Oil Spill Near Malaysia, Singapore After Ships Collide
(KUNA) -- A Malaysian tanker and a ship collided Tuesday morning near the Malaysian and Singaporean waters resulting in an oil spill.
Singapore's ports authority said in a press release that tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3 and the bulk carrier MV Waily collided in Singapore Strait.
No casualties were reported it said.
It added, "The Malaysian-registered tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3 suffered damage to one of its cargo tanks, resulting in an oil spill."
It was estimated that 2,000 tons of oil was spilled into the sea.
The authority sent four patrol and emergency teams to the area in which the collision occurred, while other teams were working to contain the spill.
Singapore's ports authority said in a press release that tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3 and the bulk carrier MV Waily collided in Singapore Strait.
No casualties were reported it said.
It added, "The Malaysian-registered tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3 suffered damage to one of its cargo tanks, resulting in an oil spill."
It was estimated that 2,000 tons of oil was spilled into the sea.
The authority sent four patrol and emergency teams to the area in which the collision occurred, while other teams were working to contain the spill.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 |
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Locating Singapore In India’s Strategic Radar
By Rahul Mishra for IDSA
The week ending 28 March 2010 was dominated by Singapore in terms of India’s politico-military and cultural diplomacy moves. It started with Minister for External Affairs S.M. Krishna’s visit to Singapore and ended with the armies of the two countries conducting a joint military exercise codenamed ‘Bold Kurukshetra’ in Madhya Pradesh. Krishna’s two-day visit was to “discuss ways of enhancing bilateral relationship in all spheres to a higher level.” During this visit, his first since appointment as Minister for External Affairs, Krishna met Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew as well as other leaders. He also visited the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and applauded the faculty there for its outstanding academic contribution to strengthening cultural linkages between India and Southeast Asia. He also updated the media on developments regarding the proposed Nalanda University in India. The visit underscores the cultural linkages India shares with Singapore.
Krishna’s visit was complimented in the politico-military sphere by the holding of the two-day annual joint armour exercise at the Babina Field Firing Range in Madhya Pradesh. The exercise was aimed at ‘validating inter-operability between the two forces’. This was the sixth in the ‘Bold Kurukshetra Series’ between the two armed forces. Among other things, the exercise involved the Singapore Armed Forces’ BIONIX Infantry Fighting Vehicle and BRONCO All-Terrain Tracked Carrier as well as BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and T-72 Main Battle Tank of the Indian Army. The exercise also included professional exchange between the two armies in the form of getting used to each other’s equipment and sand-model exercises.
These events indicate the deep seated relationship between India and Singapore as well as the strategic significance Singapore commands in India’s Look East Policy. The events of the last week have just added to half a century old cordial relations between the two countries. For instance, Singapore was the first country to support India in the 1965 War with Pakistan. Moreover, when Britain shut its bases in Singapore, “Lee Kuan Yew visited India to persuade New Delhi to evince greater interest in Southeast Asia. He wanted India to make use of the naval and dockyard facilities for building and repairing ships.”
When in 1992, under the visionary leadership of P.V. Narsimha Rao, India heralded its ‘Look East Policy’, the place where the first such meeting was held was Singapore. Since then, the policy has formed the cornerstone of India’s Southeast Asian foreign (economic) policy, with Singapore occupying a central position.1 In 1992, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Singapore became a key role player in bringing India and ASEAN member countries together at the institutional level. It was also the country-coordinator for India when India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. It was Singapore again that paved the way for India joining the ASEAN Regional Forum. India and Singapore also inked a defence co-operation agreement in 2003 which is the founding stone of regular joint military exercises the two countries carry out. Additionally, Singapore is the first country in the world with which India signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement in June 2005, which served to open new avenues for business and trading communities of the two countries.
Taking cue from the recent India-Singapore success story, it could be argued that India’s ‘natural Southeast Asian partner’ still holds the potential to serve as the ‘window to the East Asian region’. Singapore has, for a long time, been considered best for playing such a role. Sadly, not much has been done to make the best use of Singapore’s good offices in boosting ties with other friendly Southeast Asian countries. For instance, India is yet to find a mechanism to institute a tri-lateral dialogue involving India, Singapore and possibly Vietnam on defence and security issues, to begin with. India has robust defence relations with Vietnam and Singapore, individually. India has concluded a long term training arrangement with Singapore, while Singapore has been searching for Defence R&D prospects in India. Vietnam too has been a beneficiary of India’s defence assistance. At the same time, Singapore and Vietnam also have evolved strong defence relations after shedding the baggage of the Cold War. In 2009, they signed an Agreement on National Defence Cooperation (DCA). The DCA serves as a framework for both countries to formalise existing interactions and promote new areas of cooperation. Current interactions include exchange of visits, cross-attendance of training courses, as well as an annual policy dialogue which aims to bring together key officials from the two defence establishments to exchange views on defence and security issues of mutual interest.2
China’s rise in Asia will have a significant impact on countries in the continent and one cannot deny the possibility of China becoming hegemonic in future. This, in the long run, could become a uniting factor for India and Southeast Asian countries. While India and Vietnam had fought wars with China in the past, Singapore remains wary of Chinese intentions on territorial matters and on the Taiwan issue.
India at present seems content with what it has got from the ‘Look East Policy’, which no doubt is India’s most successful policy move so far in the post-Cold War era. This, however, should have prompted India to reach out to the East Asian region more vigorously. Unfortunately, apart from engaging the region through institutional arrangements such as ARF, ASEAN+3 and FTA, India has sought to engage the countries of the region only through bilateral arrangements. India’s arrangements such as those with Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore do not constitute a complete picture of its long term strategic vision in East Asia and at best look like mutually exclusive, isolated components.
It is imperative that India engages Singapore in a more robust manner so as to enable the forging of deeper and more broad-based friendships in the Southeast Asian region through Singapore’s good offices. This is something India has to work towards to enable a key role for itself as a rising power in the twenty-first century.
1. 1. Amitendu Palit, India’s Economic Engagement with Southeast Asia: Progress and Challenges, ISAS Working Paper No. 60, Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009, p. 1. Quoted in The Next Stage of Singapore-India Relations: Possibilities and Prospects, Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Sana Rahman, ISAS Working Paper No. 91, 24 September 2009
2. 2. For details, see “Fact Sheet: Singapore - Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement,”
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/sep/07sep09_nr/...
Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/LocatingSingaporeinIndiasStrategicRadar_rmishra_010410
The week ending 28 March 2010 was dominated by Singapore in terms of India’s politico-military and cultural diplomacy moves. It started with Minister for External Affairs S.M. Krishna’s visit to Singapore and ended with the armies of the two countries conducting a joint military exercise codenamed ‘Bold Kurukshetra’ in Madhya Pradesh. Krishna’s two-day visit was to “discuss ways of enhancing bilateral relationship in all spheres to a higher level.” During this visit, his first since appointment as Minister for External Affairs, Krishna met Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew as well as other leaders. He also visited the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and applauded the faculty there for its outstanding academic contribution to strengthening cultural linkages between India and Southeast Asia. He also updated the media on developments regarding the proposed Nalanda University in India. The visit underscores the cultural linkages India shares with Singapore.
Krishna’s visit was complimented in the politico-military sphere by the holding of the two-day annual joint armour exercise at the Babina Field Firing Range in Madhya Pradesh. The exercise was aimed at ‘validating inter-operability between the two forces’. This was the sixth in the ‘Bold Kurukshetra Series’ between the two armed forces. Among other things, the exercise involved the Singapore Armed Forces’ BIONIX Infantry Fighting Vehicle and BRONCO All-Terrain Tracked Carrier as well as BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and T-72 Main Battle Tank of the Indian Army. The exercise also included professional exchange between the two armies in the form of getting used to each other’s equipment and sand-model exercises.
These events indicate the deep seated relationship between India and Singapore as well as the strategic significance Singapore commands in India’s Look East Policy. The events of the last week have just added to half a century old cordial relations between the two countries. For instance, Singapore was the first country to support India in the 1965 War with Pakistan. Moreover, when Britain shut its bases in Singapore, “Lee Kuan Yew visited India to persuade New Delhi to evince greater interest in Southeast Asia. He wanted India to make use of the naval and dockyard facilities for building and repairing ships.”
When in 1992, under the visionary leadership of P.V. Narsimha Rao, India heralded its ‘Look East Policy’, the place where the first such meeting was held was Singapore. Since then, the policy has formed the cornerstone of India’s Southeast Asian foreign (economic) policy, with Singapore occupying a central position.1 In 1992, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Singapore became a key role player in bringing India and ASEAN member countries together at the institutional level. It was also the country-coordinator for India when India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. It was Singapore again that paved the way for India joining the ASEAN Regional Forum. India and Singapore also inked a defence co-operation agreement in 2003 which is the founding stone of regular joint military exercises the two countries carry out. Additionally, Singapore is the first country in the world with which India signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement in June 2005, which served to open new avenues for business and trading communities of the two countries.
Taking cue from the recent India-Singapore success story, it could be argued that India’s ‘natural Southeast Asian partner’ still holds the potential to serve as the ‘window to the East Asian region’. Singapore has, for a long time, been considered best for playing such a role. Sadly, not much has been done to make the best use of Singapore’s good offices in boosting ties with other friendly Southeast Asian countries. For instance, India is yet to find a mechanism to institute a tri-lateral dialogue involving India, Singapore and possibly Vietnam on defence and security issues, to begin with. India has robust defence relations with Vietnam and Singapore, individually. India has concluded a long term training arrangement with Singapore, while Singapore has been searching for Defence R&D prospects in India. Vietnam too has been a beneficiary of India’s defence assistance. At the same time, Singapore and Vietnam also have evolved strong defence relations after shedding the baggage of the Cold War. In 2009, they signed an Agreement on National Defence Cooperation (DCA). The DCA serves as a framework for both countries to formalise existing interactions and promote new areas of cooperation. Current interactions include exchange of visits, cross-attendance of training courses, as well as an annual policy dialogue which aims to bring together key officials from the two defence establishments to exchange views on defence and security issues of mutual interest.2
China’s rise in Asia will have a significant impact on countries in the continent and one cannot deny the possibility of China becoming hegemonic in future. This, in the long run, could become a uniting factor for India and Southeast Asian countries. While India and Vietnam had fought wars with China in the past, Singapore remains wary of Chinese intentions on territorial matters and on the Taiwan issue.
India at present seems content with what it has got from the ‘Look East Policy’, which no doubt is India’s most successful policy move so far in the post-Cold War era. This, however, should have prompted India to reach out to the East Asian region more vigorously. Unfortunately, apart from engaging the region through institutional arrangements such as ARF, ASEAN+3 and FTA, India has sought to engage the countries of the region only through bilateral arrangements. India’s arrangements such as those with Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore do not constitute a complete picture of its long term strategic vision in East Asia and at best look like mutually exclusive, isolated components.
It is imperative that India engages Singapore in a more robust manner so as to enable the forging of deeper and more broad-based friendships in the Southeast Asian region through Singapore’s good offices. This is something India has to work towards to enable a key role for itself as a rising power in the twenty-first century.
1. 1. Amitendu Palit, India’s Economic Engagement with Southeast Asia: Progress and Challenges, ISAS Working Paper No. 60, Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009, p. 1. Quoted in The Next Stage of Singapore-India Relations: Possibilities and Prospects, Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Sana Rahman, ISAS Working Paper No. 91, 24 September 2009
2. 2. For details, see “Fact Sheet: Singapore - Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement,”
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/sep/07sep09_nr/...
Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/LocatingSingaporeinIndiasStrategicRadar_rmishra_010410
Saturday, May 22, 2010 |
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Shell Completes Largest Petrochemicals Project
Shell announced this week the successful completion of the Shell Eastern Petrochemicals Complex (SEPC) project in Singapore. SEPC is Shell’s largest petrochemicals investment to date and the second world-scale petrochemicals project the company has completed in Asia in four years.
According to the company, "The completion of the project reinforces Shell’s intention to remain a leading player in the expanding Asian petrochemicals market".
“This project clearly demonstrates Shell’s strategy to focus on growth markets and to integrate oil and chemicals manufacturing to gain efficiencies,” said CEO Peter Voser. “Creating Shell’s largest integrated site will bring considerable synergies in terms of feedstocks, operations and logistics. Our ambition is to grow in the dynamic Asian petrochemicals market, where we are already a leading player.
“Through SEPC, we have once again shown we have the expertise and technologies to undertake and deliver world-scale, complex hydrocarbon projects not only on time, but also with an outstanding safety record.”
Shell designed the new facilities to maximise the benefits of locating refining and petrochemicals production within a single manufacturing hub on Bukom and Jurong islands, just off the Singapore coast. Jurong Island is a major petrochemical zone which provides opportunities for further integration with current and potential customers, as well as in Shell’s own operations.
Each of the new chemical production units started up as planned. They include a world-scale ethylene cracker, which started up in March, and one of the world’s largest mono-ethylene glycol plants, which has been producing since November 2009. The project also included modifications to the Shell Pulau Bukom Refinery, enabling it to process a wider range of crudes to supply feedstock to the cracker. A new ethylene jetty and cryogenic terminal enable the import and export of ethylene.
According to the company, "The completion of the project reinforces Shell’s intention to remain a leading player in the expanding Asian petrochemicals market".
“This project clearly demonstrates Shell’s strategy to focus on growth markets and to integrate oil and chemicals manufacturing to gain efficiencies,” said CEO Peter Voser. “Creating Shell’s largest integrated site will bring considerable synergies in terms of feedstocks, operations and logistics. Our ambition is to grow in the dynamic Asian petrochemicals market, where we are already a leading player.
“Through SEPC, we have once again shown we have the expertise and technologies to undertake and deliver world-scale, complex hydrocarbon projects not only on time, but also with an outstanding safety record.”
Shell designed the new facilities to maximise the benefits of locating refining and petrochemicals production within a single manufacturing hub on Bukom and Jurong islands, just off the Singapore coast. Jurong Island is a major petrochemical zone which provides opportunities for further integration with current and potential customers, as well as in Shell’s own operations.
Each of the new chemical production units started up as planned. They include a world-scale ethylene cracker, which started up in March, and one of the world’s largest mono-ethylene glycol plants, which has been producing since November 2009. The project also included modifications to the Shell Pulau Bukom Refinery, enabling it to process a wider range of crudes to supply feedstock to the cracker. A new ethylene jetty and cryogenic terminal enable the import and export of ethylene.
Thursday, May 06, 2010 |
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U.S. Consolidates Military Network In Asia-Pacific Region
By Rick Rozoff
The United States has six naval fleets and eleven aircraft carrier strike groups patrolling the world's oceans and seas. The U.S. Navy is as large as the world's next thirteen biggest navies combined [1].
Washington has as many aircraft carriers as all other nations together. Russia has one; China has none. The U.S. and its NATO allies - Britain (2), Italy (2), France (1) and Spain (1) - account for 17 of 22 in service in the world. Ten of the eleven American carriers are Nimitz class nuclear-powered supercarriers, substantially larger than most all non-U.S. ones. The U.S. Navy has all ten supercarriers in the world at the moment. [2]
U.S. aircraft carriers contain 70-80 planes and are available for deployment in all the world's oceans and most of its seas. They are escorted in their carrier groups by anti-air and anti-submarine warfare guided missile destroyers, anti-submarine warfare frigates, missile cruisers with long-range Tomahawks, and nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines. The U.S. also maintains between ten and twelve naval expeditionary strike groups which include amphibious assault ships and AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters in addition to destroyers, cruisers, frigates, attack submarines and P-3C Orion long-range anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft.
With the reestablishing of the Navy's Fourth Fleet - its area of responsibility includes Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea - two years ago after a 58-year hiatus, the U.S. has six fleets that can be dispatched to all five oceans.
The Seventh Fleet (there is no First Fleet), based in Japan, is the largest of U.S. forward-deployed fleets and consists of as many as 40–60 ships, 200-350 aircraft and 20,000-60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Its area of responsibility takes in more than 50 million square miles of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, from Russia's Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south, from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea, South Africa to the Korean Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait.
When on the occasion of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize last December President Barack Obama referred to himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the world's sole military superpower he was not guilty of hyperbole if he was of hubris. His defense budget for next year is almost half as large as world military spending for 2008, the last year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has compiled figures.
The U.S. has mutual defense treaties with six nations in the Asia-Pacific area: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The Pentagon has bases in Japan and South Korea, troops and base camps in the Philippines, satellite surveillance sites in Australia and the use of air bases in Thailand.
Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are included in the American global missile interceptor network with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and ship-based Standard Missile-3 deployments in those four nations. Last December it was announced that the U.S. will supply Taiwan with 200 Patriot anti-ballistic missiles and the following month it was revealed that Washington will also provide Taiwan with eight frigates capable of being upgraded to fire Standard Missile-3 interceptors. [3]
Last week the head of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, told the U.S. Congress that, as Reuters summarized it, "Japan remains fully committed to building a linchpin multibillion-dollar missile interceptor with the United States," despite hopes to the contrary entertained after the Democratic Party of Japan's Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister last September.
Referring to the current Standard Missile-3 enhancement program, O'Reilly said that Japanese government officials "have indicated that they are in full support and their commitments are solid."
In regards to the upgraded interceptor missile, the SM-3 Block IIA, he added, "Within the next year, we will begin our discussions on production arrangements between the United States and Japan." [4]
On April 27 the U.S. renewed a military logistics agreement with Australia "allowing deployed Australian forces to exploit the vast logistics capability of the American military" and permitting "U.S. forces on operations to make use of Australian logistics."
"Since its inception, the agreement had ensured supply support and services to Australian and U.S. forces deployed to all parts of the world wherever they were operating together....That included mutual support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [5]
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General James Cartwright, is visiting New Zealand this week to consult with the country's top military commanders and defense minister.
Cartwright is "the first vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit New Zealand since the position was established" in 1986. [6] His visit comes two weeks after NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, made similar trips to New Zealand and Australia.
Last month New Zealand's Defence Minister Wayne Mapp announced that joint military exercises with the U.S. would resume after 23 years, since the nation's 1987 ban on the docking of nuclear-powered warships and submarines.
New Zealand has been brought back into the fold in part by providing NATO with over 200 troops for the war in Afghanistan. Australia, with over 1,500 soldiers assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in the nation, is the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the war. Last year it unveiled plans for the most extensive military buildup in its post-World War Two history. [7]
On April 23 the U.S. and India launched the ten-day Malabar 2010 military exercises after "Ships, submarines and aircraft from the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet arrived in Goa" to engage in maneuvers which include training for "surface and anti-submarine warfare, coordinated gunnery exercises [and] air defense...." [8] The U.S. contribution consists of two guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate, a guided missile cruiser, a nuclear fast-attack submarine, P-3 Orion anti-submarine and surveillance aircraft, SH-60B Seahawk helicopters and Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) special forces.
The Malabar war games have been conducted jointly by the U.S. and India since 1992 (except for 1998-2001 after India carried out nuclear tests), but last year included Japan, and Malabar 2007 was a five-nation operation held in the Bay of Bengal with the U.S. and India joined by Australia, Japan and Singapore, leading to suspicions of U.S. designs for an Asia-Pacific analogue of NATO.
As Malabar 2010 was underway, "warships, combat aircraft and soldiers" from Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore (all Commonwealth nations) began Exercise Bersama Shield 2010 "on the Malaysian peninsula and in the South China Sea." [9]
Malaysia is among a minority of maritime states not to have joined the U.S.-launched Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) whose architect was then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. Established in 2003 as "a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors," [10], it has grown to incorporate over 90 of the world's 148 coastal nations. [11]
China, Indonesia and Malaysia have refused to join, though South Korea did in May of last year, and the first three countries along with Iran and North Korea - the states used as justification for the PSI - view the U.S.-led global surveillance, interdiction and boarding operation with deep concern and doubts about its legality, as it operates without a United Nations mandate, can be argued to circumvent and violate international maritime law, and in effect grants the U.S. and its allies the self-arrogated right to conduct piracy on the high seas.
"Launched on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. President Obama strongly supports the PSI. On April 5, 2009 in Prague, the President called on the international community to make PSI a 'durable international institution.'" [12]
The PSI has been effectively if not formally extended into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa with the U.S.-run Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 warship deployments. Recently the South Korean navy assumed command of Combined Task Force 151 from Singapore. Combined Task Force 150 contributing navies include those of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey.
Last week it was announced that NATO welcomed South Korea as the 46th nation supplying it with troops for the war in Afghanistan. On March 29 Mongolia became the 45th. [13] Singapore also has troops serving under NATO in the country and until this year Japan was providing naval support to the U.S. war effort there.
On April 26 the China Daily reported that Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly in charge of strategic studies at the Chinese army's National Defense University, said "The United States is the greatest perceived threat to the People's Liberation Army" and that "the US was the only country capable of threatening China's national security interests in an all-round way." [14]
Another Chinese news source on the same day wrote of U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) plans to be able to strike any target on earth within sixty minutes and the Pentagon's recent test flights of the X-37B orbital space plane and the Falcon hypersonic spy plane, reporting that "Chinese space technology expert Pang Zhihao said the spaceship...aids the PGS program, which he said could be a potential threat to world peace." [15]
The previous day London's Sunday Times acknowledged that "Obama's interest in Prompt Global Strike (PGS)...has alarmed China and Russia...." [16]
U.S. fast strike and first strike global missile and space strategy and its expansion of military alliances and networks in the Asia-Pacific area are rightly seen as threats to China and Russia. And to international security and peace.
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
NOTES:
1) Measured by battle fleet tonnage.
2) A supercarrier is currently defined as an aircraft carrier displacing 70,000 or more tons.
3) U.S.-China Military Tensions Grow
Stop NATO, January 19, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/u-s-china-military-tensions-grow
4) Reuters, April 21, 2010
5) Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010
6) Ibid
7) Australian Military Buildup And The Rise Of Asian NATO
Stop NATO, May 6, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/australian-military-buildup-and-the-rise-of-asian-nato
8) Navy Newsstand, April 23, 2010
9) Agence France-Presse, April 26, 2010
10) U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm
11) Proliferation Security Initiative And U.S. 1,000-Ship Navy: Control Of
World’s Oceans, Prelude To War
Stop NATO, January 29, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/proliferation-security-initiative-and-us-1000-ship-navy-control-of-worlds-oceans-prelude-to-war
12) U.S. Department of State, Ibid
13) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
14) China Daily, April 26, 2010
15) Global Times, April 26, 2010
16) Sunday Times, April 25, 2010
The United States has six naval fleets and eleven aircraft carrier strike groups patrolling the world's oceans and seas. The U.S. Navy is as large as the world's next thirteen biggest navies combined [1].
Washington has as many aircraft carriers as all other nations together. Russia has one; China has none. The U.S. and its NATO allies - Britain (2), Italy (2), France (1) and Spain (1) - account for 17 of 22 in service in the world. Ten of the eleven American carriers are Nimitz class nuclear-powered supercarriers, substantially larger than most all non-U.S. ones. The U.S. Navy has all ten supercarriers in the world at the moment. [2]
U.S. aircraft carriers contain 70-80 planes and are available for deployment in all the world's oceans and most of its seas. They are escorted in their carrier groups by anti-air and anti-submarine warfare guided missile destroyers, anti-submarine warfare frigates, missile cruisers with long-range Tomahawks, and nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines. The U.S. also maintains between ten and twelve naval expeditionary strike groups which include amphibious assault ships and AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters in addition to destroyers, cruisers, frigates, attack submarines and P-3C Orion long-range anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft.
With the reestablishing of the Navy's Fourth Fleet - its area of responsibility includes Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea - two years ago after a 58-year hiatus, the U.S. has six fleets that can be dispatched to all five oceans.
The Seventh Fleet (there is no First Fleet), based in Japan, is the largest of U.S. forward-deployed fleets and consists of as many as 40–60 ships, 200-350 aircraft and 20,000-60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Its area of responsibility takes in more than 50 million square miles of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, from Russia's Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south, from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea, South Africa to the Korean Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait.
When on the occasion of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize last December President Barack Obama referred to himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the world's sole military superpower he was not guilty of hyperbole if he was of hubris. His defense budget for next year is almost half as large as world military spending for 2008, the last year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has compiled figures.
The U.S. has mutual defense treaties with six nations in the Asia-Pacific area: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The Pentagon has bases in Japan and South Korea, troops and base camps in the Philippines, satellite surveillance sites in Australia and the use of air bases in Thailand.
Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are included in the American global missile interceptor network with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and ship-based Standard Missile-3 deployments in those four nations. Last December it was announced that the U.S. will supply Taiwan with 200 Patriot anti-ballistic missiles and the following month it was revealed that Washington will also provide Taiwan with eight frigates capable of being upgraded to fire Standard Missile-3 interceptors. [3]
Last week the head of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, told the U.S. Congress that, as Reuters summarized it, "Japan remains fully committed to building a linchpin multibillion-dollar missile interceptor with the United States," despite hopes to the contrary entertained after the Democratic Party of Japan's Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister last September.
Referring to the current Standard Missile-3 enhancement program, O'Reilly said that Japanese government officials "have indicated that they are in full support and their commitments are solid."
In regards to the upgraded interceptor missile, the SM-3 Block IIA, he added, "Within the next year, we will begin our discussions on production arrangements between the United States and Japan." [4]
On April 27 the U.S. renewed a military logistics agreement with Australia "allowing deployed Australian forces to exploit the vast logistics capability of the American military" and permitting "U.S. forces on operations to make use of Australian logistics."
"Since its inception, the agreement had ensured supply support and services to Australian and U.S. forces deployed to all parts of the world wherever they were operating together....That included mutual support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [5]
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General James Cartwright, is visiting New Zealand this week to consult with the country's top military commanders and defense minister.
Cartwright is "the first vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit New Zealand since the position was established" in 1986. [6] His visit comes two weeks after NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, made similar trips to New Zealand and Australia.
Last month New Zealand's Defence Minister Wayne Mapp announced that joint military exercises with the U.S. would resume after 23 years, since the nation's 1987 ban on the docking of nuclear-powered warships and submarines.
New Zealand has been brought back into the fold in part by providing NATO with over 200 troops for the war in Afghanistan. Australia, with over 1,500 soldiers assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in the nation, is the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the war. Last year it unveiled plans for the most extensive military buildup in its post-World War Two history. [7]
On April 23 the U.S. and India launched the ten-day Malabar 2010 military exercises after "Ships, submarines and aircraft from the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet arrived in Goa" to engage in maneuvers which include training for "surface and anti-submarine warfare, coordinated gunnery exercises [and] air defense...." [8] The U.S. contribution consists of two guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate, a guided missile cruiser, a nuclear fast-attack submarine, P-3 Orion anti-submarine and surveillance aircraft, SH-60B Seahawk helicopters and Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) special forces.
The Malabar war games have been conducted jointly by the U.S. and India since 1992 (except for 1998-2001 after India carried out nuclear tests), but last year included Japan, and Malabar 2007 was a five-nation operation held in the Bay of Bengal with the U.S. and India joined by Australia, Japan and Singapore, leading to suspicions of U.S. designs for an Asia-Pacific analogue of NATO.
As Malabar 2010 was underway, "warships, combat aircraft and soldiers" from Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore (all Commonwealth nations) began Exercise Bersama Shield 2010 "on the Malaysian peninsula and in the South China Sea." [9]
Malaysia is among a minority of maritime states not to have joined the U.S.-launched Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) whose architect was then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. Established in 2003 as "a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors," [10], it has grown to incorporate over 90 of the world's 148 coastal nations. [11]
China, Indonesia and Malaysia have refused to join, though South Korea did in May of last year, and the first three countries along with Iran and North Korea - the states used as justification for the PSI - view the U.S.-led global surveillance, interdiction and boarding operation with deep concern and doubts about its legality, as it operates without a United Nations mandate, can be argued to circumvent and violate international maritime law, and in effect grants the U.S. and its allies the self-arrogated right to conduct piracy on the high seas.
"Launched on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. President Obama strongly supports the PSI. On April 5, 2009 in Prague, the President called on the international community to make PSI a 'durable international institution.'" [12]
The PSI has been effectively if not formally extended into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa with the U.S.-run Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 warship deployments. Recently the South Korean navy assumed command of Combined Task Force 151 from Singapore. Combined Task Force 150 contributing navies include those of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey.
Last week it was announced that NATO welcomed South Korea as the 46th nation supplying it with troops for the war in Afghanistan. On March 29 Mongolia became the 45th. [13] Singapore also has troops serving under NATO in the country and until this year Japan was providing naval support to the U.S. war effort there.
On April 26 the China Daily reported that Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly in charge of strategic studies at the Chinese army's National Defense University, said "The United States is the greatest perceived threat to the People's Liberation Army" and that "the US was the only country capable of threatening China's national security interests in an all-round way." [14]
Another Chinese news source on the same day wrote of U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) plans to be able to strike any target on earth within sixty minutes and the Pentagon's recent test flights of the X-37B orbital space plane and the Falcon hypersonic spy plane, reporting that "Chinese space technology expert Pang Zhihao said the spaceship...aids the PGS program, which he said could be a potential threat to world peace." [15]
The previous day London's Sunday Times acknowledged that "Obama's interest in Prompt Global Strike (PGS)...has alarmed China and Russia...." [16]
U.S. fast strike and first strike global missile and space strategy and its expansion of military alliances and networks in the Asia-Pacific area are rightly seen as threats to China and Russia. And to international security and peace.
Rick Rozoff is a journalist and blogger and many of his articles may be found at the Stop NATO blog.
NOTES:
1) Measured by battle fleet tonnage.
2) A supercarrier is currently defined as an aircraft carrier displacing 70,000 or more tons.
3) U.S.-China Military Tensions Grow
Stop NATO, January 19, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/u-s-china-military-tensions-grow
4) Reuters, April 21, 2010
5) Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010
6) Ibid
7) Australian Military Buildup And The Rise Of Asian NATO
Stop NATO, May 6, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/australian-military-buildup-and-the-rise-of-asian-nato
8) Navy Newsstand, April 23, 2010
9) Agence France-Presse, April 26, 2010
10) U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm
11) Proliferation Security Initiative And U.S. 1,000-Ship Navy: Control Of
World’s Oceans, Prelude To War
Stop NATO, January 29, 2009
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/proliferation-security-initiative-and-us-1000-ship-navy-control-of-worlds-oceans-prelude-to-war
12) U.S. Department of State, Ibid
13) Mongolia: Pentagon Trojan Horse Wedged Between China And Russia
Stop NATO, March 31, 2010
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/mongolia-pentagon-trojan-horse-wedged-between-china-and-russia
14) China Daily, April 26, 2010
15) Global Times, April 26, 2010
16) Sunday Times, April 25, 2010
Thursday, April 29, 2010 |
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Singapore Mentors Burma In Sham Elections
By Seelan Palay
As preparations for the sham elections in Burma get into full swing, it is not difficult to notice similarities in electoral practices between the Burmese generals in uniform and Singapore’s leaders in civilian clothes.
The Burmese regime is bending over backwards to stage the fraudulent elections while refusing to respect the results of the country’s polls in 1990 that led to the landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Why reinvent the wheel, when what happened two decades ago remains unfulfilled? The same military that massacred thousands of innocent civilians, including Buddhist monks, is now pretending that everything is hunky-dory.
It is an undeniable fact that the military regime holds close economic ties to Singapore – the top brass of the Burmese army are known to have parked their ill-gotten millions in Singapore’s banks, while they and their family members own properties in upmarket areas and their children go to top schools and drive flashy cars, flaunting their wealth to the envy of ordinary Singaporeans.
Burmese drug lords who are banned from entering the US freely come and go in Singapore and some even have offices in the posh commercial district along Shenton Way. It is no wonder that Singapore is the third largest investor in Burma, helping to prop up the pariah regime.
Singapore has even named a hybrid Orchid, its national flower, after the Burmese prime minister, General Thein Sein. Orchids in the same Singapore Botanical Gardens were previously named after Princess Diana and Nelson Mandela.
The similarities between Burma and Singapore do not stop there. The election process in Singapore is as opaque as it is in Naypyidaw, the new capital of the Burmese regime. Although Singapore claims to hold periodical elections to legitimise the rule of the People’s Action Party (PAP), the exercise itself is highly questionable.
To start with, there is no independent elections commission. Only a department that comes under the Prime Minister’s Office that decides on last-minute boundary delineation, exorbitant deposits for candidates (presently $US9,900 but expected to be raised to $US11,000 in the next election), and other regular gerrymandering practices, including what is known as the Group Representation Constituencies (GRC).
This so-called electoral system has led to almost half of the seats in parliament being uncontested on Nomination Day. Presently, Singapore’s ‘parliament’ has 84 MPs, of which 82 are from Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP. And that is “democratic elections” in Singapore for you!
The paradox of Singapore’s elections is that the electorate, some of whom are nearing their 50s, have never voted in their entire lives. This so-called anomaly is glaring in Singapore, where voting is compulsory under the Parliamentary Elections Act.
With all these well-entrenched undemocratic practices, it is not surprising to even a distant observer to understand how the ruling PAP has been in power since 1959.
What is worse is the irrefutable reality in Singapore that one man, by the name of Lee Kuan Yew, has been in power for the last 51 years. The octogenarian Lee, who is now 87 years old, calls himself Minister Mentor in the cabinet headed by his prime minster son, Lee Hsien Loong.
Compare this to the reality in Burma where the army generals have held sway since the 1962 coup, ousting the democratically elected government of U Nu. Even against this, Lee Kuan Yew’s grip on power extends longer by three years, but he continues to claim that elections in his republic are based on the Westminster model of democracy.
Anyone who believes in democratic values could easily see that it is next to impossible to continue to have a one-party dominated parliament in the name of freedom and democracy. Obviously the uniformed generals are under tutelage by the authoritarian regime in Singapore, clad in civilian clothes.
While the Burmese generals continue to not recognise the results of the 1990 elections, preparations are in full swing to hold yet another elections based on its 2008 constitution, aimed at hoodwinking the people. Singapore too is notorious for amending its constitution just before every general election to give a legal facade to what is clearly an illegitimate exercise.
The Burmese generals also appear to have been keen and obedient students to their teacher, Singapore. Burmese intelligence agents are known to visit on a routine basis to study the latest electronic eavesdropping gadgets for their surveillance of Burmese political dissidents, including the NLD leaders.
The recent announcement by NLD to boycott the army-orchestrated sham elections is the right move. How can the elections be legitimate when NLD’s leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest and barred from taking part? Singapore too, has a history of barring genuine opposition leaders who were daring enough to challenge, through constitutional means, the regime of Lee Kuan Yew.
Victims of Lee’s political vendetta include prominent figures such as the late J B Jeyaretnam, Singapore’s former solicitor-general Mr Francis Seow (now in exile in the US), Singapore’s leading corporate lawyer Mr Tang Liang Hong (now in exile in Australia), and Dr Chee Soon Juan, who remains bankrupted and unable to stand for elections.
These are well-known democrats who stood up against Lee Kuan Yew, who had openly declared in 2003 that: “If we had considered them serious political figures, we would not have kept them politically alive for so long. We could have bankrupted them earlier.” Is this not what the generals in Burma are doing while loudly proclaiming to the world that there will be “free and fair” elections in the country before the end of the year?
While Singapore leaders are shedding crocodile tears and sermonizing the Burmese generals on the need for free and fair elections, is it not appropriate for them to look at their own backyard?
When Singapore’s Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong met the Burmese generals, including Than Shwe, last year, he urged them not to allow the ongoing trial of Suu Kyi to affect the national reconciliation process and to make sure that the proposed elections are free and fair.
It is better for Goh to take a hard look at himself in the mirror: he will then be able to see the ugly features that include a well-documented law providing for indefinite detention without trial, under which detainees are subject to regular physical and mental torture. It is also common in Singapore to prosecute opposition politicians for speaking in public and distributing flyers; laws that are no different from the Burmese junta.
Goh Chok Tong’s “advice” is double-speak at best. What right has he got to advise the generals when the same despicable acts are committed at every election in Singapore? Are elections in Singapore free and fair in the first place? Is the media in Singapore free and pluralistic for the voters to be informed before they go to the polls to choose their representatives to parliament?
Burma’s media laws are the strictest in the world, and so are Singapore’s, the most notorious being the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act that gives sweeping powers, including the appointment of editors to the 14 daily newspapers that are all under the control of the PAP government. Burma is ranked 171 out of 175 countries in the recent Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. Singapore is also in the miserable position of 133, several ranks below that of even Angola and Congo.
The Singapore Press Holdings, whose chairman was a former deputy prime minister, runs all the newspapers of which its flagship daily is the Straits Times. It’s a known fact that intelligence operatives masquerade as reporters and journalists in Singapore’s media scene. The Straits Times has its equivalent in Burma, the New Light of Myanmar, which is nothing but a mouthpiece of the military regime.
Similarities between the autocratic rule in Singapore and the equally notorious regime in Burma are endless. Learning from Singapore on how to perpetuate one-party rule through sham elections is a natural progression for Burma under the bloodthirsty generals.
Seelan Palay is an artist and activist from Singapore. He works with Free Burma Campaign Singapore and blogs here. This article was printed by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and is reprinted with permisison.
As preparations for the sham elections in Burma get into full swing, it is not difficult to notice similarities in electoral practices between the Burmese generals in uniform and Singapore’s leaders in civilian clothes.
The Burmese regime is bending over backwards to stage the fraudulent elections while refusing to respect the results of the country’s polls in 1990 that led to the landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Why reinvent the wheel, when what happened two decades ago remains unfulfilled? The same military that massacred thousands of innocent civilians, including Buddhist monks, is now pretending that everything is hunky-dory.
It is an undeniable fact that the military regime holds close economic ties to Singapore – the top brass of the Burmese army are known to have parked their ill-gotten millions in Singapore’s banks, while they and their family members own properties in upmarket areas and their children go to top schools and drive flashy cars, flaunting their wealth to the envy of ordinary Singaporeans.
Burmese drug lords who are banned from entering the US freely come and go in Singapore and some even have offices in the posh commercial district along Shenton Way. It is no wonder that Singapore is the third largest investor in Burma, helping to prop up the pariah regime.
Singapore has even named a hybrid Orchid, its national flower, after the Burmese prime minister, General Thein Sein. Orchids in the same Singapore Botanical Gardens were previously named after Princess Diana and Nelson Mandela.
The similarities between Burma and Singapore do not stop there. The election process in Singapore is as opaque as it is in Naypyidaw, the new capital of the Burmese regime. Although Singapore claims to hold periodical elections to legitimise the rule of the People’s Action Party (PAP), the exercise itself is highly questionable.
To start with, there is no independent elections commission. Only a department that comes under the Prime Minister’s Office that decides on last-minute boundary delineation, exorbitant deposits for candidates (presently $US9,900 but expected to be raised to $US11,000 in the next election), and other regular gerrymandering practices, including what is known as the Group Representation Constituencies (GRC).
This so-called electoral system has led to almost half of the seats in parliament being uncontested on Nomination Day. Presently, Singapore’s ‘parliament’ has 84 MPs, of which 82 are from Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP. And that is “democratic elections” in Singapore for you!
The paradox of Singapore’s elections is that the electorate, some of whom are nearing their 50s, have never voted in their entire lives. This so-called anomaly is glaring in Singapore, where voting is compulsory under the Parliamentary Elections Act.
With all these well-entrenched undemocratic practices, it is not surprising to even a distant observer to understand how the ruling PAP has been in power since 1959.
What is worse is the irrefutable reality in Singapore that one man, by the name of Lee Kuan Yew, has been in power for the last 51 years. The octogenarian Lee, who is now 87 years old, calls himself Minister Mentor in the cabinet headed by his prime minster son, Lee Hsien Loong.
Compare this to the reality in Burma where the army generals have held sway since the 1962 coup, ousting the democratically elected government of U Nu. Even against this, Lee Kuan Yew’s grip on power extends longer by three years, but he continues to claim that elections in his republic are based on the Westminster model of democracy.
Anyone who believes in democratic values could easily see that it is next to impossible to continue to have a one-party dominated parliament in the name of freedom and democracy. Obviously the uniformed generals are under tutelage by the authoritarian regime in Singapore, clad in civilian clothes.
While the Burmese generals continue to not recognise the results of the 1990 elections, preparations are in full swing to hold yet another elections based on its 2008 constitution, aimed at hoodwinking the people. Singapore too is notorious for amending its constitution just before every general election to give a legal facade to what is clearly an illegitimate exercise.
The Burmese generals also appear to have been keen and obedient students to their teacher, Singapore. Burmese intelligence agents are known to visit on a routine basis to study the latest electronic eavesdropping gadgets for their surveillance of Burmese political dissidents, including the NLD leaders.
The recent announcement by NLD to boycott the army-orchestrated sham elections is the right move. How can the elections be legitimate when NLD’s leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest and barred from taking part? Singapore too, has a history of barring genuine opposition leaders who were daring enough to challenge, through constitutional means, the regime of Lee Kuan Yew.
Victims of Lee’s political vendetta include prominent figures such as the late J B Jeyaretnam, Singapore’s former solicitor-general Mr Francis Seow (now in exile in the US), Singapore’s leading corporate lawyer Mr Tang Liang Hong (now in exile in Australia), and Dr Chee Soon Juan, who remains bankrupted and unable to stand for elections.
These are well-known democrats who stood up against Lee Kuan Yew, who had openly declared in 2003 that: “If we had considered them serious political figures, we would not have kept them politically alive for so long. We could have bankrupted them earlier.” Is this not what the generals in Burma are doing while loudly proclaiming to the world that there will be “free and fair” elections in the country before the end of the year?
While Singapore leaders are shedding crocodile tears and sermonizing the Burmese generals on the need for free and fair elections, is it not appropriate for them to look at their own backyard?
When Singapore’s Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong met the Burmese generals, including Than Shwe, last year, he urged them not to allow the ongoing trial of Suu Kyi to affect the national reconciliation process and to make sure that the proposed elections are free and fair.
It is better for Goh to take a hard look at himself in the mirror: he will then be able to see the ugly features that include a well-documented law providing for indefinite detention without trial, under which detainees are subject to regular physical and mental torture. It is also common in Singapore to prosecute opposition politicians for speaking in public and distributing flyers; laws that are no different from the Burmese junta.
Goh Chok Tong’s “advice” is double-speak at best. What right has he got to advise the generals when the same despicable acts are committed at every election in Singapore? Are elections in Singapore free and fair in the first place? Is the media in Singapore free and pluralistic for the voters to be informed before they go to the polls to choose their representatives to parliament?
Burma’s media laws are the strictest in the world, and so are Singapore’s, the most notorious being the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act that gives sweeping powers, including the appointment of editors to the 14 daily newspapers that are all under the control of the PAP government. Burma is ranked 171 out of 175 countries in the recent Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. Singapore is also in the miserable position of 133, several ranks below that of even Angola and Congo.
The Singapore Press Holdings, whose chairman was a former deputy prime minister, runs all the newspapers of which its flagship daily is the Straits Times. It’s a known fact that intelligence operatives masquerade as reporters and journalists in Singapore’s media scene. The Straits Times has its equivalent in Burma, the New Light of Myanmar, which is nothing but a mouthpiece of the military regime.
Similarities between the autocratic rule in Singapore and the equally notorious regime in Burma are endless. Learning from Singapore on how to perpetuate one-party rule through sham elections is a natural progression for Burma under the bloodthirsty generals.
Seelan Palay is an artist and activist from Singapore. He works with Free Burma Campaign Singapore and blogs here. This article was printed by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and is reprinted with permisison.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010 |
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SE Asia Worries Thailand's Unrest Could Spread
By Brian Padden
Thailand's neighbors are watching the political unrest in Bangkok with growing concern. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has said the protests there could spread economic and political instability throughout the region.
ASEAN has called on the Thai government and the anti-government demonstrators to exercise restraint and to seek a settlement through dialogue and reconciliation. The foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia have made similar statements.
Since March, 26 people have been killed and almost 1,000 injured in bomb blasts and confrontations between police and anti-government protesters in Bangkok known as red shirts. The red shirts, made up mostly of rural and urban poor, demand new elections. The demonstrations have disrupted businesses and tourism in the country.
Protests Could Affect Investments
Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah says he is concerned that instability in Thailand could lead to a repeat of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Then, the collapse of the Thai baht hurt investor confidence in the region.
"Well its rather too early to assess what would be the direct impact of the development in Thailand on the economy, but we did hope actually that it would not create similar situations [like] in the '90's when the contagion effect of the economic meltdown was felt in our region," said Faizasyah. "But hopefully this is a very isolated case but we are also very hopeful that with our efforts together then we can resolve the situation in a peaceful way."
Michael Montesano with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs says right now most foreign investors see the crisis as specific to Thailand only. But, he says, as the protests continue investment in the region could be affected.
"The only effect that we need to be afraid of is those people on the outside of the region who see the region as a whole, and who have their antenna up to instability and political crisis in Southeast Asia, and who, when they see crisis in one country become skittish about how to deal with investment and the economy and other activities in the region as a whole," said Montesano.
Neighbors Offer Assistance
Thailand's political divisions have built steadily over the past several years, since a military coup ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006.
Although Thailand's urban middle class and elite consider him corrupt, he remains very popular among farmers and the poor, because of his anti-poverty programs. His supporters consider the current government to be illegitimate because it came to power in a parliamentary deal after courts ousted two pro-Thaksin elected governments in 2008.
Singapore and Indonesia have offered help to resolve the crisis in Thailand but Faizasyah says it would only be useful if both sides request it.
"We are not interfering in our neighboring issues actually," said Faizasyah. "It must be very clear if there is anyway we can assist in the dialogue, at the request of the government or other parties in this situation then certainly we will be, we are there to provide any assistance available at our disposal."
Montesano says ASEAN's tradition of non-interference in members' affairs and the Thai government's unwillingness to ask for help, will stifle any regional mediation effort. What Thailand's neighbors can do to prevent similar protest movements from spreading, he says, is to address the concerns of the poor and disenfranchised in their own countries.
"I think that other countries in the region would do well to look at the deep roots of Thailand's crisis, and to ask themselves whether their economies and their societies aren't also subject to similar crises," said Montesano.
Apart from that, he says, Thailand's neighbors and the rest of the world can only watch to see how the crisis plays out.
Source: VOA
Thailand's neighbors are watching the political unrest in Bangkok with growing concern. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has said the protests there could spread economic and political instability throughout the region.
ASEAN has called on the Thai government and the anti-government demonstrators to exercise restraint and to seek a settlement through dialogue and reconciliation. The foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia have made similar statements.
Since March, 26 people have been killed and almost 1,000 injured in bomb blasts and confrontations between police and anti-government protesters in Bangkok known as red shirts. The red shirts, made up mostly of rural and urban poor, demand new elections. The demonstrations have disrupted businesses and tourism in the country.
Protests Could Affect Investments
Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah says he is concerned that instability in Thailand could lead to a repeat of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Then, the collapse of the Thai baht hurt investor confidence in the region.
"Well its rather too early to assess what would be the direct impact of the development in Thailand on the economy, but we did hope actually that it would not create similar situations [like] in the '90's when the contagion effect of the economic meltdown was felt in our region," said Faizasyah. "But hopefully this is a very isolated case but we are also very hopeful that with our efforts together then we can resolve the situation in a peaceful way."
Michael Montesano with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs says right now most foreign investors see the crisis as specific to Thailand only. But, he says, as the protests continue investment in the region could be affected.
"The only effect that we need to be afraid of is those people on the outside of the region who see the region as a whole, and who have their antenna up to instability and political crisis in Southeast Asia, and who, when they see crisis in one country become skittish about how to deal with investment and the economy and other activities in the region as a whole," said Montesano.
Neighbors Offer Assistance
Thailand's political divisions have built steadily over the past several years, since a military coup ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006.
Although Thailand's urban middle class and elite consider him corrupt, he remains very popular among farmers and the poor, because of his anti-poverty programs. His supporters consider the current government to be illegitimate because it came to power in a parliamentary deal after courts ousted two pro-Thaksin elected governments in 2008.
Singapore and Indonesia have offered help to resolve the crisis in Thailand but Faizasyah says it would only be useful if both sides request it.
"We are not interfering in our neighboring issues actually," said Faizasyah. "It must be very clear if there is anyway we can assist in the dialogue, at the request of the government or other parties in this situation then certainly we will be, we are there to provide any assistance available at our disposal."
Montesano says ASEAN's tradition of non-interference in members' affairs and the Thai government's unwillingness to ask for help, will stifle any regional mediation effort. What Thailand's neighbors can do to prevent similar protest movements from spreading, he says, is to address the concerns of the poor and disenfranchised in their own countries.
"I think that other countries in the region would do well to look at the deep roots of Thailand's crisis, and to ask themselves whether their economies and their societies aren't also subject to similar crises," said Montesano.
Apart from that, he says, Thailand's neighbors and the rest of the world can only watch to see how the crisis plays out.
Source: VOA
Tuesday, April 27, 2010 |
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Spain Hosts 6th Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue
Coinciding with the Spanish Presidency of the EU, the cities of Madrid and Toledo hosted the 6th Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue, the aim of which is to promote relations and mutual respect between cultures and creeds from both regions.
The working sessions, which were held at the IFEMA exhibition centre in Madrid, dealt with three main issues: religious freedom and human rights; respect and mutual understanding; and dialogue between cultures and religions as a bridge between societies.
Delegates from 27 of around 50 countries which make up the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) attended the meeting, titled 'Consolidating religious freedom and mutual understanding through interfaith and intercultural dialogue'; the meeting, which was set up in 1996, is a high-level forum between the governments of both regions.
The Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue has taken place every year since 2005, either in Asia or in Europe, and brings together diplomats, senior officials connected with interfaith matters, leading academics and religious leaders from different faiths.
This year's dialogue was jointly organised by Spain and Pakistan, and was sponsored by 15 European and Asian countries: Germany, Austria, China, South Korea, Denmark, the Philippines, Finland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore and Thailand.
The eventwas held in Spain in response to the announcement made in this regard by the President of the Government, José Luis RodrÃguez Zapatero, at the ASEM Summit in Beijing in 2008. The city councils of Madrid and Toledo and the regional government of Castilla La Mancha helped the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to organise this 6th ASEM Interfaith Dialogue.
The closing ceremony took place Friday in the city of Toledo.
The working sessions, which were held at the IFEMA exhibition centre in Madrid, dealt with three main issues: religious freedom and human rights; respect and mutual understanding; and dialogue between cultures and religions as a bridge between societies.
Delegates from 27 of around 50 countries which make up the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) attended the meeting, titled 'Consolidating religious freedom and mutual understanding through interfaith and intercultural dialogue'; the meeting, which was set up in 1996, is a high-level forum between the governments of both regions.
The Asia-Europe Interfaith Dialogue has taken place every year since 2005, either in Asia or in Europe, and brings together diplomats, senior officials connected with interfaith matters, leading academics and religious leaders from different faiths.
This year's dialogue was jointly organised by Spain and Pakistan, and was sponsored by 15 European and Asian countries: Germany, Austria, China, South Korea, Denmark, the Philippines, Finland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore and Thailand.
The eventwas held in Spain in response to the announcement made in this regard by the President of the Government, José Luis RodrÃguez Zapatero, at the ASEM Summit in Beijing in 2008. The city councils of Madrid and Toledo and the regional government of Castilla La Mancha helped the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to organise this 6th ASEM Interfaith Dialogue.
The closing ceremony took place Friday in the city of Toledo.
Saturday, April 10, 2010 |
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Wanted: India-China-Japan-Singapore Task Force On Maritime Counter-Terrorism
By B. Raman
During his forthcoming visit to China for four days from April 5, 2010, for talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, S. M. Krishna, the Indian Foreign Minister, should review co-operation in counter-terrorism with China in order to re-focus it on co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism instead of the present focus on co-operation against conventional land-based terrorism. He should explore the possibility of closer cooperation involving the Navies of India, China, Singapore and Japan in ensuring sealane security and in protecting the commercial ships and energy supplies of the four countries from possible attacks by terrorists and pirates operating from Yemen and Somalia.
Al Qaeda has extended and strengthened its presence in Yemen and Somalia. While the Somalia-based Al Qaeda elements have not operated beyond Somalia so far, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) as the Yemeni wing of Al Qaeda is called tried unsuccessfully to blow up an American aircraft over Detroit on December 25, 2009, through a Nigerian suicide bomber recruited from London and trained in Yemen.
Al Qaeda has not so far succeeded in attacking strategic economic targets such as oil and gas production facilities and supplies by sea and commercial shipping despite its talking about it for some years after 9/11. This was partly due to the strengthening of physical security measures against maritime terrorism by the countries of the region after the attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in October 2000 and on the French tanker Limberg in October 2002. Both attacks took place in the Aden area. It was also partly due to the greater-cooperation among the navies of the region in the form of greater intelligence sharing and joint or co-ordinated patrolling. The positive results of these measures have been particularly evident in the Malacca Strait area.
Maritime counter-terrorism and anti-piracy measures have not been as effective in the Gulf of Aden area. Despite the deployment of anti-piracy patrols of the Western navies as well as those of India, China, Japan, the ASEAN countries and others, the Somalian pirates continue to be very active hijacking ships carrying valuable and often dangerous cargo such as chemicals and extracting ransom from the ship-owners for releasing their ships. Even China, despite its policy against ransom payments, found itself helpless last year when a Chinese commercial ship was hijacked by the pirates. Ultimately, the Chinese company, with a nod of approval from the Government, had to pay ransom when it found that the Chinese anti-piracy patrol was not in a position to help it.
At present, there is no evidence of any linkage between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups on the one side and the Somalian pirates on the other. Lack of evidence does not mean there canot be any linkages. The kind of attention the possibility of linkages between terrorist organisations and organised land-based crime groups is receiving is not seen to monitor the possibility of linkages developing between the terrorists and the Somalian pirates. It was the realisation of the danger of pro-Al Qaeda organisations such as the Jemaah Islamiya developing linkages with the pirates based in the South-East Asian region and disrupting shipping and jamming choke-points that provided the trigger for the effective co-operation in the Malacca Strait area.
Such a trigger has not been there in the case of Somalian piracy. The danger of part of the ransom money being paid to the pirates finding its way into the coffers of Al Qaeda and its associates is real. India, China, Singapore and Japan as the countries that would be most affected if the Somalian piracy remains uncontrolled as it is presently and if Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia join hands with the pirates should take the lead in working out feasible options for dealing with the problem through measures such as intelligence-sharing, having a four-nation task force against piracy and maritime terrorism, mutual assistance in patrolling and joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises.
India already has a mechanism for counter-terrorism co-operation with China under which two exercises have been held so far in Yunnan and Karnataka. Sino-Indian co-operation against land-based terrorism would be pointless because of China's close relations with Pakistan from which most of the threats to our security from jihadi terrorists arise. Till the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, China supported Pakistan's contention that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the parent organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), was a charity and not a terrorist organisation. It was China's opposition that came in the way of the JUD being declared a terrorist organisation by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council. China and India have no shared perception when it comes to terrorist groups operating from Pakistan. China's policies and actions are largely influenced by the views of Pakistan. Under such circumstances, it would be futile to expect the co-operation mechanism against land-based terrorism to be of any benefit to India. It will be only of public relations value. Nothing more.
However, no such differences of perception arise in the case of Somalian piracy and maritime threats from Al Qaeda and its associates in Yemen and Somalia. All the four countries ought to be equally concerned over the persisting and growing threats from the Gulf of Aden area. Any disruption of shipping or energy supplies will damage their economies as they are recovering from the impact of the global economic melt-down. As the victim of a spectacular act of sea-borne terrorism by the LET in November, 2008, India should play the leadership role in evolving a co-operative maritime counter-terrorism and anti-piracy mechanism involving the navies of India, China, Singapore and Japan. The reasons for the participation of India, China and Japan are obvious and need no elaboration. Singapore's participation would be beneficial because of the co-operation of the navies of India and Singapore for some years now and Singapore's close relations with China. Singapore will be able to impart to the co-operation a good measure of professionalism.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
During his forthcoming visit to China for four days from April 5, 2010, for talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, S. M. Krishna, the Indian Foreign Minister, should review co-operation in counter-terrorism with China in order to re-focus it on co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism instead of the present focus on co-operation against conventional land-based terrorism. He should explore the possibility of closer cooperation involving the Navies of India, China, Singapore and Japan in ensuring sealane security and in protecting the commercial ships and energy supplies of the four countries from possible attacks by terrorists and pirates operating from Yemen and Somalia.
Al Qaeda has extended and strengthened its presence in Yemen and Somalia. While the Somalia-based Al Qaeda elements have not operated beyond Somalia so far, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) as the Yemeni wing of Al Qaeda is called tried unsuccessfully to blow up an American aircraft over Detroit on December 25, 2009, through a Nigerian suicide bomber recruited from London and trained in Yemen.
Al Qaeda has not so far succeeded in attacking strategic economic targets such as oil and gas production facilities and supplies by sea and commercial shipping despite its talking about it for some years after 9/11. This was partly due to the strengthening of physical security measures against maritime terrorism by the countries of the region after the attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in October 2000 and on the French tanker Limberg in October 2002. Both attacks took place in the Aden area. It was also partly due to the greater-cooperation among the navies of the region in the form of greater intelligence sharing and joint or co-ordinated patrolling. The positive results of these measures have been particularly evident in the Malacca Strait area.
Maritime counter-terrorism and anti-piracy measures have not been as effective in the Gulf of Aden area. Despite the deployment of anti-piracy patrols of the Western navies as well as those of India, China, Japan, the ASEAN countries and others, the Somalian pirates continue to be very active hijacking ships carrying valuable and often dangerous cargo such as chemicals and extracting ransom from the ship-owners for releasing their ships. Even China, despite its policy against ransom payments, found itself helpless last year when a Chinese commercial ship was hijacked by the pirates. Ultimately, the Chinese company, with a nod of approval from the Government, had to pay ransom when it found that the Chinese anti-piracy patrol was not in a position to help it.
At present, there is no evidence of any linkage between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups on the one side and the Somalian pirates on the other. Lack of evidence does not mean there canot be any linkages. The kind of attention the possibility of linkages between terrorist organisations and organised land-based crime groups is receiving is not seen to monitor the possibility of linkages developing between the terrorists and the Somalian pirates. It was the realisation of the danger of pro-Al Qaeda organisations such as the Jemaah Islamiya developing linkages with the pirates based in the South-East Asian region and disrupting shipping and jamming choke-points that provided the trigger for the effective co-operation in the Malacca Strait area.
Such a trigger has not been there in the case of Somalian piracy. The danger of part of the ransom money being paid to the pirates finding its way into the coffers of Al Qaeda and its associates is real. India, China, Singapore and Japan as the countries that would be most affected if the Somalian piracy remains uncontrolled as it is presently and if Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia join hands with the pirates should take the lead in working out feasible options for dealing with the problem through measures such as intelligence-sharing, having a four-nation task force against piracy and maritime terrorism, mutual assistance in patrolling and joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises.
India already has a mechanism for counter-terrorism co-operation with China under which two exercises have been held so far in Yunnan and Karnataka. Sino-Indian co-operation against land-based terrorism would be pointless because of China's close relations with Pakistan from which most of the threats to our security from jihadi terrorists arise. Till the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, China supported Pakistan's contention that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the parent organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), was a charity and not a terrorist organisation. It was China's opposition that came in the way of the JUD being declared a terrorist organisation by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council. China and India have no shared perception when it comes to terrorist groups operating from Pakistan. China's policies and actions are largely influenced by the views of Pakistan. Under such circumstances, it would be futile to expect the co-operation mechanism against land-based terrorism to be of any benefit to India. It will be only of public relations value. Nothing more.
However, no such differences of perception arise in the case of Somalian piracy and maritime threats from Al Qaeda and its associates in Yemen and Somalia. All the four countries ought to be equally concerned over the persisting and growing threats from the Gulf of Aden area. Any disruption of shipping or energy supplies will damage their economies as they are recovering from the impact of the global economic melt-down. As the victim of a spectacular act of sea-borne terrorism by the LET in November, 2008, India should play the leadership role in evolving a co-operative maritime counter-terrorism and anti-piracy mechanism involving the navies of India, China, Singapore and Japan. The reasons for the participation of India, China and Japan are obvious and need no elaboration. Singapore's participation would be beneficial because of the co-operation of the navies of India and Singapore for some years now and Singapore's close relations with China. Singapore will be able to impart to the co-operation a good measure of professionalism.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Tuesday, March 30, 2010 |
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Fresh Fears Of Maritime Terrorism
By B. Raman
The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October, 2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.
These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.
Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.
4. In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.
The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.
It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist group is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2, 2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said: "The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.
It is necessary for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separately of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.
The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.
Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism. We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October, 2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.
These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.
Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.
4. In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.
The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.
It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist group is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2, 2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said: "The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.
It is necessary for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separately of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.
The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.
Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism. We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Friday, March 05, 2010 |
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Al Qaeda And Radical Islamist Groups In Southeast Asia
In the 1990s, Al Qaeda made significant inroads into the Southeast Asian region, particularly the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Al Qaeda not only set up regional offices, but it also helped create, strengthen, and make more violent indigenous groups such as the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network.
By the mid-2000s, however, the actions of various national authorities in Southeast Asia appears to have drastically reduced the size and influence of Al Qaeda, JI, and other sympathetic groups. Throughout the decade, the United States—along with Australia—used capacity-building assistance and at times diplomatic pressure to support and push regional governments’ counterterrorism efforts. It should be noted that while there has been much anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia many militants in the region are focused on local agendas.
Key factors in weakening violent Islamist groups in Southeast Asia have been: the generally moderate nature of Islam in Southeast Asia; a relatively high level of economic development; the existence of democratic political systems in many affected countries; the miscalculation of JI’s radical wing in killing Muslim civilians in their bomb attacks; and the ability of most national governments to marshal the resources and public support to root out the most violent groups. One possible exception to these observations is the southern Philippines, where radical Islamist groups have been abetted by a combination of ongoing sectarian/civil conflict and relatively weak government capacity.
Since 2002, the U.S. has sent ongoing deployments of hundreds of troops to the southern Philippines to advise and assist the Philippine military.
Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. attention in Southeast Asia focused on radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, that have had or been alleged to have had ties to the Al Qaeda network. In the years before and immediately following 2001, Al Qaeda used its Southeast Asia cells to help organize and finance its global activities—including the September 11 attacks—and to provide safe harbor to Al Qaeda operatives, such as the convicted organizer of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef.
By the end of the 1990s, JI and Al Qaeda appear to have developed a highly symbiotic relationship. There reportedly was some overlap in membership. They shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, and Al Qaeda provided JI with considerable financial support.69 They shared personnel, such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al Qaeda.70 The two networks jointly planned operations and reportedly conducted attacks in Southeast Asia together.71
Members of JI with extensive ties to Al Qaeda, are known to have helped two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002 roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings. Two of the September 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who pled guilty in April 2005 to U.S. charges of involvement in the September 11 plot, apparently visited Malaysia and met with cell members in 2000.
Additionally, the FBI claims that Malaysian cell members provided Moussaoui with $35,000 and a business reference.
In 1999 and 2000, several Al Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11 and the USS Cole attacks used Kuala Lumpur as a meeting and staging ground. According to the confessions of one captured Al Qaeda leader, Malaysia was viewed as an ideal location for transiting and meeting because it allowed visa-free entry to citizens of most Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002, according to one prominent expert on Al Qaeda, roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia.
Years of surveillance, arrests, and killings of JI members by various states are believed to have significantly degraded the more militant JI factions, which were most closely associated with Al Qaeda.
As a result, by the middle of the 2000s, JI’s known links to Al Qaeda reportedly dwindled to almost nothing.72 JI appears to be taking direction from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ anti-western tactics as undermining their preferred, longer-term strategy of building up military capacity and using religious proselytization to create a mass base sufficient to support an Islamic revolution in the future.
Moreover, the crackdown on JI appears to have seriously weakened the organization, degrading its command, communication, and fundraising structures to the point where many analysts believe it primarily operates only in Indonesia, with a number of operatives also active on the large southern Philippine island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao. Both areas have majority Muslim populations.
In September 2009, Indonesian authorities killed the leader of one such cell, Noordin Mohammed Top. Top, whose faction changed its name to the Al-Qaeda Jihad Organisation for the Malay Archipelago, is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17, 2009 bombings of the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top, suspicions that received more credence when a laptop computer was found at Top’s hideout that reportedly established linkages between Indonesian militants and Al Qaeda.73
Suspected Al Qaeda Links to JI Splinter Cells
The laptop also reportedly contained information stating that militant Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahmad Jaelani, who is thought to have recruited the suicide bombers for the July 17 hotel bombings, was recruited by Al Qaeda while studying in Yemen.74 Syaifudin is thought to have become radicalized while in Yemen between 1995 and 2000.75 Syaifudin, who was a veteran of conflict in Poso with links to international terrorist financing networks, was thought likely to replace Top.
He was killed in a shoot out with Indonesian authorities in October 2009.76
Southeast Asian terrorism expert Sydney Jones has described the central question of the Jakarta hotel bombings as whether Top was imitating or had developed some “structural affiliation” with Al Qaeda.77 The Economist has stated that “Evidence recovered from the scene of Mr. Top’s death has also shown that he had links with al-Qaida and received financial support from the Middle East.”78
The head of Indonesia’s anti-terror Detachment 88 Brigadier-General Saut Usman Nasution warned in November 2009 that although Top and other violent militants had been killed or captured, new cells or splinter groups could be a source of strife, particularly in Indonesian regions such as Sulawesi and Maluku where there has been a history of inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims. Nasution stated that these groups are in the process of recruiting new members to their organizations and expressed his concern that some of the 148 terrorists in detention in Indonesia may rejoin terrorist organizations or form new ones upon their release from prison. He and others in Indonesia have called for a deradicalisation programme to prevent these releases from becoming a source of strife in the country.79 From 2002 to 2009 some 454 militants were reportedly arrested in Indonesia. Of those 352 were sent to jail.80
In January 2010, it was reported by Pakistani authorities that a Filipino militant was killed in a U.S. missile strike against a militant compound near the border of North and South Waziristan, Pakistan. The apparent death of Abdul Basit Usman, a bomb making expert reportedly with links to Abu Sayyaf and JI, points to ties between al-Qaida in Pakistan and militants in Southeast Asia.81
It was reported on January 17, 2010, that the U.S. government was considering placing Hambali, an Indonesian militant believed to be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing, on trial in Washington, DC. Hambali was captured in Thailand in 2003 and was held in Guantanamo since 2006 for his suspected involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed over 200 people.82 On January 20 it was reported that the U.S. had rejected a request from the Government of Indonesia to turn Hambali over to Indonesian authorities for trial in Indonesia.83
The Abu Sayyaf Group
Another Southeast Asian group that reportedly has had sporadic ties with Al Qaeda is Abu Sayyaf, which is a small, violent, faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in the western fringes of the big southern Filipino island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao.
Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but these links reportedly dwindled throughout by the early 2000s. Abu Sayyaf has a record of killings and kidnappings.
Under pressure from U.S.-supported Philippine military operations since 2002, Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength declined from an estimated 1,000 to about 200-300 by the middle to end of the decade. Since 2003, Abu Sayyaf has carried out bombings and plotted bombings in cooperation with JI and another, much larger Muslim group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including bombings in Manila.
Since 2002, the United States has deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military, the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP), in their fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group. The U.S. role in the operations is supposed to be non-combat and has involved the provision of intelligence and communications support of the AFP, including the employment of U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft; deployment of Navy Seal and Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units; joint training exercises with the AFP, assistance to the AFP in planning operations; and conducting civic action projects with the AFP to improve the lives of the local populace.84 The civic action projects (medical treatment, water purification installations, farm markets, renovation of schools) on the islands of Basilan and Jolo appear to have weakened support for Abu Sayyaf in these locations.85
Implications for U.S. Policy
Thus far in Southeast Asia, actions taken by regional governments appear to have nearly neutralized, though not eliminated, the threat from Islamist terror groups focused on Western targets. The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens.
Once Indonesia came to view the threat as a threat to Indonesians and the Indonesian state, it too moved to suppress JI.
The United States – along with its ally, Australia – has encouraged, pushed for, and supported these local anti-terrorism efforts through several means, including funding and training Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorist unit; deploying troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group; launching a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca; increasing intelligence sharing operations; restarting military-military relations with Indonesia; and providing substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, since 2001, Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation.
Combating anti-American terrorism in Southeast Asia has presented the Bush and Obama Administrations with a delicate foreign policy problem. Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have had to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations. Although proponents of violent, radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Such sensitivities are particularly strong in Indonesia and Malaysia, the region’s two largest Muslim majority nations.
Throughout the 2000s, the rise in anti-American sentiment propelled by both the U.S.-led invasion of and presence in Iraq and many Southeast Asian Muslims’ perceptions of America’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “blatantly pro-Israel” has presented difficulties for most governments contemplating an overt U.S. role in their internal security.86 That said, secular nationalist political parties have reaffirmed their central place in Indonesian national politics and asserted their dominance over Islamist political parties.
While Southeast Asia has had a large degree of success in curtailing Islamist terrorist activity there may be limits on the extent to which lessons learned may be applicable in other parts of the Muslim world. One lesson that does appear to translate is that full commitment to fighting Islamist militants comes with the perception by Muslim states that these militants present a threat to their regime and people and not just to Western targets in their country or region.
The moderate and tolerant aspect of Islam in Southeast Asia may predispose Southeast Asian states to view extreme forms of Islamic belief in a different light than they would in more conservative states in the Arab core of the Muslim world. Malaysia’s moderate concept of Islam Hadhhari and Malaysian leaders’ strong condemnation of violence associated with fundamentalist belief, while at the same time embracing Islam, is one example. A further factor evident in Malaysia is the delicate balance between the Muslim community and the significant non-Muslim ethnic Chinese and Indian communities that reside there. Indonesia has shown that democracy and national secular government can coexist in a largely Muslim state. For these and other reasons the Southeast Asian experience in fighting terrorism may be more applicable to places such as Bangladesh than the more conservative Arab centre of Islam.
This article is an edited selection of a larger February 2010 Congressional Research Service Report, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (PDF) or found here at Open CRS
NOTES:
68 Prepared by Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-7653 and Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-3144. For more, see CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, coordinated by Bruce Vaughn.
69 Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Report #63, August 26, 2003, p. 1; Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” p. 9.
70 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 151. Yazid Sufaat is the individual JI sent to Kandahar.
71 Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings.
72 Eric Schmitt, “Southeast Asia Sees Gains against Insurgencies,” International Herald Tribune, June 9, 2008.
73 Peter Gelling and Mark McDonald, “Indonesian Police Kill Alleged Terror Mastermind,” The New York Times, September 18, 2009.
74 “Letter Found on Top’s laptop Implicates Jibril, States Jaelani Recruited by Al Qaeda in Yemen,” OSC, September 29, 2009.
75 “Indonesian Terror Recruiter Syaifudin Likely Successor to Noordin,” OSC, September 25, 2009.
76 Sulastri Osman, “The Fatal Allure of Extremist Logic,” RSIS Commentaries, Singapore, October 23, 2009.
77 Sydney Jones, “Noordin’s Dangerous Liaiasons,” Tempo, August 9, 2009.
78 “Indonesia Risk: Security Risk,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 26, 2009.
79 Salim Osman, “New Terror Cells Taking Over JI’s Role,” The Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
80 “New Terror Cells Planning Attacks,” New Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
81 Ishtiaq Mahshud, “Filipino Militant Killed by US Missile in Pakistan,” Associated Press, January 21, 2010.
82 Chua Chin Hon, “US Govt May Hold Hambali Trial in Washington,” The Straits Times, January 17, 2010.
83 “US Rejects Indonesian Request to Extradite Terror Suspect Hambali,” BBC News, January 20, 2010.
84 Raymond Bonner and Carlos Conde, “U.S. and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader,” New York Times, July 23, 2005, p. A4. James Hookway, “Terror fight scores in Philippines,” Wall Street Journal Asia, June 20, 2007, p. 1. Roland Ramos and Inday Espina-Varona, “Expanded (old) war theater, Philippine Graphic,” November 12, 2007, p. 14-18.
85 Simon Montlake, “U.S. troops in Philippines defy old stereotype,” Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 2007, p. 7. Al Jacinto, “U.S., Filipino troops go on charm offensive,” Manila Times (internet version), September 10, 2007.
86 Daljit Singh,”The Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” in Russell Heng and Denis Hew, eds., Regional Outlook, 2003-2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
By the mid-2000s, however, the actions of various national authorities in Southeast Asia appears to have drastically reduced the size and influence of Al Qaeda, JI, and other sympathetic groups. Throughout the decade, the United States—along with Australia—used capacity-building assistance and at times diplomatic pressure to support and push regional governments’ counterterrorism efforts. It should be noted that while there has been much anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia many militants in the region are focused on local agendas.
Key factors in weakening violent Islamist groups in Southeast Asia have been: the generally moderate nature of Islam in Southeast Asia; a relatively high level of economic development; the existence of democratic political systems in many affected countries; the miscalculation of JI’s radical wing in killing Muslim civilians in their bomb attacks; and the ability of most national governments to marshal the resources and public support to root out the most violent groups. One possible exception to these observations is the southern Philippines, where radical Islamist groups have been abetted by a combination of ongoing sectarian/civil conflict and relatively weak government capacity.
Since 2002, the U.S. has sent ongoing deployments of hundreds of troops to the southern Philippines to advise and assist the Philippine military.
Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. attention in Southeast Asia focused on radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, that have had or been alleged to have had ties to the Al Qaeda network. In the years before and immediately following 2001, Al Qaeda used its Southeast Asia cells to help organize and finance its global activities—including the September 11 attacks—and to provide safe harbor to Al Qaeda operatives, such as the convicted organizer of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef.
By the end of the 1990s, JI and Al Qaeda appear to have developed a highly symbiotic relationship. There reportedly was some overlap in membership. They shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, and Al Qaeda provided JI with considerable financial support.69 They shared personnel, such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al Qaeda.70 The two networks jointly planned operations and reportedly conducted attacks in Southeast Asia together.71
Members of JI with extensive ties to Al Qaeda, are known to have helped two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002 roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings. Two of the September 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who pled guilty in April 2005 to U.S. charges of involvement in the September 11 plot, apparently visited Malaysia and met with cell members in 2000.
Additionally, the FBI claims that Malaysian cell members provided Moussaoui with $35,000 and a business reference.
In 1999 and 2000, several Al Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11 and the USS Cole attacks used Kuala Lumpur as a meeting and staging ground. According to the confessions of one captured Al Qaeda leader, Malaysia was viewed as an ideal location for transiting and meeting because it allowed visa-free entry to citizens of most Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002, according to one prominent expert on Al Qaeda, roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia.
Years of surveillance, arrests, and killings of JI members by various states are believed to have significantly degraded the more militant JI factions, which were most closely associated with Al Qaeda.
As a result, by the middle of the 2000s, JI’s known links to Al Qaeda reportedly dwindled to almost nothing.72 JI appears to be taking direction from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ anti-western tactics as undermining their preferred, longer-term strategy of building up military capacity and using religious proselytization to create a mass base sufficient to support an Islamic revolution in the future.
Moreover, the crackdown on JI appears to have seriously weakened the organization, degrading its command, communication, and fundraising structures to the point where many analysts believe it primarily operates only in Indonesia, with a number of operatives also active on the large southern Philippine island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao. Both areas have majority Muslim populations.
In September 2009, Indonesian authorities killed the leader of one such cell, Noordin Mohammed Top. Top, whose faction changed its name to the Al-Qaeda Jihad Organisation for the Malay Archipelago, is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17, 2009 bombings of the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top, suspicions that received more credence when a laptop computer was found at Top’s hideout that reportedly established linkages between Indonesian militants and Al Qaeda.73
Suspected Al Qaeda Links to JI Splinter Cells
The laptop also reportedly contained information stating that militant Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahmad Jaelani, who is thought to have recruited the suicide bombers for the July 17 hotel bombings, was recruited by Al Qaeda while studying in Yemen.74 Syaifudin is thought to have become radicalized while in Yemen between 1995 and 2000.75 Syaifudin, who was a veteran of conflict in Poso with links to international terrorist financing networks, was thought likely to replace Top.
He was killed in a shoot out with Indonesian authorities in October 2009.76
Southeast Asian terrorism expert Sydney Jones has described the central question of the Jakarta hotel bombings as whether Top was imitating or had developed some “structural affiliation” with Al Qaeda.77 The Economist has stated that “Evidence recovered from the scene of Mr. Top’s death has also shown that he had links with al-Qaida and received financial support from the Middle East.”78
The head of Indonesia’s anti-terror Detachment 88 Brigadier-General Saut Usman Nasution warned in November 2009 that although Top and other violent militants had been killed or captured, new cells or splinter groups could be a source of strife, particularly in Indonesian regions such as Sulawesi and Maluku where there has been a history of inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims. Nasution stated that these groups are in the process of recruiting new members to their organizations and expressed his concern that some of the 148 terrorists in detention in Indonesia may rejoin terrorist organizations or form new ones upon their release from prison. He and others in Indonesia have called for a deradicalisation programme to prevent these releases from becoming a source of strife in the country.79 From 2002 to 2009 some 454 militants were reportedly arrested in Indonesia. Of those 352 were sent to jail.80
In January 2010, it was reported by Pakistani authorities that a Filipino militant was killed in a U.S. missile strike against a militant compound near the border of North and South Waziristan, Pakistan. The apparent death of Abdul Basit Usman, a bomb making expert reportedly with links to Abu Sayyaf and JI, points to ties between al-Qaida in Pakistan and militants in Southeast Asia.81
It was reported on January 17, 2010, that the U.S. government was considering placing Hambali, an Indonesian militant believed to be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing, on trial in Washington, DC. Hambali was captured in Thailand in 2003 and was held in Guantanamo since 2006 for his suspected involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed over 200 people.82 On January 20 it was reported that the U.S. had rejected a request from the Government of Indonesia to turn Hambali over to Indonesian authorities for trial in Indonesia.83
The Abu Sayyaf Group
Another Southeast Asian group that reportedly has had sporadic ties with Al Qaeda is Abu Sayyaf, which is a small, violent, faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in the western fringes of the big southern Filipino island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao.
Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but these links reportedly dwindled throughout by the early 2000s. Abu Sayyaf has a record of killings and kidnappings.
Under pressure from U.S.-supported Philippine military operations since 2002, Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength declined from an estimated 1,000 to about 200-300 by the middle to end of the decade. Since 2003, Abu Sayyaf has carried out bombings and plotted bombings in cooperation with JI and another, much larger Muslim group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including bombings in Manila.
Since 2002, the United States has deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military, the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP), in their fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group. The U.S. role in the operations is supposed to be non-combat and has involved the provision of intelligence and communications support of the AFP, including the employment of U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft; deployment of Navy Seal and Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units; joint training exercises with the AFP, assistance to the AFP in planning operations; and conducting civic action projects with the AFP to improve the lives of the local populace.84 The civic action projects (medical treatment, water purification installations, farm markets, renovation of schools) on the islands of Basilan and Jolo appear to have weakened support for Abu Sayyaf in these locations.85
Implications for U.S. Policy
Thus far in Southeast Asia, actions taken by regional governments appear to have nearly neutralized, though not eliminated, the threat from Islamist terror groups focused on Western targets. The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens.
Once Indonesia came to view the threat as a threat to Indonesians and the Indonesian state, it too moved to suppress JI.
The United States – along with its ally, Australia – has encouraged, pushed for, and supported these local anti-terrorism efforts through several means, including funding and training Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorist unit; deploying troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group; launching a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca; increasing intelligence sharing operations; restarting military-military relations with Indonesia; and providing substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, since 2001, Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation.
Combating anti-American terrorism in Southeast Asia has presented the Bush and Obama Administrations with a delicate foreign policy problem. Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have had to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations. Although proponents of violent, radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Such sensitivities are particularly strong in Indonesia and Malaysia, the region’s two largest Muslim majority nations.
Throughout the 2000s, the rise in anti-American sentiment propelled by both the U.S.-led invasion of and presence in Iraq and many Southeast Asian Muslims’ perceptions of America’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “blatantly pro-Israel” has presented difficulties for most governments contemplating an overt U.S. role in their internal security.86 That said, secular nationalist political parties have reaffirmed their central place in Indonesian national politics and asserted their dominance over Islamist political parties.
While Southeast Asia has had a large degree of success in curtailing Islamist terrorist activity there may be limits on the extent to which lessons learned may be applicable in other parts of the Muslim world. One lesson that does appear to translate is that full commitment to fighting Islamist militants comes with the perception by Muslim states that these militants present a threat to their regime and people and not just to Western targets in their country or region.
The moderate and tolerant aspect of Islam in Southeast Asia may predispose Southeast Asian states to view extreme forms of Islamic belief in a different light than they would in more conservative states in the Arab core of the Muslim world. Malaysia’s moderate concept of Islam Hadhhari and Malaysian leaders’ strong condemnation of violence associated with fundamentalist belief, while at the same time embracing Islam, is one example. A further factor evident in Malaysia is the delicate balance between the Muslim community and the significant non-Muslim ethnic Chinese and Indian communities that reside there. Indonesia has shown that democracy and national secular government can coexist in a largely Muslim state. For these and other reasons the Southeast Asian experience in fighting terrorism may be more applicable to places such as Bangladesh than the more conservative Arab centre of Islam.
This article is an edited selection of a larger February 2010 Congressional Research Service Report, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (PDF) or found here at Open CRS
NOTES:
68 Prepared by Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-7653 and Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-3144. For more, see CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, coordinated by Bruce Vaughn.
69 Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Report #63, August 26, 2003, p. 1; Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” p. 9.
70 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 151. Yazid Sufaat is the individual JI sent to Kandahar.
71 Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings.
72 Eric Schmitt, “Southeast Asia Sees Gains against Insurgencies,” International Herald Tribune, June 9, 2008.
73 Peter Gelling and Mark McDonald, “Indonesian Police Kill Alleged Terror Mastermind,” The New York Times, September 18, 2009.
74 “Letter Found on Top’s laptop Implicates Jibril, States Jaelani Recruited by Al Qaeda in Yemen,” OSC, September 29, 2009.
75 “Indonesian Terror Recruiter Syaifudin Likely Successor to Noordin,” OSC, September 25, 2009.
76 Sulastri Osman, “The Fatal Allure of Extremist Logic,” RSIS Commentaries, Singapore, October 23, 2009.
77 Sydney Jones, “Noordin’s Dangerous Liaiasons,” Tempo, August 9, 2009.
78 “Indonesia Risk: Security Risk,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 26, 2009.
79 Salim Osman, “New Terror Cells Taking Over JI’s Role,” The Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
80 “New Terror Cells Planning Attacks,” New Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
81 Ishtiaq Mahshud, “Filipino Militant Killed by US Missile in Pakistan,” Associated Press, January 21, 2010.
82 Chua Chin Hon, “US Govt May Hold Hambali Trial in Washington,” The Straits Times, January 17, 2010.
83 “US Rejects Indonesian Request to Extradite Terror Suspect Hambali,” BBC News, January 20, 2010.
84 Raymond Bonner and Carlos Conde, “U.S. and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader,” New York Times, July 23, 2005, p. A4. James Hookway, “Terror fight scores in Philippines,” Wall Street Journal Asia, June 20, 2007, p. 1. Roland Ramos and Inday Espina-Varona, “Expanded (old) war theater, Philippine Graphic,” November 12, 2007, p. 14-18.
85 Simon Montlake, “U.S. troops in Philippines defy old stereotype,” Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 2007, p. 7. Al Jacinto, “U.S., Filipino troops go on charm offensive,” Manila Times (internet version), September 10, 2007.
86 Daljit Singh,”The Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” in Russell Heng and Denis Hew, eds., Regional Outlook, 2003-2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
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Singapore’s Approach To Counterterrorism
By Gavin Chua Hearn Yuit
Singapore represents a bastion of general stability amid low intensity conflicts in Southeast Asia. It has not suffered a terrorist attack on its soil in almost two decades. Nevertheless, Singapore’s counterterrorism community believes that the country could face a terrorist attack at any moment in the future, and by facing this reality it constantly attempts to respond to rapidly emerging terrorism trends.1
In the last year, for example, Asia has experienced two major terrorist attacks targeting hotels in Mumbai and Jakarta, both signifying an upward trend in sophistication and scale of terrorist operations. To adequately respond to these threats, Singapore has adopted social resilience as a key counterterrorism strategy.2 Singapore’s government considers race and religion the country’s “most visceral and dangerous fault line.”3 It believes that reducing racial and religion tension4 in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious country is critical in preventing future acts of terrorist violence in Singapore.5
This article will first provide background on the history of terrorism in Singapore, including how the country has foiled a number of recent plots. It will then identify the Singapore government’s various programs to establish social resiliency and reduce jihadist radicalization within its society. Finally, the article will show the steps Singapore has taken most recently to stir the public’s imagination to the threat of terrorism to maintain public vigilance.
Singapore’s Experience with Terrorism
The last bombings to strike Singapore occurred in November-December 1987, targeting the American International Assurance building and Shell Tower. Before 1987, Singapore faced a number of other small-scale bombings, some involving Palestinian terrorists.6 Then, in 1991, Singapore’s counterterrorism apparatus received international attention when it successfully stormed a hijacked airliner and killed four terrorists claiming to be members of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party.7 Terrorist violence in Singapore faded out thereafter.
In the months after the 9/11 attacks, however, the threat of terrorism returned. Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) prevented Singapore’s JI branch from launching a series of bomb attacks targeting foreign embassies and U.S. interests in the country in December 2001. The ISD detained a total of 13 JI members, including their spiritual leader, Ibrahim Maidin. Maidin trained in Afghanistan in 1993, and wrote several letters to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and al-Qa`ida leader Usama bin Ladin.8 Upon his return to Singapore, Maidin arranged for JI members to receive training in Afghanistan.9 Subsequent arrests ensued in September 2004 and July 2006, crippling JI’s network in Singapore.
Singapore has also faced a threat from homegrown radicalization. This was most vividly seen through the case of Abdul Basheer Kader, a 28-year-old Singaporean lecturer with a background in law.10 Abdul Basheer was about to make contact with Lashkar-i-Tayyiba in Pakistan to train for “militant jihad” at the time of his arrest in Singapore in February 2007.11 According to Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, Abdul Basheer was affected by radical jihadist discourse read on the internet.12
In January 2008, Singapore authorities arrested three young men under the Internal Security Act for involvement in activities that posed a potential terrorist threat, including attempts to make improvised explosive devices and to join foreign “mujahidin networks” to wage armed jihad in Afghanistan, Palestine and Chechnya.13
Luckily, however, vigilance by Singapore’s authorities managed to prevent these plots from actualization.
In February 2008, however, Singapore faced a major security breach when JI operative Mas Selamat Kastari escaped from a jail in the country. Kastari remained on the loose for more than a year until he was recaptured in Malaysia in May 2009 with the help of Singapore’s intelligence services.
Nevertheless, the escape dealt a major blow to Singapore’s counterterrorism reputation.
Kastari’s escape raised the possibility of fissures developing within racial and religious harmony in Singapore. After his escape, Singaporean authorities considered the possible scenario of Kastari being harbored by jihadist sympathizers in the country, which would heighten sensitivities between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.14 Minister Lim Swee Say described the Kastari escape as a “test in inter-racial cohesion” as certain communities might “take a position based on their racial or religious groups and draw the line.”15 Fortunately, Singaporeans passed the test without creating any racial or religious tension.
The Kastari incident also presented a useful test for social resilience in Singapore. There was a period of public outrage and confusion about the escape directed at the government and expressed on various online blogs and forums,16 but there were also concerted efforts made by various communities to “[put] up posters, [share] information on possible sightings and even offering rewards from their own pockets.”17
Building Social Resilience to Terrorism
As a result of Singapore’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, its leaders consistently stress the importance of social harmony. Inherent in speeches is the concern that a “single flashpoint” such as a terrorist attack could destroy decades of harmony building efforts.18 Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew presented the public audience with a wildcard scenario:
The total IRCC membership reached 1,021 by June 2006, of which Chinese, Malays, Indians and other ethnicities constituted 58%, 21%, 20% and 1% respectively.22 The IRCC was renamed “Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles” in September 2007, to reflect the new role of IRCCs in bridging different religious groups at the local level. In April 2008, the minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports, Vivian Balakrishnan, announced a six-fold increase in IRCC membership from 2006, with 84% of all religious organizations joining as members.23 The key value of the IRCC network, according to Minister Balakrishnan, is “to make sure that in times of peace, we build relationships, trust and confidence. This will create a safety net for Singapore. If ever anything unfortunate were to happen, at that point in time, this safety net would be tested.”24
After the London 7/7 bomb attacks in 2005, the government launched the Community Engagement Program (CEP) in February 2006 to provide more integrated and comprehensive efforts in preparing the populace to be psychologically and socially resilient to terrorism. Example initiatives over the past few years include introducing Safety and Security Watch Groups at industrial and commercial premises; outreach to foreign worker populations through the foreign worker dormitories; and expanding the scope of Emergency Preparedness Exercises to cover the readiness to detect and prevent the fallout from potential communal tensions in a crisis.
Aside from the IRCC and CEP, the government also formed (formally in October 2005) the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), which is an unpaid, all-volunteer grouping of Islamic scholars and teachers who possess formal Islamic educational credentials from both local madrasas and foreign universities.25 The RRG’s objective is to counsel detained JI members and to counter their ideological beliefs. Since 2003, the RRG has performed more than 800 counseling sessions, and has progressively released some of the detainees on restriction orders.26
The RRG has received attention from U.S. policymakers. In September 2005, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman testified before the U.S. Congress on the usefulness of Singapore’s RRG program to “actively [enlist] moderate clerics as a way to get insight and then to use the information from…those clerics, to construct very effective information and psychological operations.”27 In 2007, the U.S. military adopted parts of the RRG program model in Iraq, to offer an alternative to indefinite detention without trial. Marine Major-General Douglas M. Stone, a proponent of detention reform, who oversaw U.S. detention facilities in Iraq at the time, noted the progressiveness of the RRG with its very low recidivist rate, “making the Singapore model the most successful.”28
Even with the IRCC, CEP and RRG programs in place, clear signs remain to be seen that members of the public feel like equal stakeholders when it comes to countering terrorism and its threats to social resilience. The terrorist threat is not directly palpable to the public, in part an outcome of the “silent sentinel” effect of security and intelligence agencies operating behind the scenes effectively. A possible reason is the lack of terrorist attacks in Singapore. Yet, the recent Kastari escape has now sensitized the public to deal more directly with the effects of terrorism. New opportunities have arisen for closer public engagement toward building resilience to counter terrorism.
Keeping the Public Aware of the Threat
In 2009, there were three notable events and initiatives spearheaded by the government to engage the public about the dangers of terrorism. The first was Exercise Northstar VII, one of the most complex military exercises conducted in Singapore, involving more than 2,000 people from 15 agencies.29 The exercise brought to the public imagination a simulated Mumbai terrorist attack scenario, focusing on “soft targets” such as hotels, food and beverage outlets, and transportation networks. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong commented that in Mumbai, Indian civilians must have seen the terrorists moving through the streets carrying their equipment immediately before the attack. He wanted to make sure that civilians would immediately notify authorities if such an event were to occur in Singapore. “You must carry on living life as normal,” said Lee, “but at the same time always keep an eye open and be slightly suspicious and vigilant.”30
Second, the Singapore government introduced a series of measures to harden “soft targets” in the public sphere. A new Singapore Standard for Hotel Security was launched to enhance the conduct of systematic and regular reviews of emergency operating procedures, security plans and equipment.31 The Police Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Unit was enlarged to form the Public Transport Security Command, where 400 policemen will patrol the bus interchanges and MRT stations.32 Finally, the Singapore Infocomm Technology Security Authority was established to protect critical IT infrastructure against increasing global trends of cyber-espionage and cyber-terrorism.33
The third and final event was the Total Defense Display and “pledge moment” at the National Day Rally in August 2009. The purpose of the Total Defense Display was to showcase Singapore’s defense capability through an integrated demonstration of the country’s military, civil and social defense. The rally organizers sprung a surprise on the public audience with a simulated event of a bomb discovery at the rally venue, prompting momentary confusion and subsequently general awe at the Total Defense Display where the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the Home Team (Ministry of Home Affairs and affiliate agencies) were able to showcase their capabilities and instill public confidence in Singapore’s vigilance toward external threats.34
Furthermore, the rally also introduced for the first time a “pledge moment” where at exactly 8:22 PM Singaporeans were invited to spend 30 seconds reciting the country’s pledge to foster national unity. Participants also included 700 establishments and overseas Singaporeans residing in different time zones.
Conclusion
All of these efforts show that the Singapore government is continuing forward with proactive measures to cope with emerging terrorist threats, and to foster national unity in the face of jihadist attempts to create divisions. Although the government hopes to avoid a terrorist attack in the future, it is cognizant of the various terrorist cells operating in the region that have killed scores of civilians in attacks on hotels and other civilian venues. Moreover, militants associated with JI continue to target Singapore, and the only reason the country has not become a victim is due to its success in foiling these plots thus far.
Gavin Chua was a former civil servant at the National Security Coordination Secretariat (Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Program) at the Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore. He is currently Co-Founder and Managing Partner (Strategy) at IntSight (www.intsight.net), a Singapore-based venture helping organizations to anticipate and manage emerging threats and opportunities. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Singapore. This article first appeared in the December edition of the CTC Sentinel published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
NOTES:
1 “The Fight Against Terror,” National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), Singapore, 2004.
2 Through the government’s community engagement programs and other initiatives to build social resilience, civilian communities are expected to develop capacities to “detect and prevent disruptions to a nation’s security, and where necessary, to absorb shocks and bounce back into a functioning condition after a crisis as quickly as possible.” Definition provided by the Centre of Excellence for National Security’s Social Resilience program.
3 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally Speech, August 16, 2009.
4 In the 1950s and 1960s, Singapore experienced race riots. One of the most prominent incidents was the “Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots” between Malays and Chinese, which occurred on July 21, 1964. A Malay procession following the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebrations attacked ethnic Chinese spectators. The country’s race and religion fault line was also fueled by the crackdown on Singapore’s Jemaah Islamiya branch in December 2001, when the possibility of a Singaporean terrorism threat became a reality. See “Appeal for Calm,” Straits Times, July 22, 1964; Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity 9:1 (2008).
5 Of Singapore’s 4.9 million residents, 74% are Chinese, 13% Malay, 9% Indian, and 3% other ethnicities. The traditional Chinese religions, Buddhism and Taoism, account for 51% of the resident population. The proportion of Muslims and Hindus have remained relatively unchanged since 1990 at 15% and 4% respectively. Among the Chinese, there were more significant shifts in religious affiliation, with Buddhism and Christianity surpassing Taoism as the main religions from 1990 to 2000. In comparison, almost all Malays were Muslim without significant changes during the last 20 years. Among the Indians, Hinduism had the largest following (55%) and Islam accounted for slightly more than a quarter of Indians. The “Others” category refers to smaller ethnic minority groups, such as the Eurasians. See “Monthly Digest of Statistics Singapore,” Singapore Department of Statistics, November 2009; “Singapore Census of Population, 2000,” Singapore Department of Statistics, May 2001.
6 “Faber House Explosion,” Straits Times, March 18, 1985.
7 “1991 – SQ 117 Rescue,” MINDEF History, Government of Singapore, 2006.
8 “Intelligence from Afghanistan Breaks Singapore Plot,” CNN, January 11, 2002.
9 “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism: White Paper,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003.
10 “ISD Detains Self-Radicalised Singaporean,” Channel News Asia, June 8, 2007.
11 Ibid.
12 Kumar Ramakrishna, “Self-Radicalisation: The Case of Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 11, 2007.
13 “Further Releases, Issuance of Restriction Orders & Detentions Under The Internal Security Act,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, January 24, 2008.
14 “More Likely Fugitive has Fled,” Straits Times, January 16, 2009. Also see “Capture of Mas Selamat: Lesson for All in Weeding Out Terrorism,” Straits Times Forum, May 12, 2009.
15 “S’poreans Get A+ for Response on Mas Selamat’s Escape: Swee Say,” Straits Times, March 12, 2008.
16 See, for example, “90 days Since Escape…No More Information?” Online Citizen, May 26, 2008.
17 Speech by Professor S. Jayakumar at the Opening Ceremony for the Second Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO), April 14, 2008.
18 “Racial Harmony is Not a Given: MM, PM,” Straits Times, July 19, 2009.
19 Ibid.
20 Singapore is divided into 84 constituencies that serve as electoral divisions and where community outreach activities are concentrated.
21 “Community Development: Promote Racial Harmony & Community Bonding,” Government of Singapore’s eCitizen portal, February 28, 2007.
22 “Challenges for IRCCs,” Straits Times, January 14, 2007.
23 Speech by minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports, Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, at the National Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circle Workshop, April 5, 2008.
24 “Religious Groups Roped into IRCCs,” Straits Times, September 7, 2007.
25 For an in-depth analysis of the RRG, see Kumar Ramakrishna, “A Holistic Critique of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” CTC Sentinel 2:1 (2009).
26 For more information, see the website of the Religious Rehabilitation Group, located at www.rrg.sg.
27 Bruce Hoffman, “Evolving Counterterrorism Strategy,” statement to the House Committee on International Relations, September 29, 2005.
28 “Singapore Scheme Helps De-Radicalise Detainees in Iraq,” Malaysian Insider, April 20, 2009.
29 Background on the exercises can be located in the Singapore Ministry of Defense’s Cyberpioneer magazine, available at www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/index.html.
30 “Exercise Northstar Tests Singapore’s Response to Terrorist Attack,” Channel News Asia, July 15, 2009.
31 “Launch of SS 545 Singapore Standard for Hotel Security,” SPRING Singapore, August 27, 2009.
32 “Public Transport Security Command to Enhance Train, Bus Safety,” Channel News Asia, August 4, 2009.
33 “Singapore Infocomm Technology Security Authority Set Up to Safeguard Singapore against IT Security Threats,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, October 1, 2009.
Singapore represents a bastion of general stability amid low intensity conflicts in Southeast Asia. It has not suffered a terrorist attack on its soil in almost two decades. Nevertheless, Singapore’s counterterrorism community believes that the country could face a terrorist attack at any moment in the future, and by facing this reality it constantly attempts to respond to rapidly emerging terrorism trends.1
In the last year, for example, Asia has experienced two major terrorist attacks targeting hotels in Mumbai and Jakarta, both signifying an upward trend in sophistication and scale of terrorist operations. To adequately respond to these threats, Singapore has adopted social resilience as a key counterterrorism strategy.2 Singapore’s government considers race and religion the country’s “most visceral and dangerous fault line.”3 It believes that reducing racial and religion tension4 in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious country is critical in preventing future acts of terrorist violence in Singapore.5
This article will first provide background on the history of terrorism in Singapore, including how the country has foiled a number of recent plots. It will then identify the Singapore government’s various programs to establish social resiliency and reduce jihadist radicalization within its society. Finally, the article will show the steps Singapore has taken most recently to stir the public’s imagination to the threat of terrorism to maintain public vigilance.
Singapore’s Experience with Terrorism
The last bombings to strike Singapore occurred in November-December 1987, targeting the American International Assurance building and Shell Tower. Before 1987, Singapore faced a number of other small-scale bombings, some involving Palestinian terrorists.6 Then, in 1991, Singapore’s counterterrorism apparatus received international attention when it successfully stormed a hijacked airliner and killed four terrorists claiming to be members of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party.7 Terrorist violence in Singapore faded out thereafter.
In the months after the 9/11 attacks, however, the threat of terrorism returned. Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) prevented Singapore’s JI branch from launching a series of bomb attacks targeting foreign embassies and U.S. interests in the country in December 2001. The ISD detained a total of 13 JI members, including their spiritual leader, Ibrahim Maidin. Maidin trained in Afghanistan in 1993, and wrote several letters to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and al-Qa`ida leader Usama bin Ladin.8 Upon his return to Singapore, Maidin arranged for JI members to receive training in Afghanistan.9 Subsequent arrests ensued in September 2004 and July 2006, crippling JI’s network in Singapore.
Singapore has also faced a threat from homegrown radicalization. This was most vividly seen through the case of Abdul Basheer Kader, a 28-year-old Singaporean lecturer with a background in law.10 Abdul Basheer was about to make contact with Lashkar-i-Tayyiba in Pakistan to train for “militant jihad” at the time of his arrest in Singapore in February 2007.11 According to Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, Abdul Basheer was affected by radical jihadist discourse read on the internet.12
In January 2008, Singapore authorities arrested three young men under the Internal Security Act for involvement in activities that posed a potential terrorist threat, including attempts to make improvised explosive devices and to join foreign “mujahidin networks” to wage armed jihad in Afghanistan, Palestine and Chechnya.13
Luckily, however, vigilance by Singapore’s authorities managed to prevent these plots from actualization.
In February 2008, however, Singapore faced a major security breach when JI operative Mas Selamat Kastari escaped from a jail in the country. Kastari remained on the loose for more than a year until he was recaptured in Malaysia in May 2009 with the help of Singapore’s intelligence services.
Nevertheless, the escape dealt a major blow to Singapore’s counterterrorism reputation.
Kastari’s escape raised the possibility of fissures developing within racial and religious harmony in Singapore. After his escape, Singaporean authorities considered the possible scenario of Kastari being harbored by jihadist sympathizers in the country, which would heighten sensitivities between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.14 Minister Lim Swee Say described the Kastari escape as a “test in inter-racial cohesion” as certain communities might “take a position based on their racial or religious groups and draw the line.”15 Fortunately, Singaporeans passed the test without creating any racial or religious tension.
The Kastari incident also presented a useful test for social resilience in Singapore. There was a period of public outrage and confusion about the escape directed at the government and expressed on various online blogs and forums,16 but there were also concerted efforts made by various communities to “[put] up posters, [share] information on possible sightings and even offering rewards from their own pockets.”17
Building Social Resilience to Terrorism
As a result of Singapore’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, its leaders consistently stress the importance of social harmony. Inherent in speeches is the concern that a “single flashpoint” such as a terrorist attack could destroy decades of harmony building efforts.18 Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew presented the public audience with a wildcard scenario:
If a Malay-Muslim Jemaah Islamiya member blew up a bomb in a Mass Rapid Transit station and the blast killed more Chinese and Indians than Malays, it would lead to non-Muslims distancing themselves from Muslims out of fear [such as in the aftermath of the London 7/7 bomb attacks in 2005].19Singapore made early investments in building social resilience, an effort that would yield high dividends in the long run. One month after the Singapore JI network was exposed in December 2001, then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed the concept of “Inter-Racial Confidence Circles” (IRCC) for each of the country’s 84 constituencies,20 and “Harmony Circles” for schools, work places and other local organizations.21 A National Steering Committee was also established to provide broad guidance for IRCCs to deepen inter-racial and inter-religious rapport within communities.
The total IRCC membership reached 1,021 by June 2006, of which Chinese, Malays, Indians and other ethnicities constituted 58%, 21%, 20% and 1% respectively.22 The IRCC was renamed “Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles” in September 2007, to reflect the new role of IRCCs in bridging different religious groups at the local level. In April 2008, the minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports, Vivian Balakrishnan, announced a six-fold increase in IRCC membership from 2006, with 84% of all religious organizations joining as members.23 The key value of the IRCC network, according to Minister Balakrishnan, is “to make sure that in times of peace, we build relationships, trust and confidence. This will create a safety net for Singapore. If ever anything unfortunate were to happen, at that point in time, this safety net would be tested.”24
After the London 7/7 bomb attacks in 2005, the government launched the Community Engagement Program (CEP) in February 2006 to provide more integrated and comprehensive efforts in preparing the populace to be psychologically and socially resilient to terrorism. Example initiatives over the past few years include introducing Safety and Security Watch Groups at industrial and commercial premises; outreach to foreign worker populations through the foreign worker dormitories; and expanding the scope of Emergency Preparedness Exercises to cover the readiness to detect and prevent the fallout from potential communal tensions in a crisis.
Aside from the IRCC and CEP, the government also formed (formally in October 2005) the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), which is an unpaid, all-volunteer grouping of Islamic scholars and teachers who possess formal Islamic educational credentials from both local madrasas and foreign universities.25 The RRG’s objective is to counsel detained JI members and to counter their ideological beliefs. Since 2003, the RRG has performed more than 800 counseling sessions, and has progressively released some of the detainees on restriction orders.26
The RRG has received attention from U.S. policymakers. In September 2005, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman testified before the U.S. Congress on the usefulness of Singapore’s RRG program to “actively [enlist] moderate clerics as a way to get insight and then to use the information from…those clerics, to construct very effective information and psychological operations.”27 In 2007, the U.S. military adopted parts of the RRG program model in Iraq, to offer an alternative to indefinite detention without trial. Marine Major-General Douglas M. Stone, a proponent of detention reform, who oversaw U.S. detention facilities in Iraq at the time, noted the progressiveness of the RRG with its very low recidivist rate, “making the Singapore model the most successful.”28
Even with the IRCC, CEP and RRG programs in place, clear signs remain to be seen that members of the public feel like equal stakeholders when it comes to countering terrorism and its threats to social resilience. The terrorist threat is not directly palpable to the public, in part an outcome of the “silent sentinel” effect of security and intelligence agencies operating behind the scenes effectively. A possible reason is the lack of terrorist attacks in Singapore. Yet, the recent Kastari escape has now sensitized the public to deal more directly with the effects of terrorism. New opportunities have arisen for closer public engagement toward building resilience to counter terrorism.
Keeping the Public Aware of the Threat
In 2009, there were three notable events and initiatives spearheaded by the government to engage the public about the dangers of terrorism. The first was Exercise Northstar VII, one of the most complex military exercises conducted in Singapore, involving more than 2,000 people from 15 agencies.29 The exercise brought to the public imagination a simulated Mumbai terrorist attack scenario, focusing on “soft targets” such as hotels, food and beverage outlets, and transportation networks. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong commented that in Mumbai, Indian civilians must have seen the terrorists moving through the streets carrying their equipment immediately before the attack. He wanted to make sure that civilians would immediately notify authorities if such an event were to occur in Singapore. “You must carry on living life as normal,” said Lee, “but at the same time always keep an eye open and be slightly suspicious and vigilant.”30
Second, the Singapore government introduced a series of measures to harden “soft targets” in the public sphere. A new Singapore Standard for Hotel Security was launched to enhance the conduct of systematic and regular reviews of emergency operating procedures, security plans and equipment.31 The Police Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Unit was enlarged to form the Public Transport Security Command, where 400 policemen will patrol the bus interchanges and MRT stations.32 Finally, the Singapore Infocomm Technology Security Authority was established to protect critical IT infrastructure against increasing global trends of cyber-espionage and cyber-terrorism.33
The third and final event was the Total Defense Display and “pledge moment” at the National Day Rally in August 2009. The purpose of the Total Defense Display was to showcase Singapore’s defense capability through an integrated demonstration of the country’s military, civil and social defense. The rally organizers sprung a surprise on the public audience with a simulated event of a bomb discovery at the rally venue, prompting momentary confusion and subsequently general awe at the Total Defense Display where the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the Home Team (Ministry of Home Affairs and affiliate agencies) were able to showcase their capabilities and instill public confidence in Singapore’s vigilance toward external threats.34
Furthermore, the rally also introduced for the first time a “pledge moment” where at exactly 8:22 PM Singaporeans were invited to spend 30 seconds reciting the country’s pledge to foster national unity. Participants also included 700 establishments and overseas Singaporeans residing in different time zones.
Conclusion
All of these efforts show that the Singapore government is continuing forward with proactive measures to cope with emerging terrorist threats, and to foster national unity in the face of jihadist attempts to create divisions. Although the government hopes to avoid a terrorist attack in the future, it is cognizant of the various terrorist cells operating in the region that have killed scores of civilians in attacks on hotels and other civilian venues. Moreover, militants associated with JI continue to target Singapore, and the only reason the country has not become a victim is due to its success in foiling these plots thus far.
Gavin Chua was a former civil servant at the National Security Coordination Secretariat (Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Program) at the Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore. He is currently Co-Founder and Managing Partner (Strategy) at IntSight (www.intsight.net), a Singapore-based venture helping organizations to anticipate and manage emerging threats and opportunities. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Singapore. This article first appeared in the December edition of the CTC Sentinel published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
NOTES:
1 “The Fight Against Terror,” National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), Singapore, 2004.
2 Through the government’s community engagement programs and other initiatives to build social resilience, civilian communities are expected to develop capacities to “detect and prevent disruptions to a nation’s security, and where necessary, to absorb shocks and bounce back into a functioning condition after a crisis as quickly as possible.” Definition provided by the Centre of Excellence for National Security’s Social Resilience program.
3 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally Speech, August 16, 2009.
4 In the 1950s and 1960s, Singapore experienced race riots. One of the most prominent incidents was the “Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots” between Malays and Chinese, which occurred on July 21, 1964. A Malay procession following the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebrations attacked ethnic Chinese spectators. The country’s race and religion fault line was also fueled by the crackdown on Singapore’s Jemaah Islamiya branch in December 2001, when the possibility of a Singaporean terrorism threat became a reality. See “Appeal for Calm,” Straits Times, July 22, 1964; Norman Vasu, “(En)countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism and Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity 9:1 (2008).
5 Of Singapore’s 4.9 million residents, 74% are Chinese, 13% Malay, 9% Indian, and 3% other ethnicities. The traditional Chinese religions, Buddhism and Taoism, account for 51% of the resident population. The proportion of Muslims and Hindus have remained relatively unchanged since 1990 at 15% and 4% respectively. Among the Chinese, there were more significant shifts in religious affiliation, with Buddhism and Christianity surpassing Taoism as the main religions from 1990 to 2000. In comparison, almost all Malays were Muslim without significant changes during the last 20 years. Among the Indians, Hinduism had the largest following (55%) and Islam accounted for slightly more than a quarter of Indians. The “Others” category refers to smaller ethnic minority groups, such as the Eurasians. See “Monthly Digest of Statistics Singapore,” Singapore Department of Statistics, November 2009; “Singapore Census of Population, 2000,” Singapore Department of Statistics, May 2001.
6 “Faber House Explosion,” Straits Times, March 18, 1985.
7 “1991 – SQ 117 Rescue,” MINDEF History, Government of Singapore, 2006.
8 “Intelligence from Afghanistan Breaks Singapore Plot,” CNN, January 11, 2002.
9 “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism: White Paper,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003.
10 “ISD Detains Self-Radicalised Singaporean,” Channel News Asia, June 8, 2007.
11 Ibid.
12 Kumar Ramakrishna, “Self-Radicalisation: The Case of Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 11, 2007.
13 “Further Releases, Issuance of Restriction Orders & Detentions Under The Internal Security Act,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, January 24, 2008.
14 “More Likely Fugitive has Fled,” Straits Times, January 16, 2009. Also see “Capture of Mas Selamat: Lesson for All in Weeding Out Terrorism,” Straits Times Forum, May 12, 2009.
15 “S’poreans Get A+ for Response on Mas Selamat’s Escape: Swee Say,” Straits Times, March 12, 2008.
16 See, for example, “90 days Since Escape…No More Information?” Online Citizen, May 26, 2008.
17 Speech by Professor S. Jayakumar at the Opening Ceremony for the Second Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO), April 14, 2008.
18 “Racial Harmony is Not a Given: MM, PM,” Straits Times, July 19, 2009.
19 Ibid.
20 Singapore is divided into 84 constituencies that serve as electoral divisions and where community outreach activities are concentrated.
21 “Community Development: Promote Racial Harmony & Community Bonding,” Government of Singapore’s eCitizen portal, February 28, 2007.
22 “Challenges for IRCCs,” Straits Times, January 14, 2007.
23 Speech by minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports, Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, at the National Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circle Workshop, April 5, 2008.
24 “Religious Groups Roped into IRCCs,” Straits Times, September 7, 2007.
25 For an in-depth analysis of the RRG, see Kumar Ramakrishna, “A Holistic Critique of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” CTC Sentinel 2:1 (2009).
26 For more information, see the website of the Religious Rehabilitation Group, located at www.rrg.sg.
27 Bruce Hoffman, “Evolving Counterterrorism Strategy,” statement to the House Committee on International Relations, September 29, 2005.
28 “Singapore Scheme Helps De-Radicalise Detainees in Iraq,” Malaysian Insider, April 20, 2009.
29 Background on the exercises can be located in the Singapore Ministry of Defense’s Cyberpioneer magazine, available at www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/index.html.
30 “Exercise Northstar Tests Singapore’s Response to Terrorist Attack,” Channel News Asia, July 15, 2009.
31 “Launch of SS 545 Singapore Standard for Hotel Security,” SPRING Singapore, August 27, 2009.
32 “Public Transport Security Command to Enhance Train, Bus Safety,” Channel News Asia, August 4, 2009.
33 “Singapore Infocomm Technology Security Authority Set Up to Safeguard Singapore against IT Security Threats,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, October 1, 2009.
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