Wave Of Suicides Continues At Foxconn Plant In China

Another man committed suicide at Foxconn plant in China bringing the toll of suicides at the Taiwanese hi-tech company to five this month only and to an overall of 10 from the beginning of the year, local media reported.

Xinhua news agency reported that company's employee fell to his death from a dormitory building in a Shenzhen plant just hours after President of Foxconn Terry Gou arrived at the plant in China to show it off to 300 Chinese and foreign journalists in order to restore the image of the world's largest provider of electronics manufacturing services (EMS).

In all, 12 suicides were attempted at the plant since the beginning of the year, but two people survived and sustained severe injuries.

Terry Gou said the suicides are not connected with working conditions at the plant and they are the result of employees' personal problems.

According to media reports, some 400,000 people work at two Foxconn plants in Shenzhen with most of them from remote Chinese areas. They work on the average 12 hours daily and their monthly salary is estimated between $130-150.


Source: RIA Novosti
Thursday, May 27, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Clinton Press Tokyo Press Conference: N Korea Agression, Iran

Hillary Rodham Clinton, US Secretary of State
Ikura Guesthouse
Tokyo, Japan
May 21, 2010

MODERATOR: (Via translator) I would like to begin (inaudible) press conference with Foreign Minister Okada and Secretary Clinton. Minister Okada and then Secretary Clinton will speak, and then questions and answers. Mr. Okada, please.

FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA: (Via translator) Thank you. This is my fifth meeting with Secretary Clinton since last September. We had a very candid exchange of views. In today's meeting we had discussions centering on the regional situations in Asia, and the response to the Iranian nuclear issue -- but of course, other themes as well.

Instabilities and uncertainties as represented by the sinking of the ROK Navy corvette are becoming visible. And the Japan-U.S. alliance is, therefore, all the more important. Against this backdrop, this meeting, I believe, was important and timely for the purpose of addressing these situations through mutual cooperation, with common awareness of them between Japan and the United States. And, as such, it is gratifying that Secretary Clinton has visited Japan.

With regard to the sinking of the Korean corvette, we discussed the response we should take following the announcement yesterday of the results of the investigations. Setting aside details, we confirmed that coordination among Japan, U.S., and ROK, including our future response, is important, and that we shall maintain close communication with each other in addressing the matter.

As the Secretary is on her way to attend the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, I explained to her the results of the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers meeting, as well as the Japan-China Bilateral meeting held in its margins, and exchanged the views on Japan-China and U.S.-China relations, as well.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, while we will need to watch how the recent agreement between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil will play out, we see eye to eye that the cause for concern remains unchanged as Iran has publicly stated that it will continue the enrichment of uranium to approximately the 20 percent level.

I told Secretary Clinton that Japan will actively play a role in the discussions for a new UN Security Council resolution in order to enable the international community to put out a unified message. We confirmed that our two countries will continue to work closely together. We confirmed afresh the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance, including the above-mentioned exchange of views, and we shall carry on our consultations to further deepen the alliance.

On the question of relocating the Futenma air station, working-level officials of our two countries were having a meeting today, as well. And I also explained Japan's position on this. Talks are proceeding intensively between Japan and the United States. Both Japan and the United States will make further efforts towards a settlement by the end of May. That's all for me. Thank you very much.

Secretary Clinton, please.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, it's a pleasure to be back in Tokyo, and to reaffirm the enduring alliance between our two nations. I thank Minister Okada for his warm welcome and the substantive discussions that we’ve had, and I look forward to seeing the prime minister.

Japan was the first nation I visited as Secretary of State, because we recognize that this relationship continues to be a cornerstone of security, stability, and progress in a region that is so crucial to the future of our entire world.

This year, as the United States and Japan mark the 50th anniversary of our alliance, we can be very proud of all we have accomplished together; the peace we have kept, the prosperity we have built, and the bonds we have forged. This partnership is essential for meeting the challenges not only of today, but also of tomorrow. And it is a rock solid foundation for our shared future.

As the foreign minister said, we had a productive meeting on a number of critical issues and common concerns. We had a detailed discussion on the results of the international investigation into the sinking of the Korean military vessel. This was a thorough and comprehensive scientific examination, and the United States and other international observers were deeply engaged. The evidence is overwhelming and condemning. The torpedo that sunk the Cheonan and took the lives of 46 South Korean sailors was fired by a North Korean submarine. And the United States strongly condemns this act of aggression. As Minister Okada and I discussed, we will be in deep and constant consultations, not only between the United States and Japan, but also with South Korea, China, and others to determine our response.

We appreciate Japan's support of South Korea and this investigation, because we recognize the threat that North Korea's aggression poses is also to the people of Japan. Last year I met with families of the abducted, and expressed my personal sympathy and concern. The United States and Japan continue to work side by side to meet the challenges posed by North Korea. We agree that North Korea must stop its provocative behavior, halt its policy of threats and belligerence toward its neighbors, and take irreversible steps to fulfill its denuclearization commitments, and comply with international law.

I will be discussing these issues with my counterparts in Beijing next week, and then I will travel to Seoul, to consult with our South Korean partners about the way forward. But let me be clear. This will not be and cannot be business as usual. There must be an international -- not just a regional, but an international -- response.

The Minister and I also conferred about our efforts at the United Nations to secure a strong resolution on Iran. The draft resolution agreed to by the P-5+1 and circulated at the Security Council this week sends an unmistakable message to the Iranian leadership: Comply with your obligations or face growing isolation and consequences. The burden is on Iran to demonstrate through its actions, not its words, that it will live up to its responsibilities. The international non-proliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity. And the United States appreciates Japan's support on this issue, and its leadership on the broader non-proliferation agenda.

Today we also discussed issues relating to the continued successful operation of U.S. bases in Japan. These are the front line of our alliance, and an anchor of stability in the region. The United States continues to work closely with Japan on basing issues to find a way forward that serves the interest of both our countries, and an arrangement that is operationally viable and politically sustainable. Our shared goal remains unchanged: to maintain Japanese security and regional stability, while minimizing the impact on base-hosting communities.

We salute Japan's commitment to regional and global engagement, and I particularly applaud Japan's generous contribution of $5 billion over 5 years to support the people of Afghanistan, as they combat violent extremism, and work to build a secure and stable nation. From reconstruction efforts in Iraq, to combating piracy off the horn of Africa, to fighting climate change, Japan is providing crucial contributions and leadership on a wide range of global challenges. Japan is making a real difference, and is an essential partner for the United States in pursuit of our common goals and values.

Last year, during my town hall discussion at the University of Tokyo, a student asked me how we can continue developing the U.S.-Japan relationship from a regional alliance to a global partnership. This is exactly the right question. And it is the question that animates our discussion and drives our collective action. And today we look to the future full of confidence in our friendship and our ability to work together.

And so, let me thank Minister Okada once again for his hospitality and leadership, and let me state how much the United States looks forward to continuing our work together to ensure that the next 50 years are as fruitful as the last.

MODERATOR: (Via translator) Thank you very much. Since time is pressing, I would like to accept two questions. One from Japanese media, please. Mr. Mishoma.

QUESTION: (Via translator) Mishoma with JJ Press. Question for both Minister Okada and Secretary Clinton, and the same question on Futenma. While the end of May is approaching, any settlement that can win the understanding of Okinawans remains elusive. How do the two countries intend to overcome the situation? And do the two countries plan to issue some kind of a joint statement towards the end of May? Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA: As I said earlier, between Japan and the United States we would like to come up with a clear direction. And with regard to that general direction, we would like to ask (inaudible) make firm efforts to gain the understanding of Okinawans. Coming Sunday, Prime Minister plans to visit Okinawa. So we will -- the entire cabinet will continue to engage in efforts to explain the government's position and gain the understanding of the people.

At the same time, to the Japanese people, we would like to have their understanding that in the current security environment the presence of U.S. forces is indispensible for the security and stability of Japan. But not only just that, but the region's stability.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I agree completely with Minister Okada's statement about the importance of our alliance, and the United States's commitment to the defense of Japan. It has always been important. It is good to be reminded, as we recently were with the unprovoked attack on the Korean vessel, that there are still dangers and challenges that confront us together.

We are working closely to resolve the outstanding issues concerning our basing. We both seek an arrangement that is operationally viable and politically sustainable. The goal of our governments remains unchanged. We want to maintain the security of Japan and the stability of the region. And I am confident we will resolve this matter in a way that reflects the very best of our alliance, the strength of that alliance, for the next 50 years, and provides the security guarantees that the Japanese people are looking for. So we have committed to redoubling our efforts to meet the deadline that has been announced by the Japanese Government, and we look forward to a resolution of this matter.

MODERATOR: Thank you. One last question from the U.S. media corps. Mr. Schmidt?

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, you just said that there should be -- the sinking the Cheonan -- you just said that there should be a strong international response. Can you tell us what your options are? And are you worried that North Korea might retaliate to its condemnation?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I'm sorry, what was the last part of that question?

QUESTION: Are you worried that North Korea might retaliate after its condemnation?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, one of the reasons that I wanted to stop here first was to consult with the Japanese Government, and to reaffirm our commitment to working together to resolve this matter. We look forward to intensive consultations in China. And then, as you know, I will be going to Seoul. It is premature for me, at this moment, to announce options or actions without that level of consultation among the regional nations that are most directly affected by North Korea's behavior.

I think it is important to send a clear message to North Korea that provocative actions have consequences. We cannot allow this attack on South Korea to go unanswered by the international community. So we will determine our best options, moving forward, and send a clear, unmistakable message to North Korea regarding the international communities, and most particularly, its neighbors' concerns about its behavior. And I look forward to being able to work out the details over the next week.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much. With this, we conclude the joint press conference. Thank you very much. The two ministers will have to immediately leave. Would the members of the press kindly wait in your seats? Thank you.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

The Role Of China In Russia’s Military Thinking

By Simon Saradzhyan for RES

The continuing rise of China requires the Russian military to prepare a plan that allows it to counter Beijing’s
potential supremacy. However, military preparations alone will not suffice. Russia needs to reverse the negative socio-economic and demographic trends in the Far East and Siberia before they create conditions facilitating an armed conflict.

The East-2010 War-Game: Who Are Russia’s Potential Foes?

In June 2010 the Russian armed forces will stage an operational-strategic exercise dubbed Vostok-2010 (East-2010) that will become “the main combat-training event” of 2010, according to a recent Defense Ministry press release. Thousands of soldiers from the Army (including the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection Forces) Navy, Air Force, Airborne Troops and other elements of the Russian armed forces will participate in the joint exercise staged by the Far Eastern and Siberian Military Districts. While these two eastern districts and the fleet will play the lead role in the game, Vostok-2010 will also involve forces and assets from other military districts and all of Russia’s four fleets, including submarines, according to senior commanders. Russia’s long-range aviation and the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ Interior Troops will also participate in the war game.

The importance given to Vostok-2010 marks a significant change from the recent past. More often than not, it is the Zapad (West) exercise, which simulates a Russian war with NATO, that concludes the Russian armed forces’ combat training season. That was the case last year when tens of thousands of troops participated in Zapad-2009, which featured large-scale operations in western Russia and Belarus, including beach landings and a simulated nuclear strike. But this year Vostok will mark the apogee of Russian military training, according to commander of the Ground Forces Col. General Alexander Postnikov.

President Dmitry Medvedev has already promised to attend the war-game, during which troops will test the new chain of command (military district-operational command-brigade) and practice re-deployment from one region to another, chief of the General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov told RIA Novosti on January 15.

While commenting extensively on the West wargames, top Russian commanders would not publicly identify either potential foes or the overall scenario for East-2010. One unnamed, but obvious foe to prepare for is Japan. In an April 7 interview Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin openly stated that one reason why Moscow wants to buy Mistral helicopter-carrying warships from France is because Russia has an unresolved territorial dispute with Japan.

The Russian leadership is also concerned about the unpredictability of the nuclear-armed North Korean regime and has even decided to deploy its newest air defense system – the S-400 – in the Far East, even though this system is not designed to shoot down ballistic missiles during the ascending or mid-course phases of their flight.

However, there is one more potential foe in the East whose growing military might requires Russia to prepare a counter-action strategy on the scale of Vostok-2010. And that potential foe is China.

Acknowledging the Potential Threat

Until recently, Russia’s military-political leadership had been extremely careful not to mention China as a potential foe while taking pains to stress how much relations with its powerful eastern neighbor have improved.

Indeed, the two countries have settled their border disputes, signed a friendship treaty in 2001 and became partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They also agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target their nuclear weapons at each other in a deal signed in 1992.

However, China is already challenging Russia’s dominance in oil- and gas-rich Central Asia. In the future, fast-growing China could come to pose a security threat to Russia’s resource-rich Siberia and Far East, especially given the growing disparity in population density, economic output and continuing labor immigration across the Russian-Chinese border.

But while Russian officials had avoided referring to China as a potential foe, perhaps, in order to avoid angering the eastern neighbor and buy time to prepare for its further rise, former officials and experts do point to the potential threat posed by China’s conventional supremacy. “After the end of the Cold War…Moscow lost its superiority in conventional forces over NATO, China and the far eastern alliance led by the U.S,” Alexei Arbatov, one of Russia’s most authoritative arms control experts and the co-author of Russia’s new national security doctrine, observed in 2004. Now Russia sees its non-strategic nuclear weapons as the “nuclear equalizer,” compensating for the conventional forces lead held by the West and China.

More recently, the Defense Ministry top brass have begun to edge closer towards acknowledging the obvious.

In July 2009 a reporter for the Defense Ministry’s newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda pointed out to Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov that one of the slides in the commander’s own presentation “show that it is, after all, NATO and China that are the most dangerous of our geopolitical rivals.” He then asked the general whether the brigades, which Makarov said are replacing Cold War era divisions to better prepare the armed forces to fight local conflicts as opposed to the all-out wars of the 20th century, will be ready to “conduct defensive operations in massive warfare.” Makarov did not mention China in his answer.

However, earlier at the same conference he did point out that “in terms of China, we are conducting a very balanced, well-thought out policy.” However, based on my experience working as a defense and security journalist in Russia for 15 years, Krasnaya Zvezda reporters typically seek pre-approval for the questions they ask top commanders, so the reference to China as “strongest geopolitical rival” is no accident.

Two months later chief of the Ground Forces Staff Lt. General Sergei Skokov made what leading Russian military expert Alexander Khramchikhin described as an “epochal statement.” When describing what kind of warfare the national armed forces should prepare for, Skokov said the following in September 2009: “If we talk about the east, then it could be a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to conducting combat operations: straightforward, with large concentrations of personnel and firepower along individual operational directions.” Writing in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, Khramchikhin noted that “for the first time since the early days of Gorbachev, a high-ranking national commander has de facto acknowledged officially that the People’s Republic of China is our potential enemy.”

Should a conflict between Russia and China eventually break out, Russia should not hope that the conventional component of its one million strong armed forces will be able to stop the 2.8 million man People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, whose military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, according to G. John Ikenberry.

Russia has repeatedly gamed out a limited nuclear strike by air-launched cruise missiles to prevent a conventionally-superior foe from overwhelming its forces in a conventional conflict in the West and one may deduce from that that Russian generals have developed similar plans for conflicts in the East too.

However, while they serve as a powerful deterrent, nuclear weapons cannot be viewed as a panacea. Most importantly, even selected limited use of nuclear weapons, which Russian generals hope will demonstrate resolve and deescalate the conflict, can actually increase the risk that the foe will also choose to retaliate with nuclear weapons rather than sue for peace. Even the selective first use of nuclear weapons by Russia may prompt Beijing to respond by launching its ICBMs out of concern that Russia’s nuclear strike may destroy most of its nuclear arsenal. And, as a 2003 Defense Ministry report, entitled “Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Russian Armed Forces,” rightly notes: “When we speak about the nuclear deterrent, especially when this notion is applied to the deterrence of threats associated with the use of conventional forces by the enemy, we should also take into account that under contemporary conditions such deterrence can be effectively carried out only if well-equipped and combat-ready general- purpose forces are available.”

“It’s the Economy, Stupid.”

However, neither nuclear weapons nor conventional weapons will be effective in reducing the risk factors that increase the likelihood of conflict between China and Russia. Among these is the growing demographic and economic disparity between the two countries. This gap is increasingly evident in light of the macroeconomic and social data describing Russia’s Siberia and Far East. China’s economy has quadrupled in size since the late 1970s and may double again over the next decade.

China already has a population of 1.32 billion and its GDP totaled $4,326 billion in 2008, ranking third in terms of GDP in the world, according to the World Bank. Russia’s population totals some 141 million and its GDP totaled $1,601 billion in 2008, ranking ninth in the world, according to the same source. China is most likely to continue growing at rates unattainable for Russia while the latter can count only on migration to prevent further depopulation.

As of the early 2000s Russia’s Far Eastern and Siberian Districts had a total population of 27 million and their combined gross regional products totaled $110 billion per year, according to then-governor of Krasnoyarskii Krai Alexander Khoponin’s 2006 speech at the Baikal Economic Forum in 2006. The rapid growth of countries in the Asian Pacific region, which includes China, is the main challenge for Russia, Khloponin told a conference in September 2006, according to Russia’s Ekonomika i Biznes.

Nevertheless, given the current pace of development, Russia is still decades away from a serious conflict with China, if one ever erupts. As Singapore’s first premier Lee Kuan Yew, an astute observer of Asia, pointed out: “China wants time to grow. If there is going to be any conflict, they’ll postpone it for 50 years.” And before thinking of any conflict with Russia, China will of course want to re-gain Taiwan and establish its dominance in South -East Asia.

Russia should use the next several decades to pursue military reform until it produces a conventional force capable of deterring military threats along Russia’s perimeter and on par with China’s PLA, while also maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. Russian authorities should also allocate resources and introduce incentives to reverse depopulation in the Far East and Siberia and facilitate the region’s socio-economic growth to prevent the further deepening of the non-military disparities that increase the likelihood of a crisis in relations with China that may ultimately escalate into an armed conflict.


Simon Saradzhyan is a fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School Belfer Center where he researches terrorism and arms control. This article is partially based on his January 2010 paper “Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?” This article was published the Russian and Eurasia Security Network (RES), in its May 3, 2010 publication, No. 78: Russian Military Thinking Today (PDF) on pages 5-7, and is reprinted with permisison.

Recommended Reading
• G. John Ikenberry, “The Role of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.
• Lee Kuan Yew, Former Prime Minister of Singapore, Interview with Charlie Rose, October 22, 2009. Available at http://www.charlierose.com/download/transcript/10681.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

US Debt, Europe Crisis Among Issues At China Talks

By William Ide

Chinese officials say the debt crisis in Europe as well as concerns about the U.S. economy will be among a wide range of issues at high-level security and economic talks next week in Beijing.

China's assistant finance minister, Zhu Guangyao, says the situation in Europe is not only a challenge for eurozone countries, but for the entire international financial system.

Speaking at a news conference to preview the upcoming talks, Zhu says next week's U.S.-China Security and Economic Dialogue meetings in Beijing will be a chance for both countries to discuss ways they can work together to help stabilize the global economy.

Zhu says the upcoming discussions will take a strategic, global, and long-term approach toward major issues concerning China-U.S. economic relations.

He also says that China will look to coordinate its economic policies with the United States as a buffer against challenges to the global economic system.

Zhu says there will be discussions about China's currency policy and calls for it to appreciate the Chinese yuan, but downplayed the prominence Beijing would give to the topic during the meetings Monday and Tuesday.

Zhu says China will not push forward with reform of its currency because of external pressure. On the contrary, he says external pressure and noise can do nothing but slow down the reform process.

Manufacturers in the United States and members of Congress blame China for the massive U.S. trade deficit and huge losses of American manufacturing jobs. They say China unfairly manipulates the value of the yuan to give Chinese-made products a price advantage on world markets.

Beijing says the U.S. problems grow out of overspending, a lack of savings and other shortcomings.

Assistant Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao says China is also concerned about the high U.S. fiscal deficit and the gradual realization of fiscal sustainability. He says this is an issue Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have exchanged opinions on many times.

Zhu says that during next week's meetings, China will urge the United States to reflect on what has happened in Europe and look at its own fiscal situation.

China is the largest holder of U.S. debt. It holds nearly $900 billion and added to that pile in March, the first time in seven months.

Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai says China hopes the discussions will help improve ties between the two countries.

Cui says China hopes the discussions will deepen mutual understanding and increase mutual strategic trust as well as strengthen cooperation and coordination between both countries and in the international arena.

Beginning earlier this year, U.S.-China relations were buffeted by a string of events, including concerns about Internet freedom and the censorship of Google in China, Washington's approval of an arms sale to Taiwan, and President Barack Obama's meeting with Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.

Concerns about trade and the Chinese currency continue to test ties.

But, analysts note that relations began showing signs of warming when Chinese President Hu Jintao traveled to Washington last month to attend Mr. Obama's nuclear security summit. They say that trend continues and note China's decision earlier this week to support United Nations sanctions against Iran after months of foot dragging.

Source: VOA
Thursday, May 20, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Asia Markets Tumble On Greece Debt Woes

By Ron Corben

Asia markets fell sharply Friday, reacting to Wall Street's plunge over Greek debt crisis worries. But analysts and the UN regional economic arm remain upbeat on Asia's economic prospects despite the financial jitters.

Stock markets across Asia fell, including those in China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand and New Zealand, by up to four per cent. Gold climbed to just over $1200.00 an ounce - a gain of $20.00 from the previous day.

The wave of selling of stock came as investors feared that Greece's debt problems could spread to other countries within the eurozone such as Spain and Portugal.

Asia's economies have largely shown sound recovery from the global financial crisis of 2009, due largely to government stimulus packages that led to increased domestic spending.

But the market uncertainties could still rattle economic confidence.

Noeleen Heyzer, executive secretary of the U.N.'s regional economic and social arm (UNESCAP), said economic recovery remains fragile and problems faced in the eurozone could lead to more uncertainty.

"This rebound is actually fragile and it is uneven," said Heyzer. "It is a 'v' shape rebound that can become a double dip. We're very concerned about several of the risk factors that would have to be managed and this included inflation, the building up of asset bubbles because of excess liquidity, appreciation of the exchange rates in many of the Asian countries."

In Japan the Nikkei average fell over four per cent to a two month low as shares fell as a result of concerns over Europe's debt crisis.

Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hotayama in public comments expressed his concerns over what he called "the Greek problem".

The Bank of Japan Friday said it was willing to offer $22 billion in short term loans to commercial banks to boost liquidity in the world's second largest
economy.

In China markets dropped almost two per cent over concerns the central government's moves to curb bank lending with the European Union - China's largest trading partner.

While the uncertainty swept across the markets, analysts said they were still confident in the Asian economies.

Heyzer said the problems faced in the eurozone highlighted Asia's need to focus its economic development by boosting intra-regional trade and investment.

"Just look at what is happening to the eurozone today; what is happening to the U.S. debt levels today and the global imbalances. So what Asia will have to do is to look to new drivers of growth that takes into account … globalization, side by side with regionalization," said Heyzer.

UNESCAP in its latest regional survey says strong support from expansion policies has helped Asian and Pacific economies to reverse the declines of the latter half of 2009. But the outlook remained dependent on the world economy stabilizing.

Analysts Friday say they expect Asia's markets to recover as most companies in the region are not directly exposed to Europe's hardest hit economies.

Source: VOA
Friday, May 07, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Taiwan Carries Out First Executions In Five Years

Amnesty International condemned Tuesday the execution of four prisoners by the Taiwanese authorities, the first since December 2005.

Chang Chun-hung, Hung Chen-yao, Ko Shih-ming and Chang Wen-wei were executed in prisons in Taipei, Tainan and Taichun on the evening of 30 April.

The executions come just two weeks after new Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu was reported as saying that his ultimate goal is the abolition of the death penalty.

"These executions cast a dark shadow on the country's human rights record, and blatantly contradict the Justice Minister's previously declared intention to abolish the death penalty," said Catherine Baber, deputy director of Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific programme.

The resignation of Wang Ching-feng as Minister of Justice last March sparked international attention over the issue of the death penalty in Taiwan. Wang Ching-feng had refused to sign execution orders because of her opposition to the death penalty.

"The world was looking to the Taiwanese authorities to choose human rights, and to show leadership on the path towards abolishing the death penalty in the Asia-Pacific. Today's executions extinguished that hope," said Catherine Baber.

The Taiwanese Alliance to End the Death Penalty has raised concerns over the legality of the executions.

The Taiwanese authorities stated today that they are still considering alternatives to the death penalty, but such commitments are of little value while executions continue.

139 countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice. Amnesty International calls upon the Taiwanese authorities to immediately establish a moratorium on executions and take all the necessary steps to abolish the death penalty in the country.

Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases, as a violation of the right to life and the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.

Amnesty International believes that the death penalty legitimizes an irreversible act of violence by the state.
Research demonstrates that the death penalty is often applied in a discriminatory manner, being used disproportionately against the poor, minorities and members of racial, ethnic and religious communities. The death penalty is often imposed after a grossly unfair trial.

But even when trials respect international standards of fairness, the risk of executing the innocent can never be fully eliminated – the death penalty will inevitably claim innocent victims, as has been persistently demonstrated.

Scientific studies have consistently failed to find convincing evidence that the death penalty deters crime more effectively than other punishments.

Two resolutions, calling for a worldwide moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty, were adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in December 2007 and 2008 by an overwhelming majority of states.
Tuesday, May 04, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

EU Condemns Resumption Of Executions InTaiwan

Statement by the spokesperson of HR Catherine Ashton on the resumption of executions in Taiwan


The spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton has issued the following statement today: 

The High Representative condemns the executions in Taiwan of Chang Jun Hong, Hong Chen Yao, Ke Shi Ming and Chang Wen Wei.

The High Representative deplores the resumption of executions in Taiwan. The European Union had been encouraged by the de facto moratorium on executions which had been in place since 2005 and which had been continued by the administration of President Ma Ying Jeou.

The European Union's strongly held view in favour of the abolition of capital punishment is well known. The European Union considers that the abolition of the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and the progressive development of human rights. It is the European Union's view that the death penalty does not serve as an effective deterrent, and that any miscarriage of justice, which is inevitable in any legal system, is irreversible.

Consequently, the death penalty has been abolished in all European Union countries. The European Union believes that the reasons for doing away with this penalty remain valid in any part of the world. Universal abolition of the death penalty is thus a strongly held position shared by all European Union Member States, who regard moratoria on executions as an important step towards that aim.

The European Union urges the Government of Taiwan immediately to resume the de facto moratorium on the death penalty, pending legal abolition, which should include all cases still on death row in Taiwan. The European Union further urges the Government of Taiwan to resume a policy towards eventual abolition of the death penalty, in line with the global trend towards universal abolition.
Saturday, May 01, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

U.S. Consolidates Military Network In Asia-Pacific Region

By Rick Rozoff

The United States has six naval fleets and eleven aircraft carrier strike groups patrolling the world's oceans and seas. The U.S. Navy is as large as the world's next thirteen biggest navies combined [1].

Washington has as many aircraft carriers as all other nations together. Russia has one; China has none. The U.S. and its NATO allies - Britain (2), Italy (2), France (1) and Spain (1) - account for 17 of 22 in service in the world. Ten of the eleven American carriers are Nimitz class nuclear-powered supercarriers, substantially larger than most all non-U.S. ones. The U.S. Navy has all ten supercarriers in the world at the moment. [2]

U.S. aircraft carriers contain 70-80 planes and are available for deployment in all the world's oceans and most of its seas. They are escorted in their carrier groups by anti-air and anti-submarine warfare guided missile destroyers, anti-submarine warfare frigates, missile cruisers with long-range Tomahawks, and nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines. The U.S. also maintains between ten and twelve naval expeditionary strike groups which include amphibious assault ships and AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters in addition to destroyers, cruisers, frigates, attack submarines and P-3C Orion long-range anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft.

With the reestablishing of the Navy's Fourth Fleet - its area of responsibility includes Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea - two years ago after a 58-year hiatus, the U.S. has six fleets that can be dispatched to all five oceans.

The Seventh Fleet (there is no First Fleet), based in Japan, is the largest of U.S. forward-deployed fleets and consists of as many as 40–60 ships, 200-350 aircraft and 20,000-60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Its area of responsibility takes in more than 50 million square miles of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, from Russia's Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south, from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea, South Africa to the Korean Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait.

When on the occasion of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize last December President Barack Obama referred to himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the world's sole military superpower he was not guilty of hyperbole if he was of hubris. His defense budget for next year is almost half as large as world military spending for 2008, the last year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has compiled figures.

The U.S. has mutual defense treaties with six nations in the Asia-Pacific area: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The Pentagon has bases in Japan and South Korea, troops and base camps in the Philippines, satellite surveillance sites in Australia and the use of air bases in Thailand.

Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are included in the American global missile interceptor network with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and ship-based Standard Missile-3 deployments in those four nations. Last December it was announced that the U.S. will supply Taiwan with 200 Patriot anti-ballistic missiles and the following month it was revealed that Washington will also provide Taiwan with eight frigates capable of being upgraded to fire Standard Missile-3 interceptors. [3]

Last week the head of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, told the U.S. Congress that, as Reuters summarized it, "Japan remains fully committed to building a linchpin multibillion-dollar missile interceptor with the United States," despite hopes to the contrary entertained after the Democratic Party of Japan's Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister last September.

Referring to the current Standard Missile-3 enhancement program, O'Reilly said that Japanese government officials "have indicated that they are in full support and their commitments are solid."

In regards to the upgraded interceptor missile, the SM-3 Block IIA, he added, "Within the next year, we will begin our discussions on production arrangements between the United States and Japan." [4]

On April 27 the U.S. renewed a military logistics agreement with Australia "allowing deployed Australian forces to exploit the vast logistics capability of the American military" and permitting "U.S. forces on operations to make use of Australian logistics."

"Since its inception, the agreement had ensured supply support and services to Australian and U.S. forces deployed to all parts of the world wherever they were operating together....That included mutual support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [5]

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General James Cartwright, is visiting New Zealand this week to consult with the country's top military commanders and defense minister.

Cartwright is "the first vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit New Zealand since the position was established" in 1986. [6] His visit comes two weeks after NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, made similar trips to New Zealand and Australia.

Last month New Zealand's Defence Minister Wayne Mapp announced that joint military exercises with the U.S. would resume after 23 years, since the nation's 1987 ban on the docking of nuclear-powered warships and submarines.

New Zealand has been brought back into the fold in part by providing NATO with over 200 troops for the war in Afghanistan. Australia, with over 1,500 soldiers assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in the nation, is the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the war. Last year it unveiled plans for the most extensive military buildup in its post-World War Two history. [7]

On April 23 the U.S. and India launched the ten-day Malabar 2010 military exercises after "Ships, submarines and aircraft from the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet arrived in Goa" to engage in maneuvers which include training for "surface and anti-submarine warfare, coordinated gunnery exercises [and] air defense...." [8] The U.S. contribution consists of two guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate, a guided missile cruiser, a nuclear fast-attack submarine, P-3 Orion anti-submarine and surveillance aircraft, SH-60B Seahawk helicopters and Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) special forces.

The Malabar war games have been conducted jointly by the U.S. and India since 1992 (except for 1998-2001 after India carried out nuclear tests), but last year included Japan, and Malabar 2007 was a five-nation operation held in the Bay of Bengal with the U.S. and India joined by Australia, Japan and Singapore, leading to suspicions of U.S. designs for an Asia-Pacific analogue of NATO.

As Malabar 2010 was underway, "warships, combat aircraft and soldiers" from Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore (all Commonwealth nations) began Exercise Bersama Shield 2010 "on the Malaysian peninsula and in the South China Sea." [9]

Malaysia is among a minority of maritime states not to have joined the U.S.-launched Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) whose architect was then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. Established in 2003 as "a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors," [10], it has grown to incorporate over 90 of the world's 148 coastal nations. [11]

China, Indonesia and Malaysia have refused to join, though South Korea did in May of last year, and the first three countries along with Iran and North Korea - the states used as justification for the PSI - view the U.S.-led global surveillance, interdiction and boarding operation with deep concern and doubts about its legality, as it operates without a United Nations mandate, can be argued to circumvent and violate international maritime law, and in effect grants the U.S. and its allies the self-arrogated right to conduct piracy on the high seas.

"Launched on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. President Obama strongly supports the PSI. On April 5, 2009 in Prague, the President called on the international community to make PSI a 'durable international institution.'" [12]

The PSI has been effectively if not formally extended into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa with the U.S.-run Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 warship deployments. Recently the South Korean navy assumed command of Combined Task Force 151 from Singapore. Combined Task Force 150 contributing navies include those of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey.

Last week it was announced that NATO welcomed South Korea as the 46th nation supplying it with troops for the war in Afghanistan. On March 29 Mongolia became the 45th. [13] Singapore also has troops serving under NATO in the country and until this year Japan was providing naval support to the U.S. war effort there.

On April 26 the China Daily reported that Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly in charge of strategic studies at the Chinese army's National Defense University, said "The United States is the greatest perceived threat to the People's Liberation Army" and that "the US was the only country capable of threatening China's national security interests in an all-round way." [14]

Another Chinese news source on the same day wrote of U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) plans to be able to strike any target on earth within sixty minutes and the Pentagon's recent test flights of the X-37B orbital space plane and the Falcon hypersonic spy plane, reporting that "Chinese space technology expert Pang Zhihao said the spaceship...aids the PGS program, which he said could be a potential threat to world peace." [15]

The previous day London's Sunday Times acknowledged that "Obama's interest in Prompt Global Strike (PGS)...has alarmed China and Russia...." [16]

U.S. fast strike and first strike global missile and space strategy and its expansion of military alliances and networks in the Asia-Pacific area are rightly seen as threats to China and Russia. And to international security and peace.


Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.

NOTES:

1) Measured by battle fleet tonnage.
2) A supercarrier is currently defined as an aircraft carrier displacing 70,000 or more tons.
3) U.S.-China Military Tensions Grow
Stop NATO, January 19, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/u-s-china-military-tensions-grow
4) Reuters, April 21, 2010
5) Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010
6) Ibid
7) Australian Military Buildup And The Rise Of Asian NATO
Stop NATO, May 6, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/australian-military-buildup-and-the-rise-of-asian-nato
8) Navy Newsstand, April 23, 2010
9) Agence France-Presse, April 26, 2010
10) U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm
11) Proliferation Security Initiative And U.S. 1,000-Ship Navy: Control Of
World’s Oceans, Prelude To War
Stop NATO, January 29, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/proliferation-security-initiative-and-us-1000-ship-navy-control-of-worlds-oceans-prelude-to-war
12) U.S. Department of State, Ibid
13) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
14) China Daily, April 26, 2010
15) Global Times, April 26, 2010
16) Sunday Times, April 25, 2010
Thursday, April 29, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

China Puts Google And Obama In Their Place

By B. Raman

The Chinese Government has quietly put Google and President Barack Obama in their place.

In January this year, Google had expressed its intention to review its presence in China if the Chinese Government continued to insist that its search engines should black out items and web sites of political dissidents. It also protested against the alleged snooping of the e-mail addresses of Tibetan and other separatist elements using the Google mail service by the Chinese authorities.

The Chinese authorities, while regretting the decision of Google, had pointed out that the restrictions imposed in the interest of national security by the Chinese Government were in force even when Google entered the Chinese market. They looked upon the move of Google for a so-called review as politically motivated without any legal justification and made it clear that Google was welcome to continue to function in China provided it observed the Chinese regulations relating to the Internet. They rejected with indignation Google’s allegations of cyber snooping by Beijing.

Members of the Obama Administration, including Mrs. Hilary Clinton, the Secretary of State, came out in support of Google, but this did not have any effect on Beijing. Since then there has been a stalemate with neither Google nor the Chinese Government making any further move in the matter.

In the latest development, the Chinese authorities have strongly denied that any talks on the issues raised by Google were going on with its officials. They have bluntly made it clear that while they would be happy if Google decided to continue in China and observe its Internet regulations, they would be equally happy to facilitate its exit from the Chinese market if it wanted to quit.

The “China Daily” reported as follows on March 6,2010: “China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology refuted that China has been involved in any negotiations with Google since the US search engine threatened on January 21 to pull back from the country."We have yet to have any direct contacts or negotiations with them on this topic," said Miao Wei, vice-minister of the MIIT, at the sidelines of the annual session of the National People's Congress. Google had never filed reports over alleged Internet regulations and cyber attacks to the ministry or requested for negotiations, said Miao. It had also never informed the ministry that it was planning to withdraw from China. He said China respects Google's right to decide whether to continue its business in the country. "If Google decides to continue its business in China and abides by China's laws, it's welcome to stay," Miao said. "If the company chooses to withdraw from the Chinese market, it must go through certain procedures according to the law and regulations and deal with customers' problems that may arise." Miao also said he didn't think the Google incident should affect relations between China and the US."It's not a huge problem that should impact the relationship of two countries," he said. He said China doesn't want to see an Internet technical incident upgraded to a political dispute. He also said China welcomes Google to provide further information about the hacker attacks it claimed. "We will definitely investigate on the issue, because we are the victims of hackers too."Google had studied China's laws and regulations before it entered the Chinese market in 2007 and had pledged in written form to abide by the laws and regulations.”

The Chinese have similarly put Obama in his place over his decisions to sell a fresh package of arms to Taiwan and to receive His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the White House last month. The Chinese had initially reacted strongly against these decisions and announced the postponement of exchanges of military level visits between the two countries over the Taiwan issue. They had also threatened to impose sanctions against US companies selling military equipment to Taiwan under the proposed package. They have since played down these threats and permitted the US naval ship USS Nimitz to visit Hong Kong.

On Tibet, they had strongly criticised the Mr.Obama's meeting with His Holiness, but refrained from openly threatening any retaliatory action. However, Chinese officials were spreading word that President Hu Jintao may not attend the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in the US next month to which Obama attaches considerable importance to express Beijing's unhappiness over the sale of arms to Taiwan and over the meeting with His Holiness.

Chinese sources see a link between the speculation about a likely boycott of the nuclear security summit by Mr.Hu Jintao and Mr. Obama's decision to send Mr. James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, and Mr. Jeffrey Bader , a White House aide, to Beijing last week reportedly to remove misunderstandings arising from the decisions to sell more arms to Taiwan and to receive His Holiness. The visiting US officials were reported to have reassured their Chinese interlocutors that Mr. Obama's decisions did not mean any change in the US position on the one-China policy and that Tibet was an integral part of China

Commenting on the visit of the two officials to Beijing, Mr. Philip Crowley, a State Department spokesman, said on March 4,2010, that the US and China "agreed on the high importance each attaches to the relationships and their commitment to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship." He added that the US responded to China's concerns on Taiwan "by reiterating that it has followed a consistent approach, pursued by both administrations of both political parties, on a 'One China' policy."

Briefing the media in Beijing, Qin Gang, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that the US had agreed to "take China's position seriously, honor China's core interests and major concerns" and to act to improve relations. Mr. Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, also commented on the relations with the US while briefing the media on March 7, 2010, on China’s foreign policy in the margins of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, the Chinese Parliament, being held since March 5, 2010. He urged the US to take seriously China's position and respect China's core interests and major concerns with credible steps.

He added: "The United States should properly handle relevant sensitive issues and work with the Chinese side to return the China-US relationship to the track of stable development. The China-US relationship had a good start after President Obama took office last year. However, the US arms sales to Taiwan and the US leader’s meeting with the Dalai Lama caused a serious disturbance to the China-US ties and posed difficulty to the cooperation between the two countries. Such a situation is not in the interest of either side, and the responsibility for the difficulty in Sino-US relations does not lie with China."

Referring to the talks with the two visiting US officials, he said: “"The Chinese side stated in full its principled position on China-US relations and on major issues, including Taiwan and Tibet related issues. We pointed out that the relevant moves taken by the US side had seriously violated the principles set out in the three China-US joint communiques and the China-US joint statement. The moves undermined China's core interests and the overall interests of China-US relations, and China is firmly opposed to these moves."

While the US has thus taken the initiative to cool the bilateral tensions by reassuring Beijing that there has been no change in its one-China policy and on Tibet being an integral part of China, it is not yet clear whether the Chinese are sufficiently satisfied by the US assurances and whether President Hu will attend the nuclear security summit.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Monday, March 08, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Strong Earthquake Hits Taiwan; No Tsunami Alert

A powerful 6.4-magnitude earthquake jolted southern Taiwan on Thursday, injuring at least 11 people, disrupting transport, and triggering landslides and five fires, local media reported.

No tsunami alert was issued as a result to the quake that occurred at 8:18 a.m. (0018 GMT), said the Tapei-based Nownews Service.

The epicenter of the quake was a remote mountainous area of Kaohsiung County, at a depth of 5 kilometers, and aftershocks were continuing in the region.

The quake was felt across the island, and buildings swayed in the capital Taipei, some 250 kilometers away.

High-speed railway service linking Taipei and Kaohsiung were partially suspended for damage inspection.

Earthquakes are frequent in Taiwan, which lies at the intersection of the Philippine and Eurasian plates.

The most destructive was a 7.6-magnitude quake that killed more than 2,400 people and destroyed or damaged 50,000 buildings in 1999.

Source: KUNA
Thursday, March 04, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Chile Quake Triggers Tsunami Alerts in Asia, Hawaii Included

Countries in the Asia-Pacific region are bracing for a possible tsunami following a massive earthquake in Chile.

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii issued a warning for the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia and many island nations in the Pacific. A lower-level advisory was issued for the northern Pacific region.

Many countries along the Pacific Rim are evacuating residents from coastal areas.

Sirens warned residents in the French Polynesian islands to move away from the shores to higher ground. The first waves are expected to hit the Gambier archipelago.

The Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Center put that country's eastern states on a tsunami watch. Officials said high waves could reach Australia early Sunday and cause flooding.

New Zealand also is on alert, with officials warning of waves up to three meters high. The waves are expected to end in Japan.

It is hard to predict the wave length of any tsunami, or its exact path, until after it has hit the shore. The waves may not arrive at all, or could be as high as 10 meters above normal sea level.

Experts also warn that the first waves may not be the highest.

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is the most destructive on record. It was generated by a 9.0-magnitude underwater quake with an epicenter near Indonesia's Sumatra island. It killed about 150,000 people, most of them in south Asia and southeast Asia.

Officials in the Philippines are planning for possible evacuations. The country is still recovering from last year's deadly storms that caused flooding and landslides.

Japan suffered its own 7.0-magnitude quake Saturday, off the coast of the southernmost island of Okinawa. No injuries or major damage were reported.


Source: VOA
Saturday, February 27, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Meeting Taiwan's Self-Defense Needs

By Dean Cheng

The United States is the provider of both tangible security and political stability to the Taiwan Strait. Given China's ongoing military buildup, particularly toward Taiwan, it is essential that the United States provide Taiwan with the physical and political means to resist the capacity of the Chinese military to alter the political status quo. This should include continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and maintaining a robust U.S. military capability in the region.


In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. --Taiwan Relations Act of 1979[1]

With the new year, the Obama Administration has cleared the sale of advanced Patriot air defense missiles and Blackhawk helicopters to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan[2] as part of a larger package of arms sales that the Bush Administration announced in its waning days.[3] This is in keeping with the Taiwan Relations Act and the American commitment "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character." The legal mandate for this sale is clear. What remains unclear, however, is what other systems the U.S. will sell to Taiwan to help provide it with "sufficient self-defense."

To understand Taiwan's defense needs, it is important to consider the threat confronting Taiwan. Over the past decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has doubled its defense budget, greatly increasing the forces arrayed against the island. U.S. efforts to redress this imbalance are essential to any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue that accounts for the views on both sides of the strait and is not imposed under duress from Beijing. U.S. arms sales serve as both military and political signals to Beijing that the U.S. will stand by its commitments to Taiwan and maintain a robust American forward presence in the East Asian region.

The PRC Threat

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan occur in the context of a convergence between the steady development of the Chinese armed forces, especially the People's Liberation Army (PLA),[4] and its amphibious doctrine, which has clear implications for Taiwan.

For much of the past 15 years, the PLA has enjoyed annual double-digit growth in its defense budget. As a result, the official PLA budget has doubled since 1998.[5] Some of this has been used for improving military pay and the soldiers' standard of living. In 2006, the PLA increased military salaries across the board--a substantial expenditure given the 2.25 million personnel in China's active duty military.[6] Such increases are necessary to attract and retain the higher quality personnel necessary to fight today's "local wars under conditions of informatization."[7]

Yet much of the increased funding has been used to improve the quality of the PLA's equipment. This sustained investment in military acquisition since the late 1990s has resulted in a significant influx of new systems for all of the PLA services and a concomitant growth in their capabilities.

Chinese Military Capabilities.The ground forces, the preeminent PLA service, number some 1.7 million troops, organized into seven military regions and 18 group armies. These include a range of armored, mechanized, and motorized divisions and brigades as well as air defense brigades and amphibious assault divisions.[8] The steady increase in funding has enabled the acquisition of new main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and attack and transport helicopters. However, as PLA writings still regularly note, the PLA is only a "half-mechanized army," and many infantry divisions appear to be "leg" infantry (i.e., neither motorized nor mechanized.[9] For example, one PLA article notes the "twin burdens" of having to both mechanize and informatize (i.e., incorporate advanced information technologies).[10]

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is one of the world's largest navies. It fields nearly 60 nuclear-powered and conventionally powered submarines.[11] The bulk of China's diesel-electric submarines, including the Russian-built Kilo-class and the Chinese-built Song-class and Yuan-class, are of recent construction and very quiet. The Chinese are also reportedly investigating the possibility of developing new, air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems for some of their submarines.[12] Furthermore, PLAN submarines are armed with anti-ship missiles and wake-homing torpedoes that pose a growing threat to any surface forces that might be arrayed against them.

In addition, the PLAN has some 30 major surface combatants, the most modern of which field advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and advanced surface-to-air anti-aircraft systems. They are supported by nearly 50 frigates and nearly 200 coastal patrol craft as well as a variety of fast attack craft (FAC). To conduct amphibious assaults, the PLAN has around 70 landing ships of various displacements, including high-speed air-cushion vehicles.[13] In event of a conflict, the PLA can also call upon one of the world's largest merchant fleets to provide additional sealift for follow-on echelons.

The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) has about 700 shorter-ranged combat aircraft, including several hundred fighters and fighter-bombers and perhaps two dozen longer-range bombers.[14] These range from newly built H-6 bombers (based on 1950s-vintage Tu-16 Badger designs) to old J-6 fighter aircraft (the equivalent of the MiG-19) to more recent JH-7/FBC-1 and modern Su-30MKK aircraft.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has some 250,000 personnel,[15] organized into 32 air divisions, each with up to four regiments, which include fighters, ground attack aircraft, long-range bombers, transport aircraft, electronic warfare and reconnaissance craft, and a handful of tankers.[16] As with the PLAN and PLANAF, the PLAAF flight line is composed of a mix of old aircraft, some dating back to the 1960s, as well as more modern designs, including the domestically designed J-10 and the Russian-built Su-27 and Su-30MKK. These latter aircraft, including the Chinese-designed J-11, are of the same generation as the U.S. F-15, F-15E, F-16, and F-18 combat aircraft.[17] China is developing a new generation of fighter aircraft, counterparts to the U.S. F-22 and F-35.[18]

The PLAAF is also responsible for a variety of ground-based air defenses. It controls several divisions equipped with advanced systems, such as the Russian-built S-300PMU1/SA-10B and S-300PMU2/SA-10C and the Chinese-designed Hongqi (Red Flag) HQ-9 and HQ-10 air defense missiles, in addition to older HQ-7 and HQ-2 systems.[19] The more modern systems are believed to be comparable in effectiveness to the Patriot PAC-2, PAC-2+, and PAC-3. The PLAAF is also responsible for several thousand anti-aircraft guns.

In addition, as part of China's forced entry capability, the PLAAF controls 35,000 airborne troops organized into three divisions.[20] As seen in the 2009 National Day parade, elements of these divisions are now equipped with armored vehicles designed for airdrops, similar in concept (but not design) to the Soviet BMD mechanized airborne combat vehicle. This gives the assault elements more protected firepower and mobility than the traditional light infantry airborne unit.

Finally, the Chinese Second Artillery fields hundreds to thousands of short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.[21] The bulk of these missiles are arrayed opposite Taiwan and deployed on mobile launchers, making them difficult to target. In addition, China has developed land-attack cruise missiles, which may also fall under the purview of the Second Artillery. There are also persistent reports that China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile system, which could target major combatants (e.g., U.S. aircraft carriers).

However, simple bean counts tell only part of the story. How well can the PLA employ these capabilities? Since the early 1990s, the PLA has steadily sought to develop a doctrine that accounts for the major changes in modern warfare. By 1999, after witnessing not only the first Gulf War, but also NATO operations in the Balkans, the PLA unveiled a set of regulations governing PLA operations.[22] These new regulations highlighted joint operations as the hallmark of future warfare, which would be focused on "Local Wars Under Modern, High-Technology Conditions" (i.e., localized, limited wars with an emphasis on precision munitions and information technology). In essence, the PLA was shrugging off the old "people's war" mentality of relying on "rifles and millet" and overwhelming numbers (e.g., human wave attacks) with an emphasis on guerrilla warfare and protracted conflict.

Instead, the PLA would focus on developing not only combined arms operations (a growing focus as early as the mid-1980s) among branches within a service, but also joint operations among services. As one PLA analysis described it, the "fundamental expression" of Local Wars Under Modern, High-Technology Conditions would be joint campaigns.[23] Importantly, joint operations are an essential element of a successful amphibious operation. By definition, amphibious assaults are joint because they involve land, sea, and air forces. By highlighting joint operations, the PLA was essentially making a virtue of a necessity and incorporating a prerequisite for a successful Taiwan invasion into its most basic training and operational planning.

PLA Concepts of Amphibious Landing Campaigns.Subsequent PLA writings on amphibious landing campaigns provide further indications of PLA operational concepts and, implicitly, the requirements attendant with a successful campaign. According to PLA assessments, amphibious landing operations are marked by several essential characteristics.

  • Amphibious landing operations are difficult to conceal from an opponent.
  • They require securing information superiority, air superiority, and maritime superiority.
  • They involve high-intensity conflict, including high rates of weapons expenditure and casualties, especially in securing the initial beachhead.
  • The command and control associated with them is very difficult, especially because they are joint operations.
  • The logistical support is difficult.[24]
In light of these considerations, PLA writings suggest that certain tasks are associated with a successful amphibious operation. These techniques, in turn, suggest potential countermoves[25] that might complicate an amphibious operation:



  • Careful planning and preparation. Given the complexity of amphibious operations, extensive planning is required to prepare for potential contingencies. Implicitly then, the defender's ability to create surprises or otherwise disrupt the landing operation will force the attacker to diverge from his plans, which in turn will place the operation at risk.
  • Use of a variety of techniques to secure information, air, and maritime superiority. The ability to secure the "three superiorities" will likely comprise a major portion of the PLA's planning effort. The Taiwan military has concluded that the key areas of PLA capability improvement include air strike, maritime strike, and electronic warfare.[26] A defender who prevents the attacker from obtaining superiority in these areas, or at least challenges the attacker's ability to maintain superiority, can put the attack's prospects for success in doubt.
  • Concentration of the best forces. This suggests that the attacker is unlikely to retain a strategic reserve of advanced forces. If the attacker truly has concentrated all of his best forces, then if they are defeated, there will not be sufficient forces to mount a second effort. (However, especially in the context of the PLA, this is not the same as suggesting that the attacker has been disarmed.) In essence, the attacker is expected to go "all in," employing his best forces and most advanced capabilities.
  • Rapid, sustained attacks and rapid exploitation of any initial successes. Preventing close coordination among the attacking forces so that the attacker cannot sustain his efforts and exploit successes would likely disrupt the plan and lead to defeat in detail.
  • Concentration of integrated logistical support at the most essential points. Sustained attacks require a sustained supply of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts. The logistical chain in an amphibious operation against Taiwan would run from the assaulting forces to the beachhead or port to the supply vessels and in turn across the Taiwan Strait to Chinese ports and supply depots. Disrupting any part of the chain will eventually affect the front-line forces.
  • Conducting not only physical attacks, but psychological attacks aimed at shaking an opponent's will to resist. Breaking an opponent's will is essential because it reduces not only the cost of battle, but also the prospects of a resistance movement developing after the formal end of hostilities.

Themes in PLA Writings. Several themes emerge from the PLA's discussion of these elements.

The Importance of Securing Information Dominance. Information dominance is the prerequisite for securing air and maritime superiority and is the means by which the attacker can maintain the initiative. This includes the use of electronic and human reconnaissance to identify the enemy's order of battle and disposition and preserving one's own command, control, and communications system to maximize coordination of forces. In addition, it involves attacking the opponent's C4ISR[27] infrastructure, especially command and control nodes, to deny the opponent an intact ability to coordinate its defenses.

The Importance of Disrupting the Enemy's Overall Defense. Both hard-kill (e.g., missiles and air attacks) and soft-kill (e.g., cyberwarfare) techniques should aim to prevent and forestall a coordinated defense. The aim is not to simply kill a large number of defenders, but to paralyze the overall defense. In this manner, even individually capable units that survive the onslaught would be unable to coordinate their responses effectively.

The Importance of Intangible Factors in Combat. The PLA's emphasis on the importance of breaking an opponent's will is consistent with Sun Tzu's notion of winning without fighting, as well as Mao's military theories, which emphasized the importance of the human factor. The PLA would almost certainly prefer to undermine the willingness of the Taiwan population, political leadership, and military to resist, rather than engage in a campaign of attrition to secure the island.

PLA writings therefore specifically note that priority targets include military and political command centers, electronic warfare centers, air and naval bases, air defense systems, and surface-to-surface missile sites. Surviving enemy air and naval forces then must be denied the ability to interdict the attacking forces and their logistical support through a combination of missiles, mines, special operations forces, and the efforts of the land, sea, and air forces.

Taiwan's Defenses

Even as the PLA has been formulating its plans for taking Taiwan, the Republic of China's military has been taking steps to ensure the security of the island.

The ROC Army's 200,000 soldiers are organized into three corps and almost 40 brigades. Like the PLA's ground forces, the bulk of Taiwan's units are "leg" infantry. There are six armored brigades, one armored infantry brigade, and three motorized infantry brigades.[28] The army is equipped with 1960s-vintage M48H Brave Tigers, which have upgraded electronics and sensors, and somewhat newer M60A3 main battle tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers. Much of its tube artillery is towed, although it also deploys a variety of multiple rocket launchers, including the Ray Ting 2000, a domestic variant of the American M270 Multiple Launcher Rocket System. Its fleet of AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters is being supplemented with the AH-64D Apache with the Longbow radar system, and it is expected to receive UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopters.[29]

The ROC Navy (ROCN) is mostly equipped with retired American naval vessels, including four Kidd-class destroyers armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles and SM-2 Standard Medium-Range surface-to-air missiles. It has 22 frigates, which will be supplemented with eight Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates that are armed with a mix of anti-submarine and anti-ship systems.[30] Finally, it has more than 60 fast attack craft equipped with anti-ship missiles[31] and 15,000 marines organized into three brigades.

The ROC Air Force (ROCAF) has about 450 fighters and bombers, ranging from obsolescent F-5 fighters to the indigenously produced Ching-Kuo fighter and about 200 F-16A/Bs and Mirage 2000s. The proposed sale of 66 F-16C/Ds would replace the 89 F-5s, which were designed in the 1950s and entered production in the early 1960s.[32]

To counter the various Chinese missiles arrayed against the island, the Taiwan armed forces are shielded by six PAC-3 Patriot batteries and six Tien Kung (Sky Bow) surface-to-air missile systems manned by the ROC Army. However, these systems are not tactically mobile, so their firing locations have likely been identified and targeted.

In any confrontation with the PRC, Taiwan's forces will likely be outnumbered. The key to defeating any Chinese assault will therefore heavily depend on effectively deploying and allocating Taiwan's limited defense resources to maximize their impact.

During his 2000 presidential campaign, Chen Shui-bian advocated the concept of "Decisive Campaign Outside the Territory."[33] This meant engaging any attacker at sea as well as on the Chinese side of the Taiwan Strait, raising the potential for Taiwan to act preemptively to neutralize enemy military targets if an enemy attack was deemed imminent or unavoidable. However, once Chen came to power, his administration jettisoned this aspect as excessively escalatory and provocative. Instead, his administration focused on developing deep strike capabilities within the air force and navy to engage the enemy before they could establish a beachhead on Taiwan, but not preemptively.[34] The goal was to inflict casualties throughout the course of any attack, from embarkation of enemy forces throughout their transit by sea or air to the landing on the island.

Toward these ends, Taiwan developed the Hsiung Feng-2E (HF-2E) cruise missile, which can engage the enemy at a distance of 600 kilometers.[35] These missiles allow the ROC armed forces not only to target Chinese ports of embarkation, but also to cover many PLAAF and PLANAF airfields, reducing the PLA's ability to establish air and naval superiority. Taiwan is developing the HF-2E Block II, a variant with a reported range of 800-1000 kilometers, which would place even more PLA facilities at risk.[36]

The Taiwan 2004 National Defense Review also emphasized the acquisition of "precision stand-off weapon systems and...electronic countermeasure forces in order to augment our deep strike capabilities."[37] It posited that stand-off capabilities would buy the Taiwan defenses more time, both by inflicting casualties among assault forces as they were massing and by disrupting the intricate command and control structures required to coordinate such a massive undertaking as a full-blown invasion of the island.

Such a course of defensive action is predicated in part on PLA planning, which indicates that causing significant casualties among PLA forces would likely disrupt its operational plans. In essence, Taiwan's objective is to deter China from launching an assault in the first place by making it clear that any Chinese operational plan would face a high likelihood of disruption and therefore failure. Even if deterrence failed, destroying the initial echelon would delay the PLA in establishing and exploiting a beachhead, buying time both for an ROC counterstroke and for U.S. forces to deploy and help to stanch any further PLA assaults.

With the transition from Chen to Ma Ying-jeou, the focus shifted back toward defeating the PLA on Taiwan's shores. In a February 2008 speech, Ma discussed the "Hard ROC" concept. Rather than pursue the ability to strike at the PRC's territory, which Ma indicated might lead to a preemptive PRC threat, Taiwan should, instead, build "an integrated defensive capability that will make it impossible to scare us, blockade us, occupy us, or wear us down."[38] The objective would be to ensure that the Taiwan military could maintain an effective resistance, even under bombardment and attack. As the subsequent 2009 ROC Defense Report states, Taiwan's military should be as "steadfast as a boulder" (gu ruo pan shi) and would strive to create a Taiwan defense capability that "cannot be intimidated, cannot be seized, cannot be devoured, cannot be crushed."[39] This would entail capitalizing on Taiwan's presumed advantages of local mobility, knowledge of the local terrain, and time.

Under the Hard ROC concept, Taiwan would seek to ride out the initial assault, denying the PRC a quick victory and sustaining resistance--implicitly until the United States could intervene. Key requirements include "ensuring the survivability of Taiwan's warfighting capability and infrastructure...and improving defense mobilization activities."[40] Efforts to achieve this resiliency include the improvement of rapid runway repair capabilities to allow ROCAF airbases to survive and sustain operations even after repeated attacks and the acquisition of transport helicopters to rapidly redeploy forces after identifying the enemy's main thrust.[41] The ability of the ROC armed forces to weather an initial PLA onslaught and still offer coordinated resistance would, it is hoped, deter any assault in the first place.[42]

For all their differences, both the Chen and Ma administrations recognized the importance of improving the island's command and control infrastructure. This is essential to maximizing the military's available capabilities, such as launching joint operations against invading PLA forces while they are still at sea or in the air. Under Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan began funding for the Po Sheng (Broad Victory) C4ISR system. This would be Taiwan's first national-level joint command and control system, and is roughly comparable to the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)--the backbone of U.S. military communications and data sharing.[43] When Ma came into office, he noted, "We must also reduce the fragility of our C4ISR system."[44] The 2009 Taiwan Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that, to meet its defense requirements, Taiwan must acquire "a higher level of systematic links to reduce the time required for the cycle of 'detection--processing--decision--action,'" thereby improving its joint warfare capabilities.[45] In essence, it needs to improve its C4ISR capabilities. This includes electronic warfare, and air and naval surveillance capabilities.

To this end, Taiwan has continued to make substantial investments in C4ISR capabilities, including the Po Sheng defense system, so that Taiwan's limited assets can be employed most effectively. The Po Sheng program is a centerpiece of this effort--a scalable C4ISR system of datalinks that provides Taiwan with a networked sensor-weapon grid that allows land, sea, and air forces to share information and maintain situational awareness under a joint command and control system.[46] It "maximizes unit, sensor, and weapon employment...[and] optimizes weapon-target pairing for layered defense."[47] Regrettably, limits in overall Taiwan defense spending has meant that a number of key Taiwan weapons systems are still not integrated into the program, including the Patriot anti-missile batteries and the Lafayette-class frigates.

The Po Sheng program and other C4ISR enhancements are essential to any successful defense. Just as the PLA seeks to exploit asymmetric strategies to counter the U.S. military in the event of a major conflict, the Taiwan military, through improved C4ISR capabilities, hopes to pose asymmetric responses to PLA attacks.

The Role of the United States

While the Taiwan armed forces are ultimately responsible for the defense of Taiwan, the disparity in numbers and capabilities--including, ultimately, the Chinese nuclear threat--means that the United States is indispensable in ensuring their success. In this regard, the United States plays two key roles. First, the United States is a key provider of the physical elements of security. For a variety of reasons, at present only the United States is willing to sell Taiwan advanced military equipment. Moreover, under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States effectively serves as a guarantor of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, as it seeks to ensure that the political status quo is altered only with the consent of both sides. Operationally, this has meant that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a unilateral PRC decision to use force against the island.

Equally as important, the United States provides political support to the people and government of Taiwan. As the diplomatic space of the Republic of China has shrunk and China's power has become more prominent, U.S. support has been essential in ensuring that the people of Taiwan are able to chart their own path.

In this context, the policies that the Obama Administration pursues with regard to Taiwan will be key determinants of the Taiwan Strait situation for the foreseeable future. The United States therefore needs to provide Taiwan with both the physical and the political means to defend itself.

Specifically, the United States needs to:

  • Help to equip Taiwan to counter any PLA attack.

To defend itself, Taiwan must have the necessary equipment. Given the realities of the global arms market, the United States is the only supplier of advanced weapons that is willing to challenge PRC pressures and provide the ROC armed forces with weapons.

Therefore, it is essential that the U.S. make clear that it will provide Taiwan with the necessary equipment to meet the island's military needs. Based on the ROC Ministry of National Defense's own statements of requirements, this would include the means of effecting a Hard ROC capability (including the ability to absorb the first blow), countering decapitating strikes, employing mobility to counter an attack, and sustaining the defenses even in the face of extended enemy attacks.[48]

This would suggest that continued provision of C4ISR systems should be a priority for the Obama Administration because it is a key part of Taiwan defense planning to counter an invasion. At the same time, providing improved missile defense capabilities is important, especially given the PRC's ongoing buildup of both cruise and ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. Moreover, these systems almost certainly need to be made more tactically mobile so that they can relocate after the initial attack.

What is less clear is how to provide the design information to build diesel-electric submarines. The United States does not build or deploy such boats and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. The states that do manufacture such boats (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Russia, and Japan) are unlikely to sell them to Taiwan. Even if the U.S. provided Taiwan with the designs for such systems, creating an indigenous submarine-building industry would take a long time and a large amount of funding. Taiwan would probably be better served by spending its money obtaining other capabilities--including land-based anti-ship missiles, more attack helicopters, and, possibly, more robust mine technology--that would hold PLA logistics support capacity and amphibious transport capabilities at risk.

Furthermore, anti-C4ISR capabilities are a particularly worthwhile investment. Given the difficulties associated with amphibious assaults, the ability to disrupt PLA command and control systems would seem to complement enhanced Taiwanese C4ISR capabilities. Taiwan, with its extensive electronics industry, would probably not require significant U.S. assistance in this regard.

  • Maintain a robust U.S. military capability, which will itself deter any PLA attack.

Another element of the security equation in the Taiwan Strait is the direct role of the U.S. military, as opposed to its indirect role of providing arms and equipment to Taiwan. To meet its obligations and to cope with any potential contingencies, the United States must maintain a robust capability in the Western Pacific so that the PRC has no illusions that it could successfully invade Taiwan if the U.S. opposed it.

In this regard, while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is focusing on the current wars that confront the United States, the U.S. needs to continue planning and preparing for potential wars. This means not only retaining the physical ability, but also training for high-intensity warfare in addition to counterinsurgency. It also means maintaining the acquisition and the research and development programs necessary to ensure that tomorrow's military will have the cutting-edge systems to do the job.

In light of the PLA's ongoing military buildup, this would include advanced air combat systems to deal with China's next-generation fighters, anti-ballistic missile capabilities, and systems to deal with China's comprehensively improving naval capabilities.

  • Continue to provide the political support to Taipei so that it can make its own decisions, not under duress from Beijing.

For all of the material support that the U.S. can provide directly and indirectly, political support is arguably most important. If Taiwan is to resist PRC pressure, including psychological warfare, it must know that the United States will support it. Otherwise, on its own, Taiwan will inevitably lose simply because of the asymmetry of arrayed forces, both real and potential.

This is not to suggest that Washington should give Taipei a blank check. As the Bush Administration noted, a unilateral change in the Taiwan Strait situation is destabilizing, whether precipitated by action in Beijing or in Taipei. However, the Ma government has made it clear that it has no intention of altering the current status quo. Consequently, it deserves American support.

In this context, the proposed sale of F-16C/Ds plays an essential role. The sale of 66 advanced F-16s will not exactly address the aerial imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, but it would nonetheless improve the situation slightly, especially given the age of the F-5s that they would replace.

However, the political signal that such a sale would send should not be underestimated. It would clearly underscore the continuing American interest in the Taiwan Strait situation and make clear that the U.S. will not sacrifice Taiwan in favor of China, be it over global warming or other issues.

This is especially pressing in light of the potential Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile threat. The prospect of China being able to threaten American carrier groups raises the question in some quarters of whether the U.S. would be prepared to risk these platforms on behalf of Taiwan. The level of anxiety often expressed in Washington circles over this possibility raises doubts about the level of American commitment. It is important to nip such doubts in the bud before they fundamentally undermine U.S. credibility and degrade Taiwan's security.

The willingness to sell weapon systems to Taiwan and other U.S. allies, even in the face of PRC opposition, would send a clear signal that U.S. defense policy will support U.S. interests, whatever China's capabilities and reactions.

Conclusion

Despite improving relations between Beijing and Taipei, the Taiwan Strait situation remains a potential flashpoint for conflict. As long as the relationship between the two sides remains uncertain, it will remain an American interest to help to ensure that neither side will try to alter the status quo. An essential element of this is providing Taiwan with the means to resist coercion by the PRC--both physical and moral. Providing Taiwan with appropriate arms is therefore not only an obligation under the TRA, but a policy that supports America's own interests in the region.

Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, where this article first appeared (http://www.heritage.org)and is reprinted with permission.

NOTES:

[1]Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S. Code §§ 3302(a).

[2]The terms "ROC" and "Taiwan" will be used interchangeably in this paper, but should not be taken to imply anything about the political situation on Taiwan. Similarly, the terms "PRC" and "China" will be used interchangeably.

[3]Foster Klug, "AP Sources: US Decides on New Taiwan Arms Sales," ABC News, January 25, 2010, at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9658885 (February 18, 2010).

[4]The Chinese armed forces technically also include the People's Armed Police (PAP) and the Chinese militia. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge Press, 2006), p. 18.

[5]Dennis Blasko, "The Pentagon-PLA Disconnect: China's Self Assessments of Its Military Capabilities," Jamestown Foundation China Brief, July 3, 2008.

[6]Xinhuanet, "Defense Budget Increase Aims at Army Stability," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, March 7, 2006, at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t239142.htm (February 18, 2010).

[7]U.S. Department of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2008, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf (February 18, 2010).

[8]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008 (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 376.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Zhang Xuncai, "Guide Army Information Building with Scientific Development Concept," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China military science), Vol. 19, No. 4 (2006), p. 21.

[11]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008, pp. 377-378.

[12]Richard A. Bitzinger, "Air Independent Powered Submarines in the Asia-Pacific: Proliferation and Repercussions," Nanyang Technical University, R. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries No. 62, June 23, 2009, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0622009.pdf (February 18, 2010).

[13]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008, p. 378.

[14]Ibid., p. 379.

[15]The PLAAF controls not only the various fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft, but also strategic surface-to-air missile forces, anti-aircraft artillery units, and the three airborne divisions. Ibid., p. 379.

[16]Ibid.

[17]For further discussion of the growing fighter gap, see Mackenzie M. Eaglen and Lajos F. Szaszdi, "The Growing Air Power Fighter Gap: Implications for U.S. National Security," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2295, July 7, 2009, esp. p. 4, at http://www.heritage.org/research
/nationalsecurity/bg2295.cfm. See also Mackenzie M. Eaglen, "Fixing the Fighter Gap Facing the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Air National Guard," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2531, July 9, 2009, at http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/wm2531.cfm.

[18]"Deputy Commander of the PLA Air Force: The Maiden Flight of the Domestically Produced Fourth Generation Fighter," Huanqiu Shibao (Global times), November 10, 2009, at http://news.syd.com.cn/content/2009-11/10/content_24615140.htm (February 18, 2010). The Chinese refer to the F-15, F-16, and F-18 as third-generation fighters and the F-22 and F-35 as fourth-generation fighters, whereas U.S. analysts refer to them as fourth-generation and fifth-generation, respectively.

[19]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008, p. 380.

[20]Ibid., p. 376.

[21]The Military Balance 2008 lists 725 DF-11 and DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles, and 35 DF-21s. Ibid., p. 376. The U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission cites a study listing 700-750 DF-11s alone, as well as 300-350 DF-15s. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009 Report to Congress, p. 240, at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/annual_report_full_09.pdf (February 18, 2010).

[22]For further discussion of the PLA's doctrinal transition, see James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, 2005), at http://www.cna.org/documents/doctrinebook.pdf (February 18, 2010).

[23]Gao Yubiao, ed., Lianhe Zhanyi Jiaocheng (Joint campaign course materials) (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Publishing House, 2001), p. 12.

[24]Drawn from Zhang Yuliang, ed., Zhanyi Xue (The science of campaigns), 2nd ed. (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Publishing House, 2006), pp. 310-312.

[25]Drawn from ibid., pp. 312-316.

[26]The other two areas identified by the Taiwan military are precision strike and amphibious landing capabilities. Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, Guofang Baogao Shu (Year 98 defense report), 2009, pp. 55-56.

[27]Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

[28]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008, p. 403.

[29]Glenn Kessler, "Obama Commends Taiwan Arms Sale," The Washington Post, October 8, 2008, at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/10/08/obama_commends_taiwan_arms_sal.html (February 18, 2010).

[30]Agence France-Presse, "Taiwan Plans to Buy US Frigates Despite China Thaw," Google News, January 11, 2010, at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gqdLeu9HUQf5hwymptRbd3KJGjSw (February 18, 2010).

[31]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008, p. 404.

[32]Northrop Grumman, "F-5 Tiger," at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/f5tiger/index.html (February 18, 2010).

[33]York W. Chen, "The Evolution of Taiwan's Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance," Jamestown Foundation China Brief, November 19, 2009, p. 8.

[34]Ibid.

[35]The Taiwan Strait is 160 km wide at its narrowest point.

[36]Ibid., p. 10, and Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Continues Cruise Missile Effort," Defense News, March 23, 2009, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4001377 (February 18, 2010).

[37]Chen, "The Evolution of Taiwan's Military Strategy," p. 10.

[38]Ma Ying-jeou, "A SMART Strategy for National Security," speech before the Association for the Promotion of National Security, February 26, 2008, at http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=110&anum=4141 (February 18, 2010).

[39]Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, Guofang Baogao Shu, p. 69.

[40]U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009 Report to Congress, p. 241.

[41]Chen, "The Evolution of Taiwan's Military Strategy," p. 10.

[42]Ma, "A SMART Strategy for National Security."

[43]Edward W. Ross, "Improving Taiwan's Military Capabilities, C4ISR Integration," paper presented to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Conference 2009, September 27-29, 2009, p. 10, and Wendell Minnick, "Ex-PACOM Official Convicted of Spying for China," Defense News, October 5, 2009, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4302418 (February 18, 2010).

[44]Ma, "A SMART Strategy for National Security."

[45]Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2009, pp. 73-74.

[46]Shirley Kan, "Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 2, 2009, p. 17, at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf (February 18, 2010).

[47]Ross, "Improving Taiwan's Military Capabilities, C4ISR Integration," p. 10.

[48]Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, Guofang Baogao Shu, p. 79.
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