65 Killed In India Train Blast
Authorities in eastern India say a passenger train was derailed by an explosion and hit an oncoming train early Friday, killing at least 65 people and wounding more than 100 in a suspected attack by Maoist rebels.
Officials warned the death toll could rise as rescuers struggled to reach a large number of passengers still trapped inside the mangled wreckage.
The Mumbai-bound express train, traveling from the northeastern city of Kolkata in West Bengal state, derailed as it was traveling through an area known to be a stronghold of Maoist rebels.
Thirteen cars careened off the track and collided with a cargo train traveling in the opposite direction.
Sabotage is suspected, but officials cautioned it is too early to say whether the Maoists, who have stepped up their attacks in recent months, are responsible.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called the Maoist insurgency, which has spread to 20 of the country's 28 states, India's most serious domestic security issue. The rebels, also known as Naxalites, are demanding land and jobs for the poor.
Source: VOA
Officials warned the death toll could rise as rescuers struggled to reach a large number of passengers still trapped inside the mangled wreckage.
The Mumbai-bound express train, traveling from the northeastern city of Kolkata in West Bengal state, derailed as it was traveling through an area known to be a stronghold of Maoist rebels.
Thirteen cars careened off the track and collided with a cargo train traveling in the opposite direction.
Sabotage is suspected, but officials cautioned it is too early to say whether the Maoists, who have stepped up their attacks in recent months, are responsible.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called the Maoist insurgency, which has spread to 20 of the country's 28 states, India's most serious domestic security issue. The rebels, also known as Naxalites, are demanding land and jobs for the poor.
Source: VOA
Friday, May 28, 2010 |
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Calls To Protect India Children In Maoist Conflict
India should take immediate steps to protect children caught up in its conflict with Maoist rebels, in light of a report today by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Human Rights Watch said. This is the first time that the long-running Maoist conflict in India has appeared in the secretary-general's report to the UN Security Council about the use of children in armed conflict around the world.
India should immediately review state government policies of occupying and using school buildings as part of operations against Maoist armed groups, known as Naxalites, and give schools better protection from Maoist attacks, Human Rights Watch said. Human Rights Watch also called upon the Maoists to immediately cease their recruitment and use of children, and stop attacking schools.
"Both the security forces and the Maoists in India are exploiting and harming children, destroying their chances at an education and causing damage that will affect their entire lives," said Bede Sheppard, Asia researcher on children's rights at Human Rights Watch. "The new UN report will focus international attention on this tragic situation."
The UN Security Council has stated repeatedly that it will consider targeted sanctions, including arms embargoes, against parties to armed conflict that do not end their use of child soldiers.
The secretary-general's report describes how the Maoists, particularly in Chhattisgarh state, are recruiting and using boys and girls in their ranks, and that they have carried out systematic attacks on schools to damage and destroy government structures and to instill fear among local residents.
The report also noted that government security forces have been occupying school buildings in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. In 2009, security forces similarly occupied school buildings in Bihar and West Bengal states.
"Having security forces occupy school grounds puts children and their education at unnecessary risk," Sheppard said. "Now this practice is putting India's reputation on the world stage at risk."
In a 2009 report, "Sabotaged Schooling," Human Rights Watch documented how government security forces – both police and paramilitary police – occupy school buildings as bases for anti-Maoist operations, sometimes only for a few days, but often for periods lasting several months and even years. Sometimes the security forces take over entire buildings, while in other places they occupy parts of school buildings, with students trying to carry on their studies in the remaining space, often under distracting and even frightening circumstances.
Human Rights Watch has also documented that at least 34 schools in Jharkhand and 16 schools in Bihar were attacked by the Maoists during 2009. These do not include schools that were occupied by security forces at the time of attack. Most of the attacks occurred at night when students and teachers were not there.
Maoist attacks and school occupations by security forces unnecessarily place students at risk of harm, and lead many to drop out or to interrupt their studies. Girls are especially likely to drop out following a partial occupation of a school because of harassment, or perceived harassment, by the security forces. Often, schools are closed altogether and students may not be able to attend at all or are forced to move into inferior sites, to study outdoors, or, for those able to reach them, to travel to schools farther away. Students also reported to Human Rights Watch that it was traumatic to witness security forces beating suspects on school grounds.
In a 2008 report, "'Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime,'" Human Rights Watch also documented the use of children in the conflict in Chhattisgarh state. The Maoists deploy children to gather intelligence, for sentry duty, to make and plant landmines and bombs, and to engage in hostilities against government forces. They organize children ages 6 to 12 into children's associations (bal sangams), indoctrinating, training, and using them as informers. Typically, children over the age of 12 are recruited into other Maoist ranks and trained in the use of rifles, landmines, and improvised explosive devices. Children in Maoist armed guerrilla squads (dalams) are involved in fighting with government security forces.
The secretary-general's report, which covers all of 2009, was submitted in response to Security Council Resolution 1882 of August 4, 2009, in which the council requested a briefing on the issue of children and armed conflict around the world. India was one of 22 countries highlighted in the report, which will be debated by the Security Council in June.
"Secretary-General Ban has brought international attention to the mistreatment of children in India's Maoist conflict," Sheppard said. "The Security Council should be prepared to take action if the Indian government and the Maoists do not act to better protect children."
India should immediately review state government policies of occupying and using school buildings as part of operations against Maoist armed groups, known as Naxalites, and give schools better protection from Maoist attacks, Human Rights Watch said. Human Rights Watch also called upon the Maoists to immediately cease their recruitment and use of children, and stop attacking schools.
"Both the security forces and the Maoists in India are exploiting and harming children, destroying their chances at an education and causing damage that will affect their entire lives," said Bede Sheppard, Asia researcher on children's rights at Human Rights Watch. "The new UN report will focus international attention on this tragic situation."
The UN Security Council has stated repeatedly that it will consider targeted sanctions, including arms embargoes, against parties to armed conflict that do not end their use of child soldiers.
The secretary-general's report describes how the Maoists, particularly in Chhattisgarh state, are recruiting and using boys and girls in their ranks, and that they have carried out systematic attacks on schools to damage and destroy government structures and to instill fear among local residents.
The report also noted that government security forces have been occupying school buildings in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. In 2009, security forces similarly occupied school buildings in Bihar and West Bengal states.
"Having security forces occupy school grounds puts children and their education at unnecessary risk," Sheppard said. "Now this practice is putting India's reputation on the world stage at risk."
In a 2009 report, "Sabotaged Schooling," Human Rights Watch documented how government security forces – both police and paramilitary police – occupy school buildings as bases for anti-Maoist operations, sometimes only for a few days, but often for periods lasting several months and even years. Sometimes the security forces take over entire buildings, while in other places they occupy parts of school buildings, with students trying to carry on their studies in the remaining space, often under distracting and even frightening circumstances.
Human Rights Watch has also documented that at least 34 schools in Jharkhand and 16 schools in Bihar were attacked by the Maoists during 2009. These do not include schools that were occupied by security forces at the time of attack. Most of the attacks occurred at night when students and teachers were not there.
Maoist attacks and school occupations by security forces unnecessarily place students at risk of harm, and lead many to drop out or to interrupt their studies. Girls are especially likely to drop out following a partial occupation of a school because of harassment, or perceived harassment, by the security forces. Often, schools are closed altogether and students may not be able to attend at all or are forced to move into inferior sites, to study outdoors, or, for those able to reach them, to travel to schools farther away. Students also reported to Human Rights Watch that it was traumatic to witness security forces beating suspects on school grounds.
In a 2008 report, "'Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime,'" Human Rights Watch also documented the use of children in the conflict in Chhattisgarh state. The Maoists deploy children to gather intelligence, for sentry duty, to make and plant landmines and bombs, and to engage in hostilities against government forces. They organize children ages 6 to 12 into children's associations (bal sangams), indoctrinating, training, and using them as informers. Typically, children over the age of 12 are recruited into other Maoist ranks and trained in the use of rifles, landmines, and improvised explosive devices. Children in Maoist armed guerrilla squads (dalams) are involved in fighting with government security forces.
The secretary-general's report, which covers all of 2009, was submitted in response to Security Council Resolution 1882 of August 4, 2009, in which the council requested a briefing on the issue of children and armed conflict around the world. India was one of 22 countries highlighted in the report, which will be debated by the Security Council in June.
"Secretary-General Ban has brought international attention to the mistreatment of children in India's Maoist conflict," Sheppard said. "The Security Council should be prepared to take action if the Indian government and the Maoists do not act to better protect children."
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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INR 210 Crore SRE Reimbursed To Naxal Affected And NE States
By SATP
On April 28, 2010 the Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs Ajay Maken provided information about SRE Reimbursement Scheme to Naxal Affected & NE States in a written reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament).
Under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme reimbursement is made to the States for the expenditure incurred on operations. Naxal affected States covered under SRE scheme are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh & West Bengal. Insurgency affected States which are covered under SRE scheme are Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya & Arunachal Pradesh..
Details are below:
Reimbursement made to Naxal affected areas (Rs. In lakhs)
Reimbursement made to North Eastern States
Reimbursement made to J&K and Himachal Pradesh
The admissible items on which reimbursement is made under SRE inter alia include ex-gratia payment to family of civilian and security personnel killed in Naxal and extremist violence, transportation communication and logistic support for Central Para Military Forces, ammunition, training of State Police Forces, community policing, honoraria to Special Police officers, deployment of Home Guards, Village Defence Parties, rehabilitation of surrendered Naxalites and militants etc. The scheme has been quite helpful to the States.
Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India
This article was prepared by, and first appeared at, the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
On April 28, 2010 the Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs Ajay Maken provided information about SRE Reimbursement Scheme to Naxal Affected & NE States in a written reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament).
Under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme reimbursement is made to the States for the expenditure incurred on operations. Naxal affected States covered under SRE scheme are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh & West Bengal. Insurgency affected States which are covered under SRE scheme are Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya & Arunachal Pradesh..
Details are below:
Reimbursement made to Naxal affected areas (Rs. In lakhs)
| State | 2008-2009 | 2009-2010 |
| Andhra Pradesh | 582.59 | 227.51 |
| Bihar | 521.67 | 276.65 |
| Chhattisgarh | 2011.64 | 3614.24 |
| Jharkhand | 2350.24 | 1111.10 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 399.86 | 10.87 |
| Maharashtra | 471.98 | 271.18 |
| Orissa | 1308.98 | 371.22 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 185.52 | 50.75 |
| West Bengal | 167.52 | 66.48 |
| Total | 8000.00 | 6000.00 |
Reimbursement made to North Eastern States
| States | 2008-09 | 2009-10 |
| Assam | 10860.00 | 6056.00 |
| Nagaland | 3313.00 | 4123.00 |
| Manipur | 2158.00 | 2726.00 |
| Tripura | 4504.00 | 1185.00 |
| Meghalaya | 624.00 | 193.00 |
| Arunachal | 545.00 | 717.00 |
| Total | 22004.00 | 15000.00 |
Reimbursement made to J&K and Himachal Pradesh
2008 | 2009 | |||
J&K | Himachal Pradesh | J&K | Himachal Pradesh | |
| SRE(P) | 39642.17 | 357.82 | 16670.00 | 130.00 |
| SRE(RR) | 20999.13 | - | 12000.00 | - |
The admissible items on which reimbursement is made under SRE inter alia include ex-gratia payment to family of civilian and security personnel killed in Naxal and extremist violence, transportation communication and logistic support for Central Para Military Forces, ammunition, training of State Police Forces, community policing, honoraria to Special Police officers, deployment of Home Guards, Village Defence Parties, rehabilitation of surrendered Naxalites and militants etc. The scheme has been quite helpful to the States.
Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India
This article was prepared by, and first appeared at, the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
Thursday, May 20, 2010 |
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Red Kitty And Beyond - Estimating Maoist Extortion Income
Estimates of what the Maoists extract from their nationwide extortion vary from Rs 1,200cr a year to Rs 2,000cr
By Shanthie Mariet D'Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray
Just how much does the CPI-Maoist take in through its nationwide extortion? According to figures provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), it is Rs 1,400 crore annually. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh recently said that it is between Rs 1,000 and Rs 1,200 crore per year. The Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh, in November 2009, however, had said that the figure was as high as Rs 2,000 crore.
The literature recovered and the confessions extracted from the arrested Naxal leaders quote different figures. The official figures, of both the MHA and state governments, are products of (often wild) guesswork. Hence, such variations are expected. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the amount the outfit manages to extract from the regions under its domination is substantial and sufficient to keep the fire of revolution burning.
Available information indicates that Jharkhand alone could be contributing Rs 300 crore, followed by Chhattisgarh, with a share of roughly Rs 150 crore. Jharkhand, in recent years, has emerged the largest contributor to the Naxal kitty. The enormous legal and illegal mining industry in the state, coupled with the huge forest produce trade amounting to crores of rupees, now forms the backbone of the so-called Red Revolution.
Other affected states, such as Bihar and Orissa, also make sizeable contributions. In each of the states, the sources contributing to the war coffer of the CPI-Maoist remain more or less the same — forest produce contractors, mining companies, road contractors, transporters and large- and small-scale industries. Money forcibly collected from individuals is comparatively meagre. Intelligence agencies say that this enormous amount of money is allowing the Naxalites to procure arms and ammunition from illegal arms bazaars of Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Interestingly, data reveals a huge disconnect between the “annual budget” of the CPI-Maoist and the money that the outfit manages to collect through its regime of large-scale extortion and intimidation. For example, Misir Besra, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in September 2007 but was snatched away to freedom less than two years later by his colleagues from the Lakhisarai court premises in Bihar, had revealed to his interrogators that the outfit had a budget of Rs 60 crore for 2007-09. Of this, Rs 42 crore was earmarked for arms, ammunition and explosives; Rs 2 crore for intelligence gathering; and the remaining Rs 16 crore for transportation, computer training, propaganda and documentation. Even Kobad Ghandy, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in New Delhi in September 2009, said that the outfit operated on a budget of Rs 15 to 20 crore.
Intelligence and police officials in different Naxal-dominated areas narrate interesting stories about how a large part of the money, collected in the name of revolution, is being misused for personal aggrandisement by the Naxal top brass. Tales can be heard about how children of Naxal leaders are pursuing careers in engineering and medicine in Indian metros while the Naxalites themselves are destroying schools of tribal children in remote areas. Such schools house security force personnel at times, but their real “crime” appears in the Maoist mind to be that they constitute evidence that gives the lie to the Naxal narrative of state neglect.
In fact, the way a large and a complex outfit like the CPI-Maoist functions, it can be safely argued that there is little scope for personal aggrandisement by insurgent top leaders. The case, however, is certainly different where criminalised fringe outfits are concerned. These, wearing Naxal colours, have mushroomed in states such as Jharkhand.
If this much is well-known, what is only beginning to emerge is the extent to which the civil administration in states like Bihar and Jharkhand is also part of a web of corruption that feeds the conflict. Questioned during a 2009 field visit, a senior Jharkhand police official observed that Block Development Officers often pay bribes to be posted to Naxal-affected districts. “There is ample money and no accountability,” noted the senior official, his point being quite clear: Illegal mining activity in Jharkhand feeds the Naxalites, bureaucrats and politicians equally.
Little effort has been made to study this aspect of a burgeoning war economy. Instead, the debate is dominated by the government’s emphasis on the regime of loot and extortion put in place by the Red Army. Yet a symbiotic relationship is at hand. For instance, contractors laying roads in the remote areas are willing to conceal explosives under the road surface on behalf of the Naxalites, because explosions targeting culverts and small bridges permanently erase evidence of poor-quality work.
As a necessary first step in dealing with the challenge, the Seventh Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended in February 2008 that a special anti-extortion and anti-money laundering cell be set up by state police/state governments. The state governments have been asked by New Delhi to prepare action plans to monitor and curb illegal mining. The use of satellite imagery and other intelligence inputs has been advised by the central government in the preparation and implementation of such action plans. Further, a Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee has been set up by the central government to ensure elimination of delays in grants of mineral concessions to reduce the scope for illegal mining.
These are necessary measures no doubt. But capacity of the states to dominate areas currently under Naxal domination is a critical prerequisite to end extortion by both the Naxalites as well as other elements. Given the current disjointed nature of the ongoing counter-Naxal operations, such a scenario looks improbable anytime soon.
Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is visiting research fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and Bibhu Prasad Routray has been a deputy director at the National Security Council Secretariat, New Delhi. This article appeared in the Business Standard and is reprinted with permission.
By Shanthie Mariet D'Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray
Just how much does the CPI-Maoist take in through its nationwide extortion? According to figures provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), it is Rs 1,400 crore annually. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh recently said that it is between Rs 1,000 and Rs 1,200 crore per year. The Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh, in November 2009, however, had said that the figure was as high as Rs 2,000 crore.
The literature recovered and the confessions extracted from the arrested Naxal leaders quote different figures. The official figures, of both the MHA and state governments, are products of (often wild) guesswork. Hence, such variations are expected. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the amount the outfit manages to extract from the regions under its domination is substantial and sufficient to keep the fire of revolution burning.
Available information indicates that Jharkhand alone could be contributing Rs 300 crore, followed by Chhattisgarh, with a share of roughly Rs 150 crore. Jharkhand, in recent years, has emerged the largest contributor to the Naxal kitty. The enormous legal and illegal mining industry in the state, coupled with the huge forest produce trade amounting to crores of rupees, now forms the backbone of the so-called Red Revolution.
Other affected states, such as Bihar and Orissa, also make sizeable contributions. In each of the states, the sources contributing to the war coffer of the CPI-Maoist remain more or less the same — forest produce contractors, mining companies, road contractors, transporters and large- and small-scale industries. Money forcibly collected from individuals is comparatively meagre. Intelligence agencies say that this enormous amount of money is allowing the Naxalites to procure arms and ammunition from illegal arms bazaars of Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Interestingly, data reveals a huge disconnect between the “annual budget” of the CPI-Maoist and the money that the outfit manages to collect through its regime of large-scale extortion and intimidation. For example, Misir Besra, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in September 2007 but was snatched away to freedom less than two years later by his colleagues from the Lakhisarai court premises in Bihar, had revealed to his interrogators that the outfit had a budget of Rs 60 crore for 2007-09. Of this, Rs 42 crore was earmarked for arms, ammunition and explosives; Rs 2 crore for intelligence gathering; and the remaining Rs 16 crore for transportation, computer training, propaganda and documentation. Even Kobad Ghandy, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in New Delhi in September 2009, said that the outfit operated on a budget of Rs 15 to 20 crore.
Intelligence and police officials in different Naxal-dominated areas narrate interesting stories about how a large part of the money, collected in the name of revolution, is being misused for personal aggrandisement by the Naxal top brass. Tales can be heard about how children of Naxal leaders are pursuing careers in engineering and medicine in Indian metros while the Naxalites themselves are destroying schools of tribal children in remote areas. Such schools house security force personnel at times, but their real “crime” appears in the Maoist mind to be that they constitute evidence that gives the lie to the Naxal narrative of state neglect.
In fact, the way a large and a complex outfit like the CPI-Maoist functions, it can be safely argued that there is little scope for personal aggrandisement by insurgent top leaders. The case, however, is certainly different where criminalised fringe outfits are concerned. These, wearing Naxal colours, have mushroomed in states such as Jharkhand.
If this much is well-known, what is only beginning to emerge is the extent to which the civil administration in states like Bihar and Jharkhand is also part of a web of corruption that feeds the conflict. Questioned during a 2009 field visit, a senior Jharkhand police official observed that Block Development Officers often pay bribes to be posted to Naxal-affected districts. “There is ample money and no accountability,” noted the senior official, his point being quite clear: Illegal mining activity in Jharkhand feeds the Naxalites, bureaucrats and politicians equally.
Little effort has been made to study this aspect of a burgeoning war economy. Instead, the debate is dominated by the government’s emphasis on the regime of loot and extortion put in place by the Red Army. Yet a symbiotic relationship is at hand. For instance, contractors laying roads in the remote areas are willing to conceal explosives under the road surface on behalf of the Naxalites, because explosions targeting culverts and small bridges permanently erase evidence of poor-quality work.
As a necessary first step in dealing with the challenge, the Seventh Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended in February 2008 that a special anti-extortion and anti-money laundering cell be set up by state police/state governments. The state governments have been asked by New Delhi to prepare action plans to monitor and curb illegal mining. The use of satellite imagery and other intelligence inputs has been advised by the central government in the preparation and implementation of such action plans. Further, a Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee has been set up by the central government to ensure elimination of delays in grants of mineral concessions to reduce the scope for illegal mining.
These are necessary measures no doubt. But capacity of the states to dominate areas currently under Naxal domination is a critical prerequisite to end extortion by both the Naxalites as well as other elements. Given the current disjointed nature of the ongoing counter-Naxal operations, such a scenario looks improbable anytime soon.
Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is visiting research fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and Bibhu Prasad Routray has been a deputy director at the National Security Council Secretariat, New Delhi. This article appeared in the Business Standard and is reprinted with permission.
Thursday, May 20, 2010 |
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Limitations Of Operation Green Hunt
By Dr Shanthie Mariet D'Souza and Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray
On April 6 the biggest ever Maoist strike on the security forces claimed the lives of 76 CRPF personnel in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, and reinforced the claim that left-wing extremism has indeed emerged as India's most pressing internal security challenge. The CPI-Maoist, shrugging off initiation of the government's coordinated offensive, 'Operation Green Hunt,' is in no mood to compromise and continues to demonstrate that 'it will not lie low for the storm to pass over.' To the contrary, it will take on the state to assert its military superiority.
Though analysts bemoan the lack of a 'strategy' to deal with the Maoists, this shortcoming would seem the least of the worries for the Indian state as it engages the extremists in vast un-administered stretches of the country. Without addressing the tactical basics which must implement any counter-insurgency effort -- such as trained police personnel, an intelligence network, development initiatives, and unified command -- both among the states as well as within the government, no strategy can hope to move forward.
Operation Green Hunt, to be clear, is about tactics. The Centre has amassed over 75 battalions, drawn from a number of central paramilitary force units. Impressive though these numbers appear, they are simply not enough for containing a conflict that spans, according to the estimate of the ministry of home affairs, over 20 states of the country.
Bereft of the support they derive from the incapacitated and unwilling state police forces, the para-military forces are not in a position to systematically reclaim human terrain and deal with an opposition drawing its strength from local dynamics -- issues, population, and resources.
Most immediately, the biggest casualty of the April 6 attack has been the morale of the security forces. They have been committed piecemeal to fighting a faceless enemy. It is often accepted by the central forces that they have no clear mandate and thus are essentially reacting to evolving situations. The casualties that result from such a strategically (and often tactically) defensive posture are generally blamed on the non-adherence to standard operational procedures, without realising that in a guerrilla campaign, governed by individual initiative, SOPs can become real hindrances at times.
It is a responsibility of the Centre and the E N Rammohan inquiry committee that investigated the April 6 attack that the report, largely a fact finding endeavour, does not further drain the forces' sagging morale.
A first step in restoration of spirit would be agreement upon a narrative that defines the struggle. The image of the enemy as well the purpose of the fight must be well defined in the minds of the men in uniform.
Not long ago, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram had spoken of two to three years' sustained operations before the forces could start to turn the tide. Setbacks such as Dantewada could indefinitely prolong the wait. It appears that the sweep of Green Hunt, launched simultaneously in Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra, has been drawn far too wide to make any decisive impact. In its bid to win the grand war, the Centre has overextended its means and fallen into a CPI-Maoist trap. Maoist strategy is quite clear that it seeks to stretch the forces far and wide, thereby preventing their concentration.
Predictably, the April 6 attack has taken the focus off West Bengal and Jharkhand, where the Maoists recently had come under attack. Ironically, before Dantewada, there was cautious optimism in Chhattisgarh at what seemed incremental improvements in the security situation, a fact that was recognised by Chidambaram. Now, it is quite clear that progress was but an illusion.
Still, MHA opposition to the use of the army in Maoist-affected areas remains firm. The commitment of CPMFs was intended to thwart any move in such direction. Yet the CPMFs lack of specific expertise in the tactics of tackling the Maoists calls the MHA position into question. Certainly the army's light infantry counterinsurgency units, the Rashtriya Rifles, have demonstrated considerable proficiency in precisely the areas where CPMFs have been shown wanting.
Considering the army's demonstrated counterinsurgency proficiency, whether against the Naxalites in the past or in the northeastern states and even Jammu & Kashmir today, the concerns against its direct commitment should not be allowed to stymie necessary and appropriate military commitments.
In any event, the scenario in which the state police will be in the forefront of anti-Maoist operations with assistance from the CPMFs, in states such as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, is obviously far from being a realistic course of action. The MHA now speaks of developing anti-Maoist units within the paramilitary forces. To put such men on ground will take not only time but a larger role for the army in training the CPMF units.
Andhra Pradesh has demonstrated that it is possible to make one state Maoist-free without simultaneously attempting to achieve similar success in neighbouring states. Having achieved a favorable position, the state has sustained it despite negative trends in its neighbours. In the Andhra approach of calibrated use of special forces (Grey Hounds) and development, there is a lesson for the Centre in its own anti-Maoist campaign considerations. It is necessary to make incremental progress, state by state, rather than aiming for an illusory knock-out punch against the Maoists.
Dr Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is visiting research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray has been a deputy director at the National Security Council Secretariat, New Delh. This article was published by rediff.com and is reprinted with permission.
On April 6 the biggest ever Maoist strike on the security forces claimed the lives of 76 CRPF personnel in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, and reinforced the claim that left-wing extremism has indeed emerged as India's most pressing internal security challenge. The CPI-Maoist, shrugging off initiation of the government's coordinated offensive, 'Operation Green Hunt,' is in no mood to compromise and continues to demonstrate that 'it will not lie low for the storm to pass over.' To the contrary, it will take on the state to assert its military superiority.
Though analysts bemoan the lack of a 'strategy' to deal with the Maoists, this shortcoming would seem the least of the worries for the Indian state as it engages the extremists in vast un-administered stretches of the country. Without addressing the tactical basics which must implement any counter-insurgency effort -- such as trained police personnel, an intelligence network, development initiatives, and unified command -- both among the states as well as within the government, no strategy can hope to move forward.
Operation Green Hunt, to be clear, is about tactics. The Centre has amassed over 75 battalions, drawn from a number of central paramilitary force units. Impressive though these numbers appear, they are simply not enough for containing a conflict that spans, according to the estimate of the ministry of home affairs, over 20 states of the country.
Bereft of the support they derive from the incapacitated and unwilling state police forces, the para-military forces are not in a position to systematically reclaim human terrain and deal with an opposition drawing its strength from local dynamics -- issues, population, and resources.
Most immediately, the biggest casualty of the April 6 attack has been the morale of the security forces. They have been committed piecemeal to fighting a faceless enemy. It is often accepted by the central forces that they have no clear mandate and thus are essentially reacting to evolving situations. The casualties that result from such a strategically (and often tactically) defensive posture are generally blamed on the non-adherence to standard operational procedures, without realising that in a guerrilla campaign, governed by individual initiative, SOPs can become real hindrances at times.
It is a responsibility of the Centre and the E N Rammohan inquiry committee that investigated the April 6 attack that the report, largely a fact finding endeavour, does not further drain the forces' sagging morale.
A first step in restoration of spirit would be agreement upon a narrative that defines the struggle. The image of the enemy as well the purpose of the fight must be well defined in the minds of the men in uniform.
Not long ago, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram had spoken of two to three years' sustained operations before the forces could start to turn the tide. Setbacks such as Dantewada could indefinitely prolong the wait. It appears that the sweep of Green Hunt, launched simultaneously in Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra, has been drawn far too wide to make any decisive impact. In its bid to win the grand war, the Centre has overextended its means and fallen into a CPI-Maoist trap. Maoist strategy is quite clear that it seeks to stretch the forces far and wide, thereby preventing their concentration.
Predictably, the April 6 attack has taken the focus off West Bengal and Jharkhand, where the Maoists recently had come under attack. Ironically, before Dantewada, there was cautious optimism in Chhattisgarh at what seemed incremental improvements in the security situation, a fact that was recognised by Chidambaram. Now, it is quite clear that progress was but an illusion.
Still, MHA opposition to the use of the army in Maoist-affected areas remains firm. The commitment of CPMFs was intended to thwart any move in such direction. Yet the CPMFs lack of specific expertise in the tactics of tackling the Maoists calls the MHA position into question. Certainly the army's light infantry counterinsurgency units, the Rashtriya Rifles, have demonstrated considerable proficiency in precisely the areas where CPMFs have been shown wanting.
Considering the army's demonstrated counterinsurgency proficiency, whether against the Naxalites in the past or in the northeastern states and even Jammu & Kashmir today, the concerns against its direct commitment should not be allowed to stymie necessary and appropriate military commitments.
In any event, the scenario in which the state police will be in the forefront of anti-Maoist operations with assistance from the CPMFs, in states such as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, is obviously far from being a realistic course of action. The MHA now speaks of developing anti-Maoist units within the paramilitary forces. To put such men on ground will take not only time but a larger role for the army in training the CPMF units.
Andhra Pradesh has demonstrated that it is possible to make one state Maoist-free without simultaneously attempting to achieve similar success in neighbouring states. Having achieved a favorable position, the state has sustained it despite negative trends in its neighbours. In the Andhra approach of calibrated use of special forces (Grey Hounds) and development, there is a lesson for the Centre in its own anti-Maoist campaign considerations. It is necessary to make incremental progress, state by state, rather than aiming for an illusory knock-out punch against the Maoists.
Dr Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is visiting research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray has been a deputy director at the National Security Council Secretariat, New Delh. This article was published by rediff.com and is reprinted with permission.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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The Naxalite Insurgency In India
By Kristian A. Kennedy for Geopoliticalmonitor.com
While many western observers would point to violent secessionism in Kashmir as the direst threat to Indian national security, the government of India has identified the Maoist-inspired Naxalite insurgency as its most significant security challenge. A vast swath of India, from West Bengal in the northeast to Andhra Pradesh in the south, has come under the influence of the Naxalites -- the "Red Taliban" as they have been called. In recent years the Indian government has stepped-up its counter-insurgency initiatives in an attempt to contain and rollback the movement's influence. In fact, New Delhi has even redeployed security forces from Kashmir to central and eastern India in response to this development.
Who are the Naxalites?
Taking its name from the 1967 peasant revolt in the West Bengal village of Naxalbari, the Naxalite movement is a left-wing guerrilla force that is seeking to overthrow the Indian government. Since the time of the Naxalbari revolt the movement has taken on various forms and its support has fluctuated from one decade to the next. Its most recent manifestation is the result of a 2004 decision by two Maoist groupings, the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, to join forces to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). This post-2004 incarnation of the Naxalite insurgency has been one of the most sustained -- and perhaps the most lethal.
While India's other communist parties participate in electoral politics, the CPI(M) follows Mao's dictum that power flows from the barrel of a gun. The CPI(M) has declared, and government officials have acknowledged, that the Naxalites are conducting an insurgency in accordance with Mao's "protracted people's war" strategy [1]. The Naxalites view Indian society through the lens of Mao's theory of the developing world's rural poor as a pivotal revolutionary force in the class struggle. They have sought to build support among the region's lower castes, adivasis (tribal groups), and other sectors of the peasantry by establishing insurgent strongholds ("liberated zones") in districts where government authority is weak. The Party's cadres expand their influence outwards from these bases, and in doing so, they broaden their popular base through political mobilization. The targets of the Naxal class struggle are the region's upper castes, "feudal" landlords, commercial interests, and the security forces.
India's Maoist Redux
Naxalism presents a seeming paradox: the country with the second highest growth rates of the major economies finds itself in the throes of a largely agrarian rebellion inspired by an ideology that has lost its lustre in much of the world. In 2006 India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, pronounced Naxalism to be "the single biggest internal security challenge" India has ever faced [2].
Why have the Naxalites come to loom so large as a security challenge? First, a large area of the country has fallen under varying degrees of CPI(M) influence. According to one estimate, approximately 40% of India's territory is under some form of Maoist influence [3]. Just as the Maoist Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") of Peru emerged in the poor, mostly indigenous city of Ayacucho and spread outward to other areas of the Andean sierra, so the Naxalite centre-of-gravity is an area of the country that comprises several of India's most underdeveloped states -- a "Red Corridor" that includes Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa. Although establishing concrete numbers of supporters is a challenge, the Research and Analysis Wing, India's intelligence service, estimates that CPI(M) armed cadres number about 20,000 [4]. Tenuous government control, the destruction of public infrastructure, the sabotage of industrial interests, and ambushes of state security forces all pose a significant challenge to internal stability in areas of eastern and central India. A study published this month counted the Maoist insurgency as an obstacle in the way of India's emergence as a world power [3].
Government Responses
In November 2009 the Indian government announced a plan to bolster the anti-Naxalite efforts of affected states with a national counter-insurgency strategy. The strategy, which the Indian prime minister characterized as an approach that will "walk on two legs," combines a campaign to hold and clear Naxal strongholds with development projects to address what Singh acknowledged as "the sense of deprivation and alienation" in the region [2]. Known unofficially as Operation "Green Hunt," New Delhi forecasts that the campaign to re-assert government authority and win back the support of affected sectors of the population in the Red Corridor will take two years.
The spread of violence has spurred the growth of non-state anti-Naxal groupings. The most notable among them is the Salwa Judum in the state of Chhattisgarh. Like the Naxalites, these groups seek to recruit from the state's tribal groups, leaving civilians caught between competing groups on the left and the right. State officials in Chhattisgarh have actively supported the use of the Salwa Judum to counter the Naxalites, an approach that is not without controversy and as a result has generated criticism from India's Supreme Court and the central government in Delhi [5].
Foreign Support
It is difficult to establish the degree and scope of external involvement in the Naxalite insurgency. Nepalese and Filipino Maoist outfits have long been suspected of providing rhetorical and material support to the CPI(M). Following central government claims of possible arms transfers from Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) publicly admitted to having ties with the CPI(M) but did not detail its involvement [6]. Similarly, Indian and Filipino intelligence services allege that the Communist Party of the Philippines, a faction that is waging its own guerrilla war in that country, has established links with the Naxalites [7]. New Delhi also contends that it has evidence that remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are providing training to CPI(M) cadres in India [8].
Looking forward
New Delhi confronts a major challenge in the Red Corridor. Working in conjunction with the governments of affected states, the central government faces the task of winning hearts and minds in geographically isolated and economically dislocated regions of the country. It must do so even as the Naxalites work to mobilize the masses, escalate their class war, and broaden the Maoist footprint on the subcontinent. While the chances of a Naxalite seizure of power appear remote, the insurgency will continue to hold back much-needed development. It remains to be seen how effective the current counter-insurgency strategy is at strengthening the writ of the state and extending development in the region.
This article was published by Geopoliticalmonitor.com and reprinted with permission.
End Notes
[1] South Asia Terrorism Portal. "Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)." http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/CPI_M.htm; Pillai, Gopal K. "Left-Wing Extremism in India." Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses. http://www.idsa.in/event/EPLS/Left-WingExtremisminIndia.
[2] Prime Minister's Office. "PM's speech at the Chief Minister's [sic] meet on Naxalism." April 13, 2006. http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=311.
[3] Mahadevan, Prem. Rising India: Challenges and Constraints. Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, 2010. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Policy-Briefs/Detail/?id=116169.
[4] Malhotra (Ret'd), Col. Chander. "Red Terror." South Asia Defence & Strategic Review. February 10, 2010. http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=226.
[5] Press Trust of India. Hindustan Times. "Govt disapproves of 'non-state' law enforcers like Salwa Judum." December 17, 2008. http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/newdelhi/Govt-disapproves-of-non-state-law-enforcers/Article1-358723.aspx; Sinha, Bhadra. Hindustan Times. "SC against tribal force fighting Naxalites." February 6, 2009. http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/newdelhi/SC-against-tribal-force-fighting-Naxalites/Article1-375344.aspx.
[6] The Hindu. "Naxals get arms from abroad: Chidambaram." October 24, 2009. http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article38017.ece; Deccan Herald. "Nepali Maoists confirm support to Indian Naxals." November 3, 2009. http://www.deccanherald.com/content/34111/nepali-maoists-confirm-support-indian.html.
[7] Mandal, Caesar. Times of India. "Filipino insurgents in league with Maoists." April 12, 2010. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Filipino-insurgents-in-league-with-Maoists/articleshow/5785852.cms.
[8] Srivastava, Siddarth. Asia Times Online. "India probes Maoists' foreign links." November 11, 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK11Df03.html.
While many western observers would point to violent secessionism in Kashmir as the direst threat to Indian national security, the government of India has identified the Maoist-inspired Naxalite insurgency as its most significant security challenge. A vast swath of India, from West Bengal in the northeast to Andhra Pradesh in the south, has come under the influence of the Naxalites -- the "Red Taliban" as they have been called. In recent years the Indian government has stepped-up its counter-insurgency initiatives in an attempt to contain and rollback the movement's influence. In fact, New Delhi has even redeployed security forces from Kashmir to central and eastern India in response to this development.
Who are the Naxalites?
Taking its name from the 1967 peasant revolt in the West Bengal village of Naxalbari, the Naxalite movement is a left-wing guerrilla force that is seeking to overthrow the Indian government. Since the time of the Naxalbari revolt the movement has taken on various forms and its support has fluctuated from one decade to the next. Its most recent manifestation is the result of a 2004 decision by two Maoist groupings, the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, to join forces to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). This post-2004 incarnation of the Naxalite insurgency has been one of the most sustained -- and perhaps the most lethal.
While India's other communist parties participate in electoral politics, the CPI(M) follows Mao's dictum that power flows from the barrel of a gun. The CPI(M) has declared, and government officials have acknowledged, that the Naxalites are conducting an insurgency in accordance with Mao's "protracted people's war" strategy [1]. The Naxalites view Indian society through the lens of Mao's theory of the developing world's rural poor as a pivotal revolutionary force in the class struggle. They have sought to build support among the region's lower castes, adivasis (tribal groups), and other sectors of the peasantry by establishing insurgent strongholds ("liberated zones") in districts where government authority is weak. The Party's cadres expand their influence outwards from these bases, and in doing so, they broaden their popular base through political mobilization. The targets of the Naxal class struggle are the region's upper castes, "feudal" landlords, commercial interests, and the security forces.
India's Maoist Redux
Naxalism presents a seeming paradox: the country with the second highest growth rates of the major economies finds itself in the throes of a largely agrarian rebellion inspired by an ideology that has lost its lustre in much of the world. In 2006 India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, pronounced Naxalism to be "the single biggest internal security challenge" India has ever faced [2].
Why have the Naxalites come to loom so large as a security challenge? First, a large area of the country has fallen under varying degrees of CPI(M) influence. According to one estimate, approximately 40% of India's territory is under some form of Maoist influence [3]. Just as the Maoist Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") of Peru emerged in the poor, mostly indigenous city of Ayacucho and spread outward to other areas of the Andean sierra, so the Naxalite centre-of-gravity is an area of the country that comprises several of India's most underdeveloped states -- a "Red Corridor" that includes Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa. Although establishing concrete numbers of supporters is a challenge, the Research and Analysis Wing, India's intelligence service, estimates that CPI(M) armed cadres number about 20,000 [4]. Tenuous government control, the destruction of public infrastructure, the sabotage of industrial interests, and ambushes of state security forces all pose a significant challenge to internal stability in areas of eastern and central India. A study published this month counted the Maoist insurgency as an obstacle in the way of India's emergence as a world power [3].
Government Responses
In November 2009 the Indian government announced a plan to bolster the anti-Naxalite efforts of affected states with a national counter-insurgency strategy. The strategy, which the Indian prime minister characterized as an approach that will "walk on two legs," combines a campaign to hold and clear Naxal strongholds with development projects to address what Singh acknowledged as "the sense of deprivation and alienation" in the region [2]. Known unofficially as Operation "Green Hunt," New Delhi forecasts that the campaign to re-assert government authority and win back the support of affected sectors of the population in the Red Corridor will take two years.
The spread of violence has spurred the growth of non-state anti-Naxal groupings. The most notable among them is the Salwa Judum in the state of Chhattisgarh. Like the Naxalites, these groups seek to recruit from the state's tribal groups, leaving civilians caught between competing groups on the left and the right. State officials in Chhattisgarh have actively supported the use of the Salwa Judum to counter the Naxalites, an approach that is not without controversy and as a result has generated criticism from India's Supreme Court and the central government in Delhi [5].
Foreign Support
It is difficult to establish the degree and scope of external involvement in the Naxalite insurgency. Nepalese and Filipino Maoist outfits have long been suspected of providing rhetorical and material support to the CPI(M). Following central government claims of possible arms transfers from Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) publicly admitted to having ties with the CPI(M) but did not detail its involvement [6]. Similarly, Indian and Filipino intelligence services allege that the Communist Party of the Philippines, a faction that is waging its own guerrilla war in that country, has established links with the Naxalites [7]. New Delhi also contends that it has evidence that remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are providing training to CPI(M) cadres in India [8].
Looking forward
New Delhi confronts a major challenge in the Red Corridor. Working in conjunction with the governments of affected states, the central government faces the task of winning hearts and minds in geographically isolated and economically dislocated regions of the country. It must do so even as the Naxalites work to mobilize the masses, escalate their class war, and broaden the Maoist footprint on the subcontinent. While the chances of a Naxalite seizure of power appear remote, the insurgency will continue to hold back much-needed development. It remains to be seen how effective the current counter-insurgency strategy is at strengthening the writ of the state and extending development in the region.
This article was published by Geopoliticalmonitor.com and reprinted with permission.
End Notes
[1] South Asia Terrorism Portal. "Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)." http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/CPI_M.htm; Pillai, Gopal K. "Left-Wing Extremism in India." Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses. http://www.idsa.in/event/EPLS/Left-WingExtremisminIndia.
[2] Prime Minister's Office. "PM's speech at the Chief Minister's [sic] meet on Naxalism." April 13, 2006. http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=311.
[3] Mahadevan, Prem. Rising India: Challenges and Constraints. Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, 2010. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Policy-Briefs/Detail/?id=116169.
[4] Malhotra (Ret'd), Col. Chander. "Red Terror." South Asia Defence & Strategic Review. February 10, 2010. http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=226.
[5] Press Trust of India. Hindustan Times. "Govt disapproves of 'non-state' law enforcers like Salwa Judum." December 17, 2008. http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/newdelhi/Govt-disapproves-of-non-state-law-enforcers/Article1-358723.aspx; Sinha, Bhadra. Hindustan Times. "SC against tribal force fighting Naxalites." February 6, 2009. http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/newdelhi/SC-against-tribal-force-fighting-Naxalites/Article1-375344.aspx.
[6] The Hindu. "Naxals get arms from abroad: Chidambaram." October 24, 2009. http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article38017.ece; Deccan Herald. "Nepali Maoists confirm support to Indian Naxals." November 3, 2009. http://www.deccanherald.com/content/34111/nepali-maoists-confirm-support-indian.html.
[7] Mandal, Caesar. Times of India. "Filipino insurgents in league with Maoists." April 12, 2010. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Filipino-insurgents-in-league-with-Maoists/articleshow/5785852.cms.
[8] Srivastava, Siddarth. Asia Times Online. "India probes Maoists' foreign links." November 11, 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK11Df03.html.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 |
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India: Ensure Free Expression And Opinion For Maoist Supporters
The Indian government should not equate peaceful political speech with criminal acts while conducting its operations against armed Maoist groups, Human Rights Watch said Saturday.
The Indian government appears to have threatened to curb the right to freedom of expression by treating it as equivalent to providing material or physical support for criminal acts by the proscribed Communist Party of India (Maoist), also known as Naxalites, which the government has banned.
"The Indian government should think twice before trying to silence political discussion and demanding endorsement of its views on Maoist groups," said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The recent views expressed by the Indian government against so-called sympathizers could be understood as carte blanche by local authorities to harass and arrest critics of Indian government policy."
On May 6, 2010, the Home Ministry issued a statement saying that, "It has come to the notice of the government that some Maoist leaders have been directly contacting certain NGOs and intellectuals to propagate their ideology and persuade them to take steps which would provide support to the CPI (Maoist) ideology." Government officials warned members of civil society that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which calls for imprisonment of up to 10 years, could be used to punish individuals in contact with the Maoists. Home Minister P. Chidambaram had earlier called upon civil society demanding "voices of condemnation of those who have, erroneously, extended intellectual and material support to the CPI (Maoist)."
The Maoists claim to speak for the rights of the marginalized, including landless peasants, tribal groups, and Dalits. Maoists have been responsible for serious abuses, including the destruction of schools and hospitals, extortion, torture, and killings. The Indian government has acknowledged that the failure of the government to provide adequate services and development opportunities has led to disaffection and support for the Maoists in some areas.
The Indian government has carried out armed operations to restore law and order in areas dominated by the Maoists and to protect the population. Some state governments combating the Maoists, particularly in Chhattisgarh, have long subjected human rights defenders and activists to surveillance, arbitrary travel restrictions, filing of false cases, arbitrary arrests, and slander campaigns in the press. Journalists often practice self-censorship to protect themselves from government harassment. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings by government forces create a risk of fueling anger and recruiting people to the Maoist cause, Human Rights Watch said.
The population in affected areas is often caught between the Maoist combatants and government security forces. The Maoists frequently demand food or shelter at gunpoint and engage in forcible recruitment. Government forces often arrest and abuse those same villagers, claiming that they are Maoist supporters.
"The Indian government is well aware that security operations often result in increased rights abuses," Adams said. "An active and fearless civil society that monitors abuses by both sides is crucial to ensure the protection of civilians. Threats to civil society have no place in a democracy."
The Indian government appears to have threatened to curb the right to freedom of expression by treating it as equivalent to providing material or physical support for criminal acts by the proscribed Communist Party of India (Maoist), also known as Naxalites, which the government has banned.
"The Indian government should think twice before trying to silence political discussion and demanding endorsement of its views on Maoist groups," said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The recent views expressed by the Indian government against so-called sympathizers could be understood as carte blanche by local authorities to harass and arrest critics of Indian government policy."
On May 6, 2010, the Home Ministry issued a statement saying that, "It has come to the notice of the government that some Maoist leaders have been directly contacting certain NGOs and intellectuals to propagate their ideology and persuade them to take steps which would provide support to the CPI (Maoist) ideology." Government officials warned members of civil society that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which calls for imprisonment of up to 10 years, could be used to punish individuals in contact with the Maoists. Home Minister P. Chidambaram had earlier called upon civil society demanding "voices of condemnation of those who have, erroneously, extended intellectual and material support to the CPI (Maoist)."
The Maoists claim to speak for the rights of the marginalized, including landless peasants, tribal groups, and Dalits. Maoists have been responsible for serious abuses, including the destruction of schools and hospitals, extortion, torture, and killings. The Indian government has acknowledged that the failure of the government to provide adequate services and development opportunities has led to disaffection and support for the Maoists in some areas.
The Indian government has carried out armed operations to restore law and order in areas dominated by the Maoists and to protect the population. Some state governments combating the Maoists, particularly in Chhattisgarh, have long subjected human rights defenders and activists to surveillance, arbitrary travel restrictions, filing of false cases, arbitrary arrests, and slander campaigns in the press. Journalists often practice self-censorship to protect themselves from government harassment. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings by government forces create a risk of fueling anger and recruiting people to the Maoist cause, Human Rights Watch said.
The population in affected areas is often caught between the Maoist combatants and government security forces. The Maoists frequently demand food or shelter at gunpoint and engage in forcible recruitment. Government forces often arrest and abuse those same villagers, claiming that they are Maoist supporters.
"The Indian government is well aware that security operations often result in increased rights abuses," Adams said. "An active and fearless civil society that monitors abuses by both sides is crucial to ensure the protection of civilians. Threats to civil society have no place in a democracy."
Sunday, May 09, 2010 |
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The Maoist Insurgency In India
By Binoy Kampmark
The Indian government is puzzled by one fundamental problem that has become desperate to its own security. With its officials eyeing Pakistan and the funnelling of terrorism through its borders, and the concern with international jihadi movements, it has ignored its own, Maoist grown revolt. Anywhere up to 6,000 people have perished in the Naxalite insurgency of the last 20 years, and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has decided to place the Maoist movement’s threat to Indian security at the forefront of public and official debate.
Near the end of 2009, the central Indian government began implanting forceful measures to combat the Naxals, who now have a presence in 180 of Indians 626 districts (Guardian, Dec 6, 2009). The establishment of this Red Corridor is certainly a far cry from the origins of the movement, which sprouted from the Naxalbari area of West Bengal in 1967. Then, they were a motley crew, discordant and incoherent, susceptible to internal vendettas and feuds. With a marriage of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Maoist tactics, the movement staggered and stuttered through near annihilation to emerge as a highly dangerous force.
In December, government forces commenced operations with Operation Green Hunt, a military engagement with little fuss and even less activity. The rebels, reports suggested, had simply melted into the jungles. The military solution is now all some officials can talk about. The logic of force, rather than the force of logic, prevail in these circles.
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram has insisted that the Maoist ultras will be crushed. His most recent comments, quoted in the Indian press, suggest that he has little time for their revolutionary antics. The Naxals were ‘cowards enacting dramas’, lethal thespians who went about the business less of protecting the poor than destroying schools, railway lines and vital infrastructure links. ‘If they have courage they should take part in democratic processes and face elections. Who is stopping them from winning elections?’ (Indian Express, Apr 5).
The attacks by the Naxals on schools are certainly doing it no favours. Violent attacks in such states as Chhattisgarh, involving the dynamiting of scores of school buildings, must surely alienate their core support. But its members undoubtedly feel that the state has to be attacked at vital centres, endings that require demolition and severance. Education is inevitably one of the targets in this Maoist appraisal.
Truth has not merely been a casualty of this war, but a sure corpse, lying in state for all to witness it. Paramilitary forces have backed militias and classes who have been ruthless in perpetrating what Manmohan Singh admitted were grave acts of ‘social and economic abuse’. Atrocities are committed by all participating forces in this conflict. Martyrs are created in numbers, such as those of Kursam Lakhi and Sukki Modiyam of the village of Pedda Korma, raped and killed by the forces of the Salway Judum militia and their police counterparts on February 6, 2005 (The Observer, Mar 29, 2009). The Naxal messages of land and wealth redistribution hold a natural attraction.
Chidambaram is confident that the insurgency will be put down in two or three years. This will be difficult, given the Naxalite rise from conventional guerrilla force to something approximating to an army. But the refusal to deal with a whole series of reforms, the continuing poverty in the North Eastern states and the perennial problem of ethic conflict, will allow the Naxal flame to burn that much longer. Military force will simply perform its own dramatic role of obfuscation. The diplomatic tables will be left empty that much longer.
Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com. This article appeared at Global Research and is reprinted with permission.
The Indian government is puzzled by one fundamental problem that has become desperate to its own security. With its officials eyeing Pakistan and the funnelling of terrorism through its borders, and the concern with international jihadi movements, it has ignored its own, Maoist grown revolt. Anywhere up to 6,000 people have perished in the Naxalite insurgency of the last 20 years, and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has decided to place the Maoist movement’s threat to Indian security at the forefront of public and official debate.
Near the end of 2009, the central Indian government began implanting forceful measures to combat the Naxals, who now have a presence in 180 of Indians 626 districts (Guardian, Dec 6, 2009). The establishment of this Red Corridor is certainly a far cry from the origins of the movement, which sprouted from the Naxalbari area of West Bengal in 1967. Then, they were a motley crew, discordant and incoherent, susceptible to internal vendettas and feuds. With a marriage of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Maoist tactics, the movement staggered and stuttered through near annihilation to emerge as a highly dangerous force.
In December, government forces commenced operations with Operation Green Hunt, a military engagement with little fuss and even less activity. The rebels, reports suggested, had simply melted into the jungles. The military solution is now all some officials can talk about. The logic of force, rather than the force of logic, prevail in these circles.
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram has insisted that the Maoist ultras will be crushed. His most recent comments, quoted in the Indian press, suggest that he has little time for their revolutionary antics. The Naxals were ‘cowards enacting dramas’, lethal thespians who went about the business less of protecting the poor than destroying schools, railway lines and vital infrastructure links. ‘If they have courage they should take part in democratic processes and face elections. Who is stopping them from winning elections?’ (Indian Express, Apr 5).
The attacks by the Naxals on schools are certainly doing it no favours. Violent attacks in such states as Chhattisgarh, involving the dynamiting of scores of school buildings, must surely alienate their core support. But its members undoubtedly feel that the state has to be attacked at vital centres, endings that require demolition and severance. Education is inevitably one of the targets in this Maoist appraisal.
Truth has not merely been a casualty of this war, but a sure corpse, lying in state for all to witness it. Paramilitary forces have backed militias and classes who have been ruthless in perpetrating what Manmohan Singh admitted were grave acts of ‘social and economic abuse’. Atrocities are committed by all participating forces in this conflict. Martyrs are created in numbers, such as those of Kursam Lakhi and Sukki Modiyam of the village of Pedda Korma, raped and killed by the forces of the Salway Judum militia and their police counterparts on February 6, 2005 (The Observer, Mar 29, 2009). The Naxal messages of land and wealth redistribution hold a natural attraction.
Chidambaram is confident that the insurgency will be put down in two or three years. This will be difficult, given the Naxalite rise from conventional guerrilla force to something approximating to an army. But the refusal to deal with a whole series of reforms, the continuing poverty in the North Eastern states and the perennial problem of ethic conflict, will allow the Naxal flame to burn that much longer. Military force will simply perform its own dramatic role of obfuscation. The diplomatic tables will be left empty that much longer.
Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com. This article appeared at Global Research and is reprinted with permission.
Monday, April 19, 2010 |
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India: Internal Security, External Threats
By Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman for IPCS
The brutal attack on the Central Reserve Police Force soldiers by Naxalites in Dantewada has raised many questions and concerns about internal security in India. The large Naxal presence, its firepower and its ability to strike the police forces at will, makes for a tense law and order situation in many states of India. There have been intense debates about considering the deployment of the Army and the possible use of the Air Force as well. It is pertinent at this point to analyze the internal security situation in Naxal affected areas and draw some vital linkages with the internal security situation in Northeast India.
Northeast India has been witness to many raging insurgencies ever since Indian independence with many of them still simmering on. The Army has been deployed in almost all the insurgency affected states in Northeast India over time, and even the Air Force was used once in Aizawl during the height of the Mizo insurgency to end a seize of an army camp by the Mizo rebels. The Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) has been in force since 1958 in various insurgency affected parts of Northeast India, giving the Army special and exceptional powers to operate in counter-insurgency operations.
The current debate that has gained momentum, that the Armed Forces are primarily meant for external threats, and not for internal counter-insurgency operations; the talks of avoiding collateral damage in populated areas, is a signal of a ‘new’ thinking in the Armed Forces and the central security policy makers. This is only welcome if it is backed by adequate reforms in the internal policing system, which they say will be bolstered soon in the Naxal affected areas, and Operation Green Hunt could go on without the Armed Forces’ help. However, even after decades of the Army’s deployment in Northeast India, the central government or the respective state governments have not managed to implement any reforms towards bolstering the internal policing structure, which could possibly replace the Army in any of its counter-insurgency duties.
Vast portions of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh have insignificant and weak local policing system, which cannot combat the complexities of strong insurgent networks at present. The ability of the Northeastern insurgent groups to continue operating as well as managing strong networks of trafficking in arms, ammunition, narcotics and fake currency is testimony to the collective failure of the Army, the local police and the internal security policies. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has admitted many times that Northeast India has been the corridor of arms and ammunition and other logistical support to the Naxalites.
The various insurgencies in Northeast India have been, to an extent, kept in abeyance by New Delhi for long now, without an attempt to solve them politically. Many of the ceasefire insurgent groups in Northeast India who kept languishing in ‘designated camps’, have invested in a huge narco-terrorism network. It requires no rocket scientist to point out that this active ‘kept in abeyance’ insurgency network in Northeast India has indeed strengthened the Naxal preparations against the government. The short sighted policy of delaying or postponing the peace in Northeast India, has in fact presented to the central government another internal security problem in the shape of this network, the dimensions of which it is yet to fully comprehend.
Given the interconnectedness of the conflict scenario in Northeast India, special counter-insurgency attention must be focused on certain insurgent ‘hotspots’, which are characterized by complex insurgent networks and insufficient governmental presence. The identifiable insurgent hotspots in Northeast India are Karbi Anglong-North Cachar Hills region of Assam, Lohit-Tirap-Changlang region of Arunachal Pradesh, West Kameng-East Kameng-Baksa-Udalguri-Sonitpur region encompassing Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, Ukhrul-Senapati-Chandel region of Manipur and Southern Mizoram. Rapid modernization of police forces, to continually monitor these ‘hotspots’ is required.
The Army, which in its normal course of duties, is meant to monitor the extremely porous border areas of Northeast India with Myanmar and Bangladesh, finds itself pressed in internal security duties in many internal areas, where the local police is insufficiently capable of handling the same. The force for monitoring these active hotspots will have to be an army-local police collaboration, as it will require strong local intelligence networks. The level of ground level and intelligence sharing coordination between the local police and the army leaves much to be desired in Northeast India, even with the presence of the Unified Command structure in some of the states. This is also because of the lack of working trust between security agencies and the varying briefs given to them by the central government at one level and the state government at another level.
A genuine peace in Northeast India will ultimately come from involving local people in the peace process, not by having an exceptional act in the form of AFSPA with little national debate on its amendment or withdrawal for over fifty years, or stalemated negotiations with insurgent groups. New Delhi needs to analyze the internal security situation of India in a wider connected framework and treat the inadequacies urgently.
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman is a Research Scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University and may reached at mirzalibra10@gmail.com. This article was published by the Institute of Peace And Conflict Studies (IPCS) and is reprinted with permission.
The brutal attack on the Central Reserve Police Force soldiers by Naxalites in Dantewada has raised many questions and concerns about internal security in India. The large Naxal presence, its firepower and its ability to strike the police forces at will, makes for a tense law and order situation in many states of India. There have been intense debates about considering the deployment of the Army and the possible use of the Air Force as well. It is pertinent at this point to analyze the internal security situation in Naxal affected areas and draw some vital linkages with the internal security situation in Northeast India.
Northeast India has been witness to many raging insurgencies ever since Indian independence with many of them still simmering on. The Army has been deployed in almost all the insurgency affected states in Northeast India over time, and even the Air Force was used once in Aizawl during the height of the Mizo insurgency to end a seize of an army camp by the Mizo rebels. The Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) has been in force since 1958 in various insurgency affected parts of Northeast India, giving the Army special and exceptional powers to operate in counter-insurgency operations.
The current debate that has gained momentum, that the Armed Forces are primarily meant for external threats, and not for internal counter-insurgency operations; the talks of avoiding collateral damage in populated areas, is a signal of a ‘new’ thinking in the Armed Forces and the central security policy makers. This is only welcome if it is backed by adequate reforms in the internal policing system, which they say will be bolstered soon in the Naxal affected areas, and Operation Green Hunt could go on without the Armed Forces’ help. However, even after decades of the Army’s deployment in Northeast India, the central government or the respective state governments have not managed to implement any reforms towards bolstering the internal policing structure, which could possibly replace the Army in any of its counter-insurgency duties.
Vast portions of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh have insignificant and weak local policing system, which cannot combat the complexities of strong insurgent networks at present. The ability of the Northeastern insurgent groups to continue operating as well as managing strong networks of trafficking in arms, ammunition, narcotics and fake currency is testimony to the collective failure of the Army, the local police and the internal security policies. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has admitted many times that Northeast India has been the corridor of arms and ammunition and other logistical support to the Naxalites.
The various insurgencies in Northeast India have been, to an extent, kept in abeyance by New Delhi for long now, without an attempt to solve them politically. Many of the ceasefire insurgent groups in Northeast India who kept languishing in ‘designated camps’, have invested in a huge narco-terrorism network. It requires no rocket scientist to point out that this active ‘kept in abeyance’ insurgency network in Northeast India has indeed strengthened the Naxal preparations against the government. The short sighted policy of delaying or postponing the peace in Northeast India, has in fact presented to the central government another internal security problem in the shape of this network, the dimensions of which it is yet to fully comprehend.
Given the interconnectedness of the conflict scenario in Northeast India, special counter-insurgency attention must be focused on certain insurgent ‘hotspots’, which are characterized by complex insurgent networks and insufficient governmental presence. The identifiable insurgent hotspots in Northeast India are Karbi Anglong-North Cachar Hills region of Assam, Lohit-Tirap-Changlang region of Arunachal Pradesh, West Kameng-East Kameng-Baksa-Udalguri-Sonitpur region encompassing Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, Ukhrul-Senapati-Chandel region of Manipur and Southern Mizoram. Rapid modernization of police forces, to continually monitor these ‘hotspots’ is required.
The Army, which in its normal course of duties, is meant to monitor the extremely porous border areas of Northeast India with Myanmar and Bangladesh, finds itself pressed in internal security duties in many internal areas, where the local police is insufficiently capable of handling the same. The force for monitoring these active hotspots will have to be an army-local police collaboration, as it will require strong local intelligence networks. The level of ground level and intelligence sharing coordination between the local police and the army leaves much to be desired in Northeast India, even with the presence of the Unified Command structure in some of the states. This is also because of the lack of working trust between security agencies and the varying briefs given to them by the central government at one level and the state government at another level.
A genuine peace in Northeast India will ultimately come from involving local people in the peace process, not by having an exceptional act in the form of AFSPA with little national debate on its amendment or withdrawal for over fifty years, or stalemated negotiations with insurgent groups. New Delhi needs to analyze the internal security situation of India in a wider connected framework and treat the inadequacies urgently.
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman is a Research Scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University and may reached at mirzalibra10@gmail.com. This article was published by the Institute of Peace And Conflict Studies (IPCS) and is reprinted with permission.
Thursday, April 15, 2010 |
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India's Maoists And The Dreamscape Of 'Solutions'
By Ajai Sahni for SATP
In November 2003, according to the then-Union Home Secretary, 55 Districts in nine Indian States were listed as "Maoist affected";1 by 2009, the country's Minister for Home Affairs, P. Chidambaram informs us, that number had risen to 223 Districts in 20 States. Further, the new 'solutions' currently being proposed, the Maoist leadership confidently assures us, will only help the Naxalites "expand to wider areas, mobilise wider masses... gather new momentum and get new dynamism."2
Some may contest the Maoist assessment of the future, but, clearly, the many 'solutions' being applied to the problem (those who have been sworn to protect India over the past decades have surely been trying to solve this 'gravest internal security threat' to the country) are not working.
No doubt, the situation is not quite as alarming as the 223 District figure (India has a total of about 636 Districts) may initially suggest. A third of the country has by no means been 'captured' by the Maoists, nor are these vast areas seething with disruptive violence. The Home Minister thus clarified that violence "has been consistently witnessed in about 400 Police Station areas of around 90 Districts in 13 States" (there are over 14,000 Police Stations in the country). But 90 Districts experiencing 'consistent violence' is by far greater than the total of 55 variously affected Districts in 2003. The steady expansion of Maoist networks and the calibrated extension of their violence, suggest a significant strategic failure on the part of the state.
The most profound reason for this strategic failure is, bluntly put, sheer and enduring stupidity. No 'solution' has any relevance whatsoever without a clear detailing of the resource configuration and the objective context within which it is to be applied. Yet, virtually the entire counter-insurgency (CI) discourse in India has remained doctrinaire, with almost no reference to the nuts and bolts of what is available, a coherent strategy into which these capacities are woven, and how this is to be implemented.
The chief manifestations of this discourse have been the dogmas of the 'military / law and order (L&O) approach'3 vs. the 'developmental / political solution' - as if by saying 'military approach' or 'developmental solution' all issues of policy, resources, strategy and tactics are resolved at a stroke.
Let us, quickly, see how this is utter nonsense. In Manipur, the Police-Population ratio stands at a startling 554 per 100,000 (at a time when the average for India was 125). In addition, some 42 battalions of Central Paramilitary Forces and the Army are deployed in a counter-insurgency grid in the State. Manipur does, of course, have an elected Government and an immensely overstaffed paraphernalia of administration, but no one pretends that there is a functional civil government in the State. Despite much 'hearts and minds' rhetoric, the 'military solution' - the use of force - is the only visible CI strategy in operation. And yet, this tiny State, with a population of under 2.4 million (ranking 22nd out of 28 States, by population size) now accounts for the largest number of insurgency-related killings for any single State in the country. Total fatalities in Manipur were 416 in 2009; Assam (population 26.7 million) accounted for 392; Jammu & Kashmir (population 10.1 million), 377; and Chhattisgarh (population 20.8 million), 345.4
On the other hand, Andhra Pradesh (population 76.2 million) has an extremely poor Police-population ratio, currently at 96 per 100,000. At the peak of the successful CI phase, between 2005-09, no more than six battalions of CPMFs were ever deployed in the State for anti-Naxalite operations, and the core responsibility of the campaign was vested squarely in the State Police. Of course, the quality of administration in the State is infinitely better than Manipur, but, once again, no one could, on the merits of the record, argue, that 'development' has ever been systematically and effectively applied as a CI strategy. In 2005, the Maoists were rampaging across every one of the State's 23 Districts, and total Naxalite-related fatalities in that year stood at 320. By 2009, total fatalities were down to 28, with the Maoists operating principally from across the borders of neighbouring States, into just four peripheral Andhra Districts.
Clearly, 'military' strategies or L&O approaches vary widely across theatres, and the efficacy of use of force is far from uniform across these. There is no simple choice of a 'military' or 'L&O' response, with automatic and inevitable consequences to follow. The question of utility and impact cannot simply be resolved without reference to detailed realities of the ground, including the character and stage of the insurgency, force structure, leadership, capacities, deployment, motivation, terrain, population, strategy and tactics. All use of force is not equal, and this is the case even where the quantum of force used may be comparable. The 'military' or 'law and order' solution, indeed, comprehends an infinitely wide spectrum of Force dispositions, strategies, tactics, policies and practices, many of them effective, and others entirely counter-productive. Nothing but a detailed study of specific campaigns - both successful and unsuccessful - can yield an understanding of what works and what fails, in what circumstances. Such a study has been conspicuous in its absence within the Indian CI-CT and security establishment, as well as among 'civil society' voices that are particularly voluble on the subject.
On the other hand, advocates of the 'developmental solution' would have us accept, as a general proposition, that the problem of terrorism-insurgency cannot be addressed through 'security responses' or use of force, but must be resolved through the implementation of a range of programmes for poverty alleviation, the 'empowerment' of disadvantaged groups, the redressal of grievances, and delivery on wider developmental goals, to undercut the 'recruitment pool' of terrorist and violent political groups.
This is another unexamined shibboleth, essentially based on a priori reasoning, a hollow tautology that rests, simply, on the unverified claim that the lack of development (poverty) is the 'root cause' of terrorism and, therefore, the 'elimination' of this 'cause' is the 'solution'. There is, here, no reference either to available resource configurations and administrative capacities, or to any rational assessment of the deficits that would need to be met in order to realize this 'solution'. One may, just as well, argue that the 'solution' to poverty is wealth; or the 'solution' to disease is good health - both claims are impeccably true, but imagine the reaction of a cancer patient being advised by his doctor to 'go home and be healthy'!
It is not surprising that the Maoists are laughing at these inanities. When the Centre declares its 'new strategy' would 'clear, hold and develop' areas under present Maoist dominance, Azad, the spokesman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) responds:
The exploiting classes have absolute control over more than 90 percent of the country's geographical area. If at all they wish to reach out to the masses with their so-called reforms, who is preventing them from doing so? Instead of addressing problems of the poor in these vast regions under their absolute control, they are talking of recapturing territory from Maoists.5
Advocacy of the 'developmental solution' is, in fact, based on a number of politically correct but altogether contra-factual assumptions.6 Among the emotively powerful articulations of this advocacy is the idiom of 'winning hearts and minds', and Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar's counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya is held up by the uninformed as a shining example of this model. But, as Paul Dixon notes, relatively mildly, "the phrase 'hearts and minds' does not accurately describe Britain's highly coercive campaign in Malaya. The British approach in Malaya did involve high levels of force, was not fought within the law and led to abuses of human rights."7 David Benest is more outspoken: "Bluntly put, coercion was the reality - 'hearts and minds' the myth."8 And in the most significant assessment, Sir Templar himself had, by 1968, come to refer to 'hearts and minds' as "that nauseating phrase I think I invented."9
In essence, the 'development solution' fails - and inevitably founders - on the following considerations:
Over the past year, nevertheless, the Centre has been tom-tomming 'massive', 'comprehensive' and 'coordinated' operations against the Maoists in the major affected States. These statements, with small variants, have found occasional echoes in some of the worst-affected States, while other States continue to support a 'negotiated solution' with the Maoists. Despite all claims to novelty, however, the essence of these pronouncements is exhausted by the tired 'multi-pronged approach' that has been the staple of the MHA's declarations for decades now.
There was, of course, some initial enthusiasm under the new dispensation at North Block for Army deployment and some kite flying about hi-tech UAV guided 'precision strikes' against the Naxalites, but better sense quickly (and fortunately) prevailed. The Centre's eventual grand vision crystallized in Home Minister Chidambaram's words: "Our response... will be police action to wrest control of territory that is now dominated by the Naxalites, restoration of civil administration and undertaking developmental activities - in that order."10 Home Secretary G.K. Pillai elaborates, with Panglossian optimism, "We hope that literally within 30 days of security forces moving in and dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil administration there."11 From Chhattisgarh, the Director General of Police, Vishwaranjan, elaborates on this scenario in classical tache d'huile (oil spot) counter-insurgency terms: "Our newest strategy is to win complete control over small areas under Maoist influence, hold them, and not withdraw forces until development in the area is well under way... We will repeat this pattern in other areas, a few at a time, until the enemy has nowhere to go."12
What is fascinating in these narratives is their exquisite simplicity and their utter divorce from reality. It would, indeed, be quite miraculous if the state could even 'restore civil administration' to vast expanses of rural India where the Maoists have no presence whatsoever, but where virtually the entire apparatus of governance has vanished. At least some of these areas are little more than a stone's throw from Delhi.
The problem with these various 'strategies' is that they aren't 'strategies' at all. These are borrowed ideas with no reference to capacities, capabilities, resources and the conditions of the ground.
A quick review of the relevant capacities is useful here. First, police-population ratios for the whole country stood at a bare 125 per 100,000 in early 2008. According to the Prime Minister's statement on September 15, 2009, this has now risen to about 145 per 100,000 - still abysmally low, compared to required ratios for peacetime policing at over 222, and ranging, in some western countries, at well over 500 per 100,000. This is, moreover, a primitive, ill-trained and ill-equipped Force, and, in most States, has little capacity or orientation to deal with a full-blown insurgency. Worse, these numbers reflect sanctioned strengths, and not the actual strength available on the ground. Thus, there was more than a 14 percent deficit against total sanctioned strength in 2008. The situation in the States most affected by Naxalism is infinitely worse. Bihar has a Police-population ratio of just 60, and a deficit of over 33 percent against sanctioned strength. Orissa has a sanctioned ratio of 97, and a deficit of nearly 19 percent. In Jharkhand, the ratio is 136/100,000, and the deficit is 21 percent; Chhattisgarh has 128/100,000 and a deficit of 26 per cent; Andhra Pradesh, 96/100,000 and a deficit of 11 percent; West Bengal, 92 per 100,000, and a deficit of 25 percent.
The crisis of leadership is more acute. At the cutting-edge ranks of Deputy Superintendent of Police to Senior Superintendent of Police, deficits in Andhra stand at 19 percent; in Bihar at 35 percent; in Chhattisgarh at 28 percent; in Jharkhand at 51 percent; in Orissa at 34 percent; and in West Bengal at 25 percent. In the 'fighting leadership' at the ranks of Assistant Sub-Inspector to Inspector, deficits in Andhra are at 15 percent; Bihar: 39 percent; Chhattisgarh: 41 percent; Jharkhand: 18 percent; Orissa, 34 percent; and West Bengal 30 percent. Crucially, sanctioned strengths in most leadership ranks are severely inadequate, and will become progressively so as recruitment to the lower ranks accelerates. The overall system does not appear to be geared to respond to these predicaments.
Manpower deficits are, of course, infinitely compounded by extreme shortfalls in technical, technological and training variables, by irrational and wasteful deployment of Forces, and by persistently imprudent political interventions. The outcome is that current capacities of Police Forces in the afflicted States are simply insufficient to design an effective response to the Maoist challenge.
The Centre pretends to come 'to the rescue' with its 'battalion approach', and there has been much talk of 'massive deployment' of CPMFs. The reality is sobering. Prior to the much advertised 'massive operations' the total allocation of CPMFs in the Maoist affected areas was a mere 37 battalions, yielding a total of just 14,800 men in the field. There is now talk of 70 battalions being sent to these areas - though it is not clear whether this will be an additional 70 or an augmentation of current Force to this number. We would, in other words, have either 70 or 107 battalions allocated under the Centre's projected operational plans, that is, 28,000 or 42,800 CPMF personnel, as the case may be, for six worst-affected States with a total area of 1.86 million square kilometers and a total population of over 446 million. This is like trying to irrigate the desert with dewdrops.
Of course, the Centre's 'operational strategy' seeks to concentrate this Force in areas of specific Maoist dominance, to 'recover' these areas, and 'bring them under civil administration'. But the Maoists would simply refuse to confront the state in its areas of strength, and the state cannot, given existing capacities, maintain permanent saturation in the 'recovered' areas. Where the state's deployments are heavy, the Maoists will simply walk away. Where state Forces are dispersed or their presence is eventually diluted, they will be selectively targeted in a campaign of attrition.
The reality is, the Maoist ideology and strategy find fertile ground in the security, administrative and political vacuum that extends over vast areas of the country. The entire structure of rural administration in the Naxalite-affected areas has been wholly emasculated, or has simply not evolved beyond the primitive structures of colonial governance, or has, through a combination of factors, including primarily the incompetence, corruption and criminalisation of the political leadership, deteriorated to the point of paralysis.
These are not deficiencies that can easily be addressed, even outside the regions where Maoists have established disruptive dominance. There has been a long-standing myth that India suffers from 'too much governance'; that its 'bloated bureaucracy' needs to be 'rationalised' through drastic 'down-sizing'. This is another bit of the most extraordinarily contra-factual nonsense that has taken firm root in the Indian imagination. The reality is, India's administrative capacities are collapsing, not just qualitatively - because of rising incompetence and corruption - but even in terms of minimal quantitative variables. Thus USA, with its belief that 'the best government governs least', has as many as 889 Federal Government employees per 100,000 population. India's Central Government employs just 295 per 100,000, and a large proportion of these are flogged out to a number of public sector enterprises and agencies entirely unconnected with core governance. The Railways, for instance, account for over 42 percent of the total pool. If Railway employees were to be excluded from the strength of Central Government Employees, this would leave us with a ratio of just 171 Central Government employees per 100,000. Moving on to State and Local Government employees, we find that, in the US, these account for another 6,314 per 100,000; in sharp contrast, Uttar Pradesh has 352; Bihar, 472; Orissa, 1,007; Chhattisgarh, 1,067; Maharashtra, 1,223; Punjab, 1,383; Gujarat, 1,694. Worse, in India, the overwhelming proportion of Government employees is in the lower cadres, as against the 'thinking' element of the state in higher echelons. Even in the latter category, qualitative profiles, including modern and administrative skills, training and technological competence are severely limited.
It is the infirmity of the state and the effective absence of its agencies and services across India's vast rural hinterland, and not some inherent and irresistible appeal of the Maoist ideology, that explains the widening footprint of this anachronistic doctrine and its violent manifestations across an apparently modernizing India. The Maoist strategy simply harnesses a complex of inducements and terror to enthral populations that have fallen into the blackholes of India's security and administrative system as a result of decades of political neglect, vacillation, collusion, corruption and ineptitude. A 'strategy' of response would have to factor in the cumulative deficits that have come to cripple the Indian state today.
On the other hand, as one senior Police official expressed it on conditions of anonymity, "if you don't have a strategy, you start operations." That is the reality of current state responses to the Maoist challenge in India.
Ajai Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management; Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism Portal; and Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He is also a founding and Executive Committee member of the Urban Futures Initiative. This article first appeared at the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
NOTES:
1. At intensities varying from marginal, through moderate to high.
2. Mohua Chatterjee, "Thanks to Chidambaram, our war will expand to wider areas: CPI (Maoist)", The Times of India, January 19, 2010.
3. I conflate the 'military' and 'law and order' approaches, as both essentially imply reliance on use of force, which is the basic template across which the contrast against the 'developmental / political' approach is constructed. Clearly, however, there is tremendous strategic distinction between reliance on the 'military' and on the 'Police', but that is an issue that requires separate treatment. The 'military' approach is, itself, far from unique or homogeneous.
4. All fatalities data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal database, www.satp.org.
5. Mohua Chatterjee, op. cit.
6. The various arguments against the 'developmental solution' have been dealt with in greater detail in Ajai Sahni, "Challenging Terrorism", India & Global Affairs, April-June, 2009.
7. Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq", Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 32, Issue 3, June 2009, p. 353.
8. David Benest, "Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76", in H. Strachen (Ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the Twentieth Century, London: Routeledge, 2006, pp. 118-19.
9. Quoted in Paul Dixon, op. cit., p. 363.
10. Statement of the Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on August 17, 2009 at the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security in New Delhi, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/Hm_is_170809.htm.
11. "Centre to launch massive operation against Naxals in November", rediffnews.com, October 12, 2009,
http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/oct/12/massive-anti-naxal-op-to-be-launched-in-nov.htm.
12. Jessica Bachman, "India steps up its fight against Naxalites", Time.com, November 20, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1940559,00.html.
In November 2003, according to the then-Union Home Secretary, 55 Districts in nine Indian States were listed as "Maoist affected";1 by 2009, the country's Minister for Home Affairs, P. Chidambaram informs us, that number had risen to 223 Districts in 20 States. Further, the new 'solutions' currently being proposed, the Maoist leadership confidently assures us, will only help the Naxalites "expand to wider areas, mobilise wider masses... gather new momentum and get new dynamism."2
Some may contest the Maoist assessment of the future, but, clearly, the many 'solutions' being applied to the problem (those who have been sworn to protect India over the past decades have surely been trying to solve this 'gravest internal security threat' to the country) are not working.
No doubt, the situation is not quite as alarming as the 223 District figure (India has a total of about 636 Districts) may initially suggest. A third of the country has by no means been 'captured' by the Maoists, nor are these vast areas seething with disruptive violence. The Home Minister thus clarified that violence "has been consistently witnessed in about 400 Police Station areas of around 90 Districts in 13 States" (there are over 14,000 Police Stations in the country). But 90 Districts experiencing 'consistent violence' is by far greater than the total of 55 variously affected Districts in 2003. The steady expansion of Maoist networks and the calibrated extension of their violence, suggest a significant strategic failure on the part of the state.
The most profound reason for this strategic failure is, bluntly put, sheer and enduring stupidity. No 'solution' has any relevance whatsoever without a clear detailing of the resource configuration and the objective context within which it is to be applied. Yet, virtually the entire counter-insurgency (CI) discourse in India has remained doctrinaire, with almost no reference to the nuts and bolts of what is available, a coherent strategy into which these capacities are woven, and how this is to be implemented.
The chief manifestations of this discourse have been the dogmas of the 'military / law and order (L&O) approach'3 vs. the 'developmental / political solution' - as if by saying 'military approach' or 'developmental solution' all issues of policy, resources, strategy and tactics are resolved at a stroke.
Let us, quickly, see how this is utter nonsense. In Manipur, the Police-Population ratio stands at a startling 554 per 100,000 (at a time when the average for India was 125). In addition, some 42 battalions of Central Paramilitary Forces and the Army are deployed in a counter-insurgency grid in the State. Manipur does, of course, have an elected Government and an immensely overstaffed paraphernalia of administration, but no one pretends that there is a functional civil government in the State. Despite much 'hearts and minds' rhetoric, the 'military solution' - the use of force - is the only visible CI strategy in operation. And yet, this tiny State, with a population of under 2.4 million (ranking 22nd out of 28 States, by population size) now accounts for the largest number of insurgency-related killings for any single State in the country. Total fatalities in Manipur were 416 in 2009; Assam (population 26.7 million) accounted for 392; Jammu & Kashmir (population 10.1 million), 377; and Chhattisgarh (population 20.8 million), 345.4
On the other hand, Andhra Pradesh (population 76.2 million) has an extremely poor Police-population ratio, currently at 96 per 100,000. At the peak of the successful CI phase, between 2005-09, no more than six battalions of CPMFs were ever deployed in the State for anti-Naxalite operations, and the core responsibility of the campaign was vested squarely in the State Police. Of course, the quality of administration in the State is infinitely better than Manipur, but, once again, no one could, on the merits of the record, argue, that 'development' has ever been systematically and effectively applied as a CI strategy. In 2005, the Maoists were rampaging across every one of the State's 23 Districts, and total Naxalite-related fatalities in that year stood at 320. By 2009, total fatalities were down to 28, with the Maoists operating principally from across the borders of neighbouring States, into just four peripheral Andhra Districts.
Clearly, 'military' strategies or L&O approaches vary widely across theatres, and the efficacy of use of force is far from uniform across these. There is no simple choice of a 'military' or 'L&O' response, with automatic and inevitable consequences to follow. The question of utility and impact cannot simply be resolved without reference to detailed realities of the ground, including the character and stage of the insurgency, force structure, leadership, capacities, deployment, motivation, terrain, population, strategy and tactics. All use of force is not equal, and this is the case even where the quantum of force used may be comparable. The 'military' or 'law and order' solution, indeed, comprehends an infinitely wide spectrum of Force dispositions, strategies, tactics, policies and practices, many of them effective, and others entirely counter-productive. Nothing but a detailed study of specific campaigns - both successful and unsuccessful - can yield an understanding of what works and what fails, in what circumstances. Such a study has been conspicuous in its absence within the Indian CI-CT and security establishment, as well as among 'civil society' voices that are particularly voluble on the subject.
On the other hand, advocates of the 'developmental solution' would have us accept, as a general proposition, that the problem of terrorism-insurgency cannot be addressed through 'security responses' or use of force, but must be resolved through the implementation of a range of programmes for poverty alleviation, the 'empowerment' of disadvantaged groups, the redressal of grievances, and delivery on wider developmental goals, to undercut the 'recruitment pool' of terrorist and violent political groups.
This is another unexamined shibboleth, essentially based on a priori reasoning, a hollow tautology that rests, simply, on the unverified claim that the lack of development (poverty) is the 'root cause' of terrorism and, therefore, the 'elimination' of this 'cause' is the 'solution'. There is, here, no reference either to available resource configurations and administrative capacities, or to any rational assessment of the deficits that would need to be met in order to realize this 'solution'. One may, just as well, argue that the 'solution' to poverty is wealth; or the 'solution' to disease is good health - both claims are impeccably true, but imagine the reaction of a cancer patient being advised by his doctor to 'go home and be healthy'!
It is not surprising that the Maoists are laughing at these inanities. When the Centre declares its 'new strategy' would 'clear, hold and develop' areas under present Maoist dominance, Azad, the spokesman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) responds:
The exploiting classes have absolute control over more than 90 percent of the country's geographical area. If at all they wish to reach out to the masses with their so-called reforms, who is preventing them from doing so? Instead of addressing problems of the poor in these vast regions under their absolute control, they are talking of recapturing territory from Maoists.5
Advocacy of the 'developmental solution' is, in fact, based on a number of politically correct but altogether contra-factual assumptions.6 Among the emotively powerful articulations of this advocacy is the idiom of 'winning hearts and minds', and Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar's counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya is held up by the uninformed as a shining example of this model. But, as Paul Dixon notes, relatively mildly, "the phrase 'hearts and minds' does not accurately describe Britain's highly coercive campaign in Malaya. The British approach in Malaya did involve high levels of force, was not fought within the law and led to abuses of human rights."7 David Benest is more outspoken: "Bluntly put, coercion was the reality - 'hearts and minds' the myth."8 And in the most significant assessment, Sir Templar himself had, by 1968, come to refer to 'hearts and minds' as "that nauseating phrase I think I invented."9
In essence, the 'development solution' fails - and inevitably founders - on the following considerations:
- You cannot develop what you do not control
- 'Development' is not something that can be ordered off a menu card. The state's absolute capacities to deliver an acceptable level of development to populations in the principal 'problem areas' are themselves limited by demographics, the available natural, financial and human resource base, and structural infirmities.
- No society in the world has ever 'out-developed' an ongoing insurgency or terrorist movement.
- The 'developmental solution' has progressively become an alibi for persistent failures to address immediate tasks of response.
- The time frames of counter-terrorism and developmental policy cannot be reconciled. Counter-terrorism demands immediate responses; development is, by definition a long-drawn-out process.
- While the rhetoric of 'development' dominates the discourse in areas of major conflict, there is little evidence of a sustained effort at development or good governance in areas - particularly in the rural hinterland - where there is no significant manifestation of insurgent or terrorist violence.
- Crucially, an overwhelming proportion of developmental resources actually flow into the vast underground economy of terrorism, strengthening the very edifice that they are intended to dismantle.
Over the past year, nevertheless, the Centre has been tom-tomming 'massive', 'comprehensive' and 'coordinated' operations against the Maoists in the major affected States. These statements, with small variants, have found occasional echoes in some of the worst-affected States, while other States continue to support a 'negotiated solution' with the Maoists. Despite all claims to novelty, however, the essence of these pronouncements is exhausted by the tired 'multi-pronged approach' that has been the staple of the MHA's declarations for decades now.
There was, of course, some initial enthusiasm under the new dispensation at North Block for Army deployment and some kite flying about hi-tech UAV guided 'precision strikes' against the Naxalites, but better sense quickly (and fortunately) prevailed. The Centre's eventual grand vision crystallized in Home Minister Chidambaram's words: "Our response... will be police action to wrest control of territory that is now dominated by the Naxalites, restoration of civil administration and undertaking developmental activities - in that order."10 Home Secretary G.K. Pillai elaborates, with Panglossian optimism, "We hope that literally within 30 days of security forces moving in and dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil administration there."11 From Chhattisgarh, the Director General of Police, Vishwaranjan, elaborates on this scenario in classical tache d'huile (oil spot) counter-insurgency terms: "Our newest strategy is to win complete control over small areas under Maoist influence, hold them, and not withdraw forces until development in the area is well under way... We will repeat this pattern in other areas, a few at a time, until the enemy has nowhere to go."12
What is fascinating in these narratives is their exquisite simplicity and their utter divorce from reality. It would, indeed, be quite miraculous if the state could even 'restore civil administration' to vast expanses of rural India where the Maoists have no presence whatsoever, but where virtually the entire apparatus of governance has vanished. At least some of these areas are little more than a stone's throw from Delhi.
The problem with these various 'strategies' is that they aren't 'strategies' at all. These are borrowed ideas with no reference to capacities, capabilities, resources and the conditions of the ground.
A quick review of the relevant capacities is useful here. First, police-population ratios for the whole country stood at a bare 125 per 100,000 in early 2008. According to the Prime Minister's statement on September 15, 2009, this has now risen to about 145 per 100,000 - still abysmally low, compared to required ratios for peacetime policing at over 222, and ranging, in some western countries, at well over 500 per 100,000. This is, moreover, a primitive, ill-trained and ill-equipped Force, and, in most States, has little capacity or orientation to deal with a full-blown insurgency. Worse, these numbers reflect sanctioned strengths, and not the actual strength available on the ground. Thus, there was more than a 14 percent deficit against total sanctioned strength in 2008. The situation in the States most affected by Naxalism is infinitely worse. Bihar has a Police-population ratio of just 60, and a deficit of over 33 percent against sanctioned strength. Orissa has a sanctioned ratio of 97, and a deficit of nearly 19 percent. In Jharkhand, the ratio is 136/100,000, and the deficit is 21 percent; Chhattisgarh has 128/100,000 and a deficit of 26 per cent; Andhra Pradesh, 96/100,000 and a deficit of 11 percent; West Bengal, 92 per 100,000, and a deficit of 25 percent.
The crisis of leadership is more acute. At the cutting-edge ranks of Deputy Superintendent of Police to Senior Superintendent of Police, deficits in Andhra stand at 19 percent; in Bihar at 35 percent; in Chhattisgarh at 28 percent; in Jharkhand at 51 percent; in Orissa at 34 percent; and in West Bengal at 25 percent. In the 'fighting leadership' at the ranks of Assistant Sub-Inspector to Inspector, deficits in Andhra are at 15 percent; Bihar: 39 percent; Chhattisgarh: 41 percent; Jharkhand: 18 percent; Orissa, 34 percent; and West Bengal 30 percent. Crucially, sanctioned strengths in most leadership ranks are severely inadequate, and will become progressively so as recruitment to the lower ranks accelerates. The overall system does not appear to be geared to respond to these predicaments.
Manpower deficits are, of course, infinitely compounded by extreme shortfalls in technical, technological and training variables, by irrational and wasteful deployment of Forces, and by persistently imprudent political interventions. The outcome is that current capacities of Police Forces in the afflicted States are simply insufficient to design an effective response to the Maoist challenge.
The Centre pretends to come 'to the rescue' with its 'battalion approach', and there has been much talk of 'massive deployment' of CPMFs. The reality is sobering. Prior to the much advertised 'massive operations' the total allocation of CPMFs in the Maoist affected areas was a mere 37 battalions, yielding a total of just 14,800 men in the field. There is now talk of 70 battalions being sent to these areas - though it is not clear whether this will be an additional 70 or an augmentation of current Force to this number. We would, in other words, have either 70 or 107 battalions allocated under the Centre's projected operational plans, that is, 28,000 or 42,800 CPMF personnel, as the case may be, for six worst-affected States with a total area of 1.86 million square kilometers and a total population of over 446 million. This is like trying to irrigate the desert with dewdrops.
Of course, the Centre's 'operational strategy' seeks to concentrate this Force in areas of specific Maoist dominance, to 'recover' these areas, and 'bring them under civil administration'. But the Maoists would simply refuse to confront the state in its areas of strength, and the state cannot, given existing capacities, maintain permanent saturation in the 'recovered' areas. Where the state's deployments are heavy, the Maoists will simply walk away. Where state Forces are dispersed or their presence is eventually diluted, they will be selectively targeted in a campaign of attrition.
The reality is, the Maoist ideology and strategy find fertile ground in the security, administrative and political vacuum that extends over vast areas of the country. The entire structure of rural administration in the Naxalite-affected areas has been wholly emasculated, or has simply not evolved beyond the primitive structures of colonial governance, or has, through a combination of factors, including primarily the incompetence, corruption and criminalisation of the political leadership, deteriorated to the point of paralysis.
These are not deficiencies that can easily be addressed, even outside the regions where Maoists have established disruptive dominance. There has been a long-standing myth that India suffers from 'too much governance'; that its 'bloated bureaucracy' needs to be 'rationalised' through drastic 'down-sizing'. This is another bit of the most extraordinarily contra-factual nonsense that has taken firm root in the Indian imagination. The reality is, India's administrative capacities are collapsing, not just qualitatively - because of rising incompetence and corruption - but even in terms of minimal quantitative variables. Thus USA, with its belief that 'the best government governs least', has as many as 889 Federal Government employees per 100,000 population. India's Central Government employs just 295 per 100,000, and a large proportion of these are flogged out to a number of public sector enterprises and agencies entirely unconnected with core governance. The Railways, for instance, account for over 42 percent of the total pool. If Railway employees were to be excluded from the strength of Central Government Employees, this would leave us with a ratio of just 171 Central Government employees per 100,000. Moving on to State and Local Government employees, we find that, in the US, these account for another 6,314 per 100,000; in sharp contrast, Uttar Pradesh has 352; Bihar, 472; Orissa, 1,007; Chhattisgarh, 1,067; Maharashtra, 1,223; Punjab, 1,383; Gujarat, 1,694. Worse, in India, the overwhelming proportion of Government employees is in the lower cadres, as against the 'thinking' element of the state in higher echelons. Even in the latter category, qualitative profiles, including modern and administrative skills, training and technological competence are severely limited.
It is the infirmity of the state and the effective absence of its agencies and services across India's vast rural hinterland, and not some inherent and irresistible appeal of the Maoist ideology, that explains the widening footprint of this anachronistic doctrine and its violent manifestations across an apparently modernizing India. The Maoist strategy simply harnesses a complex of inducements and terror to enthral populations that have fallen into the blackholes of India's security and administrative system as a result of decades of political neglect, vacillation, collusion, corruption and ineptitude. A 'strategy' of response would have to factor in the cumulative deficits that have come to cripple the Indian state today.
On the other hand, as one senior Police official expressed it on conditions of anonymity, "if you don't have a strategy, you start operations." That is the reality of current state responses to the Maoist challenge in India.
Ajai Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management; Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism Portal; and Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He is also a founding and Executive Committee member of the Urban Futures Initiative. This article first appeared at the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
NOTES:
1. At intensities varying from marginal, through moderate to high.
2. Mohua Chatterjee, "Thanks to Chidambaram, our war will expand to wider areas: CPI (Maoist)", The Times of India, January 19, 2010.
3. I conflate the 'military' and 'law and order' approaches, as both essentially imply reliance on use of force, which is the basic template across which the contrast against the 'developmental / political' approach is constructed. Clearly, however, there is tremendous strategic distinction between reliance on the 'military' and on the 'Police', but that is an issue that requires separate treatment. The 'military' approach is, itself, far from unique or homogeneous.
4. All fatalities data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal database, www.satp.org.
5. Mohua Chatterjee, op. cit.
6. The various arguments against the 'developmental solution' have been dealt with in greater detail in Ajai Sahni, "Challenging Terrorism", India & Global Affairs, April-June, 2009.
7. Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq", Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 32, Issue 3, June 2009, p. 353.
8. David Benest, "Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76", in H. Strachen (Ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the Twentieth Century, London: Routeledge, 2006, pp. 118-19.
9. Quoted in Paul Dixon, op. cit., p. 363.
10. Statement of the Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on August 17, 2009 at the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security in New Delhi, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/Hm_is_170809.htm.
11. "Centre to launch massive operation against Naxals in November", rediffnews.com, October 12, 2009,
http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/oct/12/massive-anti-naxal-op-to-be-launched-in-nov.htm.
12. Jessica Bachman, "India steps up its fight against Naxalites", Time.com, November 20, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1940559,00.html.
Wednesday, April 07, 2010 |
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6/4: India's Black Day In Counter-Insurgency
by B. Raman
6/4 will go down as a black day in the history of India's counter-insurgency just as 26/11 became a black day in the history of Indian counter-terrorism.
In a well-prepared and well-executed attack of unprecedented mobilisation, precision and savagery a large number of Maoists (Naxalites_) -- estimated by the local police to be about 1000 strong -- ambushed a combined party of over 80 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the District Police returning from road security duty and managed to kill 72 members of the CRPF and one member of the District police force on April 6,2010. The Maoists had reportedly taken up position on a hill overlooking the route by which the party was returning after performing its task. It is not clear whether the route was a regular road or a motorable jungle track. The ambush took place in the thick Mukrana forests of Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.
The fact that the Maoists were able to mobilise such a large number of persons for the ambush would indicate that they had advance indication of the return of the CRPF party by that route. They might have had advance intelligence of the plans of the party or they might have assessed that the CRPF might be returning by this road after watching the CRPF men conduct search and destroy operations in the area for three days.
A rule of precaution in counter-insurgency operation is that you don't use the same route for going to an operational area and for returning from there. Often, this precaution is not followed by the security forces either due to carelessness or due to the fact that the security forces do not have much of a choice due to the poor development of roads in the jungle areas in which the Maoists operate.
One may recall an incident a couple of years ago when a large police party had gone by boat from Andhra Pradesh into Orissa. The Maoists had noticed them going and had correctly assessed that the AP police party would be returning by the same route. When they did, a large number of Maoists had taken up position on a raised feature overlooking the river and they literally mowed down over 50 members of the police party.
We had probably not learnt the right lessons from the river ambush and facilitated a deadly road ambush in thick forests by not following basic dos and donts of counter-insurgency. The CRPF and the District Police have to perform a thankless task for want of proper road and telecommunications networks in the Maoist-infected areas. While the Maoists are trained to treck long distances by foot, the security forces tend to be road and vehicles-bound. They become sitting ducks for the insurgents, who surprise them with explosives and landmines and then mow them down with hand-held weapons. The reflexes of the security forces tend to be weak as could be seen from the fact that there have been very few instances of an ambushed security forces patrol recovering from the ambush and retaliating against the Maoists. Ambushes always tend to be fatal for the security forces with very few instances of successful counter-ambushes by the security forces.
Continuing serious deficiencies in rural policing and in police-rural communities relationships have been coming in the way of village help for the police by way of preventive intelligence. Counter-intelligence in the rural areas to prevent the penetration of the security forces by the Maoists is also weak. The fact that only one member of the District Police was killed in the ambush of April 6 as against 72 members of the CRPF makes one suspect possible collusion between the Maoists and some members of the District Police. Since the Maoist and the District Police recruits are recruited from the same rural stock, possibilities of penetration of the new police recruits by the Maoists are high.
The time has come to think in terms of using helicopter patrols and spotter drones in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists in areas covered by thick jungles. An important question to be examined in this connection is how to prevent civilian casualties of villagers and residents of jungles and avoid environmental damage.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
6/4 will go down as a black day in the history of India's counter-insurgency just as 26/11 became a black day in the history of Indian counter-terrorism.
In a well-prepared and well-executed attack of unprecedented mobilisation, precision and savagery a large number of Maoists (Naxalites_) -- estimated by the local police to be about 1000 strong -- ambushed a combined party of over 80 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the District Police returning from road security duty and managed to kill 72 members of the CRPF and one member of the District police force on April 6,2010. The Maoists had reportedly taken up position on a hill overlooking the route by which the party was returning after performing its task. It is not clear whether the route was a regular road or a motorable jungle track. The ambush took place in the thick Mukrana forests of Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.
The fact that the Maoists were able to mobilise such a large number of persons for the ambush would indicate that they had advance indication of the return of the CRPF party by that route. They might have had advance intelligence of the plans of the party or they might have assessed that the CRPF might be returning by this road after watching the CRPF men conduct search and destroy operations in the area for three days.
A rule of precaution in counter-insurgency operation is that you don't use the same route for going to an operational area and for returning from there. Often, this precaution is not followed by the security forces either due to carelessness or due to the fact that the security forces do not have much of a choice due to the poor development of roads in the jungle areas in which the Maoists operate.
One may recall an incident a couple of years ago when a large police party had gone by boat from Andhra Pradesh into Orissa. The Maoists had noticed them going and had correctly assessed that the AP police party would be returning by the same route. When they did, a large number of Maoists had taken up position on a raised feature overlooking the river and they literally mowed down over 50 members of the police party.
We had probably not learnt the right lessons from the river ambush and facilitated a deadly road ambush in thick forests by not following basic dos and donts of counter-insurgency. The CRPF and the District Police have to perform a thankless task for want of proper road and telecommunications networks in the Maoist-infected areas. While the Maoists are trained to treck long distances by foot, the security forces tend to be road and vehicles-bound. They become sitting ducks for the insurgents, who surprise them with explosives and landmines and then mow them down with hand-held weapons. The reflexes of the security forces tend to be weak as could be seen from the fact that there have been very few instances of an ambushed security forces patrol recovering from the ambush and retaliating against the Maoists. Ambushes always tend to be fatal for the security forces with very few instances of successful counter-ambushes by the security forces.
Continuing serious deficiencies in rural policing and in police-rural communities relationships have been coming in the way of village help for the police by way of preventive intelligence. Counter-intelligence in the rural areas to prevent the penetration of the security forces by the Maoists is also weak. The fact that only one member of the District Police was killed in the ambush of April 6 as against 72 members of the CRPF makes one suspect possible collusion between the Maoists and some members of the District Police. Since the Maoist and the District Police recruits are recruited from the same rural stock, possibilities of penetration of the new police recruits by the Maoists are high.
The time has come to think in terms of using helicopter patrols and spotter drones in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists in areas covered by thick jungles. An important question to be examined in this connection is how to prevent civilian casualties of villagers and residents of jungles and avoid environmental damage.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Wednesday, April 07, 2010 |
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Attack By Maoist Rebels Kills Indian Troops; Over 75 Dead
By Anjana Pasricha
In India, Maoist rebels have mounted one of their deadliest attacks on security forces, killing at least 75 policemen. It is the second strike by the rebels this week and comes as the guerrillas step up attacks in response to an anti-Maoist offensive launched by the government.
Police say a patrol party of more than 100 paramilitary forces was on its way to Dantewada, in Chattisgarh state, early Tuesday, when it was surrounded and ambushed by hundreds of Maoist rebels. The patrol party had been sent to rescue soldiers who had come under attack when they were engaged in an anti-Maoist offensive in the remote and forested area.
Officials say the rebels triggered land mine explosions and fired indiscriminately on the soldiers from hilltops. Fighting carried on hours after the ambush began.
Home Minister P. Chidambaram called it a huge attack by the rebels, who are also known as Naxalites. Their group is called the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPM Maoist.
"They seem to have walked into a camp or a trap set by the Naxalites," he said. "Casualties are quite high and I am deeply shocked. But this shows the savage nature of the CPM Maoist, their brutality and savagery which they are capable of."
The latest Maoist strike is the deadliest since the government launched an anti-Maoist operation last year, vowing to root out the guerillas from their strongholds in several central and eastern states.
Maoist leaders have threatened to step up attacks, in response to the offensive, and have conducted several raids targeting security forces. Sunday, they triggered a land mine blast which killed 10 soldiers in the eastern Orissa state. In February, they carried out a daylight attack in West Bengal state, killing at least two dozen police.
Ajay Sahni, who heads the Institute of Conflict Studies in New Delhi, says security forces are vulnerable because the numbers deployed are too few to combat the rebels in the huge swathes of territory where they are active.
"They [soldiers] are spread out so thin, you can take them out wherever you want. When you do not have adequate level of saturation, they pick you off on your peripheries. They pick you off on your vulnerabilities. They pick you off on transport. They pick you up when you are in movement," Sahni said. "So they will just keep on knocking off five people here, ten people there, when they are lucky 50-60 people at a time."
The operation to counter the rebels was launched last year as the guerrillas steadily gained influence in rural and remote areas, which remain backward and untouched by economic progress witnessed in other parts of the country.
The Maoist rebels say they are fighting for the rights of the rural poor. Top Indian leaders have called the insurgency the most serious domestic threat faced by the country.
Source: VOA
In India, Maoist rebels have mounted one of their deadliest attacks on security forces, killing at least 75 policemen. It is the second strike by the rebels this week and comes as the guerrillas step up attacks in response to an anti-Maoist offensive launched by the government.
Police say a patrol party of more than 100 paramilitary forces was on its way to Dantewada, in Chattisgarh state, early Tuesday, when it was surrounded and ambushed by hundreds of Maoist rebels. The patrol party had been sent to rescue soldiers who had come under attack when they were engaged in an anti-Maoist offensive in the remote and forested area.
Officials say the rebels triggered land mine explosions and fired indiscriminately on the soldiers from hilltops. Fighting carried on hours after the ambush began.
Home Minister P. Chidambaram called it a huge attack by the rebels, who are also known as Naxalites. Their group is called the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPM Maoist.
"They seem to have walked into a camp or a trap set by the Naxalites," he said. "Casualties are quite high and I am deeply shocked. But this shows the savage nature of the CPM Maoist, their brutality and savagery which they are capable of."
The latest Maoist strike is the deadliest since the government launched an anti-Maoist operation last year, vowing to root out the guerillas from their strongholds in several central and eastern states.
Maoist leaders have threatened to step up attacks, in response to the offensive, and have conducted several raids targeting security forces. Sunday, they triggered a land mine blast which killed 10 soldiers in the eastern Orissa state. In February, they carried out a daylight attack in West Bengal state, killing at least two dozen police.
Ajay Sahni, who heads the Institute of Conflict Studies in New Delhi, says security forces are vulnerable because the numbers deployed are too few to combat the rebels in the huge swathes of territory where they are active.
"They [soldiers] are spread out so thin, you can take them out wherever you want. When you do not have adequate level of saturation, they pick you off on your peripheries. They pick you off on your vulnerabilities. They pick you off on transport. They pick you up when you are in movement," Sahni said. "So they will just keep on knocking off five people here, ten people there, when they are lucky 50-60 people at a time."
The operation to counter the rebels was launched last year as the guerrillas steadily gained influence in rural and remote areas, which remain backward and untouched by economic progress witnessed in other parts of the country.
The Maoist rebels say they are fighting for the rights of the rural poor. Top Indian leaders have called the insurgency the most serious domestic threat faced by the country.
Source: VOA
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 |
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India's Army Caught In Ambush, Over 70 Soldiers Killed
At least 70 soldiers and police officers were killed in an ambush that was set this morning by alleged Naxalite (Maoist) rebels in central India this morning, reports MISNA.
The ‘Times of India’ said that the number of killed and wounded is slated to increase in the next few hours, seeing as many of the wounded are in very serious condition.
According to an early and partial report, the ambush took place in the district of Dantewada, in the state of Chhattisgarh, in the early hours of the day and it targeted a military unit returning from an operation against the rebels in the Mukrana forest.
MISNA reported that the ‘Times of India’ said the regular military troops were caught in an ambush as the rebels attacked them from nearby hills as they marched along the main road.
If the deathtoll is confirmed, this would be one of the deadliest attacks ever carried out by the Naxalite rebels.
At the end of last year, the Indian government launched a vast anti-maoist offensive in the area where this ambush took place, which is considered to have one of the largest Maosit rebel contingents.
Since 2004, the Maoist rebellion has caused at least 1500 deaths in Chhattisgarh, of which 400 are civilians. The Maoists, or Naxalites, claim to have taken up the armed struggle to install an egalitarian government and to emancipate the Dalit (low cast) and tribal people, who are marginalized from the rest of society.
Source: Original reporting MISNA
The ‘Times of India’ said that the number of killed and wounded is slated to increase in the next few hours, seeing as many of the wounded are in very serious condition.
According to an early and partial report, the ambush took place in the district of Dantewada, in the state of Chhattisgarh, in the early hours of the day and it targeted a military unit returning from an operation against the rebels in the Mukrana forest.
MISNA reported that the ‘Times of India’ said the regular military troops were caught in an ambush as the rebels attacked them from nearby hills as they marched along the main road.
If the deathtoll is confirmed, this would be one of the deadliest attacks ever carried out by the Naxalite rebels.
At the end of last year, the Indian government launched a vast anti-maoist offensive in the area where this ambush took place, which is considered to have one of the largest Maosit rebel contingents.
Since 2004, the Maoist rebellion has caused at least 1500 deaths in Chhattisgarh, of which 400 are civilians. The Maoists, or Naxalites, claim to have taken up the armed struggle to install an egalitarian government and to emancipate the Dalit (low cast) and tribal people, who are marginalized from the rest of society.
Source: Original reporting MISNA
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India And Her Maoists
By Ajai Sahni for SATP
A decade and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more than three decades after the Chinese began to gradually unshackle themselves of Maoist dogma, to progressively embrace the mantras of capitalism, India is experiencing a vast and escalating surge of a violent Maoist rebellion. To the Western mind, the developments in both Russia and China irrevocably demonstrated the failure of the communist ideology, and it is bewildering to see a resurgence of this discredited doctrine in an India that has widely come to be regarded as an engine of growth, a dynamic economy, a rising global power and a stable centre of democratic governance, in an otherwise volatile and crisis-ridden South Asian region. The seduction of Maoism in India, however, remains very real.
India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has, since November 2004, repeatedly declared that the Maoists - in local parlance, also called 'Naxalites' - constitute the country's "greatest internal security challenge". The assessment has been sharply underlined by Home Minister P. Chidambaram's disclosures, in September 2009, that the Maoists were 'active' in as many as 223 Districts across 20 States, out of a total of 626 Districts and 28 States in the country. Of course, only a fraction of these Districts have actually witnessed Maoist violence, and most are in the early stages of 'revolutionary mobilisation' - the creation of basic networks, the establishment of underground and 'overground' organisations, and the opportunistic harnessing of local grievances for radical political activity. The Home Minister has thus revealed that violence "has been consistently witnessed in about 400 Police station areas of around 90 Districts in 13 States".
It is sobering, however, to note that, at a meeting of the Central Coordination Committee of Naxalite-affected States at Bhubaneshwar on November 21, 2003, the then Union Home Secretary had disclosed that a total of 55 districts in nine States were affected by varying degrees of Naxalite activity. Just ten months later, on September 21, 2004, an official note circulated at the meeting of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States indicated that this number had gone up to as many as 156 Districts in 13 States by September 2004.2 The sphere of Maoist activity was estimated to have expanded further to 170 districts in 15 States by February 20053, to push relentlessly on to the present figure of 223 Districts in 20 States.
The dramatic expansion of Naxalite activities is the more spectacular when seen against the slow, painstaking and uncertain struggle that went into the seizure of the 55 districts that had fallen under their shadow by the end of 2003. The current movement traces its genealogy back to the insurrection of 1967 in the Naxalbari area of North Bengal (hence the appellation "Naxalites"), but that insurgency - after a wildfire spread in its early years - had been comprehensively defeated by 1973, with the entire top leadership of the spearhead Communist Party of India - Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) either jailed or dead. What little remained of its splintered survivor organizations was destroyed during Indira Gandhi's Emergency of 1975.
It was in 1980, with the formation of the People's War Group (PWG) under the leadership of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah (an erstwhile Central Organising Committee Member of the CPI-ML) in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, and the reorganization of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar in the mid-1980s, that the movement resurfaced in some strength. Initial successes were, again, rapid, and by the mid-1980s, 31 districts in seven States were afflicted by Naxalite violence. By the early 1990s, however, the problem had been eliminated from at least 16 of these districts, bringing the total number of affected districts to just 15 in four States.4 It is from this uncertain revival that the Maoists have swelled to their present power.
Despite the Prime Minister's unwavering focus on the dangers of the Maoist rebellion, this threat was carelessly dismissed by much of India's political leadership, including his own Cabinet colleagues, till fairly recently. On April 15, 2005, the Prime Minister articulated the most crystalline perspective on terrorism and political violence:
Less than ten days later, his then Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, publicly declared, "The Government is not interested in using weapons. They (the Naxalites) are our brothers and sisters and we know that this is a socio-economic problem rather than one of law and order… " 5While the dissonance was not as strident, there was certainly also a grave measure of denial in the then-Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's comment that, "Naxalite activity in Andhra Pradesh and other parts has caused some concerns but it is manageable and there is no need for anyone to panic. The problem is being dealt with."6 Such conflicts of perspective remained endemic till Chidambaram took over as Home Minister on November 30, 2008.
Such discordance of perspectives in the highest echelons of the national Government appears, now, to be substantially a thing of the past. Unfortunately, the state appears to have taken a hasty swing from under-reaction to unplanned and ill-conceived belligerence over the past months. Certainly since the re-election of the Manmohan Singh Government in May 2009, steady leaks from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and other Central departments and agencies have fed a media frenzy about 'surgical strikes' by combined teams of 'Special Forces' from the States and the Central Paramilitary Forces, in a 'coordinated' and 'massive' offensive across the Maoist 'heartland' areas. These imaginings have been backed with sci-fi visions of high resolution aerial, satellite and thermal imagery and air support for ground troops.
As the Centre loudly and continuously tom-tommed its projected 'massive operations', it became abundantly clear these would come as no surprise whatsoever to the Maoists. Indeed, there was ample evidence that the Maoists had been systematically preparing for the 'imminent' onslaught for months, and had already initiated operations to thwart and circumvent the state's strategy. A Maoist Politburo document of June 12, 2009, had warned that 'revolutionary cadres' had to prepare themselves for "far more brutal, deadly and savage" state repression "than under any other regime hitherto witnessed" and would have to deal with "the state's khaki (Police) and olive-clad (Army) terrorist forces". The Politburo, however, also declared,
As talk of an imminent 'war' against the Naxalites escalated, consequently, diversionary violence by the rebels intensified. As against 721 confirmed fatalities in 2008 (MHA data), the South Asia Terrorism Portal had already documented a provisional total of 873 fatalities in Maoist-related violence in 2009 (till November 16). 2009 has already witnessed as many as 77 major incidents (defined as incidents involving three or more fatalities) as against 59 in 2008.
This wave of pre-emptive Maoist violence has evidently had a sobering impact on the strategicians of the Centre's 'massive operation', and there has been a dramatic dilution of the earlier 'war rhetoric'. On November 12, the Home Minister dismissed talk of the Central operation as "pure invention of the media" (though he omitted mention of the significant and continuous leaks from the Home Ministry that had fed distorted public perceptions). He declared, further, that what was to be expected "in the months ahead is merely a more coordinated effort by the state police to reassert control over territory or tracts of land where regrettably the civil administration has lost control. And for that purpose we (the Centre) will assist them in every manner possible, particularly by providing paramilitary forces and sharing of intelligence."
How did this happen? How could a group variously estimated to have no more than 15 to 20,000 armed cadre spread thinly across vast territories so quickly force the combined might of the Federal and State Governments into an apparent turnaround? The reality is that the Maoists have consolidated their disruptive dominance in areas where the state has little presence and, worse, the cumulative capacity deficits in the security apparatus are so great that there is little possibility of altering the balance of Force in any radical measure to secure a demonstrable victory against the rebels.
It is crucial to review the relevant state capacities in this context. First, police-population ratios for the whole country stood at a bare 125 per 100,000 in early 2008. According to the Prime Minister's statement at the Conference of Directors General of Police on September 15, 2009, this has now risen to about 145 per 100,000 - still abysmally low, compared to required ratios for peacetime policing at well over 200, and ranging, in some western countries, at over 500 per 100,000. This is, moreover, a primitive, ill-trained and ill-equipped Force, and, in most States, has little capacity or orientation to deal with a full-blown insurgency. Worse, these numbers reflect sanctioned strengths, and not the actual strength available on the ground. Thus, there was more than a 14 percent deficit against total sanctioned strength in 2008. The situation in the States most affected by Naxalism is infinitely worse. Bihar has a Police-population ratio of just 60, and a deficit of over 33 percent against sanctioned strength. Orissa has a sanctioned ratio of 97, and a deficit of nearly 19 percent. In Jharkhand, the ratio is 136/100,000, and the deficit is 21 percent; Chhattisgarh has 128/100,000 and a deficit of 26 per cent; Andhra Pradesh, 96/100,000 and a deficit of 11 percent; West Bengal, 92 per 100,000, and a deficit of 25 percent.
The crisis of leadership is more acute. At the cutting edge ranks of Deputy Superintendent of Police to Senior Superintendent of Police, deficits in Andhra stand at 19 percent; in Bihar at 35 percent; in Chhattisgarh at 28 percent; in Jharkhand at 51 percent; in Orissa at 34 percent; and in West Bengal at 25 percent. In the 'fighting leadership' at the ranks of Assistant Sub-Inspector to Inspector, deficits in Andhra are at 15 percent; Bihar: 39 percent; Chhattisgarh: 41 percent; Jharkhand: 18 percent; Orissa, 34 percent; and West Bengal 30 percent. Crucially, sanctioned strengths in most leadership ranks are severely inadequate, and will become progressively so as recruitment to the lower ranks accelerates. The overall system does not appear to be geared to respond to these predicaments. In the worst case, for instance, Orissa has a current sanctioned strength of as many as 207 officers in the IPS ranks, but has just 84 officers currently available. The State had requested the Centre to allocate a trifling eight IPS officers from the graduating batch of 2009; the Centre allocated just four - a number that will be significantly exceeded by those retiring this year, and against the current deficit of as many as 123 officers.
Manpower deficits are, of course, infinitely compounded by extreme shortfalls in technical, technological and training variables, by irrational and wasteful deployment of Forces, and by persistently imprudent political interventions. The outcome is that current capacities of Police Forces in the afflicted States are simply insufficient to design an effective response to the Maoist challenge.
The Centre pretends to come 'to the rescue' with its 'battalion approach', and there has been much talk of 'massive deployment' of CPMFs. The reality is sobering. Prior to the much advertised 'massive operations' the total allocation of CPMFs in the Maoist affected areas was a mere 37 battalions, yielding a total of just 14,800 men in the field. There is now talk of 70 battalions being sent to these areas - though it is not clear whether this will be an additional 70 or an augmentation of current Force to this number. We would, in other words, have either 70 or 107 battalions allocated under the Centre's projected operational plans, that is, 28,000 or 42,800 CPMF personnel, as the case may be, for six worst affected States with a total area of 1.86 million square kilometers and a total population of over 446 million. This is like trying to irrigate the desert with dewdrops.
Of course, the Centre's operational strategy would seek to concentrate this Force in areas of specific Maoist dominance, to 'recover' these areas, and then 'bring them under civil administration'. But the Maoists would simply refuse to confront the state in its areas of strength, and the state cannot, given existing capacities, maintain permanent saturation in the 'recovered' areas. Where the state's deployments are heavy, the Maoists will simply walk away. Where State Forces are dispersed or their presence is eventually diluted, they will be selectively targeted in a campaign of attrition.
The reality is, the Maoist ideology and strategy finds fertile ground in the security, administrative and political vacuum that extends over vast areas of the country, where the state is systematically and chronically failing to provide the public goods and services that it is obliged to - including the security of life and property, criminal justice and opportunities for social and economic growth. In such circumstances, it is inevitable that other individuals and agencies will step in to fill the vacuum. It is inevitable, also, that in most such cases, these individuals and agencies will not be constrained by the limits of law or any established procedure, in their interactions with local populations, and, consequently, that these interactions will tend to be unacceptably violent, exploitative and even tyrannical.
The fact is that the entire structure of rural administration in the Naxalite-affected areas has been wholly emasculated, or has simply not evolved beyond the primitive structures of colonial governance, or has, through a combination of factors, including primarily the incompetence, corruption and criminalisation of the political leadership, deteriorated to the point of paralysis.
This give rise to strong advocacy in the India establishment and among armies of international 'activists' and 'experts' for another bogus 'solution' to the Maoist rampage: bringing 'development' and 'civil administration' to areas currently under Maoist disruptive dominance. But this 'strategy' - if kite-flying deserves such a title - has no possible future. It is based on a simple logic of inversion: if the lack of administration is the problem, providing administration is the obvious solution. But this is not as easy as it may first seem.
There has been a long-standing myth that India suffers from 'too much governance'; that its 'bloated bureaucracy' needs to be 'rationalised' through drastic reduction. This is another bit of the most extraordinarily contrafactual nonsense that has taken firm root in the Indian imagination. The reality is, India's administrative capacities are collapsing, not just qualitatively - because of the rising incompetence and corruption of the system - but even in terms of minimal quantitative variables. Thus USA, with its belief that "the best government governs least" has as many as 889 Federal Government employees per 100,000 population. India's Central Government employs just 295 per 100,000, and a large proportion of these are flogged out to a number of public sector enterprises and units entirely unconnected with core governance. The Railways, for instance, is the largest single Central Government employer, accounting for over 42 percent of the total pool. If Railway employees were to be excluded from the strength of Central Government Employees, this would leave us with a ratio of just 171 Central Government employees per 100,000. Moving on to State and Local Government employees, we find that, in the US, these account for another 6,314 per 100,000; in sharp contrast, Uttar Pradesh has 352; Bihar, 472; Orissa, 1,007; Chhattisgarh, 1,067; Maharashtra, 1,223; Punjab, 1,383; Gujarat, 1,694. Worse, in India, the overwhelming proportion of Government employees is in the lower cadres, as against the 'thinking' element of the state in higher echelons. Even in the latter category, qualitative profiles, including modern and administrative skills, training and technological competence are severely limited. Crucially, there is no plan or programme, given current resource configurations, that can address the cumulative developmental deficits in India in any timeframe that is relevant to counter-insurgency goals. Given current state capacities, it must be clear, no proposed strategy can offer the possibility of a decisive victory, or even enduring gains, against the Maoists.
It is the infirmity of the state, and the effective absence of its agencies and services across India's vast rural hinterland, and not some inherent and irresistible appeal of the Maoist ideology, that explains the seeming 'popularity' of this anachronistic doctrine in a modernizing world and an apparently modernizing India. The Maoist strategy simply harnesses a complex of inducements and terror to enthral populations that have fallen into the blackholes of India's administrative and security system as a result of decades of political neglect, vacillation, collusion, corruption and ineptitude.
Ajai Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management; Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism Portal; and Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He is also a founding and Executive Committee member of the Urban Futures Initiative. This article first appeared at the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
1. Mao Tse Tung, "The People's Liberation Army Captures Nanking", April 1949.
2. Ajai Sahni, "Naxalites: While We Were Sleeping", South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, Number 19, November 22, 2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_19.htm#assessment1) Nihar Nayak, "Naxalites: The Economy at Risk", South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, Number 31, February 13, 2005, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_31.htm.
3. Nihar Nayak, "Naxalites: The Economy at Risk", op.cit.
4. Ajai Sahni, "Bad Medicine for a Red Epidemic", South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, Number 12, October 4, 2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_12.htm#ASSESSMENT2.
5. Union Minister's statement at a meeting with representatives of political parties and voluntary organisations in Bangalore, The Telegraph, April 25, 2005, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050425/asp/nation/story_4658169.asp
6. Ambassador Mulford, during a visit to Andhra Pradesh. See "India rejects Mulford remarks on Naxal violence", The Times of India, January 29, 2005, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1004832.cms
A decade and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more than three decades after the Chinese began to gradually unshackle themselves of Maoist dogma, to progressively embrace the mantras of capitalism, India is experiencing a vast and escalating surge of a violent Maoist rebellion. To the Western mind, the developments in both Russia and China irrevocably demonstrated the failure of the communist ideology, and it is bewildering to see a resurgence of this discredited doctrine in an India that has widely come to be regarded as an engine of growth, a dynamic economy, a rising global power and a stable centre of democratic governance, in an otherwise volatile and crisis-ridden South Asian region. The seduction of Maoism in India, however, remains very real.
India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has, since November 2004, repeatedly declared that the Maoists - in local parlance, also called 'Naxalites' - constitute the country's "greatest internal security challenge". The assessment has been sharply underlined by Home Minister P. Chidambaram's disclosures, in September 2009, that the Maoists were 'active' in as many as 223 Districts across 20 States, out of a total of 626 Districts and 28 States in the country. Of course, only a fraction of these Districts have actually witnessed Maoist violence, and most are in the early stages of 'revolutionary mobilisation' - the creation of basic networks, the establishment of underground and 'overground' organisations, and the opportunistic harnessing of local grievances for radical political activity. The Home Minister has thus revealed that violence "has been consistently witnessed in about 400 Police station areas of around 90 Districts in 13 States".
It is sobering, however, to note that, at a meeting of the Central Coordination Committee of Naxalite-affected States at Bhubaneshwar on November 21, 2003, the then Union Home Secretary had disclosed that a total of 55 districts in nine States were affected by varying degrees of Naxalite activity. Just ten months later, on September 21, 2004, an official note circulated at the meeting of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States indicated that this number had gone up to as many as 156 Districts in 13 States by September 2004.2 The sphere of Maoist activity was estimated to have expanded further to 170 districts in 15 States by February 20053, to push relentlessly on to the present figure of 223 Districts in 20 States.
The dramatic expansion of Naxalite activities is the more spectacular when seen against the slow, painstaking and uncertain struggle that went into the seizure of the 55 districts that had fallen under their shadow by the end of 2003. The current movement traces its genealogy back to the insurrection of 1967 in the Naxalbari area of North Bengal (hence the appellation "Naxalites"), but that insurgency - after a wildfire spread in its early years - had been comprehensively defeated by 1973, with the entire top leadership of the spearhead Communist Party of India - Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) either jailed or dead. What little remained of its splintered survivor organizations was destroyed during Indira Gandhi's Emergency of 1975.
It was in 1980, with the formation of the People's War Group (PWG) under the leadership of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah (an erstwhile Central Organising Committee Member of the CPI-ML) in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, and the reorganization of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar in the mid-1980s, that the movement resurfaced in some strength. Initial successes were, again, rapid, and by the mid-1980s, 31 districts in seven States were afflicted by Naxalite violence. By the early 1990s, however, the problem had been eliminated from at least 16 of these districts, bringing the total number of affected districts to just 15 in four States.4 It is from this uncertain revival that the Maoists have swelled to their present power.
Despite the Prime Minister's unwavering focus on the dangers of the Maoist rebellion, this threat was carelessly dismissed by much of India's political leadership, including his own Cabinet colleagues, till fairly recently. On April 15, 2005, the Prime Minister articulated the most crystalline perspective on terrorism and political violence:
There can be no political compromise with terror. No inch conceded. No compassion shown… There are no good terrorists and bad terrorists. There is no cause, root or branch, that can ever justify the killing of innocent people. No democratic Government can tolerate the use of violence against innocent people and against the functionaries of a duly established democratic Government…
Less than ten days later, his then Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, publicly declared, "The Government is not interested in using weapons. They (the Naxalites) are our brothers and sisters and we know that this is a socio-economic problem rather than one of law and order… " 5While the dissonance was not as strident, there was certainly also a grave measure of denial in the then-Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's comment that, "Naxalite activity in Andhra Pradesh and other parts has caused some concerns but it is manageable and there is no need for anyone to panic. The problem is being dealt with."6 Such conflicts of perspective remained endemic till Chidambaram took over as Home Minister on November 30, 2008.
Such discordance of perspectives in the highest echelons of the national Government appears, now, to be substantially a thing of the past. Unfortunately, the state appears to have taken a hasty swing from under-reaction to unplanned and ill-conceived belligerence over the past months. Certainly since the re-election of the Manmohan Singh Government in May 2009, steady leaks from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and other Central departments and agencies have fed a media frenzy about 'surgical strikes' by combined teams of 'Special Forces' from the States and the Central Paramilitary Forces, in a 'coordinated' and 'massive' offensive across the Maoist 'heartland' areas. These imaginings have been backed with sci-fi visions of high resolution aerial, satellite and thermal imagery and air support for ground troops.
As the Centre loudly and continuously tom-tommed its projected 'massive operations', it became abundantly clear these would come as no surprise whatsoever to the Maoists. Indeed, there was ample evidence that the Maoists had been systematically preparing for the 'imminent' onslaught for months, and had already initiated operations to thwart and circumvent the state's strategy. A Maoist Politburo document of June 12, 2009, had warned that 'revolutionary cadres' had to prepare themselves for "far more brutal, deadly and savage" state repression "than under any other regime hitherto witnessed" and would have to deal with "the state's khaki (Police) and olive-clad (Army) terrorist forces". The Politburo, however, also declared,
"Though the enemy is itching to suppress our Party and movement by deploying a huge force in all our areas, he has severe difficulties in implementing this at present; he has plans to increase the number of central forces in the next few years… but in the immediate context it is quite difficult for the Centre to send the forces required by each state to control our movement. Keeping this in mind, we have to further aggravate the situation and create more difficulties to the enemy forces by expanding our guerrilla war to new areas on the one hand and intensifying the mass resistance in the existing areas so as to disperse the enemy forces over a sufficiently wider area… tactical counter-offensives should be stepped up and also taken up in new areas so as to divert a section of the enemy forces from attacking our guerrilla bases and organs of political power." (Emphases added).
As talk of an imminent 'war' against the Naxalites escalated, consequently, diversionary violence by the rebels intensified. As against 721 confirmed fatalities in 2008 (MHA data), the South Asia Terrorism Portal had already documented a provisional total of 873 fatalities in Maoist-related violence in 2009 (till November 16). 2009 has already witnessed as many as 77 major incidents (defined as incidents involving three or more fatalities) as against 59 in 2008.
This wave of pre-emptive Maoist violence has evidently had a sobering impact on the strategicians of the Centre's 'massive operation', and there has been a dramatic dilution of the earlier 'war rhetoric'. On November 12, the Home Minister dismissed talk of the Central operation as "pure invention of the media" (though he omitted mention of the significant and continuous leaks from the Home Ministry that had fed distorted public perceptions). He declared, further, that what was to be expected "in the months ahead is merely a more coordinated effort by the state police to reassert control over territory or tracts of land where regrettably the civil administration has lost control. And for that purpose we (the Centre) will assist them in every manner possible, particularly by providing paramilitary forces and sharing of intelligence."
How did this happen? How could a group variously estimated to have no more than 15 to 20,000 armed cadre spread thinly across vast territories so quickly force the combined might of the Federal and State Governments into an apparent turnaround? The reality is that the Maoists have consolidated their disruptive dominance in areas where the state has little presence and, worse, the cumulative capacity deficits in the security apparatus are so great that there is little possibility of altering the balance of Force in any radical measure to secure a demonstrable victory against the rebels.
It is crucial to review the relevant state capacities in this context. First, police-population ratios for the whole country stood at a bare 125 per 100,000 in early 2008. According to the Prime Minister's statement at the Conference of Directors General of Police on September 15, 2009, this has now risen to about 145 per 100,000 - still abysmally low, compared to required ratios for peacetime policing at well over 200, and ranging, in some western countries, at over 500 per 100,000. This is, moreover, a primitive, ill-trained and ill-equipped Force, and, in most States, has little capacity or orientation to deal with a full-blown insurgency. Worse, these numbers reflect sanctioned strengths, and not the actual strength available on the ground. Thus, there was more than a 14 percent deficit against total sanctioned strength in 2008. The situation in the States most affected by Naxalism is infinitely worse. Bihar has a Police-population ratio of just 60, and a deficit of over 33 percent against sanctioned strength. Orissa has a sanctioned ratio of 97, and a deficit of nearly 19 percent. In Jharkhand, the ratio is 136/100,000, and the deficit is 21 percent; Chhattisgarh has 128/100,000 and a deficit of 26 per cent; Andhra Pradesh, 96/100,000 and a deficit of 11 percent; West Bengal, 92 per 100,000, and a deficit of 25 percent.
The crisis of leadership is more acute. At the cutting edge ranks of Deputy Superintendent of Police to Senior Superintendent of Police, deficits in Andhra stand at 19 percent; in Bihar at 35 percent; in Chhattisgarh at 28 percent; in Jharkhand at 51 percent; in Orissa at 34 percent; and in West Bengal at 25 percent. In the 'fighting leadership' at the ranks of Assistant Sub-Inspector to Inspector, deficits in Andhra are at 15 percent; Bihar: 39 percent; Chhattisgarh: 41 percent; Jharkhand: 18 percent; Orissa, 34 percent; and West Bengal 30 percent. Crucially, sanctioned strengths in most leadership ranks are severely inadequate, and will become progressively so as recruitment to the lower ranks accelerates. The overall system does not appear to be geared to respond to these predicaments. In the worst case, for instance, Orissa has a current sanctioned strength of as many as 207 officers in the IPS ranks, but has just 84 officers currently available. The State had requested the Centre to allocate a trifling eight IPS officers from the graduating batch of 2009; the Centre allocated just four - a number that will be significantly exceeded by those retiring this year, and against the current deficit of as many as 123 officers.
Manpower deficits are, of course, infinitely compounded by extreme shortfalls in technical, technological and training variables, by irrational and wasteful deployment of Forces, and by persistently imprudent political interventions. The outcome is that current capacities of Police Forces in the afflicted States are simply insufficient to design an effective response to the Maoist challenge.
The Centre pretends to come 'to the rescue' with its 'battalion approach', and there has been much talk of 'massive deployment' of CPMFs. The reality is sobering. Prior to the much advertised 'massive operations' the total allocation of CPMFs in the Maoist affected areas was a mere 37 battalions, yielding a total of just 14,800 men in the field. There is now talk of 70 battalions being sent to these areas - though it is not clear whether this will be an additional 70 or an augmentation of current Force to this number. We would, in other words, have either 70 or 107 battalions allocated under the Centre's projected operational plans, that is, 28,000 or 42,800 CPMF personnel, as the case may be, for six worst affected States with a total area of 1.86 million square kilometers and a total population of over 446 million. This is like trying to irrigate the desert with dewdrops.
Of course, the Centre's operational strategy would seek to concentrate this Force in areas of specific Maoist dominance, to 'recover' these areas, and then 'bring them under civil administration'. But the Maoists would simply refuse to confront the state in its areas of strength, and the state cannot, given existing capacities, maintain permanent saturation in the 'recovered' areas. Where the state's deployments are heavy, the Maoists will simply walk away. Where State Forces are dispersed or their presence is eventually diluted, they will be selectively targeted in a campaign of attrition.
The reality is, the Maoist ideology and strategy finds fertile ground in the security, administrative and political vacuum that extends over vast areas of the country, where the state is systematically and chronically failing to provide the public goods and services that it is obliged to - including the security of life and property, criminal justice and opportunities for social and economic growth. In such circumstances, it is inevitable that other individuals and agencies will step in to fill the vacuum. It is inevitable, also, that in most such cases, these individuals and agencies will not be constrained by the limits of law or any established procedure, in their interactions with local populations, and, consequently, that these interactions will tend to be unacceptably violent, exploitative and even tyrannical.
The fact is that the entire structure of rural administration in the Naxalite-affected areas has been wholly emasculated, or has simply not evolved beyond the primitive structures of colonial governance, or has, through a combination of factors, including primarily the incompetence, corruption and criminalisation of the political leadership, deteriorated to the point of paralysis.
This give rise to strong advocacy in the India establishment and among armies of international 'activists' and 'experts' for another bogus 'solution' to the Maoist rampage: bringing 'development' and 'civil administration' to areas currently under Maoist disruptive dominance. But this 'strategy' - if kite-flying deserves such a title - has no possible future. It is based on a simple logic of inversion: if the lack of administration is the problem, providing administration is the obvious solution. But this is not as easy as it may first seem.
There has been a long-standing myth that India suffers from 'too much governance'; that its 'bloated bureaucracy' needs to be 'rationalised' through drastic reduction. This is another bit of the most extraordinarily contrafactual nonsense that has taken firm root in the Indian imagination. The reality is, India's administrative capacities are collapsing, not just qualitatively - because of the rising incompetence and corruption of the system - but even in terms of minimal quantitative variables. Thus USA, with its belief that "the best government governs least" has as many as 889 Federal Government employees per 100,000 population. India's Central Government employs just 295 per 100,000, and a large proportion of these are flogged out to a number of public sector enterprises and units entirely unconnected with core governance. The Railways, for instance, is the largest single Central Government employer, accounting for over 42 percent of the total pool. If Railway employees were to be excluded from the strength of Central Government Employees, this would leave us with a ratio of just 171 Central Government employees per 100,000. Moving on to State and Local Government employees, we find that, in the US, these account for another 6,314 per 100,000; in sharp contrast, Uttar Pradesh has 352; Bihar, 472; Orissa, 1,007; Chhattisgarh, 1,067; Maharashtra, 1,223; Punjab, 1,383; Gujarat, 1,694. Worse, in India, the overwhelming proportion of Government employees is in the lower cadres, as against the 'thinking' element of the state in higher echelons. Even in the latter category, qualitative profiles, including modern and administrative skills, training and technological competence are severely limited. Crucially, there is no plan or programme, given current resource configurations, that can address the cumulative developmental deficits in India in any timeframe that is relevant to counter-insurgency goals. Given current state capacities, it must be clear, no proposed strategy can offer the possibility of a decisive victory, or even enduring gains, against the Maoists.
It is the infirmity of the state, and the effective absence of its agencies and services across India's vast rural hinterland, and not some inherent and irresistible appeal of the Maoist ideology, that explains the seeming 'popularity' of this anachronistic doctrine in a modernizing world and an apparently modernizing India. The Maoist strategy simply harnesses a complex of inducements and terror to enthral populations that have fallen into the blackholes of India's administrative and security system as a result of decades of political neglect, vacillation, collusion, corruption and ineptitude.
Ajai Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management; Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism Portal; and Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He is also a founding and Executive Committee member of the Urban Futures Initiative. This article first appeared at the South Asia Terrorist Portal - SATP - (http://www.satp.org) - produced by the Institute of Conflict Management.
1. Mao Tse Tung, "The People's Liberation Army Captures Nanking", April 1949.
2. Ajai Sahni, "Naxalites: While We Were Sleeping", South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, Number 19, November 22, 2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_19.htm#assessment1) Nihar Nayak, "Naxalites: The Economy at Risk", South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, Number 31, February 13, 2005, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_31.htm.
3. Nihar Nayak, "Naxalites: The Economy at Risk", op.cit.
4. Ajai Sahni, "Bad Medicine for a Red Epidemic", South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, Number 12, October 4, 2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_12.htm#ASSESSMENT2.
5. Union Minister's statement at a meeting with representatives of political parties and voluntary organisations in Bangalore, The Telegraph, April 25, 2005, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050425/asp/nation/story_4658169.asp
6. Ambassador Mulford, during a visit to Andhra Pradesh. See "India rejects Mulford remarks on Naxal violence", The Times of India, January 29, 2005, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1004832.cms
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