GAO: White House Erred On Intelligence Oversight

By Steven Aftergood

The Obama Administration presented "several misstatements of law and fact" in its March 15 letter opposing legislation to enhance the role of the Government Accountability Office in intelligence oversight, the head of the GAO said in a letter to congressional intelligence committees yesterday.

The GAO letter (pdf) said that neither the Senate nor the House version of the FY2010 intelligence authorization act would fundamentally alter the status quo with respect to the GAO, as the White House letter had indicated, but would simply bolster the oversight authority that the GAO already has, enabling it to overcome the obstacles placed in its way by the executive branch.

"The proposed legislative provisions in essence reaffirm GAO's existing authority in order to address the lack of cooperation GAO has received from certain elements of the IC [intelligence community] in carrying out work at the specific request of the intelligence committees, and other committees of jurisdiction as defined by the rules of the Senate and House," wrote Acting Comptroller General Gene L. Dodaro in a March 18 letter obtained by Secrecy News.

"GAO acknowledges and does not seek to displace the special relationship between the congressional intelligence committees and the IC," he wrote.

"However, GAO does not agree with the Administration's view, originating in a 1988 opinion of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, that the creation of the congressional intelligence oversight structure implicitly exempted reviews of intelligence activities from the scope of GAO's existing audit authority."

The executive branch's interpretation of the law "has resulted in GAO frequently being unable to obtain the access or cooperation necessary to provide useful information to Congress on matters involving the IC," Mr. Dodaro wrote.

"Even where the matters under evaluation are well outside the scope of traditional intelligence activities... GAO has encountered resistance."

"While intelligence oversight poses unique challenges, GAO can play an important role in such oversight, and that role is well within our authority and capability," he wrote.

GAO has no independent stake in intelligence oversight and has plenty of other work to do anyway.  The question is whether Congress wants to take advantage of the investigative and analytical resources that GAO has to offer in order to improve intelligence oversight.  If it does, then the pending legislation would help to clear away the barriers imposed by the executive branch.

"Should either the Senate or House version of the GAO provision at issue become law," Mr. Dodaro wrote, "I believe that the reaffirmation of GAO's authorities would help better position GAO to do the type of work that has been requested of us in the past and to respond to the interests of Congress in this realm in the future."


OSC VIEWS CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF MILITARY

Cuban President Raul Castro "more commonly presents himself as a civilian rather than military leader," observes a new assessment from the DNI Open Source Center.  More generally, "Current [Cuban] senior military officers maintain a largely ceremonial presence in state media, where the military receives limited but overwhelmingly favorable coverage."

The OSC report has not been approved for public release, but a copy was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Cuba -- Military's Profile in State Media Limited, Positive" (pdf), Open Source Center, February 26, 2010.

Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Friday, March 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Admin Threatens Veto Over GAO Role In Intel Oversight

By Steven Aftergood

One of the simplest, most effective ways to strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence would be for Congress to make increased use of specially cleared investigators from the Government Accountability Office.  This is such a straightforward step towards improving oversight that it was even championed by CIA Director Leon Panetta when he was a Congressman.

But the Obama Administration told Congress on Monday that new language to reinforce the GAO's role in intelligence oversight was among several provisions in the pending FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act that were objectionable to the White House and that might prompt a presidential veto of the bill.

"Three categories of provisions are so serious that the President's senior advisers would recommend that the veto the bill if they are included in a bill presented for his signature," wrote Peter Orszag of the White House Office of Management and Budget in a March 15 letter (pdf).  He cited a requirement to increase congressional notification of covert actions beyond the "Gang of 8"; the proposed GAO language; and a proposed reduction in the budget authorization for the Office of the DNI.  The letter also expressed lesser opposition to numerous other provisions.

The dispute over an increased role for GAO in intelligence oversight is particularly illustrative of the disparate and conflicting interests of the legislative and executive branches.  Should Congress use all the tools at its disposal to improve its oversight of intelligence?  Or is the status quo good enough?  The White House letter implied that the current arrangement is already optimal and that any revision would be destabilizing.

"By allowing GAO to conduct intelligence oversight, these provisions would fundamentally change the statutory framework for oversight of the IC [intelligence community] through the intelligence oversight committees and alter the long-standing relationship and information flow between the IC and intelligence committee members and staff," Mr. Orszag wrote.

If one believed that the long-standing relationship between the IC and the intelligence committee members and staff was altogether satisfactory, this might be a compelling argument.  But if one concluded that the existing structure has been woefully inadequate, then other options would merit consideration.

Sen. Daniel Akaka (D-HI), Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) and others have repeatedly argued that the GAO could usefully supplement the intelligence oversight process without detracting anything.  "It is Congress's responsibility to ensure that the IC carries out its critical functions effectively and consistent with congressional authorization. For too long, GAO's expertise and ability to engage in constructive oversight of the IC have been underutilized," Sen. Akaka said last year.

In 2008, Sen. Akaka chaired a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee hearing (at which I testified [pdf]) on the feasibility and utility of GAO intelligence oversight.  "Congress must redouble its efforts--that is what we are trying to do--to ensure that U.S. intelligence activities are conducted efficiently, effectively, and with due respect for the civil rights and civil liberties of Americans, and I will work to see that it does," Sen. Akaka said then.

Amazingly, an earlier version of the proposal for an expanded GAO role in intelligence oversight was introduced in 1987 by then-Rep. Leon Panetta, who is now the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

According to Rep. Panetta's proposed "CIA Accountability Act of 1987" (H.R. 3603 in the 100th Congress), "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Comptroller General [who directs the GAO] shall audit the financial transactions and shall evaluate the programs and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency" either at his own initiative or at the request of the congressional intelligence committees.

Today, DCIA Panetta is presumably among those senior advisers who would advise a veto of the proposal he once advocated.

At the January 22, 2009 confirmation hearing (pdf) of Adm. Dennis C. Blair to be Director of National Intelligence, Adm. Blair also acknowledged a role for GAO in intelligence oversight.

Sen. Ron Wyden asked him: "If the GAO is conducting a study at the direction of one of the intelligence committees using properly cleared staff, will you give them the access they need to do their work?"

Adm. Blair replied: "Senator, I’m aware that the direction of GAO studies and the terms of them are generally subject to talk between the two branches of government for a variety of reasons, and subject to having those discussions, ultimately I believe the GAO has a job to do and I will help them do that job."

But the Obama Administration now says it will not help the GAO do their job if that means an enhancement of their legal authority to do it.

Arguably, the Administration is acting rationally in attempting to minimize independent oversight of its intelligence activities.  Who would voluntarily seek out an independent auditor to look over his shoulder?  But that leaves it up to Congress to pursue its own institutional self-interest with equal or greater determination, and to take maximum advantage of the intelligence oversight tools that it has available, including appropriate use of the GAO.

"We've already agreed to drop a significant number of the provisions identified as concerns [in the Orszag letter]," a congressional official told Secrecy News.  He declined to say whether the GAO oversight language was among the now-abandoned provisions.


VARIOUS RESOURCES

A government website (USAspending.gov) that is intended to provide transparency on government contracts and awards currently presents incomplete, inconsistent and sometimes invalid data, the Government Accountability Office said last week.  See "Electronic Government: Implementation of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006" (pdf), GAO-10-365, March 2010.

"Improving Transparency and Accessibility of Federal Contracting Databases" (pdf) was the subject of a September 29, 2009 hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (published last month).

"Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations" was discussed at a March 2009 hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee (also published last month).

"Widespread violent crimes in the United States posed threats to the lives, properties and personal security of its people," the Chinese government declared in a new report on the "Human Rights Record of the United States in 2009." The Chinese government report, a compilation of sad facts, dubious assumptions and assorted exaggerations, was published on March 12 as a rejoinder and a rebuke to the U.S. State Department which published its latest Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on March 11.  "The [U.S.] reports are full of accusations of the human rights situation in more than 190 countries and regions including China, but turn a blind eye to, or dodge and even cover up rampant human rights abuses on its own territory," the new Chinese report said.

Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Wednesday, March 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

DOD Report Forecasts Future Military Environment

By Steven Aftergood

The U.S. Joint Forces Command has updated its assessment of emerging geopolitical and technological trends and estimated their potential impact on future military operations in the new Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 report (pdf).

"We will find ourselves caught off guard by changes in the political, economic, technological, strategic, and operational environments," the report states. "We will find ourselves surprised by the creativity and capability of our adversaries. Our goal is not to eliminate surprise – that is impossible. Our goal is, by a careful consideration of the future, to suggest the attributes of a joint force capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes."

The JOE 2010 report is not overly sophisticated.  It is full of clumsily formulated truisms.  ("Modern wars are fought in more than simply the physical elements of the battlefield.")  It recycles tired maxims from Sun Tzu.  It misspells Hitler's first name.

But it also presents a number of stimulating assertions and provocative observations.  For example:

Growing financial deficits "will likely mean far fewer dollars available to spend on defense... Indeed, the Department of Defense may shrink to less than ten percent of the total Federal budget.... If the U.S. enters a financial regime in which defense is to be cut by a third or more, Joint Force planners must carefully explore new areas of risk as force posture and procurement budgets shrink."

"Future Joint Force commanders will find conflict over water endemic to their world, whether as the spark or the underlying cause of conflicts among various racial, tribal, or political groups, ...with armed groups controlling or warring over remaining water, while the specter of disease resulting from unsanitary conditions would hover in the background."

"The challenges that Chinese leadership confronts at present are enormous, and an unsuccessful China is perhaps more worrisome than a prosperous one. China is confronting major internal problems that could have an impact on its strategic course. The country will face increasing demographic pressures as its population ages. Due to its 'one child' policy, China may grow old before it grows rich. Furthermore, a cultural preference for male heirs will create a surplus male population nearing 30 million by 2020."

"The open and free flow of information favored by the West will allow adversaries an unprecedented ability to gather intelligence. Other nations without the legal and cultural restraints found in the U.S. may excel at capturing, assessing, or even manipulating this information for military purposes as an aid to waging the 'Battle of Narratives.' Indeed, adversaries have already taken advantage of computer networks and the power of information technology not only to plan and execute savage acts of terrorism, but also to influence directly the perceptions and will of the U.S. Government and the American population."

"It is by no means certain that the United States and its allies will maintain their overall lead in technological development over the next 25 years. America’s secondary educational system is declining in a relative sense when compared to leading technological competitors, e.g., India and China."

The previous edition (pdf) of the JOE report in 2008 generated unwanted controversy when it explicitly identified North Korea and Israel as nuclear weapons states, and warned of a threat to the stability of Mexico from criminal gangs and drug cartels.  Regrettably, perhaps, most of those rough edges have been smoothed out in the latest report.


MOLETRONICS, INSONIFICATION, AND MORE FROM JASON

Nearly two dozen reports from the JASON defense advisory panel have just been added to the archive of JASON reports on the Federation of American Scientists website.

New additions (all pdf) include a 2004 report on "DNA Barcodes and Watermarks," a 2001 report on "Moletronics" or molecular electronics, and a 1998 report on "Insonification for Area Denial" (where "insonification" means the projection of focused sound waves).  Scanned copies of older JASON reports have been OCR'd to render them word searchable.

A partial, chronological list of unclassified JASON titles from 1963 to 2009 (pdf) was prepared by Allen Thomson, who also helped gather the latest additions to the online collection.

The JASON panel is regularly tasked to investigate challenging, complex issues that are on the horizon if not the forefront of defense science.  But many of the panel's reports are sufficiently well written that they are at least partially intelligible to non-specialists.  No new JASON reports have been approved for public releases since October 2009.

Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Tuesday, March 16, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Pentagon Study Critiques 2003 Transition In Iraq

By Steven Aftergood

The transition of U.S. military forces in Iraq to post-major combat operations in 2003 was marred by failures in leadership and planning, according to an internal report (pdf) prepared for the Pentagon that was partially declassified and released this month under the Freedom of Information Act.

"The transition that occurred was not the one that was planned," the 2006 report delicately stated.

"Insufficient and untimely availability of resources impeded effectiveness of post-combat operations and contributed to a difficult transition."  Intelligence support, joint command and control, and communications infrastructure all "fell short of expectations or needs."

See "Transitions in Iraq: Changing Environment, Changing Organizations, Changing Leadership," Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 21 July 2006.

The newly disclosed report was cited in a 2008 book by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.  According to Gen. Sanchez's account, the report had been suppressed at the direction of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who did not welcome its critical findings.

In 2008, U.S. Joint Forces Command told TPM Muckraker that the report had been completed but was classified and not publicly available.  ("Pentagon Report on Iraq Debacle 'Remains Classified'" by Paul Kiel, May 6, 2008). Now portions of it have been released.

Another newly declassified report found no corroboration of allegations that the DoD Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) had withheld information from the 9/11 Commission.  The DoD Inspector General said there was no basis for such a claim.  But the 2008 IG report, formerly classified Secret, provides some new details on the operation of the JFIC.  See "Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11" (pdf), September 23, 2008.


NAVY INTEL OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING UNCLASSIFIED INFO

The U.S. Navy has released some new guidance pertaining to intelligence programs, including the following items (both pdf).

"Oversight of the Department of the Navy Military Intelligence Program," SECNAV Instruction 5000.38A, February 5, 2010.

"Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment for Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command Forces," OPNAV Instruction 3501.382, March 1, 2010.

The Department of Defense has invited comment on a proposal to modify and enhance controls on unclassified DoD information held in industry in order to protect such information from unauthorized access and disclosure.  The proposed changes may be altered at a later date, the DoD notice states, in response to ongoing development of a government-wide policy on "controlled unclassified information."  See the March 3 DoD Federal Register notice here.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration issued its own proposed rule on the handling of "restricted information" in a March 4 Federal Register notice.


BOOK:  A GENIUS FOR DECEPTION

One of the few unclassified discussions of official U.S. policy on the use of "cover stories" to conceal classified activities and operations advised that "Cover stories must be believable."  (1992 draft SAP Supplement [pdf], at p. 3-1-5).

But such pedestrian guidance would not have been needed by British military and intelligence officials during the past century because they had an almost instinctive gift for concealment and misdirection, writes Nicholas Rankin in "A Genius for Deception: How Cunning Helped the British Win Two World Wars" (Oxford University Press, 2009).

From the emergence of camouflage (a word that entered the English language in 1917) to the development of modern propaganda to the strategic deceptions of World War II, the author treats familiar figures such as T.E. Lawrence and John Buchan (author of The 39 Steps) and many unfamiliar ones.

"A Genius for Deception" is surprisingly colorful, with an endless stream of strange, offbeat and sometimes appalling anecdotes that the author has culled from his extensive reading and research.

He quotes an enterprising British intelligence officer in World War I who discovered that the German officers' latrines in an East Africa camp "were a good source of soiled documents and letters, yielding 'filthy, though accurate information'."

In a personal epilogue, Rankin observes that the calculated deception of an enemy is ethically distinct from and not to be confused with propaganda directed at one's own people.

Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Tuesday, March 09, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative - Summary

As reported by Steven Aftergood, who writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists, the White House released Tuesday a newly declassified description of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), a highly classified program that is intended to protect U.S. government computer networks against intrusion and disruption.

Despite various appeals, the foundational directive has not been disclosed. Instead, the White House released a descriptive summary (and below) of 12 component elements of the Cybersecurity Initiative, a gesture that it said was consistent with the President's emphasis on increased transparency.

*****

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative

President Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter. Shortly after taking office, the President therefore ordered a thorough review of federal efforts to defend the U.S. information and communications infrastructure and the development of a comprehensive approach to securing America’s digital infrastructure.

In May 2009, the President accepted the recommendations of the resulting Cyberspace Policy Review, including the selection of an Executive Branch Cybersecurity Coordinator who will have regular access to the President. The Executive Branch was also directed to work closely with all key players in U.S. cybersecurity, including state and local governments and the private sector, to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents; strengthen public/private partnerships to find technology solutions that ensure U.S. security and prosperity; invest in the cutting-edge research and development necessary for the innovation and discovery to meet the digital challenges of our time; and begin a campaign to promote cybersecurity awareness and digital literacy from our boardrooms to our classrooms and begin to build the digital workforce of the 21st century. Finally, the President directed that these activities be conducted in a way that is consistent with ensuring the privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution and cherished by all Americans.

The activities under way to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review build
on the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/ HSPD-23) in January 2008. President Obama determined that the CNCI and its associated activities should evolve to become key elements of a broader, updated national U.S. cybersecurity strategy. These CNCI initiatives will play a key role in supporting the achievement of many of the key recommendations of President Obama’s Cyberspace Policy Review.

The CNCI consists of a number of mutually reinforcing initiatives with the following major goals designed to help secure the United States in cyberspace:

  • To establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Government—and ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector partners—and the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.
  • To defend against the full spectrum of threats by enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key information technologies.
  • To strengthen the future cybersecurity environment by expanding cyber education; coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts across the Federal Government; and working to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity in cyberspace.

In building the plans for the CNCI, it was quickly realized that these goals could not be achieved without also strengthening certain key strategic foundational capabilities within the Government. Therefore, the CNCI includes funding within the federal law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities to enhance such key functions as criminal investigation; intelligence collection, processing, and analysis; and information assurance critical to enabling national cybersecurity efforts.

The CNCI was developed with great care and attention to privacy and civil liberties concerns in close consultation with privacy experts across the government. Protecting civil liberties and privacy rights remain fundamental objectives in the implementation of the CNCI.

In accord with President Obama’s declared intent to make transparency a touchstone of his presidency, the Cyberspace Policy Review identified enhanced information sharing as a key component of effective cybersecurity. To improve public understanding of Federal efforts, the Cybersecurity Coordinator has directed the release of the following summary description of the CNCI.

CNCI Initiative Details Initiative #1. Manage the Federal Enterprise Network as a single network enterprise with Trusted Internet Connections. The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, headed by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Homeland Security, covers the consolidation of the Federal Government’s external access points (including those to the Internet). This consolidation will result in a common security solution which includes: facilitating the reduction of external access points, establishing baseline security capabilities; and, validating agency adherence to those security capabilities. Agencies participate in the TIC initiative either as TIC Access Providers (a limited number of agencies that operate their own capabilities) or by contracting with commercial Managed Trusted IP Service (MTIPS) providers through the GSA-managed NETWORX contract vehicle.

Initiative #2. Deploy an intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal enterprise. Intrusion Detection Systems using passive sensors form a vital part of U.S. Government network defenses by identifying when unauthorized users attempt to gain access to those networks. DHS is deploying, as part of its EINSTEIN 2 activities, signature-based sensors capable of inspecting Internet traffic entering Federal systems for unauthorized accesses and malicious content. The EINSTEIN 2 capability enables analysis of network flow information to identify potential malicious activity while conducting automatic full packet inspection of traffic entering or exiting U.S. Government networks for malicious activity using signature-based intrusion detection technology. Associated with this investment in technology is a parallel investment in manpower with the expertise required to accomplish DHS’s expanded network security mission. EINSTEIN 2 is capable of alerting US-CERT in real time to the presence of malicious or potentially harmful activity in federal network traffic and provides correlation and visualization of the derived data. Due to the capabilities within EINSTEIN 2, US-CERT analysts have a greatly improved understanding of the network environment and an increased ability to address the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Federal network security. As a result, US-CERT has greater situational awareness and canmore effectively develop and more readily share security relevant information with network defenders across the U.S. Government, as well as with security professionals in the private sector and the American public. The Department of Homeland Security’s Privacy Office has conducted and published a Privacy Impact Assessment for the EINSTEIN 2 program.

Initiative #3. Pursue deployment of intrusion prevention systems across the Federal enterprise. This Initiative represents the next evolution of protection for civilian Departments and Agencies of the Federal Executive Branch. This approach, called EINSTEIN 3, will draw on commercial technology and specialized government technology to conduct real-time full packet inspection and threat-based decision-making on network traffic entering or leaving these Executive Branch networks. The goal of EINSTEIN 3 is to identify and characterize malicious network traffic to enhance cybersecurity analysis, situational awareness and security response. It will have the ability to automatically detect and respond appropriately to cyber threats before harm is done, providing an intrusion prevention system supporting dynamic defense. EINSTEIN 3 will assist DHS US-CERT in defending, protecting and reducing vulnerabilities on Federal Executive Branch networks and systems. The EINSTEIN 3 system will also support enhanced information sharing by US-CERT with Federal Departments and Agencies by giving DHS the ability to automate alerting of detected network intrusion attempts and, when deemed necessary by DHS, to send alerts that do not contain the content of communications to the National Security Agency (NSA) so that DHS efforts may be supported by NSA exercising its lawfully authorized missions. This initiative makes substantial and long-term investments to increase national intelligence capabilities to discover critical information about foreign cyber threats and use this insight to inform EINSTEIN 3 systems in real time. DHS will be able to adapt threat signatures determined by NSA in the course of its foreign intelligence and DoD information assurance missions for use in the EINSTEIN 3 system in support of DHS’s federal system security mission. Information sharing on cyber intrusions will be conducted in accordance with the laws and oversight for activities related to homeland security, intelligence, and defense in order to protect the privacy and rights of U.S. citizens.
DHS is currently conducting a exercise to pilot the EINSTEIN 3 capabilities described in this initiative based on technology developed by NSA and to solidify processes for managing and protecting information gleaned from observed cyber intrusions against civilian Executive Branch systems. Government civil liberties and privacy officials are working closely with DHS and US-CERT to build appropriate and necessary privacy protections into the design and operational deployment of EINSTEIN 3.

Initiative #4: Coordinate and redirect research and development (R&D) efforts. No single individual or organization is aware of all of the cyber-related R&D activities being funded by the Government. This initiative is developing strategies and structures for coordinating all cyber R&D sponsored or conducted by the U.S. government, both classified and unclassified, and to redirect that R&D where needed. This Initiative is critical to eliminate redundancies in federally funded cybersecurity research, and to identify research gaps, prioritize R&D efforts, and ensure the taxpayers are getting full value for their money as we shape our strategic investments.

Initiative #5. Connect current cyber ops centers to enhance situational awareness. There is a pressing need to ensure that government information security offices and strategic operations centers share data regarding malicious activities against federal systems, consistent with privacy protections for personally identifiable and other protected information and as legally appropriate, in order to have a better understanding of the entire threat to government systems and to take maximum advantage of each organization’s unique capabilities to produce the best overall national cyber defense possible. This initiative provides the key means necessary to enable and support shared situational awareness and collaboration across six centers that are responsible for carrying out U.S. cyber activities. This effort focuses on key aspects necessary to enable practical mission bridging across the elements of U.S. cyber activities: foundational capabilities and investments such as upgraded infrastructure, increased bandwidth, and integrated operational capabilities; enhanced collaboration, including common technology, tools, and procedures; and enhanced shared situational awareness through shared analytic and collaborative technologies.

The National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) within the Department of Homeland Security will play a key role in securing U.S. Government networks and systems under this initiative by coordinating and integrating information from the six centers to provide cross-domain situational awareness, analyzing and reporting on the state of U.S. networks and systems, and fostering interagency collaboration and coordination.

Initiative #6. Develop and implement a government-wide cyber counterintelligence (CI) plan. A government-wide cyber counterintelligence plan is necessary to coordinate activities across all Federal Agencies to detect, deter, and mitigate the foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threat to U.S. and private sector information systems. To accomplish these goals, the plan establishes and expands cyber CI education and awareness programs and workforce development to integrate CI into all cyber operations and analysis, increase employee awareness of the cyber CI threat, and increase counterintelligence collaboration across the government. The Cyber CI Plan is aligned with the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America (2007) and supports the other programmatic elements of the CNCI.

Initiative #7. Increase the security of our classified networks. Classified networks house the Federal Government’s most sensitive information and enable crucial war-fighting, diplomatic, counterterrorism, law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security operations. Successful penetration or disruption of these networks could cause exceptionally grave damage to our national security. We need to exercise due diligence in ensuring the integrity of these networks and the data they contain.

Initiative #8. Expand cyber education. While billions of dollars are being spent on new technologies to secure the U.S. Government in cyberspace, it is the people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to implement those technologies who will determine success. However there are not enough cybersecurity experts within the Federal Government or private sector to implement the CNCI, nor is there an adequately established Federal cybersecurity career field. Existing cybersecurity training and personnel development programs, while good, are limited in focus and lack unity of effort. In order to effectively ensure our continued technical advantage and future cybersecurity, we must develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce and an effective pipeline of future employees. It will take a national strategy, similar to the effort to upgrade science and mathematics education in the 1950’s, to meet this challenge.

Initiative #9. Define and develop enduring “leap-ahead” technology, strategies, and programs. One goal of the CNCI is to develop technologies that provide increases in cybersecurity by orders of magnitude above current systems and which can be deployed within 5 to 10 years. This initiative seeks to develop strategies and programs to enhance the component of the government R&D portfolio that pursues high-risk/high-payoff solutions to critical cybersecurity problems. The Federal Government has begun to outline Grand Challenges for the research community to help solve these difficult problems that require ‘out of the box’ thinking. In dealing with the private sector, the government is identifying and communicating common needs that should drive mutual investment in key research areas.

Initiative #10. Define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs. Our Nation’s senior policymakers must think through the long-range strategic options available to the United States in a world that depends on assuring the use of cyberspace. To date, the U.S. Government has been implementing traditional approaches to the cybersecurity problem—and these measures have not achieved the level of security needed. This Initiative is aimed at building an approach to cyber defense strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace by improving warning capabilities, articulating roles for private sector and international partners, and developing appropriate responses by both state and non-state actors.

Initiative #11. Develop a multi-pronged approach for global supply chain risk management. Globalization of the commercial information and communications technology marketplace provides increased opportunities for those intent on harming the United States by penetrating the supply chain to gain unauthorized access to data, alter data, or interrupt communications. Risks stemming from both the domestic and globalized supply chain must be managed in a strategic and comprehensive way over the entire lifecycle of products, systems and services. Managing this risk will require a greater awareness of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with acquisition decisions; the development and employment of tools and resources to technically and operationally mitigate risk across the lifecycle of products (from design through retirement); the development of new acquisition policies and practices that reflect the complex global marketplace; and partnership with industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk management standards and best practices. This initiative will enhance Federal Government skills, policies, and processes to provide departments and agencies with a robust toolset to better manage and mitigate supply chain risk at levels commensurate with the criticality of, and risks to, their systems and networks.

Initiative #12. Define the Federal role for extending cybersecurity into critical infrastructure domains. The U.S. Government depends on a variety of privately owned and operated critical infrastructures to carry out the public’s business. In turn, these critical infrastructures rely on the efficient operation of information systems and networks that are vulnerable to malicious cyber threats. This Initiative builds on the existing and ongoing partnership between the Federal Government and the public and private sector owners and operators of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR). The Department of Homeland Security and its private-sector partners have developed a plan of shared action with an aggressive series of milestones and activities. It includes both short-term and long-term recommendations, specifically incorporating and leveraging previous accomplishments and activities that are already underway. It addresses security and information assurance efforts across the cyber infrastructure to increase resiliency and operational capabilities throughout the CIKR sectors. It includes a focus on public-private sharing of information regarding cyber threats and incidents in both government and CIKR.
Thursday, March 04, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

White House Offers Glimpse Of Cybersecurity Program

By Steven Aftergood


The White House yesterday released a newly declassified description (pdf) of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), a highly classified program that is intended to protect U.S. government computer networks against intrusion and disruption.

The cybersecurity initiative was established in January 2008 by President Bush's classified National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 54, and quickly became controversial in part because of the intense secrecy surrounding it.

"Virtually everything about the initiative is highly classified," the Senate Armed Services Committee complained in 2008, "and most of the information that is not classified is categorized as 'For Official Use Only'.  These restrictions preclude public education, awareness and debate about the policy and legal issues, real or imagined, that the initiative poses in the areas of privacy and civil liberties.... The Committee strongly urges the [Bush] Administration to reconsider the necessity and wisdom of the blanket, indiscriminate classification levels established for the initiative."  No such reconsideration was forthcoming until now.

Concerns about overclassification were also expressed by the National Academy of Sciences in a 2009 report, which called for "a broad, unclassified national debate and discussion about cyber-attack policy," and argued that "secrecy even about broad policy issues serves mostly to inhibit necessary discussion about them."

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative was "the single largest request and the most important initiative of the President's fiscal year 2009 [intelligence] budget request," the House Intelligence Committee said in its report on the FY2009 intelligence authorization act.

The Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit (pdf) just last month seeking declassification and disclosure of the Bush Administration's NSPD 54.

But that foundational directive was not disclosed, nor did the Obama Administration address the issue of offensive cyber policy raised by the National Academy.  Instead, the White House released a descriptive summary of 12 component elements of the Cybersecurity Initiative, a gesture that it said was consistent with the President's emphasis on increased transparency.

"Transparency is particularly vital in areas, such as the CNCI, where there have been legitimate questions about sensitive topics like the role of the intelligence community in cybersecurity," said Howard A. Schmidt, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator who announced the disclosure.  "Transparency provides the American people with the ability to partner with government and participate meaningfully in the discussion about how we can use the extraordinary resources and expertise of the intelligence community with proper oversight for the protection of privacy and civil liberties," Mr. Schmidt said.

But without a clear delineation of legal authorities and implementation mechanisms, the scope for meaningful public discussion seems limited.

As the House Intelligence Committee put it in 2008, "a cybersecurity initiative [is] worthwhile in principle, but the details of the CNCI remain vague and, thus, open to question."

In order to bolster independent oversight of programs such as the CNCI that must remain classified, at least in part, dozens of public interest organizations including the Federation of American Scientists this week urged President Obama (pdf) to finally appoint the members of an independent executive branch oversight board.

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (pdf), originally proposed in 2004 by the 9/11 Commission to monitor and defend civil liberties in information sharing and counterterrorism activities, was given independent agency status by Congress in 2007.  But it has remained vacant since that time and thus unable to fulfill its assigned task.

"It is crucial that you nominate qualified individuals to serve on the PCLOB, so that it may begin to provide guidance as new policies and procedures are developed," the public interest group letter said.


ARMY FORESEES "PERPETUAL TURBULENCE" IN CYBERSPACE

U.S. Army doctrine (pdf) published last week anticipates an increasingly unstable information environment that may challenge Army operations and test national capabilities.

"Unprecedented levels of adverse activity in and through cyberspace threaten the integrity of United States critical infrastructure, financial systems, and elements of national power. These threats range from unwitting hackers to nation-states, each at various levels of competence. Collectively, the threats create a condition of perpetual turbulence without traditional end states or resolution."

Under prevailing circumstances, the Army says, "Notions of 'dominating' cyberspace are simplistic and unrealistic. A realistic and meaningful goal is to achieve and maintain freedom of action in and through cyberspace while being able to affect that of the adversaries."

The Army's assessment and proposed response are described in "Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028," TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8, February 22, 2010.


USE OF U.S. FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2009, AND MORE FROM CRS

Noteworthy new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

"Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2009," January 27, 2010.

"Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians," February 26, 2010.

"China-North Korea Relations," January 22, 2010.

"Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009-January 2010," February 1, 2010.

"Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence," February 16, 2010.

"Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues," February 1, 2010.



Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Wednesday, March 03, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

House Approves Two Secrecy Policy Measures

By Steven Aftergood


The House of Representatives last week approved two secrecy-related amendments to the pending FY 2010 intelligence authorization act (HR 2701).  The amendments and the bill itself await further action by the Senate.

An amendment by Rep. Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) would require the Director of National Intelligence to identify records held by U.S. intelligence agencies that deal with human rights violations in Argentina committed by that country's military dictatorship between 1976 and 1985, and to review such records for declassification (sec. 360).  An amendment by Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) would require the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to prepare a report "containing an analysis of the problem of over-classification and ways to address such over-classification" (sec. 358).

Argentina's so-called "dirty war" in the 1970s was a national trauma that persists in living memory, involving the death and disappearance of tens of thousands of victims.  "By passing this measure today," said Rep. Hinchey, "Congress is helping to lift the veil of secrecy surrounding the terrible human rights abuses committed by the despotic Argentinian regime of the 1970's and 1980's and helping to bring truth and justice to what was a horrific period in South America."

Rep. Harman's amendment would help to enlist the new Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in the process of intelligence classification reform.  Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, only Congress can require the Inspector General to undertake this task.  And the IG should be well-positioned to do so, with all of the necessary clearances and depth of access.

In truth, however, it is a little late in the day for a "report" on overclassification.  It is more than a half century since the Coolidge Committee (pdf) informed the Secretary of Defense that "overclassification has reached serious proportions," and dozens of other official and unofficial commissions and reviews have generated similar findings (pdf) since that time.

Fortunately, secrecy policy today seems to have moved beyond the "analysis" phase. A focused effort to combat overclassification in practice was approved in President Obama's executive order 13526 (sec. 1.9).  Specifically, all classifying agencies have been ordered to perform a "fundamental review" of their classification guidance "to ensure the guidance reflects current circumstances and to identify classified information that no longer requires protection and can be declassified."

The Fundamental Classification Guidance Review is "the most important effort to address this problem [of overclassification]," said William H. Leary of the National Security Council.

"[It] is a totally new requirement that agencies conduct fundamental reviews of their classification guides and other guidance to ensure that they eliminate outdated and unnecessary classification requirements.  The first of these fundamental reviews has to be completed within two years, and agencies are required to make public the results so that people... can hold us responsible for the results," said Mr. Leary, who spoke at a January 20 program at American University's Collaboration on Government Secrecy.

"These reviews can be extremely important in changing the habits and the practices of classifiers throughout government," he said.


ARAB MEDIA OUTLOOK SEES GROWTH IN 2009-2013

A study (pdf) of the news media in 15 Arab countries shows some new signs of vigor and creativity in the Arab press, despite familiar financial constraints and structural changes affecting news organizations.  Overall daily circulation and the number of news publications continue to rise.

"We are confident that the fundamentals of the media in our region are strong enough to not only withstand the storms of the times, but also to forge ahead, learning lessons from the past and making amends for things that went wrong," wrote Mona al Marri, chairperson of the Dubai Press Club in the United Arab Emirates, which produced the new study.

"A majority of media stakeholders that we interviewed across the 15 countries covered in the report thought future prospects for the media in the region were positive in spite of the impact of the economic downturn," said Maryam bin Fahad, executive director of the Press Club. "We also noticed a growing preference for local Arabic content in countries that produce local content such as Egypt and Lebanon, indicating further maturation of the media industry and media consumers away from generalized regional or global media content."

"The newspaper industry in the Arab Region is currently an unsaturated market in the majority of countries," according to the study. "The concentration of newspapers in the region relative to its population remains low compared to Western Europe, North America and even Eastern Europe."

"Bahrain has, by far, the highest concentration of newspaper titles by population in the region," followed by Qatar and Kuwait.  Other countries, "including Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, could benefit from an increase in newspapers."  Varying levels of press freedom and legal protection for the press are noted in passing.

"Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013: Inspiring Local Content," was released last month and is posted with the permission of the Dubai Press Club.


SOME NEW CONGRESSIONAL HEARING VOLUMES

Noteworthy new volumes of congressional hearings on national security-related topics include the following (all pdf).

"War Powers in the 21st Century," Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 28, 2009 (published January 2010).

"Voice of Veterans of the Afghan War," Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 23, 2009 (published February 2010).

"Strategic Importance of the Arctic in U.S. Policy," Senate Appropriations Committee, August 20, 2009 (published January 2010).

"Defeating the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Today's Efforts and Tomorrow's Requirements," House Armed Services Committee, September 16, 2008 (published December 2009).

"Implications of the Supreme Court's Boumediene Decision for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Non-Governmental Perspective," House Armed Services Committee, July 30, 2008 (published January 2010).



Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Monday, March 01, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Moving Beyond "A Declassification System That Doesn't Work"

By Steven Aftergood

Executive branch agencies have spent more than a billion dollars on declassification of government records in recent years, but the results have been unsatisfactory, requiring a change in declassification policy and procedure.

"Between 1997 and 2007 the Federal Government acknowledges spending $1.343 billion on declassification," reported Michael J. Kurtz, Assistant Archivist at the National Archives, in a newly disclosed briefing (pdf).  "This does not include the monies spent by the Intelligence Community on declassification," an amount that is considered classified.

Despite the enormous expenditure of money, there is a large and growing backlog of records awaiting declassification.

"The Federal government has 408 million pages of historical records that are 25 years old and older at the National Archives and Records Administration that are still classified and an estimated 1.24 billion pages of historical records in agency custody which need to be reviewed and declassified over the next 25 years," Mr. Kurtz said.

"Without reform in policy and process," he said, "billions of dollars will be spent perpetuating a declassification system that does not work, while the backlog of records awaiting processing for the open shelves will continue to grow."

Mr. Kurtz spoke at a November 2009 government conference on records management.  Slides from his presentation were released earlier this month.

Having characterized the problem, Mr. Kurtz went on to describe NARA's conception of the solution -- a National Declassification Center.  The Center, he said, will "enable efficient and effective agency review" while improving quality control and productivity.  The Center was in fact established by President Obama'sexecutive order 13526 on December 29, 2009 and was announced by the National Archivist on December 30, 2009.  It began initial operations last month.

From an outside perspective, the declassification challenge goes at least one level deeper than what Mr. Kurtz described in his briefing.  The problem is not simply one of inefficiency or a lack of interagency coordination.  It is that agencies are adhering to erroneous classification policies that obstruct and defeat the declassification process.

One convenient example of such a classification error is the secrecy of Intelligence Community declassification costs, as noted by Mr. Kurtz.  Any government employee who seriously believes that the disclosure of declassification spending by intelligence agencies could cause "damage to the national security" needs to be reassigned to a non-national security function.  No more public money should be wasted to enforce such obvious misunderstandings.

The Fundamental Classification Guidance Review prescribed in executive order 13526 (sec. 1.9), which requires a top to bottom "scrub" of all agency classification policies over the next two years, may help to streamline the declassification process by eliminating these kinds of errors in classification judgment.


SOME BELATED ANSWERS ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

The Justice Department has released its responses to questions (pdf) originally posed by the House Judiciary Committee in 2007 about the Department's views on the legal framework governing electronic surveillance under the amended Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

In questions for the record from a September 18, 2007 hearing, House Committee members probed the potential use of electronic surveillance against U.S. persons, the exclusivity of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the claimed scope of independent presidential authority, and the basis for mandating telecommunication carrier immunity.

"If the so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) was perfectly legal as has been claimed, why would companies who cooperated in it need immunity?" the Committee asked.  (To protect classified information, among other reasons, the Department responded.)  "Is the President free to disregard any provisions of FISA with which he disagrees?"  (No, not exactly.)  "If an individual in the United States is suspected of working in collusion with persons outside the United States--such that an investigation of one is in effect the investigation of the other--under what circumstances, generally, would you use criminal or other FISA wiretaps?"  (Targeting of persons in the United States can only be done under FISA procedures.)

The Committee hearing volume (pdf) was published in June 2008 without the Justice Department's answers to these questions, because they were provided to Congress too late to be included in the published record.  A copy of the answers was released last week under the Freedom of Information Act.


FINANCIAL TURMOIL, AID TO PAKISTAN, AND MORE FROM CRS

New reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

"Government Interventions in Response to Financial Turmoil," February 1, 2010.

"International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues," February 3, 2010.

"Architect of the Capitol: Appointment Process and Current Legislation," February 16, 2010.

"Ozone Air Quality Standards: EPA's Proposed January 2010 Revisions," February 1, 2010.

"The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy in Asia," February 4, 2010.

"Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2011," February 16, 2010.

"Paraguay: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations," February 1, 2010.



Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Monday, February 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Public Input On Open Government Solicited

By Steven Aftergood


The Obama Administration's open government initiative might possibly inspire a transformation in the character of government operations along with an expansion of citizen engagement in policy development.  But in order to succeed, it needs some thoughtful, creative input from members of the public.

All Cabinet level agencies (and a few others) have now prepared Open Government Webpages to document their progress in improving transparency and to solicit public suggestions for how to proceed, including recommendations for development of the Open Government Plans that will define each agency's transparency program.

What this means is that "openness" is becoming incorporated into the bureaucratic machinery of government.  While executive branch agencies remain constrained by security restrictions, resource limits and other considerations, these rule-driven organizations are being given some new rules to follow.

But the actual contours of the new thrust towards openness -- its scope, its content, its urgency -- depend significantly on the quality of feedback and support that the initiative receives from the interested public.

Agencies need specific, achievable, actionable suggestions for how to meet their new openness obligations.  Each agency's openness webpage (linked here) invites readers to "share your ideas" on how to proceed.  There has never been a better time for concerned citizens to help shape the government transparency agenda.  (Actually, there has never been a "government transparency agenda" before.)

And there is a premium on good ideas.  Proposals that are unintelligible, impractical, irrelevant, or inane are effectively endorsements of the status quo because they cannot be implemented.

What kind of ideas would be useful and appropriate?  Those who already interact with each particular agency will be in the best position to say what that agency could and should provide to help advance the Administration's declared goals of transparency, participation and collaboration.

But one general approach to the issue is to consider the diverse categories of government information that have been removed from public access over the past decade, and to use those as a metaphorical trail of bread crumbs leading back to a more transparent posture.  Restoring access to that missing information could help agencies to reorient their policies and to chart a new direction forward.  And it is clearly within the realm of possibility, since it has already been done.

So, for example, these are some suggestions that we have submitted for agency consideration:

Restore public access to the Los Alamos Technical Report Library.  Until 2002, thousands of unclassified technical reports from Los Alamos National Laboratory dating back half a century and longer were publicly available on the Lab web site.  And then they weren't.  They constitute an invaluable archive of technological development, historical information, and current scientific research.  A sizable fraction of the sequestered reports have been republished on the Federation of American Scientists website.  But the entire collection, with updated content since 2002, should be restored to the public domain.

Restore public access to orbital element data.  For many years, NASA provided direct public access to so-called Two-Line Element sets that characterize the orbits of the many objects in Earth orbit that are tracked by Air Force surveillance, including active and defunct U.S. and foreign spacecraft, as well as significant debris.  In 2004, open public access was terminated.  That step should be reversed.

Publish the Defense Department telephone directory.  For decades, the Pentagon telephone directory served as a public guide to the complex structure of the Department of Defense, and provided a way to establish direct contact with individual offices and officials.  It was always for sale at the Government Printing Office Bookstore to anyone who cared to buy it.  But in 2001, the DoD telephone directory was designated "for official use only."  In the interests of "openness, participation, and collaboration," public access to the DoD directory should be restored.  (Other agencies with national security and foreign policy missions including the Department of Energy and the Department of State already make their personnel directories available online.)

There must be countless other possibilities for moving towards a more open, responsive and accountable government.  Some will be of broad interest, while others may serve a specialized constituency.  Some will be easily achievable, others may require new investments or new modes of operation.  But all of a sudden, "openness" is on the government-wide agenda in a way that it has never been before.  The opportunities are there to be seized.


MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

Among the untold official resources that have been removed from public access in recent years is the Army's Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, a quarterly journal on Army intelligence policy and practice.

We have made a commitment to restoring access to the Bulletin, including current and past issues.  The latest issue (pdf), dated April-June 2009, has just been released to us under the Freedom of Information Act.  It is entitled "Operations in OEF: Afghanistan."

Possibly annoyed by our repeated FOIA requests for the Bulletin over a period of years, an Army official at Fort Huachuca informed us this week that "the Bulletin will soon be published on public web pages again."


NO U.S. CITIZENS ON CIA HIT LISTS

It is useful to be reminded from time to time that not every allegation or published report concerning Central Intelligence Agency operations is necessarily true.

A front-page story in the Washington Post on January 27 included the remarkable statement that "Both the CIA and the JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command of the Department of Defense] maintain lists of individuals... whom they seek to kill or capture. The JSOC list includes three Americans, including [Islamist cleric Anwar al-] Aulaqi, whose name was added late last year. As of several months ago, the CIA list included three U.S. citizens, and an intelligence official said that Aulaqi's name has now been added."

But at least the part about the CIA list turns out to be unfounded.

"The article referred incorrectly to the presence of U.S. citizens on a CIA list of people the agency seeks to kill or capture," the Washington Post said in a correction published in the February 12 edition.  "After The Post's report was published, a source said that a statement the source made about the CIA list was misunderstood. Additional reporting produced no independent confirmation of the original report, and a CIA spokesman said that The Post's account of the list was incorrect. The military's Joint Special Operations Command maintains a target list that includes several Americans. In recent weeks, U.S. officials have said that the government is prepared to kill U.S. citizens who are believed to be involved in terrorist activities that threaten Americans."

The correction has been appended to the online version of the article.

On February 3, Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair testified to his view that U.S. government agencies may use lethal force against U.S. citizens who are involved in terrorist activities.  "We don't target people for free speech," he said. "We target them for taking action that threatens Americans."

"I'm actually a little bit surprised you went this far in open session," said Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) at the hearing of the House Intelligence Committee.

"The reason I went this far in open session," replied DNI Blair, "is I just don't want other Americans who are watching to think that we are careless about endangering -- in fact, we're not careless about endangering lives at all, but we especially are not careless about endangering American lives as we try to carry out the policies to protect most of the country. And I think we ought to go into details in closed session."



Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Tuesday, February 16, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

U.S Senate Holds, Filibusters And The Nuclear Option

By Steven Aftergood


Last week, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) placed a "hold" on all of the Obama Administration nominations that are pending before the Senate, thereby preventing a vote on their confirmation.  There are said to be at least 70 such nominations awaiting Senate action, including those of several senior defense and intelligence officials.  Sen. Shelby, a man of flexible principles who has served as both a Democrat and a Republican, reportedly adopted the blanket holds in an attempt to compel the Administration to award certain defense contracts to his home state of Alabama.

Shelby's action is "outlandish," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) on the Senate floor last Thursday.  But that was as far as he was prepared to go, or perhaps farther than he intended to go.  Striking a tactical retreat, he immediately added: "I can't imagine this is the right thing to do."

The new obstructionism has the potential to cripple the U.S. government, warned Paul Krugman today in the New York Times, and to do so in a particularly pointless and humiliating way:  "Instead of re-enacting the decline and fall of Rome, we’re re-enacting the dissolution of 18th-century Poland," he wrote.

Confronted with rampant irresponsibility and procedural abuse, the White House and the Majority party are not -- or should not be -- helpless to respond.  In theory, their options include recess appointments to circumvent the Senate confirmation process, and the so-called "nuclear" option to alter existing Senate procedures.  These alternatives, along with related background, have been usefully described in a series of reports from the Congressional Research Service (all pdf).

"Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions," updated March 12, 2008.

"'Entrenchment' of Senate Procedure and the 'Nuclear Option' for Change: Possible Proceedings and Their Implications," March 28, 2005.

"Cloture Attempts on Nominations," March 30, 2009.

"'Holds' in the Senate," May 19, 2008.

"Senate Policy on 'Holds': Action in the 110th Congress," March 14, 2008.

"Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate," March 28, 2003.

"Minority Rights and Senate Procedures," August 22, 2005.


CONGRESSIONAL PROFILES

Several recent reports from the Congressional Research Service provide descriptive profiles of the present and past composition of Congress by race, ethnicity, gender, education, religion and occupation (all pdf).

"Membership of the 111th Congress: A Profile," February 4, 2010.

"Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2009," December 23, 2009.

"Asian Pacific Americans in the United States Congress," February 1, 2010.

"African-American Members of the United States Congress: 1870-2009," February 2, 2010.


CRS ON AL QAEDA AFFILIATES, RUM TAXES

Other new reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following (pdf):

"Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy," February 5, 2010.

"The Rum Excise Tax Cover-Over: Legislative History and Current Issues," January 20, 2010.







Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Monday, February 08, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Future Al-Qaeda US Attacks And Limiting Knowledge In A Democracy

By Steven Aftergood


In testimony this week before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair declared unequivocally that Al Qaeda would attack the United States within the next six months.  "The priority is certain, I would say," he told (PDF) the Committee.

This recalls nothing so much as the startling August 6, 2001 item in the President's Daily Brief (PDB) that was entitled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US"(pdf).

But the 2001 warning to President Bush was classified at the highest possible level and remained secret for years thereafter, until it was finally dislodged at the insistence of the 9/11 Commission.  In contrast, DNI Blair's comparable statement was openly presented and was about as public as it could be.

Why should that be so?  Clearly the political circumstances for the two warnings are different, as are the venues in which they were delivered.  But it is also true that the parameters of official secrecy are subject to change.  Yesterday's top secret might not even qualify as today's front-page news.

The boundaries of official secrecy will be examined at a conference at the New School in New York City on February 24-26 on "Limiting Knowledge in a Democracy."

"There is no question that the free access to knowledge and information are the bedrock of all democratic societies, yet no democratic society can function without limits on what can be known, what ought to be kept confidential and what must remain secret," according to the conference overview. "The tension among these competing ends is ever present and continuously raises questions about the legitimacy of limits. What limits are necessary to safeguard and protect a democratic polity? What limits undermine it?"

I will be speaking on February 26 on "National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change."


TWITTER IN CONGRESS, AND MORE FROM CRS

Some new reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not previously been made available to the public include the following (all pdf).

"Social Networking and Constituent Communications: Member Use of Twitter During a Two-Month Period in the 111th Congress," February 3, 2010.

"Metropolitan Transportation Planning," February 3, 2010.

"Veterans Health Care: Project HERO Implementation," February 3, 2010.


THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE, AND MORE HEARINGS

Several noteworthy new hearing volumes on national security policy have recently appeared (all pdf).  In most cases, the published volumes include valuable new supplementary material for the record.

"Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving Accountability," Senate Judiciary Committee, February 13, 2008 (published December 2009) (large pdf).

"Coercive Interrogation Techniques: Do They Work, Are They Reliable, and What Did the FBI Know About Them?", Senate Judiciary Committee, June 10, 2008 (published December 2009) (large pdf).

"Protecting National Security and Civil Liberties: Strategies for Terrorism Information Sharing," Senate Judiciary Committee, April 21, 2009 (published January 2010).

"Chinese Interrogation vs. Congressional Oversight: The Uighurs at Guantanamo," House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 16, 2009 (published December 2009).


OSC VIEWS DEFENSE WEBSITES IN TAIWAN

Websites and blogs dealing with military issues in Taiwan were surveyed in a recent report from the DNI Open Source Center that has not been publicly released.  See "Taiwan: Unofficial Military Websites" (pdf), Open Source Center Media Aid, January 12, 2010.



Steven Aftergood writes at Secrecy News Blog, which is part of the Project on Government Secrecy, and published by the Federation of American Scientists. See also "Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works" by Steven Aftergood, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2009: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf
Friday, February 05, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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