Russia Gives US Information On Afghan, Central Asian Drug Traffickers
Russia has handed over information on nine major drug traffickers, living in Afghanistan and Central Asia, to the U.S. drug police in a framework of Russian-U.S. bilateral presidential commission, the head of the State Anti-Narcotics Committee, Viktor Ivanov, said.
Ivanov is also the Russian side head of the commission's working group on combating drug trafficking.
"In a framework of a strategic cooperation, the Russian side handed over [information on] nine objects, living in Afghanistan and Central Asia, who are involved in drug trafficking, in supply of bulk of drugs," Ivanov said.
Russia's drug control chief said that the information was handed over int the Moscow's Sheremetievo airport during his meeting with the U.S. Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske adding that earlier Russia passed over data on another 25 individuals involved in drug trafficking.
In March, Ivanov said that Russia would boost its drug control mission staff in Afghanistan as "the drug situation in Russia is rather difficult, and needs fast decisions, both in Russia and within the framework of international cooperation."
Moscow will hold an international forum on combating Afghan drug trafficking on June 9-10. Representatives of key anti-drugs agencies and leading experts are expected to attend it.
Afghan drug production increased dramatically after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban in 2001, and Russia has been one of the most affected countries, with heroin consumption rising steeply. An estimated 90% of heroin consumed in Russia is trafficked from Afghanistan via Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
According to the Federal Drug Control Service, Afghan opium causes the deaths of around 100,000 people around the world annually. In Russia alone Afghan heroin kills around 30,000 young people each year.
Source: RIA Novosti
Ivanov is also the Russian side head of the commission's working group on combating drug trafficking.
"In a framework of a strategic cooperation, the Russian side handed over [information on] nine objects, living in Afghanistan and Central Asia, who are involved in drug trafficking, in supply of bulk of drugs," Ivanov said.
Russia's drug control chief said that the information was handed over int the Moscow's Sheremetievo airport during his meeting with the U.S. Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske adding that earlier Russia passed over data on another 25 individuals involved in drug trafficking.
In March, Ivanov said that Russia would boost its drug control mission staff in Afghanistan as "the drug situation in Russia is rather difficult, and needs fast decisions, both in Russia and within the framework of international cooperation."
Moscow will hold an international forum on combating Afghan drug trafficking on June 9-10. Representatives of key anti-drugs agencies and leading experts are expected to attend it.
Afghan drug production increased dramatically after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban in 2001, and Russia has been one of the most affected countries, with heroin consumption rising steeply. An estimated 90% of heroin consumed in Russia is trafficked from Afghanistan via Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
According to the Federal Drug Control Service, Afghan opium causes the deaths of around 100,000 people around the world annually. In Russia alone Afghan heroin kills around 30,000 young people each year.
Source: RIA Novosti
Sunday, May 23, 2010 |
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Is Kyrgyzstan Ready For A Legal Islamic Political Party?
By Ulan Temirov
Some believers in Kyrgyzstan think the political upheaval that brought down Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s administration has created a new opportunity to mix faith and politics. There’s even talk these days that Kyrgyzstan could become the second Central Asian state, after Tajikistan, to feature a legally operating Islamist political party.
The Bakiyev administration was perceived as hostile to most forms of Islamic religious expression, especially anything with a political message.
The provisional government, which assumed power amid the early April upheaval in Bishkek, is seen as more open to incorporating the views of moderate believers into the political process.
Kyrgyzstan’s citizens are predominantly Muslim, at least culturally. Taking a step to acknowledge this fact, the provisional government invited Muslim leaders to provide input in the drafting of a new constitution. The new basic law may well raise Islam to the level of state religion. The text of the draft constitution is scheduled to be released May 19. It is slated to be put to a popular referendum on June 27.
One member of the constitutional commission, Duishon Abdyldaev, head of Akyl-Es-Ruh-Yiman (Wisdom-Spirit-Faith), a religious movement seeking to unite believers under a traditional form of Kyrgyz Islam, said the new constitution should consider the needs of the faithful. But he stopped short of endorsing an Islamic party.
“We want the new constitution to reflect the interests of millions believers in Kyrgyzstan,” he told EurasiaNet.org. “The acting constitution was outdated because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan adopted a constitution for an atheistic society and state. That is not the reality any longer, as the lion’s share of the population is Muslims and Orthodox Christians.”
Abdyldaev’s views appear to widely resonate throughout Kyrgyz society. Though religious practice among Muslims and Christians is on the rise, many believers are reluctant to endorse the creation of an Islamic political party. Many fear that such a party could end up becoming a source of radical Islamic activity, which, in turn, would fan instability, and even terrorism.
Abdyldaev suggested Kyrgyzstan should look to the United States for inspiration on how to keep religion and the state separate, yet make faith an electoral issue. “That will help bring more honest and devoted people to power,” he said.
Despite the widespread concern about the potential growth of radical Islam, some religious activists want the new constitution to pave the way for a party based on Islamic precepts.
“With proper constitutional amendments and Kyrgyzstan’s new political path towards a parliamentary republic, it is very possible that, gradually, some political party will be established that will attract people based on moral and religious principles,” said a member of Tabligh Jamaat, one of the largest international Islamic movements in Kyrgyzstan, speaking on condition of anonymity. He downplayed the radical Islamic threat by pointing to the existence of moderate, religious-oriented parties elsewhere, including the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.
Also speaking on condition of anonymity, an imam at a Bishkek mosque said he would like to see politics and politicians grow closer to Islam. His fear, however, is that politicians would manipulate faith in order to pursue their own ends. “Though we do not have legal structures for religious political parties, it would be great to have religion in Kyrgyzstan as a core of moral values and principles in our politicians,” the imam said.
Officials do not appear to share such hope. Many are steadfast in their desire to see Kyrgyzstan remain secular.
Kanybek Osmonaliev, who served as director of the State Committee for Religious Affairs until May 14, told EurasiaNet.org days before his dismissal that the state must protect secularism to ward off increasing religious tensions. “According to our constitution, the creation of parties based on religious principles is prohibited,” he said.
Kyrgyzstan's state-run Muftiyat – a board of Islamic clergy governing all official mosques throughout the country – has supported Osmonaliev's position. “The level of education and preparedness for political activity among believers is inadequate to match contemporary challenges,” said Loma Yusur, an advisor to the Muftiyat. Simultaneously, he recognized that “Muslims are also citizens and a part of the electorate. Thus, in order to protect the interests of electorate, it should be written in the constitution that a majority of the population is Muslim,” he told EurasiaNet.org.
The time is not yet right for the creation of a religious party, agreed Kadyr Malikov, head of the independent analytical center Religion, Law and Politics, a widely respected observer of religious affairs. Kyrgyz society is too easily susceptible to secularist fears, he said, and religious figures are not ready for the responsibility of leading a party.
“Political parties in Kyrgyzstan, both in opposition and in power, are ideologically colorless. That's why the political elite plays up [the threat of radical influence from] Afghanistan to intimidate the population from accepting an ideological religious party. Secondly, Muslims are not ready for public and political activity. There are not many educated lawyers, politicians and economists among Muslims,” he said. “I am afraid that if an Islamic party was created today, it would hurt the perception of religious parties.”
Still, Malikov believes the state must create an official place for sincere discourse with believers. “Such a political platform and dialogue between the state and Islam will [help] avoid extremism,” he concluded.
Ulan Temirov is the pseudonym for a journalist based in Bishkek. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Some believers in Kyrgyzstan think the political upheaval that brought down Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s administration has created a new opportunity to mix faith and politics. There’s even talk these days that Kyrgyzstan could become the second Central Asian state, after Tajikistan, to feature a legally operating Islamist political party.
The Bakiyev administration was perceived as hostile to most forms of Islamic religious expression, especially anything with a political message.
The provisional government, which assumed power amid the early April upheaval in Bishkek, is seen as more open to incorporating the views of moderate believers into the political process.
Kyrgyzstan’s citizens are predominantly Muslim, at least culturally. Taking a step to acknowledge this fact, the provisional government invited Muslim leaders to provide input in the drafting of a new constitution. The new basic law may well raise Islam to the level of state religion. The text of the draft constitution is scheduled to be released May 19. It is slated to be put to a popular referendum on June 27.
One member of the constitutional commission, Duishon Abdyldaev, head of Akyl-Es-Ruh-Yiman (Wisdom-Spirit-Faith), a religious movement seeking to unite believers under a traditional form of Kyrgyz Islam, said the new constitution should consider the needs of the faithful. But he stopped short of endorsing an Islamic party.
“We want the new constitution to reflect the interests of millions believers in Kyrgyzstan,” he told EurasiaNet.org. “The acting constitution was outdated because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan adopted a constitution for an atheistic society and state. That is not the reality any longer, as the lion’s share of the population is Muslims and Orthodox Christians.”
Abdyldaev’s views appear to widely resonate throughout Kyrgyz society. Though religious practice among Muslims and Christians is on the rise, many believers are reluctant to endorse the creation of an Islamic political party. Many fear that such a party could end up becoming a source of radical Islamic activity, which, in turn, would fan instability, and even terrorism.
Abdyldaev suggested Kyrgyzstan should look to the United States for inspiration on how to keep religion and the state separate, yet make faith an electoral issue. “That will help bring more honest and devoted people to power,” he said.
Despite the widespread concern about the potential growth of radical Islam, some religious activists want the new constitution to pave the way for a party based on Islamic precepts.
“With proper constitutional amendments and Kyrgyzstan’s new political path towards a parliamentary republic, it is very possible that, gradually, some political party will be established that will attract people based on moral and religious principles,” said a member of Tabligh Jamaat, one of the largest international Islamic movements in Kyrgyzstan, speaking on condition of anonymity. He downplayed the radical Islamic threat by pointing to the existence of moderate, religious-oriented parties elsewhere, including the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.
Also speaking on condition of anonymity, an imam at a Bishkek mosque said he would like to see politics and politicians grow closer to Islam. His fear, however, is that politicians would manipulate faith in order to pursue their own ends. “Though we do not have legal structures for religious political parties, it would be great to have religion in Kyrgyzstan as a core of moral values and principles in our politicians,” the imam said.
Officials do not appear to share such hope. Many are steadfast in their desire to see Kyrgyzstan remain secular.
Kanybek Osmonaliev, who served as director of the State Committee for Religious Affairs until May 14, told EurasiaNet.org days before his dismissal that the state must protect secularism to ward off increasing religious tensions. “According to our constitution, the creation of parties based on religious principles is prohibited,” he said.
Kyrgyzstan's state-run Muftiyat – a board of Islamic clergy governing all official mosques throughout the country – has supported Osmonaliev's position. “The level of education and preparedness for political activity among believers is inadequate to match contemporary challenges,” said Loma Yusur, an advisor to the Muftiyat. Simultaneously, he recognized that “Muslims are also citizens and a part of the electorate. Thus, in order to protect the interests of electorate, it should be written in the constitution that a majority of the population is Muslim,” he told EurasiaNet.org.
The time is not yet right for the creation of a religious party, agreed Kadyr Malikov, head of the independent analytical center Religion, Law and Politics, a widely respected observer of religious affairs. Kyrgyz society is too easily susceptible to secularist fears, he said, and religious figures are not ready for the responsibility of leading a party.
“Political parties in Kyrgyzstan, both in opposition and in power, are ideologically colorless. That's why the political elite plays up [the threat of radical influence from] Afghanistan to intimidate the population from accepting an ideological religious party. Secondly, Muslims are not ready for public and political activity. There are not many educated lawyers, politicians and economists among Muslims,” he said. “I am afraid that if an Islamic party was created today, it would hurt the perception of religious parties.”
Still, Malikov believes the state must create an official place for sincere discourse with believers. “Such a political platform and dialogue between the state and Islam will [help] avoid extremism,” he concluded.
Ulan Temirov is the pseudonym for a journalist based in Bishkek. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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Tajikistan Immunization Drive Should Stem Polio Outbreak - WHO
(IRIN) -- A sharp decrease in polio cases is expected as a result of an ongoing nationwide anti-polio immunization campaign in Tajikistan, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).
“During the immunization campaign we are vaccinating all children under six, which is about 1.1 million children. We are sure that the result of these three rounds will be a decrease of infected cases,” Cristiana Salvi, a spokesperson for WHO in Tajikistan, told IRIN in the capital Dushanbe.
The first round of the campaign ended on 8 May 2010, the second round will take place on 18-22 May and the third is slated for 1-5 June.
According to WHO, as of 9 May, Tajikistan had reported 278 cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), the most common sign of acute polio but also associated with a number of other pathogenic agents. Of these, 56 have been laboratory confirmed as cases of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) - of which 52 are in children under the age of six – and five others have been confirmed negative for poliovirus. The remaining cases are still being determined.
“We have two confirmed deaths,” said Salvi. “We are investigating the deaths among the suspected cases but we cannot confirm polio in those cases until we get laboratory confirmation.”
This is the first polio outbreak in what WHO calls the ‘European region’ after it was declared a polio-free zone in 2002.
So far, all AFP cases have occurred in southwestern Tajikistan - bordering Afghanistan, a polio-endemic country - and Dushanbe.
On 23 April, WHO said that genetic sequencing has determined that the WPV1 found in Tajikistan is most closely related to viral strains previously identified in Uttar Pradesh, India, another polio-endemic country.
First Russian cases
Russia, Tajikistan’s main trade partner and home to an estimated one million Tajik economic migrants, has reportedly banned the entry of all children under six from Tajikistan.
According to some media reports on 14 May, two polio cases, the first in five decades, have been confirmed in Russia recently – one in Irkutsk and the other in Moscow. Both patients are newly arrived baby girls from Tajikistan.
In a blog posted on 13 May, Allana Shaikh, a Tajikistan-based public health expert and blogger, said: “Tajikistan should simply not be seeing a polio outbreak. An 82 percent vaccination rate is enough to achieve herd immunity and protect even the unvaccinated.”
The World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention put the herd immunity threshold for polio at 80-86 percent, meaning if this proportion of the population is immune to the disease, it should theoretically no longer persist.
“There are several ways that the health system could fail on vaccination,” said Shaikh. “Vaccine records could be inaccurate, causing unvaccinated children to be missed by the system. Or the cold chain is not being maintained and the vaccines are losing effectiveness – the oral polio vaccine is especially vulnerable to warm temperatures. Whatever happened, it’s a sign of a health system weakness and the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan will need support to improve it.”
“During the immunization campaign we are vaccinating all children under six, which is about 1.1 million children. We are sure that the result of these three rounds will be a decrease of infected cases,” Cristiana Salvi, a spokesperson for WHO in Tajikistan, told IRIN in the capital Dushanbe.
The first round of the campaign ended on 8 May 2010, the second round will take place on 18-22 May and the third is slated for 1-5 June.
According to WHO, as of 9 May, Tajikistan had reported 278 cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), the most common sign of acute polio but also associated with a number of other pathogenic agents. Of these, 56 have been laboratory confirmed as cases of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) - of which 52 are in children under the age of six – and five others have been confirmed negative for poliovirus. The remaining cases are still being determined.
“We have two confirmed deaths,” said Salvi. “We are investigating the deaths among the suspected cases but we cannot confirm polio in those cases until we get laboratory confirmation.”
This is the first polio outbreak in what WHO calls the ‘European region’ after it was declared a polio-free zone in 2002.
So far, all AFP cases have occurred in southwestern Tajikistan - bordering Afghanistan, a polio-endemic country - and Dushanbe.
On 23 April, WHO said that genetic sequencing has determined that the WPV1 found in Tajikistan is most closely related to viral strains previously identified in Uttar Pradesh, India, another polio-endemic country.
First Russian cases
Russia, Tajikistan’s main trade partner and home to an estimated one million Tajik economic migrants, has reportedly banned the entry of all children under six from Tajikistan.
According to some media reports on 14 May, two polio cases, the first in five decades, have been confirmed in Russia recently – one in Irkutsk and the other in Moscow. Both patients are newly arrived baby girls from Tajikistan.
In a blog posted on 13 May, Allana Shaikh, a Tajikistan-based public health expert and blogger, said: “Tajikistan should simply not be seeing a polio outbreak. An 82 percent vaccination rate is enough to achieve herd immunity and protect even the unvaccinated.”
The World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention put the herd immunity threshold for polio at 80-86 percent, meaning if this proportion of the population is immune to the disease, it should theoretically no longer persist.
“There are several ways that the health system could fail on vaccination,” said Shaikh. “Vaccine records could be inaccurate, causing unvaccinated children to be missed by the system. Or the cold chain is not being maintained and the vaccines are losing effectiveness – the oral polio vaccine is especially vulnerable to warm temperatures. Whatever happened, it’s a sign of a health system weakness and the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan will need support to improve it.”
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Russian-Tajik ‘Polio War’ Seen Having Broader Consequences
By Paul Goble
An outbreak of polio in Tajikistan has led Moscow to introduce a series of measures to prevent the spread of that disease into the Russian Federation as the result either of the importation of food products from that Central Asian republic or visits by Tajiks to their relatives working as migrant laborers in Russian cities.
So far, these measures appear to be successful: While 278 cases of polio were recorded in Tajikistan since last December, there have been only two in Russia, the first there since 1998 and involving Tajiks rather than Russians. But if the spread of the disease into Russia has in fact been stopped, the consequences of what Moscow media are calling “the polio war” have not.
On the one hand, the way in which Russian officials and media have been discussing this outbreak, focusing almost exclusively on Tajiks and Tajik Gastarbeiters, is fueling xenophobic attitudes among radical nationalist skinhead groups and xenophobic organizations like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), thus increasing the likelihood of new clashes.
And on the other, as Tajik activists have pointed out, Moscow’s approach not only threatens the construction of the Rogun hydro-electric dam in Tajikistan, something on which Dushanbe had been counting, but also threatens to re-ignite the civil war which ravaged that Central Asian country in the 1990s.
Last Thursday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrey Nesterenko said that the appearance of a polio-infected nine-month-old Tajik child in Irkutsk represented “by international standards an extraordinary situation” and that the Russian government had taken “additional measures” to block the spread of the virus (evrazia.org/news/13114).
Among these measures, Nesterenko said, were the introduction of supplemental vaccinations, testing at border points, temporary restrictions on visits to Russia by Tajik children under six years old, and a ban on imports of dried fruits and vegetables from Tajikistan until the danger has passed.
At the same time, however, the foreign ministry spokesman stressed that “there are no obstacles for the entrance of minor citizens of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Tajikistan to the Motherland,” although such people will have to undergo medical screening and be immunized.
Nesterenko’s statement came in the wake of one by Gennady Onishchenko, the chief public health doctor of the Russian Federation. He said last Wednesday that Moscow had asked Tajikistan to assist Russians living in Tajikistan and especially those under six to leave that republic and return home.
“But the Tajik side unilaterally took a decision not to release our children,” Onishchenko said in language that has been picked up and amplified by Russian nationalist and xenophobic websites. And, he added, “we assess this decision as not having any relationship to epidemiology,” a charge that in its consequences at least is almost certainly true.
On Friday, Onishchenko added that “the outbreak of polio in Tajikistan was first of all a serious defeat for the European Bureau of the World Health Organization” and that despite the two cases in Russia, his country “remains as before a country free from polio” and committed to “effectively extinguishing the spark” in Tajikistan (www.easttime.ru/news/1/10/2303.html).
At the end of last week, Russian media outlets nonetheless reported that “polio threatens 1.5 million Russians,” slightly more than one percent of the country’s population (news.babr.ru/?IDE=85759). Perhaps as a result, Onishchenko tried to calm the situation by saying that things in Russia “are under control” (www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=224498).
But the Russian government doctor’s words may have just the opposite effect. He noted that Russia faces serious problems from Tajikistan where “there now are more than 1,000 children of Russian officers” who should return after immunization shots that Moscow has sent there are administered.
And one Tajik living in Russia pointed to two dangers he sees arising from “the polio war.” On the one hand, Izatullo Kholov, the head of the National Organization of Tajik Youth in Russia, suggested, such reporting about Tajikistan almost certainly will make Russians nervous about ethnic Tajiks living among them (www.islamnews.ru/news-24180.html).
But on the other, he continued, Onishchenko’s comments have “a pre-history,” one connected with the desire of Tajikistan to build the Rogun Hydro-Electric Station with Russia’s help despite the opposition of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and despite the failure of the project to make much progress in recent months.
According to Kholov, the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has offered only “the imitation” of construction because he has an interest in trading gas found on the territory of Uzbekistan. And even Kazakhstan is opposed to the dam. Kholov said that Dushanbe “has not been able to show anyone the vital necessity of [the dam] for the country” and its neighbors.
Today, he continued, “Tajikistan is experiencing difficult times. Flooding in the south of the country has killed dozens of people. The country is blockaded by Uzbekistan, and thousands of railcars for Tajikistan are being held up by various invented pretexts by the Uzbekistan authorities.”
“And now, in advance of the Victory Holiday,” he said, “a hit is delivered to a major part of the Tajikistan economy, the trade in dried fruits and vegetables. The country is driven into ‘a corner, and its present goes to celebrate in Moscow” because “Tajikistan as a state cannot stand up for itself.”
Kholov said that he is especially worried by Onishchenko’s call last week for Russians now living in Tajikistan to “leave the country in the shortest possible time.” “We recall,” he said, “that at the start of the 1990s, many Russian-language residents left the republic and following on that in the country broke out a civil war.”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
An outbreak of polio in Tajikistan has led Moscow to introduce a series of measures to prevent the spread of that disease into the Russian Federation as the result either of the importation of food products from that Central Asian republic or visits by Tajiks to their relatives working as migrant laborers in Russian cities.
So far, these measures appear to be successful: While 278 cases of polio were recorded in Tajikistan since last December, there have been only two in Russia, the first there since 1998 and involving Tajiks rather than Russians. But if the spread of the disease into Russia has in fact been stopped, the consequences of what Moscow media are calling “the polio war” have not.
On the one hand, the way in which Russian officials and media have been discussing this outbreak, focusing almost exclusively on Tajiks and Tajik Gastarbeiters, is fueling xenophobic attitudes among radical nationalist skinhead groups and xenophobic organizations like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), thus increasing the likelihood of new clashes.
And on the other, as Tajik activists have pointed out, Moscow’s approach not only threatens the construction of the Rogun hydro-electric dam in Tajikistan, something on which Dushanbe had been counting, but also threatens to re-ignite the civil war which ravaged that Central Asian country in the 1990s.
Last Thursday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrey Nesterenko said that the appearance of a polio-infected nine-month-old Tajik child in Irkutsk represented “by international standards an extraordinary situation” and that the Russian government had taken “additional measures” to block the spread of the virus (evrazia.org/news/13114).
Among these measures, Nesterenko said, were the introduction of supplemental vaccinations, testing at border points, temporary restrictions on visits to Russia by Tajik children under six years old, and a ban on imports of dried fruits and vegetables from Tajikistan until the danger has passed.
At the same time, however, the foreign ministry spokesman stressed that “there are no obstacles for the entrance of minor citizens of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Tajikistan to the Motherland,” although such people will have to undergo medical screening and be immunized.
Nesterenko’s statement came in the wake of one by Gennady Onishchenko, the chief public health doctor of the Russian Federation. He said last Wednesday that Moscow had asked Tajikistan to assist Russians living in Tajikistan and especially those under six to leave that republic and return home.
“But the Tajik side unilaterally took a decision not to release our children,” Onishchenko said in language that has been picked up and amplified by Russian nationalist and xenophobic websites. And, he added, “we assess this decision as not having any relationship to epidemiology,” a charge that in its consequences at least is almost certainly true.
On Friday, Onishchenko added that “the outbreak of polio in Tajikistan was first of all a serious defeat for the European Bureau of the World Health Organization” and that despite the two cases in Russia, his country “remains as before a country free from polio” and committed to “effectively extinguishing the spark” in Tajikistan (www.easttime.ru/news/1/10/2303.html).
At the end of last week, Russian media outlets nonetheless reported that “polio threatens 1.5 million Russians,” slightly more than one percent of the country’s population (news.babr.ru/?IDE=85759). Perhaps as a result, Onishchenko tried to calm the situation by saying that things in Russia “are under control” (www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=224498).
But the Russian government doctor’s words may have just the opposite effect. He noted that Russia faces serious problems from Tajikistan where “there now are more than 1,000 children of Russian officers” who should return after immunization shots that Moscow has sent there are administered.
And one Tajik living in Russia pointed to two dangers he sees arising from “the polio war.” On the one hand, Izatullo Kholov, the head of the National Organization of Tajik Youth in Russia, suggested, such reporting about Tajikistan almost certainly will make Russians nervous about ethnic Tajiks living among them (www.islamnews.ru/news-24180.html).
But on the other, he continued, Onishchenko’s comments have “a pre-history,” one connected with the desire of Tajikistan to build the Rogun Hydro-Electric Station with Russia’s help despite the opposition of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and despite the failure of the project to make much progress in recent months.
According to Kholov, the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has offered only “the imitation” of construction because he has an interest in trading gas found on the territory of Uzbekistan. And even Kazakhstan is opposed to the dam. Kholov said that Dushanbe “has not been able to show anyone the vital necessity of [the dam] for the country” and its neighbors.
Today, he continued, “Tajikistan is experiencing difficult times. Flooding in the south of the country has killed dozens of people. The country is blockaded by Uzbekistan, and thousands of railcars for Tajikistan are being held up by various invented pretexts by the Uzbekistan authorities.”
“And now, in advance of the Victory Holiday,” he said, “a hit is delivered to a major part of the Tajikistan economy, the trade in dried fruits and vegetables. The country is driven into ‘a corner, and its present goes to celebrate in Moscow” because “Tajikistan as a state cannot stand up for itself.”
Kholov said that he is especially worried by Onishchenko’s call last week for Russians now living in Tajikistan to “leave the country in the shortest possible time.” “We recall,” he said, “that at the start of the 1990s, many Russian-language residents left the republic and following on that in the country broke out a civil war.”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Monday, May 17, 2010 |
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Tajikistan Government Issues Decress On Flooding
In accordance with the article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan on "The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan" and with the purpose of the timely liquidation of the effects of natural disasters in the Republic of Tajikistan, caused by the torrential rains in the months of April and May of the current year, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan decrees:
1) The Ministry of Economy and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense under the Republic of Tajikistan, the executive powers of Khatlon and Sogd provinces should submit in the next 10 days the following information to the State Committee on Emergency Situation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan: 1) total sum of damage, caused by natural disaster, 2) accurate and finalized list of affected population and their needs in reconstruction and repair works of their houses, 3) information on the needs of relocation of the affected population to the new safe areas and building new houses, 4) the list of construction needs.
2) Agency on Construction and Architecture under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan together with the local executive powers of the affected areas, should submit the resolution letter on the possibility of reconstruction of the damaged houses in the affected areas.
3) The State Committee on Land Management and Geodesy of the Republic of Tajikistan, together with the Main Department of Geology (Glavgeology) under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the local executive body of Khatlon Province in accordance with the established procedure should submit to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan the draft regulation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on allocation of land in the new safe areas for construction of dwelling houses for the affected families.
4) The Ministry of Melioration and Water Management of the Republic of Tajikistan together with the executive power under state jurisdiction of Kuljab city should submit a project proposals to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on the reconstruction of the Tebolai river bank, with proper considerations of relocation of the population, living close by the river bank
1) The Ministry of Economy and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense under the Republic of Tajikistan, the executive powers of Khatlon and Sogd provinces should submit in the next 10 days the following information to the State Committee on Emergency Situation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan: 1) total sum of damage, caused by natural disaster, 2) accurate and finalized list of affected population and their needs in reconstruction and repair works of their houses, 3) information on the needs of relocation of the affected population to the new safe areas and building new houses, 4) the list of construction needs.
2) Agency on Construction and Architecture under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan together with the local executive powers of the affected areas, should submit the resolution letter on the possibility of reconstruction of the damaged houses in the affected areas.
3) The State Committee on Land Management and Geodesy of the Republic of Tajikistan, together with the Main Department of Geology (Glavgeology) under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the local executive body of Khatlon Province in accordance with the established procedure should submit to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan the draft regulation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on allocation of land in the new safe areas for construction of dwelling houses for the affected families.
4) The Ministry of Melioration and Water Management of the Republic of Tajikistan together with the executive power under state jurisdiction of Kuljab city should submit a project proposals to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on the reconstruction of the Tebolai river bank, with proper considerations of relocation of the population, living close by the river bank
Saturday, May 15, 2010 |
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Russia On Guard Against Tajik Polio
Everyone entering Russia from Tajikistan will be vaccinated against polio, the Foreign Ministry said on Thursday after two babies became ill with the disease after arriving from the Central Asian state.
Russian chief doctor Gennady Onishchenko said a nine-month girl in east Siberia's Irkutsk and an infant girl in Moscow are in satisfactory conditions.
Some 300 cases of polio were registered in Tajikistan recently with 13 deaths. Around 90% of those infected are children under five years old.
The Russian Foreign Ministry also said that everyone entering the country from Tajikistan would be vaccinated against polio as hundreds of children of Russian servicemen live there.
"In a country where polio has not been registered for many years, even imported cases are really dangerous," Onishchenko said.
He said although adults have immunity they still can become transient carriers of the infection.
Polio, or infantile paralysis, is an acute viral infectious disease spread from person to person, primarily via the fecal-oral route.
Source: RIA Novosti
Russian chief doctor Gennady Onishchenko said a nine-month girl in east Siberia's Irkutsk and an infant girl in Moscow are in satisfactory conditions.
Some 300 cases of polio were registered in Tajikistan recently with 13 deaths. Around 90% of those infected are children under five years old.
The Russian Foreign Ministry also said that everyone entering the country from Tajikistan would be vaccinated against polio as hundreds of children of Russian servicemen live there.
"In a country where polio has not been registered for many years, even imported cases are really dangerous," Onishchenko said.
He said although adults have immunity they still can become transient carriers of the infection.
Polio, or infantile paralysis, is an acute viral infectious disease spread from person to person, primarily via the fecal-oral route.
Source: RIA Novosti
Thursday, May 13, 2010 |
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Anger At Tajik Authorities After Floods
(RFE/RL) -- Search and rescue efforts are under way in Tajikistan's southern Kulob region, where according to the authorities floods have killed at least 21 people.
Emergency officials say dozens of people are still unaccounted for.
RFE/RL correspondents in the city of Kulob say people are looking for their missing relatives and recovering bodies alongside the river.
Local residents have expressed anger at what they call the authorities' insufficient and belated response to the natural disaster that hit in the early hours of May 7.
Two days since the floods hit, locals say they haven't received food, dry clothes, or medical assistance. Kulob, a city of around 100,000 people, also faces a severe shortage of clean drinking water.
Asliddin Dostiev, a Kulob resident, says "emergency teams arrived late and without any equipment to rescue people and without any tents to shelter people."
Muhammadjon Sharifov, a Kulob resident who has lost his mother in the flood, says many lives would have been saved if emergency services arrived on time.
"My mother, sister, and nephews were sleeping in one room. I was in another when the flood came. I rescued the small children, then I saw my mother's body floating in the water," Sharifov says.
"Emergency services and officials arrived only after eight o'clock. But even then they didn't do much to help. 'We can't do anything, our clothes might get muddy,' they told us."
Another local affected by the disaster, Ahmad Ibrohimov, said that "people are helping each other, some bringing food, others bringing warm clothes."
Officials from Tajikistan's Emergency Situations Ministry told RFE/RL's Tajik Service that the ministry teams in the area "are making a list of missing people, a list of victims, and evacuating residents to safe locations."
Disputed Casualty Figures
According to official figures, more than 1,500 houses, several schools, and offices have been completely or partially destroyed in Kulob and surrounding villages. Flood waters have also destroyed 12 bridges.
An RFE/RL correspondent in Kulob, Mumin Ahmadi, says that local people fear that "actual casualty numbers are much higher than the official version."
"Residents say they have buried more than 50 bodies of those killed by floods. Some 60-70 people are still missing and feared dead. People say their bodies remain under rocks or have been driven away by flood waters," Ahmadi says.
Military units from the Russian base in Kulob took part in the rescue operation and offered armored vehicles to help transport victims to safer areas.
Oxfam and the International Committee of the Red Cross have reportedly begun to deliver emergency aid including tents, warm clothes, and hot meals.
Tajikistan's emergency services have been criticized in the past for their slow and inadequate response to disasters.
In March, an avalanche in the Anzob mountainous pass in the northwest of the country killed at least 15 people. Eyewitnesses blamed most of the deaths on the absence of timely help.
Emergency teams were also criticized for their response to a 2008 fire at the Tajik Medical University, when fire fighters -- based not far from the area -- arrived only after the building was almost completely burned to the ground.
Kulob authorities receive some $2.5million every year for "taking measures to minimize flood damage," but Tajikistan's anticorruption agency has said that much of that money is lost due to "corruption."
Reported from Kulob by RFE/RL Tajik Service correspondents; written by Farangiz Najiballah in Prague. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Emergency officials say dozens of people are still unaccounted for.
RFE/RL correspondents in the city of Kulob say people are looking for their missing relatives and recovering bodies alongside the river.
Local residents have expressed anger at what they call the authorities' insufficient and belated response to the natural disaster that hit in the early hours of May 7.
Two days since the floods hit, locals say they haven't received food, dry clothes, or medical assistance. Kulob, a city of around 100,000 people, also faces a severe shortage of clean drinking water.
Asliddin Dostiev, a Kulob resident, says "emergency teams arrived late and without any equipment to rescue people and without any tents to shelter people."
Muhammadjon Sharifov, a Kulob resident who has lost his mother in the flood, says many lives would have been saved if emergency services arrived on time.
"My mother, sister, and nephews were sleeping in one room. I was in another when the flood came. I rescued the small children, then I saw my mother's body floating in the water," Sharifov says.
"Emergency services and officials arrived only after eight o'clock. But even then they didn't do much to help. 'We can't do anything, our clothes might get muddy,' they told us."
Another local affected by the disaster, Ahmad Ibrohimov, said that "people are helping each other, some bringing food, others bringing warm clothes."
Officials from Tajikistan's Emergency Situations Ministry told RFE/RL's Tajik Service that the ministry teams in the area "are making a list of missing people, a list of victims, and evacuating residents to safe locations."
Disputed Casualty Figures
According to official figures, more than 1,500 houses, several schools, and offices have been completely or partially destroyed in Kulob and surrounding villages. Flood waters have also destroyed 12 bridges.
An RFE/RL correspondent in Kulob, Mumin Ahmadi, says that local people fear that "actual casualty numbers are much higher than the official version."
"Residents say they have buried more than 50 bodies of those killed by floods. Some 60-70 people are still missing and feared dead. People say their bodies remain under rocks or have been driven away by flood waters," Ahmadi says.
Military units from the Russian base in Kulob took part in the rescue operation and offered armored vehicles to help transport victims to safer areas.
Oxfam and the International Committee of the Red Cross have reportedly begun to deliver emergency aid including tents, warm clothes, and hot meals.
Tajikistan's emergency services have been criticized in the past for their slow and inadequate response to disasters.
In March, an avalanche in the Anzob mountainous pass in the northwest of the country killed at least 15 people. Eyewitnesses blamed most of the deaths on the absence of timely help.
Emergency teams were also criticized for their response to a 2008 fire at the Tajik Medical University, when fire fighters -- based not far from the area -- arrived only after the building was almost completely burned to the ground.
Kulob authorities receive some $2.5million every year for "taking measures to minimize flood damage," but Tajikistan's anticorruption agency has said that much of that money is lost due to "corruption."
Reported from Kulob by RFE/RL Tajik Service correspondents; written by Farangiz Najiballah in Prague. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Sunday, May 09, 2010 |
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Tajikistan Mudslides And Floods Kill 15
(IRIN) -- Mudslides and floods have killed at least 15 people and 40 others are missing in the southern Tajik town of Kulob, according to the Tajikistan Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.
"Seven people have been reported dead so far, including four children. All these people drowned. At least eight more people were found dead by their relatives and buried immediately," Munira Nazariyeva, a spokesperson for the emergencies committee, told IRIN in the Tajik capital Dushanbe on 8 May.
Recent heavy rains in the Central Asian republic caused on 7 May an overflow of the small river Tebalai in Kulob, which is in the southern province of Khatlon, close to the Afghan border and about 195km southeast of Dushanbe. Thousands have reportedly been made homeless by the disaster in this town of some 100,000 people.
"More than 1,500 houses were damaged, completely or partly destroyed, in Kulob and nearby villages. Also, 12 bridges were destroyed and several schools and other municipal buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged," Nazariyeva said.
Local authorities estimate that the mudslides and floods have caused more than US$100 million-worth of damage.
Kulob's streets have been transformed into fast-flowing rivers of muddy water, as shown on Tajik TV, making it difficult for residents to cross. Tajik president Imomali Rakhmon visited the town and instructed local authorities to provide aid immediately to victims.
Oxfam and the International Committee of the Red Cross have begun to provide emergency aid such as tents, warm clothes and hot meals to those affected.
On 11 and 12 April, several villages in Baljuvon, Muminabad, Shurabad and Vose districts in Khatlon Province were badly affected by floods and mudflows and again by heavy rains and wind on 17 April, according to the Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT), a body comprising government institutions, UN agencies and international and local NGOs.
In May 2009, 18 people were killed by floods and mudslides after heavy rains in Tajikistan. In 2010, before the recent flooding in Kulob, 17 people had died in natural disasters such as avalanches and rockslides.
"Seven people have been reported dead so far, including four children. All these people drowned. At least eight more people were found dead by their relatives and buried immediately," Munira Nazariyeva, a spokesperson for the emergencies committee, told IRIN in the Tajik capital Dushanbe on 8 May.
Recent heavy rains in the Central Asian republic caused on 7 May an overflow of the small river Tebalai in Kulob, which is in the southern province of Khatlon, close to the Afghan border and about 195km southeast of Dushanbe. Thousands have reportedly been made homeless by the disaster in this town of some 100,000 people.
"More than 1,500 houses were damaged, completely or partly destroyed, in Kulob and nearby villages. Also, 12 bridges were destroyed and several schools and other municipal buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged," Nazariyeva said.
Local authorities estimate that the mudslides and floods have caused more than US$100 million-worth of damage.
Kulob's streets have been transformed into fast-flowing rivers of muddy water, as shown on Tajik TV, making it difficult for residents to cross. Tajik president Imomali Rakhmon visited the town and instructed local authorities to provide aid immediately to victims.
Oxfam and the International Committee of the Red Cross have begun to provide emergency aid such as tents, warm clothes and hot meals to those affected.
On 11 and 12 April, several villages in Baljuvon, Muminabad, Shurabad and Vose districts in Khatlon Province were badly affected by floods and mudflows and again by heavy rains and wind on 17 April, according to the Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT), a body comprising government institutions, UN agencies and international and local NGOs.
In May 2009, 18 people were killed by floods and mudslides after heavy rains in Tajikistan. In 2010, before the recent flooding in Kulob, 17 people had died in natural disasters such as avalanches and rockslides.
Sunday, May 09, 2010 |
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Ethnic Russians Don’t Declare Their Nationality On Military Documents
By Paul Goble
Unlike passports from which the nationality line has been eliminated, the military documents Russian soldiers and officers carry still has such a line, although commanders, as a provision of the 1993 Constitution specifies, are not in a position to demand that anyone declare his nationality.
According to one officer, Lt. Col. Roman Ilyushchenko, the documents of one unit he examined showed that “not more than five to seven percent of the soldiers” expressed “a desire to declare themselves “ethnic Russians,” even though almost all of the non-Russian personnel declared their nationalities (www.russdom.ru/node/2856).
In an article entitled “The [Ethnic] Russian Question in the [Non-Ethnic] Russian Army,” Ilyushchenko says that this pattern raises many questions, not least of which “why don’t these boys want to freely declare that they are [ethnic] Russians?” The answer to that, he suggests, is that “they do not know their roots.”
According to Ilyushchenko, “such a passive life position corresponds to the forcibly introduced into our society criteria of tolerance and the plans of the globalists to raise in Russia citizens of the world, ‘Ivanovs who do not remember their kinship’” with the Russians who won the countries earlier wars.
Such attitudes, the officer continues, “destroy all the traditions and principle of the [ethnic] Russian and [non-ethnic] Russian army, which never was a non-national armed formation.” Even in Soviet times, he writes, “soldiers maintained the elements of national self-identification,” an identity that “always played an important role” in strengthening the unit.
Ilyushchenko refers to a comment by an unnamed senior commander others have cited as well. According to that officer, “it isn’t politically correct to be interested in the nationality of soldiers. That is now defined only when a soldier commits a crime.” From that, Ilyushchenko says, one could conclude that “only a criminal has a nationality.”
“The further minimalization of the nationality question in the army,” he continues, “is fraught with the most serious consequences for its fighting ability,” something that the current Russian government does not appear to recognize but that some groups, including the Russian Orthodox Church very much do.
Ilyushchenko cites a January 2010 comment by Patriarch Kirill, who said with obvious bitterness that “unfortunately, not only the younger but even the older generation frequently forgets that we will never be able to move forward until we understand how we turned out to be where we are.”
“Sociological research shows,” the Orthodox leader said, “that the majority of our citizens have an extremely uncertain knowledge not only of the history of the fatherland but even about their own genealogy. This knowledge frequently does not extend beyond the third generation -- that is one’s grandmother and grandfather.”
Only seven percent of Russians have composed a family tree, Kirill said; with 38 percent telling pollsters that “no one had told them about this” and “48 percent assertingthat this question for their families was a matter of indifference,” an attitude that Ilyushchenko says helps to explain the breakdown in national self-identification among ethnic Russians.
And the decline of such identification matters not only for the military but for the society as a whole. Those who are conscious of “their membership in a concrete nation or family” not only “have the strength to withstand inevitable difficulties and deprivations” but have a reason not to dishonor their ancestors and their fellows by bad actions.
Tragically, Ilyushchenko continues, Russian military commanders now are exacerbating this loss of ethnic identification rather than helping to overcome it. In the outline for military lectures on “Patriotism and the Problems of the Spiritual and Moral Security of Russia,” “there is not a word about love for one’s own (Russian people and its history.”
Instead, the lieutenant colonel says, “the word ‘[ethnic] Russian” is used four times” in that document, only slightly more than the words “Ukrainian” or Georgian” are used – two times each – or “Kazakh” and “Tajik” once each. That reflects a fundamental change – and in Ilyushchenko’s view, an incorrect one.
“Soldiers drafted from regions where Muslims live in compact groups,” he says, “indicate their nationality much more often in military tickets” than those soldiers, including ethnic Russian ones, from other places.
“They are accustomed to this, and it does not enter anyone’s head to accuse an Avar, a Dargin, a Tabasaran or a Tatar of nationalism.”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Unlike passports from which the nationality line has been eliminated, the military documents Russian soldiers and officers carry still has such a line, although commanders, as a provision of the 1993 Constitution specifies, are not in a position to demand that anyone declare his nationality.
According to one officer, Lt. Col. Roman Ilyushchenko, the documents of one unit he examined showed that “not more than five to seven percent of the soldiers” expressed “a desire to declare themselves “ethnic Russians,” even though almost all of the non-Russian personnel declared their nationalities (www.russdom.ru/node/2856).
In an article entitled “The [Ethnic] Russian Question in the [Non-Ethnic] Russian Army,” Ilyushchenko says that this pattern raises many questions, not least of which “why don’t these boys want to freely declare that they are [ethnic] Russians?” The answer to that, he suggests, is that “they do not know their roots.”
According to Ilyushchenko, “such a passive life position corresponds to the forcibly introduced into our society criteria of tolerance and the plans of the globalists to raise in Russia citizens of the world, ‘Ivanovs who do not remember their kinship’” with the Russians who won the countries earlier wars.
Such attitudes, the officer continues, “destroy all the traditions and principle of the [ethnic] Russian and [non-ethnic] Russian army, which never was a non-national armed formation.” Even in Soviet times, he writes, “soldiers maintained the elements of national self-identification,” an identity that “always played an important role” in strengthening the unit.
Ilyushchenko refers to a comment by an unnamed senior commander others have cited as well. According to that officer, “it isn’t politically correct to be interested in the nationality of soldiers. That is now defined only when a soldier commits a crime.” From that, Ilyushchenko says, one could conclude that “only a criminal has a nationality.”
“The further minimalization of the nationality question in the army,” he continues, “is fraught with the most serious consequences for its fighting ability,” something that the current Russian government does not appear to recognize but that some groups, including the Russian Orthodox Church very much do.
Ilyushchenko cites a January 2010 comment by Patriarch Kirill, who said with obvious bitterness that “unfortunately, not only the younger but even the older generation frequently forgets that we will never be able to move forward until we understand how we turned out to be where we are.”
“Sociological research shows,” the Orthodox leader said, “that the majority of our citizens have an extremely uncertain knowledge not only of the history of the fatherland but even about their own genealogy. This knowledge frequently does not extend beyond the third generation -- that is one’s grandmother and grandfather.”
Only seven percent of Russians have composed a family tree, Kirill said; with 38 percent telling pollsters that “no one had told them about this” and “48 percent assertingthat this question for their families was a matter of indifference,” an attitude that Ilyushchenko says helps to explain the breakdown in national self-identification among ethnic Russians.
And the decline of such identification matters not only for the military but for the society as a whole. Those who are conscious of “their membership in a concrete nation or family” not only “have the strength to withstand inevitable difficulties and deprivations” but have a reason not to dishonor their ancestors and their fellows by bad actions.
Tragically, Ilyushchenko continues, Russian military commanders now are exacerbating this loss of ethnic identification rather than helping to overcome it. In the outline for military lectures on “Patriotism and the Problems of the Spiritual and Moral Security of Russia,” “there is not a word about love for one’s own (Russian people and its history.”
Instead, the lieutenant colonel says, “the word ‘[ethnic] Russian” is used four times” in that document, only slightly more than the words “Ukrainian” or Georgian” are used – two times each – or “Kazakh” and “Tajik” once each. That reflects a fundamental change – and in Ilyushchenko’s view, an incorrect one.
“Soldiers drafted from regions where Muslims live in compact groups,” he says, “indicate their nationality much more often in military tickets” than those soldiers, including ethnic Russian ones, from other places.
“They are accustomed to this, and it does not enter anyone’s head to accuse an Avar, a Dargin, a Tabasaran or a Tatar of nationalism.”
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Tuesday, May 04, 2010 |
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Niqab Adds New Wrinkle To Tajikistan's Head-Scarf Ban
By Farangis Najibullah
(RFE/RL) -- It's been nearly a year since 18-year-old Fatima began wearing the niqab, a loose cloak that covers her from head to toe, leaving only her eyes exposed.
The Dushanbe resident, who declined to provide her full name, says she has studied Islam "for some time" and eventually came to the conclusion that wearing the niqab was befitting of her religious beliefs.
"People stare at me in streets," she says. "Some of them call me 'ninja.' But I don't care. It makes my faith even stronger."
In the past year, the number of Tajik women wearing the niqab has grown considerably -- with the trend most evident among women in their late teens or early 20s.
The niqab's rising popularity comes despite a partial ban imposed in 2007 on the comparatively more revealing hijab, branded as an unnecessary foreign import. The wearing of that head scarf, popular among many Tajik Muslim women, is not allowed in state institutions, some public places, and shops.
Surayo Nabieva, a secondary-school teacher in the northern city of Khujand, explains the dilemma the Tajik authorities now face.
"We thought the hijab was extreme," Nabieva says. "Now there is the niqab, which makes the hijab look moderate."
Element Of Arab Culture
Belgium's recently approved ban on Muslim women wearing veils that cover their entire face -- as well as similar legislation being considered in France -- provide examples of the most extreme methods for dealing with the issue. As Tajik authorities ponder the situation, some experts argue that not only do clothing bans fail to keep foreign religious influences at bay, they may end up having the opposite effect.
Many in predominantly Muslim Tajikistan regard the niqab as an element of Arab culture -- one that does not fit with the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam practiced by most Tajik Muslims, which does not require women to cover their faces. Tajikistan's Council of Ulema, a state-backed independent religious body, has called on believers to stick to tradition by wearing the Tajik costume consisting of a medium-length, colorful dress worn with trousers.
But as the influence of religion grows in Tajik society, the country can expect to see more women opting for the hijab or niqab as religious diversity rises. Singling out those believers for official scrutiny, observers argue, won't diminish their beliefs or prevent them from looking outside Hanafi tradition.
Fatima says her decision to wear the niqab has led to harassment, with passers-by treating her with suspicion or even calling her a "Wahhabi," a term widely used in Tajikistan for religious extremists.
Violates Constitution
Bakhtiyor Nasrulloev, a lawyer who specializes in family law and women's rights, is campaigning to have the ban on head scarves in Tajik schools lifted.
"The ban violates the Tajik Constitution in two ways," says Nasrulloev, who does not see any connection between the ban on head scarves and growing use of the niqab. "First, according to the law, every Tajik citizen has the right to practice their religion of choice. And secondly, every citizen has the right to an education. Denying these young women their education because they wear the hijab is against Tajik law."
Many Muslim women now remove their hijabs just before entering the grounds of universities or schools. Many who have refused have been expelled. Parents of hijab-wearing students, conservative religious groups, and the Islamic Renaissance Party -- the only officially registered Islamic party in Central Asia -- all accuse the Education Ministry of violating citizens' rights. At least one female student has sued the ministry, unsuccessfully.
Education officials appear unbowed. Fourth-year university student Ganjina Sharifova was expelled from Tajik National University on April 26.
"I always comply with the ban when I'm inside the university building and put on my hijab after I leave the building," she says. "But the dean of the university saw me wearing the hijab on my way to the dormitory."
So far, the wearing of the niqab has been seen mostly in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe. But Khujand schoolteacher Nabieva laments that it won't be long before the trend spreads to other regions.
"I don't like the niqab. No one among my family or friends approves of it," says Nabieva. "But I'm afraid it is becoming a fixture of everyday life and no one seems to be able to stop it."
RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
(RFE/RL) -- It's been nearly a year since 18-year-old Fatima began wearing the niqab, a loose cloak that covers her from head to toe, leaving only her eyes exposed.
The Dushanbe resident, who declined to provide her full name, says she has studied Islam "for some time" and eventually came to the conclusion that wearing the niqab was befitting of her religious beliefs.
"People stare at me in streets," she says. "Some of them call me 'ninja.' But I don't care. It makes my faith even stronger."
In the past year, the number of Tajik women wearing the niqab has grown considerably -- with the trend most evident among women in their late teens or early 20s.
The niqab's rising popularity comes despite a partial ban imposed in 2007 on the comparatively more revealing hijab, branded as an unnecessary foreign import. The wearing of that head scarf, popular among many Tajik Muslim women, is not allowed in state institutions, some public places, and shops.
Surayo Nabieva, a secondary-school teacher in the northern city of Khujand, explains the dilemma the Tajik authorities now face.
"We thought the hijab was extreme," Nabieva says. "Now there is the niqab, which makes the hijab look moderate."
Element Of Arab Culture
Belgium's recently approved ban on Muslim women wearing veils that cover their entire face -- as well as similar legislation being considered in France -- provide examples of the most extreme methods for dealing with the issue. As Tajik authorities ponder the situation, some experts argue that not only do clothing bans fail to keep foreign religious influences at bay, they may end up having the opposite effect.
Many in predominantly Muslim Tajikistan regard the niqab as an element of Arab culture -- one that does not fit with the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam practiced by most Tajik Muslims, which does not require women to cover their faces. Tajikistan's Council of Ulema, a state-backed independent religious body, has called on believers to stick to tradition by wearing the Tajik costume consisting of a medium-length, colorful dress worn with trousers.
But as the influence of religion grows in Tajik society, the country can expect to see more women opting for the hijab or niqab as religious diversity rises. Singling out those believers for official scrutiny, observers argue, won't diminish their beliefs or prevent them from looking outside Hanafi tradition.
Fatima says her decision to wear the niqab has led to harassment, with passers-by treating her with suspicion or even calling her a "Wahhabi," a term widely used in Tajikistan for religious extremists.
Violates Constitution
Bakhtiyor Nasrulloev, a lawyer who specializes in family law and women's rights, is campaigning to have the ban on head scarves in Tajik schools lifted.
"The ban violates the Tajik Constitution in two ways," says Nasrulloev, who does not see any connection between the ban on head scarves and growing use of the niqab. "First, according to the law, every Tajik citizen has the right to practice their religion of choice. And secondly, every citizen has the right to an education. Denying these young women their education because they wear the hijab is against Tajik law."
Many Muslim women now remove their hijabs just before entering the grounds of universities or schools. Many who have refused have been expelled. Parents of hijab-wearing students, conservative religious groups, and the Islamic Renaissance Party -- the only officially registered Islamic party in Central Asia -- all accuse the Education Ministry of violating citizens' rights. At least one female student has sued the ministry, unsuccessfully.
Education officials appear unbowed. Fourth-year university student Ganjina Sharifova was expelled from Tajik National University on April 26.
"I always comply with the ban when I'm inside the university building and put on my hijab after I leave the building," she says. "But the dean of the university saw me wearing the hijab on my way to the dormitory."
So far, the wearing of the niqab has been seen mostly in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe. But Khujand schoolteacher Nabieva laments that it won't be long before the trend spreads to other regions.
"I don't like the niqab. No one among my family or friends approves of it," says Nabieva. "But I'm afraid it is becoming a fixture of everyday life and no one seems to be able to stop it."
RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Tuesday, May 04, 2010 |
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Is Kyrgyzstan's Revolution Ready For Export?
By Farangis Najibullah
Could the recent political upheaval that brought down Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev have a domino effect on other countries in Central Asia?
It's a question that is being asked in the region in the wake of Kyrgyzstan's bloody antigovernment demonstrations earlier this month.
The events have been portrayed as a wake-up call to other Central Asian leaders, lest their citizens follow the example set in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. And there are ample similarities between Kyrgyzstan and its fellow Central Asian states to give credence to the suggestion.
The five Central Asian countries all come under criticism in varying degrees over constraints on political freedoms, government pressure on independent media, and free speech. Nepotism and corruption, two key ingredients behind the Kyrgyz unrest, are common complaints across the region.
In Kyrgyzstan, the wave of discontent over Bakiev's appointment of his children, siblings, and other relatives to key official posts eventually swept his government away. In an ironic twist, it was virtually the same wave Bakiev himself rode to power five years before, when his predecessor, Askar Akaev, was ousted as a result of the Tulip Revolution.
Family Factor
Elsewhere in Central Asia -- with the exception of Turkmenistan, where tribal politics reign -- members of presidential families control major businesses, banks, and wield enormous influence in politics.
In Uzbekistan, Gulnara Karimova is often touted as a potential successor to her president father, Islam Karimov. The first daughter enjoys a life of fame as a European-based fashion designer, and riches due to her reputed control of the company Zeromax, which oversees a wide range of oil and gas businesses in Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev's second daughter, Dinara Kulibaeva, has immense influence over the resource-rich country's energy sphere along with her husband, Timur Kulibaev, one of the country's richest men.
In Tajikistan, Rustam Emomali, President Emomali Rahmon's eldest son, recently made his political debut by gaining a seat on Dushanbe city council, sparking speculation that he is being groomed for the presidency.
In the weeks leading up to the Kyrgyz uprising, citizens became increasing vocal in expressing their belief that the presidential family was expanding its influence and wealth as a result of corruption, while the rest of the country struggled with poverty.
Such sentiments can also be found among ordinary people throughout Central Asia, who often feel their respective governments leave them to deal with poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities on their own.
Lack Of Organized Opposition
Many analyses and commentaries published after the Kyrgyz unrest predicted it wouldn't be long before people would be demonstrating against their leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in the region.
"The poverty, corruption, and harsh economic conditions that bred resentment in Kyrgyzstan are also present in abundance in neighboring states," read a passage from an article posted on eurasia.net on April 21. "None of [Central Asian leaders] can rule out turmoil at home."
But while a number of similar ingredients can be found in Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, this doesn't mean they will bring about the same result.
While Kyrgyzstan exhibited signs of a nascent democracy for years -- for example, it is the only country in the region in which the opposition has a parliamentary faction -- the powers that be in the other Central Asian states have maintained a much tighter grip.
The parliament in Uzbekistan, for example, is filled by ruling party members and their colleagues from other pro-government groups. Turkmenistan still practices a one-party system. In Kazakhstan, all parliamentary seats belong to the pro-presidential Nur Otan party.
Tajikistan's opposition Islamic Renaissance Party officially held onto its two parliamentary seats following a February election. But for years, even though one of its two legislators was terminally ill and bed-ridden, it wasn't allowed to replace him with another candidate.
Tajik political analyst Sabur Vahhob says that, compared to Kyrgyzstan, the other Central Asian states lack strong opposition figures. "There aren't experienced political [opposition] leaders, capable of gathering people around themselves," he says. "People need a leader whom they can trust, but we can't see such personalities yet."
Loyal Security Teams
In addition, while Bakiev's government in recent years took steps to clamp down on independent media and imprison opposition leaders, it remained the only country in the region where people enjoyed relative freedom to hold antigovernment protests. Bakiev himself, speaking from exile in Minsk last week, implied he didn't see anything wrong in demonstrations taking place.
Governments across Central Asia have been criticized for restricting political freedom and persecuting their political opponents.
Perhaps the harshest example in recent years came in Uzbekistan, when a rare public demonstration in the eastern town of Andijon in 2005 was brutally suppressed by government forces who fired into the crowd. The government claims 187 people, including police, were killed in the violence, but rights groups say several hundred protesters were killed. Hundreds fled the country following the crackdown, fearing imprisonment.
A key difference between Bakiev and other Central Asian leaders can be found in the people surrounding them. Most of regional leaders have taken firm control over key ministries -- security, defense, and interior -- by appointing close allies. Even at the level of middle management in the security and law enforcement agencies, only those most loyal to the presidential office can be found.
Bakiev, on the other hand, placed a sibling in charge of the elite presidential guard, but was at odds with his defense minister and onetime ally, Ismail Isakov, whom he eventually imprisoned.
Nervous Silence
The minimal coverage of Kyrgyz events by state-run media in Central Asia is indicative of the efforts taken in the region to prevent any carryover effect. Official media in all Central Asian countries have downplayed the scope and significance of the Kyrgyz events, while the Turkmen media has completely ignored them.
Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov -- keeping a nervous eye on Kyrgyzstan?
No Central Asian leader has officially recognized the interim government in Bishkek. But that does not mean the events have gone unnoticed by the governments of Central Asia.
When the unrest in Kyrgyz began to unfold, Kazakh President Nazarbaev was vocal in predicting that similar events would not take place in Kazakhstan. According to Nazarbaev, people in his oil-rich country are content with their living standards.
Speaking during the Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty on April 27, Nazarbaev described the situation in Kyrgyzstan as a mere "fight for power." He added: "It was not a revolution. It was complete banditry."
'Preventative Measures'
Others in the region appear to have taken steps designed to ensure a Kyrgyz-like political scenario does not unfold on their territory. Tajikistan appears to be taking the soft approach, while Uzbekistan is reportedly taking a hard line.
In an April 24 address to the nation, Tajik President Rahmon instructed all local government heads to have "open doors" every Saturday to meet with people and listen to their opinions, problems, and complaints.
The Uzbek response has been starkly different. According to RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, law enforcement officials along with neighborhood committees in the southeastern Ferghana Province are asking people to sign "loyalty letters," promising they will not agitate against the government. Such letters reportedly appeared shortly after the Kyrgyz unrest, and mainly target relatives of dissidents, political activists, and conservative religious people.
If history is any indication, the chances of any export of the revolutionary spirit seen in Kyrgyzstan depend largely on how successful the uprising is at bringing about real democratic change.
The Tulip Revolution five years ago initially brought hope of such change, and was widely welcomed by younger people in Central Asia. But those hopes faded as many expected reforms failed to materialize. This, Kyrgyz say today, merely demonstrated that the 2005 revolution wasn't about democracy, but simply replaced once corrupt strongman with another.
Likewise, if Kyrgyz hopes once again turn into disenchantment, their neighbors' criticisms of the "chronic revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan that lead to nothing will only be strengthened.
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
Could the recent political upheaval that brought down Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev have a domino effect on other countries in Central Asia?
It's a question that is being asked in the region in the wake of Kyrgyzstan's bloody antigovernment demonstrations earlier this month.
The events have been portrayed as a wake-up call to other Central Asian leaders, lest their citizens follow the example set in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. And there are ample similarities between Kyrgyzstan and its fellow Central Asian states to give credence to the suggestion.
The five Central Asian countries all come under criticism in varying degrees over constraints on political freedoms, government pressure on independent media, and free speech. Nepotism and corruption, two key ingredients behind the Kyrgyz unrest, are common complaints across the region.
In Kyrgyzstan, the wave of discontent over Bakiev's appointment of his children, siblings, and other relatives to key official posts eventually swept his government away. In an ironic twist, it was virtually the same wave Bakiev himself rode to power five years before, when his predecessor, Askar Akaev, was ousted as a result of the Tulip Revolution.
Family Factor
Elsewhere in Central Asia -- with the exception of Turkmenistan, where tribal politics reign -- members of presidential families control major businesses, banks, and wield enormous influence in politics.
In Uzbekistan, Gulnara Karimova is often touted as a potential successor to her president father, Islam Karimov. The first daughter enjoys a life of fame as a European-based fashion designer, and riches due to her reputed control of the company Zeromax, which oversees a wide range of oil and gas businesses in Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev's second daughter, Dinara Kulibaeva, has immense influence over the resource-rich country's energy sphere along with her husband, Timur Kulibaev, one of the country's richest men.
In Tajikistan, Rustam Emomali, President Emomali Rahmon's eldest son, recently made his political debut by gaining a seat on Dushanbe city council, sparking speculation that he is being groomed for the presidency.
In the weeks leading up to the Kyrgyz uprising, citizens became increasing vocal in expressing their belief that the presidential family was expanding its influence and wealth as a result of corruption, while the rest of the country struggled with poverty.
Such sentiments can also be found among ordinary people throughout Central Asia, who often feel their respective governments leave them to deal with poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities on their own.
Lack Of Organized Opposition
Many analyses and commentaries published after the Kyrgyz unrest predicted it wouldn't be long before people would be demonstrating against their leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in the region.
"The poverty, corruption, and harsh economic conditions that bred resentment in Kyrgyzstan are also present in abundance in neighboring states," read a passage from an article posted on eurasia.net on April 21. "None of [Central Asian leaders] can rule out turmoil at home."
But while a number of similar ingredients can be found in Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, this doesn't mean they will bring about the same result.
While Kyrgyzstan exhibited signs of a nascent democracy for years -- for example, it is the only country in the region in which the opposition has a parliamentary faction -- the powers that be in the other Central Asian states have maintained a much tighter grip.
The parliament in Uzbekistan, for example, is filled by ruling party members and their colleagues from other pro-government groups. Turkmenistan still practices a one-party system. In Kazakhstan, all parliamentary seats belong to the pro-presidential Nur Otan party.
Tajikistan's opposition Islamic Renaissance Party officially held onto its two parliamentary seats following a February election. But for years, even though one of its two legislators was terminally ill and bed-ridden, it wasn't allowed to replace him with another candidate.
Tajik political analyst Sabur Vahhob says that, compared to Kyrgyzstan, the other Central Asian states lack strong opposition figures. "There aren't experienced political [opposition] leaders, capable of gathering people around themselves," he says. "People need a leader whom they can trust, but we can't see such personalities yet."
Loyal Security Teams
In addition, while Bakiev's government in recent years took steps to clamp down on independent media and imprison opposition leaders, it remained the only country in the region where people enjoyed relative freedom to hold antigovernment protests. Bakiev himself, speaking from exile in Minsk last week, implied he didn't see anything wrong in demonstrations taking place.
Governments across Central Asia have been criticized for restricting political freedom and persecuting their political opponents.
Perhaps the harshest example in recent years came in Uzbekistan, when a rare public demonstration in the eastern town of Andijon in 2005 was brutally suppressed by government forces who fired into the crowd. The government claims 187 people, including police, were killed in the violence, but rights groups say several hundred protesters were killed. Hundreds fled the country following the crackdown, fearing imprisonment.
A key difference between Bakiev and other Central Asian leaders can be found in the people surrounding them. Most of regional leaders have taken firm control over key ministries -- security, defense, and interior -- by appointing close allies. Even at the level of middle management in the security and law enforcement agencies, only those most loyal to the presidential office can be found.
Bakiev, on the other hand, placed a sibling in charge of the elite presidential guard, but was at odds with his defense minister and onetime ally, Ismail Isakov, whom he eventually imprisoned.
Nervous Silence
The minimal coverage of Kyrgyz events by state-run media in Central Asia is indicative of the efforts taken in the region to prevent any carryover effect. Official media in all Central Asian countries have downplayed the scope and significance of the Kyrgyz events, while the Turkmen media has completely ignored them.
Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov -- keeping a nervous eye on Kyrgyzstan?
No Central Asian leader has officially recognized the interim government in Bishkek. But that does not mean the events have gone unnoticed by the governments of Central Asia.
When the unrest in Kyrgyz began to unfold, Kazakh President Nazarbaev was vocal in predicting that similar events would not take place in Kazakhstan. According to Nazarbaev, people in his oil-rich country are content with their living standards.
Speaking during the Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty on April 27, Nazarbaev described the situation in Kyrgyzstan as a mere "fight for power." He added: "It was not a revolution. It was complete banditry."
'Preventative Measures'
Others in the region appear to have taken steps designed to ensure a Kyrgyz-like political scenario does not unfold on their territory. Tajikistan appears to be taking the soft approach, while Uzbekistan is reportedly taking a hard line.
In an April 24 address to the nation, Tajik President Rahmon instructed all local government heads to have "open doors" every Saturday to meet with people and listen to their opinions, problems, and complaints.
The Uzbek response has been starkly different. According to RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, law enforcement officials along with neighborhood committees in the southeastern Ferghana Province are asking people to sign "loyalty letters," promising they will not agitate against the government. Such letters reportedly appeared shortly after the Kyrgyz unrest, and mainly target relatives of dissidents, political activists, and conservative religious people.
If history is any indication, the chances of any export of the revolutionary spirit seen in Kyrgyzstan depend largely on how successful the uprising is at bringing about real democratic change.
The Tulip Revolution five years ago initially brought hope of such change, and was widely welcomed by younger people in Central Asia. But those hopes faded as many expected reforms failed to materialize. This, Kyrgyz say today, merely demonstrated that the 2005 revolution wasn't about democracy, but simply replaced once corrupt strongman with another.
Likewise, if Kyrgyz hopes once again turn into disenchantment, their neighbors' criticisms of the "chronic revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan that lead to nothing will only be strengthened.
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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WHO Investigates Polio Outbreak In Tajikistan; Immunization Planned
WHO deployed a team of experts April 16 to investigate a suspected polio outbreak in the south-west of Tajikistan, in the area bordering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.
A sharp increase of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases in early April prompted the Tajik government to notify WHO of a possible polio outbreak. After further investigation by the Tajik national health authorities jointly with WHO, laboratory tests by the WHO collaborating center in Moscow confirmed poliovirus as the cause of the outbreak.
Tests are being done to further characterize the virus.
WHO said it immediately alerted all WHO Member States of this new public health risk in eastern central Asia, as required under the International Health Regulations.
WHO has also alerted the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to intensify surveillance for AFP cases and to rapidly conduct national or subnational polio immunization campaigns.
This is the first outbreak from imported poliovirus in the WHO European Region since the Region was certified polio-free in 2002.
WHO, together with the active participation of its partners in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, said it will continue to provide technical and field support until the outbreak is brought under control.
WHO and its partners will support the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan in conducting a mass immunization campaign.
A sharp increase of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases in early April prompted the Tajik government to notify WHO of a possible polio outbreak. After further investigation by the Tajik national health authorities jointly with WHO, laboratory tests by the WHO collaborating center in Moscow confirmed poliovirus as the cause of the outbreak.
Tests are being done to further characterize the virus.
WHO said it immediately alerted all WHO Member States of this new public health risk in eastern central Asia, as required under the International Health Regulations.
WHO has also alerted the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to intensify surveillance for AFP cases and to rapidly conduct national or subnational polio immunization campaigns.
This is the first outbreak from imported poliovirus in the WHO European Region since the Region was certified polio-free in 2002.
WHO, together with the active participation of its partners in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, said it will continue to provide technical and field support until the outbreak is brought under control.
WHO and its partners will support the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan in conducting a mass immunization campaign.
Friday, April 23, 2010 |
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Political Islam In Central Asia: The Role Of Hizb Al-Tahrir
By Emmanuel Karagiannis for the CTC-Sentinel
One of the fastest growing global, Sunni Islamic political organizations is Hizb al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party, HT).1 HT often escapes in-depth analysis because the group itself does not use violence to seek political change. As a result, it is not on the U.S. government’s list of terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, HT is pursuing an agenda at odds with the West, and eventually the group could pose an active threat to the United States and its allies.
Profiling HT is important as the group is one of the most popular pan-Islamic organizations, counting tens of thousands of members.2 While it rejects violence at this time, it is open to waging jihad once a proper Islamic state is established with the purpose of creating a global Islamic caliphate. To establish this initial Islamic state, HT is pursuing an agenda to make society more “Islamist” so that such a state can be established peacefully. Nevertheless, the group ascribes to a little discussed strategy called nusra, which means it could support a coup d’etat by an armed force if that force is pursuing an Islamist agenda.
This article will provide background on HT, including its strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate. It will then profile HT’s role in Central Asia, the region in which it is most active.
Background on Hizb al-Tahrir
HT was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin. In the decades since its establishment, HT has become an international movement3 with tens of thousands of followers worldwide. Although the group is primarily active in Central Asia, it also has a large following in a number of Western countries, including in the United States. Today, HT is led by Ata Abu Rashta, a Palestinian civil engineer who studied in Cairo and previously served as the party’s spokesman in Jordan.
HT does not view itself as a religious organization, but as a political party based on Islamic values. HT’s political doctrine is founded on two principles. The first is the need for Islamic law, or Shari`a, to regulate all aspects of human life—politics, economics, science and ethics. The second principle is the need for an authentic Islamic state, which would pave the way for the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. According to HT, a “just” society can only be achieved within such a political entity.
HT’s goal is to create an Islamic state that will first absorb all Muslim-populated territories into its borders to establish a caliphate, and then spread Islam worldwide through jihad. For instance, al-Nabhani wrote in Article 183 of his proposed constitution for the future Islamic state that “conveying the Islamic da’wah [to the world] is the axis around which the foreign policy revolves, and the basis upon which the relation between the [Islamic] state and other states is built.”4 Moreover, “this policy is implemented by a defined method that never changes, which is jihad, regardless of who is in authority. Jihad is the call to Islam which involves fighting or the contribution of money, opinions, or literature towards the fighting.”5 To achieve these goals, HT envisages a three-stage program of action, modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced on his path to establishing the first Islamic state:
To achieve this strategy, HT does not want to seize control of the state by force and coerce society into accepting its political agenda. Rather, HT wants to persuade society to accept its ideas willingly, which would then inevitably lead to a regime change. Yet even in these circumstances, it is likely that HT would use some form of pressure to remove recalcitrant regimes; party ideologues have often implied that regimes could be overthrown by acts of civil disobedience, such as demonstrations and strikes. For example, the media representative of HT in Britain, Imran Waheed, once wrote:
Moreover, HT has also developed the concept of seeking outside support (nusra) to remove a regime from power. HT compares this strategy to how the Prophet Muhammad received support from Arab tribes in his conquest of Medina after he fled Mecca for fear of persecution by the pagan leaders.8 HT has interpreted the conquest of Medina as a coup d’etat orchestrated by the Prophet Muhammad and his allies that took their local opponents by surprise.
According to the group’s literature, if the land was a land of Kufr and the rules of Islam were not put in implementation, then removing the ruler who governs over the Muslims would be through using the method of Nusrah, i.e. seeking [military]9 help. This is the method that the Prophet Muhammad adopted to establish the State of Islam and to implement the Islamic rules.10
In practice, this means that HT could support a coup organized by a military that would have first embraced Islamism as its ideology. For example, HT encouraged elements within the Jordanian armed forces to overthrow the Jordanian government in 1968 and 1969. Moreover, there are indications that some members of HT were linked to a failed coup attempt in Egypt in 1974.11 The objectives of seeking nusra for the re-establishment of the caliphate are twofold: first, to enable HT to continue its political struggle without risking a military confrontation with authorities; second, to propagate its ideology to the security forces so that they overthrow existing regimes and establish an Islamic state.
It is important to note, however, that HT never developed a paramilitary wing and its members did not provide military support for the coup attempts in Jordan and Egypt, although these coups were aimed at establishing an Islamic state. Moreover, HT has not been involved in any other violent or velvet coups in the Muslim world since the mid-1970s.
HT’s Role in Central Asia
Although HT has influence globally—including in the United States and in the West—it is most active in Central Asia because it has faced little competition from other Islamist groups in this region. There are a number of factors that led to HT’s rise in Central Asia, not least of which is the fact that Central Asia is predominately Muslim.12 Poor economic conditions in post-Soviet Central Asia provided fertile soil for Islamist groups to achieve support in changing the current social order. Governments in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan exclude Uzbek minorities, which has allowed HT to recruit among this class in these countries. Furthermore, many in the population are attracted to the prospect of an Islamic government, primarily due to the lack of legitimate channels for protest against the region’s authoritarian governments.
Moreover, the collapse of communism produced an ideological vacuum in Central Asia, which HT has attempted to fill with religious rhetoric. The group appeals to individuals who want to believe in a coherent ideology that provides ready answers not only for spiritual questions, but also practical issues. HT’s vision of a universal Islamic state also appeals to Central Asians who feel nostalgia for the loss of Soviet society, which theoretically promoted values of “solidarity” and “justice.” There are widespread feelings of mistrust in the capability of Central Asian governments to cater to the citizens’ needs. The application of Shari`a, propagated by HT, promises to a fraction of the population a legitimate blueprint for a “just” society. Its radical calls to overthrow regimes through peaceful measures are well received by many people who, while rejecting violence as a method for political change, have lost hope in the Central Asian regimes’ ability to reform themselves.
HT’s emergence in Central Asia was initially an “Uzbek phenomenon.” The early development of a mosque-centered faith in Uzbek-populated areas means that the local population is accustomed to thinking that Islam can provide solutions to problems. Since the late 1990s, however, HT succeeded in spreading its message throughout Central Asia. As a result, HT is the leading Islamist group in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with thousands of members in each country.13 These governments have responded to the emergence of HT with repressive measures against its members and supporters. These punitive measures, however, are having the opposite effect: HT is growing in popularity, as can be measured by its ability to recruit across broad swathes of society, including students, businessmen, intellectuals and women. Only in Turkmenistan does HT have a minimal presence, which is probably due to severe state repression.
HT differs considerably from other clandestine Islamist groups when it comes to recruitment. The group welcomes as members both men and women. HT is more likely to use its female members for demonstrations and protests in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, based on the belief that security services in these countries are less likely to abuse them physically or arrest them. Also, HT has been active in recruiting prisoners in Central Asia. Jailed HT members propagate their ideology to fellow convicts who, due to the harsh prison conditions, are susceptible to Islamist messaging. This has become such a problem that in Uzbekistan, for example, authorities tend to isolate HT members from common prisoners.14
HT pursues a different strategy in each Central Asian country where it is active. In Uzbekistan, HT spreads its message clandestinely. In Kyrgyzstan, it takes advantage of the country’s relatively relaxed political atmosphere to launch public relations campaigns. In Kazakhstan, HT is still growing its cadres while avoiding a confrontation with the authorities. In Tajikistan, HT chooses to confront both the authorities and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, its main political competitor. While maintaining a coherent and concrete agenda, HT has tactically focused on each country’s unique problems.
Prospects for the Future
HT does not constitute an immediate threat to the security of Central Asian states. Nevertheless, HT may in the medium- to long-term ally itself with radical elements within the security services or armed forces to overthrow one or more governments in the Central Asian region in line with the group’s nusra strategy. HT’s rejection of political violence is conditional on the prevailing political circumstances: when nusra is not an option, the group aims at the Islamization of society and the eventual peaceful overthrow of the regime.
Although HT cannot be classified as a terrorist organization, the political implications of its growing influence in the region are serious. The group constitutes an obstacle to the emergence of democracy in Central Asia, since its growing popularity has allowed regional leaders to solidify their positions and resist Western calls for political and economic reforms. Moreover, if HT were to collaborate with an armed force to establish an Islamic state in a country, its next goal would be to re-establish the Islamic caliphate, which would clearly set this new state up for conflict with its regional neighbors.
Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis is an Assistant Professor of Russian and post-Soviet Politics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece and an Investigator at the University of Maryland’s START Center. His new book on Hizb al-Tahrir in Central Asia, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has just been published by Routledge in New York.
This article first appeared in the CTC Sentinel Volume 3-Issue 2 (February 2010), pages 13- 15 (PDF). The CTC Sentinel is published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. This article is reprinted with permission.
NOTES:
1 Hizb al-Tahrir is more commonly transliterated as Hizb ut-Tahrir.
2 HT’s total numbers in Central Asia are not known because the group operates clandestinely. There are, however, some 6,000 HT members and sympathizers serving time in Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik prisons. The U.S. State Department claims, for example, that as many as 4,500 HT members are currently jailed in Uzbekistan alone. See the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Uzbekistan – International Religious Freedom Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007).
3 The terms group, party, organization and movement are used interchangeably in this article.
4 Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1998), p. 275.
5 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
6 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), p. 32.
7 Imrad Waheed, “Who Killed Farhad Usmanov?” Caliphate, July 2002.
8 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 22.
9 HT refers to the “people of support” (ahl un-Nusra) who were physically powerful enough not only to help establish the first Islamic state, but also to defend it against enemies. They were the equivalent of an army. By definition, those who now can help in re-establishing the caliphate must be armed. On more than one occasion, HT has openly asked the armed forces of Muslim countries to intervene in certain states. Therefore, it must be emphasized that HT is interested in those who are militarily (not politically) capable.
10 The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, p. 22.
11 S. Taji-Farouk, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), pp. 27, 168.
12 According to the CIA World Factbook, the Muslim populations in the four Central Asian republics are: Tajikistan (90%), Uzbekistan (88%), Kazakhstan (47%), and Kyrgyzstan (75%).
13 Based on interviews with security officials and group members, as well as extrapolating from the number of arrested members in the country, the author estimates that there are around 10,000-15,000 members and many more sympathizers in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the majority of HT members appear to be from the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent—as assessed by the number of arrested members from these areas. In Tajikistan, despite the existence of a legal Islamic party, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), HT has managed to establish a presence in the country. The first HT cells in Tajikistan were established by Uzbek citizens who moved into northern Tajikistan in the late 1990s. A rough estimate of HT membership in Tajikistan is about 3,000 members. In Kazakhstan, the first HT members appeared in 1998. As in Tajikistan, the first generation of members in southern Kazakhstan were ethnic Uzbeks. In recent years, however, a large number of members are ethnic Kazakhs. HT likely has about 2,000 members in Kazakhstan, mostly active in the south in areas such as Shymkent and Kentau. In Kyrgyzstan, HT is strong in the southern provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken. According to security sources, there are around 4,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan. These details are based on: “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Extremistskaya Organizatsiya,” Shyt [Dushanbe], January 27, 2005; Personal interview, Igor Savin, director of NGO Dialogue, Shymkent, Kazakhstan, February 2004; Personal interview, Kazakh diplomat, Washington, D.C., September 2009; Personal interview, Kazakh security official, Astana, Kazakhstan, February 2009; Personal interview, Sadykdzhan Mahmoudov, director of NGO Rays of Solomon, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2004.
14 Personal interview, member of Hizb al-Tahrir, name withheld at request, Namangan, Uzbekistan, August 2005.
One of the fastest growing global, Sunni Islamic political organizations is Hizb al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party, HT).1 HT often escapes in-depth analysis because the group itself does not use violence to seek political change. As a result, it is not on the U.S. government’s list of terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, HT is pursuing an agenda at odds with the West, and eventually the group could pose an active threat to the United States and its allies.
Profiling HT is important as the group is one of the most popular pan-Islamic organizations, counting tens of thousands of members.2 While it rejects violence at this time, it is open to waging jihad once a proper Islamic state is established with the purpose of creating a global Islamic caliphate. To establish this initial Islamic state, HT is pursuing an agenda to make society more “Islamist” so that such a state can be established peacefully. Nevertheless, the group ascribes to a little discussed strategy called nusra, which means it could support a coup d’etat by an armed force if that force is pursuing an Islamist agenda.
This article will provide background on HT, including its strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate. It will then profile HT’s role in Central Asia, the region in which it is most active.
Background on Hizb al-Tahrir
HT was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin. In the decades since its establishment, HT has become an international movement3 with tens of thousands of followers worldwide. Although the group is primarily active in Central Asia, it also has a large following in a number of Western countries, including in the United States. Today, HT is led by Ata Abu Rashta, a Palestinian civil engineer who studied in Cairo and previously served as the party’s spokesman in Jordan.
HT does not view itself as a religious organization, but as a political party based on Islamic values. HT’s political doctrine is founded on two principles. The first is the need for Islamic law, or Shari`a, to regulate all aspects of human life—politics, economics, science and ethics. The second principle is the need for an authentic Islamic state, which would pave the way for the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. According to HT, a “just” society can only be achieved within such a political entity.
HT’s goal is to create an Islamic state that will first absorb all Muslim-populated territories into its borders to establish a caliphate, and then spread Islam worldwide through jihad. For instance, al-Nabhani wrote in Article 183 of his proposed constitution for the future Islamic state that “conveying the Islamic da’wah [to the world] is the axis around which the foreign policy revolves, and the basis upon which the relation between the [Islamic] state and other states is built.”4 Moreover, “this policy is implemented by a defined method that never changes, which is jihad, regardless of who is in authority. Jihad is the call to Islam which involves fighting or the contribution of money, opinions, or literature towards the fighting.”5 To achieve these goals, HT envisages a three-stage program of action, modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced on his path to establishing the first Islamic state:
Stage One: Recruitment of members.
Stage Two: Islamization of society.
Stage Three: Takeover of the state and jihad against non-believers.6
To achieve this strategy, HT does not want to seize control of the state by force and coerce society into accepting its political agenda. Rather, HT wants to persuade society to accept its ideas willingly, which would then inevitably lead to a regime change. Yet even in these circumstances, it is likely that HT would use some form of pressure to remove recalcitrant regimes; party ideologues have often implied that regimes could be overthrown by acts of civil disobedience, such as demonstrations and strikes. For example, the media representative of HT in Britain, Imran Waheed, once wrote:
a day will come when the Muslims will take revenge against all those who participated in their oppression [i.e. the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan]. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not use weapons or resort to violence, nor uses any physical means in its call…However, do not expect, that these rulers and their regimes will collapse all by themselves. On the contrary, patient believers are required to shake these regimes and uproot them.7
Moreover, HT has also developed the concept of seeking outside support (nusra) to remove a regime from power. HT compares this strategy to how the Prophet Muhammad received support from Arab tribes in his conquest of Medina after he fled Mecca for fear of persecution by the pagan leaders.8 HT has interpreted the conquest of Medina as a coup d’etat orchestrated by the Prophet Muhammad and his allies that took their local opponents by surprise.
According to the group’s literature, if the land was a land of Kufr and the rules of Islam were not put in implementation, then removing the ruler who governs over the Muslims would be through using the method of Nusrah, i.e. seeking [military]9 help. This is the method that the Prophet Muhammad adopted to establish the State of Islam and to implement the Islamic rules.10
In practice, this means that HT could support a coup organized by a military that would have first embraced Islamism as its ideology. For example, HT encouraged elements within the Jordanian armed forces to overthrow the Jordanian government in 1968 and 1969. Moreover, there are indications that some members of HT were linked to a failed coup attempt in Egypt in 1974.11 The objectives of seeking nusra for the re-establishment of the caliphate are twofold: first, to enable HT to continue its political struggle without risking a military confrontation with authorities; second, to propagate its ideology to the security forces so that they overthrow existing regimes and establish an Islamic state.
It is important to note, however, that HT never developed a paramilitary wing and its members did not provide military support for the coup attempts in Jordan and Egypt, although these coups were aimed at establishing an Islamic state. Moreover, HT has not been involved in any other violent or velvet coups in the Muslim world since the mid-1970s.
HT’s Role in Central Asia
Although HT has influence globally—including in the United States and in the West—it is most active in Central Asia because it has faced little competition from other Islamist groups in this region. There are a number of factors that led to HT’s rise in Central Asia, not least of which is the fact that Central Asia is predominately Muslim.12 Poor economic conditions in post-Soviet Central Asia provided fertile soil for Islamist groups to achieve support in changing the current social order. Governments in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan exclude Uzbek minorities, which has allowed HT to recruit among this class in these countries. Furthermore, many in the population are attracted to the prospect of an Islamic government, primarily due to the lack of legitimate channels for protest against the region’s authoritarian governments.
Moreover, the collapse of communism produced an ideological vacuum in Central Asia, which HT has attempted to fill with religious rhetoric. The group appeals to individuals who want to believe in a coherent ideology that provides ready answers not only for spiritual questions, but also practical issues. HT’s vision of a universal Islamic state also appeals to Central Asians who feel nostalgia for the loss of Soviet society, which theoretically promoted values of “solidarity” and “justice.” There are widespread feelings of mistrust in the capability of Central Asian governments to cater to the citizens’ needs. The application of Shari`a, propagated by HT, promises to a fraction of the population a legitimate blueprint for a “just” society. Its radical calls to overthrow regimes through peaceful measures are well received by many people who, while rejecting violence as a method for political change, have lost hope in the Central Asian regimes’ ability to reform themselves.
HT’s emergence in Central Asia was initially an “Uzbek phenomenon.” The early development of a mosque-centered faith in Uzbek-populated areas means that the local population is accustomed to thinking that Islam can provide solutions to problems. Since the late 1990s, however, HT succeeded in spreading its message throughout Central Asia. As a result, HT is the leading Islamist group in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with thousands of members in each country.13 These governments have responded to the emergence of HT with repressive measures against its members and supporters. These punitive measures, however, are having the opposite effect: HT is growing in popularity, as can be measured by its ability to recruit across broad swathes of society, including students, businessmen, intellectuals and women. Only in Turkmenistan does HT have a minimal presence, which is probably due to severe state repression.
HT differs considerably from other clandestine Islamist groups when it comes to recruitment. The group welcomes as members both men and women. HT is more likely to use its female members for demonstrations and protests in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, based on the belief that security services in these countries are less likely to abuse them physically or arrest them. Also, HT has been active in recruiting prisoners in Central Asia. Jailed HT members propagate their ideology to fellow convicts who, due to the harsh prison conditions, are susceptible to Islamist messaging. This has become such a problem that in Uzbekistan, for example, authorities tend to isolate HT members from common prisoners.14
HT pursues a different strategy in each Central Asian country where it is active. In Uzbekistan, HT spreads its message clandestinely. In Kyrgyzstan, it takes advantage of the country’s relatively relaxed political atmosphere to launch public relations campaigns. In Kazakhstan, HT is still growing its cadres while avoiding a confrontation with the authorities. In Tajikistan, HT chooses to confront both the authorities and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, its main political competitor. While maintaining a coherent and concrete agenda, HT has tactically focused on each country’s unique problems.
Prospects for the Future
HT does not constitute an immediate threat to the security of Central Asian states. Nevertheless, HT may in the medium- to long-term ally itself with radical elements within the security services or armed forces to overthrow one or more governments in the Central Asian region in line with the group’s nusra strategy. HT’s rejection of political violence is conditional on the prevailing political circumstances: when nusra is not an option, the group aims at the Islamization of society and the eventual peaceful overthrow of the regime.
Although HT cannot be classified as a terrorist organization, the political implications of its growing influence in the region are serious. The group constitutes an obstacle to the emergence of democracy in Central Asia, since its growing popularity has allowed regional leaders to solidify their positions and resist Western calls for political and economic reforms. Moreover, if HT were to collaborate with an armed force to establish an Islamic state in a country, its next goal would be to re-establish the Islamic caliphate, which would clearly set this new state up for conflict with its regional neighbors.
Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis is an Assistant Professor of Russian and post-Soviet Politics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece and an Investigator at the University of Maryland’s START Center. His new book on Hizb al-Tahrir in Central Asia, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has just been published by Routledge in New York.
This article first appeared in the CTC Sentinel Volume 3-Issue 2 (February 2010), pages 13- 15 (PDF). The CTC Sentinel is published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. This article is reprinted with permission.
NOTES:
1 Hizb al-Tahrir is more commonly transliterated as Hizb ut-Tahrir.
2 HT’s total numbers in Central Asia are not known because the group operates clandestinely. There are, however, some 6,000 HT members and sympathizers serving time in Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik prisons. The U.S. State Department claims, for example, that as many as 4,500 HT members are currently jailed in Uzbekistan alone. See the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Uzbekistan – International Religious Freedom Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007).
3 The terms group, party, organization and movement are used interchangeably in this article.
4 Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1998), p. 275.
5 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
6 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), p. 32.
7 Imrad Waheed, “Who Killed Farhad Usmanov?” Caliphate, July 2002.
8 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 22.
9 HT refers to the “people of support” (ahl un-Nusra) who were physically powerful enough not only to help establish the first Islamic state, but also to defend it against enemies. They were the equivalent of an army. By definition, those who now can help in re-establishing the caliphate must be armed. On more than one occasion, HT has openly asked the armed forces of Muslim countries to intervene in certain states. Therefore, it must be emphasized that HT is interested in those who are militarily (not politically) capable.
10 The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, p. 22.
11 S. Taji-Farouk, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), pp. 27, 168.
12 According to the CIA World Factbook, the Muslim populations in the four Central Asian republics are: Tajikistan (90%), Uzbekistan (88%), Kazakhstan (47%), and Kyrgyzstan (75%).
13 Based on interviews with security officials and group members, as well as extrapolating from the number of arrested members in the country, the author estimates that there are around 10,000-15,000 members and many more sympathizers in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the majority of HT members appear to be from the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent—as assessed by the number of arrested members from these areas. In Tajikistan, despite the existence of a legal Islamic party, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), HT has managed to establish a presence in the country. The first HT cells in Tajikistan were established by Uzbek citizens who moved into northern Tajikistan in the late 1990s. A rough estimate of HT membership in Tajikistan is about 3,000 members. In Kazakhstan, the first HT members appeared in 1998. As in Tajikistan, the first generation of members in southern Kazakhstan were ethnic Uzbeks. In recent years, however, a large number of members are ethnic Kazakhs. HT likely has about 2,000 members in Kazakhstan, mostly active in the south in areas such as Shymkent and Kentau. In Kyrgyzstan, HT is strong in the southern provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken. According to security sources, there are around 4,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan. These details are based on: “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Extremistskaya Organizatsiya,” Shyt [Dushanbe], January 27, 2005; Personal interview, Igor Savin, director of NGO Dialogue, Shymkent, Kazakhstan, February 2004; Personal interview, Kazakh diplomat, Washington, D.C., September 2009; Personal interview, Kazakh security official, Astana, Kazakhstan, February 2009; Personal interview, Sadykdzhan Mahmoudov, director of NGO Rays of Solomon, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2004.
14 Personal interview, member of Hizb al-Tahrir, name withheld at request, Namangan, Uzbekistan, August 2005.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010 |
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Dubai Court Jails Tajik, Iranian Over Chechen Army Officer Murder
A Dubai court sentenced on Monday two men to 25 years in prison for their roles in the murder of the commander of a Russian Defense Ministry battalion in Chechnya.
Sulim Yamadayev, a Hero of Russia who commanded the elite Vostok Battalion in Chechnya, died in Dubai on March 28, 2009. He was shot in the chest with three bullets from a gold-plated gun in the car park of a luxury apartment complex where he was living with his wife and children.
Tajik businessman Makhsudzhon Ismatov and Iranian Mahdi Lorniya were accused of planning the murder and assisting the man who pulled the trigger. They will be deported to their home countries after serving their terms, which are equivalent to a life sentence in the Gulf state.
Lorniya previously worked in Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's stables.
Police said the gun used in the killing had been handed over to them by a Chechen delegation led by Kadyrov that visited the United Arab Emirates in 2008.
The Dubai court rejected in December a request for Kadyrov to be summoned to give evidence at the trial.
The name of the man suspected of pulling the trigger has not been disclosed. Investigators said he acted on information received from Ismatov, who is believed to have helped the man to flee the Emirates.
Dubai police have accused Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov's close friend and a lawmaker in Russia's lower house of parliament, of ordering the assassination. Both strongly denied any link to the murder.
Both Kadyrov and Yamadayev were former militants who joined Russia's federal troops. Chechnya saw two separatist wars in the late 1990s-early 2000s. The Vostok Battalion answered to the federal Defense Ministry and clashed on occasion with forces loyal to the Chechen president.
Sulim's brother Ruslan Yamadayev, a former member of the Russian parliament's lower house, was gunned down in central Moscow in September 2008. He was a prominent opponent of Kadyrov, who denied any involvement in his killing.
Source: RIA Novosti
Sulim Yamadayev, a Hero of Russia who commanded the elite Vostok Battalion in Chechnya, died in Dubai on March 28, 2009. He was shot in the chest with three bullets from a gold-plated gun in the car park of a luxury apartment complex where he was living with his wife and children.
Tajik businessman Makhsudzhon Ismatov and Iranian Mahdi Lorniya were accused of planning the murder and assisting the man who pulled the trigger. They will be deported to their home countries after serving their terms, which are equivalent to a life sentence in the Gulf state.
Lorniya previously worked in Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's stables.
Police said the gun used in the killing had been handed over to them by a Chechen delegation led by Kadyrov that visited the United Arab Emirates in 2008.
The Dubai court rejected in December a request for Kadyrov to be summoned to give evidence at the trial.
The name of the man suspected of pulling the trigger has not been disclosed. Investigators said he acted on information received from Ismatov, who is believed to have helped the man to flee the Emirates.
Dubai police have accused Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov's close friend and a lawmaker in Russia's lower house of parliament, of ordering the assassination. Both strongly denied any link to the murder.
Both Kadyrov and Yamadayev were former militants who joined Russia's federal troops. Chechnya saw two separatist wars in the late 1990s-early 2000s. The Vostok Battalion answered to the federal Defense Ministry and clashed on occasion with forces loyal to the Chechen president.
Sulim's brother Ruslan Yamadayev, a former member of the Russian parliament's lower house, was gunned down in central Moscow in September 2008. He was a prominent opponent of Kadyrov, who denied any involvement in his killing.
Source: RIA Novosti
Monday, April 12, 2010 |
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UN Chief Urges Central Asians To Resolve Water Issues
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrived in Tajikistan and plunged directly into the most controversial topic in Central Asia -- water.
Ban said water has already been a primary issue in conversations with leaders in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
"The question is how to use common resources for common prosperity," Ban said.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not have the hydrocarbon resources their Central Asian neighbors have and the two mountainous countries suffer chronic energy shortages that are particularly noticeable in winter months.
The solution to their energy problem seems to be developing hydropower potential, which is enormous in both countries.
But downstream countries, Uzbekistan in particular, oppose plans to build immense hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of fears water released from reservoirs in winter for electricity will lead to insufficient amounts of water for irrigation downstream in spring and summer.
As Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have gone ahead with their hydropower projects, Uzbekistan has grown increasingly anxious and critical of the projects. Uzbekistan has tried to enlist the support of two other downstream countries, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Ban today noted the tensions and urged the Central Asian countries to cooperate in use of resources.
"That is why I am visiting Central Asia, before tensions grow worse," Ban said. "Whether it is oil and natural gas or water, these resources should be used fairly and harmoniously, respecting the interests of neighboring countries."
Importance Of Mediation
The focus of Uzbekistan's objections is Tajikistan's Roghun dam project. The Tajik government has advertised it as a key to energy independence and for months has been encouraging the public to invest in its construction.
Tashkent recently stopped freight cars bound for Tajikistan, in part, Dushanbe says, because they were carrying some construction material for Roghun. Ban said he was "deeply concerned" about the dispute.
Ban urged patience from all five countries, pointing out that an environmental assessment team from the World Bank would soon be in the region to start work.
"Therefore all parties concerned should refrain from unilateral actions until the World Bank has concluded its technical assessment of Tajikistan's proposed hydropower projects," Ban said.
Tajikistan seems to have a slightly different interpretation of how the World Bank is approaching Central Asia's water issue. Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrakhon Zarifi said not just Tajik hydropower projects need to be evaluated.
Zarifi said that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon told Ban "that there is need of serious and competent international environmental expertise of all irrigation systems in Central Asia, including all existing reservoirs and other diversions that have a negative impact on the environment."
Some Tajik experts have argued that their neighbor's frivolous use of water is responsible for water shortages in downstream countries, while Uzbek experts argue the problems of water use start in upstream countries.
Ban mentioned the UN's Center for Preventative Diplomacy, located in Turkmenistan, as a vehicle for helping resolve Central Asia's water problems. Turkmenistan was Ban's first stop on his current Central Asian tour and the center was among the first places Ban visited.
RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Ban said water has already been a primary issue in conversations with leaders in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
"The question is how to use common resources for common prosperity," Ban said.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not have the hydrocarbon resources their Central Asian neighbors have and the two mountainous countries suffer chronic energy shortages that are particularly noticeable in winter months.
The solution to their energy problem seems to be developing hydropower potential, which is enormous in both countries.
But downstream countries, Uzbekistan in particular, oppose plans to build immense hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of fears water released from reservoirs in winter for electricity will lead to insufficient amounts of water for irrigation downstream in spring and summer.
As Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have gone ahead with their hydropower projects, Uzbekistan has grown increasingly anxious and critical of the projects. Uzbekistan has tried to enlist the support of two other downstream countries, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Ban today noted the tensions and urged the Central Asian countries to cooperate in use of resources.
"That is why I am visiting Central Asia, before tensions grow worse," Ban said. "Whether it is oil and natural gas or water, these resources should be used fairly and harmoniously, respecting the interests of neighboring countries."
Importance Of Mediation
The focus of Uzbekistan's objections is Tajikistan's Roghun dam project. The Tajik government has advertised it as a key to energy independence and for months has been encouraging the public to invest in its construction.
Tashkent recently stopped freight cars bound for Tajikistan, in part, Dushanbe says, because they were carrying some construction material for Roghun. Ban said he was "deeply concerned" about the dispute.
Ban urged patience from all five countries, pointing out that an environmental assessment team from the World Bank would soon be in the region to start work.
"Therefore all parties concerned should refrain from unilateral actions until the World Bank has concluded its technical assessment of Tajikistan's proposed hydropower projects," Ban said.
Tajikistan seems to have a slightly different interpretation of how the World Bank is approaching Central Asia's water issue. Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrakhon Zarifi said not just Tajik hydropower projects need to be evaluated.
Zarifi said that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon told Ban "that there is need of serious and competent international environmental expertise of all irrigation systems in Central Asia, including all existing reservoirs and other diversions that have a negative impact on the environment."
Some Tajik experts have argued that their neighbor's frivolous use of water is responsible for water shortages in downstream countries, while Uzbek experts argue the problems of water use start in upstream countries.
Ban mentioned the UN's Center for Preventative Diplomacy, located in Turkmenistan, as a vehicle for helping resolve Central Asia's water problems. Turkmenistan was Ban's first stop on his current Central Asian tour and the center was among the first places Ban visited.
RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 |
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State Islam, Outsiders Compete For Influence In Central Asia
By Bruce Pannier
“Islam is a religion of knowledge," the cleric told a television audience. "Unfortunately, some people attempt to use Islam -- the religion of knowledge, goodness, and development -- wrongly or for their own selfish ends."
It's a message that might not appear extraordinary -- the virtues and peaceful nature of Islam have long been espoused -- until you consider the source. As imam-khatib at Tashkent's Kukeldash Mosque, Anvar Qori Tursunov enjoys the backing of the Uzbek authorities, making it apparent that his words address not only Islamic adversaries, but perceived enemies of the state itself.
In the ideological vacuum left by the demise of communism, religion reentered the scene in Central Asia. And with officially sanctioned Islam pitted against outside interpretations that authorities do not want to take root, the region's regimes have deployed clerics like Tursunov in an ongoing battle for influence.
Central Asia's Islamic history dates back more than a millennium, but for most of the 20th century, the region was part of the Soviet Union, cut off from the rest of the Islamic world. With the fall of the USSR, the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan quickly re-embraced their Islamic heritage.
Islamic groups saw fertile recruiting ground in the region, with its 50 million primarily Sunni Muslims. Since making their entrance to the region, they have posed an immense challenge to clerics like Tursunov in thousands of officially registered mosques.
Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow and director for the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C., says that the governments of Central Asia were unprepared for the arrival of widely divergent religious groups from outside the region.
"Central Asia was perfect ground and many of the governments in Central Asia at the time, including Uzbekistan, did not understand that not all Islamic groups are the same,” Baran says.” They did not know and they did not understand that some of them are radical, some of them have political ideologies."
Over time, the states of Central Asia tried to strengthen the voice of their official interpretations of Islam by silencing the outsiders. Hizb-ut Tahrir from the Middle East, Tablighi Jama'at from Pakistan, Salafiya from the Arab world, and Nurchilar from Turkey were banned, among other groups.
But despite these bans, continued reports of arrests of various prohibited groups' followers in Central Asia suggest that they enjoy significant support, and that their appeal may even be on the rise.
Competing Sects
The chief mufti of Kyrgyzstan's Spiritual Directorate, Murataaly-Hajji Jumanov, the highest Islamic official in his country, explains the need to combat outside Islamic groups. "Their brainwashing of some of our citizens is a big problem," Jumanov tells RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service. "We can't hide our heads in the sand and ignore them, we have to prevent this and maintain order. Otherwise we will have problems later."
The preferred alternative preached by Jumanov and other state clerics is the region's traditional Hanafi School of Islamic Law -- considered by some to be the most liberal of the four schools of Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali) -- mixed with Naqshbandi Sufism, a mystic order whose founder, Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari, came from Central Asia.
This form of Islam, its official adherents believe, best reflects the values of Central Asia's mostly Turkic and Persian peoples, and the region's rich Islamic history is often invoked by clerics and Islamic scholars as they exhort people to resist forms of Islam arriving from other countries.
But another element of the region's history works against state Islam. Sultans, emirs, khans, and others tried for centuries to bend Islamic clerics to their will, knowing that Islam was the greatest unifying force in their regions, and therefore both the biggest potential threat to their regimes and the best way of legitimizing their rule.
Today's regimes, in this respect, are no different than their predecessors.
Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda of Tajikistan has a unique perspective on the modern role of Islam and the state in Central Asia. He was the Qazi Qalon of Tajikistan, the country's highest Islamic imam, in the last years of the Soviet Union and first years after Tajikistan became independent.
He joined the Islamic opposition that was fighting government forces during the 1992-97 Tajik civil war and was forced to flee the country. But he and other opposition figures were amnestied as part of the agreement that ended the war, and he has been back in Tajikistan for more than a decade.
Turajonzoda, who since his return has held state positions not related to religion, tells RFE/RL's Tajik Service there is a clear connection between the state and the imams preaching in mosques.
"Some 90 percent of imams are appointed by the government, by local government [officials] and offices of the security agency,” Turajonzoda says. “Even the law says that imams are supposed to be appointed by worshippers at the mosques with the approval of the government. But it is actually the government that selects who the imams will be, and when they appoint imams it is clear [the government] controls the mosque through these protégés."
Clerics Under Pressure
The influence of the state is apparent in mosques throughout Central Asia. As Kudrat, who spoke to RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service on condition that his full name not be used, explains, official clerics are not entirely free to say what they wish.
Kudrat prays five times daily and goes to mosque when he can -- "Fridays for sure," he says -- but laments that "our clerics are very restricted and talk only about the way to behave. We need to learn about politics also."
Qosimi Bekmuhammad, a Tajik expert on politics and religion, supports Kudrat's impression. State clerics, he says, “avoid speaking about important topics, the problems of today and tomorrow, and concentrate on topics from 500 years ago."
Adding to the problem, according to the Hudson Institute's Baran, is that some state-trained clerics are simply unable to answer all the questions youths have regarding social justice or identity issues. Seeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, they get conflicting messages about whether the West is at war with Islam, and what they should be doing, because state-trained imams focus "primarily on Islamic ethics and [are] purely sticking to religious areas."
"They are not able to always answer the questions that the youths have, and then the youth goes to the charismatic and self-appointed religious leaders or imams who do then provide them often with black-and-white answers that seem satisfactory," Baran says.
This failure to address contemporary issues exposes a significant vulnerability of state Islam in Central Asia, according to Bekmuhammad.
While he does not think that a large number of young people have been attracted to outside Islamic groups, he recognizes that the social conditions in Central Asia have led some to join up with outside, and potentially violent, forms of Islam.
"Never say all youth do this, but some do,” Bekmuhammad says. “There are several reasons. First, there are socioeconomic conditions. There are no jobs. These problems have been in the country for 15 years and have led to disappointment among young people."
The youth of Central Asia, Bekmuhammad says, are looking for advice and spiritual instruction on how to be good Muslims and still survive in the modern world. And this is where state imams are not delivering an adequate message.
In their effort to recruit new followers, outside Islamic groups also seize on state Islam's connection to secular authorities to discredit its message.
Separation Of Mosque And State
Ayubkhan is a member of Hizb-ut Tahrir, a group formed by Palestinians in the 1950s that is officially banned throughout Central Asia. Ayubkhan currently lives in Kyrgyzstan's section of the Ferghana Valley. He spoke to RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, on condition that his full name not be used, about why he has no faith in state Islam.
"The mufti and his people -- in a democratic country they don't have to do what the government says. There is a law on religion and the government being separate,” Ayubkhan says. “Politicians should not be involved in the mufti's affairs and the mufti should not follow government orders. The Koran says the mufti should follow Shari'a. I don't see the mufti doing this."
Tajik expert Bekmuhammad notes that young people who join outside Islamic groups "often do so because they feel governments in their countries have too much influence in Islam, whereas they would rather Islam had a dominant influence in government."
Hizb-ut Tahrir member Ayubkhan backs Bekmuhammad's assessment.
"I study Shari'a and study Hizb-ut Tahrir. I found out that Hizb-ut Tahrir teaches exactly what the Prophet Muhammad wanted us to know,” Ayubkhan says. “The Holy Koran is the ideology of Hizb-ut Tahrir -- not just how a person should live in society but how a person should serve other people."
Body And Soul
State clerics themselves portray the relationship between official Islam and secular authorities in Central Asia as inevitable.
Omurbek, the press secretary for Kazakhstan's Muslim Religious Directorate, speaks of a symbiosis between Islam in his country and the state.
"According to our constitution the state and religion are separate. But, in fact, we can't divide the body from the soul of a human being,” Omurbek says. “A human being has reason, a body, and a soul, and we can't separate them. It's not possible."
And Omurbek is insistent that it is not the state that is influencing Islam, but Islam that is influencing politicians.
"God forbid there would be such a thing! To the contrary, our president himself built a huge mosque in the town where he was born,” he says. “Following his example, many rich people, governors, mayors, and others are building many mosques."
Kyrgyzstan's chief mufti Jumanov says there is no reason for conflict between Islam and secular authorities in his country.
"First of all, of course, in a secular country sometimes there are different opinions on religion, but during my time as mufti I haven't seen any problem or conflict,” Jumanov says. “On the other hand, our state is following the correct policy toward Islam. From our side we are trying to work on a path where religion doesn't have any conflict with state policy."
There are, of course, the examples to the contrary. One notable conflict between state Islam and the secular authorities happened in the most authoritarian of the Central Asian states, Turkmenistan.
In 2002, Turkmenistan's chief mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, objected to having passages from authoritarian President Saparmurat Niyazov's "Rukhnama," his lengthy spiritual guide, inscribed on the walls of a new mosque alongside passages from the Koran. The mufti was sacked, convicted of plotting to kill the president, and jailed for 22 years.
So state imams do have limitations on what they can say, and authorities expect those imams to support the state.
‘Connections To Terrorism’
For many Central Asians dissatisfied with their governments, Islamic opposition groups represent the best and sometimes seemingly only hope for changing the system.
This may explain why Central Asian governments often portray these outside Islamic groups as having links to terrorism.
There is no question that some members of these groups clearly are violent. In one recent example, Imam Anvar Qori Tursunov of Tashkent's official Kukeldash Mosque was stabbed outside his home on July 31, 2009. Several Islamic militants killed in a security operation in the Uzbek capital in August were blamed for the attack.
In neighboring Tajikistan, the small extremist group Bayat has for years been tied to sometimes deadly attacks against non-Muslims and state-approved Islamic clergy.
But while Central Asian states often resort to describing adherents of alternative forms of Islam as "terrorists," the label is sometimes false.
Former high imam Turajonzoda rejects charges that all the foreign Islamic groups have connections to terrorism.
"I'm not really sure they are terrorists,” Turajonzoda says. “I'm against terrorism myself, against forcibly propagating ideas, against extremism. But most of these organizations are terrorists in name only."
Turajonzoda says that by trying to paint all these Islamic groups with the same brush, Central Asia's governments and state imams only discredit themselves. Central Asians see how some groups behave and perceive them as pious, not violent. This leads people to question the motives of authorities and state imams in branding all groups as terrorists.
Others suggest alternative methods of dealing with the outside Islamic groups.
Tursunbai Bakir Uluu, a former Kyrgyz ombudsman, has called for legalizing Hizb-ut Tahrir in his country. This, he believes, would allow the group to publicly demonstrate what it has to offer, while removing the element of mystery that may attract some to the Islamic sect.
His appeal was rejected and Hizb-ut Tahrir remains banned in Kyrgyzstan and throughout Central Asia.
"I think the region in general still suffers from knowing too little about Islamic history and their own history, because Central Asia once upon a time used to be the center of Islamic civilization,” says the Hudson Institute’s Baran. “Across the Silk Road there were great centers of Islamic learning where scientific thinking and spirituality and rationality and knowledge spread from Central Asia to the rest of the Islamic world and brought great civilization."
It's a message that official clerics like Tursunov of Tashkent's Kukeldash Mosque might incorporate in future sermons. Confidence in traditional belief systems, combined with the ability to communicate those beliefs today, might prove to be the most effective way of countering the influence of outside Islam.
Saida Kalkulova and Erzhan Karabek of RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, Venera Djumataeva of RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, and Iskander Aliev and Salimjon Aioubov of RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
“Islam is a religion of knowledge," the cleric told a television audience. "Unfortunately, some people attempt to use Islam -- the religion of knowledge, goodness, and development -- wrongly or for their own selfish ends."
It's a message that might not appear extraordinary -- the virtues and peaceful nature of Islam have long been espoused -- until you consider the source. As imam-khatib at Tashkent's Kukeldash Mosque, Anvar Qori Tursunov enjoys the backing of the Uzbek authorities, making it apparent that his words address not only Islamic adversaries, but perceived enemies of the state itself.
In the ideological vacuum left by the demise of communism, religion reentered the scene in Central Asia. And with officially sanctioned Islam pitted against outside interpretations that authorities do not want to take root, the region's regimes have deployed clerics like Tursunov in an ongoing battle for influence.
Central Asia's Islamic history dates back more than a millennium, but for most of the 20th century, the region was part of the Soviet Union, cut off from the rest of the Islamic world. With the fall of the USSR, the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan quickly re-embraced their Islamic heritage.
Islamic groups saw fertile recruiting ground in the region, with its 50 million primarily Sunni Muslims. Since making their entrance to the region, they have posed an immense challenge to clerics like Tursunov in thousands of officially registered mosques.
Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow and director for the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C., says that the governments of Central Asia were unprepared for the arrival of widely divergent religious groups from outside the region.
"Central Asia was perfect ground and many of the governments in Central Asia at the time, including Uzbekistan, did not understand that not all Islamic groups are the same,” Baran says.” They did not know and they did not understand that some of them are radical, some of them have political ideologies."
Over time, the states of Central Asia tried to strengthen the voice of their official interpretations of Islam by silencing the outsiders. Hizb-ut Tahrir from the Middle East, Tablighi Jama'at from Pakistan, Salafiya from the Arab world, and Nurchilar from Turkey were banned, among other groups.
But despite these bans, continued reports of arrests of various prohibited groups' followers in Central Asia suggest that they enjoy significant support, and that their appeal may even be on the rise.
Competing Sects
The chief mufti of Kyrgyzstan's Spiritual Directorate, Murataaly-Hajji Jumanov, the highest Islamic official in his country, explains the need to combat outside Islamic groups. "Their brainwashing of some of our citizens is a big problem," Jumanov tells RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service. "We can't hide our heads in the sand and ignore them, we have to prevent this and maintain order. Otherwise we will have problems later."
The preferred alternative preached by Jumanov and other state clerics is the region's traditional Hanafi School of Islamic Law -- considered by some to be the most liberal of the four schools of Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali) -- mixed with Naqshbandi Sufism, a mystic order whose founder, Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari, came from Central Asia.
This form of Islam, its official adherents believe, best reflects the values of Central Asia's mostly Turkic and Persian peoples, and the region's rich Islamic history is often invoked by clerics and Islamic scholars as they exhort people to resist forms of Islam arriving from other countries.
But another element of the region's history works against state Islam. Sultans, emirs, khans, and others tried for centuries to bend Islamic clerics to their will, knowing that Islam was the greatest unifying force in their regions, and therefore both the biggest potential threat to their regimes and the best way of legitimizing their rule.
Today's regimes, in this respect, are no different than their predecessors.
Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda of Tajikistan has a unique perspective on the modern role of Islam and the state in Central Asia. He was the Qazi Qalon of Tajikistan, the country's highest Islamic imam, in the last years of the Soviet Union and first years after Tajikistan became independent.
He joined the Islamic opposition that was fighting government forces during the 1992-97 Tajik civil war and was forced to flee the country. But he and other opposition figures were amnestied as part of the agreement that ended the war, and he has been back in Tajikistan for more than a decade.
Turajonzoda, who since his return has held state positions not related to religion, tells RFE/RL's Tajik Service there is a clear connection between the state and the imams preaching in mosques.
"Some 90 percent of imams are appointed by the government, by local government [officials] and offices of the security agency,” Turajonzoda says. “Even the law says that imams are supposed to be appointed by worshippers at the mosques with the approval of the government. But it is actually the government that selects who the imams will be, and when they appoint imams it is clear [the government] controls the mosque through these protégés."
Clerics Under Pressure
The influence of the state is apparent in mosques throughout Central Asia. As Kudrat, who spoke to RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service on condition that his full name not be used, explains, official clerics are not entirely free to say what they wish.
Kudrat prays five times daily and goes to mosque when he can -- "Fridays for sure," he says -- but laments that "our clerics are very restricted and talk only about the way to behave. We need to learn about politics also."
Qosimi Bekmuhammad, a Tajik expert on politics and religion, supports Kudrat's impression. State clerics, he says, “avoid speaking about important topics, the problems of today and tomorrow, and concentrate on topics from 500 years ago."
Adding to the problem, according to the Hudson Institute's Baran, is that some state-trained clerics are simply unable to answer all the questions youths have regarding social justice or identity issues. Seeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, they get conflicting messages about whether the West is at war with Islam, and what they should be doing, because state-trained imams focus "primarily on Islamic ethics and [are] purely sticking to religious areas."
"They are not able to always answer the questions that the youths have, and then the youth goes to the charismatic and self-appointed religious leaders or imams who do then provide them often with black-and-white answers that seem satisfactory," Baran says.
This failure to address contemporary issues exposes a significant vulnerability of state Islam in Central Asia, according to Bekmuhammad.
While he does not think that a large number of young people have been attracted to outside Islamic groups, he recognizes that the social conditions in Central Asia have led some to join up with outside, and potentially violent, forms of Islam.
"Never say all youth do this, but some do,” Bekmuhammad says. “There are several reasons. First, there are socioeconomic conditions. There are no jobs. These problems have been in the country for 15 years and have led to disappointment among young people."
The youth of Central Asia, Bekmuhammad says, are looking for advice and spiritual instruction on how to be good Muslims and still survive in the modern world. And this is where state imams are not delivering an adequate message.
In their effort to recruit new followers, outside Islamic groups also seize on state Islam's connection to secular authorities to discredit its message.
Separation Of Mosque And State
Ayubkhan is a member of Hizb-ut Tahrir, a group formed by Palestinians in the 1950s that is officially banned throughout Central Asia. Ayubkhan currently lives in Kyrgyzstan's section of the Ferghana Valley. He spoke to RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, on condition that his full name not be used, about why he has no faith in state Islam.
"The mufti and his people -- in a democratic country they don't have to do what the government says. There is a law on religion and the government being separate,” Ayubkhan says. “Politicians should not be involved in the mufti's affairs and the mufti should not follow government orders. The Koran says the mufti should follow Shari'a. I don't see the mufti doing this."
Tajik expert Bekmuhammad notes that young people who join outside Islamic groups "often do so because they feel governments in their countries have too much influence in Islam, whereas they would rather Islam had a dominant influence in government."
Hizb-ut Tahrir member Ayubkhan backs Bekmuhammad's assessment.
"I study Shari'a and study Hizb-ut Tahrir. I found out that Hizb-ut Tahrir teaches exactly what the Prophet Muhammad wanted us to know,” Ayubkhan says. “The Holy Koran is the ideology of Hizb-ut Tahrir -- not just how a person should live in society but how a person should serve other people."
Body And Soul
State clerics themselves portray the relationship between official Islam and secular authorities in Central Asia as inevitable.
Omurbek, the press secretary for Kazakhstan's Muslim Religious Directorate, speaks of a symbiosis between Islam in his country and the state.
"According to our constitution the state and religion are separate. But, in fact, we can't divide the body from the soul of a human being,” Omurbek says. “A human being has reason, a body, and a soul, and we can't separate them. It's not possible."
And Omurbek is insistent that it is not the state that is influencing Islam, but Islam that is influencing politicians.
"God forbid there would be such a thing! To the contrary, our president himself built a huge mosque in the town where he was born,” he says. “Following his example, many rich people, governors, mayors, and others are building many mosques."
Kyrgyzstan's chief mufti Jumanov says there is no reason for conflict between Islam and secular authorities in his country.
"First of all, of course, in a secular country sometimes there are different opinions on religion, but during my time as mufti I haven't seen any problem or conflict,” Jumanov says. “On the other hand, our state is following the correct policy toward Islam. From our side we are trying to work on a path where religion doesn't have any conflict with state policy."
There are, of course, the examples to the contrary. One notable conflict between state Islam and the secular authorities happened in the most authoritarian of the Central Asian states, Turkmenistan.
In 2002, Turkmenistan's chief mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, objected to having passages from authoritarian President Saparmurat Niyazov's "Rukhnama," his lengthy spiritual guide, inscribed on the walls of a new mosque alongside passages from the Koran. The mufti was sacked, convicted of plotting to kill the president, and jailed for 22 years.
So state imams do have limitations on what they can say, and authorities expect those imams to support the state.
‘Connections To Terrorism’
For many Central Asians dissatisfied with their governments, Islamic opposition groups represent the best and sometimes seemingly only hope for changing the system.
This may explain why Central Asian governments often portray these outside Islamic groups as having links to terrorism.
There is no question that some members of these groups clearly are violent. In one recent example, Imam Anvar Qori Tursunov of Tashkent's official Kukeldash Mosque was stabbed outside his home on July 31, 2009. Several Islamic militants killed in a security operation in the Uzbek capital in August were blamed for the attack.
In neighboring Tajikistan, the small extremist group Bayat has for years been tied to sometimes deadly attacks against non-Muslims and state-approved Islamic clergy.
But while Central Asian states often resort to describing adherents of alternative forms of Islam as "terrorists," the label is sometimes false.
Former high imam Turajonzoda rejects charges that all the foreign Islamic groups have connections to terrorism.
"I'm not really sure they are terrorists,” Turajonzoda says. “I'm against terrorism myself, against forcibly propagating ideas, against extremism. But most of these organizations are terrorists in name only."
Turajonzoda says that by trying to paint all these Islamic groups with the same brush, Central Asia's governments and state imams only discredit themselves. Central Asians see how some groups behave and perceive them as pious, not violent. This leads people to question the motives of authorities and state imams in branding all groups as terrorists.
Others suggest alternative methods of dealing with the outside Islamic groups.
Tursunbai Bakir Uluu, a former Kyrgyz ombudsman, has called for legalizing Hizb-ut Tahrir in his country. This, he believes, would allow the group to publicly demonstrate what it has to offer, while removing the element of mystery that may attract some to the Islamic sect.
His appeal was rejected and Hizb-ut Tahrir remains banned in Kyrgyzstan and throughout Central Asia.
"I think the region in general still suffers from knowing too little about Islamic history and their own history, because Central Asia once upon a time used to be the center of Islamic civilization,” says the Hudson Institute’s Baran. “Across the Silk Road there were great centers of Islamic learning where scientific thinking and spirituality and rationality and knowledge spread from Central Asia to the rest of the Islamic world and brought great civilization."
It's a message that official clerics like Tursunov of Tashkent's Kukeldash Mosque might incorporate in future sermons. Confidence in traditional belief systems, combined with the ability to communicate those beliefs today, might prove to be the most effective way of countering the influence of outside Islam.
Saida Kalkulova and Erzhan Karabek of RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, Venera Djumataeva of RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, and Iskander Aliev and Salimjon Aioubov of RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
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Chinese-Central Asian Relationship Requires Delicate Balancing Act
By Bruce Pannier
It would appear to be a match made in heaven. China, in order to fuel its economic ambitions, has moved quickly to snatch up Central Asian resources. Central Asia, looking to upgrade its aging infrastructure, has increasingly opened itself up to Chinese investment.
But while everything appears to be going swimmingly, the idyllic arrangement is not likely to last for long. This is because Central Asian states work alone in wooing the Chinese, which plays to Beijing's strength in bilateral dealings. But the cross-border networks it aims to build require a diplomatic balancing act that China lacks experience to pull off.
A shortage of energy resources is the main threat to China's economic ambitions, leading Chinese companies to sign contracts for energy imports around the world.
Jennifer DeLay, editor of the Edinburgh-based “FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,” says that while the pace of China's economic growth has slowed amid the global financial crisis, "it certainly hasn't reversed." She says China's economy is set to keep growing, requiring more energy, and that gas imports in particular are expected to increase dramatically in the coming years.
DeLay said China is already consuming 4.1 million barrels of oil daily, and just over half of that (51.8 percent) is imported. Natural gas imports account for only 11 percent of current consumption, but are set to increase greatly as China replaces coal with gas.
China's southern neighbors either don't have much to offer, or, in the case of Vietnam, relations are not at a stage where oil imports are up for discussion. DeLay notes that there are plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar to China, but those won't be operational until 2012. With the shortage of direct land routes, China is largely dependent on sea routes.
"The statistic I've seen is that as of January this year, foreign tankers account for about 80 percent of all the oil imported into China," DeLay says. As for natural gas, "again it's very much a majority. China is working to build up an LNG [liquefied natural gas] fleet so that it can import its own LNG, but they don't have it yet."
Fortunately for China, its western neighbors -- the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have vast energy resources, leading Beijing to court them heavily since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Long Courtship
It started with confidence-building agreements along the Sino-CIS border in April 1996 that involved China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The group evolved, adding Uzbekistan and taking on an economic and security dimension.
The grouping now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has enabled China to penetrate deeply into Central Asia's energy resource market in little more than a decade.
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed its first major Central Asian contract with Kazakhstan in 1997. The two parties agreed to build a 2,238-kilometer oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China, which has now started operating. A gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China started operating in December 2009.
"China is currently connected by pipelines to only two countries," DeLay says. "Turkmenistan for gas -- and that pipeline just began operating last December -- and Kazakhstan for oil. That pipeline has been operating since 2006."
These two pipelines receive much attention and by themselves are sufficient to show China's growing influence in Central Asia, but China's interests in Central Asia go much further and involve every country.
Energy Exploration
The CNPC is helping to explore and develop oil and gas fields in eastern and western Uzbekistan, including in the Aral Sea. China Investment Corp bought a 14.5 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production last year, paying $939 million.
Besides the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline that started operations last December, PetroChina is helping build another gas pipeline to ship some 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from western Kazakhstan to the Chinese border. In Turkmenistan, the CNPC is the only foreign company that can boast of having an onshore contract to explore for energy.
Just over the border from where Chinese workers in Turkmenistan are developing gas fields, the possibility of China helping develop gas fields in northwestern Afghanistan is under consideration. During Afghan President Hamid Karzai's recent visit to China, the project not far from where the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline starts was discussed.
Not wishing to rely solely on pipelines to import Central Asian oil and gas, China has embarked on ambitious railway projects. Chinese company HPGI, created specifically to build rail lines between China and Kazakhstan, has plans for 21 new rail lines, eight solely for transporting oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG.
There are also plans to build a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail line that would end in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, near where the CNPC is developing Uzbek oil and gas fields.
Central Asia needs to upgrade its electricity systems and China's Tebian Electric Apparatus is building 220-kV and 500-kV power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's XD Group is modernizing and reconstructing the electricity system for the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.
Chinese companies are also involved in Central Asia's hydropower projects. China's Sinohydro is helping build the Nurobad and Shurob hydroelectric power plants (HPP) in Tajikistan as well as modernizing the Kayrakkum HPP.
Tebian is building three more power plants in Tajikistan, which paid the Chinese company by giving it rights to mine gold, silver, copper, tungsten, mica, and gemstones in the Pamir Mountains. Other Chinese mining companies are also working gold deposits and looking for uranium and rare earth elements in Tajikistan.
China is also looking to increase its civilian nuclear power potential, and there too it can find the resources it needs in Central Asia. The China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation own shares in Kazakh uranium mines, and have contracts to buy uranium from Kazatomprom. In Uzbekistan, a subsidiary of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is jointly prospecting for black-shale uranium in Navoi Province. Sinosteel is prospecting, with Australia's Monaro Mining, for uranium in Kyrgyzstan.
Chinese companies are also constructing or improving roads leading from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, Chinese workers are building a tunnel Tajikistan, and Chinese-made goods can be found at every Central Asian bazaar.
Dangerous Liaisons
The arrangement looks fantastic on the surface. China receives a major portion of the energy resources it needs as long as Beijing finances the development of the oil and gas fields, uranium mines, infrastructure, and import-export routes. Central Asia gets a steady customer who not only pays on time, but is actually constructing the means for the five countries to export their raw materials.
But while China may be a rising world power, its experience in international mediation is limited and Central Asian regional politics are full of potential pitfalls. China holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but is rarely involved in talks aimed at resolving conflicts, the situation with its neighbor North Korea being a notable exception.
On the business end, DeLay says, China has long preferred to keep its business deals on a bilateral level with one foreign partner. Many of the agreements China has worked out in Central Asia follow this model, she says, but geography dictates that Beijing engage in multilateral dealings as well.
For example, the gas pipeline linking China to Turkmenistan passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A rail project linking Uzbekistan to China will go through Kyrgyzstan, requiring Beijing to find common ground with two feuding neighbors.
John MacLeod, the head of Central Asian programs at the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, says that in recent years, “there's constant talk about various kinds of regional economic structures, but they never work out.”
“Even things like simplified customs rules, and even visas for citizens, are constantly a problem because practical things are often tied up with politics and very often with the kind of very individualistic stances of each set of leaderships, who feel that their country is preeminent and they don't want their interests to be encroached upon by the others,” MacLeod says.
NATO just saw an example of such regional complications. When Uzbekistan recently halted train traffic bound for Tajikistan, supplies headed for Tajikistan and then on to NATO troops in Afghanistan were held up. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have never had good relations, but ties are particularly strained amid a dispute over Tajikistan's hydropower plans, leaving Uzbekistan worried it will be left with water shortages.
MacLeod said such incidents highlight the likelihood of breakdowns in China's regional balancing act.
"You have this history of rocky relationships and less than perfect cooperation, so simply managing this new conduit through all their territories could throw up all those problems,” MacLeod says. “You could have a situation where a simple dispute about the division of transit fees -- say, between the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs -- could escalate into something worse given this kind of difficult political relationship.... What is effectively a business dispute over money suddenly takes on this political aspect."
MacLeod notes that the Chinese have worked to ensure these multilateral deals in Central Asia benefit all the parties involved, and cites the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline as an example.
"The Chinese are trying to mitigate that risk by giving each of the players, particularly the Uzbeks, a stake in it by holding out the prospect that they too can export some gas down the pipeline," he says.
The Central Asian states’ reasons for allowing the Chinese so far into the region are clear, MacLeod explains.
"Only China will put in money into things that are not necessarily immediately commercially valuable -- like roads in Tajikistan, like developing oil and gas in Uzbekistan -- where other...commercial players would be more faint-hearted because they know about the kind of terrible legal problems you can have operating in a country like that,” MacLeod says. “So the Chinese are in it for the long game.”
He continues: “The Central Asians appear to be just not thinking about...the big politics and hoping that the Chinese are simply a kind of an investment bank that they can deal with."
This may leave a traditional suitor, Russia, out in the cold. Before the global economic crisis, the Kremlin was spending a lot of the revenues it was receiving from oil and gas sales on projects in Central Asia. But the economic crisis hit Russia hard, leaving financially secure China a free economic hand in Central Asia.
MacLeod said Moscow is putting on a brave face, but cannot be happy with the way things are shaping up in Central Asia.
"I think to an extent the Russians have accepted the Chinese economic expansion in terms of investment and energy exploration in Central Asia as a fact,” MacLeod says. “They may not like it. but they're saying that they're perfectly happy and that it meshes well with their own interests. But of course, to an extent, it doesn't.”
He explains: “Currently Russia -- the Kremlin, through Gazprom, the huge energy company -- has de facto control of the pipeline network coming out of Central Asia. And although Kazakhstan is obviously an independent oil exporter...Russia has a huge say in what happens, especially if there's turbulence at the political level."
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Original article
It would appear to be a match made in heaven. China, in order to fuel its economic ambitions, has moved quickly to snatch up Central Asian resources. Central Asia, looking to upgrade its aging infrastructure, has increasingly opened itself up to Chinese investment.
But while everything appears to be going swimmingly, the idyllic arrangement is not likely to last for long. This is because Central Asian states work alone in wooing the Chinese, which plays to Beijing's strength in bilateral dealings. But the cross-border networks it aims to build require a diplomatic balancing act that China lacks experience to pull off.
A shortage of energy resources is the main threat to China's economic ambitions, leading Chinese companies to sign contracts for energy imports around the world.
Jennifer DeLay, editor of the Edinburgh-based “FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,” says that while the pace of China's economic growth has slowed amid the global financial crisis, "it certainly hasn't reversed." She says China's economy is set to keep growing, requiring more energy, and that gas imports in particular are expected to increase dramatically in the coming years.
DeLay said China is already consuming 4.1 million barrels of oil daily, and just over half of that (51.8 percent) is imported. Natural gas imports account for only 11 percent of current consumption, but are set to increase greatly as China replaces coal with gas.
China's southern neighbors either don't have much to offer, or, in the case of Vietnam, relations are not at a stage where oil imports are up for discussion. DeLay notes that there are plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar to China, but those won't be operational until 2012. With the shortage of direct land routes, China is largely dependent on sea routes.
"The statistic I've seen is that as of January this year, foreign tankers account for about 80 percent of all the oil imported into China," DeLay says. As for natural gas, "again it's very much a majority. China is working to build up an LNG [liquefied natural gas] fleet so that it can import its own LNG, but they don't have it yet."
Fortunately for China, its western neighbors -- the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have vast energy resources, leading Beijing to court them heavily since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Long Courtship
It started with confidence-building agreements along the Sino-CIS border in April 1996 that involved China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The group evolved, adding Uzbekistan and taking on an economic and security dimension.
The grouping now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has enabled China to penetrate deeply into Central Asia's energy resource market in little more than a decade.
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed its first major Central Asian contract with Kazakhstan in 1997. The two parties agreed to build a 2,238-kilometer oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China, which has now started operating. A gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China started operating in December 2009.
"China is currently connected by pipelines to only two countries," DeLay says. "Turkmenistan for gas -- and that pipeline just began operating last December -- and Kazakhstan for oil. That pipeline has been operating since 2006."
These two pipelines receive much attention and by themselves are sufficient to show China's growing influence in Central Asia, but China's interests in Central Asia go much further and involve every country.
Energy Exploration
The CNPC is helping to explore and develop oil and gas fields in eastern and western Uzbekistan, including in the Aral Sea. China Investment Corp bought a 14.5 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production last year, paying $939 million.
Besides the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline that started operations last December, PetroChina is helping build another gas pipeline to ship some 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from western Kazakhstan to the Chinese border. In Turkmenistan, the CNPC is the only foreign company that can boast of having an onshore contract to explore for energy.
Just over the border from where Chinese workers in Turkmenistan are developing gas fields, the possibility of China helping develop gas fields in northwestern Afghanistan is under consideration. During Afghan President Hamid Karzai's recent visit to China, the project not far from where the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline starts was discussed.
Not wishing to rely solely on pipelines to import Central Asian oil and gas, China has embarked on ambitious railway projects. Chinese company HPGI, created specifically to build rail lines between China and Kazakhstan, has plans for 21 new rail lines, eight solely for transporting oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG.
There are also plans to build a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail line that would end in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, near where the CNPC is developing Uzbek oil and gas fields.
Central Asia needs to upgrade its electricity systems and China's Tebian Electric Apparatus is building 220-kV and 500-kV power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's XD Group is modernizing and reconstructing the electricity system for the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.
Chinese companies are also involved in Central Asia's hydropower projects. China's Sinohydro is helping build the Nurobad and Shurob hydroelectric power plants (HPP) in Tajikistan as well as modernizing the Kayrakkum HPP.
Tebian is building three more power plants in Tajikistan, which paid the Chinese company by giving it rights to mine gold, silver, copper, tungsten, mica, and gemstones in the Pamir Mountains. Other Chinese mining companies are also working gold deposits and looking for uranium and rare earth elements in Tajikistan.
China is also looking to increase its civilian nuclear power potential, and there too it can find the resources it needs in Central Asia. The China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation own shares in Kazakh uranium mines, and have contracts to buy uranium from Kazatomprom. In Uzbekistan, a subsidiary of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is jointly prospecting for black-shale uranium in Navoi Province. Sinosteel is prospecting, with Australia's Monaro Mining, for uranium in Kyrgyzstan.
Chinese companies are also constructing or improving roads leading from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, Chinese workers are building a tunnel Tajikistan, and Chinese-made goods can be found at every Central Asian bazaar.
Dangerous Liaisons
The arrangement looks fantastic on the surface. China receives a major portion of the energy resources it needs as long as Beijing finances the development of the oil and gas fields, uranium mines, infrastructure, and import-export routes. Central Asia gets a steady customer who not only pays on time, but is actually constructing the means for the five countries to export their raw materials.
But while China may be a rising world power, its experience in international mediation is limited and Central Asian regional politics are full of potential pitfalls. China holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but is rarely involved in talks aimed at resolving conflicts, the situation with its neighbor North Korea being a notable exception.
On the business end, DeLay says, China has long preferred to keep its business deals on a bilateral level with one foreign partner. Many of the agreements China has worked out in Central Asia follow this model, she says, but geography dictates that Beijing engage in multilateral dealings as well.
For example, the gas pipeline linking China to Turkmenistan passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A rail project linking Uzbekistan to China will go through Kyrgyzstan, requiring Beijing to find common ground with two feuding neighbors.
John MacLeod, the head of Central Asian programs at the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, says that in recent years, “there's constant talk about various kinds of regional economic structures, but they never work out.”
“Even things like simplified customs rules, and even visas for citizens, are constantly a problem because practical things are often tied up with politics and very often with the kind of very individualistic stances of each set of leaderships, who feel that their country is preeminent and they don't want their interests to be encroached upon by the others,” MacLeod says.
NATO just saw an example of such regional complications. When Uzbekistan recently halted train traffic bound for Tajikistan, supplies headed for Tajikistan and then on to NATO troops in Afghanistan were held up. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have never had good relations, but ties are particularly strained amid a dispute over Tajikistan's hydropower plans, leaving Uzbekistan worried it will be left with water shortages.
MacLeod said such incidents highlight the likelihood of breakdowns in China's regional balancing act.
"You have this history of rocky relationships and less than perfect cooperation, so simply managing this new conduit through all their territories could throw up all those problems,” MacLeod says. “You could have a situation where a simple dispute about the division of transit fees -- say, between the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs -- could escalate into something worse given this kind of difficult political relationship.... What is effectively a business dispute over money suddenly takes on this political aspect."
MacLeod notes that the Chinese have worked to ensure these multilateral deals in Central Asia benefit all the parties involved, and cites the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline as an example.
"The Chinese are trying to mitigate that risk by giving each of the players, particularly the Uzbeks, a stake in it by holding out the prospect that they too can export some gas down the pipeline," he says.
The Central Asian states’ reasons for allowing the Chinese so far into the region are clear, MacLeod explains.
"Only China will put in money into things that are not necessarily immediately commercially valuable -- like roads in Tajikistan, like developing oil and gas in Uzbekistan -- where other...commercial players would be more faint-hearted because they know about the kind of terrible legal problems you can have operating in a country like that,” MacLeod says. “So the Chinese are in it for the long game.”
He continues: “The Central Asians appear to be just not thinking about...the big politics and hoping that the Chinese are simply a kind of an investment bank that they can deal with."
This may leave a traditional suitor, Russia, out in the cold. Before the global economic crisis, the Kremlin was spending a lot of the revenues it was receiving from oil and gas sales on projects in Central Asia. But the economic crisis hit Russia hard, leaving financially secure China a free economic hand in Central Asia.
MacLeod said Moscow is putting on a brave face, but cannot be happy with the way things are shaping up in Central Asia.
"I think to an extent the Russians have accepted the Chinese economic expansion in terms of investment and energy exploration in Central Asia as a fact,” MacLeod says. “They may not like it. but they're saying that they're perfectly happy and that it meshes well with their own interests. But of course, to an extent, it doesn't.”
He explains: “Currently Russia -- the Kremlin, through Gazprom, the huge energy company -- has de facto control of the pipeline network coming out of Central Asia. And although Kazakhstan is obviously an independent oil exporter...Russia has a huge say in what happens, especially if there's turbulence at the political level."
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
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Monday, April 05, 2010 |
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