ASEAN and SAARC: Intra Regional Connectivity

By Tanvi Pate for IPCS

During the recent 16th SAARC Summit at Thimpu, the enthusiasm to firm up the agreements on developing intra-regional connectivity was dampened as Pakistan refused endorsement of the Motor Vehicles Agreement meant to provide connectivity between Kabul and Dhaka criss-crossing the South Asian region. It is imperative to examine that after twenty-five years of existence, to what extent has SAARC achieved one of its main ambitions of intra-state connectivity? How has SAARC fared as compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in terms of Cross Border Infrastructure (CBI)? And if SAARC is woefully inadequate, why is that so? What should SAARC do to address this problem?

Cross border connectivity is an important aspect that automatically comes to fore when gauging the success of any regional organization. Connectivity brings countries together and acts as a dispensable force for harmonizing cross-border legislations. It also facilitates intra regional trade and bestows an opportunity upon the ‘land locked’ countries to eventually become ‘land linked’.

ASEAN, in this sense has come a far way since its inception in 1967. With intra-state and regional connectivity growing fourfold over the past two decades, a complex maze of road and air networks now connects the major cities. For instance, Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore are connected by the North South expressway where extending from Bukit Kayu Hitam in Kedah near the Malaysia-Thai border connects Phetkasem road in Thailand to Johor Bahru in southern Malaysia and finally joins Singapore. The Myanmar-Thailand-Cambodia link road starts from Myawaddy-Mae Sot-Tak-Bangkok-Aranyaprathet to Khlong Luek on Thailand-Cambodia border through Siem Reap and Phnom Penh. Similarly, all the major airports in the region operate direct flights between most of the capitals. The number of direct flights each week range almost from seventy between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to twenty-one between Yangon and Bangkok, respectively. Even Phnom Penh and Vientiane operate on an average seven direct flights a week.

SAARC, on the other hand displays grossly inefficient CBI as there are no direct land routes in operation between India and Pakistan or India and Sri-Lanka. Single transit routes connect Petrapole (India) to Benapole (Bangladesh). Bhutan and Bangladesh are connected via India through Phuentsholing (Bhutan)-Jaigaon (India)-Changrabandha (India)-Burimari (Bangladesh). Likewise Nepal and India are linked by border towns of Birgunj and Raxaul, on western front the Kabul-Pakistan highway connects Pakistan and Kabul. Direct flight connectivity in SAARC is also minimal. For instance, the busiest hub is New Delhi-Kathmandu, with an average of forty-two flights to and fro every week. Apart from only three flights weekly between New Delhi and Paro, there are no direct flight connections from New Delhi to either Dhaka or Male or between Kabul and Karachi.

The above comparison clearly displays the wide disparity between CBI of these two regional organizations. One of the reasons as to why ASEAN has succeeded in connecting itself is due to its massive intra regional trade, which has forced the countries to soothe out their trade barriers as displayed by the zero tariff regimes already in place between the original five members and Brunei. Goods being dumped in individual markets is a prevalent concern in ASEAN, however it is recognized that complex production links and joint ventures would remedy these short term adjustment losses. Measures like ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010, have also encouraged the countries to upgrade or establish new road and air networks. On the whole, the group has realized that their trade potential will remain under- exploited in absence of proper connectivity and will put in jeopardy their ambition of forming an Economic Community by 2015.

The scenario in SAARC is in complete contradiction. The successive summits have stressed the importance of CBI and the regional multimodal transport study has given important suggestions on linking the region through various corridors, however SAARC countries have not really gathered pace in addressing these shortcomings cooperatively. Connectivity has been hampered by inadequate rules and regulations across the borders, as evident from the lack of formal transit agreement at regional level or bilateral level. Due to lack of political trust and the fear of their markets being swamped by goods, small countries like Bangladesh still refuse to allow transit rights to India. Moreover, SAARC corridors do fall under the Asian Highway Network project and Asian Development Bank has forwarded loans for roads like AH2 in Nepal, but the pace of up-gradation is incredibly slow. Low intraregional trade along with sluggish attitude towards regionalism are definitely the main causes of low intra regional connectivity in SAARC.

ASEAN is able to enhance its connectivity, as for its members, ASEAN is a number one priority, whereas this does not stand true for SAARC. For establishing greater connectivity, the member countries will have to overcome their bilateral issues, promote intra-regional trade and make efficient use of private resources available. A proper time frame for completion of CBI is also needed whereby a stipulated action plan could speed up the process further. Unless SAARC member countries peer into the abyss of opportunities that lie ahead and focus on the benefits of intense regionalisation, connecting SAARC will remain a distant possibility.


Tanvi Pate is a Research Intern at IPCS and may be reached at tanvi@ipcs.org. This article was published by IPCS.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Oil Spill Near Malaysia, Singapore After Ships Collide

(KUNA) -- A Malaysian tanker and a ship collided Tuesday morning near the Malaysian and Singaporean waters resulting in an oil spill.

Singapore's ports authority said in a press release that tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3 and the bulk carrier MV Waily collided in Singapore Strait.

No casualties were reported it said.

It added, "The Malaysian-registered tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3 suffered damage to one of its cargo tanks, resulting in an oil spill."

It was estimated that 2,000 tons of oil was spilled into the sea.

The authority sent four patrol and emergency teams to the area in which the collision occurred, while other teams were working to contain the spill.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Malaysia’s Bloggers Debate ‘Allah’ Issue

(UCAN) -- Malaysian bloggers gathered this week to debate last year’s High Court decision to allow the Catholic newspaper Herald to use “Allah” in its Malay-language section.

“It is not wrong for Christians to say their ‘three-in-one’ God is Allah. It is their religion. Isn’t ‘Allah’ God?” asked Khalid Samad, a Member of Parliament from the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), told the annual meeting of the country’s bloggers.

“People use semantics to confuse the issue,” he said, adding that the Malay-language Bible uses “Allah” for God, and he sees “no problem” in it.

Prophet Muhammad did not tell Christians it is haram (forbidden) to use the word “Allah” just because Christians believe in the Trinity, said another Muslim speaker, Harris Ibrahim, founder of the blog, People’s Parliament.

“Even if it is possible to confuse the Muslim community [over the issue], it is we who are at fault, if we are weak. Why blame others?”

A youth activist and pro-government blogger, Akhramsyah Muammar Ubaidah Sanusi, said the Allah issue should not be politicized. “The Catholic Church should show it is as magnanimous as it claims to be, and make suggestions on how to solve the issue.”

A prominent opposition figure and lawyer, Zaid Ibrahim, told participants that the “government should accept the decision of the court.”

“Go back to the Qur’an,” he said. “Non-Muslims are allowed to use the word ‘Allah’ and Muslims have to accept it.”
Monday, May 24, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Lundin Petroleum Signs New Production Sharing Contract In Malaysia

Lundin Petroleum announced that its wholly owned subsidiary, Lundin Malaysia BV, has signed a new PSC with PETRONAS covering blocks SB307 and SB308, offshore Sabah.

Blocks SB307 and SB308 cover an area of about 6,230 km2. The blocks contain one oil discovery that will be the subject of further evaluation to determine if it can be commercially developed. In addition, several prospects and leads have been identified in the blocks from previous 2D and 3D seismic campaigns.

Further seismic data acquisition, reprocessing and the drilling of at least one exploration well will be completed on these two blocks.

Ashley Heppenstall, President and CEO of Lundin Petroleum said, "The success of our predecessor company Lundin Oil was built upon exploration success in Malaysia. We are pleased to be expanding our acreage position in Malaysia where we will commence exploration drilling activities in 2011."

Lundin Petroleum holds a 42.5 percent interest and is the operator in SB307 and SB308. Nio Petroleum and PETRONAS Carigali hold a 42.5 per cent and 15.0 per cent interest respectively.

These two blocks sit adjacent to Block SB303 where Lundin Petroleum is operator with a 75 percent interest alongside PETRONAS Carigali who has a 25.0 percent interest.
Thursday, May 20, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Calls For Release Of Malawian Couple Convicted Of 'Gross Indecency'

Amnesty International has called on the Malawian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release a couple convicted on Tuesday on charges of "gross indecency" and "unnatural acts".

Steven Monjeza and Tiwonge Chimbalanga were arrested by police on 28 December 2009 in Blantyre, two days after holding an engagement ceremony in the southern city's Chirimba township. Both have denied the charges. Their sentence is expected on Thursday and they face up to 14 years in prison.

"Being in a relationship should not be a crime. No one should be arrested and detained solely on the basis of their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity," said Michelle Kagari, Deputy Africa Director at Amnesty International.

"Their human rights, the rights to freedom from discrimination, of conscience, expression and privacy have been flagrantly violated."

The defendants have reportedly been beaten by police while in custody and Tiwonge Chimbalanga was subjected to forcible anal examinations, in a bid to establish whether the couple had "consummated" their relationship.

Such an examination performed without consent, contravenes the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. A fair trial would have ruled such evidence as inadmissible.

"The conviction of this couple is a step backward for Malawi, Steven Monjeza and Tiwonge Chimbalanga have done nothing wrong and should be released immediately," said Michelle Kagari.

Amnesty International declared the men prisoners of conscience and has repeatedly called for their immediate and unconditional release.

Criminalization of individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity is banned under treaties ratified by Malawi, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Malawi is legally bound by these treaties to respect and protect freedom of conscience, expression and the right to privacy, without discrimination on the grounds of real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity, said AI.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Malaysia Police Warn Against Politicizing ‘Allah’ Issue

(UCAN) -- The outcome of a by-election in Sarawak is being closely watched after a court fixed a date to hear an application by an Evangelical church of its constitutional right to use the word “Allah.”

The Sarawak-based Evangelical Church of Borneo asserts that it has the right to use the Arabic word for “God” in its religious publications and practices.

The high court has fixed June 24 as the date on which to hear the case.

Now, eyes are on the outcome of a by-election in the state as more than 50 percent of the voters of the Sibu parliamentary seat are Christians.

The seat fell vacant when the ruling government’s Member of Parliament died, prompting a by-election which will be held on May 16. The seat is being contested by the National Front’s Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), which is fielding Robert Lau Hui Yew. The opposition Democratic Action Party’s (DAP) candidate is Wong Ho Leng.

The DAP has latched on the Allah issue, urging Christians to vote for the party to show their displeasure over the government’s ban on non-Muslims using the word “Allah” in print.

Police then immediately banned all political parties from bringing up the issue, vowing to take action under the Sedition Act or the Internal Security Act which allow for detention without trial for up to two years.
‘A sensitive issue’

“This is a sensitive issue and we advise all parties to stop using it once and for all,” Huzir Mohammed, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police for Sarawak said at a press conference.

Dismissing the issue, the chief minister of the state, Abdul Taib Mahmud told a May 8 press conference, “Christians have been using the term for the last 100 years, so why should it be an issue?”

SUPP’s Robert Lau told the Malaysian Insider that national issues such as the ban on the use of the word Allah should not be used as an election issue, adding that the election campaign should only highlight local issues.

This earned him a stinging rebuke from DAP’s national vice chairman, Chong Chieng Jen.

In a media statement, Chong said that a Member of Parliament “has to be concerned with the nation’s political and economic development in order to defend the welfare and constitutional rights of the people.”

However, Lau told the Malaysian Insider that “religion is divinity, politics is humanity.”

He added, “Religion is a personal relationship between yourself and God, let us not politicize that.”
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Tony Blair Very Close To Being Indicted Fr War Crimes

By Prof. Michel Chossudovsky

While on a speaking engagement in Malaysia organized by "Success Resources Company", former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the object of an articulate protest movement demanding his indictment for war crimes.

This was no ordinary protest. Tony Blair has been accused of war crimes in a legal initiative led by the country's former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.

A War Crimes Tribunal as well as a War Crimes Commission were set up integrated by renowned jurists. Documentary evidence of war crimes committed by Blair and Bush has been carefully compiled and collected since 2006. The prosecution is led by several of Malaysia's most prominent lawyers.

Dr Mahathir in a public statement "expressed disgust at the companies that had sponsored Blair's visit here. 'How can you sponsor and get advice from a liar? Do you also intend to lie in carrying out your business?' he asked." (Thousands Of Slippers To 'Greet' Tony Blair In Malaysia, April 24, 2010)

Rather than mingling with delegates to the venue, Blair was hiding in the VIP lounge of the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center, surrounded by British and Malaysian security personnel. Upon entering the main convention hall, Tony Blair was very close to being served with an indictment for war crimes:

Acting Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission, Mr. Zainur Zakaria, Chief Prosecutor of the War Crimes Commission, Mr. Matthias Chang [barrister], two members of the Perdana Global Peace Organisation, Mr. Ram Karthigasu and Mr. Christopher Chang, a representative of the Malaysian Kwong Siew Association (one of the largest Chinese clan association) and two representatives of the Iraq Community in Malaysia evaded the security by registering themselves as delegates.

At 8.30 am, members of NGOs gathered at the entrance of the convention center to protest against the visit of war criminal Blair. Undercover teams were dispatched to the three separate entrances to confront and attempt to serve the war crimes indictment on Blair. But he could not be seen entering the convention centre.

He had entered surreptitiously and was hiding in a VIP room just above the convention hall where the function was held. His original schedule was 10.00am this morning. But organisers issued statements that no schedule is available.

British and Malaysian security officers were seen patrolling the corridors and had identified the seven delegates who were waiting for Blair. They kept a close watch on the delegates. Mind games began when rumours were spread that Blair would not be speaking today. Hints were given that Blair would be speaking on Sunday in the hope that the seven delegates would abandon their vigil.

At 11.25am, the seven delegates discovered that Blair was hiding in the VIP room just above the convention hall. They took their positions, with three members tasked with taking photographs.

At 11.30am Blair and his team of goons descended from the VIP room and walked towards the VIP entrance of the convention hall.

Mr. Matthias Chang and Mr. Zainur Zakaria rushed forward to serve the indictment, while the Iraqi representatives loudly denounced Blair ? "mass murderer, war criminal, shame on you," repeatedly. Blair was obviously unsettled and put on an embarrassed smile.

Mr. Matthias Chang and Mr. Zainur Zakaria were prevented from handing the indictment to Blair by over 30 British and Malaysian security personnel. Both of them denounced Blair within earshot, "War criminal, shame on you! Mass Murderer!"

Mr. Zainur Zakaria also shouted at the Malaysian security personnel, "Why are you protecting a war criminal?" The security officers could only respond with a silly expression.

Having arrogantly told the Chilcot Inquiry in London that he had no regrets for invading Iraq notwithstanding there were no WMDs, Blair displayed cowardice in the face of only seven delegates.

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission stated that this is only the beginning of a global campaign to ostracise war criminals like Blair and Bush and urge people the world over to adopt similar campaigns against Bush and Blair.

While these unfolding events have been acknowledged by the Malaysian press, Tony Blair's visit to Malaysia has passed virtually unnoticed in the United Kingdom. In fact, outside of Malaysia, the issue has not received press coverage.

Deafening silence and complicity of the British media? One would expect that people in Britain would want to know what happened to Tony Blair in Kuala Lumpur.

Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics, Director of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG), Member of the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission and Signatory of the 2005 Kuala Lumpur Initiative to Criminalize War. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com, and is reprinted with permission. (This article was originally published in the Global Research website: www.globalresearch.ca.)
Tuesday, April 27, 2010 | 1 comments | Read more...

Malaysia Denies Halting Fuel Exports To Iran

(Radio Zamaneh) -- Najib Razak, Malaysian Prime Minister, has denied reports that Malaysia has stopped sale of petrol to Iran saying there has merely been no requests for fuel from Iran since March.

Rueters news agency quoted a Petronas spokesman earlier saying that the company has halted sale of petrol to Iran since March.

The report also maintained that the decision was based on fears of risking Malaysia-US relations with the looming US sanctions on Iran over its nuclear activities.

In the past months, US efforts to start a new set of sanctions against Iran have led a number of international companies to reduce or even completely halt their business relations with Iran.

Najib Razak told reporters in New York that Petronas has made no such decision to stop fuel sales to Iran. He maintained that Petronas was involved in a cash sale with Iran in mid-March and since then they have received no other requests from Iran.

He emphasized that this is a business transaction and if there are any other requests put forth, they will be duly considered.

Iran is the fifth major exporter of crude oil in the world; however, over 40 percent of its fuel consumption is supplied by petrol imports because of its limited refining capabilities.

Iran's daily petrol consumption, according to ISNA, is 73 million litres.
Saturday, April 17, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Malaysian Muslim Convert Fails To Get Custody Of Toddler

(UCAN) -- A high court today rejected a Muslim convert’s application to stay the court’s ruling that he hand over custody of his child to his Hindu wife.

The High Court in Ipoh ordered Mohd. Ridzuan Abdullah to immediately surrender his third and youngest child to the custody of Indira Gandhi. The couple have been separated for a year, ever since the former Hindu man converted to Islam.

On March 11, 2010, the High Court gave Indira custody of the 23-month-old child, effectively overturning an earlier order by the Syariah Court.

Indira’s lead lawyer M. Kulasegaran told UCA News that enforcing the court order is “very slow and painful.” The lawyer, who is also a Member of Parliament, said he will raise this matter in Parliament on April 1 evening.

According to the news portal Malaysian Insider, Gandhi recalled she married Pathmanathan, Mohd. Ridzuan’s original name, according to Hindu rites 14 years ago, but the marriage turned sour afterward. However, Gandhi stuck by him and bore three children now aged 13, 12 and two.

In March last year, Pathmanathan suggested that the family embrace Islam for economic advantage. “I refused and so did my two older children,” Gandhi said. Patmanathan left home soon after, taking with him their then 11-month-old daughter.

Gandhi lodged a police report and it was only then that she was told that Pathmanathan had embraced Islam in early March 2009 and that he had converted their three children a month later on April 12 without her consent or knowledge.

The Syariah Court had also granted Pathmanathan custody of the children.

Fight taken to civil courts

Gandhi took her fight to the civil courts to nullify her children’s conversion and to get custody. On March 11 this year, the Perak state High Court judge gave her custody of the youngest child, overturning the Syariah Court order.

The judge also overruled objections from the lawyers for the state Religious Department who argued that the matter should have been handled by the Syariah Court.

Lawyer Kulasegaran told media after the hearing that “the judge said Gandhi, being a non-Muslim, had no rights in the Syariah Court.” Mohd. Ridzuan then applied for a stay of execution of the high court order.

That the civil court decided to hear the case was seen as a “breakthrough” as the Federal Constitution states that matters pertaining to Shari’a law cannot be heard in the civil court.

Kulasegaran told the press he plans to file contempt proceedings should the child not be handed over to Gandhi.

Indira’s case, which is only the latest of several similar cases, prompted the Malaysian cabinet to make a landmark decision in April last year to end the problem faced by non-Muslims when one spouse converts to Islam and also converts the children to Islam without the knowledge or approval of the other spouse.

The cabinet decided that the children from such a marriage will continue with the common religion of the parents at the time of marriage. Moreover, in the event one spouse converts to Islam, the civil courts will be the place to dissolve the marriage.

The policy has not been translated into law as it has yet to be brought to Parliament, prompting many to declare that it was merely a political decision. Many believe any attempts to do so will face fierce resistance from Islamic groups.

Meanwhile in a separate court, the decision on Gandhi’s application for leave for a judicial review to quash the conversion of her three children to Islam has been set for April 3.
Friday, April 02, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Malaysia's New Economic Model

By Jude Chia


After months of creating anticipation for the ambitious New Economic Model (NEM), Malaysia's Prime Minister, Najib finally unveiled the first part of the plan detailing the future economic direction. It is a major development following a series of selective liberalization measures introduced by Najib since he became the Prime Minister in 2009, constantly projected to be eloquently driving a strong message in gradual economic liberalization and overhaul of affirmative action for ethnic Malay majority in order to make the country more competitive.
The effort is much lauded especially by policy makers in mainstream press, but the citizen media abounds with skepticism. Meanwhile Najib acknowledged the need to be more transparent about the timeline and implementation plan which will be announced later of the year. So the questions are still centered on two key aspects: Has the government finally gathered enough political will to change? Are there enough change agents to take up the ambitious initiative other than the PM?
South East Asian economies have always been characterized by large-state corporations, Najib has made a direct challenge to call for private-sector driven economy and reduce political patronage. How many will embrace such ideas? As Din Merican pointed out, Malaysia needs the drive of SMEs and entrepreneurs to turn this nation into high-income developed country.
These are the people who have been excluded from participation simply because they only have technical skills but no patronage and no intimate relationship with powerful decision makers.
Controversial writer, Raja Petra Kamarudin gave a colorful critique in Shakespearean metaphors, doubting the policy change will immediately constitute the change of heart of key implementers.
The New Economic Policy (NEP) has transformed into the National Economic Policy and now the National Economic Model. It is certainly a change of clothes. But is the wearer of the clothes the same? If so then it would be old wine in a new bottle.
The affirmative action, NEP has always been at the heart of debate. Najib promised to overhaul it into need-based rather than race-based. But some still reserve doubts about it. As Hafiz Noor Shams said:
Somewhere in the speech, the term market-friendly affirmative action appeared. I am not quite bought by that term. I rather hear the abolition of affirmative action but I am willing to give ground that need-based is far better than race-based affirmative action.
In a collection of interviews of economic policy experts, Stephanie Sta Maria highlighted polarized opinions on NEM. Professor Lim Teck Ghee from the Centre of Policy Initiatives described the framework as pure rhetoric.
The long-term time frame of the NEM is an excuse for inaction or delaying tactics. NEM has no short-term targets and I think it will suffer the same fate as the other ambitious policies before it.
University Malaya's Professor Edmund Terence Gomez also delivered a blunt critique that NEM is a fresh coat of gloss on old ideas.
Najib says that the affirmative action policy will now be need-based instead of race-based. But the aspects of its transparency and market-friendliness are clearly targeted at Bumiputeras (Ethnic Malays). And this is no different from the NEP.
Without a track record in making tough political choices and implementing changes, there is little surprise about the level of skepticism on NEM. While the intent of reform is clear but the end result is not, the job has just begun for the coalition government.  Like balajoe27 articulated:
The fact is NEM is still in its infant stage – there are good items under the NEM but whether it turns out to be another one-sided policy by another name or it can be implemented effectively, it will remain to be seen.

This article by Jude Chia was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world. 
Friday, April 02, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Malaysia - End Abuse Of Migrant Workers

The Malaysian authorities should take action to end widespread workplace and police abuses of the migrant workers who make up more than 20 per cent of the country's workforce, Amnesty International said in a report released Wednesday.

Trapped: The Exploitation of Migrant Workers in Malaysia documents widespread abuses against migrant workers from eight South Asian and Southeast Asian countries who are lured to Malaysia by the promise of jobs but are instead used in forced labour or exploited in other ways.

“Migrant workers are critical to Malaysia’s economy, but they systematically receive less legal protection than other workers,” said Michael Bochenek, the report author and director of policy at Amnesty International. “They are easy prey for unscrupulous recruitment agents, employers and corrupt police.”

Migrants, many from Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Nepal, are forced to work in hazardous situations, often against their will, and toil for 12 hours a day or more. Many are subject to verbal, physical and sexual abuse.
Most pay recruitment agents substantial sums of money to secure jobs, work permits and training. Once they arrive, they often find that much of what their agents told them about their new jobs is untrue—the pay, type of work, even the existence of those jobs or their legal status in the country.

Most workers have taken out loans at exorbitant interest rates and simply cannot afford to return to their home countries. Some are in situations close to bonded labour.

Nearly all employers hold their workers’ passports, placing workers at risk of arrest and in practice preventing them from leaving abusive workplaces. Coercive practices such as these are indicators of forced labour.

Labour laws are not effectively enforced, and labour courts may take months or years to resolve cases. For domestic workers, who are not covered by most of the labour laws, recourse to the courts is usually not an option.

“Malaysia can and must do better for its workforce. Everyone, regardless of immigration status, is entitled to safe and fair working conditions and to equal treatment under the law,” said Michael Bochenek. Amnesty International’s report concludes that many workers are victims of human trafficking. The Malaysian government has the responsibility to prevent such abuses but instead facilitates trafficking through its loose regulation of recruitment agents and through laws and policies that fail to protect workers.

In addition, Amnesty International heard over a dozen cases in which Malaysian authorities delivered immigration detainees to traffickers operating on the Thai border between 2006 and 2009.

Malaysia imposes severe and excessive criminal penalties—in some cases caning—on migrants who work without proper permits, even when errors by the employer are the reason for immigration violations.

Large-scale, public roundups in markets and on city streets and indiscriminate, warrantless raids on private dwellings in poorer neighbourhoods are common. Police frequently ask migrants for bribes. Those who cannot pay are arrested and held in deplorable conditions in immigration detention centres.

“The Malaysian government must stop criminalising its migrant worker force and instead tackle forced and compulsory labour,” said Michael Bochenek. “Until the Malaysia’s labour laws offer effective protection and are effectively enforced, exploitation will continue.”

Amnesty International called on the Malaysian government to reform its labour laws and promptly investigate abuses in the workplace and by police. Malaysia should also make more effective use of its Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act to prosecute individuals who recruit, transport or receive workers through fraud or deception in order to exploit them.
Thursday, March 25, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Fresh Fears Of Maritime Terrorism

By B. Raman

The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October, 2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.

These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.

Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.

4. In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.

The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.

It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist group is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2, 2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said: "The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.

It is necessary for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separately of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.

The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.

Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism. We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Friday, March 05, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Recovering From The Global Crisis: Exit Policies And Challenges Ahead

By Murilo Portugal, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, at the Australian School of Business, Sydney
March 3, 2009

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to be with you in Sydney today to address this distinguished gathering. I wish to thank the Australian School of Business for inviting me, and particularly, Prof. Moshirian for organizing this event.

Today, I want to touch on three issues.

First, I want to share the IMF’s view on the global and the regional economic outlook. Second, I will highlight the key challenges policymakers are facing in the current environment, in particular the challenges of exiting from extraordinary policy support, of building a stable financial system, and of reducing public debt. And third, I want to conclude with the enhanced role of the G-20 and its agenda to achieve strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.

I. Global and Regional Economic Outlook

Let me begin with the outlook for the world economy. Following the deepest global recession in recent history, the global recovery is off to a stronger start than we had earlier anticipated. We expect global output to rise by 4 percent in 2010. This represents an upward revision of ¾ percentage point from the October 2009 WEO and is the good news. But the recovery is proceeding at different speeds across the various regions and is still heavily dependent on extraordinary policy support.

In most advanced economies, growth is likely to be sluggish. Output is forecast to expand on average by 2 percent in 2010 and 2½ percent in 2011 in these economies, following a sharp decline in output in 2009. The recovery will be slow by past standards, with few signs that private demand is self-sustaining on the back of high unemployment—especially in Europe and the United States.

The outlook is much brighter in emerging market economies. Growth is expected to reach 6 percent in 2010, and pick up further in 2011, although again with significant variation across and within regions, reflecting different initial conditions and policy responses. The recovery is being led by key emerging Asian economies, notably China, India, Indonesia, and Korea thanks to buoyant domestic demand and stimulus measures.

In Asia, growth is likely to reach almost 7 percent in 2010 (1 percentage point higher than our forecast in October), largely driven by buoyant domestic demand, particularly consumption. The outlook for private investment is more mixed. In a few Asian economies, investment is expected to pick up significantly in 2010.

In Korea, this reflects a fast return to high levels of capacity utilization; in India, a pickup in credit; and in Indonesia, the beginning of large infrastructure projects. But elsewhere, the investment outlook remains somewhat weak, partly owing to the still large excess capacity in manufacturing sectors, such as in Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand.

The outlook for Asia’s exports and industrial production is generally strong, with restocking of inventories in the United States providing a significant boost. However, export volumes remain below pre-crisis levels—with the exception of Korea and China. Domestic inventory rebuilding is also expected to contribute significantly to growth in 2010.

In China, growth is expected to reach 10 percent in 2010, following stronger than expected growth of almost 9 percent in 2009. Activity will continue to be driven by strong domestic demand supported by a large policy stimulus, although there are also signs that the private sector is providing growth momentum.

Australia has been remarkably resilient to the global turmoil. The economy was hit by the global financial crisis. But growth was stronger than in any other advanced economy thanks to a timely and significant policy response, robust demand for commodities from China, a flexible exchange rate, and a healthy banking sector.
For Australia, the IMF forecasts 2½ percent growth in 2010 and 3 percent growth in 2011. This represents an upward revision from the October 2009 WEO. The revision was prompted by an improved global outlook and better-than-expected domestic performance in recent months, especially in the labor market. We expect growth will be led by domestic demand, both private and public.

Strong commodity income prospects are supporting investment in the resource sector in Australia. Some large projects have commenced recently, such as the Gorgon LNG project with investment equivalent to almost 3 percent of Australia’s GDP. Other large projects are in the pipeline in Western Australia and North Territory.
In the medium term, Australia will continue to benefit from China’s large fiscal stimulus and its demand for commodities. As you know, a large component of China’s fiscal package consists of large public investment in its infrastructure, mainly railways and roads. For example, China plans to build about 20,000 miles of railway by 2020. To give you an idea of the scale of these plans, this is the equivalent of building 10 railway lines from Canberra to Perth. While Australia is benefiting from China’s demand, this presents some risks. A sharp fall in demand for commodities would hurt the resource sector in Australia, although the likely adjustment in the exchange rate would provide a buffer.

II. The exit strategy from supportive policies

Turning to my second issue, policymakers now face a critical policy challenge. Given the still-fragile nature of the recovery, withdrawing policy support too early may undermine growth momentum, while leaving policy support for too long could lead to overheating and asset bubbles. The key challenge remains to exit at the right time, pace and sequencing.

A. Macroeconomic Policies to Ensure an Orderly Exit

As I said, this is a multi-speed recovery. For this reason, the pace of exit strategies will have to differ among countries. Macroeconomic policy stimulus should be maintained in major advanced countries, but may need to be unwound sooner in key emerging markets.

In advanced economies where the recovery is expected to be weak, central banks should maintain low interest rates in 2010 given that underlying inflation is expected to remain subdued and unemployment is expected to remain high. At the same time, credible strategies for unwinding monetary policy support need to be prepared and communicated clearly to anchor inflation expectations.

On the fiscal front, due to the still-fragile nature of the recovery, policies need to remain supportive of economic activity in the near term and the stimulus planned for 2010 should be implemented. However, countries facing growing concerns about fiscal sustainability need credible medium-term consolidation plans. There is also a need to start implementing measures that do not have a negative impact on aggregate demand now, for example by increasing the retirement age for public pensions and strengthening budget policies.
In some major emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, output gaps are rapidly closing and policy makers will need to guard against the risk of overheating. If low interest rates persist for too long, they could lead to inflationary pressures and asset price bubbles. This suggests that an earlier exit is needed in these countries than elsewhere. In India, where the output gap is closing and inflationary pressures have emerged, the authorities have started to tighten monetary conditions. In China, given that the recovery is increasingly well established, we agree with the government that it is time to withdraw some monetary stimulus, given the risks it poses to credit quality and asset price inflation.

Australia entered the global turmoil on a solid footing, and thus the exit strategy appears less challenging here than elsewhere. Indeed the early recovery, compared to other advanced countries, has allowed the Reserve Bank of Australia to begin the process of normalizing interest rates. On the fiscal front, the Government has already begun to unwind its fiscal stimulus, as originally planned. However, the still fragile nature of the global recovery suggests that withdrawal of policy stimulus should continue to proceed gradually. In the medium term, even though public debt is projected to remain low by advanced economy standards, an early return to budget surpluses would be prudent for a number of reasons. It would put Australian on a firmer footing to deal with future shocks and contain the debt servicing costs associated with the private sector’s relatively high external debt. It would also help the budget face longer term challenges from population aging.

B. Financial Sector Reform

As you know, financial markets have recovered strongly since the peak of the crisis, thanks to improving economic fundamentals and policy support. Risk appetite has returned, equity markets have improved, corporate bond issuance has reached record levels, and capital markets have re-opened. As a result, systemic risk receded somewhat. All this is good news.

However financial stability remains fragile. Continued deleveraging pressure on banks suggests that bank credit will remain weak for some time. And corporate bond issuance has been insufficient to offset the decline in bank financing, particularly for small and medium enterprises.

New risks are emerging as a result of the extraordinary policy support. Concerns over sustainability and political uncertainty have led to a widening of the sovereign spreads in some small countries in Europe. There is a risk that public debt issuance in the coming years could crowd out private sector credit growth, gradually raising interest rates for private and public borrowers and putting a drag on the economic recovery.
There has been a resurgence in portfolio flows to emerging markets, with Asia receiving a large part. This surge has been driven primarily by rapidly improving growth prospects, a rise in risk appetite, and large interest rate differentials. The return of capital to emerging markets is good news. However, the strength of these flows may complicate economic policy management.

Policies to manage a surge in capital inflows depend on circumstances. Options include macro-prudential policies aimed at limiting the emergence of new asset price bubbles, some buildup of reserves, and greater exchange rate flexibility. Some capital controls on inflows, especially if the surge in capital flows is expected to be temporary, can be part of the appropriate response. However, capital controls are costly and may not be effective in the long run. Of course, the right policy mix depends on each country’s circumstances. We need to be pragmatic and open-minded.

Australia’s banking system has proved resilient to the global crisis and recovery has been much quicker. The Australian government’s decision to remove the guarantee on large deposits and wholesale funding from end-March 2010 is an important sign of the improvement in bank funding conditions. Continued stress-testing of banks in Australia and close supervision will be key to avoid the emergence of problems.

But in other countries much work is still needed to repair damage to the financial system from the crisis. In many advanced countries and some hard-hit emerging market countries, banking systems are still stressed and unable to play a proper role in channeling credit to worthy borrowers. In most advanced economies, policymakers still have to address an overhang of bad loans.

Moreover, bank restructuring needs to gain pace, including through liquidation of nonviable financial institutions. The absorption of failed financial institutions has led to an exacerbation of the “too-important-to-fail” problem and the associated moral hazard. The shortening of bank funding maturities is raising the need to address a rapidly advancing “wall of maturities”.

Over the medium term, countries should adopt policies that solidify financial stability. Public sector risks will need to be reduced through credible fiscal consolidation, while risks emanating from private financial activities should be addressed by the adoption of a new regulatory framework.

This leads me to my next topic—regulatory reform. Major failures of regulation and supervision created dangerous financial fragilities that led to the current crisis. The international community has recognized the importance of regulatory reform and has strengthened supervision of banks and other financial institutions, to prevent future financial crisis. They mandated the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to coordinate and monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation and supervision.

The major regulatory reform proposals are centered on strengthening bank capital and liquidity. Some enhancements to the Basel II capital framework were announced in July 2009, to be implemented by end 2010. These include significantly higher capital requirements for banks’ trading book exposures and increased capital requirements for certain securitizations. These measures would significantly increase the capital required to be held against market risk. Other proposals announced in December 2009 are aimed at improving the quality and transparency of bank capital and introducing a minimum global standard for funding liquidity.

The impact on the Australian banks of these new proposals may be less than in many other advanced countries. This is because Australian regulators adopted a conservative approach in the implementation of Basel II capital requirements. Moreover, Australian banks had a lower share of securitized assets than many other banks in advanced countries, so may not be so affected by new rules on securitization.

How should a new financial system look?

As you know, the IMF is working with the Financial Stability Board and other international agencies to craft a more stable and secure financial system.

The new regulatory framework should put more weight on financial stability. But avoiding excessive regulation that could stifle innovation and the benefits of a more globally integrated financial system is important. The increased regulatory burden imposed by higher capital and liquidity requirements is likely to lower returns, increase the cost of capital, and restrain risk-taking.

The perimeter of regulation will need to be extended to better take into account the risks in the non-banking financial sector and avoid cross-sectoral arbitrage. Moreover, the regulatory framework will need to be consistent across countries in order to ensure a level playing field. Regulation needs to be adjusted in some way to the economic cycle, to limit the risk that credit standards weaken because of excessive optimism during economic upswings.

The IMF has a role in helping countries transition to a healthier financial system, and in ensuring a level playing field. The G-20 has asked the IMF to review options on how the financial sector could make “a fair and substantial” contribution to paying for government interventions to repair the banking system.

We are taking a broad perspective on this issue, including the trade-offs between taxes and regulation of the financial sector. We will present our initial analysis at our Spring Meetings in April, and in a final report to the G-20 Leaders Summit in June.

One point is clear. We cannot return to the financial system of yesterday. We must move forward to set up a financial system where macro and micro regulations complement each other and help to reduce systemic risks.

III. Policies for strong, sustainable and balanced growth: The G-20 agenda

To tackle all these challenges, international policy collaboration will need to be more effective. The G-20—in which Australia is playing a major role—has emerged as a key forum for the world’s major economies to discuss policy priorities. As you know, the G-20 leaders launched a framework for strong, sustainable and balanced global growth.

What does this mean in practice?

• Growth is strong if it can create enough jobs to return to full employment and close output gaps.
• Growth is sustainable if it is driven by private demand rather than the public sector and the inventory cycle. And is consistent with the underlying potential of the economy.
• Growth is balanced if it is broad-based across regions and does not involve excessive global imbalances, such as persistent and large current account deficits or surpluses that stem from domestic or international distortions, and asset price booms.

Global external current account balances declined sharply in the aftermath of the crisis, due to painful adjustments. But imbalances are projected to widen over the medium term based on current policies, though not to pre-crisis levels.

Going forward, rebalancing growth is essential. This will require shifting toward internal demand in economies with large and persistent current account surpluses and shifting toward external demand in economies with large and persistent current account deficits.

Over the medium term, the key challenge for Asian policymakers remains to strengthen domestic sources of growth. For China, there is a need for financial reforms to improve credit availability for smaller enterprises and to establish broader social protection to help reduce precautionary households’ saving. The government’s plan for public healthcare is an important step in this direction. Raising productivity in the service sector through structural reforms could enhance domestic growth prospects in Korea and Japan. For many ASEAN economies improving the environment for private investment will be key in boosting private domestic demand.

This can be achieved through easier access to credit especially for small and medium enterprises and by removing red tape. In the United States and some countries in Europe that have traditionally run large current account deficits there is a need to shift resources toward the tradable sector.

Greater exchange rate flexibility in major emerging market surplus countries would help rebalancing. Allowing currencies to strengthen in key emerging market surplus countries would raise households’ purchasing power and shift resources from tradable to non tradable sectors. Depreciating currencies in major deficit countries would facilitate adjustment away from overstretched domestic demand.

Strengthening the availability of foreign exchange liquidity could also help promote greater exchange rate flexibility, by limiting the precautionary incentives to hold excessive foreign exchange reserves. The IMF has already taken an important step in this direction, by introducing the Flexible Credit Line. We are looking into ways to further boost the availability of precautionary and crisis financing, through further reform of our financing facilities, and also by exploring the possibility of collaborating with regional reserve pools.

To achieve strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth will require collaborative policy efforts by both advanced and emerging economies. The G-20 has asked the IMF to assist countries by developing an analysis of the consistency of individual country policy frameworks. In this way, the world’s largest economies will be accountable to each other for adopting policies needed to ensure strong, stable and sustainable growth.

IV. Concluding Remarks


Let me conclude by saying that we stand at a major turning point in global governance and in economic development.

We all need to adapt to the new challenges presented by the current environment. To achieve this, all countries need to play their part. Close policy cooperation amongst the major countries was critical to overcome the most acute period of the crisis. It will continue to be important to ensure a sustained, stronger and balanced recovery. While the path ahead will not be easy, the unprecedented international commitment to find shared solutions to common challenges makes me very confident that we will be able to build a more stable and prosperous world economy.

It has been a pleasure speaking to you this afternoon. Thank you.
Wednesday, March 03, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Al Qaeda And Radical Islamist Groups In Southeast Asia

In the 1990s, Al Qaeda made significant inroads into the Southeast Asian region, particularly the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Al Qaeda not only set up regional offices, but it also helped create, strengthen, and make more violent indigenous groups such as the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network.

By the mid-2000s, however, the actions of various national authorities in Southeast Asia appears to have drastically reduced the size and influence of Al Qaeda, JI, and other sympathetic groups. Throughout the decade, the United States—along with Australia—used capacity-building assistance and at times diplomatic pressure to support and push regional governments’ counterterrorism efforts. It should be noted that while there has been much anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia many militants in the region are focused on local agendas.

Key factors in weakening violent Islamist groups in Southeast Asia have been: the generally moderate nature of Islam in Southeast Asia; a relatively high level of economic development; the existence of democratic political systems in many affected countries; the miscalculation of JI’s radical wing in killing Muslim civilians in their bomb attacks; and the ability of most national governments to marshal the resources and public support to root out the most violent groups. One possible exception to these observations is the southern Philippines, where radical Islamist groups have been abetted by a combination of ongoing sectarian/civil conflict and relatively weak government capacity.

Since 2002, the U.S. has sent ongoing deployments of hundreds of troops to the southern Philippines to advise and assist the Philippine military.

Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. attention in Southeast Asia focused on radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, that have had or been alleged to have had ties to the Al Qaeda network. In the years before and immediately following 2001, Al Qaeda used its Southeast Asia cells to help organize and finance its global activities—including the September 11 attacks—and to provide safe harbor to Al Qaeda operatives, such as the convicted organizer of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef.

By the end of the 1990s, JI and Al Qaeda appear to have developed a highly symbiotic relationship. There reportedly was some overlap in membership. They shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, and Al Qaeda provided JI with considerable financial support.69 They shared personnel, such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al Qaeda.70 The two networks jointly planned operations and reportedly conducted attacks in Southeast Asia together.71

Members of JI with extensive ties to Al Qaeda, are known to have helped two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002 roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings. Two of the September 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who pled guilty in April 2005 to U.S. charges of involvement in the September 11 plot, apparently visited Malaysia and met with cell members in 2000.

Additionally, the FBI claims that Malaysian cell members provided Moussaoui with $35,000 and a business reference.

In 1999 and 2000, several Al Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11 and the USS Cole attacks used Kuala Lumpur as a meeting and staging ground. According to the confessions of one captured Al Qaeda leader, Malaysia was viewed as an ideal location for transiting and meeting because it allowed visa-free entry to citizens of most Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.

In 1999 and 2000, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were the sites for important strategy meetings among some of the September 11 plotters. By 2002, according to one prominent expert on Al Qaeda, roughly one-fifth of Al Qaeda’s organizational strength was centered in Southeast Asia.

Years of surveillance, arrests, and killings of JI members by various states are believed to have significantly degraded the more militant JI factions, which were most closely associated with Al Qaeda.

As a result, by the middle of the 2000s, JI’s known links to Al Qaeda reportedly dwindled to almost nothing.72 JI appears to be taking direction from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ anti-western tactics as undermining their preferred, longer-term strategy of building up military capacity and using religious proselytization to create a mass base sufficient to support an Islamic revolution in the future.

Moreover, the crackdown on JI appears to have seriously weakened the organization, degrading its command, communication, and fundraising structures to the point where many analysts believe it primarily operates only in Indonesia, with a number of operatives also active on the large southern Philippine island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao. Both areas have majority Muslim populations.

In September 2009, Indonesian authorities killed the leader of one such cell, Noordin Mohammed Top. Top, whose faction changed its name to the Al-Qaeda Jihad Organisation for the Malay Archipelago, is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17, 2009 bombings of the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top, suspicions that received more credence when a laptop computer was found at Top’s hideout that reportedly established linkages between Indonesian militants and Al Qaeda.73

Suspected Al Qaeda Links to JI Splinter Cells

The laptop also reportedly contained information stating that militant Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahmad Jaelani, who is thought to have recruited the suicide bombers for the July 17 hotel bombings, was recruited by Al Qaeda while studying in Yemen.74 Syaifudin is thought to have become radicalized while in Yemen between 1995 and 2000.75 Syaifudin, who was a veteran of conflict in Poso with links to international terrorist financing networks, was thought likely to replace Top.

He was killed in a shoot out with Indonesian authorities in October 2009.76

Southeast Asian terrorism expert Sydney Jones has described the central question of the Jakarta hotel bombings as whether Top was imitating or had developed some “structural affiliation” with Al Qaeda.77 The Economist has stated that “Evidence recovered from the scene of Mr. Top’s death has also shown that he had links with al-Qaida and received financial support from the Middle East.”78

The head of Indonesia’s anti-terror Detachment 88 Brigadier-General Saut Usman Nasution warned in November 2009 that although Top and other violent militants had been killed or captured, new cells or splinter groups could be a source of strife, particularly in Indonesian regions such as Sulawesi and Maluku where there has been a history of inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims. Nasution stated that these groups are in the process of recruiting new members to their organizations and expressed his concern that some of the 148 terrorists in detention in Indonesia may rejoin terrorist organizations or form new ones upon their release from prison. He and others in Indonesia have called for a deradicalisation programme to prevent these releases from becoming a source of strife in the country.79 From 2002 to 2009 some 454 militants were reportedly arrested in Indonesia. Of those 352 were sent to jail.80

In January 2010, it was reported by Pakistani authorities that a Filipino militant was killed in a U.S. missile strike against a militant compound near the border of North and South Waziristan, Pakistan. The apparent death of Abdul Basit Usman, a bomb making expert reportedly with links to Abu Sayyaf and JI, points to ties between al-Qaida in Pakistan and militants in Southeast Asia.81

It was reported on January 17, 2010, that the U.S. government was considering placing Hambali, an Indonesian militant believed to be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing, on trial in Washington, DC. Hambali was captured in Thailand in 2003 and was held in Guantanamo since 2006 for his suspected involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed over 200 people.82 On January 20 it was reported that the U.S. had rejected a request from the Government of Indonesia to turn Hambali over to Indonesian authorities for trial in Indonesia.83

The Abu Sayyaf Group

Another Southeast Asian group that reportedly has had sporadic ties with Al Qaeda is Abu Sayyaf, which is a small, violent, faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in the western fringes of the big southern Filipino island of Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao.

Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but these links reportedly dwindled throughout by the early 2000s. Abu Sayyaf has a record of killings and kidnappings.

Under pressure from U.S.-supported Philippine military operations since 2002, Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength declined from an estimated 1,000 to about 200-300 by the middle to end of the decade. Since 2003, Abu Sayyaf has carried out bombings and plotted bombings in cooperation with JI and another, much larger Muslim group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including bombings in Manila.

Since 2002, the United States has deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military, the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP), in their fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group. The U.S. role in the operations is supposed to be non-combat and has involved the provision of intelligence and communications support of the AFP, including the employment of U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft; deployment of Navy Seal and Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units; joint training exercises with the AFP, assistance to the AFP in planning operations; and conducting civic action projects with the AFP to improve the lives of the local populace.84 The civic action projects (medical treatment, water purification installations, farm markets, renovation of schools) on the islands of Basilan and Jolo appear to have weakened support for Abu Sayyaf in these locations.85

Implications for U.S. Policy

Thus far in Southeast Asia, actions taken by regional governments appear to have nearly neutralized, though not eliminated, the threat from Islamist terror groups focused on Western targets. The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens.

Once Indonesia came to view the threat as a threat to Indonesians and the Indonesian state, it too moved to suppress JI.

The United States – along with its ally, Australia – has encouraged, pushed for, and supported these local anti-terrorism efforts through several means, including funding and training Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorist unit; deploying troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group; launching a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca; increasing intelligence sharing operations; restarting military-military relations with Indonesia; and providing substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, since 2001, Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation.

Combating anti-American terrorism in Southeast Asia has presented the Bush and Obama Administrations with a delicate foreign policy problem. Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have had to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations. Although proponents of violent, radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Such sensitivities are particularly strong in Indonesia and Malaysia, the region’s two largest Muslim majority nations.

Throughout the 2000s, the rise in anti-American sentiment propelled by both the U.S.-led invasion of and presence in Iraq and many Southeast Asian Muslims’ perceptions of America’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “blatantly pro-Israel” has presented difficulties for most governments contemplating an overt U.S. role in their internal security.86 That said, secular nationalist political parties have reaffirmed their central place in Indonesian national politics and asserted their dominance over Islamist political parties.

While Southeast Asia has had a large degree of success in curtailing Islamist terrorist activity there may be limits on the extent to which lessons learned may be applicable in other parts of the Muslim world. One lesson that does appear to translate is that full commitment to fighting Islamist militants comes with the perception by Muslim states that these militants present a threat to their regime and people and not just to Western targets in their country or region.

The moderate and tolerant aspect of Islam in Southeast Asia may predispose Southeast Asian states to view extreme forms of Islamic belief in a different light than they would in more conservative states in the Arab core of the Muslim world. Malaysia’s moderate concept of Islam Hadhhari and Malaysian leaders’ strong condemnation of violence associated with fundamentalist belief, while at the same time embracing Islam, is one example. A further factor evident in Malaysia is the delicate balance between the Muslim community and the significant non-Muslim ethnic Chinese and Indian communities that reside there. Indonesia has shown that democracy and national secular government can coexist in a largely Muslim state. For these and other reasons the Southeast Asian experience in fighting terrorism may be more applicable to places such as Bangladesh than the more conservative Arab centre of Islam.


This article is an edited selection of a larger February 2010 Congressional Research Service Report, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (PDF) or found here at Open CRS

NOTES:

68 Prepared by Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-7653 and Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-3144. For more, see CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, coordinated by Bruce Vaughn.
69 Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Report #63, August 26, 2003, p. 1; Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” p. 9.
70 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 151. Yazid Sufaat is the individual JI sent to Kandahar.
71 Al Qaeda and JI leaders met in Southeast Asia for at least two critical meetings: One in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings.
72 Eric Schmitt, “Southeast Asia Sees Gains against Insurgencies,” International Herald Tribune, June 9, 2008.
73 Peter Gelling and Mark McDonald, “Indonesian Police Kill Alleged Terror Mastermind,” The New York Times, September 18, 2009.
74 “Letter Found on Top’s laptop Implicates Jibril, States Jaelani Recruited by Al Qaeda in Yemen,” OSC, September 29, 2009.
75 “Indonesian Terror Recruiter Syaifudin Likely Successor to Noordin,” OSC, September 25, 2009.
76 Sulastri Osman, “The Fatal Allure of Extremist Logic,” RSIS Commentaries, Singapore, October 23, 2009.
77 Sydney Jones, “Noordin’s Dangerous Liaiasons,” Tempo, August 9, 2009.
78 “Indonesia Risk: Security Risk,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 26, 2009.
79 Salim Osman, “New Terror Cells Taking Over JI’s Role,” The Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
80 “New Terror Cells Planning Attacks,” New Straits Times, November 20, 2009.
81 Ishtiaq Mahshud, “Filipino Militant Killed by US Missile in Pakistan,” Associated Press, January 21, 2010.
82 Chua Chin Hon, “US Govt May Hold Hambali Trial in Washington,” The Straits Times, January 17, 2010.
83 “US Rejects Indonesian Request to Extradite Terror Suspect Hambali,” BBC News, January 20, 2010.
84 Raymond Bonner and Carlos Conde, “U.S. and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader,” New York Times, July 23, 2005, p. A4. James Hookway, “Terror fight scores in Philippines,” Wall Street Journal Asia, June 20, 2007, p. 1. Roland Ramos and Inday Espina-Varona, “Expanded (old) war theater, Philippine Graphic,” November 12, 2007, p. 14-18.
85 Simon Montlake, “U.S. troops in Philippines defy old stereotype,” Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 2007, p. 7. Al Jacinto, “U.S., Filipino troops go on charm offensive,” Manila Times (internet version), September 10, 2007.
86 Daljit Singh,”The Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” in Russell Heng and Denis Hew, eds., Regional Outlook, 2003-2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
Monday, March 01, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Malaysia Urged To End Brutal Punishments After Women Caned

Amnesty International has called on the Malaysian government to end caning after three women were subjected to the punishment following their conviction for extramarital sex.

This is the first time women have been subjected to caning in Malaysia.

Malaysian Home Minister Hishammuddin Hussein announced on Wednesday that three Muslim women were caned on 9 February at a prison near Kuala Lumpur. The women, along with four men, had been convicted of having extramarital sex in the Shariah court system, which has jurisdiction over Muslims in matters such as family law.

"The caning of these three women is just the tip of the iceberg," said Donna Guest, Deputy Director of Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific programme. "Since 2002 the Malaysian authorities have caned over 35,000 people, mostly non-Malaysians for immigration offenses."

Most caning sentences in Malaysia are handed down by civil courts rather than Shariah courts. Amendments to the Immigration Act in 2002 stipulate caning for immigration offences, thus increasing the use of this punishment. In June 2009 the Malaysian government announced that they had sentenced 47,914 migrants to be caned since the amendments took effect.

"These thousands of cases point to an epidemic of caning in Malaysia," said Donna Guest. "The Malaysian government needs to abolish this cruel and degrading punishment, no matter what the offence."

The practice of caning can inflict severe physical suffering and leave damage and scarring for months. Such corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, which is prohibited absolutely under international customary human rights law.

In July 2009, the Shariah High Court in Pahang sentenced a Muslim woman, Kartika Sari Dewi Shukarno, to six strokes of the cane and a fine after she pleaded guilty to consuming alcohol in a hotel bar in December 2007. To date her sentence has not yet been carried out.
Friday, February 19, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...

Managing Financial Innovation In Emerging Markets

Speech by John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, at the Reserve Bank of India First International Research Conference

*****

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Reserve Bank of India on the occasion of its 75th anniversary, and to thank the RBI for sponsoring this most timely and useful International Research Conference. It is an honor for me to have the opportunity to participate in the RBI’s first such conference. The presence of so many distinguished speakers reflects both the importance of the topics that are being addressed, but also India’s growing role in the intense international collaboration currently underway on global financial issues.

My IMF colleagues and I have watched with great interest – and satisfaction – the strides that India has made in its economic policy management in recent years, and that has been reflected in the economy’s impressive progress. In particular, I would like to underscore the RBI’s adept handling of monetary and regulatory policy in the current financial crisis. This is a testimony to the professional qualities of the RBI’s skilled senior staff and to the leadership of Governor Subbarao and former Governor Reddy. As is recognized widely, India is well positioned to continue on its path of strong and inclusive growth, thanks in no small part to the RBI’s stewardship.

In my address today, I will focus on the importance of finance for rapid and sustainable growth. While some might consider this topic odd in light of the current crisis, I will seek to draw out some key lessons of recent events for the appropriate policy stance toward financial innovation. Many critics —although notably not including policy-makers in India or in most other major emerging markets—have concluded that such innovation is to be actively discouraged. But I would claim that this is precisely the wrong lesson to draw.
Despite the unsettling and even dramatic recent global experience with “cutting edge” finance, I believe that without a renewed effort to foster financial innovation in the global economy, all countries—including emerging market economies—will underperform their potential. The principal challenge for policymakers, then, is to strike an appropriate balance between financial openness that supports growth-enhancing innovation while at the same time implementing regulations and effective supervision that limit the potential risk of financial instability.

This does not mean that we should return to the exuberant pre-crisis approach to financial innovation. Neither does it suggest a one-size-fits-all approach to the issue. In fact, I agree very much with Deputy Governor Gopinath’s observation that innovation “needs to be pursued in the broader context of financial stability and has to necessarily correspond to the level of maturity of the financial system and the needs of the real economy…”

Great strides already have been made in the development of the Indian financial system. As the recent Rajan report noted, “India’s financial sector is at a turning point. There are many successes—the rapidity and reliability of settlement at the NSE or the mobile phone banking being implemented around the country indicate that much of the system is at the Internet age and beyond. There is justifiable reason to take pride in this. Yet much needs to be done.”1

Growth and the Financial Sector

There is a clear connection between economic growth and the state of development of the financial sector. Speaking late last year at the Bank of Mexico2, I reviewed the economic literature on the relationship between finance and economic growth. At that time, I highlighted that for many decades the financial sector largely was ignored in theories of economic growth. In fact, only since the 1990s has the important role of the financial sector been widely accepted.3

In modern market-based economies, financial intermediation is a critical determinant of performance. As economies develop and mature, so do financial markets. The accompanying infrastructure also has evolved to meet the wide range of needs of households, businesses, and government.

Looking forward from the current conjuncture, financial innovation has at least three principal tasks. First, it should address the challenge of missing markets, such as those for the long-term financing that is required for creating long-lived assets, or for efficient risk sharing by providing appropriate insurance and hedging products.

Second, it should deepen liquidity in existing markets, for example by reducing excessive reliance on a narrow base of depositors for funding. And, third, by raising the quantity and quality of investment, it can increase efficiency in the economy as a whole.

The limits of traditional banking systems

A key challenge faced by many emerging markets is their heavy reliance on traditional commercial banking. While such a system may be more than adequate during the early stages of a country’s development, it may act as an unintended constraint on growth as the real economy becomes more complex and as the demand for financial services expands. There are several reasons for this:

First, in the absence of robust debt and money markets, the ability of banks to grow their loan portfolio is limited by their access to deposits.

Second, banks are not well placed to meet the significant needs in emerging and developing countries for long-term infrastructure financing. The size, maturity, and illiquidity of such loans make them unsuitable for traditional commercial bank financing. The danger in such operations is that banks would take on inappropriate levels of credit and interest rate risk or else operate under a system where the government provides a financial backstop, and hence, passes on the risk to taxpayers.

And, third, commercial banks often are not well-placed to diversify the credit risk in their loan portfolios—their financial performance therefore typically mirrors the underlying condition of their borrowers and of the local economy.

Implications for India

While India’s financial system is multi-faceted, with some world class segments such as its equity market, other segments—notably, the corporate bond market—remain less developed. Because of the limited size of India’s debt capital markets, banks are the main source of loans to both firms and households. Moreover, India has enormous infrastructure needs, but infrastructure financing remains largely dependent on bank financing, with all its attendant inadequacies and risks. There are also important issues of access to credit and financial services for Indian corporations, but especially for SMEs, and households.

A recent IMF staff study found that Indian firms increasingly have become reliant on borrowed funds (as opposed to retained earnings) to fund their investments, but the study also found that there are important inefficiencies in debt financing. In fact, firms in industries that are more dependent on such financing have tended to grow more slowly.4 A lack of financial instruments also has limited firms’ ability to manage risks. The limited availability of derivative products leaves corporations to shoulder risk-related costs that they otherwise would not bear and that may stymie their ability to expand. At another level, only 40 percent of India’s population benefits from a bank account, as a large number of households still remain outside the formal financial sector.

These issues are well understood here. Thus, several steps are being taken to meet the growing needs for more diverse sources of finance. Notably, the RBI has undertaken important initiatives to promote financial inclusion, with the goal of having a banking outlet in every village of more than two thousand residents by 2011.

Moreover, Indian authorities are targeting an increase in infrastructure spending of some $500 billion during the current five-year plan. With fiscal space limited, meeting this need in a prudent fashion will require a more developed capital market, and especially a more developed long-term corporate bond market. The India Infrastructure Finance Corporation Limited (IIFCL) has been established with a mandate to co-finance projects and issue local currency-denominated bonds. In addition, repos for corporate bonds have been introduced, as well as interest rate and currency futures.

Fortunately, there are several successful models of capital market development in emerging markets. The growth of corporate bond markets in Mexico and Malaysia, for instance, has been closely linked to the development of domestic institutional investors. Mobilizing such investors through the gradual liberalization of portfolio guidelines of insurance companies and pension funds would help transform India’s large pool of savings into investable funds for long-term financing.

However, liquidity may need to be generated in other ways, as these institutions typically are buy-and-hold investors. In India, increasing foreign participation in the local debt market would provide additional liquidity and more robust pricing of local bond market issues. A recent IMF study5 of ten emerging markets suggests that foreign participation has lowered borrowing costs. Of course, unfettered access by foreign investors to India’s large government securities market would create concerns, hence it would be reasonable to proceed in an orderly manner6.

Similarly, further progress in the development of an active securitization market for consumer and small business loans would facilitate greater access to credit, by enabling risks to be shared by banks and other investors. Such securitizations, executed prudently, would help to broaden the investor base and allow for the conversion of longer-term amortizing loans into instruments more suitable for institutional investors. This development would have the added benefit of facilitating better diversification by banks of their credit and maturity risks, while providing institutional investors with the opportunity to earn higher yields by taking on some of the risks of underlying loans. Of course, it is important that securitization include appropriate safeguards—I will say more about that later.

Facing Up to Risks

I recognize that there is a growing skepticism about the merits of moving towards a more modern financial system and away from bank-centric financial systems. It has been widely noted that major emerging markets have avoided the current problems being experienced in the United States and Europe. Some would argue that financial innovation ended up wreaking havoc on advanced economies—and indirectly on the rest of the world—and therefore should be avoided in emerging markets at all costs.

In my view, however, the financial crisis in the advanced economies was not primarily a function of asset securitization or the general growth of securitized capital markets. Rather, the crisis reflected a toxic mix of factors, including:

• Excessive complacency among both borrowers and investors regarding risk – including systemic risks – reflecting an extended period of exceptional economic performance and low market volatility;
• Poor governance and risk management at overly leveraged financial institutions, resulting in the development and spread of excessively complex instruments and of unexamined and unrecognized interconnectedness and fragility;
• The failure of some institutional investors to exercise the due diligence responsibilities inherent in their fiduciary duties;
• Regulatory arrangements that did not adjust effectively to financial market developments; and
• Supervision that failed to enforce standards effectively.

Happily, India is in a favorable situation in this regard. First, complexity of instruments is not currently a problem. Second, governance and risk management appear adequate in the current circumstances, and bank leverage is appropriate. Third, both the RBI and capital markets regulators have fostered a robust financial sector. This suggests that India has significant opportunities for productive and prudent financial innovation, leaving it in the enviable position of learning from the experience of others.

Lessons from the crisis

Perhaps the key lesson of the current crisis is that traditional virtues -- of maintaining adequate capital, of avoiding excessive reliance on short-term funding, of maintaining proper loan underwriting, of following sound risk management and effective corporate governance -- remain as critical as always. We have been reminded again by recent events that securitization – an innovation that has the capacity to enhance systemic efficiency and effectiveness – must be developed within a sound regulatory and supervisory framework, especially when facilitated by intermediation paths outside of the formal banking sector.

In the United States and some other markets, it is clear that the fundamentals underlying some forms of securitized mortgages and other complex instruments simply were inadequate: Underwriting standards in many markets had become lax and were not properly regulated, ultimately harming both consumers and investors. The role in this process of the United States’ so-called shadow banking sector also highlighted weaknesses in regulatory cooperation and in the construction of the regulatory perimeter.

Complexity was an element that contributed to the crisis, but excessive instrument complexity in some cases -- and the lack of a clear economic function of some of the most exotic products – was more a reflection of systemic weaknesses than an underlying cause. It is painfully evident that many institutional investors failed in their most basic fiduciary duties by purchasing instruments whose risks they simply did not understand on the basis of third-party recommendations and ratings. The lack of attention to risk management practices and the lack of understanding of liquidity risks being accumulated played an important role in creating, overpricing, and overleveraging complex assets. Unfortunately, the consequences were nearly catastrophic.

Some aspects of the crisis reflected a lack of transparency in products and markets. A principal example of this is the credit default swap market -- an enormous market that developed almost entirely over-the-counter. In the event, some of the key participants in this market simply failed to assess counterparty risks adequately, with disastrous results. The move to standardize and centrally clear a substantial portion of derivative trading will help to address these risks, as will a redrawing of the regulatory perimeter and an improvement in supervisory effectiveness.

Even in the extraordinarily deep and broad crisis of the last two years, not all major firms and not all advanced financial systems were affected equally. Canada and Australia, for instance, escaped most of the problems affecting the United States and Europe. While their financial institutions were exposed to the same disruption in global capital markets, they weathered the crisis well, underlining the importance of ensuring that as financial systems become more complex, prudential supervision and regulation remains appropriate.

The Role of International Cooperation

This crisis has had at least one beneficial effect: it has galvanized international cooperation in economic policy-making in general and, specifically, in seeking to build a global financial system that can contribute to strong and sustainable growth. The G20 leaders—including India’s Prime Minister Singh—agreed at last year’s Pittsburgh Leaders Summit to establish a Financial Inclusion Expert Group to identify innovative approaches to enhancing financial access, financial literacy, and consumer protection.

At the same time, efforts are underway at an international level to reduce the likelihood that the current financial sector crisis will be repeated. Regulatory reform, spearheaded by the G20 leaders, is being implemented both at the national level and internationally. The London Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System included a series of recommendations on overhauling the financial sector’s regulatory framework. It also established the Financial Stability Board—with both India and the IMF as members— that is charged with implementing the agreed recommendations.

Many of the proposals being considered—notably those on the quality of bank capital, liquidity metrics, and leverage ratios— have been under discussion for several years. The crisis has created a powerful incentive to forge a consensus on these as well as newer initiatives, such as focusing on macro-prudential supervision and on aligning compensation with firms’ risk management objectives.

Creativity is called for in these reform efforts. An example of this is the request by the G-20 Leaders to the IMF to prepare a report on policy options for the financial sector itself to cover the costs associated with crisis-related government intervention in the sector. We are exploring options for a financial sector levy that would create the appropriate incentives for reducing risks while at the same time providing the required anti-crisis funding.

Modernizing Financial Systems

Ultimately, each country will develop its own approach to fostering appropriate and useful financial innovation. I would, however, like to offer a few general suggestions for emerging market countries looking to realize the benefits of financial innovation.

First, keep it simple.

Introduce products that are relatively straightforward and that offer clear value-added. Thus, new financial products should be understood by regulators, by sellers and by prospective buyers. Investors should be able to calculate the risks being undertaken without undue reliance on credit ratings agencies or other outside advisors. Close attention should be paid to ensuring adequate disclosure. In this regard, long-term institutional investors—including insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds—are vital to securitization markets, because they can and should form a stable and sophisticated investor base.

Second, keep incentives aligned throughout the process.

In approving new products, ensure that the interests of the originators of loans and securitized assets are aligned with the interests of investors. As you know, the RBI has adopted a retention rule and a lock-in period for securitized instruments designed to align incentives—although it will be important to see what impact these will have on issuers. After all, the most seriously affected advanced-economy firms in the current crisis were grievously damaged by excessive retention of toxic assets – reflecting their sub-standard risk management and exacerbated by weak supervision.

Third, ensure that banks’ risk management systems and the regulatory system keep up with the pace of innovation.

The recently released Senior Supervisors Group report7 highlighted ongoing problems in the governance, firm management, internal control programs, and risk management in many of the world’s largest financial institutions. Notably, many boards of directors appeared to be largely uninformed about or did not understand the risks their institutions were undertaking. It is critical that governance be reformed, and that boards include members with the experience to take a useful role in monitoring and controlling the level of risk taken by their institution.

Regulation and supervision also must keep up with innovation. This requires both adequate resources to hire skilled professionals, together with political support to ensure that regulations and supervisory recommendations are taken seriously. Indian regulators have been a part of the global standard setting process and will continue to be early adopters of new standards. This should help to prepare India for ongoing and even accelerated modernization.

Fourth, develop a robust resolution scheme.

It is inevitable that in every financial market, some financial firms eventually will experience difficulties. A key policy conclusion highlighted by the crisis is that an effective resolution scheme must be created for systemically important firms, so that governments will be able act promptly and effectively when an institution becomes troubled. Such regimes should minimize potential market disruption as well as dampen moral hazard8.

Of particular importance in our globalized financial world is dealing with the cross-border dimensions of large institutional failures. Progress in this important task is taking place through development of contingency plans for global financial institutions by their home and host supervisors, combined with efforts to identify and address barriers to implementation of plans for the recovery or orderly resolution of these institutions. This is a complex undertaking, but it is extremely important.

In conclusion

Despite the current difficulties and challenges, financial innovation will continue to play an important role in promoting global growth, especially in emerging markets and developing countries. The current crisis can provide important lessons, and I am confident that our Indian hosts will draw useful conclusions. Hopefully, this inaugural International Research Conference will help to promote this process. After all, we all share responsibility for ensuring that the global financial system evolves in a manner that supports strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

Thank you for your attention.

NOTES:

1 Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reform, Government of India, Planning Commission, New Delhi
2 Remarks by IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky
at the Bank of Mexico Conference, "Challenges and Strategies for Promoting Economic Growth" Mexico City, Mexico, October 19, 2009
3 Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “Financial Dependence and Growth.” American Economic Review 88, No. 3 (1998).
4 Hiroko Oura, 2008, “Financial Development and growth in India: A growing tiger in a cage?”, IMF WP/08/79.
5 Peiris, S. “Foreign Participation in Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond Markets,” IMF Working paper, forthcoming
6 As background, there is currently a limit for FIIs of $5 billion in the government debt market and $15 bn in the corporate debt market. The Fund has advised to merge these limits as currently the one on the corporate bond market has very little utilization, while that on the government debt market is close to its limit. This will mainly help to develop the government bond market in the first instance, but by improving liquidity in this market, it will also provide a benchmark for the corporate bond market.
7 Senior Supervisors Group “Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008” October 21, 2009
8 Charles Calomiris “Financial Innovation, Regulation and Reform” Cato Journal, Washington DC (Winter 2009)
Friday, February 12, 2010 | 0 comments | Read more...



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