen media community pulled all the stops to cover torrential rains which struck Riyadh today.
A dedicated blog was set up in hours to aggregate content from Twitter and YouTube, featuring Twitter updates and videos uploaded on to video sharing site YouTube. The blog is entitled The Riyadh Rain Catastrophe.
This video by s123ssa shows flooded roads and cars manoeuvring their way through the floods, with onlookers cheering the brave drivers:
People wading through the ‘lakes' formed by the rain can also be seen.
Hamodhamad filmed the rain, and the floods it created here:
This video also shows cars making their way through the ‘rivers' as well as several stalled cars, which did not survive the experience. In one clip, a truck is speeding through the water, trying to overtake a Land Cruiser.
This video, by flv.2, shows drenched neighbourhoods:
For more videos, check out the blog above.
Saudi Jeans‘ Ahmed Al Omran has also uploaded several excellent videos showing the extensive damage and flooding caused by the storm.
Among them is this video, by sssuuuwww, which shows students rescued from a bus, which 'sunk':
Al Omran writes:
Amira Al Hussaini is a former news editor of an English language daily in Bahrain, journalist, columnist, blogger and educated and raised in Bahrain. This article was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
Saudi Arabia's citizen media community pulled all the stops to cover torrential rains which struck Riyadh today.
A dedicated blog was set up in hours to aggregate content from Twitter and YouTube, featuring Twitter updates and videos uploaded on to video sharing site YouTube. The blog is entitled The Riyadh Rain Catastrophe.
This video by s123ssa shows flooded roads and cars manoeuvring their way through the floods, with onlookers cheering the brave drivers:
People wading through the ‘lakes' formed by the rain can also be seen.
Hamodhamad filmed the rain, and the floods it created here:
This video also shows cars making their way through the ‘rivers' as well as several stalled cars, which did not survive the experience. In one clip, a truck is speeding through the water, trying to overtake a Land Cruiser.
This video, by flv.2, shows drenched neighbourhoods:
For more videos, check out the blog above.
Saudi Jeans‘ Ahmed Al Omran has also uploaded several excellent videos showing the extensive damage and flooding caused by the storm.
Among them is this video, by sssuuuwww, which shows students rescued from a bus, which 'sunk':
Al Omran writes:
It is raining heavily on the capital Riyadh at the moment, and the situation looks disastrous. From what I can see, it is a scary reminder of the Jeddah floods. People are stuck in highways and streets around the city, especially in the north and east. Major roads are blocked. At least one person is dead. The Civil Defense and the Ministry of Health have announced a state of emergency. You can follow the news on Twitter in real time using the hashtag #riyadhrain. You can also use RiyadRain.com, which aggregates content from Twitter. People in Riyadh are advised to stay home as heavy rains are expected to continue.
Amira Al Hussaini is a former news editor of an English language daily in Bahrain, journalist, columnist, blogger and educated and raised in Bahrain. This article was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
Monday, May 03, 2010 |
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GCC Sees Potential Despite Economic Downturn
Despite its challenges, the financial crisis has pushed the GCC to innovate and re-create an attractive investment environment on a regional and global level, according to a report by CPI Financial.
Dominic de Souza, Chairman of CPI Financial, said, "The global financial crisis has brought on many changes in the Middle East and some, surprisingly positive. Far from slowing down, the region has shown great innovation. With a vast number of opportunities in the region, this book will help readers understand them as well as their potential."
"Offering an intricate analysis and overview of regional markets, I believe this second edition of Investing in the GCC Markets, to be a vital guide for investors, government entities, decision- makers, and analysts eager to dive into the complexities of the regional market," said Robin AmlĂ´t, Managing Editor of CPI Financial.
In reference to the positive outcomes of the financial crisis, Albert Momdjian, Managing Director and Head of Middle East & Africa Investment Banking, and CALYON DIFC Branch Chief Executive Officer said, "One of the key benefits of the cooling off in the region has been reduced inflation, which for some countries has become negative in 2009. The fundamental drivers of growth are in place, and with governments investing in infrastructure projects, the medium-term view is that the GCC is robust enough to weather the current economic crisis.
"However, recent directives by certain GCC countries such as the UAE to reduce the minimum capital requirement have definitely opened up the market to new start-up businesses."
On the other hand, the various market flaws uncovered by the financial crisis and the potential investment opportunities are also thoroughly discussed; revealing ways of taking advantage of available resources within the GCC and maximizing global investment portfolios within the region.
According to a recent study by Hawkamah and the National Investor (TNI), only 2% out of listed companies in the GCC hold analyst meetings or conference calls, 91% of companies do not pre-announce results publication dates, and 19% of GCC companies do not have a website.
In terms of changing market trends, it is highly noted that Islamic finance has weathered the global crisis and is continuously growing. Due to its Shari'ah compliance, the features of Islamic financial systems encompass a thorough screening process, greater transparency and a need to understand the nature of the investment rather than just focusing on returns. Such features ensure a built in checks and balances system that creates a more stable financial institution, the report argues.
In reviewing Islamic finance, Salmaan Jaffery, Director, Islamic Financial Services Group, Advisory, Ernst & Young, said, "In light of the recent crisis, Islamic managers are capturing some of the conventional markets that has been put off by the range of toxic derivatives products that exacerbated the effects of the financial crisis. Practitioners and industry watchers have taken note of the increasing interest being experienced from conventional but 'ethical' investors who see the value proposition in Islamic products."
Dominic de Souza, Chairman of CPI Financial, said, "The global financial crisis has brought on many changes in the Middle East and some, surprisingly positive. Far from slowing down, the region has shown great innovation. With a vast number of opportunities in the region, this book will help readers understand them as well as their potential."
"Offering an intricate analysis and overview of regional markets, I believe this second edition of Investing in the GCC Markets, to be a vital guide for investors, government entities, decision- makers, and analysts eager to dive into the complexities of the regional market," said Robin AmlĂ´t, Managing Editor of CPI Financial.
In reference to the positive outcomes of the financial crisis, Albert Momdjian, Managing Director and Head of Middle East & Africa Investment Banking, and CALYON DIFC Branch Chief Executive Officer said, "One of the key benefits of the cooling off in the region has been reduced inflation, which for some countries has become negative in 2009. The fundamental drivers of growth are in place, and with governments investing in infrastructure projects, the medium-term view is that the GCC is robust enough to weather the current economic crisis.
"However, recent directives by certain GCC countries such as the UAE to reduce the minimum capital requirement have definitely opened up the market to new start-up businesses."
On the other hand, the various market flaws uncovered by the financial crisis and the potential investment opportunities are also thoroughly discussed; revealing ways of taking advantage of available resources within the GCC and maximizing global investment portfolios within the region.
According to a recent study by Hawkamah and the National Investor (TNI), only 2% out of listed companies in the GCC hold analyst meetings or conference calls, 91% of companies do not pre-announce results publication dates, and 19% of GCC companies do not have a website.
In terms of changing market trends, it is highly noted that Islamic finance has weathered the global crisis and is continuously growing. Due to its Shari'ah compliance, the features of Islamic financial systems encompass a thorough screening process, greater transparency and a need to understand the nature of the investment rather than just focusing on returns. Such features ensure a built in checks and balances system that creates a more stable financial institution, the report argues.
In reviewing Islamic finance, Salmaan Jaffery, Director, Islamic Financial Services Group, Advisory, Ernst & Young, said, "In light of the recent crisis, Islamic managers are capturing some of the conventional markets that has been put off by the range of toxic derivatives products that exacerbated the effects of the financial crisis. Practitioners and industry watchers have taken note of the increasing interest being experienced from conventional but 'ethical' investors who see the value proposition in Islamic products."
Thursday, April 29, 2010 |
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Executives Optimistic For GCC Region Economy, Investments
The fundamentals are in place for strong economic growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries through the remainder of this year and in 2011, according to a study released by Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP (Blakes), a Canadian-based international business law firm.
The study, undertaken for Blakes by Mergermarket, is based on interviews with more than 75 corporate executives from the GCC to gain their perspectives on the outlook for investment and trends in the region over the near term.
"Blakes has opened offices in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in association with Dr. Saud Al-Ammari Law Firm, so we are interested in getting the views of corporate executives in the region," said Brock Gibson, the Firm's Chair. "Thirty-one per cent of the surveyed executives expect growth in the GCC to come through continuing improvement in international economic conditions, while 23 per cent expect it to come as a result of stabilization of oil prices. At the same time, while the petroleum industry will remain a pillar of the GCC economies, the region is clearly moving toward less dependence on this still very vital industry. In fact, diversification is a recurring theme in the study."
Eighteen per cent of respondents believe the growth of non-oil industries will be the most important factor fueling economic growth, with 26 per cent identifying telecommunications and 30 per cent identifying either natural resources or transportation-based infrastructure as the sectors that will develop most quickly. These sectors are also said to offer the greatest opportunities for both domestic and foreign investors.
"Saudi Arabia and Qatar are consistently identified as the region's most active players for both foreign-investment activity and intra-regional activity, followed by the UAE, which will continue to be an important centre of economic activity," said Dr. Saud Al-Ammari, Blakes Managing Partner, Saudi Arabia and Gulf Region. "Forty-six per cent of the respondents expect joint ventures (JVs) to be the most common deal structure over the next year. However, a majority identified local ownership rights and legal/enforceability risks as important factors to foreign investors. With offices on the ground, this is certainly an area where Blakes can help."
China and India are identified not only as key markets for GCC-based investors, but also as the countries that will lead foreign-investment activity in the region over the next 12 months, exceeding both the United States and Western Europe.
M&A and private-equity transactions will continue to be affected by the global economic climate and the availability of liquidity, with the clear majority of the study respondents - about 70 per cent - expecting consolidation in the region to increase while 31 per cent expecting it to remain constant over the course of the year. The study also highlighted that most private-equity firms will be focused on restructurings and identifying new opportunities, while M&A will be largely dependent on attractive valuations of assets, with opportunities for distressed assets sales.
"There is definitely optimism about the prospects for this year. Moreover, significant growth and increased liquidity is expected in 2011," said Dan Fournier, Blakes Chair for the Gulf Region. "Most corporate executives believe that growth in the Islamic finance sector will continue, but there will be considerable demand for general conventional debt as well."
The study, undertaken for Blakes by Mergermarket, is based on interviews with more than 75 corporate executives from the GCC to gain their perspectives on the outlook for investment and trends in the region over the near term.
"Blakes has opened offices in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in association with Dr. Saud Al-Ammari Law Firm, so we are interested in getting the views of corporate executives in the region," said Brock Gibson, the Firm's Chair. "Thirty-one per cent of the surveyed executives expect growth in the GCC to come through continuing improvement in international economic conditions, while 23 per cent expect it to come as a result of stabilization of oil prices. At the same time, while the petroleum industry will remain a pillar of the GCC economies, the region is clearly moving toward less dependence on this still very vital industry. In fact, diversification is a recurring theme in the study."
Eighteen per cent of respondents believe the growth of non-oil industries will be the most important factor fueling economic growth, with 26 per cent identifying telecommunications and 30 per cent identifying either natural resources or transportation-based infrastructure as the sectors that will develop most quickly. These sectors are also said to offer the greatest opportunities for both domestic and foreign investors.
"Saudi Arabia and Qatar are consistently identified as the region's most active players for both foreign-investment activity and intra-regional activity, followed by the UAE, which will continue to be an important centre of economic activity," said Dr. Saud Al-Ammari, Blakes Managing Partner, Saudi Arabia and Gulf Region. "Forty-six per cent of the respondents expect joint ventures (JVs) to be the most common deal structure over the next year. However, a majority identified local ownership rights and legal/enforceability risks as important factors to foreign investors. With offices on the ground, this is certainly an area where Blakes can help."
China and India are identified not only as key markets for GCC-based investors, but also as the countries that will lead foreign-investment activity in the region over the next 12 months, exceeding both the United States and Western Europe.
M&A and private-equity transactions will continue to be affected by the global economic climate and the availability of liquidity, with the clear majority of the study respondents - about 70 per cent - expecting consolidation in the region to increase while 31 per cent expecting it to remain constant over the course of the year. The study also highlighted that most private-equity firms will be focused on restructurings and identifying new opportunities, while M&A will be largely dependent on attractive valuations of assets, with opportunities for distressed assets sales.
"There is definitely optimism about the prospects for this year. Moreover, significant growth and increased liquidity is expected in 2011," said Dan Fournier, Blakes Chair for the Gulf Region. "Most corporate executives believe that growth in the Islamic finance sector will continue, but there will be considerable demand for general conventional debt as well."
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Iraq's Oil Bid Rounds: Politics And Pitfalls
By Saifaldin D. Abdul-Rahman for MEI
The first rounds of bidding to develop Iraq’s oil fields were perceived to have been a failure because only the BP-led consortium accepted Iraq’s bid parameters. However, the second round - with seven groups of international oil companies (IOCs) eventually signing contracts to develop fields and two more deals from the first round signed - was a success. This represented a major breakthrough not only for Iraq (particularly because the terms negotiated are very favorable to the host government), but also for Iraqi Oil Minister Husayn Shahristani, who almost singlehandedly pushed the licensing round policy. Nevertheless, some potential problems lie ahead.
The Contracts
The major fields and the companies that will develop them are:
Potential Pitfalls
Discontent may spread among the residents of Iraq’s oil producing provinces, who are likely to feel cheated not only by the federal government but also by the IOCs. In fact, this scenario has already started to play out at Alahdab field, where local residents say that the Chinese have not hired anyone locally and have brought in their own workers.
The persistence or intensification of this discontent is problematic at two levels. At the micro level, the disgruntlement could lead to instability, as has occurred in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. At the macro level, the issues are more numerous and complex. At the top of the list is the absence of a legal framework for apportioning the revenues accrued from oil production. Impeding efforts to establish this framework are the competing concerns of Iraq’s three main ethnic/ sectarian groups: the Sunnis, who still feel that they have no stake in the new Iraq or its oil; the Shi‘a, who feel that they do not receive enough of the oil revenues; and the Kurds, who are wrangling with the central government over their rights to produce and sell oil. This contention over the hydrocarbons law and revenue sharing stems from the fact that there is not yet an agreed upon social contract binding the state together. Put differently, Iraqis have yet to agree on the most fundamental of state functions and where sovereignty lies. The stakes will only be higher as oil revenue begins to increase and as some regions and provinces begin to develop more rapidly than their neighbors. Whether they know it or not, many of the major oil companies are now at the center of this potential maelstrom.
The second major issue is what is likely to be a disparity between promises and results. Iraq has embarked upon one of the most ambitious oil development plans in history. Iraqi Oil Minister Husayn Shahristani has declared that Iraq’s production would reach six million barrels per day (bpd) within three years and over ten million bpd within seven years. Most analysts do not believe that these goals can be attained. However, setting such overly ambitious goals risks creating unrealistic expectations which, if unfulfilled, are apt to cause peoples’ confidence in the central government to erode. Some political groups (e.g., the Sadrists) might exploit the situation by fomenting unrest in order to undermine establishment politicians.
Setting unrealistically high oil production goals also unnecessarily antagonizes Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, adding a new dynamic to the already complex relationships between the three countries. Were Iraq to reach the six million bpd threshold, it would begin to challenge Saudi Arabia’s role as OPEC’s leading producer. Reaching that threshold also would complicate Iraq’s relationship with other OPEC members, which might seek to limit Iraqi production because of price concerns. Whether Iraq will accept such limitations, given the years of sanctions and lack of investment in the oil sector, is an open question.
Equally uncertain is the role that Iran might play should the situation in the Gulf deteriorate. For example, in the event of a military strike against Iran, the possibility of Iranian retaliation against Western oil interests (i.e., oil companies operating near its border) cannot be ruled out.
Finally, Iraq has yet to finalize all of the legal frameworks associated with signing the development contracts with the IOCs. Nor do its laws adequately address some of the questions raised in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. What if a new prime minister or Council of Representatives seeks to change or dissolve the contracts that have already been signed? This issue is particularly important now that the Sadrists have a significant bloc in the Council and historically have sought to undermine the Oil Minister and the contracts he promulgated, which they believed were not in Iraq’s best interests.
The Way Forward
While the aforementioned issues are numerous and complex, international oil companies can take steps at the local level (i.e., in Iraq’s southern provinces) and Iraq’s central government can adopt measures at the national level to address them.
The central government must initiate an education campaign highlighting the role of the IOCs in Iraq and the need for the technology and investment they bring in helping to develop Iraq’s fields. This must be coupled with a transparent policy that spells out precisely how much of the revenues will be returned directly to the producing provinces.
The IOCs can, and should, help Iraq reach this target, not by directly talking to Iraq’s government, but by lobbying their own governments to push Iraqi leaders and the United Nations to draft such a policy and widely disseminate it. Iraq’s constitution stipulates that provinces which previously had been unfairly deprived of resources could be compensated. Applied judiciously, this provision could be used to placate both the southern provinces and the Sunni provinces, which, since 2003, have been deprived.
In addition to a transparent policy on revenue distribution, the federal government should clearly outline an energy strategy for the country that includes the development of the energy sector and the surrounding infrastructure. This would help stimulate construction in the provinces where oil is being produced, which in turn could alleviate some of the popular discontent.
The oil companies have already done some things right in training Iraqi oil engineers on new technology outside Iraq. This needs to turn into a comprehensive program to develop a cadre of local technocrats who can be genuine partners for the IOCs in the years to come. Such a program would involve identifying talented students, offering them scholarships to study engineering and other fields needed for Iraq’s upstream and downstream oil development, and enabling them to gain hands-on experience with the IOCs themselves. The IOCs must ensure that they do not become benevolent foundations, which would only engender more problems. They should target projects and sectors that would aim both to quell discontent and to serve their interests where they operate.
While the situation in Iraq is fraught with many pitfalls and dangers, there is a huge potential to create model policies which, if developed and implemented effectively, could mitigate many of them. The Iraqi government and the major oil companies operating there would be well advised to look beyond the narrow view of oil development and think of this as a broad step towards better institutions and a more stable state.
Saifaldin D. Abdul-Rahman is Vice President of IWG a US / Iraqi firm providing consulting, logistics, and construction work in Iraq. He is also a partner in the Taj Al-Khairat Group for Investment. He has held senior posts in the Iraqi government, including as Advisor to the Vice President of Iraq (2009), Chief of Staff to the Speaker of Parliament (2005), and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Industry & Minerals (2004).
This article appeared in the The Middle East Institute's 4/26/2010 Viewpoints, "Special Edition: Iraq’s Petroleum Industry: Unsettled Issues" (PDF), pages 9-11, and is reprinted with permission.
The first rounds of bidding to develop Iraq’s oil fields were perceived to have been a failure because only the BP-led consortium accepted Iraq’s bid parameters. However, the second round - with seven groups of international oil companies (IOCs) eventually signing contracts to develop fields and two more deals from the first round signed - was a success. This represented a major breakthrough not only for Iraq (particularly because the terms negotiated are very favorable to the host government), but also for Iraqi Oil Minister Husayn Shahristani, who almost singlehandedly pushed the licensing round policy. Nevertheless, some potential problems lie ahead.
The Contracts
The major fields and the companies that will develop them are:
- Rumaila - BP / CNPC
- Qurnah 1 - ExxonMobil / Shell
- Zubair - ENI / Oxy / Kogas
- Majnoon - Shell / Petronas
- West Qurnah 2 - Lukoil / Statoil
Potential Pitfalls
Discontent may spread among the residents of Iraq’s oil producing provinces, who are likely to feel cheated not only by the federal government but also by the IOCs. In fact, this scenario has already started to play out at Alahdab field, where local residents say that the Chinese have not hired anyone locally and have brought in their own workers.
The persistence or intensification of this discontent is problematic at two levels. At the micro level, the disgruntlement could lead to instability, as has occurred in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. At the macro level, the issues are more numerous and complex. At the top of the list is the absence of a legal framework for apportioning the revenues accrued from oil production. Impeding efforts to establish this framework are the competing concerns of Iraq’s three main ethnic/ sectarian groups: the Sunnis, who still feel that they have no stake in the new Iraq or its oil; the Shi‘a, who feel that they do not receive enough of the oil revenues; and the Kurds, who are wrangling with the central government over their rights to produce and sell oil. This contention over the hydrocarbons law and revenue sharing stems from the fact that there is not yet an agreed upon social contract binding the state together. Put differently, Iraqis have yet to agree on the most fundamental of state functions and where sovereignty lies. The stakes will only be higher as oil revenue begins to increase and as some regions and provinces begin to develop more rapidly than their neighbors. Whether they know it or not, many of the major oil companies are now at the center of this potential maelstrom.
The second major issue is what is likely to be a disparity between promises and results. Iraq has embarked upon one of the most ambitious oil development plans in history. Iraqi Oil Minister Husayn Shahristani has declared that Iraq’s production would reach six million barrels per day (bpd) within three years and over ten million bpd within seven years. Most analysts do not believe that these goals can be attained. However, setting such overly ambitious goals risks creating unrealistic expectations which, if unfulfilled, are apt to cause peoples’ confidence in the central government to erode. Some political groups (e.g., the Sadrists) might exploit the situation by fomenting unrest in order to undermine establishment politicians.
Setting unrealistically high oil production goals also unnecessarily antagonizes Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, adding a new dynamic to the already complex relationships between the three countries. Were Iraq to reach the six million bpd threshold, it would begin to challenge Saudi Arabia’s role as OPEC’s leading producer. Reaching that threshold also would complicate Iraq’s relationship with other OPEC members, which might seek to limit Iraqi production because of price concerns. Whether Iraq will accept such limitations, given the years of sanctions and lack of investment in the oil sector, is an open question.
Equally uncertain is the role that Iran might play should the situation in the Gulf deteriorate. For example, in the event of a military strike against Iran, the possibility of Iranian retaliation against Western oil interests (i.e., oil companies operating near its border) cannot be ruled out.
Finally, Iraq has yet to finalize all of the legal frameworks associated with signing the development contracts with the IOCs. Nor do its laws adequately address some of the questions raised in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. What if a new prime minister or Council of Representatives seeks to change or dissolve the contracts that have already been signed? This issue is particularly important now that the Sadrists have a significant bloc in the Council and historically have sought to undermine the Oil Minister and the contracts he promulgated, which they believed were not in Iraq’s best interests.
The Way Forward
While the aforementioned issues are numerous and complex, international oil companies can take steps at the local level (i.e., in Iraq’s southern provinces) and Iraq’s central government can adopt measures at the national level to address them.
The central government must initiate an education campaign highlighting the role of the IOCs in Iraq and the need for the technology and investment they bring in helping to develop Iraq’s fields. This must be coupled with a transparent policy that spells out precisely how much of the revenues will be returned directly to the producing provinces.
The IOCs can, and should, help Iraq reach this target, not by directly talking to Iraq’s government, but by lobbying their own governments to push Iraqi leaders and the United Nations to draft such a policy and widely disseminate it. Iraq’s constitution stipulates that provinces which previously had been unfairly deprived of resources could be compensated. Applied judiciously, this provision could be used to placate both the southern provinces and the Sunni provinces, which, since 2003, have been deprived.
In addition to a transparent policy on revenue distribution, the federal government should clearly outline an energy strategy for the country that includes the development of the energy sector and the surrounding infrastructure. This would help stimulate construction in the provinces where oil is being produced, which in turn could alleviate some of the popular discontent.
The oil companies have already done some things right in training Iraqi oil engineers on new technology outside Iraq. This needs to turn into a comprehensive program to develop a cadre of local technocrats who can be genuine partners for the IOCs in the years to come. Such a program would involve identifying talented students, offering them scholarships to study engineering and other fields needed for Iraq’s upstream and downstream oil development, and enabling them to gain hands-on experience with the IOCs themselves. The IOCs must ensure that they do not become benevolent foundations, which would only engender more problems. They should target projects and sectors that would aim both to quell discontent and to serve their interests where they operate.
While the situation in Iraq is fraught with many pitfalls and dangers, there is a huge potential to create model policies which, if developed and implemented effectively, could mitigate many of them. The Iraqi government and the major oil companies operating there would be well advised to look beyond the narrow view of oil development and think of this as a broad step towards better institutions and a more stable state.
Saifaldin D. Abdul-Rahman is Vice President of IWG a US / Iraqi firm providing consulting, logistics, and construction work in Iraq. He is also a partner in the Taj Al-Khairat Group for Investment. He has held senior posts in the Iraqi government, including as Advisor to the Vice President of Iraq (2009), Chief of Staff to the Speaker of Parliament (2005), and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Industry & Minerals (2004).
This article appeared in the The Middle East Institute's 4/26/2010 Viewpoints, "Special Edition: Iraq’s Petroleum Industry: Unsettled Issues" (PDF), pages 9-11, and is reprinted with permission.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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Calls For Saudi Arabia To Free Forgotten Prisoners
Saudi prosecutors should immediately ensure that prison authorities set free all prisoners whose sentences have expired, Human Rights Watch said.
At least four Saudi, Yemeni, and Pakistani prisoners in al-Ha'ir prison, south of Riyadh, still remain in prison a month to three months after having completed their sentences, Human Rights Watch has learned. The men remain in prison even though a unit in the prosecutor's office is supposed to monitor prisons to make certain that everyone being held is detained legally.
"Saudi prosecutors are failing in their duty to make sure prisoners are being released as soon as their time is up," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. "The only ones who pay for Saudi authorities' failure to apply the law are those who languish in prison arbitrarily."
The Office for Prison Supervision and Execution of Sentences, part of the Interior Ministry's Bureau for Investigation and Public Prosecutions, is supposed to monitor the detention sites. Article 3(f) of the 1989 Law of Interrogation Authority and Public Prosecution obliges the officials to "listen[...] to the complaints of prisoners and detainees, and verify[...] the legality of their imprisonment or detention, the legality of their remaining [detained after] the termination of their sentences, and taking the necessary actions to release whomsoever [is] imprisoned or detained without a legitimate reason."
Current and former prisoners in more than 10 Saudi prisons have told Human Rights Watch that prosecutors rarely visit prisons. In one wing of al-Ha'ir prison, inmates said they had not seen an official from the monitoring division in over four years. Inmates there said that about 10 of the 100 inmates in that wing remained there even though they had completed their sentences.
A Saudi man in that wing of al-Ha'ir prison said his sentence had expired on March 7, 2010, but that the prison authorities had not informed him of his release date or taken any other steps toward releasing him.
A Yemeni man said his sentence expired on January 29 and that the Yemeni embassy had issued him a permit to cross the Saudi-Yemeni border to be deported. He said that there were no outstanding investigations, charges, or claims against him. Another Yemeni said his sentence expired on March 1, and that he also had a Yemeni embassy border crossing permit to be deported and that no procedures were pending against him.
A Pakistani man said his sentence expired on February 7 and that the Pakistani embassy had prepared the papers for his deportation, but that he remained forgotten in the prison. He added that that his sentence included a fine of several thousand Riyals, but that he had benefited from an amnesty in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan under which the state settled the amount he owed.
In a 2008 study of the Saudi criminal justice system, Precarious Justice: Arbitrary Detention and Unfair Trials in the Deficient Criminal Justice System of Saudi Arabia, Human Rights Watch detailed ten cases of prisoners detained beyond the expiration of their sentences, including in al-Ha'ir prison.
The report found that in addition to negligence, other reasons why prisoners sometimes were held beyond the end of their sentences were outstanding civil claims, unsettled debts, unresponsiveness by embassies to deportation orders against their imprisoned nationals, and unadministered lashes as part of the sentence. These factors are not valid reasons for keeping prisoners detained when their prison sentences expires, though. International law, apart from prohibiting arbitrary detention, specifically bans detention on the grounds of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation. Furthermore, as far as Human Rigths Watch was able to determine, none of those factors applied to the four prisoners cited.
Judges in Saudi Arabia only rarely give convicted persons copies of the court verdict. Each of the four prisoners whose sentences had ended told Human Rights Watch that the judge in their case did not give them a written verdict, but informed them orally of its content. As a result, none of the four have anything on paper to prove their release date to prison authorities. In November 2006 the director of al-Ha'ir prison told a visiting delegation from Human Rights Watch that the prison administration keeps these files for each prisoner and has the authority to release prisoners on the date the sentence ends without requiring further authority.
At least four Saudi, Yemeni, and Pakistani prisoners in al-Ha'ir prison, south of Riyadh, still remain in prison a month to three months after having completed their sentences, Human Rights Watch has learned. The men remain in prison even though a unit in the prosecutor's office is supposed to monitor prisons to make certain that everyone being held is detained legally.
"Saudi prosecutors are failing in their duty to make sure prisoners are being released as soon as their time is up," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. "The only ones who pay for Saudi authorities' failure to apply the law are those who languish in prison arbitrarily."
The Office for Prison Supervision and Execution of Sentences, part of the Interior Ministry's Bureau for Investigation and Public Prosecutions, is supposed to monitor the detention sites. Article 3(f) of the 1989 Law of Interrogation Authority and Public Prosecution obliges the officials to "listen[...] to the complaints of prisoners and detainees, and verify[...] the legality of their imprisonment or detention, the legality of their remaining [detained after] the termination of their sentences, and taking the necessary actions to release whomsoever [is] imprisoned or detained without a legitimate reason."
Current and former prisoners in more than 10 Saudi prisons have told Human Rights Watch that prosecutors rarely visit prisons. In one wing of al-Ha'ir prison, inmates said they had not seen an official from the monitoring division in over four years. Inmates there said that about 10 of the 100 inmates in that wing remained there even though they had completed their sentences.
A Saudi man in that wing of al-Ha'ir prison said his sentence had expired on March 7, 2010, but that the prison authorities had not informed him of his release date or taken any other steps toward releasing him.
A Yemeni man said his sentence expired on January 29 and that the Yemeni embassy had issued him a permit to cross the Saudi-Yemeni border to be deported. He said that there were no outstanding investigations, charges, or claims against him. Another Yemeni said his sentence expired on March 1, and that he also had a Yemeni embassy border crossing permit to be deported and that no procedures were pending against him.
A Pakistani man said his sentence expired on February 7 and that the Pakistani embassy had prepared the papers for his deportation, but that he remained forgotten in the prison. He added that that his sentence included a fine of several thousand Riyals, but that he had benefited from an amnesty in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan under which the state settled the amount he owed.
In a 2008 study of the Saudi criminal justice system, Precarious Justice: Arbitrary Detention and Unfair Trials in the Deficient Criminal Justice System of Saudi Arabia, Human Rights Watch detailed ten cases of prisoners detained beyond the expiration of their sentences, including in al-Ha'ir prison.
The report found that in addition to negligence, other reasons why prisoners sometimes were held beyond the end of their sentences were outstanding civil claims, unsettled debts, unresponsiveness by embassies to deportation orders against their imprisoned nationals, and unadministered lashes as part of the sentence. These factors are not valid reasons for keeping prisoners detained when their prison sentences expires, though. International law, apart from prohibiting arbitrary detention, specifically bans detention on the grounds of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation. Furthermore, as far as Human Rigths Watch was able to determine, none of those factors applied to the four prisoners cited.
Judges in Saudi Arabia only rarely give convicted persons copies of the court verdict. Each of the four prisoners whose sentences had ended told Human Rights Watch that the judge in their case did not give them a written verdict, but informed them orally of its content. As a result, none of the four have anything on paper to prove their release date to prison authorities. In November 2006 the director of al-Ha'ir prison told a visiting delegation from Human Rights Watch that the prison administration keeps these files for each prisoner and has the authority to release prisoners on the date the sentence ends without requiring further authority.
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Saudi Arabia Announces To Build 'Nuclear And Renewable Energy City'
Saudi Arabia announced on Saturday the establishment of the King Abdullah Nuclear and Renewable Energy City in Riyadh and said it would use the atomic energy for peaceful purposes, especially in industry, agriculture, mining, desalination and medical field, reported Arab News.
The operation is part of the country's efforts to meet the Kingdom’s growing requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources, according to Arab News, which noted that electricity power demand in Saudi Arabia grew by eight percent last year and is expected to grow more than 60,000 megawatt by 2020.
Arab News said the royal decree said nuclear and renewable energies would ensure continued supplies of drinking water and electricity to its growing population and save hydrocarbon resources such as petroleum and gas for use by future generations, thus making them a source of income for a longer period.
“The peaceful use of nuclear energy will enable the state to meet the requirements of society through proper planning,” an official statement said. It said the new city would serve as a scientific and specialized authority to draft and implement national policies relating to nuclear and renewable energy, and revise related regulations. The city was established on the recommendation of a ministerial committee chaired by Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, reported Arab News.
The operation is part of the country's efforts to meet the Kingdom’s growing requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources, according to Arab News, which noted that electricity power demand in Saudi Arabia grew by eight percent last year and is expected to grow more than 60,000 megawatt by 2020.
Arab News said the royal decree said nuclear and renewable energies would ensure continued supplies of drinking water and electricity to its growing population and save hydrocarbon resources such as petroleum and gas for use by future generations, thus making them a source of income for a longer period.
“The peaceful use of nuclear energy will enable the state to meet the requirements of society through proper planning,” an official statement said. It said the new city would serve as a scientific and specialized authority to draft and implement national policies relating to nuclear and renewable energy, and revise related regulations. The city was established on the recommendation of a ministerial committee chaired by Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, reported Arab News.
Monday, April 19, 2010 |
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France Denies Visa To Ex-Bin Laden Bodyguard
French authorities have denied the former bodyguard of Osama Bin Laden Nasser Al-Bahri an entry visa, reports Middle East media.
A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Bernard Valiro said in a press conference on Friday that it was not suitable for Al-Bahri to enter France, according to the Yemeni state media agency SABA.
The Saudi-born Al-Bahri joined Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1996 but he left the organization in 2000 after he was arrested in Yemen following the bombing of the US Cole destroyer, reported SABA.
Al-Bahri's had planned to travel to France to publicize a book on Bin Laden titled, Under The Shadow Of Bin Laden.
A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Bernard Valiro said in a press conference on Friday that it was not suitable for Al-Bahri to enter France, according to the Yemeni state media agency SABA.
The Saudi-born Al-Bahri joined Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1996 but he left the organization in 2000 after he was arrested in Yemen following the bombing of the US Cole destroyer, reported SABA.
Al-Bahri's had planned to travel to France to publicize a book on Bin Laden titled, Under The Shadow Of Bin Laden.
Saturday, April 17, 2010 |
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