Al Qaeda And Radical Islamist Groups In Southeast Asia

Monday, March 01, 2010

In the 1990s, Al Qaeda made significant inroads into the Southeast Asian region, particularly the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Al Qaeda not only set up regional offices, but it also helped create, strengthen, and make more violent indigenous groups such as the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network.

By the mid-2000s, however, the actions of various national authorities in Southeast Asia appears to have drastically reduced the size and influence of Al Qaeda, JI, and other sympathetic groups. Throughout the decade, the United States—along with Australia—used capacity-building assistance and at times diplomatic pressure to support and push regional governments’ counterterrorism efforts. It should be noted that while there has been much anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia many militants in the region are focused on local agendas.

Key factors in weakening violent Islamist groups in Southeast Asia have been: the generally moderate nature of Islam in Southeast Asia; a relatively high level of economic development; the existence of democratic political systems in many affected countries; the miscalculation of JI’s radical wing in killing Muslim civilians in their bomb attacks; and the ability of most national governments to marshal the resources and public support to root out the most violent groups. One possible exception to these observations is the southern Philippines, where radical Islamist groups have been abetted by a combination of ongoing sectarian/civil conflict and relatively weak government capacity.

Since 2002, the U.S. has sent ongoing deployments of hundreds of troops to the southern Philippines to advise and assist the Philippine military.

Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. attention in Southeast Asia focused on radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, that have had or been alleged to have had ties to the Al Qaeda network. In the years before and immediately following 2001, Al Qaeda used its Southeast Asia cells to help organize and finance its global activities—including the September 11 attacks—and to provide safe harbor to Al Qaeda operatives, such as the convicted organizer of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef.

By the end of the 1990s, JI and Al Qaeda appear to have developed a highly symbiotic relationship. There reportedly was some overlap in membership. They shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, and Al Qaeda provided JI with considerable financial support.69 They shared personnel, such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al Qaeda.70 The two networks jointly planned operations and reportedly conducted attacks in Southeast Asia together.71

Members of JI with extensive ties to Al Qaeda, are known to have helped two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002 roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings. Two of the September 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who pled guilty in April 2005 to U.S. charges of involvement in the September 11 plot, apparently visited Malaysia and met with cell members in 2000.

Additionally, the FBI claims that Malaysian cell members provided Moussaoui with $35,000 and a business reference.

In 1999 and 2000, several Al Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11 and the USS Cole attacks used Kuala Lumpur as a meeting and staging ground. According to the confessions of one captured Al Qaeda leader, Malaysia was viewed as an ideal location for transiting and meeting because it allowed visa-free entry to citizens of most Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.

In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002, according to one prominent expert on Al Qaeda, roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia.

Years of surveillance, arrests, and killings of JI members by various states are believed to have significantly degraded the more militant JI factions, which were most closely associated with Al Qaeda.

As a result, by the middle of the 2000s, JI’s known links to Al Qaeda reportedly dwindled to almost nothing.72 JI appears to be taking direction from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ anti-western tactics as undermining their preferred, longer-term strategy of building up military capacity and using religious proselytization to create a mass base sufficient to support an Islamic revolution in the future.

Moreover, the crackdown on JI appears to have seriously weakened the organization, degrading its command, communication, and fundraising structures to the point where many analysts believe it primarily operates only in Indonesia, with a number of operatives also active on the large southern Philippine island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao. Both areas have majority Muslim populations.

In September 2009, Indonesian authorities killed the leader of one such cell, Noordin Mohammed Top. Top, whose faction changed its name to the Al-Qaeda Jihad Organisation for the Malay Archipelago, is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17, 2009 bombings of the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top, suspicions that received more credence when a laptop computer was found at Top’s hideout that reportedly established linkages between Indonesian militants and Al Qaeda.73

Suspected Al Qaeda Links to JI Splinter Cells

The laptop also reportedly contained information stating that militant Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahmad Jaelani, who is thought to have recruited the suicide bombers for the July 17 hotel bombings, was recruited by Al Qaeda while studying in Yemen.74 Syaifudin is thought to have become radicalized while in Yemen between 1995 and 2000.75 Syaifudin, who was a veteran of conflict in Poso with links to international terrorist financing networks, was thought likely to replace Top.

He was killed in a shoot out with Indonesian authorities in October 2009.76

Southeast Asian terrorism expert Sydney Jones has described the central question of the Jakarta hotel bombings as whether Top was imitating or had developed some “structural affiliation” with Al Qaeda.77 The Economist has stated that “Evidence recovered from the scene of Mr. Top’s death has also shown that he had links with al-Qaida and received financial support from the Middle East.”78

The head of Indonesia’s anti-terror Detachment 88 Brigadier-General Saut Usman Nasution warned in November 2009 that although Top and other violent militants had been killed or captured, new cells or splinter groups could be a source of strife, particularly in Indonesian regions such as Sulawesi and Maluku where there has been a history of inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims. Nasution stated that these groups are in the process of recruiting new members to their organizations and expressed his concern that some of the 148 terrorists in detention in Indonesia may rejoin terrorist organizations or form new ones upon their release from prison. He and others in Indonesia have called for a deradicalisation programme to prevent these releases from becoming a source of strife in the country.79 From 2002 to 2009 some 454 militants were reportedly arrested in Indonesia. Of those 352 were sent to jail.80

In January 2010, it was reported by Pakistani authorities that a Filipino militant was killed in a U.S. missile strike against a militant compound near the border of North and South Waziristan, Pakistan. The apparent death of Abdul Basit Usman, a bomb making expert reportedly with links to Abu Sayyaf and JI, points to ties between al-Qaida in Pakistan and militants in Southeast Asia.81

It was reported on January 17, 2010, that the U.S. government was considering placing Hambali, an Indonesian militant believed to be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing, on trial in Washington, DC. Hambali was captured in Thailand in 2003 and was held in Guantanamo since 2006 for his suspected involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed over 200 people.82 On January 20 it was reported that the U.S. had rejected a request from the Government of Indonesia to turn Hambali over to Indonesian authorities for trial in Indonesia.83

The Abu Sayyaf Group

Another Southeast Asian group that reportedly has had sporadic ties with Al Qaeda is Abu Sayyaf, which is a small, violent, faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in the western fringes of the big southern Filipino island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao.

Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but these links reportedly dwindled throughout by the early 2000s. Abu Sayyaf has a record of killings and kidnappings.

Under pressure from U.S.-supported Philippine military operations since 2002, Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength declined from an estimated 1,000 to about 200-300 by the middle to end of the decade. Since 2003, Abu Sayyaf has carried out bombings and plotted bombings in cooperation with JI and another, much larger Muslim group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including bombings in Manila.

Since 2002, the United States has deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military, the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP), in their fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group. The U.S. role in the operations is supposed to be non-combat and has involved the provision of intelligence and communications support of the AFP, including the employment of U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft; deployment of Navy Seal and Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units; joint training exercises with the AFP, assistance to the AFP in planning operations; and conducting civic action projects with the AFP to improve the lives of the local populace.84 The civic action projects (medical treatment, water purification installations, farm markets, renovation of schools) on the islands of Basilan and Jolo appear to have weakened support for Abu Sayyaf in these locations.85

Implications for U.S. Policy

Thus far in Southeast Asia, actions taken by regional governments appear to have nearly neutralized, though not eliminated, the threat from Islamist terror groups focused on Western targets. The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens.

Once Indonesia came to view the threat as a threat to Indonesians and the Indonesian state, it too moved to suppress JI.

The United States – along with its ally, Australia – has encouraged, pushed for, and supported these local anti-terrorism efforts through several means, including funding and training Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorist unit; deploying troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group; launching a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca; increasing intelligence sharing operations; restarting military-military relations with Indonesia; and providing substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, since 2001, Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation.

Combating anti-American terrorism in Southeast Asia has presented the Bush and Obama Administrations with a delicate foreign policy problem. Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have had to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations. Although proponents of violent, radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Such sensitivities are particularly strong in Indonesia and Malaysia, the region’s two largest Muslim majority nations.

Throughout the 2000s, the rise in anti-American sentiment propelled by both the U.S.-led invasion of and presence in Iraq and many Southeast Asian Muslims’ perceptions of America’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “blatantly pro-Israel” has presented difficulties for most governments contemplating an overt U.S. role in their internal security.86 That said, secular nationalist political parties have reaffirmed their central place in Indonesian national politics and asserted their dominance over Islamist political parties.

While Southeast Asia has had a large degree of success in curtailing Islamist terrorist activity there may be limits on the extent to which lessons learned may be applicable in other parts of the Muslim world. One lesson that does appear to translate is that full commitment to fighting Islamist militants comes with the perception by Muslim states that these militants present a threat to their regime and people and not just to Western targets in their country or region.

The moderate and tolerant aspect of Islam in Southeast Asia may predispose Southeast Asian states to view extreme forms of Islamic belief in a different light than they would in more conservative states in the Arab core of the Muslim world. Malaysia’s moderate concept of Islam Hadhhari and Malaysian leaders’ strong condemnation of violence associated with fundamentalist belief, while at the same time embracing Islam, is one example. A further factor evident in Malaysia is the delicate balance between the Muslim community and the significant non-Muslim ethnic Chinese and Indian communities that reside there. Indonesia has shown that democracy and national secular government can coexist in a largely Muslim state. For these and other reasons the Southeast Asian experience in fighting terrorism may be more applicable to places such as Bangladesh than the more conservative Arab centre of Islam.


This article is an edited selection of a larger February 2010 Congressional Research Service Report, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (PDF) or found here at Open CRS

NOTES:

68 Prepared by Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-7653 and Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-3144. For more, see CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, coordinated by Bruce Vaughn.
69 Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Report #63, August 26, 2003, p. 1; Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” p. 9.
70 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 151. Yazid Sufaat is the individual JI sent to Kandahar.
71 Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings.
72 Eric Schmitt, “Southeast Asia Sees Gains against Insurgencies,” International Herald Tribune, June 9, 2008.
73 Peter Gelling and Mark McDonald, “Indonesian Police Kill Alleged Terror Mastermind,” The New York Times, September 18, 2009.
74 “Letter Found on Top’s laptop Implicates Jibril, States Jaelani Recruited by Al Qaeda in Yemen,” OSC, September 29, 2009.
75 “Indonesian Terror Recruiter Syaifudin Likely Successor to Noordin,” OSC, September 25, 2009.
76 Sulastri Osman, “The Fatal Allure of Extremist Logic,” RSIS Commentaries, Singapore, October 23, 2009.
77 Sydney Jones, “Noordin’s Dangerous Liaiasons,” Tempo, August 9, 2009.
78 “Indonesia Risk: Security Risk,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 26, 2009.
79 Salim Osman, “New Terror Cells Taking Over JI’s Role,” The Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
80 “New Terror Cells Planning Attacks,” New Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
81 Ishtiaq Mahshud, “Filipino Militant Killed by US Missile in Pakistan,” Associated Press, January 21, 2010.
82 Chua Chin Hon, “US Govt May Hold Hambali Trial in Washington,” The Straits Times, January 17, 2010.
83 “US Rejects Indonesian Request to Extradite Terror Suspect Hambali,” BBC News, January 20, 2010.
84 Raymond Bonner and Carlos Conde, “U.S. and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader,” New York Times, July 23, 2005, p. A4. James Hookway, “Terror fight scores in Philippines,” Wall Street Journal Asia, June 20, 2007, p. 1. Roland Ramos and Inday Espina-Varona, “Expanded (old) war theater, Philippine Graphic,” November 12, 2007, p. 14-18.
85 Simon Montlake, “U.S. troops in Philippines defy old stereotype,” Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 2007, p. 7. Al Jacinto, “U.S., Filipino troops go on charm offensive,” Manila Times (internet version), September 10, 2007.
86 Daljit Singh,”The Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” in Russell Heng and Denis Hew, eds., Regional Outlook, 2003-2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
  • Digg
  • del.icio.us
  • StumbleUpon
  • Yahoo! Buzz
  • Technorati
  • Facebook
  • TwitThis
  • MySpace
  • LinkedIn
  • Live
  • Google
  • Reddit
  • Sphinn
  • Propeller
  • Slashdot
  • Netvibes

0 comments:

Post a Comment




Search Eurasia Review

Custom Search