Three Indicted In $100 Mln Ukraine-Based "Scareware" Cyber Fraud Scam

An international cybercrime scheme caused Internet users in more than 60 countries to purchase more than one million bogus software products, causing victims to lose more than $100 million, according to a federal indictment returned against a Cincinnati area man and two other men believed to be living abroad.

The charges allege that the defendants, through fake advertisements placed on various legitimate companies’ websites, deceived Internet users into falsely believing that their computers were infected with “malware” or had other critical errors to induce them to purchase “scareware” software products that had limited or no ability to remedy the purported, but nonexistent, defects. The alleged scheme is widely regarded as one of the fastest-growing and most prevalent types of Internet fraud.

Two defendants, Bjorn Daniel Sundin, and Shaileshkumar P. Jain, with others owned and operated Innovative Marketing, Inc. (IM), a company registered in Belize that purported to sell anti-virus and computer performance/repair software through the internet and that operated a subsidiary called Innovative Marketing Ukraine, located in Kiev. The company appeared to close down last year after the U.S. Federal Trade Commission filed a federal lawsuit in Maryland seeking to end the allegedly fraudulent practices.

Jain, 40, who performed the functions of IM’s chief executive officer, is a U.S. citizen and is believed to be living in Ukraine. Sundin, 31, who performed the duties of IM’s chief technology officer and chief operating officer, is a Swedish citizen and is believed to be in Sweden.

The third defendant, James Reno, 26, of Amelia, Ohio, with others owned and operated the former Byte Hosting Internet Services, which operated call centers that provided technical and billing support to victim consumers on behalf of IM. Reno is expected to present himself for arraignment at a later date in U.S. District Court in Chicago.

Sundin and Jain were each charged with 24 counts of wire fraud, and Reno with 12 counts of wire fraud, and all three were charged with one count each of conspiracy to commit computer fraud and computer fraud in a 26-count indictment returned yesterday by a federal grand jury in Chicago. The indictment also seeks forfeiture of approximately $100 million and any and all funds held in a bank account in Kiev.

The charges were announced by Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and Robert D. Grant, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which conducted the global investigation. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section assisted in the investigation.

“These defendants allegedly preyed on innocent computer users, exploiting their fraudulently induced fears for personal gain. We will continue our efforts to identify and aggressively investigate similar schemes with the assistance of our law enforcement partners both at home and internationally,” Mr. Grant said.

According to the indictment, after causing a series of false error messages, Sudin, Jain and others caused Internet users worldwide, including throughout the United States, Sweden and Ukraine, to purchase software products bearing such names as “DriveCleaner” and “ErrorSafe,” ranging in price from approximately $30 to $70, which they falsely represented would rid the victims’ computers of purported defects, but actually did little or nothing to improve or repair computer performance, resulting in financial losses exceeding $100 million.

Sundin, Jain and others allegedly created at least seven fictitious advertising agencies that contacted multiple victim companies purporting to act as advertising brokers on behalf of known legitimate entities that wanted to place Internet ads on the unnamed victim companies’ websites, when in fact the ads were unauthorized. The victim companies allegedly were defrauded of at least $85,000 in unpaid fees promised by the fictitious ad agencies.

Unknown to the victim companies, the Internet ads that were placed on their websites by these fictitious agencies contained hidden computer code that “hijacked” the Internet browsers of individual victims, redirecting their computers without their consent to websites controlled by Sudin, Jain and others, the indictment alleges. The individual victims were then prompted with a series of error messages claiming that the user’s computer was experiencing a critical error and the victim needed to purchase an IM-distributed software product to remedy the problem.

Reno allegedly aided and abetted Sudin, Jain and others in creating and operating the fictitious ad agencies by providing support as a technical adviser for the computer servers and networks used to facilitate their operation. The fictitious ad agencies included “BurnAds,” “UniqAds,” “Infyte,” “NetMediaGroup,” and “ForceUp,” according to the indictment.

After the defendants caused a victim to be directed to an IM scareware website they controlled, the indictment alleges that the following events typically occurred:
  • the IM scareware site appeared not to be a website at all, but rather a warning message from the computer user’s operating system, falsely informing the user of an error and prompting the user to click on a box to address the purported error. Further error message prompts occurred regardless of whether the user clicked the box agreeing to or declining to proceed or attempted to close the error message window;
  • the IM scareware displayed an animated graphic image that gave the fake appearance that the computer was being scanned for various errors or viruses. Bogus results falsely showed that critical errors were detected by the fake scan; and
  • the IM scareware website then prompted the victim user to download a free trial version of an IM product, falsely promising that the software could repair the nonexistent critical errors.

As a result of the browser hijacking, multiple fraudulent scans, and false error messages the defendants and others allegedly deceived victims into purchasing the full paid versions of IM software products, such as “Malware Alarm,” “Antivirus 2008,” and “VirusRemover 2008.” At times, the defendants defrauded victims into purchasing multiple products through a deceptive order screen that kept hidden certain pre-checked option boxes which, when checked, increased the total number of products being purchased, the indictment alleges.

The proceeds of these sales, typically by credit card, were allegedly deposited into bank accounts controlled by the defendants and others throughout the world, and then were transferred to additional bank accounts located in Europe.

The defendants and others allegedly used Byte Hosting to deflect complaints from victims who purchased IM software products. Knowing the products to be fraudulent and distributed and sold under false pretenses, Reno and others caused call center representatives to be instructed to lie to customers about the products and persuade them to remove legitimate pre-existing anti-virus software, the indictment alleges.

To persuade the Byte Hosting call center representatives to continue their employment, Reno and others falsely informed them that they were not involved in a fraud scheme because United States law did not apply to IM and its business practices because IM was based overseas. The call center employees were authorized to provide refunds to discourage victims from notifying their credit card companies or law enforcement that they were deceived into purchasing the fraudulent software products, according to the indictment.
Friday, May 28, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Moscow Wants To Replace Saakashvili And Lukashenka

By Paul Goble

That Moscow would like to see Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili replaced isn’t news to anyone but that it would like to have someone else in the place of his Belarusian counterpart Alyaksandr Lukashenka may come as a surprise, although Russian analysts say it is far from clear who that might be or how Moscow could arrange it.

Last week, “Newsweek” reported that having claimed “two political scalps” in the last few months with the replacement of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev with more malleable leaders, Moscow was now looking to replace others in the former Soviet space with which it is unhappy.

Not surprisingly, the weekly suggested that Saakashvili was “target number one,” but more interestingly, it indicated that Lukashenka ranked just behind him in the Kremlin’s wish list. Now this week, in “Novaya politika,” Lidiya Adrusenko considers what may happen in Georgia and Belarus and concludes that Moscow faces enormous obstacles in both.

Some of the Moscow officials and analysts with whom “Newsweek” spoke suggested that a move against Saakashvili might begin as early as May 30th when elections are held for the mayor of Tbilisi and for the leaders of other local government bodies across Georgia (www.novopol.ru/-vremya-novyih-liderov-esche-ne-prishlo-text85198.html).

The possibility of using elections in Georgia as the occasion for a kind of “reverse orange-style revolution” was first put forward, Adrusenko points out, not by Duma deputy Sergey Markov as “Newsweek” reported but rather by Zurab Nogaideli, the former Georgian premier who “more often than his other colleagues visits Moscow.”

Nogaideli suggested that “if Saakashvili tries to falsify the vote, then an uprising will begin in Tbilisi similar to ‘the Bishkek revolution.’” But later, the Moscow commentator notes, Nogaideli reversed himself, saying that there would not be a Kyrgyz variant in Georgia, and that “scenarios” of this type were being dreamed up by Saakashvili but not in Moscow.

“Serious analysts,” Andrusenko continues, conclude that “the upcoming elections may turn out to be a complete defeat of the opposition figures, because they cannot unite and are competing among themselves.” Moreover, polls show that 51 percent of Georgians “positively assess” Saakashvili, while “12 percent support the opposition.”

Saakashvili’s ruling party should win without difficulty, these analysts say, “not because the population of Georgia is satisfied with him but because it is disappointed in other political forces” and is not prepared, as the failed counter-demonstration of May 6 showed, ready to follow its lead.

Thus, Andrusenko sums up for Georgia, “Saakashvili’s time has still not come to an end, and Moscow must carry out a lengthy search for an alternative leader on whom it might rely.” But Russia does have one advantage now: It won’t be acting alone because both the EU and the US are increasingly cool toward someone they had earlier enthusiastically backed.

The situation for Moscow in Belarus is more complicated for three reasons: First, although Russian leaders are “terribly tired” of Lukashenka, he is “formally” Russia’s ally, so moving against him is hard. Second, Lukashenka exercises much greater control in his country that Saakashvili does in his.

And third, the opposition in Belarus is far weaker than is its counterpart in Georgia. Those factors combine to mean that Moscow has had far fewer contacts with the Belarusian opposition than it has had with the Georgian one and that the Russian leadership thus has fewer choices about how to proceed to have any chance of success.

Later this year or the beginning of next, Belarus is scheduled to have presidential elections, an event that Moscow might seek to make use of. Lukashenka has indicated that he is ready to serve a fourth term, and all indications are that despite his international isolation he almost certainly could guarantee his “re-election.”

Despite that, Andrusenko continues, Russian officials are beginning to say “and quite openly at that” that they would like to be able “to deal in Belarus with another leader.” For them, the analyst says, the question isn’t so much about whether he would be “pro-Russian” or “pro-European” but rather more pragmatic and predictable.

Alyaksandr Milinkevich, the leader of the pro-Western united Belarusian opposition, is unlikely to get Moscow’s backing, but other leaders who have been discussed include Andrey Sannikov, the former foreign minister, who Andrusenko suggests views the relations Ukraine is now establishing with Moscow as “an example” for Belarus.

But some commentators in Moscow suggest that mentions of Sannikov are “only for cover,” while Moscow finds someone else. And they suggest that the Russiana powers that be might push current head of the Belarusian cabinet Sergey Sidorsky, even though he has expressed no interest in the race.

Consequently and despite Moscow’s desires, Andrusenko concludes, “the epoch of Lukashenka” in Belarus is not likely to come to an end as a result of the elections because the current Belarusian leader has created a political system in which “no one except for himself has a chance to become president” – at least by electoral means.


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Thursday, May 27, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Haggling Over The Former Moldavian SSR Dispute

By Michael Averko
 
Vladimir Socor's May 19 Eurasia Daily Monitor article "Soviet Chekists, Slavic Fist and the Medvedev-Yanukovych Declaration on Transnistria" includes this excerpt:
  
"Originally, Moscow had called for political settlement to be synchronized with Russian troop withdrawal; but it then increased its demands step by step. Instead of withdrawing the troops, Russia wants them to stay on, re-designated from peacekeepers to peace-guarantors, if and when a political settlement is achieved. Moscow would accept a cosmetic internationalization of the troop contingent in return for OSCE legitimization of it. And it would insist (with Ukraine in tow) on 'participating in it actively' so as to minimize international participation in such a contingent."
 
Not mentioned is that in 2003, the Moldovan government suddenly backed out of a Russian brokered agreement, which included the eventual withdrawal of Russian forces from Pridnestrovie (Transnistria). The Moldovan government's sudden rejection coincided with the stated opposition of the agreement from some leading Western governments and Moldova's political opposition.
 
If I am not mistaken, Socor opposed that agreement, which would have had Pridnestrovie as an agreed part of a federalized Moldova. Critics of the rejected agreement suspiciously note how it permitted Russian troops to remain in Pridnestrovie for an extended period. On the other hand, in Pridnestrovie, the Russian troop presence is more favorably viewed as a safeguard. (Somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 Russian troops are said to be stationed in Pridnestrovie. This figure is thousands less than the foreign military presence in Kosovo.) 
 
Since 2003, there are several noteworthy occurrences which have some relevance to the matters relating to the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and the other disputed former Communist bloc territories.
 
- In 2006, Pridnestrovie held a referendum in support of that territory's continued separation from Moldova. (The over 95% in favor tally is on par with the result of Pridnestrovie's referendum in 1991. Such results are evident elsewhere. They include the 2006 referendum in South Ossetia, as well as the referendums in 1967 and 2002 regarding Gibraltar's status. Is it possible for the Pridnestrovie referendum results to each be off by more than 45%?)
 
- Following Pridnestrovie's 2006 referendum, Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have received some international recognition of their stated independence. 
 
- When compared to his predecessor Victor Yushchenko, Ukraine's newly elected President Viktor Yanukovych appears more willing to sympathize with Pridnestrovie's concerns.
 
Much of the English language mass media coverage of the former Moldavian SSR continues to not address a number of pertinent facts and fact based opinions.
 
In relation to history and human rights, Pridnestrovie can reasonably claim that it has a better independence claim than the other disputed former Communist bloc territories. Realpolitik (the views of the major powers) have shortchanged Pridnestrovie's independence desire. It is not in Russia's interests to upset the Moldovan government to drastically undertake policies more distant from Russia. At the same time, some influential elements in the West are apprehensive about recognizing the independence of a Russocentric leaning disputed territory. 
 
Moldova remains unable to govern over Pridnestrovie. Pridnestrovie's government appears to better represent Pridnestrovie than Moldova's government. Moldova desires Pridnestrovie and not the opposite. Pridnestrovie is not like North Korea to the point of being able to successfully intimidate a popular movement in support of the disputed territory becoming a part of Moldova.
 
The recent meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents restated support for the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic existing as one nation. One idea for settling the former Moldavian SSR dispute takes into consideration such examples as how New York is not a part of New Jersey and vice versa, while both are in the same nation.  
 
As is true with some other issues, there has been mud slinging on the subject of the former Moldavian SSR. This manner can draw attention away from key variables.  
 
In varying degrees, there are negative Soviet era attributes throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. Supporting the ability to defend against certain types of foreign infiltration is not necessarily akin to being soft on abuses related to the Soviet period. References to Soviet like thinking can get selective. The boundaries of the Stalin created Moldavian SSR in 1940, were formalized years after the Soviet Union's founding, with that land mass having never previously existed as an independent state. (During the period between the end of World War I and 1940, Moldova and Pridnestrovie were part of different nations. The two lands had different historical experiences beforehand as well.)
 
UPDATE: There is a claim making the rounds about a secret agreement between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. The Ukrainian government denies the claim that Ukraine has plans of taking over Pridnestrovie with Russian approval. This particular claim adds that such an occurrence would pressure Moldova into having a closer relationship with Russia.

Logistically, putting Pridnestrovie in Ukraine is not so problematical. There are some other things to consider.

Despite wanting to be on better terms with Russia, Ukraine also wants good relations with the West. This hypothetical move would put both countries on rough terms with the West. Regarding Russia, just how easy would it be for Russia to then move on Moldova as claimed? Moldova would not be in a particularly good mood to come closer to Russia under such a scenario. Moreover, Russia unfriendly folks in the West would gladly tap dance on such an occurrence.

Pridnestrovie's 2006 referendum result supports independence and an eventual reunification with Russia.

 
Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. This article first appears in the American Chronicle on May 26.
Thursday, May 27, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Ukraine Unwilling To Reduce Cooperation With NATO

Ukraine has no intention of reducing cooperation with NATO, the country's deputy foreign minister said on Wednesday.

"We are interested in the maintenance of political dialogue with NATO," Kostantyn Yeliseyev told a joint Ukraine-NATO working group on the country's defense program and national security in Kiev.

"Ukraine will continue to fulfill obligations in its relations with NATO... We intend to continue wholesale inner reforms and appreciate NATO's help in this direction," he added.

Yeliseyev said bilateral ties would continue to develop along the principles outlined in the Charter on Ukrainian-NATO partnership.

NATO's assistant secretary general for defense policy and planning said in an interview with a Ukrainian newspaper that the experience of the alliance's partnership with Kiev was "unprecedented," as the country maintains close ties with NATO yet expresses an unwillingness to join it.

"NATO will continue to provide help to Ukraine," Jiri Sedivy said, adding that NATO respects Ukraine's policy.

New Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has indicated that Ukraine will drop his predecessor's plans to attempt to seek NATO membership, a proposal that infuriated Russia, but has also indicated that he will try to maintain good ties with both Moscow and the West.

Source: RIA Novosti
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Medvedev And Yanukovich Planning ‘Secret Protocol’ On Transdniestria?

By Paul Goble

Although aides to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich are denying it, many commentators and politicians in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania are convinced that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have secretly agreed to a course of action that would have Transdniestria attached to Ukraine and Moldova brought under tight Russian control.

When they met last week, Medvedev and Yanukovich issued a joint declaration about the resolution of the Transdniestria dispute. It contained only general expressions of good will, but a week ago, an official in the Ukrainian president’s protocol service leaked information about the talks of the two presidents that suggested they had agreed on rather more.

Indeed, what some have compared to “the secret protocols” of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the supposed accord calls for a referendum in Transdniestria by the end of the year on its becoming an autonomous republic within Ukraine and pressure on Chisinau to elect a president and form a government more to Moscow’s liking.

In the current issue of “Versiya,” Georgy Filin discusses this case, not only detailing the statements of the various sides but also suggesting some of the consequences for Moldova, Ukraine, and their neighbors if reports about a secret agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich are even partially true (versia.ru/articles/2010/may/24/pridnestrovje).

The leak of information about the supposed accord, Filin says, were “well paid for by functionaries of the Block of Yulia Timoshenko,” and the associates of this anti-Yanukovich party immediately handed copies of the document to Oleh Bilorus, a member of that party who heads the Foreign Relations Committee of the Verkhovna Rada.

Immediately copies were handed over to Chisinau officials where, in Filin’s words, they had “the effect of a bomb going off.” Sergey Mokan, the head of the Moldovan “People’s Action” Movement, said the Medvedev-Yanukovich accord “represents an ultimatum to Moldova and is the beginning of a new military-political expansion in the post-Soviet space.”

“Kyiv and Moscow have decided to act according to the principle of ‘divide and rule.’” Mokan’s comment was expanded upon by Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, who said what Medvedev and Yanukovich had agreed to was like “the swallowing up” businessmen talk about when they takeover companies. And neither asked the Moldovans what they “think.”

“What in fact have Russia and Ukraine prepared for Moldova and Transdniestria?” Filin asks rhetorically. The first thing that has to be said, he points out, is that “the protocols which have fallen into the hands of Ukrainian journalists were prepared by the Ukrainian side” rather than being a joint statement or agreement.

They are thus, the “Versiya” journalist says, “exclusively ‘the Ukrainian vision’ of the resolution of the Transdniestria question and at the same time of the Moldovan one.” That “vision” calls for a referendum in November or December in Transdniestria concerning that breakaway territory’s inclusion into Ukraine as an autonomous republic.

Why, Filin asks, did the accord not call for uniting Transdniestria to the Russian Federation, as many in Transdniestria have proposed? The answer to that question, he continues, is “very simple.” Uniting Transdniestria to Ukraine makes greater sense economically, and doing so will allow Russia to “begin in Moldova a program of ‘an orange counterrevolution.’”

That will allow the Russian powers that be to orchestrate the election by the Moldovan parliament of a pro-Moscow president sometime next year. “Of course,” Filin continues, “one cannot talk about any Anschluss of Moldova by Russia.” In this case, “the technology is different,” one that counts on Moldovan wine producers wanting to sell their output in Russia.

According to Ukrainian parliamentarian Bilorus, “the new leadership of Ukraine has taken a new position concerning Transdniestria, one that in essence is the copy of Russia’s position.” Two years ago, he continued, Moscow offered Kyiv the same deal: ‘You gather in Transdniestria and give us Moldova,” an exchange then-President Viktor Yushchenko rejected.

Romania’s President Traian Basescu has reacted just as harshly as the Moldovans. “If Kyiv has pretensions concerning the return of Transdniestria to Ukraine, then officials there should not forget about the return to Chisinau of Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, territories which the former Ukrainian SSR received after the Second World War.”

And Basescu suggested that “Moscow and now Kyiv are trying to create on the territory which at the end of World War II should have been returned to Romania a pseudo-federation of three political-legal pseudo-subjects. But we will do everything to oppose the Russian-Ukrainian plan for the amputation of Bessarabia.”

Although Filin does not mention it, the possibility that Moldova could become part of Romania if Transdniestria were to become an autonomy within Ukraine is not the only way in which such a Russian-Ukrainian plan would send shockwaves through the international system far beyond Transdniestria.

If Transdniestria were transferred, that would trigger a provision in the 1994 accord between Chisinau and the Gagauz, an Orthodox Christian Turkic-speaking community in southern Moldova. That agreement allows the Gagauz to withdraw from Moldova if the status of Transdniestria were ever to change.

Perhaps because of these reactions or perhaps because the supposed agreement between Medvedev and Yanukovich never took place, Yanukovich’s office has been at pains to deny that there is or was any such accord. Anna German, a representative of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration made a public declaration to that effect.

“Transdniestria will remain independent and not become part of Ukraine,” she said. Suggestions to the contrary are “provocations” by Yuliya Timoshenko in order to cast doubt on “the political and diplomatic successes of Viktor Yanukovich in order to destabilize the situation in the country.”

But Filin concludes, her words are less than fully convincing, all the more because the Verkhovna Rada has already discussed the procedure that would have to be followed for places like Transdniestria to join Ukraine. Indeed, he says, the Ukrainian deputies have come up with a slogan: ‘Transdniestria – the First Stage of a New Pereyaslavska Rada’ – neither more nor less!”


Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .  
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

World Traveler Record-Holder Stops Exploring To Become Priest

Famous Russian traveler Fyodor Konyukhov has given up exploration and world records to become an Orthodox priest, Ukraine's UNIAN reported on Saturday.

An extensive traveler, Konyukhov has reached the North Pole three times, the South Pole, the Pole of Inaccessibility, and climbed to the top of Mt. Everest. He has set world records by crossing the Atlantic Ocean in a rowboat in 46 days, as well as crossing Greenland on a dogsled in 22 hours. He has also made several round the world trips alone on yachts.

"Something probably serious happened since I made such a decision: I thought, enough of temptation, I want to pray more," Konyukhov said.

He said he had made the decision during his last trip to the Antarctic and will now undertake praying for those who travel. He did not name the reason why he made such a drastic change in his life.

"I have worked a lot for people and for people's fame as well as my own fame, and now I want to work for God and the Church," Konyukhov said.

Konyukhov, 59, had earlier sent an official letter to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, requesting to become a priest. Kirill told Konyukhov in April that he may choose which eparchy he would like to begin his priesthood.

Konyukhov decided on Zaporizhia, Ukraine, where he was born in 1951.

He made his first "expedition" when he was 15 by crossing the Sea of Azov on a rowboat. By the time he reached 50 years old, Konyukhov made more than 40 unique expeditions and climbs. He has written numerous books and painted many pictures of his travels.

Source: RIA Novosti
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russian Intelligence Services’ Return to Crimea Seen Having Far-Reaching Consequences

By Paul Goble

Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of Russia’s FSB, and Valery Khoroshkovsky, head of Ukraine’s SBU, have signed a five-year agreement that will allow Moscow again to put intelligence agents in Crimea, from which 19 such Russian officers were expelled at the end of last year for attempting to recruit Ukrainians as spies.
While the new accord reportedly allows Ukraine the right to approve or disapprove Russian officers to be sent there, something the 2000 accord Kyiv denounced in December 2009 did not, many Ukrainian analysts have expressed doubts that this provision will protect Kyiv’s interests and fears that the accord will have serious and far-reaching consequences for Ukraine.

Nadezhda Maynaya of “Glavred” interviewed two Ukrainian analysts to get their reactions to this latest development in the ongoing warming of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Their responses should set off alarm bells not only in Ukraine but also in regional and Western capitals (glavred.info/archive/2010/05/19/170153-4.html).

The behavior of Russian agents last year, Rostislav Pavlenko, the director of the School of Political Analysis of the Kyiv-Mohylev Academy, said, raises doubts as to whether any document Moscow officials sign or any statements they make can be trusted. After all, what the Russians did last year was prohibited by bilateral agreements.

“Today,” the Ukrainian analyst continued, “we observe in fact an invitation to the Russian special services to return to the territory of Ukraine,” a development that he said has at least three serious consequences. First, the presence of Russian special service officers in Ukraine has been legalized,” opening the way to more abuse.

Second, the accords create problems by setting up “a collision of legislation,” with Russian law calling for one thing and Ukrainian another. And third, Pavlenko said, “there can arise definite geopolitical and geo-strategic problems,” such as occurred in August 2008 when Ukraine took Georgia’s side following Moscow’s invasion of the Caucasus country.

Given that Ukraine has agreed to extend the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for another 25 years, there is certainly time for the appearance of a situation “when the Black Sea Fleet and the special services based within it can be used in actions that are counter to the interests of Ukraine.”

But the impact of this FSB-SBU accord is likely to be even larger, Ukrainian political scientist Yevgeny Zherebetsky argued. That is because the commanders of the Black Sea Fleet, immediately after the extension of the basing accord, began a “massive” downsizing, retiring some 7500 staffers, “of whom 6500 are civilians and citizens of Ukraine.”

In addition, the fleet plans to retire 550 officers, many of whom will like the civilians have relatively low pensions and thus be open as are the civilians for recruitment by the Russian special services for work against Ukraine as a way to supplement their relatively small benefit checks.

According to Zherebetsky, it is “very important for Russians to obtain control over Crimea” because it lacks warm water ports. But “if everything will develop so ‘well’ [for Moscow] as it is now, then the Russians will try to extend their influence to Odessa, Kherson, and Nikolayev,” in an arc extending from Transdniestria to Abkhazia.

For that purpose, he continued, “Russia needs a broad network of agents of the special services,” but its prospects for success if these agents are active are very good because “over the course of the period of independence, the Ukrainian leadership has done nothing so that Ukraine could obtain complete power over the territory of Crimea.”

Pavlenko agreed, and he added that “the official strengthening of the return of FSB agents to Ukraine are steps toward the development, legalization and creation of opportunities which are in no way connected only with the defense of the Black Sea Fleet” but rather are intended to create “a mechanism of influence on Ukraine.”

And this problem is going to arise very quickly, Zherebetsky added. One issue that seems certain to break into the open is the question of whether the Russian ships carry nuclear weapons. As a declared non-nuclear state, Ukraine cannot have military units on its territory that have such weapons, but the new accord makes it impossible for Kyiv to know whether they are there.

Moreover, even as this agreement was being signed, Russian officials were signaling that they want even more. One Russian leader suggested that the sailors in the Black Sea Fleet should have dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship (news.liga.net/news/N1014381.html), and another said Moscow wants all of Sevastopol back (news.km.ru/rossiya_mozhet_potrebovat_sevast).



Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .   
Saturday, May 22, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russia Considers Buying Back Missile Cruiser Ukraina

By Ilya Kramnik

The Russian and Ukrainian presidents have agreed that Russia will help Ukraine complete the building of the guided missile cruiser Ukraina, which has been docked unfinished at the Nikolayev (Mykolaiv) shipyard in Ukraine.

The question right now is, what fate does the future hold for this cruiser, the last commissioned unit of a class of warships known as Project 1164, and, in particular, who will the ship ultimately belong to?

The fourth Project 1164 class cruiser (the class is also referred to as Slava, by the name of its initial ship) was laid down in 1984 as Admiral Lobov. Under the project, its missiles were designed for use against high-survivability warships accompanied by auxiliary vessels with air and missile defense weapons systems.

It was to be supplied to the Russian navy in 1990, but construction slowed down in the late 1980s after the Soviet Union cut its military spending. The vessel was eventually launched in August 1990, but was in practice only 95% complete, lacking some non-essential equipment and weapons.

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the cruiser was turned over to Ukraine, which had no money for completing it, and renamed Ukraina. At first, the Russian navy could not buy it, and later, the deal was prevented by political differences between the two countries.

Neither could the warship be sold to China or India because its weapons, in particular the Bazalt/Vulkan (SS-N-12 Sandbox) missile system with a range of 1,000 km (622 miles), could not be exported as exceeding the 300-km (186-mile) international range limit on exported missiles.

When Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential election in Ukraine last year, and a change in the political climate ensued, the two countries resumed talks on the completion of the cruiser for the Russian navy. However, the problem is it cannot be completed according to the initial design because the equipment created in the 1970s and 1980s is no longer produced.

In fact, the idea is to undertake an extensive overhaul to modernize the ship and arm it with modern weapons systems. Besides, the equipment mounted on the cruiser needs to be repaired or replaced after its long stay in the dock.

Most importantly, considering Russia's serious need for large modern warships, it could actually buy the cruiser Ukraina (and possibly rename it again). A modernized cruiser armed with a modern combat command and control system, a multipurpose shipboard fire-control system and sonar equipment would be among the world's most powerful and effective warships, if supported by the new-generation corvettes and frigates that are being built for the Russian navy, against any enemy. And if the modernization of the cruiser Ukraina proves a success, it could also be used on the other Project 1164 ships - Moskva, Marshal Ustinov and Varyag.

The cruiser Ukraina has a firepower second only to the Project 1144 heavy missile cruisers, such as Pyotr Veliky, currently the only ship of this class on combat duty. Its foreign analogue is the Ticonderoga class of missile cruisers (22), which have better electronic and air defense systems, but a weaker anti-ship capability.

An upgrade of the Project 1164 cruisers, with installation of new combat command and control systems and replacement of the S-300F Fort missile systems with new-generation weapons, would ensure them superior firepower compared to their main rivals.

However, even the best warships are not fully effective without a sufficient number of escort and auxiliary vessels, a coastal infrastructure and trained personnel. And they will be even less effective in the absence of a clear short- and medium-term naval strategy.

The Russian authorities are yet to prove that they are aware of this.

(Slava class cruisers were designed as surface strike ships with an anti-aircraft and ASW capability. They carry 16 SS-N-12 Sandbox nuclear-capable supersonic anti-ship missiles, with launchers mounted in four pairs on either side of the superstructure. Russia has three Slava class cruisers in service with its Navy.)

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article was published.
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Ukraine Doesn't Plan To Hand Russia Control Of Gas Pipelines

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko on Friday said Kiev had no plans to transfer control of its gas pipeline system to Russia.

"In the framework of cooperation between the government bodies of Ukraine and Russia, the issue of using Ukraine's gas pipeline system in the maximum effective way is being discussed; no one intends to transfer it to anyone," Hryshchenko told the Ukrainian parliament.

The Ukrainian foreign minister said no "specific deal" has been reached between Russia and Ukraine at the moment.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin proposed a merger between Russian gas giant Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz on April 30. His spokesman said this meant the creation of a new company but not the absorption of Ukraine's gas monopoly.

Earlier this week, Gazprom's CEO Alexei Miller said the Russian energy giant may fund the modernization of Ukraine's gas transport system if the agreement on the merger is signed.

Ukraine's gas pipeline system, which stretches over 37,500 kilometers (23,306 miles), includes 71 booster stations and 13 underground gas storage units of 32 billion cubic meters.

The system pumps 141 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe annually. Russia's gas export, which reached 167 billion cubic meters last year, is forecast to hit 217 billion cubic meters this year.

Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, May 21, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

NATO's New Strategic Concept

By Andrei Fedyashin

NATO comes out with a new strategic concept once every ten years, like a child that outgrows its old clothes and needs new ones. The great paradox of these regular changes is that NATO's original "zone of hostility" has been shrinking geographically over the past 20 years while its zone of activity has continued to expand. In fact, all of NATO's past concepts simply provided a formal rationale for what it had been doing for a few years anyway, even if this extended beyond NATO's official competence.

But that is beside the point, really. Sometimes military alliances do have to adapt to volatile times in ways their founders could not have envisioned. However, one needs to distinguish between a single deviation from the mission and a consistent policy of expanding one's authority.

NATO is certainly the latter case. The "wise men" led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have recently released their recommendations for NATO's strategic goals for the next decade. The report will have to be considered by the 28 member governments and approved at the Lisbon summit in November. The 2010 Strategic Concept will replace the 1999 concept.

The report, titled "NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement", recommends that NATO engage dynamically with countries and organizations that are outside the Euro-Atlantic region, which it has been doing de facto for the past 20 years. There is also a proposal to incorporate NATO forces into the larger UN military structure, allowing NATO to conduct operations all over the world, possibly in partnership with other countries (Russia, China). But any potential partnership will clearly be tilted toward NATO leadership.

There has been speculation that Albright's recommendations would move NATO in that very direction ever since her team of a dozen military and civilian experts from the private and public sectors began its work last summer. The only question was to what extent NATO's transformation into a global military and political organization (in spite of its Charter) would be institutionalized. The answer, we now know, is: to a large extent.

Over the past decade, Europeans have come to view NATO as an anachronism badly in need of modernization. Yet no one seriously proposed disbanding the alliance, with the exception, perhaps, of some lefty revolutionary hotheads. NATO is so deeply entrenched in Europe's economy that uprooting it would inevitably come with social and economic consequences, such as increased unemployment. Not even Russia would make such an absurd (for the time being) demand. But there is a big difference between not actively opposing NATO and supporting its globalization.

Documents like Albright's usually do not recommend fundamental changes, as they are authored by seasoned diplomats, military experts, politicians, academics, advisors and other brains.

Ever since 1951, the alliance has always looked to its best and brightest to resolve problems that conventional diplomacy could not.

NATO has been trying to justify its existence in a world that has changed dramatically over the past 20 years. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's opponent and reason for existing, most Warsaw Pact members became NATO members. Now, without its communist counterpart, NATO is finding it difficult to come up with a political rationale for the existence of its colossal war machine. Russia certainly remained a threat to Europe during the turmoil of the 1990s, but a threat that required an international police force, at most. NATO could not accept such a downgraded status.

Therefore, Albright's group was given the difficult task of creating a new political and ideological rationale for NATO's existence. NATO's new concept must be a kind of seal of approval for the 21st century, proving that the alliance is essential for the global security framework.

That is why the document contains provisions on the expansion of NATO's political and military roles, the boundaries of its activity, its methods and means and completely new functions. Under the new concept, NATO's primary objectives would be to improve the global non-proliferation regime, cut nuclear arsenals, fight terrorism, build a missile-defense shield in Europe, and combat maritime piracy and cyber-attacks. Other objectives include ensuring energy security, preventing global warming and protecting water sources and other natural resources. These do not sound like the objectives of a military alliance.

The concept also proposes creating a NATO liaison department at the UN. In addition, NATO would assume responsibility for providing military support for the UN's civilian operations.

The concept includes an entire paragraph on Russia. It does not include much in the way of new ideas, except for a call to strengthen cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council, which has been inadequate to date. Russia is no longer seen as an enemy, but at the same time NATO does not want partnership with Russia to limit its ability to protect its members.

The only truly new idea is bad news for Ukraine and Georgia - or perhaps just Georgia, as Ukraine's new government is unlikely to seek NATO membership. One of the clauses contains a curious phrase, which could be interpreted in a variety of ways, none of which can be very good for prospective members. "In addition, NATO's diplomatic efforts with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and the other countries of the Caucasus, and other nonmember states, show that nations do not have to be part of the Alliance to join with NATO on projects that benefit all."

Officially, the concept reiterates that NATO is a voluntary alliance with an open-door policy.

It is extremely tempting to venture into that "open door" to challenge NATO's new concept. If global security is NATO's primary concern, then all the problems besetting NATO-Russia relations could be solved in an instant. All Moscow needs to do is file for membership. Our individual problems and concerns would be transformed into shared problems and concerns. Nikita Khrushchev suggested this as a joke in 1954. He nearly filed an application. Why not try again?

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti, where this article was published.
Thursday, May 20, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Medvedev: Russia Won't Use Black Sea Fleet Against Neighbors

(Civil.Ge) -- Russia is “a peaceful country” and has no intention to use its Black Sea fleet, based in Ukraine’s Sevastopol, against “adjacent states”, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said.

"Will Russia use its Black Sea fleet to attack adjacent states? No, it will not," Medvedev said while speaking at the Kiev State University on May 18.

Russia used part of its Sevastopol-based Black Sea fleet, including flagship, guided missile cruiser Moskva, during the August, 2008 war with Georgia.

In what appeared to be an allusion to U.S. warships’ regular port calls to Georgia, Medvedev said visits of “foreign ships” in Black Sea were source of concern.

“It strains us – and I know it also strains Turks – when foreign ships, which have nothing to do with our Black Sea basin, come and demonstrate something,” he said.

“You know various developments took place, including grave ones – there was Caucasian crisis in 2008 [reference to Georgia-Russia war]; so more the situation is stable in the Black Sea basin, it’s better for everyone, including for NATO,” Medvedev said and added that it was the main reason behind the prolongation of an agreement with Ukraine on Russian navy base in Sevastopol.

He also said that main guarantee that Russia would not use its Black Sea fleet against neighbors was “system of international relations, including our commitments within UN, as well as commitments under the international conventions, including under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975”.

“Will we ignore the international law? Of course we will not, because it’s not favorable for Russia. Russia is a huge country, which has multiple interests and it will affect us if we start dropping out from the international community,” Medvedev added.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

MEPs Approve €500 Million EU Loan To Ukraine

Ukraine will be eligible for an EU loan of up to €500 million to help it through the financial crisis, following a vote at the European Parliament on Tuesday.

A maximum of €500 million EU loan will be available to Ukraine for 30 months, after MEPs approved - by 604 votes to 37, with 16 abstentions - a compromise reached between the EU institutions. The loan, due to be repaid within 15 years, would help Kiev to finance its balance-of-payments deficit and meet its budgetary needs.

This money will supplement IMF support and the €110 million in EU macro-financial assistance already granted in 2002.

Parliament insisted that the lending conditions for the assistance must ensure better efficiency, transparency and accountability. Progress must be regularly assessed by the Commission, and Parliament must be briefed on how the assistance is managed.

The macro-financial assistance, MEPs believe, can only contribute to economic stabilisation if the main Ukrainian political forces ensure political stability and support rigorous implementation of the necessary structural reforms.

In November 2009, Parliament gave its backing for macro-financial support to Serbia (€200 million in the form of a loan), Bosnia and Herzegovina (€100 million, loan), Armenia (€65 million loan and €35 million grant), and Georgia (€46 million, grant).
Tuesday, May 18, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Gazprom Says May Fund Ukraine Gas Pipeline Modernization

If an agreement on the merger of Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz takes place, Gazprom may fund the modernization of Ukraine's gas transport system, Gazprom's CEO Alexei Miller said on Monday.

"If Gazprom and Naftogaz merge, Gazprom may fund the full modernization of the Ukrainian gas transport," Miller said.

He said a merger should be held in stages and would be equally profitable to both sides.

"The proposal of merging the two companies is completely in line with the global trend of mergers in the energy sector," he said.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin first put forward the idea of a Gazprom-Naftogaz merger at the end of April, after Moscow and Kiev agreed on a deal to extend Russia's lease on a key naval base in Ukraine in exchange for discounted prices for Russian gas. The Russian government's press service later said Moscow was not proposing a takeover but the creation of a new company.

Ahead of his visit to Kiev this week, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Russia and Ukraine would not discuss the potential Gazprom - Naftogaz merger, but the consolidation of some assets is possible.

Source: RIA Novosti
Monday, May 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Georgia In Proposals For NATO’s Strategic Concept

(Civil.Ge) -- NATO enlargement for states, which have expressed desire to join the alliance, “should move forward as each state fulfils the requirements for membership,” says a report by a group of experts, which lays out proposals for NATO’s strategic concept for next decade.

Recommendations were developed by a group of 12 top experts, led by former U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who presented the report to NATO officials in Brussels on May 17.

The part of the report under subtitle “Partnership with Georgia and Ukraine” says that “one of the major failures of NATO’s partnership structure” was the August, 2008 between Russia and Georgia.

It says that NATO’s channels of communication with these two countries through NATO-Georgia Commission and NATO-Ukraine Commission “are excellent.”

“The Allies should make regular use of the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia commissions to discuss mutual security concerns and to foster practical cooperation, including on defence reforms. The clearer NATO articulates its position to the partners and the more accurately it can assess their perceptions, the more adept the Allies will be at defusing crises and building trust,” the report reads.

“The Allies should also employ NATO’s crisis management mechanisms, in association with the partnership commissions, to assess and monitor security developments affecting these two countries,” it says.

The expert group’s report will provide the basis for discussions at NATO's summit in Lisbon in November, which is expected to approve the alliance’s updated strategic concept.
Monday, May 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russian President Arrives In Ukraine For Official Visit

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has arrived in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev on a two-day visit where he is due to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yanukovych and sign a number of bilateral agreements.

A group of Ukrainian officials headed by Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko met Medvedev at Barispol International Airport on Monday.

This is Medvedev's second visit to Ukraine since Yanukovych was elected Ukrainian president in February. Yanukovych has twice visited Russia as the two former Soviet neighbors have rekindled their relations over the past three months.

The Russian president said on Sunday he hoped to sign a number of bilateral agreements concerning "energy cooperation, as well as cooperation in humanitarian exchanges, in interregional and international problems."

Medvedev also said Moscow and Kiev have recently made important steps to restore "full-fledged, kindhearted, sincere and friendly relations traditional for our countries."

The Russian leader said agreements on Black Sea security, settlement in Moldova's breakaway region of Transdnestr and European security issues could also be signed.

Transdnestr has been considered a "frozen conflict" zone since a brief war in 1992, which was the culmination of tensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE are mediators in the conflict; the EU and the United States are observers.

Yanukovych, who replaced Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential office, has made good on his campaign pledge to improve relations with Russia, which were soured by Yushchenko's anti-Russian policies.

In particular, Russia and Ukraine recently signed an agreement extending the lease on the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol for 25 years after the current lease expires in 2017. The deal, which gave Ukraine a 30% discount for Russian gas supplies, has infuriated the Ukrainian opposition, which has described it as posing a threat to Ukraine's sovereignty.

Ahead of the Russian president's visit to Kiev, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies strengthened security near the country's presidential administration office to prevent potential violence instigated by the country's opposition and assure safety of the Russian and Ukrainian presidents and officials.

Source: RIA Novosti
Monday, May 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Ukraine FM Brushes Off Fears Of Territory Loss In Border Dispute

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said on Saturday the country will not lose the island of Tuzla if the Russian-Ukrainian sea border is demarcated.

The Ukrainian-Russian border in the Kerch Strait, which links the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea remains undemarcated since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian opposition leader and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko said on Friday Ukraine may loose the island, which lies in the middle of the Kerch Strait, as a result of the demarcation of the border.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yanukovych will discuss the issue of border demarcation between Russia and Ukraine during Medvedev's visit to Kiev on May 17-18.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said it was "surprised" by Tymoshenko's claims.

"The question of who the island belongs to has not been and will never be raised in talks [with Russia]. The island is an intrinsic part of Ukrainian territory and Russia fully recognizes this fact," the statement, published in Ukrainian news agency UNIAN said.

Source: RIA Novosti
Saturday, May 15, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russia Poised To Leapfrog Ukraine, Moldova In EU Visa Drive

By Ahto Lobjakas

(RFE/RL) -- Russia is putting pressure on the European Union to turn the next top-level meeting between the two -- the Rostov-na-Donu gathering on May 31 -- into a "visa summit."

Officials in Brussels say the EU and Russia will jointly sign a document at Rostov-na-Donu outlining "common steps" toward visa liberalization. This would represent a significant advance for Russia in its decade-long drive toward visa-free travel in the EU. At the same time, it would hand Russia a psychological and political victory over countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, who have long awaited visa liberalization and have offered political reforms to get it.

If Russia, which has no obligations to reform, steps ahead of those countries in the visa-free queue, it will only serve to emphasize that the status of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries matters very little when it comes to strategic concessions from the bloc.

Diplomats say a majority of EU foreign ministers, debating the issue in Brussels on May 10, supported the plan. (Under EU rules, a qualified majority decision is sufficient.) A concession on visas is seen as essential to ensure the success of the Rostov-na-Donu summit on May 31.

There, the EU wants Russia to commit to a broad "modernizing partnership" by reaffirming its commitment to concluding a new strategic partnership agreement, joining the World Trade Organization, and cooperating on a range of issues from border management to trade issues.

Russia's champions in this debate are Germany, France, and most of the EU's southern member states -- along with, somewhat surprisingly, Finland. Poland continues to sound a cautionary note, but even the plan's detractors now see it as a foregone conclusion.

'Road Map' In All But Name

In all but name, the common steps constitute a "road map" -- the EU term for an agreement committing the bloc to dropping its visa requirement for short-stay visitors to its Schengen space (comprising all EU countries except Britain, Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Romania; as well as Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland) once its conditions have been met.

So far, only countries in the western Balkans have been awarded such road maps. No ex-Soviet country outside the EU has managed to secure one.

A visa-liberalization road map sets out detailed requirements for reforms to be implemented in key areas. Chief among the EU's concerns are document security -- above all, the introduction of biometric passports; border management; combating illegal migration; and the fight against organized crime and corruption.

The road map does not fix the date when visas will be lifted, but it effectively commits the EU to doing so once all its conditions have been met. In the western Balkans, Serbia, Croatia, and Macedonia late last year became the first countries to complete a road map -- and are now seen as having set a precedent for others.

Top EU foreign policy official Hugues Mingarelli made the link at the European Parliament in early April, when he said a number of EU member states are reluctant to give Ukraine a road map for fear of making movement toward the abolition of visas a virtually "automatic process." Instead, these EU countries would like to retain what Mingarelli described as their "political discretion."

Most Desirable Goal

Visa-free travel in the EU has become the most desirable goal for all of the bloc's Eastern neighbors, who see in it great psychological, political, and economic benefits. Most EU member states, on the other hand, are fearful of greater immigration and crime, and generally do not want to send Eastern neighbors signals which could be interpreted as encouragement to pursue a course aimed at eventual accession.

As a result, movement toward visa liberalization has been a drawn-out process. Russia was the first to secure it as a "long-term" goal in 2003. Ukraine followed suit in 2008, and Moldova did the same earlier this year.

A number of ministers on May 10 warned that Russia is attempting to manipulate the EU, offering unenforceable promises of partnership and cooperation in return for what remains effectively the bloc's only real leverage.

Visa 'Currency'

Poland's Radoslaw Sikorski warned that visa liberalization is a "currency" the EU should spend wisely. Sikorski noted that the EU's visa policy "must not go against its foreign policy," with its declared aim of transforming Russia into a European society where the rule of law prevails. Talks on a new EU-Russia strategic partnership treaty have stalled, largely as a result of Russia's palpable lack of interest in saddling itself with further obligations.

Sikorski, along with the ministers of the Baltic and Nordic countries as well as Romania, also argued that Russia must not advance ahead of Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU's other Eastern neighbors, who this week celebrated five years of membership in the European Neighborhood Policy and last week the first year of their Eastern Partnership with the EU.

A number of ministers said the issued should be linked to Russia's cooperation on frozen conflicts involving Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

But the Friends of Russia club appears to have carried the day, supported by the EU's executive arm, the European Commission. France, Spain, and Portugal once again emerged as champions of "positive interdependence" between Russia and the EU. Greece and Cyprus highlighted the prospective benefits of visa-free travel with Russia. All were identified as primary targets for Russian foreign policy engagement in a memo published last week by the Russia version of "Newsweek."

Officials say the outcome of the Brussels meeting was decided by Germany. Traditionally skeptical of immigration, Berlin appears to have concluded that the economic benefits of improved ties with Russia will be sufficient to offset the downside.

After the Brussels meeting on May 10, Germany was described as the "swing state" by the Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb -- representing another country which has pursued an increasingly pragmatic course in its relationship with Moscow over the past few years.


Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Friday, May 14, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Russia, Ukraine To Draft Long-Term Nuclear Fuel Deal By June

Moscow and Kiev will draw up by June a long-term contract on Russian deliveries of nuclear fuel to Ukraine, the head of the Russian presidential administration said Friday.

"Our relevant departments and enterprises have been instructed to draft by June 1 this year a long-term contract to supply nuclear fuel for Ukraine's nuclear power plants starting from 2011," Sergei Naryshkin said, adding that the contract's price will be known later.

Naryshkin said that when the two presidents meet in Kiev on May 17 their discussions will include "joint steps and contracts in the nuclear power industry sphere."

Ukraine's nuclear power utility Energoatom signed a contract in March 2008 with the U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company on fuel supplies for its nuclear power plants (NPPs) in 2011-2015, causing discontent on the part of neighboring Russia.

In 2005, Westinghouse supplied the Soviet-built South Ukraine plant with a set of fuel rod assemblies, which were used in the reactor core in conjunction with Russian fuel rods for a trial period.

The Russian and Ukrainian prime ministers met in the southern Russian resort of Sochi on April 30 and instructed officials to start developing nuclear cooperation initiatives. Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko earlier said that should a 25-year contract to supply Russian fuel to Ukrainian reactors be concluded, the overall discount for Ukraine could exceed $1 billion.

Ukraine has four nuclear power plants - Zaporozhye, South Ukraine, Rovno and Khmelnitskaya - with a total generating capacity of 13.835 GW, accounting for more than half of the country's electricity generation.

Russian corporation TVEL supplies nuclear fuel to Ukrainian nuclear parts as part of a long-term contract expiring in 2010.

In his first three months in office, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has made good on his campaign pledge to conduct a more friendly policy toward Russia than his predecessor, working swiftly to end the bitter disputes that arose under the Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko.

Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, May 14, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Ukraine Refuses To Recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia

Despite improving relations between Russia and Ukraine, Kiev has no plans to recognize the former Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ukrainian Foreign Minister said in an interview with a respected Kiev daily.

"The issue of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders is fundamental to us," Kostyantyn Hryshchenko told Kommersant-Ukraine.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia recognized their independence after a five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 that began when Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia in an attempt to bring it back under central control. Only Nicaragua, Venezuela and the tiny Pacific island state of Nauru have followed suit.

Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko supported Georgia in the war over South Ossetia, causing a worsening of already sour relations between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev's NATO bid and a series of gas disputes were also causes of animosity.

Viktor Yanukovych, who was sworn in on February 25, has pledged to steer a more balanced policy towards Russia.

Before his victory in February's polls, Yanukovych's Party of Regions called on the Yushchenko administration to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Many experts believe Yanukovych, seen as pro-Russian during the election campaign, will "disappoint" Moscow, pledging friendship with the Kremlin while still trying to pursue Yushchenko's bid to take Ukraine into NATO and the EU.

Source: RIA Novosti
Friday, May 14, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Putin, Not Medvedev, Remains Master Of Russian Foreign Policy

By Alexander Osipovich

Two years after the inauguration of President Dmitry Medvedev, analysts say his powerful predecessor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, still wields control over Russia’s foreign policy -- especially the Kremlin’s efforts to reassert influence in the former Soviet Union.

Legally speaking, this should not be the case. Under the Russian Constitution, the president oversees foreign policy while the prime minister handles the economy and most domestic matters. But few Kremlin-watchers believe that Moscow’s foreign policy is shaped by Medvedev, who took office on May 7, 2008, and is now marking the halfway point of his presidential term.

“The leading role still clearly belongs to Putin. This reflects the unspoken agreement that was reached between Putin and Medvedev,” said Yevgeny Volk, an independent political analyst in Moscow.

“There have been some nuances and accents that have changed since Medvedev’s arrival. But these are mostly stylistic differences,” Volk added.

Medvedev regularly flies around the world to attend summits and international meetings in far-flung countries. But his role at such events is often ceremonial, while Putin, often working behind the scenes, appears to achieve the meatiest results. And that plays into the “good cop, bad cop” pattern that has long characterized the two men’s relationship: Medvedev, with his image as a liberal modernizer, is more palatable to the West, while Putin is the tough guy ready to play hardball to assert Russia’s interests.

On April 8, for instance, Medvedev was in Prague signing a nuclear disarmament treaty with US President Barack Obama -- a historic, though largely ceremonial event -- while Putin was in Moscow dealing with the rapidly unfolding crisis in Kyrgyzstan. On that day, Putin became the first foreign leader to call Roza Otunbayeva, the head of the new provisional government that took power after violent protests led to former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s ouster. Putin’s quick move advanced Russian interests in the strategically important Central Asian state, and he followed it up a few days later by pledging 50 million dollars in loans and aid to the Kyrgyz interim government.

“There are strong economic levers in Putin’s hands,” Volk said, describing loans and energy assistance as two of the prime minister’s key tools.

Putin was also a critical player in Moscow’s other major foreign-policy triumph in April: the surprise agreement with Ukraine that allows Russia to maintain its Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for 25 more years. Kyiv offered the base extension in exchange for a 30-percent discount on its purchases of Russian natural gas. Though the agreement was signed by Medvedev and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, it came only after a flurry of meetings between Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Mykola Azarov.

“In the latest Russian foreign-policy success with Ukraine… I think there is little doubt that Putin is the central figure,” said Maria Lipman, an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

“Formally, it is Medvedev who attends meetings at the presidential level. But de facto, the most important decisions in foreign policy are at the very least decided jointly, and I think it is possible that Putin’s word carries more importance,” Lipman said.

The maneuverings of Russia’s ruling tandem have been especially convoluted when they have dealt with Moscow’s arch-foe Georgia.

In August 2008, when Georgia attempted to retake control of the Moscow-backed separatist region of South Ossetia, it was Putin -- not Medvedev -- who gave the first public reaction, even though Putin was attending the Beijing Summer Olympics at the time. Later, as Russia started to deploy massive force against Georgia, Putin paid a dramatic visit to North Ossetia to meet soldiers and refugees, reinforcing his image as a man of action.

But it was Medvedev, as the commander-in-chief of the Russian military, who gave the formal order for the so-called “operation to force peace” on Georgia, and who signed the ceasefire accord brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that ended the five-day conflict. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].

Sergei Mikheyev, an analyst at the Center for Political Technologies in Moscow, argues that this elaborate two-man performance showed that Putin and Medvedev shape foreign policy jointly.

“Some roles were filled by Medvedev, others by Putin. To say that Putin or Medvedev decided anything by themselves would be naïve,” Mikheyev said.

More recently, Putin opened a new front in Russia’s relations with Georgia by meeting a key leader of the Georgian opposition, former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze, in early March. Burjanadze -- a fierce critic of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- had a friendly meeting with Putin, who does not disguise his hatred for the pro-Western Saakashvili these days.

“Russia is trying to find people to talk to in Georgia other than Saakashvili, and Burjanadze is one such person,” Mikheyev said.


Alexander Osipovich is a Moscow-based writer who specializes in regional affairs. Copyright (c) 2003 Open Society Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Society Institute, 400 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019 USA, www.EurasiaNet.org or www.soros.org.
Sunday, May 09, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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