History, BP Oil Spill Haunt Caspian Sea

By Antoine Blua

(RFE/RL) -- For years, the race to tap into the Caspian Sea's vast oil and gas resources has outweighed any desire to protect its delicate environment.

All five littoral states -- Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan -- have plans to further exploit the sea's estimated 44 billion barrels of oil reserves.

Such projects mean drilling new wells, highlighting risks for an incident that could cause a catastrophic oil spill in the landlocked sea -- the largest inland body of water on earth.

Mais Gulaliyev, co-chairman of Azerbaijan's Green Party, tells RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service he has called for measures to prevent such a threat from becoming reality.

"The accident in the Gulf of Mexico shows us that such a disaster could happen anywhere. The United States, with its super-modern technologies, is barely capable of stopping this disaster," Gulaliyev says. "You can imagine the scale of the damages to the environment from such incidents in countries like Azerbaijan."

At least 5,000 barrels of oil a day have been gushing into the Gulf of Mexico since an April 20 explosion destroyed a drilling rig leased and operated by BP, threatening unique wildlife refuges, beaches, and fishing grounds along the southern U.S. coast.

History Of Environmental Damage

The dangers of the Caspian Sea's oil fields gained international attention during the last days of the Soviet Union, when a well at Kazakhstan's huge Tengiz oil field blew out in 1985. The well burned for more than a year before it was eventually put out.

Makhamet Khakimov tells RFE/RL's Kazakh Service that little has been done since the incident in which 3 million tons of oil and tens of billions of cubic meters of different kinds of gases were burned, harming the population and wildlife in the Atyrau region.

Dozens of platforms are currently operating across the Caspian Sea, mainly in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which have been the focus of Western investment.

Oil exploration and production work have also developed in the remaining three littoral states. LUKoil last month kicked off commercial oil production in the Russian sector of the sea, launching the Yury Korchagin platform. Iran earlier this year started drilling its first exploratory well in the southern Caspian Sea -- the deepest part of the sea -- to search for oil. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is continuing exploration of Caspian shelf deposits along with foreign partners.

Environmentalists say investments in energy projects have often been made to the detriment of local communities.

On May 13, Kazakh Deputy Minister for Environmental Protection Eldana Sadvakasova acknowledged that with the oil price decreasing, oil-extracting companies had "stopped performance of some measures or postponed them for the later periods."

In February, a Kazakh court fined the onshore Karachaganak natural-gas venture, which includes BG, Eni, Chevron, and LUKoil, for environmental violations including excessive waste dumping. The village of Berezovka, which is situated less than 5 kilometers from the field and is exposed to the field's toxic emissions, has been fighting for justice for years.

Environmentalists say energy development is also threatening already endangered species of fish such as the Beluga, Stellate, and Russian sturgeon, the kilka (Caspian sprat), as well as the Caspian seal. In Turkmenistan, energy development is causing particular risk to the Krasovodsk Nature Reserve, home to hundreds of thousands of birds and more than 40 mammal species.

Greater Supervision, Transparency Needed

Energy firms operating in the region, however, argue that they are doing their utmost to ensure the safety of their infrastructure.

"I assure you that we have done and will continue to do everything possible to ensure the full technical security of all our operations in the Caspian," says Tamam Bayatli, public relations manager for BP Azerbaijan, which is involved in a number of exploration and production projects in the country.

"It has been and will remain our No. 1 priority to ensure technical safety and security of the people as well as to protect the environment."

Environmentalists and civil-society activists say the authorities should better supervise the energy companies' work and call for the terms of production-sharing agreements between energy companies and host governments in the Caspian region to be made public.

Kate Watters, executive director of Crude Accountability, a Virginia-based nongovernmental organization that focuses on environmental justice, says the public should be informed about the investments being made and about the environmental and social protection needed to be put in place to safeguard the environment and the health of the local inhabitants.

"The oil companies need to be held to the highest standards, and those standards maybe need to be reexamined," Watters says. "We have a case [in the Gulf of Mexico] where governments are relying on the expertise of private corporations and putting at risk entire populations and ecosystems based on promises that need to be demonstrably fulfilled before a project starts."

Improving Regulation, Or Just Talk?

At a conference in Astrakhan on April 28, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said all work related to the development of fields in the Russian sector of the Caspian is being conducted "in strict compliance with international environmental standards," applying zero discharge technology. This means that waste resultant of production activities is not discharged into the sea, but is collected before being rendered harmless and reprocessed. Putin also voiced hope that companies from other countries operating in the region will join in this initiative.

On the regional level, the five countries around the Caspian Sea have ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, or Tehran Convention, and thus established a framework to jointly address and solve environmental problems in and around the sea.

But Watters is skeptical, saying the absence of public participation in the convention's preparation resulted in a relatively meaningless document.

As BP and the U.S. authorities battle to contain the spill in the Gulf of Mexico and issues of responsibility are being investigated, the U.S. administration has said it will review environmental procedures for offshore drilling.

And in Russia, the State Duma, or lower house of parliament, is considering the need for drafting a law on "environmental control and protection of seas from oil spills."

The head of the Duma's Committee for Natural Resources, Nature Management, and Environment, Yevgeny Tugolukov, announced the move on May 5 in comments on what conclusions Russia should make in the wake of the environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.

And at a cabinet meeting on May 4, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov instructed the ministries for oil and gas and for environmental protection to inspect the country's oil-drilling platforms.

But Crude Accountability's Watters doubts the Kazakh measure will be effective. She notes that while BP "has this reputation all over the world for having the best technology, for being green, for being sustainable," the company is responsible for the spill in the Gulf of Mexico "and had absolutely no plan in place if something like this were to happen. So we have no guarantees that any Western company working in the Caspian would act any differently."

So while Watters believes the Kazakh government is acting correctly, "my question would be: 'Do they have the capacity to take care of an accident, should one happen?' And I think the answer is likely 'no.'"



RFE/RL's Azerbaijani and Kazakh services contributed to this report. Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

EU's Central Asia Policy 'Confused', Says Expert

By pushing for the Nabucco pipeline, the European Union has signalled its obsession with reducing its dependence on Russian gas. But replacing it with gas from Turkmenistan, an authoritarian country where the EU exerts even less influence, would not improve the situation, a Central Asia expert told EurActiv Germany in an interview.

Michael Laubsch, who works for the 'Eurasian Transition Group', an NGO, says that Turkmenistan is key for the Nabucco pipeline project, which is designed to bring gas to Europe from sources other than Russia.

Unless the political situation in Iran changes, Nabucco must focus on Turkmen gas – otherwise the project does not make sense economically, he argues.

Describing Turkmenistan as a "dictatorship", Laubsch argues that the EU cannot make any plans until the country is transparent about its gas resources.

Western politicians' arguments that an intensified economic relationship would also mean a change of political culture in countries such as Turkmenistan are more or less hypocritical, he said.

"The EU should demand independent and objective test drillings and publication of the results before investing a huge amount of assets," Laubsch insisted.

He argued that Turkmenistan has a tradition of "pendulum" policies between Russia and the EU, which Moscow has always won, resulting in benefits from the Russians for Turkmenistan.

Laubsch warned that China is in fact Russia's real rival in Turkmenistan. "I would predict that during the next decade the Chinese influence in Central Asia will increase, while the Russian influence will decrease and the EU concept can be ignored because of a lack of success," he said.

The expert was also sceptical about plans for a section of Nabucco to cross the Caspian seabed, which is considered to be both an internal sea and the largest lake on Earth.

Oil reserves in the Caspian basin are estimated to be worth several trillion dollars, and negotiations over the demarcation of the Caspian Sea have been ongoing for nearly a decade among the states bordering the Caspian - Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran.

In this context, Laubsch said that the legal status of the Caspian Sea, combined with its estimated energy resources, constitutes a risk to the region's security and stability.

"Unless all Caspian countries solve this problem, Western investments in the region will be at risk," he warned.

Source: EurActiv
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Nabucco Pipeline 'Needs Patience And Public Support'

Although the EU's proposed Nabucco gas pipeline is suffering from a lack of finance, demand and suppliers and could be delayed further, the EU and its member states should still back the project politically and financially, argues a European policy think-tank.

In a new policy brief, Centre for European Reform (CER) deputy director Katinka Barysch argues that despite the problems and postponements, the project ''still makes sense'' and should remain the flagship of the EU's energy policy.

Yet the paper, published on 5 May, also warns that the EU must recognise that its power to secure gas supplies from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq is fairly limited.

The Nabucco pipeline is designed to provide the EU with gas from suppliers in the Caspian and possibly the Middle East, yet faces competition from the South Stream project, backed by Russia.

In March, EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger said that a decision on the construction of the Nabucco pipeline should be made in 2010, but that its completion may be delayed by four years – from 2014 to 2018.

Despite the current lack of demand for Nabucco and the EU's ambitious climate change goals, many energy experts still foresee a slow but steady increase in European demand for gas in the future, the CER paper states.

''If such forecasts turn out to be correct, the EU will need Nord Stream, South Stream and all the southern corridor pipelines to satisfy its additional demand,'' says Barysch.

Nabucco, which is at the centre of the EU's southern corridor strategy, would reduce Europe's reliance on gas imports from Russia and provide a link to the gas-rich Caspian region – and possibly the Middle East in future.

Barysch believes that the EU and its governments should give Nabucco stronger public support if they believe it can achieve objectives ''beyond enabling some energy companies to make a profit by shipping additional gas to Europe''.

Challenges for guaranteeing supply

Currently, the only readily available gas field for Nabucco is Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan and a bilateral dispute between Baku and Ankara over gas prices is holding up progress on the second stage of the pipeline.

Turkmenistan – which exports most of its gas to Russia – is keen to get connected to the Nabucco pipeline, yet contractual and transit issues cast doubts on its readiness to sign up, Barysch states.

Iraq is another potential supplier for the project, but a number of obstacles exist – particularly how to share the revenues between Baghdad and the gas-rich Kurdish region in the north.

Though the pipeline could help the EU to develop stronger ties with these countries and help relations with Turkey as its membership bid stagnates, the EU ultimately ''has limited influence over many of the make-or-break issues for Nabucco,'' the paper concludes.


Source: EurActiv
Friday, May 07, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Azerbaijan Ready To Supply 50% Of Gas For Nabucco Project

Energy-rich Azerbaijan is ready to supply half its natural gas extracts to the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline intended to pump gas to Europe, a presidential administration official said on Thursday.

Nabucco, whose planned pipeline would bypass Russia, is a rival project to the Kremlin-backed South Stream gas pipeline. Both projects aim to supply natural gas to Southern and Central Europe.

"Azerbaijan attaches great importance to Nabucco ... We are ready to supply 50% of Azerbaijani gas via the pipeline," Ali Gasanov, head of the social and political department of the Azerbaijani president administration, said.

The South Stream project is designed to deliver up to 63 billion cubic meters of Central Asian and Russian natural gas under the Black Sea while Nabucco is intended to pump 31 billion cu m of natural gas from the Caspian region via Turkey.

Natural gas production in Azerbaijan grew 0.8% in 2009 year-on-year to 23.58 billion cubic meters. Azerbaijani gas is currently supplied to Turkey, Georgia, Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan's recoverable gas reserves are estimated at 2-3 trillion cubic meters.

In an apparent bid to divert Azerbaijani gas supplies from Nabucco, Russian energy giant Gazprom agreed with Azerbaijan to buy 1 billion cubic meters of gas from the ex-Soviet South Caucasus republic this year and around 2 bcm from 2011.

Even though Azerbaijan is viewed as a potential supplier of gas for Nabucco, experts doubt that the pipeline will ever come online as its operation requires the participation of Turkmenistan, a major natural gas supplier in Central Asia, which has not yet agreed to join the project.

Source: RIA Novosti
Thursday, May 06, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

WHO Investigates Polio Outbreak In Tajikistan; Immunization Planned

WHO deployed a team of experts April 16 to investigate a suspected polio outbreak in the south-west of Tajikistan, in the area bordering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

A sharp increase of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases in early April prompted the Tajik government to notify WHO of a possible polio outbreak. After further investigation by the Tajik national health authorities jointly with WHO, laboratory tests by the WHO collaborating center in Moscow confirmed poliovirus as the cause of the outbreak.

Tests are being done to further characterize the virus.

WHO said it immediately alerted all WHO Member States of this new public health risk in eastern central Asia, as required under the International Health Regulations.

WHO has also alerted the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to intensify surveillance for AFP cases and to rapidly conduct national or subnational polio immunization campaigns.

This is the first outbreak from imported poliovirus in the WHO European Region since the Region was certified polio-free in 2002.

WHO, together with the active participation of its partners in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, said it will continue to provide technical and field support until the outbreak is brought under control.

WHO and its partners will support the Ministry of Health of Tajikistan in conducting a mass immunization campaign.
Friday, April 23, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Iran Stresses Closer Ties With Armenia, Turkmenistan

Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stressed expansion of bilateral and regional ties with Armenia and Turkmenistan, according to the Iranian state news agency ISNA.

Mottaki met Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisian on the sidelines of Tehran's International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and they conferred on expansion of bilateral political, economic and cultural relationships and consulted about regional developments.

Mottaki and his Turkmen counterpart Rashid Meredov also met and discussed expansion of bilateral ties and regional and international issues, ISNA reported.

According to ISNA, Meredov called Iran the first and the closest neighbor of Turkmenistan and added, "cooperation with Iran is in priority for Turkmenistan's foreign policy."

"We have always emphasized that Iran's nuclear activities are based on peaceful purposes and we support the country's stances," Meredov was quoted as saying.
Monday, April 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

One Russian in Four Now Goes Online Daily Prompting Moscow To Consider Draconian Restrictions

By Paul Goble

Nearly one Russian in four now goes online on a daily basis, and almost half of those who do use the Internet to get their news, a challenge to the Kremlin’s control of much of the electronic media and a development that is prompting some of the powers that be to look at the way in which Belarus and Turkmenistan are trying to control the web.

Today, the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) released the results of its latest poll on Russian use of the Internet. According to the firm, 46 percent of Russians now have a personal computer, and 40 percent of the population uses them to connect to the Internet (wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13386.html).

More than four out of five of those going online do so at home rather than at work, thus limiting the ability of employers to control the way in which Russians make use of the web, even though most respondents in the VTsIOM survey say that they use the Internet “chiefly for work or study.”

Increasingly over the last several years, the poll found, Russians use the Internet for email, 51 percent now compared to 42 percent in 2008, for getting news, 49 percent compared to 48 percent, to find people with similar views, 28 percent compared to nine percent, and for entertainment and purchases of goods and services.

Not surprisingly, Internet use is highest in the capitals, among younger and more educated people, and among those who are financially better off, but use of the net appears to be spreading to other groups in the population relatively rapidly, with the share of people saying they never use the Internet falling dramatically.
Given that access to the Internet reduces the ability of the Russian powers that be to control the messages the citizenry receives, Moscow is increasingly considering adopting draconian measures like those in Turkmenistan and Belarus to limit access to the net or at least to intimidate some so that they will not make use of it for news.

In an interview with Baltinfo.ru this week, Aleksey Vlasov, an influential Moscow analyst says that “Russia is step by step approaching the models of many countries of the post-Soviet space” regarding control over information and especially the Internet (www.baltinfo.ru/tops/Terroristy-v-SMI-Kollektivnyi-dogovor-protiv-zakonodatelnoi-palki-137827).

Discussions about control of the information space in post-Soviet countries are “far from new,” Vlasov continues. Governments engage in it “for various reasons but by similar measures. Thus, in Kazakhstan, it was recently required that all sites be hosted only on the territory of the republic so that the owners of Internet portals could be found.”

Belarus and Turkmenistan have gone the furthest, the Moscow analyst says, but “Russia step by step is moving toward these republics in a the understanding of the Internet sphere as an ‘out of control’ element which must be put in order and held under tight control,” even if there is no agreement yet on just what methods to adopt.

The current anti-terrorist “hysteria,” he suggests, is likely to cover major moves to control access to the Internet in the name of defending “state interests” and the population from future terrorist attacks. That is all the more likely if more information comes to light about the use of the Internet by terrorist groups.

But one of the main issues that will have to be addressed soon is whether the blogosphere is “a mass media.”
If Russian officials ultimately decide that it is, then they will be in a position to demand the closure of “hundreds of blogs,” something that would seriously restrict what is now the freest part of the Russian media.
Even if the powers that be take that step, Vlasov concludes, it is still “unknown how far [they might yet go to impose] total control.” At the very least, moves to tighter government control over the Internet in Russia will set off another competition between offense and defense in this area much as they have in other countries.

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

UN Chief Urges Central Asians To Resolve Water Issues

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrived in Tajikistan and plunged directly into the most controversial topic in Central Asia -- water.

Ban said water has already been a primary issue in conversations with leaders in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

"The question is how to use common resources for common prosperity," Ban said.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not have the hydrocarbon resources their Central Asian neighbors have and the two mountainous countries suffer chronic energy shortages that are particularly noticeable in winter months.

The solution to their energy problem seems to be developing hydropower potential, which is enormous in both countries.

But downstream countries, Uzbekistan in particular, oppose plans to build immense hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of fears water released from reservoirs in winter for electricity will lead to insufficient amounts of water for irrigation downstream in spring and summer.

As Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have gone ahead with their hydropower projects, Uzbekistan has grown increasingly anxious and critical of the projects. Uzbekistan has tried to enlist the support of two other downstream countries, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

Ban today noted the tensions and urged the Central Asian countries to cooperate in use of resources.

"That is why I am visiting Central Asia, before tensions grow worse," Ban said. "Whether it is oil and natural gas or water, these resources should be used fairly and harmoniously, respecting the interests of neighboring countries."

Importance Of Mediation

The focus of Uzbekistan's objections is Tajikistan's Roghun dam project. The Tajik government has advertised it as a key to energy independence and for months has been encouraging the public to invest in its construction.

Tashkent recently stopped freight cars bound for Tajikistan, in part, Dushanbe says, because they were carrying some construction material for Roghun. Ban said he was "deeply concerned" about the dispute.

Ban urged patience from all five countries, pointing out that an environmental assessment team from the World Bank would soon be in the region to start work.

"Therefore all parties concerned should refrain from unilateral actions until the World Bank has concluded its technical assessment of Tajikistan's proposed hydropower projects," Ban said.

Tajikistan seems to have a slightly different interpretation of how the World Bank is approaching Central Asia's water issue. Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrakhon Zarifi said not just Tajik hydropower projects need to be evaluated.

Zarifi said that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon told Ban "that there is need of serious and competent international environmental expertise of all irrigation systems in Central Asia, including all existing reservoirs and other diversions that have a negative impact on the environment."

Some Tajik experts have argued that their neighbor's frivolous use of water is responsible for water shortages in downstream countries, while Uzbek experts argue the problems of water use start in upstream countries.

Ban mentioned the UN's Center for Preventative Diplomacy, located in Turkmenistan, as a vehicle for helping resolve Central Asia's water problems. Turkmenistan was Ban's first stop on his current Central Asian tour and the center was among the first places Ban visited.

RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

State Islam, Outsiders Compete For Influence In Central Asia

By Bruce Pannier

“Islam is a religion of knowledge," the cleric told a television audience. "Unfortunately, some people attempt to use Islam -- the religion of knowledge, goodness, and development -- wrongly or for their own selfish ends."

It's a message that might not appear extraordinary -- the virtues and peaceful nature of Islam have long been espoused -- until you consider the source. As imam-khatib at Tashkent's Kukeldash Mosque, Anvar Qori Tursunov enjoys the backing of the Uzbek authorities, making it apparent that his words address not only Islamic adversaries, but perceived enemies of the state itself.

In the ideological vacuum left by the demise of communism, religion reentered the scene in Central Asia. And with officially sanctioned Islam pitted against outside interpretations that authorities do not want to take root, the region's regimes have deployed clerics like Tursunov in an ongoing battle for influence.

Central Asia's Islamic history dates back more than a millennium, but for most of the 20th century, the region was part of the Soviet Union, cut off from the rest of the Islamic world. With the fall of the USSR, the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan quickly re-embraced their Islamic heritage.

Islamic groups saw fertile recruiting ground in the region, with its 50 million primarily Sunni Muslims. Since making their entrance to the region, they have posed an immense challenge to clerics like Tursunov in thousands of officially registered mosques.

Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow and director for the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C., says that the governments of Central Asia were unprepared for the arrival of widely divergent religious groups from outside the region.

"Central Asia was perfect ground and many of the governments in Central Asia at the time, including Uzbekistan, did not understand that not all Islamic groups are the same,” Baran says.” They did not know and they did not understand that some of them are radical, some of them have political ideologies."

Over time, the states of Central Asia tried to strengthen the voice of their official interpretations of Islam by silencing the outsiders. Hizb-ut Tahrir from the Middle East, Tablighi Jama'at from Pakistan, Salafiya from the Arab world, and Nurchilar from Turkey were banned, among other groups.

But despite these bans, continued reports of arrests of various prohibited groups' followers in Central Asia suggest that they enjoy significant support, and that their appeal may even be on the rise.

Competing Sects

The chief mufti of Kyrgyzstan's Spiritual Directorate, Murataaly-Hajji Jumanov, the highest Islamic official in his country, explains the need to combat outside Islamic groups. "Their brainwashing of some of our citizens is a big problem," Jumanov tells RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service. "We can't hide our heads in the sand and ignore them, we have to prevent this and maintain order. Otherwise we will have problems later."

The preferred alternative preached by Jumanov and other state clerics is the region's traditional Hanafi School of Islamic Law -- considered by some to be the most liberal of the four schools of Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali) -- mixed with Naqshbandi Sufism, a mystic order whose founder, Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari, came from Central Asia.

This form of Islam, its official adherents believe, best reflects the values of Central Asia's mostly Turkic and Persian peoples, and the region's rich Islamic history is often invoked by clerics and Islamic scholars as they exhort people to resist forms of Islam arriving from other countries.

But another element of the region's history works against state Islam. Sultans, emirs, khans, and others tried for centuries to bend Islamic clerics to their will, knowing that Islam was the greatest unifying force in their regions, and therefore both the biggest potential threat to their regimes and the best way of legitimizing their rule.

Today's regimes, in this respect, are no different than their predecessors.

Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda of Tajikistan has a unique perspective on the modern role of Islam and the state in Central Asia. He was the Qazi Qalon of Tajikistan, the country's highest Islamic imam, in the last years of the Soviet Union and first years after Tajikistan became independent.

He joined the Islamic opposition that was fighting government forces during the 1992-97 Tajik civil war and was forced to flee the country. But he and other opposition figures were amnestied as part of the agreement that ended the war, and he has been back in Tajikistan for more than a decade.

Turajonzoda, who since his return has held state positions not related to religion, tells RFE/RL's Tajik Service there is a clear connection between the state and the imams preaching in mosques.

"Some 90 percent of imams are appointed by the government, by local government [officials] and offices of the security agency,” Turajonzoda says. “Even the law says that imams are supposed to be appointed by worshippers at the mosques with the approval of the government. But it is actually the government that selects who the imams will be, and when they appoint imams it is clear [the government] controls the mosque through these protégés."

Clerics Under Pressure

The influence of the state is apparent in mosques throughout Central Asia. As Kudrat, who spoke to RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service on condition that his full name not be used, explains, official clerics are not entirely free to say what they wish.

Kudrat prays five times daily and goes to mosque when he can -- "Fridays for sure," he says -- but laments that "our clerics are very restricted and talk only about the way to behave. We need to learn about politics also."

Qosimi Bekmuhammad, a Tajik expert on politics and religion, supports Kudrat's impression. State clerics, he says, “avoid speaking about important topics, the problems of today and tomorrow, and concentrate on topics from 500 years ago."

Adding to the problem, according to the Hudson Institute's Baran, is that some state-trained clerics are simply unable to answer all the questions youths have regarding social justice or identity issues. Seeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, they get conflicting messages about whether the West is at war with Islam, and what they should be doing, because state-trained imams focus "primarily on Islamic ethics and [are] purely sticking to religious areas."

"They are not able to always answer the questions that the youths have, and then the youth goes to the charismatic and self-appointed religious leaders or imams who do then provide them often with black-and-white answers that seem satisfactory," Baran says.

This failure to address contemporary issues exposes a significant vulnerability of state Islam in Central Asia, according to Bekmuhammad.

While he does not think that a large number of young people have been attracted to outside Islamic groups, he recognizes that the social conditions in Central Asia have led some to join up with outside, and potentially violent, forms of Islam.

"Never say all youth do this, but some do,” Bekmuhammad says. “There are several reasons. First, there are socioeconomic conditions. There are no jobs. These problems have been in the country for 15 years and have led to disappointment among young people."

The youth of Central Asia, Bekmuhammad says, are looking for advice and spiritual instruction on how to be good Muslims and still survive in the modern world. And this is where state imams are not delivering an adequate message.

In their effort to recruit new followers, outside Islamic groups also seize on state Islam's connection to secular authorities to discredit its message.

Separation Of Mosque And State

Ayubkhan is a member of Hizb-ut Tahrir, a group formed by Palestinians in the 1950s that is officially banned throughout Central Asia. Ayubkhan currently lives in Kyrgyzstan's section of the Ferghana Valley. He spoke to RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, on condition that his full name not be used, about why he has no faith in state Islam.

"The mufti and his people -- in a democratic country they don't have to do what the government says. There is a law on religion and the government being separate,” Ayubkhan says. “Politicians should not be involved in the mufti's affairs and the mufti should not follow government orders. The Koran says the mufti should follow Shari'a. I don't see the mufti doing this."

Tajik expert Bekmuhammad notes that young people who join outside Islamic groups "often do so because they feel governments in their countries have too much influence in Islam, whereas they would rather Islam had a dominant influence in government."

Hizb-ut Tahrir member Ayubkhan backs Bekmuhammad's assessment.

"I study Shari'a and study Hizb-ut Tahrir. I found out that Hizb-ut Tahrir teaches exactly what the Prophet Muhammad wanted us to know,” Ayubkhan says. “The Holy Koran is the ideology of Hizb-ut Tahrir -- not just how a person should live in society but how a person should serve other people."

Body And Soul

State clerics themselves portray the relationship between official Islam and secular authorities in Central Asia as inevitable.

Omurbek, the press secretary for Kazakhstan's Muslim Religious Directorate, speaks of a symbiosis between Islam in his country and the state.

"According to our constitution the state and religion are separate. But, in fact, we can't divide the body from the soul of a human being,” Omurbek says. “A human being has reason, a body, and a soul, and we can't separate them. It's not possible."

And Omurbek is insistent that it is not the state that is influencing Islam, but Islam that is influencing politicians.

"God forbid there would be such a thing! To the contrary, our president himself built a huge mosque in the town where he was born,” he says. “Following his example, many rich people, governors, mayors, and others are building many mosques."

Kyrgyzstan's chief mufti Jumanov says there is no reason for conflict between Islam and secular authorities in his country.

"First of all, of course, in a secular country sometimes there are different opinions on religion, but during my time as mufti I haven't seen any problem or conflict,” Jumanov says. “On the other hand, our state is following the correct policy toward Islam. From our side we are trying to work on a path where religion doesn't have any conflict with state policy."

There are, of course, the examples to the contrary. One notable conflict between state Islam and the secular authorities happened in the most authoritarian of the Central Asian states, Turkmenistan.

In 2002, Turkmenistan's chief mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, objected to having passages from authoritarian President Saparmurat Niyazov's "Rukhnama," his lengthy spiritual guide, inscribed on the walls of a new mosque alongside passages from the Koran. The mufti was sacked, convicted of plotting to kill the president, and jailed for 22 years.

So state imams do have limitations on what they can say, and authorities expect those imams to support the state.

‘Connections To Terrorism’

For many Central Asians dissatisfied with their governments, Islamic opposition groups represent the best and sometimes seemingly only hope for changing the system.

This may explain why Central Asian governments often portray these outside Islamic groups as having links to terrorism.

There is no question that some members of these groups clearly are violent. In one recent example, Imam Anvar Qori Tursunov of Tashkent's official Kukeldash Mosque was stabbed outside his home on July 31, 2009. Several Islamic militants killed in a security operation in the Uzbek capital in August were blamed for the attack.

In neighboring Tajikistan, the small extremist group Bayat has for years been tied to sometimes deadly attacks against non-Muslims and state-approved Islamic clergy.

But while Central Asian states often resort to describing adherents of alternative forms of Islam as "terrorists," the label is sometimes false.

Former high imam Turajonzoda rejects charges that all the foreign Islamic groups have connections to terrorism.

"I'm not really sure they are terrorists,” Turajonzoda says. “I'm against terrorism myself, against forcibly propagating ideas, against extremism. But most of these organizations are terrorists in name only."

Turajonzoda says that by trying to paint all these Islamic groups with the same brush, Central Asia's governments and state imams only discredit themselves. Central Asians see how some groups behave and perceive them as pious, not violent. This leads people to question the motives of authorities and state imams in branding all groups as terrorists.

Others suggest alternative methods of dealing with the outside Islamic groups.

Tursunbai Bakir Uluu, a former Kyrgyz ombudsman, has called for legalizing Hizb-ut Tahrir in his country. This, he believes, would allow the group to publicly demonstrate what it has to offer, while removing the element of mystery that may attract some to the Islamic sect.

His appeal was rejected and Hizb-ut Tahrir remains banned in Kyrgyzstan and throughout Central Asia.

"I think the region in general still suffers from knowing too little about Islamic history and their own history, because Central Asia once upon a time used to be the center of Islamic civilization,” says the Hudson Institute’s Baran. “Across the Silk Road there were great centers of Islamic learning where scientific thinking and spirituality and rationality and knowledge spread from Central Asia to the rest of the Islamic world and brought great civilization."

It's a message that official clerics like Tursunov of Tashkent's Kukeldash Mosque might incorporate in future sermons. Confidence in traditional belief systems, combined with the ability to communicate those beliefs today, might prove to be the most effective way of countering the influence of outside Islam.

Saida Kalkulova and Erzhan Karabek of RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, Venera Djumataeva of RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, and Iskander Aliev and Salimjon Aioubov of RFE/RL's Tajik Service contributed to this report

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. 
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Kyrgyzstan: The Requiem On Independent Journalism

By Ferghana.ru

In the last three weeks of March, 2010 the government of Kyrgyzstan managed to nearly eliminate the independent journalism that has been emerging and developing in the republic since gaining independence in 1991.

The independent newspapers, regularly counting the number of days, remaining till the end of President Askar Akaev’s presidential term, at the front pages, do not exist anymore. The live and uninterrupted broadcast of multi-day opposition meetings in central square of Bishkek is already the history.

The journalists will not ask the President or Minister inconvenient and open questions, shocking the press-officers of the state agencies.

There are no live programs in the First State Television channel of Kyrgyzstan, attended by the opposition leaders and President Kurmanbek Bakiev, when the Kyrgyz leader openly debated against his opponents.

The local mass media cancelled "the watch of correspondents in the parliament" although the parliamentary correspondents daily reported the sensational statements of deputies, both from opposition and pro-government side.

Today, the news programs of the local TV channels and news lines of mass media remind Soviet news: field news, crop battles, hero of labor and sport…

The commencement of "silent mode"

The new page in the history of Kyrgyzstan was turned on March 10, 2010. People are getting used to an information vacuum: even if there are important political events in the republic most of people will never learn about them.

In the last few days three opposition newspapers were shut down, the local and international online media were filtered while the local news agencies were agreed (or forced) not to cover certain political agenda.

The most recent attack was attempted on April 1 at independent Stan TV internet television.

The financial police officers showed up in the office of Stan TV channel and brought the Microsoft representative that said Stan TV was running unlicensed software at the computers. The human rights defenders, arriving shortly, blocked up the entrance door and kept the financial police officers outside for about an hour. "The computers in the financial police office have the same illegal software" the IT engineers of Stan TV and human rights advocates noticed. "We do not even use our computers" the financial police officers mentioned in response. Ultimately, the authorities sealed the equipment and server room and, therefore, stopped the broadcast. The journalists were not even allowed to take their office laptops.

It is sad that the journalists were not even attempting to resist the law enforcement officers. Obviously, the journalists were internally ready for such events. People remember well the murder of Alisher Saipov and Gennadiy Pavlyuk, the severe beating and knife injuries of Syrgak Abduldaev.

When you know exactly what can happen to the journalists in this country, the filtering of website or sealed editorial office may seem the simplest pay for your work.

The thing is that comparing to what they can do to you, the current losses are nothing. Good thing is that you are alive. Today, the Kyrgyz journalists work in the following system of axes: "killed-not killed-severely injured"; the self censorship turns on automatically. The question "what will happen to my kids" becomes the priority and people leave journalism through either changing the occupation or adopting the censorship, which is still the abandonment of journalism. Today, there is no more free journalism in Kyrgyzstan.

The reason why Kyrgyz authorities decided to reinforce total "silent regime" is the scandal, involving international financier Eugene Gourevitch, whose company managed significant state assets. These assets were transferred to Gourevitch by Kyrgyzstan’s Development Fund, headed by Maxim Bakiev, the son of the president. The news, delivered by various agencies, on the fact that Italian court issued the arrest warrant for Gourevitch, de facto personal financial consultant of Bakiev’s family, became the signal for the President’s Secretariat and secret services to start filtering domestic access to the websites of Ferghana.Ru news agency, Centrasia.Ru, Belyi Parus online newspaper. The broadcast of Azattyk radio (Kyrgyz Service f RFE/RL) through private radio and TV channels was also shut down.

If earlier the government struggled with certain opponents and journalists one by one, now, apparently, it was decided to put systematic pressure on political opponents and independent mass media.

The neighbors are with us

The establishment of strict vertical power system and suppression methods, used against the opposition and mass media, were successfully adopted by Kurmanbek Bakiev from the neighbors, especially considering that other presidents in Central Asia were hinting that Kyrgyzstan must not be "an odd bird".

While the independent mass media were closed in other countries of the region Kyrgyzstan remained the area for regional conferences, round tables and seminars, attended by the representatives of such isolated republics as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This was certainly irritating the authoritarian regimes, surrounding the republic.

Bakiev is well aware that strict policy in cleaning up the political field will be supported by all regional leaders – in any case, Kyrgyzstan without revolutions, demonstrations and political struggle is more attractive partner than Kyrgyzstan in 1991, 2005 and 2007. If Karimov, Nazarbayev, Berdymukhammedov and Rakhmon are not even thinking they can leave their positions – Bakiev must also reinforce his (or his family) life-long position in the political Olympus of the region.

This means that the image "island of democracy" in the region is not valuable any more. Who needs this image if today the United States need Kyrgyzstan as well as vice versa? While the war in Afghanistan is in progress, the United States will pay for Manas, build training center in the southern region and ignore such effects of Kyrgyz state building process as the murders of journalists and politicians, faked criminals cases, severe verdicts for non-compromising opposition leaders: USA and Europe have their own interests in Kyrgyzstan; sometimes their very democratic policies view the violation of human rights and freedoms as "domestic affairs of another state".

People keep silence

The only remaining hope of the opposition and independent mass media is the support of people. Today, the national protest potential is quite high while Kyrgyz ability to mobilize is well known. The Central Executive Committee of People’s Kurultai issued the statement, saying "To protect the freedom of speech!"; it also mentions that similar situation with shutting down the independent media was observed on the eve of tulip revolution of 2005: "That was the time when newspapers, website and independent TV channels and radio stations were blocked. Neither Akaev nor Bakiev will be able to hide the truth from people. Very soon the Kyrgyzstanis, attending the assembly meetings and kurultai, will give their own valuation to this regime and decisively demand to rebuild the sovereignty. The filtering of media is not the obstacle for people, but will give additional determination and courage! The executive committee addresses international community with the appeal to show solidarity to the people of Kyrgyzstan in their struggle for justice, rule of law and constitutional freedoms! The executive committee urges all Kyrgyz citizens to show courage and human dignity, stand up to protect freedom, the right for worthy life and people’s rule!"

The Stan TV staff in Bishkek also asked for the support of "the governments of democratic countries and the leaders of international organizations". Understanding the fact that the suspension of channel operations had to be necessarily approved by the highest authorities, the Stan TV staff believes "the unprecedented action against independent media source must produce public resonance and adequate response of the world community… We urge the leaders of democratic countries and the representatives of international organizations to pay attention to the events in the information area of Kyrgyzstan and judge the government of the republic, violating the constitutional rights of citizens for getting objective and truthful information".

Most likely, no democratic country, whose opinion is important for Kyrgyzstan, will respond on this case. By the way, what democratic country’s opinion is so important for Kyrgyzstan? Kazakhstan is also considered as the democratic state… and Tajikistan… Russia. Kyrgyzstan is surrounded by democratic societies…

There is no money for the development of independent Kyrgyz media: the West does not provide grants any more while poor economic development hinders the financial success of the media projects. The pressure on journalists, put by authorities, is extremely intensive. Today, Kyrgyz journalism is hiding in the cocoon of fear and despair, waiting for the better times.


Source: The Ferghana.Ru news agency was established in 1998 when the Ferghana Community web site was set up. Ferghana.Ru news agency is a popular resource dealing with the life of Central Asian countries of the former USSR.
Monday, April 05, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Turkmenistan: European Bank Urges Rights Improvements

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has made clear that Turkmenistan's government needs to improve its poor human rights record before it can expect normalized relations, Human Rights Watch said.

The bank's new country strategy for Turkmenistan, published yesterday, sets specific human rights benchmarks for the Turkmen government to fulfill, and makes the bank's level of engagement dependant on Turkmenistan's progress in meeting them.

"The bank has made clear it expects reforms in exchange for enhanced relations," said Veronika Szente Goldston, advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia at Human Rights Watch. "Now it's up to Turkmenistan's leadership to heed these calls and take the steps the bank has identified as necessary."

The bank's shareholder governments, many of them important bilateral partners of Turkmenistan - such as Germany, France, the United States, and Japan - should actively back the bank's reform demands and ensure that their policies are fully consistent with the bank's approach, Human Rights Watch said.

In its strategy, the bank acknowledges "political and economic changes ... aimed at reversing social and economic policies of the previous regime," but concludes that "much remains to be done in the area of democratic competition and accountability, strengthening the rule of law and guaranteeing protection of human rights and media freedom." The strategy stresses that "the overall progress on implementation of the adopted laws, the rule of law and respect for human rights remains a serious concern."

The bank further said it will engage in a "proactive policy dialogue" with Turkmen authorities on the need for "accelerat[ed] reforms" and "openness." The bank also set specific "reform benchmarks" against which it will "actively and continually monitor developments" and report to the bank's board of directors on an annual basis. These benchmarks include:

  • Progress toward genuine political pluralism and meaningful political accountability, including the strengthening of checks and balances in the political system, removal of impediments to registration and free functioning of nongovernmental organizations, and even-handed application of the rule of law;
  • Substantial progress in increasing media freedom and freedom of expression; and
  • Further significant progress in improving the country's human rights record, with the following singled out as "priority areas requiring urgent attention":
    • The release of political prisoners;
    • Free access for the International Committee of the Red Cross to places of detention;
    • Removal of the remaining restrictions on foreign travel of its citizens, and;
    • Freedom of the media and free functioning of civil society groups.

In what it terms "a calibrated strategic approach," the bank reserved the right "to increase its engagement with Turkmenistan" - a move that marks a notable shift away from its prior, more restrictive approach of a complete ban on public sector investment. But it expressly linked any increase in operations to progress by the Turkmen side in meeting the reform expectations the bank has set forth. The strategy describes the bank's approach as "carefully calibrated to increase its operational scope in a measured and incremental way, as the Turkmen authorities make progress in political and economic reform."

The bank, set up in 1991 to promote market economy in countries "committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics," is unique in having an explicit political mandate. This mandate makes it all the more important for the bank to ensure any enhancement in relations with Turkmenistan is made strictly conditional on human rights progress.

"The bank has put its political mandate to good use by setting benchmarks for human rights compliance and linking its level of engagement to their fulfillment," Szente Goldston said. "A key test of this commitment will be the bank's - and indeed its shareholders' - resolve in enforcing this linkage, which requires staying true to the reform demands, and engaging in a genuine effort to ensure they are carried through."

The strategy states the bank "will continue to be guided by its mandate." In a separate document, the bank goes even further, explaining that it "is not conducting ‘business as usual' in Turkmenistan," and that its "modified strategic approach does not resume ‘normal' operations, insofar as the operating environment remains difficult and there are gaps with respect to compliance [with the bank's political mandate]."

Turkmenistan is one of the most repressive countries in the world. It is also a country rich in natural gas, making it an important strategic partner to many governments.

Unknown numbers of political prisoners languish in Turkmenistan's prisons, and the rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion are subject to draconian restrictions. Independent civil society and media cannot operate openly, if at all. The government threatens, harasses, and arrests those who question its policies, however modestly.

In a letter to the EBRD board of directors in advance of its discussion of the Turkmenistan strategy, Human Rights Watch urged the bank to stay true to its political mandate and refrain from public sector investment until such time as the Turkmen government makes credible progress toward meeting the benchmarks the bank has set for it. The letter objects to the bank's reference to "recent progress in the political...sphere" as "provid[ing] an opportunity for deeper engagement," and critiques its description of a number of key human rights developments as incomplete, raising questions about the bank's commitment to an objective and accurate assessment of the situation on the ground.
Monday, April 05, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Chinese-Central Asian Relationship Requires Delicate Balancing Act

By Bruce Pannier

It would appear to be a match made in heaven. China, in order to fuel its economic ambitions, has moved quickly to snatch up Central Asian resources. Central Asia, looking to upgrade its aging infrastructure, has increasingly opened itself up to Chinese investment.

But while everything appears to be going swimmingly, the idyllic arrangement is not likely to last for long. This is because Central Asian states work alone in wooing the Chinese, which plays to Beijing's strength in bilateral dealings. But the cross-border networks it aims to build require a diplomatic balancing act that China lacks experience to pull off.

A shortage of energy resources is the main threat to China's economic ambitions, leading Chinese companies to sign contracts for energy imports around the world.

Jennifer DeLay, editor of the Edinburgh-based “FSU Oil and Gas Monitor,” says that while the pace of China's economic growth has slowed amid the global financial crisis, "it certainly hasn't reversed." She says China's economy is set to keep growing, requiring more energy, and that gas imports in particular are expected to increase dramatically in the coming years.

DeLay said China is already consuming 4.1 million barrels of oil daily, and just over half of that (51.8 percent) is imported. Natural gas imports account for only 11 percent of current consumption, but are set to increase greatly as China replaces coal with gas.

China's southern neighbors either don't have much to offer, or, in the case of Vietnam, relations are not at a stage where oil imports are up for discussion. DeLay notes that there are plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar to China, but those won't be operational until 2012. With the shortage of direct land routes, China is largely dependent on sea routes.

"The statistic I've seen is that as of January this year, foreign tankers account for about 80 percent of all the oil imported into China," DeLay says. As for natural gas, "again it's very much a majority. China is working to build up an LNG [liquefied natural gas] fleet so that it can import its own LNG, but they don't have it yet."

Fortunately for China, its western neighbors -- the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have vast energy resources, leading Beijing to court them heavily since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Long Courtship

It started with confidence-building agreements along the Sino-CIS border in April 1996 that involved China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The group evolved, adding Uzbekistan and taking on an economic and security dimension.

The grouping now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has enabled China to penetrate deeply into Central Asia's energy resource market in little more than a decade.

The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed its first major Central Asian contract with Kazakhstan in 1997. The two parties agreed to build a 2,238-kilometer oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China, which has now started operating. A gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China started operating in December 2009.

"China is currently connected by pipelines to only two countries," DeLay says. "Turkmenistan for gas -- and that pipeline just began operating last December -- and Kazakhstan for oil. That pipeline has been operating since 2006."

These two pipelines receive much attention and by themselves are sufficient to show China's growing influence in Central Asia, but China's interests in Central Asia go much further and involve every country.

Energy Exploration

The CNPC is helping to explore and develop oil and gas fields in eastern and western Uzbekistan, including in the Aral Sea. China Investment Corp bought a 14.5 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production last year, paying $939 million.

Besides the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline that started operations last December, PetroChina is helping build another gas pipeline to ship some 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from western Kazakhstan to the Chinese border. In Turkmenistan, the CNPC is the only foreign company that can boast of having an onshore contract to explore for energy.

Just over the border from where Chinese workers in Turkmenistan are developing gas fields, the possibility of China helping develop gas fields in northwestern Afghanistan is under consideration. During Afghan President Hamid Karzai's recent visit to China, the project not far from where the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline starts was discussed.

Not wishing to rely solely on pipelines to import Central Asian oil and gas, China has embarked on ambitious railway projects. Chinese company HPGI, created specifically to build rail lines between China and Kazakhstan, has plans for 21 new rail lines, eight solely for transporting oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG.

There are also plans to build a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail line that would end in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, near where the CNPC is developing Uzbek oil and gas fields.

Central Asia needs to upgrade its electricity systems and China's Tebian Electric Apparatus is building 220-kV and 500-kV power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's XD Group is modernizing and reconstructing the electricity system for the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.

Chinese companies are also involved in Central Asia's hydropower projects. China's Sinohydro is helping build the Nurobad and Shurob hydroelectric power plants (HPP) in Tajikistan as well as modernizing the Kayrakkum HPP.

Tebian is building three more power plants in Tajikistan, which paid the Chinese company by giving it rights to mine gold, silver, copper, tungsten, mica, and gemstones in the Pamir Mountains. Other Chinese mining companies are also working gold deposits and looking for uranium and rare earth elements in Tajikistan.

China is also looking to increase its civilian nuclear power potential, and there too it can find the resources it needs in Central Asia. The China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation own shares in Kazakh uranium mines, and have contracts to buy uranium from Kazatomprom. In Uzbekistan, a subsidiary of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is jointly prospecting for black-shale uranium in Navoi Province. Sinosteel is prospecting, with Australia's Monaro Mining, for uranium in Kyrgyzstan.

Chinese companies are also constructing or improving roads leading from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, Chinese workers are building a tunnel Tajikistan, and Chinese-made goods can be found at every Central Asian bazaar.

Dangerous Liaisons

The arrangement looks fantastic on the surface. China receives a major portion of the energy resources it needs as long as Beijing finances the development of the oil and gas fields, uranium mines, infrastructure, and import-export routes. Central Asia gets a steady customer who not only pays on time, but is actually constructing the means for the five countries to export their raw materials.

But while China may be a rising world power, its experience in international mediation is limited and Central Asian regional politics are full of potential pitfalls. China holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but is rarely involved in talks aimed at resolving conflicts, the situation with its neighbor North Korea being a notable exception.

On the business end, DeLay says, China has long preferred to keep its business deals on a bilateral level with one foreign partner. Many of the agreements China has worked out in Central Asia follow this model, she says, but geography dictates that Beijing engage in multilateral dealings as well.

For example, the gas pipeline linking China to Turkmenistan passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A rail project linking Uzbekistan to China will go through Kyrgyzstan, requiring Beijing to find common ground with two feuding neighbors.

John MacLeod, the head of Central Asian programs at the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, says that in recent years, “there's constant talk about various kinds of regional economic structures, but they never work out.”

“Even things like simplified customs rules, and even visas for citizens, are constantly a problem because practical things are often tied up with politics and very often with the kind of very individualistic stances of each set of leaderships, who feel that their country is preeminent and they don't want their interests to be encroached upon by the others,” MacLeod says.

NATO just saw an example of such regional complications. When Uzbekistan recently halted train traffic bound for Tajikistan, supplies headed for Tajikistan and then on to NATO troops in Afghanistan were held up. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have never had good relations, but ties are particularly strained amid a dispute over Tajikistan's hydropower plans, leaving Uzbekistan worried it will be left with water shortages.

MacLeod said such incidents highlight the likelihood of breakdowns in China's regional balancing act.

"You have this history of rocky relationships and less than perfect cooperation, so simply managing this new conduit through all their territories could throw up all those problems,” MacLeod says. “You could have a situation where a simple dispute about the division of transit fees -- say, between the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs -- could escalate into something worse given this kind of difficult political relationship.... What is effectively a business dispute over money suddenly takes on this political aspect."

MacLeod notes that the Chinese have worked to ensure these multilateral deals in Central Asia benefit all the parties involved, and cites the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline as an example.

"The Chinese are trying to mitigate that risk by giving each of the players, particularly the Uzbeks, a stake in it by holding out the prospect that they too can export some gas down the pipeline," he says.

The Central Asian states’ reasons for allowing the Chinese so far into the region are clear, MacLeod explains.

"Only China will put in money into things that are not necessarily immediately commercially valuable -- like roads in Tajikistan, like developing oil and gas in Uzbekistan -- where other...commercial players would be more faint-hearted because they know about the kind of terrible legal problems you can have operating in a country like that,” MacLeod says. “So the Chinese are in it for the long game.”

He continues: “The Central Asians appear to be just not thinking about...the big politics and hoping that the Chinese are simply a kind of an investment bank that they can deal with."

This may leave a traditional suitor, Russia, out in the cold. Before the global economic crisis, the Kremlin was spending a lot of the revenues it was receiving from oil and gas sales on projects in Central Asia. But the economic crisis hit Russia hard, leaving financially secure China a free economic hand in Central Asia.

MacLeod said Moscow is putting on a brave face, but cannot be happy with the way things are shaping up in Central Asia.

"I think to an extent the Russians have accepted the Chinese economic expansion in terms of investment and energy exploration in Central Asia as a fact,” MacLeod says. “They may not like it. but they're saying that they're perfectly happy and that it meshes well with their own interests. But of course, to an extent, it doesn't.”

He explains: “Currently Russia -- the Kremlin, through Gazprom, the huge energy company -- has de facto control of the pipeline network coming out of Central Asia. And although Kazakhstan is obviously an independent oil exporter...Russia has a huge say in what happens, especially if there's turbulence at the political level."


Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
 
Original article
Monday, April 05, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Central Asia And Caucasus Governments Spending Heavily On Arms

By Joshua Kucera

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have gone on a weapons spending spree over the past decade, collectively increasing their defense spending five-fold, according to a report recently released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Armenia increased its annual defense spending from $93 million in 1999 to $217 million in 2008, using constant 2005 dollars, SIPRI reported. Azerbaijan’s military budget rose from $133 million in 1999 to $697 million in 2008, and Georgia’s went from $39.8 million to $651 million over the same period.

Regional tensions were the primary cause of the buildup, said the report’s author, Paul Holtom, director of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.

"In the decade preceding the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict in South Ossetia, military expenditure in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia increased by more than 500 percent in real terms," Holtom wrote.

"Military reform and modernization have been offered as justifications for increased military spending and arms procurement in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, but unresolved border disputes, territorial claims and separatism remain among the main national security threats facing these countries," the report continued.

While SIPRI tried to collect similar data on the countries of Central Asia, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan offered enough information to do so. Kazakhstan’s defense spending increased from $206 million in 1999 to $855 million in 2008, and Kyrgyzstan’s went from $44.8 million to $79.3 million over the same period (again using constant 2005 dollars).

Over the last two years, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have all made significant defense procurements from foreign suppliers, according to SIPRI data, while Armenia and the rest of the post-Soviet Central Asian states did not.

Azerbaijan got 70 armored personnel carriers (of the BTR-80A variety) from Russia in 2009, and arranged with South Africa’s Paramount Groups to start producing Matador and Marauder mine-protected vehicles in Azerbaijan. Those vehicles will likely be assembled in Azerbaijan, and could mark the first movement toward Baku’s stated goal of creating a domestic defense industry that can produce export-worthy military hardware, Holtom said in an interview with EurasiaNet.

Azerbaijan’s focus on new ground vehicles and recent purchases of unmanned drone aircraft from Israel, combined with Baku’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric towards Armenia leaves little doubt that Azerbaijan is preparing for the possibility of a renewed conflict over its lost territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Holtom said.

"With the rhetoric that’s been coming out in recent months, it’s clear to what end this buildup is for, it’s Nagorno-Karabakh," Holtom said. While Azerbaijan may have a decisive material advantage now, the key factor in any potential conflict with Armenia would be the posture of the Russian forces in Armenia, he added. "The Russian reaction is going to be the key thing, with the security pact that Russia and Armenia have, whether Azerbaijan feels if it can go for it," he said.

Georgia has made similar purchases to Azerbaijan, including several land-vehicle buys in 2009, including 70 Ejder armored personnel carriers from Turkey and 32 tanks from Ukraine, 20 T-72s and 12 T-84s. Russia’s arms purchases suggest that it was not happy with the way the war with Georgia turned out, Holtom said, including looking to buy drones from Israel and Mistral amphibious attack ships from France. "It was perhaps a tougher fight than they expected," Holtom said.

Kazakhstan obtained 79 armored personnel carriers (BTR-80As) from Russia in 2009, as well as three ANSAT light utility helicopters and 12 Mi-8 and Mi-17 attack helicopters, all of which were bought in 2007. In addition, Kazakhstan last year signed agreements with Russia for 10 S-330 surface-to-air missile air defense systems and Su-27, MiG-27 and MiG-23UB combat planes. From Israel, Kazakhstan completed its acquisitions of weapons from Israel bought in 2006 and 2007, including 18 Lynx rocket systems, six Semser 122mm self-propelled guns, and 18 CARDOM 120mm mortars for use on armored personnel carriers.

Last year, Turkmenistan bought six Smerch multiple rocket launch systems, 10 T-90 tanks and two Tarantul fast-attack boats for its nascent navy. The Caspian military buildup will likely continue, with Kazakhstan considering naval purchases as well, though Astana appears to be looking to non-Russian sources, Holtom said.

"With Turkmenistan it looks like they’re turning to Russia for the naval dimension, but Kazakhstan could go to South Korea, the United Kingdom, Spain and the United States," he said.

Kazakhstan is unique among the Central Asian states for having implemented sound reforms of the military it inherited from the Soviet Union, said Erica Marat, author of a recent book on Central Asian militaries, The Military and the State in Central Asia. Still, Kazakhstan is likely to continue to heavily favor Russian military equipment since, as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, it gets discount rates, Marat added.

Joshua Kucera is a Washington, DC,-based freelance writer who specializes in security issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org. or www.soros.org.
Thursday, March 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Central Asia Profile - Terrorism And Border Tensions (Part 2)

Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements—largely consisting of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power—tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan. These forces consisted of Russia’s 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999).

Terrorist actions were carried out by both sides, and international terrorist groups provided some support to the Tajik opposition. Reportedly, these groups included the IMU, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and Al Qaeda.14 As the civil war wound down in the late 1990s, most of these forces left Tajikistan.

After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994, the UNSC established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the demobilization of Tajik opposition fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and offer advice for holding elections. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of government and opposition members. On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhman and opposition leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhman remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC disbanded, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile.

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan According to some estimates, there are some 4,000 IMU fighters in Afghanistan. Pakistan reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJU members who had placed rockets near presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of military intelligence in Islamabad. Reportedly, the IJU was targeting the government because of its support for the United States.15

Pakistani media reported in March-April 2007 that dozens of IMU members had been killed in northern Pakistan when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their strength or forcing them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. More alleged IMU and IJU members were reported killed by Pakistani forces during fighting in North Waziristan in October 2007. Indicating a widening of the IMU’s focus, Tohir Yuldash called in January 2008 for creating a Shariah state in Pakistan.

Among other incidents:
  • In January 2008, an IJU website seemed to indicate that Abu Laith al-Libi—an al Qaeda official who had been killed by the United States in Pakistan—had been one of the leaders of the IJU.16
  • In March 2008, an IJU website claimed that one of its members—the Germanborn Cunyt Ciftci (alias Saad Abu Fourkan)—had assisted Taliban forces in Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide bombing that killed two Afghan and two U.S. troops and wounded several others.17 According to the IJU website and other sources, IJU is playing a more significant role in fighting in Afghanistan.
  • In June 2008, an IJU video claimed that one Uzbek IJU member had taken part in the 1999 attack in Kyrgyzstan, and later had fought in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance and then against U.S. and NATO forces. Another Uzbek member had been trained in Chechnya by Khattab in 1998 and also had fought against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.18
  • In July and September 2009, ISAF and the Afghan military reportedly carried out operations in the northern Konduz province against IMU terrorists who supposedly had moved into the province after being forced out of Pakistan.
  • Tohir Yuldash allegedly was killed in Pakistan by a U.S. predator missile on September 26, 2009. A Russian Tatar, Abdur Rakhman, allegedly became the new leader of the IMU. 
  • On October 11, 2009, 10 terrorists attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, resulting in 20 deaths. The government alleges that three of the attackers belonged to the IMU.
  • In late October 2009, Pakistani armed forces reportedly were attacking an IMU base in the town of Kaniguram in South Waziristan.
  • In February 2010, Pakistani media reported that a U.S. predator missile killed several terrorists in North Waziristan, including four Uzbek citizens. The terrorists were said to be linked to Al Qaeda.
  • In February 2010, alleged IMU terrorists attacked a police station in Bannu, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, killing 15 police and civilians.

Some officials in Central Asia have warned that the crackdown on the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan may be forcing some of the terrorists to return to Central Asia. Other officials have stated that a large-scale influx has not yet occurred.

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere

Officials in Germany arrested four individuals on September 5, 2007, on charges of planning explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic offices, and other targets in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received their orders from Gofir Salimov (not apprehended), who is wanted in Uzbekistan in connection with the 2004 bombings. The suspects were part of a larger IJU branch in Germany. In U.S. congressional testimony on September 10, 2007, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, John Redd, and the then-Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated that U.S. communications intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot. In July 2009, German media reported that the suspects had confessed that they were trained at an IJU terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. The leader of the IJU was identified as Najmiddin Jalolov (mentioned above), a.k.a. “commander Ahmad.” In testimony in September 2009, two of the defendants admitted that while in Afghanistan in 2006, they had launched attacks against two U.S. military camps.19

Among other incidents:
  • In May 2008, French, German, and Dutch authorities reported that they had detained 10 individuals for suspicion of running a network to funnel money to the IMU in Uzbekistan.
  • In late September 2008, German authorities reported the arrest of two suspected members of IJU and issued wanted posters for two other suspected members. The four allegedly had received terrorist training in Pakistani IJU camps. German authorities also arrested two people allegedly attempting to leave the country to undergo terrorism training in Pakistan by the IJU (they later were released on the grounds of inconclusive evidence).20
  • A video released by the IJU in late October 2008 stated that as long as Germany supports NATO operations in Afghanistan, and uses a base in Uzbekistan to support these operations, it is subject to IJU attacks.
  • A video was released by the IJU in January 2009 that threatened German “occupation” troops in Afghanistan.
  • Turkish authorities arrested over three dozen alleged IJU members in April 2009.
  • German media reported in June 2009 that a video released by the IJU provided more evidence that the terrorist organization was linked to al Qaeda.21

Border Tensions

Borders among the five Central Asian states for the most part were delineated by 1936, based partly on where linguistic and ethnic groups had settled, but mainly on the exigencies of Soviet control over the region. The resulting borders are ill-defined in mountainous areas and extremely convoluted in the fertile Fergana Valley, parts of which belong to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Over a dozen tiny enclaves add to the complicated situation, as does Soviet-era decisions to build roads and railways with scant regard to intra-regional borders. Some in Central Asia have demanded that borders be redrawn to incorporate areas inhabited by co-ethnics, or otherwise dispute the location of borders.

Caspian Sea borders have not been fully agreed upon, mainly because of Iranian intransigence, but Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also have not resolved their mutual claims to undersea oil and gas resources. In August 2009, Turkmenistan called for the issue of the disputed offshore resources to be adjudicated, presumably by the International Court of Justice. In November 2009, Senior Advisor to the US State Department in Eurasian Energy Affairs, Daniel Stein, reportedly offered U.S. good offices to mediate the dispute, but stated that even if such a settlement is not soon reached, the United States believed that trans-Caspian pipelines still could be built. Iran’s foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki reportedly denounced the U.S. offer, asserting that the littoral states will be the sole arbiters of the borders.22 Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on delineation and shared exploitation of seabed oil resources.

China has largely settled border delineation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reportedly involving “splitting the difference” on many of the disputed territories, which are usually in unpopulated areas. Popular passions were aroused in Kyrgyzstan after a 1999 China-Kyrgyzstan border agreement ceded about 9,000 hectares of mountainous Kyrgyz terrain. Kyrgyz legislators in 2001 opened a hearing and even threatened to try to impeach then-President Akayev. He arrested the leader of the impeachment effort, leading to violent demonstrations in 2002 calling for his ouster and the reversal of the “traitorous” border agreement. Dissident legislators appealed the border agreement to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2003 that it was legal. In June 2006, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev visited China and assuaged Chinese concerns by signing a joint declaration with Chairman Hu Jintao which re-affirmed that “the parties will abide strictly by all the agreements and documents signed between the two countries on the border issue.” In July 2009, the Kyrgyz Border Service reportedly rebutted claims by some Kyrgyz legislators and others that some territory was being ceded to China and confirmed that all border demarcation issues with China had been resolved.23

The problem of delineating their 4,200 mile border has been an important source of concern to Russia and Kazakhstan. During most of the 1990s, neither Russia nor Kazakhstan wished to push border delineation, Russia because of concerns that it would be conceding that Kazakhstan’s heavily ethnic Russian northern regions are part of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan because of concerns that delineation might inflame separatism. In 1998, Russia established border patrols along its border with Kazakhstan for security reasons, and determined to delineate the border. By late 2004, most of the Russian-Kazakh border had in principle been delimited, but the sides are still involved in the placement of border signs and border posts.24 To head off separatist proclivities in the north, Kazakhstan reorganized administrative borders in northern regions to dilute the influence of ethnic Russians, established a strongly centralized government to limit local rule, and moved its capital northward. These and other moves apparently contributed to political resignation among many ethnic Russians, and many emigrated to Russia.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have agreed on the delimitation of about one-half of their 579 mile shared border and pledged in September 2007 to peacefully settle contentious disputes involving borders in the Fergana Valley. These disputes have resulted in some deaths and injuries. Tensions have increased because of demographic shifts along the border. Some Kyrgyz allege that Tajiks have moved into lands in Kyrgyzstan that have been vacated by Kyrgyz, who have moved to cities or become migrant workers. Conversely, some Tajiks allege that Kyrgyz have moved into their lands.25 In January 2010, Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi stated that the delineation of borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was “very complicated since quite often the borderline crosses towns, cities, streets and even separate houses,” but that Russia recently had provided archival information that might facilitate the settlement of border disputes.26

Uzbekistan has had contentious border talks with all the other Central Asian states. According to Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, about 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s 680-mile border with Uzbekistan remains to be demarcated.27 Legislators and others in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 vehemently protested a border delineation agreement with Uzbekistan reached by the two prime ministers that ceded a swath of the Kyrgyz Batken region, ostensibly to improve Uzbek access to its Sokh enclave in Kyrgyzstan. Faced with this protest, the Kyrgyz government sent a demarche to Uzbekistan repudiating any intention to cede territory. Similarly, in late 2004 Kyrgyz legislators demanded that Uzbekistan’s Shohimardon enclave in Kyrgyzstan (ceded in the 1930s) be returned.28 These and other contentious issues resulted in the cessation of border talks between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for five years until they resumed in December 2009.

Uzbekistan’s unilateral efforts to delineate and fortify its borders with Kazakhstan in the late 1990s led to tensions. In September 2002, however, the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents announced that delineation of their 1,400 mile border was complete, and some people in previously disputed border villages began to relocate if they felt that the new borders cut them off from their “homeland.” However, many people continued to ignore the new border or were uncertain of its location, leading to several shootings of Kazakh citizens by Uzbek border troops. In one case, transit between the villages of Arnasay and Kostakyr in South Kazakhstan and the rest of Kazakhstan was cut off when an area of the sole roadway from the towns was ceded to Uzbekistan. Residents complained that Uzbek border guards were constantly arresting them for violating the border, while Kazakh officials called for the residents to relocate.29

The Uzbek and Tajik presidents signed an accord in October 2002 delimiting most of their 720-mile joint border. Contention has continued over about 15-20% of the border. In October 2006, the head of the Tajik border guard service complained that demarcation was being hindered by Uzbekistan’s peremptory placement of border markers, barbed wire and fences.30 Some Tajiks have raised concerns that Uzbekistan wants to redraw borders in order to take possession of the Farhod reservoir on the Syr Darya River.31

Besides border claims, other problems revolve around whether borders are open or closed. Open borders within the Central Asian states after the breakup of the Soviet Union were widely viewed as fostering trafficking in drugs and contraband and free migration, so border controls increasingly have been tightened in all the states.

Uzbekistan mined areas of its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999, intending to protect it against terrorist incursions, but in fact leading to many civilian Kyrgyz and Tajik casualties. Kyrgyzstan has demanded that Uzbekistan clear mines it has sown along the borders, including some allegedly sown on Kyrgyz territory, but Uzbekistan has asserted that it will maintain the minefields to combat terrorism. (Kyrgyzstan too has raised tensions by sowing mines and blowing up mountain passes along its borders with Tajikistan.) Border tensions between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also flared in late 2002, after Turkmenistan accused Uzbek officials of complicity in the coup attempt. Uzbekistan’s economic problems led it in mid-2002 to impose heavy duties on imports and at the beginning of 2003 to close its borders to “suitcase trading” (small-scale, unregulated trading), heightening tensions with bordering states.

Sharp disagreements remain between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on mine clearing, Uzbek restrictions on Tajik transportation, clashes between Uzbek and Tajik border guards, and the Uzbek visa regime with Tajikistan. In July 2009, Tajikistan began building a short railway spur to link the capital more directly with the Qurghonteppa region to the south, to circumvent a longer route through Uzbekistan that involved complicated customs requirements.32

After terrorists carried out several attacks in Uzbekistan in May 2009, Uzbekistan alleged that they had entered the country from Kyrgyzstan, and built more concrete walls, trenches, and ditches along the border. The Kyrgyz Border Service stated in June 2009 that Uzbekistan was violating bilateral accords that stipulated that such border fortifications should not be built “until the delineation and demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan state borders is completed.” Uzbek officials reportedly alleged that they were forced to make unilateral decisions about the location of borders while emplacing fortifications because Kyrgyzstan had refused to meet to demarcate borders. One trench reportedly was moved to accommodate Kyrgyz concerns.33

Iran’s intransigence in settling on Caspian Sea borders has contributed to the build-up of naval forces and the failure to build trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines. In August 2002, Russia conducted the largest naval maneuvers in its history in the northern Caspian. Kazakhstan announced its intent to form a navy in early 2003, leading to protests from the Russian Foreign Ministry, but Kazakh military officials emphasized their determination to proceed with plans to protect their offshore oil fields and maritime borders. There reportedly were about 3,000 naval personnel in late 2008. Turkmenistan’s dispute with Azerbaijan over sea borders and the ownership of offshore oilfields also has stymied the development of trans-Caspian pipelines.

Crime and Corruption

Organized crime networks have expanded in all the Central Asian states, and have established ties with crime groups worldwide that are involved in drug, arms, and human trafficking. All the states serve as origin, transit, or destination states for human trafficking. Crime groups collude with local border and other officials to transport people to the Middle East or other destinations for forced labor or prostitution.34

Corruption is a serious threat to democratization and economic growth in all the states. The increasing amount of foreign currency entering the states as the result of foreign oil and natural gas investments, the low pay of most government bureaucrats, and inadequate laws and norms are conducive to the growth of corruption. Perhaps most significantly, the weakness of the rule of law permits the Soviet-era political patronage and spoils system to continue.

According to the World Bank:
  • in Kazakhstan, corruption showed relatively little change over the period from 1996-2008. The country was at the 16th percentile in 2008 (that is, 178 of 212 countries had better records in combating corruption);
  • in Kyrgyzstan, corruption increased over the time period 1996-2007, but declined slightly in 2008. The country was at the 13th percentile in 2008;
  •  in Tajikistan, corruption declined slightly over the time period 1996-2007, but increased in 2008. The country was at the 14th percentile in 2008;
  • in Turkmenistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period 1996-2008. The country was at the 5th percentile in 2008;
  • in Uzbekistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period 1996-2008. The country was at the 11th percentile in 2008.35

Corrupt officials in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have been able to siphon off massive revenues from oil and gas exports, according to some observers. The Turkmen president controls a “presidential fund,” that receives 50% of gas revenues and is ostensibly used for economic development, though budgetary transparency is lacking on how the fund is used.36 Perhaps the most sensational allegations of corruption have involved signing bonuses and other payments in the 1990s by U.S. energy companies operating in Kazakhstan (or by their proxies) that allegedly were funneled into Swiss bank accounts linked to Kazakh officials, allegedly including Nazarbayev. U.S. officials concurred with a Swiss decision to freeze the funds and open investigations in 1999-2000. The New York Times reported that Nazarbayev unsuccessfully raised the issue of unfreezing some of these accounts during his visit with then-President Bush in December 2001.37 Kazakhstan set up a National Fund in 2001 under the National Bank for receipt of oil revenues that reportedly operates under strict international accounting standards.



Source: This article is an edited portion of the March 11, 2010 Congressional Research Service report, "Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests", prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs. A full copy of the report may be found at here at the Open CRS website.

1 Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
2 Asad Alam, Mamta Murthi, Ruslan Yemtsov, Edmundo Murrugarra, Nora Dudwick, Ellen Hamilton, and Erwin Tiongson, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank, 2005.
3 Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, State-Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006. pp. 131-151.
4 Most Central Asian Muslims traditionally have belonged to the Sunni branch and the Hanafi school of interpretation. Islamic Sufiism has been significant, as have pre-Islamic customs such as ancestor veneration and visits to shrines.
5 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale: Yale University Press, 2002; T. Jeremy Gunn, Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 389-410; Pinar Akcali, Central Asian Survey, June 1998, pp. 267-284; Aziz Niyazi, Religion, State & Society, March 1998, pp. 39-50.
6 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Implications for the EU, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2006.
7 U.S. Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2006, September 15, 2006. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 2, 2005; Annual Report, May 3, 2006; Annual Report, May 1, 2007; Annual Report, May 1, 2008; Annual Report, May 1, 2009. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in its 2005 report.
8 Cheryl Bernard has argued that HT writings borrow heavily from Marxism-Leninism and rely much less on Islamic principles. HT publications have stated that the movement “has adopted the amount [of Islam] which it needs as a political party,” that the Islamic world is the last hope for establishing communism, and that terrorist acts against Western interests are appropriate. Hizb ut Tahrir—Bolsheviks in the Mosque, RAND Corporation, nd.
9 HT literature has demanded the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and the closure of the coalition’s Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, March 13, 2003, Doc. No. CEP -104; CEDR, January 7, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-91.
10 Also, Russia’s military operations in its breakaway Chechnya region after 1999 may have helped disrupt Al Qaeda plans for Central Asia. The terrorist group was operating terrorist training camps in Chechnya in the late 1990s that it planned to use in part as launching pads for establishing new cells and camps throughout Central Asia. Defense Intelligence [Agency] Report Details al Qaeda’s Plans for Russia, Chechnya & WMD, Judicial Watch, Press Office, November 16, 2004. The declassified Intelligence Information Report is dated October 1998.
11 CEDR, March 6, 2003, Doc. No. 217. In testimony in October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones stated that “there is a resurgence of the ability of the IMU to operate” in Central Asia and that it “represents a serious threat to the region and therefore to our interests.” U.S. Congress. House International Relations Committee. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, October 29, 2003.
12 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005. According to Uzbek reporter Aleksey
Volosevich, the group “was headed by Najmiddin Jalolov, born in Andijon in 1972, and his deputy, Mansur Sohayil, whose nickname is Abu Huzaifa. Both of them are ethnic Uzbeks. They fell out with Tohir Yuldash unhappy with the absence of active combat actions on the territory of Uzbekistan.... Jalolov managed to get the backing of Al Qaeda regional leaders, after promising them to set up something like a Central Asian structural body of the organization.” CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261.
13 CEDR, February 16, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-237; June 23, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-178; and May 14, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-443.
14 Osama bin Laden in mid-1991 began dispatching mujahidin to assist in overthrowing the then-communist regime in Tajikistan. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report, July 23, 2004, pp. 58, 64.
15 BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.
16 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism, Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2008; U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Testimony of Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: The Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2008.
17 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda; UPI, March 17, 2008.
18 CEDR, August 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-318001.
19 Guido Steinberg has argued that several dozen recruits of various ethnic groups have travelled from Germany to Pakistan for training in IMU and IJU camps. Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report, August 10, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-72003.
20 Simon Sturdee, “German Commandos Arrest Two Terror Suspects on Aircraft,” Agence France Presse, September 26, 2008; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Pulls Two Suspected Terrorism Trainees from Plane,” Washington Post, September 27, 2008, p. A14.
21 Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), June 5, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-85023.
22 Open Source Center. Iran: Daily Report, November 25, 2009, Doc. No. IAP-434001.
23 CEDR, February 28, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-284; March 9, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-27; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950306; ITAR-TASS, July 14, 2009.
24 ITAR-TASS, August 7, 2008.
25 CEDR, September 18, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950239; December 24, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950130; August 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950103; “Kyrgyzstan: Ambiguous Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Increases Risk Of Conflict,” Eurasia Insight, February 2, 2009.
26 CEDR, January 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP950107; ITAR-TASS, January 18, 2010.
27 CEDR, February 17, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088; September 8, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950162; December 13, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950238; January 12, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950025; May 14, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950537; January 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950013; December 29, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.
28 CEDR, November 6, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-130.
29 CEDR, January 15, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950078.
30 CEDR, October 20, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950282. In the case of contention between the residents of the Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan and the bordering Soghd region in northern Tajikistan, the U.N. Development Program has implemented initiatives to create mutual trust and the sharing of trans-border resources such as water. CEDR, March 20, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950134; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950045.
31 Victoria Naumova, “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan to Hold Next Border Delineation Negotiations in Late April,” Asia-Plus, April 18, 2009; CEDR, April 9, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950027; July 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.
32 CEDR, January 24, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088.
33 CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261; September 4, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950154.
34 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 12, 2007. In the 2006 and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan was placed in “tier three,” among those countries that do not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and are not making significant efforts to do so. Tier three countries may be subject to U.S. aid restrictions.
35 The World Bank. Governance Matters 2009: Country Data Reports, online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp. See also Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, online at http://www.transparency.org/.
36 The non-governmental organization Global Witness alleged in 2006 that the late Turkmen President Niyazov personally controlled a vast portion of this gas wealth. The NGO raised concerns that organized crime groups were involved in these exports and urged the European Union to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan. Global Witness. It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006.
37 New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A16; Interfax-Kazakhstan, February 5, 2003; Washington Post, June 10, 2002, p. A12; Financial Times (London), April 16, 2002, p. 12; Agence France Presse, September 24, 2001; PR Newswire, January 10, 2001; Washington Post, September 25, 2000, p. A1; Peter Maass, “The Fuel Fixers,” The New York Times, December 23, 2007; “Prosecutors Drop Some Charges Against Oil Dealer Giffen,” Platts Commodity News, December 10, 2008..
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